Fritz Hollings

Mr. HOLLINGS

Mr. HOLLINGS. I appreciate the fact that the Senator from Georgia brought this matter to the committee's attention. Bus security is in fact an important issue which unfortunately cannot be appropriately addressed before the end of this year. I applaud the initiative of the Senator from Georgia and leadership on this issue and, in particular, his introduction of S. 1739, which establishes a competitive grant program to allocate funding to bus companies to increase security and safety and creates a research and development program for new technologies to increase bus security and safety. It is my intention to consider this legislation on the markup calendar of the Commerce Committee's first executive session of 2002.

Mr. HOLLINGS. In my 5 minutes, I thank the distinguished Senator from Arizona, my ranking member--this is really a bipartisan initiative-- Senator Graham of Florida who has been a leader in this regard and also Senator Hutchison of Texas. I also thank the distinguished director of the Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Mr. Kevin Kayes; Mr. Carl Bentzel, the expert on port security who has been working on this over the past several years; and Mr. Matthew Morrissey. We actually reported the bill before September 11 of this year. We have been working diligently to take care of the concerns on both sides of the aisle and both sides of the Capitol. We think this measure can pass expeditiously, as soon as the House returns. Following the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, we have worked hard to improve the security of America's transportation system, starting with the airline security bill just signed into law. However, protecting America from terrorist threats is only as effective as the weakest line of defense. That means every mode of transportation must be secured, including maritime transportation. The United States has more than 1,000 harbor channels and 25,000 miles of inland, intracoastal, and coastal waterways. Those waterways serve 361 ports and have more than 3,700 terminals handling passengers and cargo. The U.S. marine transportation system each year moves more than 2 billion tons of domestic and international freight, imports 3 billion tons of oil, transports 134 million passengers by ferry, and hosts more than 7 million cruise ship passengers. Of the more than 2 billion tons of freight, the majority of cargo is shipped in huge containers from ships directly onto trucks and railcars that immediately head onto our highways and rail systems. However less than 2 percent of those containers are ever checked by Customs or law enforcement officials. The volume of maritime trade is expected to more than double by the year 2020, making maritime security even more important for the future. This is a gaping hole in our national security that must be fixed--and it must be fixed before enemies of the United States try to exploit our weakness. Before discussing the specifics of our bill, I want to read an excerpt from a chilling story published October 8 in the The Times of London: Intelligence agencies across the world are examining Osama bin Laden's multimillion [dollar] shipping interests. He maintains a secret fleet, under a variety of flags of convenience, allowing him to hide his ownership and transport goods, arms, drugs, and recruits with little official scrutiny. Three years ago, nobody paid much attention to a crew unloading cargo from a rusting freighter tied up on the quayside in Mombasa, Kenya. The freighter was part of Osama bin Laden's merchant fleet and the crew were delivering supplies for the team of suicide bombers who weeks later would blow up the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Bin Laden's covert shipping interests were revealed at the trial of the bombers, but until now security services have been slow to track down how many vessels he operates. Lloyd's List International reported that a NATO country's intelligence service has identified more than 20 merchant vessels believed to be linked to Osama bin Laden. Those vessels are now subject to seizure in ports all over the world. Some of the vessels are thought to be owned outright by bin Laden's business interests, while others are on long-term charter. Several weeks ago, a suspected member of the Al Qaeda terrorist network was arrested in Italy after he tried to stow-away in a shipping container heading to Toronto. The container was furnished with a bed, a toilet, and its own power source to operate the heater and recharge batteries. According to the Toronto Sun, the man also had a global satellite telephone, a laptop computer, an airline mechanics certificate, and security passes for airports in Canada, Thailand and Egypt. These two stories really bring home this issue of seaport security. Except for those of us who live in port cities like Charleston, Americans often do not think about their ports--the ports that load industrial and consumer goods onto trucks and railroad cars heading directly to their hometowns. Therefore, security provided through our seaports ultimately affects landlocked communities in the heartland of the United States. Of the cargo imported and exported into the United States, 95 percent arrives through our seaports; the balance is shipped through land and air borders. The potential damage and destruction that can be accomplished through security holes at our seaports potentially exceeds any other mode of transportation. And yet we have failed to make seaport security a priority. Many of our busiest seaports are not only near large cities, they are in the core of cities like Charleston, Boston, Miami, and Seattle. These seaports have been the historic hubs of economic growth, and, in some cases, they have existed for close to four centuries. By comparison, our rail infrastructure is 150 years old and most of our aviation infrastructure is less than 60 years old. The port areas in many cities have become increasingly attractive places to live because many people want a view of the water, and to live near the coast. So we are facing a major problem: the number of people who want to live close to the waterfront is growing rapidly, but the open nature of our seaports exposes them to risks associated with maritime trade, including the transport of hazardous materials. Most Americans would be surprised to discover there is no unified federal plan for overseeing the security of the international borders at our seaports. And that's what seaports are: international borders that must be protected as well as our land borders with Canada and Mexico. Yet we have failed to make them secure. The U.S. Coast Guard and Customs Service are doing an outstanding job, but they are outgunned. In the year 2000, we imported 5.5 million trailer truckloads of cargo. Due to that volume, seaports, according to the Customs Service, are only able to inspect between 1 to 2 percent of containers. In other words, potential terrorists and drug smugglers have a 98 percent chance of randomly importing illegal and dangerous materials. When traveling by airplane, we walk through metal detectors, our luggage is X-rayed, and Customs officials may interview us and check our bags. The inspection rate is 100 percent. At our land border crossings, every single car and truck driver is stopped and interviewed, or at least reviewed by the federal government. Again, the inspection rate is 100 percent. However, at a U.S. seaport, a person has a 98 percent chance of importing a 48-foot truckload of cargo with no inspection at all. One marine container can carry more heroin than is used in the United States in one year. Some of these containers can carry as much as 30 tons, or 60,000 pounds of cargo. A medium sized tanker can carry as much as 32 million gallons of petroleum or hazardous materials. Nearly one-quarter of all hazardous materials are moved via water, most of it in bulk form via huge tankers. These shipments of oil or hazardous materials--most of them carried by foreign vessels--are especially dangerous targets for terrorists. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, we must take action to better secure our maritime borders. The Congress recently approved a new law that spends $3.2 billion to improve security at our airports. The highway reauthorization bill-- TEA-21 passed in 1998--directed $140 million a year for five years to improve roads and security infrastructure at our land borders. We annually fund the Border Patrol to guard against illegal entry at our land borders. At U.S. seaports, the federal government provides officers from the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs Service, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service--but the federal government invests nothing in security infrastructure at our seaports. We leave that up to the state-controlled port authorities and private marine terminal operators. Thus, we have essentially abrogated the federal responsibility of our international seaport borders to states and the private sector. Like airline security, seaport and international border security is one of the prime responsibilities of the federal government. We must meet the challenge head-on with enough resources to address these serious issues of national security, and to help our partners at the state and local levels protect their own communities. While these security holes at our seaports may be less obvious to the public, they do exist. Because of the magnitudes of the cargoes, the proximity of cargo delivery to large populations, and the transportability that water confers to certain hazardous materials or oil, seaports lacking adequate security are more vulnerable to attack and sabotage than our airports or land borders. A couple years ago, Senator Bob Graham convinced President Clinton to appoint a commission to look at seaport security. At the time, the main focus of port security was stopping illegal drugs, the smuggling of people, and cargo theft. While those problems still exist, the new--and very real--threat of terrorism strikes right at the heart of our national defense. The Interagency Commission on Crime and Security at U.S. Seaports issued a report in September 2000 that said security at U.S. seaports ``ranges from poor to fair.'' Let me repeat that: 17 federal agencies reviewed our port security system and found that it is in poor shape. According to the Commission: Control of access to the seaport or sensitive areas within the seaports is often lacking. Practices to restrict or control the access of vehicles to vessels, cargo receipt and delivery operations, and passenger processing operations at seaports are either not present or not consistently enforced, increasing the risk that violators could quickly remove cargo or contraband. Many ports do not have identification cards issued to personnel to restrict access to vehicles, cargo receipt and delivery operations, and passenger processing operations. At many seaports, the carrying of firearms is not restricted, and thus internal conspirators and other criminals are allowed armed access to cargo vessels and cruise line terminals. In addition, many seaports rely on private security personnel who lack the crime prevention and law enforcement training and capability of regular police officers. The report also found that port-related businesses did not know where to report cargo theft and other crimes, and that federal, state and local law enforcement agencies responsible for a port's security rarely meet to coordinate their work. That is what our legislation does--it creates mechanisms to integrate all these different security agencies and their security efforts at our seaports and the railways and highways that converge at our seaports. Our seaport security bill also directly funds more Customs officers, more screening equipment, and the building of important security infrastructure. Each agency is good at what they do individually. But they will be even stronger working together, sharing information and tactics, and coordinating security coverage at our seaports. More teamwork between these federal, state and local agencies--along with our security partners in the private sector--will produce a more secure seaport environment that is stronger than the sum of each agency's individual efforts. S. 1214, the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001, requires the Secretary of Transportation to chair a National Maritime Security Advisory Committee. The Secretary is required to request participation of the U.S. Customs Service and invite the participation of other federal agencies with an interest in crime or threats of terrorism at U.S. seaports. The bill also authorizes the establishment of subcommittees, including a subcommittee comprised of Federal, State, and local government law enforcement agencies to address port security issues, and law enforcement-sensitive matters. The Committee is required to advise on long-term solutions for maritime and port security; coordination of information-sharing and operations among federal, state and local governments, and area and local port and harbor security committees; conditions for maritime security loan guarantees and grants; and the development of a National Maritime Security Plan. Given the varied nature and geographical structure of our port system, it will be important to consider private sector input. A one-size-fits-all approach will not work because we are looking at a wide variety of waterside facilities and maritime transportation- related infrastructure. The bill will mandate, for the first time ever, that all ports and waterfront facilities have a comprehensive security plan approved by the Secretary of Transportation. An element of port security often overlooked are the intermodal means for transporting cargo from the ships: railroads, highways, and barges. The bill requires that all the modes of transportation converging at the port be covered by a port's security plan. To make the entire waterfront environment more secure, any facility that might pose a threat to the public must tender security plans to the Coast Guard for review and approval. However, we will do more than just mandate security plans. We will have security experts to assess waterfront and port security, and provide those assessments to the individuals in charge of making security plans. Assessment information will be invaluable in helping the industry use the best information in order to complete effective security plans. The bill requires the Secretary to incorporate existing programs and practices when reviewing and approving security plans. The Department of Transportation will have to take into account the different security practices of our different ports. The Department must recognize and harmonize existing security practices to avoid duplicating costs. However, recognition of existing practices should not require the Department to endorse or approve faulty security. At the seaport level, the bill will establish local port security committees at each U.S. seaport. The section would require membership of these committees to include representatives of the port authority, labor organizations, the private sector, and Federal, State, and local governments and law enforcement. The Committees would be chaired by the Coast Guard Captain of the Port, and meet 4 times per year. The Committees would be responsible for coordinating planning and other port security activities; making recommendations for the port security evaluations; annually reviewing security plans; and conducting a field security exercise at least once every 3 years. These committees will play a vital role--day to day and month to month--coordinating the actions of law enforcement and the private sector in combating threats of terrorism and crime. The bill requires the Secretary of Transportation, in coordination with the Director of the FBI, ensure that all area maritime counter- terrorism and incident contingency plans are reviewed, revised, and updated no less than once every three years. The Secretary shall ensure that local port security committees conduct annual simulation exercises for all such plans, and actual practice drills at least once every three years. The plans should be comprehensive and address terrorist threats to waterfront facilities and adjacent areas, and also cover elements of prevention and protection as well as response. I would hope that the Secretary would take steps to ensure that area maritime counter-terrorism and incident contingency plans are coordinated with security plans. The bill creates standards and procedures for training and certifying maritime security professionals. The bill requires the Secretary of Transportation and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, ``FLETC,'' to establish a Maritime Security Institute for training security personnel, in accordance with internationally recognized law enforcement standards. I look forward to working with the Department of Transportation and the FLETC to establish an Institute to strengthen and professionalize maritime law enforcement and security forces. I have worked with FLETC to establish a facility in Charleston, South Carolina to train Border Patrol personnel. I also look forward to working with the Secretary and FLETC to establish the Maritime Law Institute. The legislation requires the Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Transportation, and the Attorney General to work together to establish shared dockside inspection facilities at seaports for Federal and State agencies. At some U.S. ports, federal investigators and inspectors do not have any space available to conduct inspections, and they have to route the cargo to other places before inspection. In other words, it would be similar to Customs officials at JFK airport asking arriving international passengers to take a cab to the Customs headquarters downtown in order to have their bags inspected. That is just not right. To improve seaport security tactics, the bill directs the Secretary of Transportation to immediately establish domestic maritime safety and security teams for the purpose of responding to terrorist activity, criminal activity, or other threats to U.S. ports, especially in strategically important ports. The units shall consist of personnel trained in anti-terrorism, drug interdiction, navigation assistance, and facilitating responses to security threats. I want to thank Senator Edwards for his work on this security team initiative. I was pleased that we were able to include in the bill two other amendments authored by Senator Edwards: one promotes research and development funds for non-intrusive scanning technology; the second establishes standards for locking marine containers. These amendments will contribute greatly to increasing security at our seaports. Ports, terminals, waterfront facilities, and adjacent facilities will be required to immediately implement interim security measures, including securing their perimeters. The Secretary of Transportation will then prescribe regulations for the aforementioned parties to follow when designing the required maritime security plans. An important point is that the regulations will require ports to control and limit personnel access to security-sensitive areas. Ports also will be required to limit cars and trucks in security-sensitive areas, restrict firearms and other weapons, coordinate local and private law enforcement, and develop an evacuation plan. While the bill requires security programs to be individually tailored due to the varied nature of different ports, the Department of Transportation regulations will still require certain elements to be incorporated. In implementing new regulations, I would hope that the Department would review the feasibility of establishing a nationwide credentialing process. If we can harmonize identification procedures, we can eliminate duplication and reduce costs. The Secretary of Transportation will write regulations to designate controlled access areas in the Maritime Facility Security Plan for each waterfront facility and other covered entities, and require ports to limit access to security-sensitive information, such as passenger and cargo manifests. The regulations may require physical searches of persons entering controlled access areas or exiting such areas, security escorts, and employment history and criminal background checks for individuals with unrestricted access to controlled areas or sensitive information. An individual will be eligible to work in such positions if they meet the criteria established by the Secretary, and a background check does not reveal a felony conviction within the previous 7 years, or release from prison during the previous 5 years. An individual that otherwise may have been disqualified from a security-sensitive position may still be hired if the employer establishes alternate security arrangements acceptable to the Secretary. The bill would allow the Secretary to access FBI, fingerprint, and other crime data bases to conduct the background investigations, and transmit the results to port authorities or other covered entities. The bill also would require the Secretary and the Attorney General to establish and collect reasonable fees to pay expenses incurred for the background checks. The intent of conducting criminal background checks of port employees, employers and other maritime transportation-related employees or employers, is not to upset any of the existing work relationships or dynamics. Rather the background checks are intended to identify legitimate criminal and national security risks. The Secretary of Transportation will write regulations outlining how background checks should be conducted, and will be responsible for conducting the background checks. In the aviation security bill, we created a Deputy Secretary for Transportation Security. The person in that position should be responsible for implementing the national security check program. The Secretary also will determine which areas are controlled-access areas. Clearly, not all areas in ports are security risks areas justifying designation as such. I would suggest that controlled access areas include areas where ships tie up carrying combustibles, or storage areas for combustibles or explosives, areas where security admit credentialed persons into the port or terminal areas, or areas in the port or terminal where containers are opened or exposed. However, the Secretary should determine where risk or threat resides, and create a way to check the backgrounds of individuals who pose a national security or criminal threat by virtue of their presence in areas requiring a greater degree of control. Individuals subject to potential disqualification from positions with access to ocean manifests or segregated controlled access areas must be given full and adequate due process, and collected information must be protected from disclosure and only revealed to the extent that it is pertinent to security considerations. The bill would give the Secretary of Transportation additional authority to address security risks arising from foreign ports, such as enhanced enforcement against vessels arriving from such port, travel advisories for passengers, suspension of the right of a United States vessel to enter such port, and authority to assist foreign port authorities to maintain an appropriate level of security. The Secretary of Transportation would be authorized to work through the Secretary of State to notify foreign countries of security problems with their ports, and to publish a list of ports with insufficient security that would be posted prominently at U.S. ports, on passenger tickets, and as a travel advisory by the State Department. The Secretary of Transportation, after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, may prohibit or prescribe conditions of port entry into the U.S. for any vessel arriving from a port listed as not secure. In particular, I would like to commend both Senator Kerry, who chairs the Coast Guard Subcommittee, and Senator Breaux, who chairs the Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Subcommittee, for their efforts on this front. Senators Kerry and Breaux authored another critical section of this bill: the Sea Marshal program. The bill would authorize the Coast Guard to board vessels in order to deter, prevent, or respond to acts of terrorism or otherwise provide for the safety and security of the port and maritime environment. We would authorize $13 million over five years for this new Coast Guard enforcement. The provision in question also requires the Secretary to evaluate the potential of using licensed U.S. merchant marine personnel to supplement the law enforcement efforts of the U.S. Coast Guard. The bill would authorize the President, without prior notice or a hearing, to suspend the right of any vessel or person of the United States to enter from a foreign port or depart to a foreign port in which a condition exists that threatens the safety or security of passengers, vessels, or crew traveling to that port, or if a public interest requires the suspension of trade between the United States and that port. The bill would authorize the imposition of civil penalties of up to $50,000 for violating the law. S. 1214 will require that we know more in advance about the cargo and crew members coming into the United States. The more we know about a ship's cargo, and where it originated, the better our Customs agents and other law enforcement officers can target the most suspicious containers and passengers. Even with more screening equipment, we are still going to have an inadequate number of inspections. So targeting the highest risk cargo will be crucial. The bill requires ships to electronically send their cargo manifests to the port before gaining clearance to enter. While denying vessel clearance to land is within the authority of Customs, I would urge that it be used only in the most extreme cases, and that enforcement alternatives for handling offending cargo interests be pursued in order not to disrupt all the other legal cargoes on-board a vessel. Unloading cargo will be prohibited if it is not properly documented. Advanced import information is regularly transmitted by nearly 90 percent of the ocean shippers. But for the shippers who are not transmitting that information, we will require it. By giving Customs advance cargo information, we can better screen imported cargo. Specifically, the legislation requires carriers, including non- vessel-owning common carriers, to provide by electronic transmission, cargo manifest information in advance of port entry or clearance. However, the Secretary of Treasury may exclude classes of vessels for which the Secretary concludes these manifest requirements are not necessary, and in some cases such as trucking, where the electronic transmission may not be possible. Customs should use its authority to require electronic transmission, but recognize, because of the nature of certain categories of transport, that it may not be possible to conduct electronic transmissions in every situation. The bill also outlines the cargo and route information that must be transmitted to Customs. The bill prohibits the export of cargo unless properly documented, and no marine terminal operator may load, or cause to be loaded, any cargo that is not documented. The bill requires the U.S. Customs Service to be notified of improperly documented cargo that has remained in a marine terminal for more than 48 hours, and authorizes that cargo to be searched, seized, and forfeited. Undocumented cargo should not sit in port areas for extended periods of time. Specifically, shippers who file Shippers Export Declarations (SED) by paper shall be required to provide a copy of the SED to the carrier; shippers who file their SEDs electronically shall be required to provide the carrier with a complete master bill of lading or equivalent shipping instructions, including the Automated Export System number. While it is important that we obtain certain crucial pieces of information about cargo, Customs should recognize that certain elements of cargo information, such as weight discrepancies, may fluctuate and shippers should not be held responsible for 100 percent accuracy. The bill creates civil penalties for violating documentation requirements. An important part of the legislation creates new requirements for the documentation and electronic transmission of passenger information in advance of entry or clearance into a port. It is imperative that the United States have advanced information on foreign passengers and crew members to ensure that we are not admitting security risks. Evidence indicates that materials used in terrorist attacks in Kenya and Tanzania were shipped by vessels owned and operated by Osama bin Laden. More information--and more credible information--about foreign entrants will be vital given the volume of vessels, cargo and crew members entering into U.S. waters. In establishing such regulations, Customs should work with all federal agencies to harmonize data reporting requirements to ensure that entrants into the United States only need to file one form. Policies such as INS pre-qualification of crew members between specific pre-approved train routes between the United States and Canada should be allowed to continue. Such policies ensure advance compliance, and stimulate regular cross-border operation, while not jeopardizing security. I am also pleased that we were able to accept an amendment authored by Senator Cleland to allow the Commissioner of Customs to develop a pilot program to pre-clear cargo coming into the United States if it is determined that such program would improve the security and safety of U.S. ports. However, before implementation of such a program, Customs must determine that it would not compromise existing procedures for ensuring the safety of these ports and the United States. The pilot program should be used to determine whether we can successfully shift the evaluation of cargo and cargo security to points outside the United States, and also ensure that the subsequent delivery of cargo is accomplished in a way that protects against tampering and maintains the integrity of the cargo seal. The bill directs the Customs Service to improve reporting of imports, including consigned items and goods, of in-bond goods arriving at U.S. seaports. Current policies can sometimes allow goods to travel into the United States, and travel for, in some instances, up to 37 days, without recording formal entry. The bill will require the reporting of in-bond movements prior to arrival to ensure advance filing of information identifying the cosignor, consignee, country of origin, and the 6-digit harmonized tariff code. The new information must be electronically filed by the importer of record, or its agent. This information will better enable Customs to track cargo and to intercept any suspicious cargoes in a more timely fashion. This reporting is not intended to reflect formal entry, but will allow Customs to use their targeting system on in-bond cargoes, where current policies make it difficult to enter relevant targeting data. Within 6 months of the bill's enactment, the bill would require a report that evaluates the feasibility of establishing a general database to collect information about the movements of vessels, cargo, and maritime passengers in order to identify criminal threats, national and economic security threats, and threats of terrorism. The Secretary would submit a report of the findings to Congress. Among several requirements, the report must estimate potential costs and benefits of using public and private databases to collect and analyze information, including the feasibility of establishing a Joint Inter-Agency Task Force on Maritime Intelligence. Additional information, and coordination of information will be crucial in allowing law enforcement to evaluate threats in advance of U.S. arrival, ultimately, policies allowing us to identify risks abroad will help us avoid being forced to rely on policies of deterrence and prevention on U.S. soil. Perhaps most importantly, we need to give seaport authorities the resources to get the job done. It would be great if we could simply declare our ports to be more secure. However, it takes money to make sure the international borders at our seaports are fully staffed with Customs, law enforcement, and Immigration personnel. It takes money to make sure they have modern security equipment, including the latest scanners to check cargo for the most dangerous materials. And it takes money to build the physical infrastructure of a secure port. Our bill will provide $219 million over four years directly to these important national security functions. Cargo ships currently pay a tax on the gross registered tonnage the ship can carry. That tax rate, in current law, is scheduled to decline beginning in 2003. Our bill will simply extend the existing tax rate--which has been imposed since 1986--until 2006. All those revenues will be directed to help beef up security. These tax revenues will have to be appropriated, but they can only be spent on the programs authorized by this seaport security bill. However, the funds provided directly by the tonnage tax extension are insufficient to cover all of the port security needs. So the bill includes additional authorizations of $965.5 million that Congress can appropriate as our colleagues come to realize the important security needs that must be met in the defense of our nation. Absent the realization of these authorized funds, Congress will be imposing an unfunded mandate on states and the private sector to secure our nation's maritime border. The money will help pay for many of the items previously mentioned, and additionally will be focused on building infrastructure at our seaports, including gates and fencing, security-related lighting systems, remote surveillance systems, concealed video systems, and other security equipment. The bill will directly fund and authorize $390 million in grants to local port security projects. Specifically, the bill amends the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to provide grants for security projects, of which the federal government will pay up to 75 percent. Projects under $25,000 would not have a matching requirement, and the Secretary may approve federal contributions above 75 percent to a project the Secretary deems to have high merit. The bill also will fund loan guarantees that, according to regular credit risk premiums for federal loans, could cover as much as $3.3 billion in long term loans to port authorities acting to improve their security infrastructure. The loans could not cover more than 87.5 percent of the actual cost of a security infrastructure project, and can extend for up to 25 years. The loan guarantee mechanism allows the federal government to leverage funds by extending credit to cover loans for security infrastructure, and can help port authorities reduce their capital costs for security infrastructure by amortizing it over time. Ultimately, this policy will help us build an infrastructure at our maritime borders in the most cost-effective way. The bill makes directly available and authorizes $166 million to cover the credit risks of loans extended under this provision. U.S. Customs officers must be able to screen more than just 2 percent of the cargo coming into our seaports. Investing in new screening technologies will help human screeners inspect more cargo, and detect the most dangerous shipments. To increase the amount of cargo screened, the bill authorizes $145 million for FY02 for additional Customs personnel, and to help Customs update their computer systems consistent with the requirements of this bill. Especially important is that the bill directly funds and authorizes $168 million to purchase non- intrusive screening and detection equipment for the U.S. Customs Service. While we cannot expect to screen every marine container entering into the United States, we need to provide some expectation of inspection, or create some level of deterrence to dissuade smugglers from using the intermodal system to smuggle cargo. We are so busy investing in a anti- ballistic missile defense system, we fail to see perhaps even a greater threat: a cargo container equipped with a digital global positioning system can be delivered anywhere in the United States for less than $5,000. Why would the enemies of America spend millions on a rocket launcher and go up against the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy when they could spend $5,000 to ship a container full of explosives or other dangerous materials that has only a two percent chance of being inspected? The bill also will authorize $75 million to establish a grant program to fund the development, testing, and transfer of technology to enhance security at U.S. seaports. The screening technology would focus on finding explosives or firearms, weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological weapons. The grants may not exceed 75 percent of the research program. This bill is the product of bipartisan compromise. I want to thank the Administration for their efforts to produce this legislation. The Maritime Administration, Coast Guard and Office of the Secretary all played a vital role in helping draft the bill. I had intended to work to include legislation that would increase various maritime criminal statutes. Unfortunately, in the crush of time we were unable to clear these amendments. I think that both Senator McCain and I agree that these amendments are really important to be included in final legislation on seaport security, and I will work with him, and Chairman Leahy and Ranking Member Hatch of the Judiciary Committee to include provisions updating our maritime criminal laws. The bill would require the Secretary of Transportation to prepare and publish a National Maritime Transportation Security Plan for prevention and response to maritime crime and terrorism. The plan would include an allocation of duties among federal departments and agencies and among state and local governments and agencies; procedures and techniques for preventing and responding to acts of crime or terrorism; and designation of the federal official who shall be the Federal Maritime Security Coordinator for each area for which an Area Maritime Security Plan is required and prepared. Additionally, the bill would also require the Secretary of Transportation to establish Area Maritime Security Committees comprised of members appointed by the Secretary. Each Area Maritime Security Committee would be required to prepare a maritime security plan, and work with state and local officials to enhance contingency planning. Each Area Maritime Security Plan must be submitted to the Secretary of Transportation. The plans are required to outline how to respond to an act of maritime crime or terrorism in or near the area, describe the area covered by the plan, and describe in detail how the plan is integrated with other security plans. This requirement is similar to the planning requirements that we mandated in the Oil Pollution Act for oil spill response, and will help ensure that we have local, regional and national level responses to maritime crime and terrorism. The bill would also authorize the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations establishing requirements for vessel security plans and programs for vessels calling on United States ports, would also authorize the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the Attorney General, to require crewmembers aboard vessels calling on the United States ports to carry and present upon demand such identification as the Secretary determines. The bill would require the Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of Treasury to establish a joint task force to work with ocean shippers in the development of a system to track data for shipments, containers, and contents. The Secretaries also would work with the National Institute of Standards and Technology to develop enhanced performance standards for in-bond seals and locks for use on or in containers used for water-borne cargo shipments. The bill includes a number of reporting requirements to assess our progress on seaport security. I would like to thank Senator Nelson of Florida for his amendment asking for a Coast Guard and Navy study on the feasibility of creating a Center for Coastal and Maritime Security. We all look forward to the results of this important study. We have made dramatic improvements to this bill since it was first approved by the Commerce Committee before the terrorist attacks. And I want to thank Senator McCain for working with me to co-sponsor this manager's amendment to the previous version of our seaport security bill, S. 1214. Senator McCain does not have many seaports in Arizona, but he understands that the cargo, materials and people who come through our seaports make their way quickly inland on trains and highways. So even if you are living in the desert, the security of our seaports affects all of us. I also would like to recognize and thank Rob Freeman of Senator McCain's staff, who invested hours of time and effort to finalize this product. I also must recognize the extraordinary efforts of Senator Bob Graham, who began working to improve port security long ago and put this issue on our radar screen. Senator Graham's home state of Florida has been wrestling with issues of crime, theft and drug smuggling at its seaports for many years. And while the federal government failed to address these problems, the state of Florida invested millions of dollars of its own resources to improve port security, which has helped the communities surrounding those ports. But they will still need much more. The states should not carry the entire burden of protecting the international boarders at our seaports. And yet, the problems had become so severe, that the state of Florida, led in part by Bob Graham, decided it had to act on its own. Senator Graham's leadership was vital as we developed this seaport security bill long before the terrorist attacks of September 11. I would also like to thank the fine work of Senator Graham's staffer, Tandy Barrett, she also worked very hard on this legislation. The initiatives in S. 1214 can help protect America and its citizens from potential terrorist threats against seaports and intermodal connections throughout the country. These initiatives will not make maritime transportation immune from attack. But this bill takes the necessary preventative steps to better protect the American public. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation that is vital to protecting our national security.

Mr. HOLLINGS. If the senior Senator from California will yield, I assure her that is our intent. Where was authorize activities or funding to step up survelliance, inspection, and detection of WMDs at our seaports, we would want to target any kind of nuclear devices as well as chemical and biological weapons. So, for instance, any authorizations in the bill for the purchase of detection equipment could be used to buy radiation pagers for the Customs agents who inspect cargo, or for radiation detectors on cargo X-ray machines, or to retrofit existing X-ray machines with sensitive sodium iodide detectors.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, may I be recognized?

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment. It is a managers' amendment agreed to by Senators McCain, Graham, Hutchison, and myself.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Under the legislation, the Secretary of Transportation would issue regulations for security programs for cargo as well for protecting passengers, crew members and other workers. The authority for security of cargo is broad enough to cover not only cargoes in port but also dangerous cargoes anywhere in the maritime navigation system including those in transit through navigation locks.

Mr. HOLLINGS. As chairman of the Commerce Committee, I am very aware of the need of the bus community. It is an important segment of our transportation infrastructure. I look forward to working with my colleague from Georgia on his legislation at the earliest opportunity in 2002.

Mr. HOLLINGS

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, the Wall Street Journal printed an article earlier this week on Monday entitled, ``The Stimulus Fiasco.'' I ask unanimous consent this article be printed in the Record.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, earlier this week USA Today had an editorial entitled ``Shopping for 2002 Votes, Dems, GOP Raid Surplus.'' I will read the last sentence: In Washington, putting on a great show of activity to demonstrate concern for anyone's economic hurt may seem to be smart politics. But sometimes the best thing the government can do is nothing. This is one such time. I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the Record.

Mr. HOLLINGS. I will read the last sentence: But in the long run [Mr. Bush] owes Americans coping with hard times a better domestic political strategy and a stronger economic team. That is the first time I heard the Wall Street Journal ask for a stronger economic team. The reason is because we are in deep trouble. We ended up last fiscal year, which ended just 3 months ago, on September 30 with a deficit of $141 billion. That was not as a result of September 11. I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record a Wall Street Journal editorial dated August 16.

Mr. HOLLINGS. I read from the article: The Wall Street Journal analysis looked at earnings excluding extraordinary items going back to September 1995 for about 4,200 companies listed on Nasdaq, which is heavily weighted toward technology stocks, but also includes hundreds of financial and other growth companies. For the most recently reported four quarters those companies tallied $148.3 billion in losses. That roughly equaled the $145.3 billion in profit before extraordinary items these companies have reported since September 1995. It is as if the last 5 years never occurred. What did I have to listen to as a long-time member of the Budget Committee? Surpluses as far as the eye can see, they said in June when the President signed the $2.3 trillion tax cut. I want to say it right as a Senator saying we ought to be increasing revenues, paying our way. I see the distinguished former Governor of Florida in the Chamber. We could not get by as Governors in our States unless we had a triple-A credit rating. None of these industries are going to expand and come to us at all. What really hearkened this particular Senator because we never seem to learn. The same act, same scene 20 years ago: David Stockman, the head of President Reagan's economic team, the Director of his Office of Management and Budget, in his book, ``The Triumph of Politics,'' talks about the Trojan horse, growth-growth, Kemp-Roth, and what we had entitled ``voodoo No. 1.'' Now we have voodoo No. 2. Referring to voodoo No. 1 on page 342, at the end of the year in November after they passed the tax cuts, we immediately went into recession, which is exactly what has happened in the year 2001. I quote: [President Reagan] had no choice but to repeal, or substantially dilute, the tax cut. Can you imagine that? He had no choice but to repeal, or substantially dilute, the tax cut. That would have gone far toward restoring the stability of the strongest capitalist economy in the world. It would have been a great act of statesmanship to have admitted the error back then, but in the end it proved too mean a test. In November 1981, Ronald Reagan chose not to be a leader but a politician, and in so doing he showed why passion and imperfection, not reason and doctrine, rule the world. His obstinacy was destined to keep America's economy hostage to the errors of his advisers for a long time. That is exactly our dilemma now. For those who regret the non-passage of the stimulus bill, go to Sunday school and thank the Good Lord because--as Stiglitz said and as the USA Today said and as the Wall Street Journal said and now as Dave Stockman said 20 years ago--we ought to be removing those tax cuts, repealing that $2.3 trillion. It is not the confidence of consumers, it is the confidence of the market. The money boys who really govern the economic affairs of this country--the $2 trillion is still going to be lost. How much are we up? I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record, the deficit to the penny as included by none other than the Secretary of Treasury. It is entitled the Public Debt to the Penny. That is the Secretary of the Treasury. I ask unanimous consent that this document be printed in the Record.

Mr. HOLLINGS. We are already $76 billion in the red in addition to the $141 billion we ended up in the red this last fiscal year. We had to listen to Alan Greenspan say, ``Oh, wait a minute; we might pay off the debt too quick.'' We had $5.6 trillion and surpluses as far as the eye could see, and now what do they need to do? They need to increase the debt limit. They asked us the other day, let us increase the debt limit. The debt limit, according to the budget and economic outlook for fiscal years at the beginning of the year, they said, and I quote: ``Under those projections, the debt ceiling would be reached in 2009.'' That is what they told us 11 months ago, that in 2009 the debt limit was going to be reached. The first order of business when we come back in January and February is to increase the debt limit, all on account of a rosy scenario, all on account of--what do they call it?--voodoo number two. We better sober up and start paying the bill in Washington. I yield the floor.

Mr. HOLLINGS

Mr. HOLLINGS. First, let me commend the Senator from West Virginia. Over the years, I have seen him accomplish many feats. None would be more outstanding than what he has done on homeland security for the City of New York. Like Horatio at the bridge, he stood there against all forces, particularly with respect to the executive branch, and otherwise, and made sure we at least got some semblance of homeland security started. It is on account of Senator Byrd of West Virginia.

Mr. HOLLINGS

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I share Chairman Leahy's concern that we provide adequate safeguards for both access to and use of this sensitive information. That is why we have included important protections and limitations for such use and access in the bill. Background checks will be limited to those employees who have access to sensitive cargo information or unrestricted access to segregated ``controlled access areas,'' that is defined areas within ports, terminals, or affiliated maritime infrastructure which present a demonstrable security concern. In addition, under this bill the use of such material, once it is obtained, will be restricted to the minimum necessary to disqualify an ineligible employee. In other words, only the minimum amount of law enforcement information necessary to make eligibility decisions will be shared with port authorities or maritime terminal operators.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, we worked hard with the administration to incorporate many of their suggested changes in this bill to sharpen the policy and create a better legislative product. I had intended to work with Chairman Leahy of the Judiciary Committee to modernize and update some of our maritime criminal laws to reflect the realities following the attacks of September 11th, and to strengthen our laws to protect against maritime terrorism. Unfortunately, the administration did not consult or share with the Judiciary Committee the changes in criminal laws and other matters within the Judiciary Committee's jurisdiction that were provided to me. I ask the chairman of the Judiciary Committee if he would be willing to work to work with me and Senator McCain next year to consider whether new criminal provisions are necessary to enhance seaport security?

Mr. HOLLINGS

Mr. HOLLINGS. Madam President, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation has adopted modified rules governing its procedures for the 107th Congress. Pursuant to Rule XXVI, paragraph 2, of the Standing Rules of the Senate, on behalf of myself and Senator McCain, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the Committee rules be printed in the Record.

Mr. HOLLINGS

Mr. HOLLINGS. Madam President, this is a unanimous consent request to take up the Port Maritime and Rail Security Act. I ask unanimous consent that the majority leader, following consultation with the Republican leader, may proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 161, S. 1214, the Port Maritime and Rail Security Act, and when the measure is considered it be under the following limitations: That a managers' substitute amendment be in order; that the substitute amendment be considered and agreed to and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table; that the bill as thus amended be considered as original text for the purpose of further amendment; with no points of order waived by this agreement; that all first-degree amendments must be transportation related; that the second-degree amendments must be relevant to the first-degree amendment to which it is offered; and that upon the disposition of all amendments, the bill be read a third time and the Senate vote on passage of the bill with this action occurring with no further intervening action or debate.

Mr. HOLLINGS

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I want to thank Senator Bingaman and Senator Daschle for their leadership on the introduction of a comprehensive energy bill today, the Energy Policy Act of 2001. This bill has many components, and it required a great deal of coordination and effort to compile pieces that address issues that cut across committee lines. I appreciate their efforts in this regard. As chairman of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, I am particularly pleased to see several areas of coverage in the bill. This bill incorporates many climate science and technology provisions from a bill Senators Kerry, Stevens, Inouye, Akaka, and I recently introduced, S. 1716, the Global Climate Change Act of 2001. These provisions will improve our climate monitoring, measurement, research, and technology so that we are better able to discern climate change, understand its patterns, and manage its effects. In addition, it contains provisions that would establish a service to provide expert, unbiased technology advice to Congress, which we have sorely lacked since the Office of Technology Assessment was abolished in 1995. In addition, there is a placeholder in the bill for a CAFE provision. In 1975, I co-sponsored the legislation that became the current CAFE law. I was also very involved in efforts during the 101st and 102nd Congresses to increase CAFE standards. I am pleased to report that the Commerce Committee is again taking up the issue of fuel economy standards. In fact, we will be holding a hearing on this topic tomorrow morning. The Committee is embarking on a process to develop a strong and technically feasible CAFE proposal that will strengthen our domestic and economic security. Such a provision must achieve oil savings to reduce our petroleum consumption and dependence on imported oil. It also must ensure that our automotive industry remains technically competitive. This is quite a challenge, but it is an issue that must be addressed. The CAFE measures originally arose out of concern for the nation's energy security following the oil crisis of the early 1970s. When the U.S. first pursued CAFE, imported oil accounted for 36 percent of the nation's oil use; today imported oil accounts for 56 percent of U.S. oil use. Twenty-eight percent of our nation's total oil consumption is used in the transportation sector. Since CAFE was implemented in 1975, we have seen an approximate doubling in the fuel economy of the nation's vehicle fleet. In 2000 alone, we saved over 3 million barrels of oil per day because of the fuel economy gains made since the mid-1970s. Clearly, a comprehensive energy policy must incorporate provisions to reduce energy use in the transportation sector--a goal that I believe can best be achieved by using technological advances to boost the fuel economy of passenger vehicles. I appreciate that Senator Bingaman and Senator Daschle recognized the complexity of CAFE issues. I look forward to reporting back in a few months with a solid piece of legislation, compiled through the entire Commerce Committee, to fill the current placeholder in the energy bill.

Mr. HOLLINGS

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I want to thank Senator Bingaman and Senator Daschle for their leadership on the introduction of a comprehensive energy bill today, the Energy Policy Act of 2001. This bill has many components, and it required a great deal of coordination and effort to compile pieces that address issues that cut across committee lines. I appreciate their efforts in this regard. As chairman of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, I am particularly pleased to see several areas of coverage in the bill. This bill incorporates many climate science and technology provisions from a bill Senators Kerry, Stevens, Inouye, Akaka, and I recently introduced, S. 1716, the Global Climate Change Act of 2001. These provisions will improve our climate monitoring, measurement, research, and technology so that we are better able to discern climate change, understand its patterns, and manage its effects. In addition, it contains provisions that would establish a service to provide expert, unbiased technology advice to Congress, which we have sorely lacked since the Office of Technology Assessment was abolished in 1995. In addition, there is a placeholder in the bill for a CAFE provision. In 1975, I co-sponsored the legislation that became the current CAFE law. I was also very involved in efforts during the 101st and 102nd Congresses to increase CAFE standards. I am pleased to report that the Commerce Committee is again taking up the issue of fuel economy standards. In fact, we will be holding a hearing on this topic tomorrow morning. The Committee is embarking on a process to develop a strong and technically feasible CAFE proposal that will strengthen our domestic and economic security. Such a provision must achieve oil savings to reduce our petroleum consumption and dependence on imported oil. It also must ensure that our automotive industry remains technically competitive. This is quite a challenge, but it is an issue that must be addressed. The CAFE measures originally arose out of concern for the nation's energy security following the oil crisis of the early 1970s. When the U.S. first pursued CAFE, imported oil accounted for 36 percent of the nation's oil use; today imported oil accounts for 56 percent of U.S. oil use. Twenty-eight percent of our nation's total oil consumption is used in the transportation sector. Since CAFE was implemented in 1975, we have seen an approximate doubling in the fuel economy of the nation's vehicle fleet. In 2000 alone, we saved over 3 million barrels of oil per day because of the fuel economy gains made since the mid-1970s. Clearly, a comprehensive energy policy must incorporate provisions to reduce energy use in the transportation sector--a goal that I believe can best be achieved by using technological advances to boost the fuel economy of passenger vehicles. I appreciate that Senator Bingaman and Senator Daschle recognized the complexity of CAFE issues. I look forward to reporting back in a few months with a solid piece of legislation, compiled through the entire Commerce Committee, to fill the current placeholder in the energy bill.

Mr. HOLLINGS

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I rise today to recognize White Knoll Middle School in Lexington, South Carolina for their wonderful donation of a fire truck for the New York City Fire Department. You might ask why, Mr. President, would Lexington, South Carolina be interested in purchasing a fire truck for New York City. In 1867, after fire from the Civil War devastated our state capital of Columbia located just across the county line from Lexington, a group of New York City firefighters raised money to buy Columbia a new fire truck, known then as a hose reel wagon. Because the hose reel wagon was so much more effective in putting out fires than the bucket brigade, Columbia officials pledged to return the favor some day. With the devastation in New York City and the loss of dozens of rescue vehicles in the September 11th attacks, the students of White Knoll learned of the all but forgotten pledge and decided to take matters into their own hands. They started raising money by selling patriotic buttons, T-shirts, and baked goods. They also solicited help from area businesses. The students' goal of $354,000 was the minimum needed to purchase a new fire truck without any additional equipment. Four students were selected to take the two day trip to New York City to award Mayor Rudolph Giuliani with an oversized check with the amount of $354,411. Thomas Dunn, Maurice Hallman, Staci Smith, and Leigh Tyson also rode in the Macy's Thanksgiving Day Parade with Mayor Giuliani and Yankees manager Joe Torre. South Carolina and New York have been reunited by generosity in the midst of tragedy. I commend all the students at White Knoll Middle School for their inspiring community service and hard work.

Mr. HOLLINGS

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, for the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation I report favorably the following nomination lists which were printed in the Records on the dates indicated, and ask unanimous consent, to save the expense of reprinting on the Executive Calendar that these nominations lie at the Secretary's desk for the information of Senators. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Coast Guard nominations beginning Anita K. Abbott and ending Steven G. Wood, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record on October 30, 2001. Coast Guard nominations beginning Albert R. Agnich and ending Jose M. Zuniga, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record on October 30, 2001.

Mr. HOLLINGS

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, in light of the need to provide additional capacity and reassurance to the insurance industry for terrorism risks without burdening the taxpayer, balanced with the need to protect consumers from excessive increased in commercial insurance rates, I rise today to introduce the National Terrorism Reinsurance Fund Act. This legislation will create a fund from assessments on the commercial insurance industry as a whole to for the purpose of providing a temporary backstop for terrorism losses for primary insurance companies doing business in the U.S. The Fund and assessment mechanisms would provide the first $50 billion of protection for the insurance industry. In addition to this fund, the bill provides a program to provide direct Federal aid on a temporary basis for losses over $50 billion, in order to increase insurance market capacity and ensure the availability of reinsurance in relation to acts of terrorism. The overall program is to last for 3 years only and is to be administered by the Secretary of Commerce. All terrorism-related events causing losses beyond $50 billion will be governed by a direct Federal grant program. Once a company has incurred losses of more than 10 percent of its premiums from the previous year, it can apply for assistance from the Fund and the Federal Government. For the first year, the government will cover up to 90 percent of a company's losses. For the second and third years, the government will cover up to 80 percent of that company's losses. This aid will be applicable up to losses of $100 billion. For events casing losses beyond this amount, the Secretary is required to seek guidance from Congress. Additionally, provisions have been included to ensure the industry shoulders the appropriate financial responsibility and to prevent unreasonable increases in insurance rates. Simply put the legislation accomplishes the following goals: 1. it provides insurance companies the assistance they need to continue writing terrorism coverage; 2. it ensures the availability of insurance coverage for American businesses and consumers; 3. it avoids an unnecessary and potentially massive bailout of an insurance industry by forcing them to use their own resources to ensure the availability of terrorism reinsurance while setting direct Federal aid at levels sufficient to account for the industry's current positive capitalization; and 4. it strikes the right balance regarding the interests of industry, taxpayers and the consumers of insurance and the marketplace in general. I look forward to working with other Senators to obtain swift passage of this important legislation. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. HOLLINGS

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, in light of the need to provide additional capacity and reassurance to the insurance industry for terrorism risks without burdening the taxpayer, balanced with the need to protect consumers from excessive increased in commercial insurance rates, I rise today to introduce the National Terrorism Reinsurance Fund Act. This legislation will create a fund from assessments on the commercial insurance industry as a whole to for the purpose of providing a temporary backstop for terrorism losses for primary insurance companies doing business in the U.S. The Fund and assessment mechanisms would provide the first $50 billion of protection for the insurance industry. In addition to this fund, the bill provides a program to provide direct Federal aid on a temporary basis for losses over $50 billion, in order to increase insurance market capacity and ensure the availability of reinsurance in relation to acts of terrorism. The overall program is to last for 3 years only and is to be administered by the Secretary of Commerce. All terrorism-related events causing losses beyond $50 billion will be governed by a direct Federal grant program. Once a company has incurred losses of more than 10 percent of its premiums from the previous year, it can apply for assistance from the Fund and the Federal Government. For the first year, the government will cover up to 90 percent of a company's losses. For the second and third years, the government will cover up to 80 percent of that company's losses. This aid will be applicable up to losses of $100 billion. For events casing losses beyond this amount, the Secretary is required to seek guidance from Congress. Additionally, provisions have been included to ensure the industry shoulders the appropriate financial responsibility and to prevent unreasonable increases in insurance rates. Simply put the legislation accomplishes the following goals: 1. it provides insurance companies the assistance they need to continue writing terrorism coverage; 2. it ensures the availability of insurance coverage for American businesses and consumers; 3. it avoids an unnecessary and potentially massive bailout of an insurance industry by forcing them to use their own resources to ensure the availability of terrorism reinsurance while setting direct Federal aid at levels sufficient to account for the industry's current positive capitalization; and 4. it strikes the right balance regarding the interests of industry, taxpayers and the consumers of insurance and the marketplace in general. I look forward to working with other Senators to obtain swift passage of this important legislation. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. HOLLINGS

Mr. HOLLINGS. The purpose of this legislation, as we have now provided for airport and airline security, is to provide for port security and rail security. I want to make some comments about it. If that is permitted, we will go into debate, and if the Chair will recognize me, if they will allow it, I will explain in detail. This is what I want to do.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the majority leader, following consultation with the Republican leader, may proceed to consideration of Calendar No. 161, S. 1214, the Port, Maritime, and Rail Security Act; that when the measure is considered, it be under the following limitations: That a managers' substitute amendment be in order; that the substitute amendment be considered and agreed to and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table; that the bill, as thus amended, be considered as original text for the purpose of further amendment, with no points of order waived by this agreement; that all first-degree amendments must be transportation-related; that the second-degree amendments must be relevant to the first-degree amendment to which it is offered; that upon the disposition of all amendments, the bill be read the third time, and the Senate vote on passage of the bill, with this action occurring with no further intervening action or debate.