Fritz Hollings

Mr. HOLLINGS

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Nancy Foster Scholarship Act, legislation to create a scholarship program in marine biology or oceanography in honor of Dr. Nancy Foster, head of the National Ocean Service at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) until her passing on Tuesday, June 27, 2000. I am proud to introduce legislation to commemorate the life and work of such a wonderful leader, mentor, and coastal advocate. I thank my colleagues Senators Snowe, Kerry, Stevens, Breaux, and Cleland for joining me in recognizing Dr. Foster's strong commitment to improving the conservation and scientific understanding of our precious coastal resources. My legislation would create a Nancy Foster Marine Biology Scholarship Program within the Department of Commerce. This Program would provide scholarship funds to outstanding women and minority graduate students to support and encourage independent graduate level research in marine biology. It is my hope that this scholarship program will promote the development of future leaders of Dr. Foster's caliber. Dr. Foster was the first woman to direct a NOAA line office, and during her 23 years at NOAA rose to one of the most senior levels a career professional can achieve. She directed the complete modernization of NOAA's essential nautical mapping and charting programs, and created a ground-breaking partnership with the National Geographic Society to launch a 5-year undersea exploration program called the Sustainable Seas Expedition. Dr. Foster was a strong and enthusiastic mentor to young people and a staunch ally to her colleagues, and for this reason, I believe the legislation I am introducing today to be the most appropriate way for us all to ensure that her deep commitment to marine science continues on in others. Mr. President, we will all feel Dr. Foster's loss deeply for years to come. The creation of a scholarship program in her honor is one small way we can thank a person who did so much for us all.

Mr. HOLLINGS

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I rise today, to introduce the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2000. This legislation is long overdue. It is needed to facilitate future technological and advances and increases in international trade, and ensure that we have the sort of security control necessary to ensure that our borders are protected from drug smuggling, illegal aliens, trade fraud, threats of terrorism as well as potential threats to our ability to mobilize U.S. military force. The Department of Transportation recently commenced an evaluation of our marine transportation needs for the 21st Century. In September 1999, Transportation Secretary Slater issued a preliminary report of the Marine Transportation System (MTS) Task Force--An Assessment of the U.S. Marine Transportation System. The report reflected a highly collaborative effort among public sector agencies, private sector organizations and other stakeholders in the MTS. The report indicates that the United States has more than 1,000 harbor channels and 25,000 miles of inland, intracoastal, and coastal waterways in the United States which serve over 300 ports, with more than 3,700 terminals that handle passenger and cargo movements. These waterways and ports link to 152,000 miles of railways, 460,000 miles of underground pipelines and 45,000 miles of interstate highways. Annually, the U.S. marine transportation system moves more than 2 billion tons of domestic and international freight, imports 3.3 billion tons of domestic oil, transports 134 million passengers by ferry, serves 78 million Americans engaged in recreational boating, and hosts more than 5 million cruise ship passengers. The MTS provides economic value, as waterborne cargo contributes more than $742 billion to U.S. gross domestic product and creates employment for more than 13 million citizens. While these figures reveal the magnitude of our waterborne commerce, they don't reveal the spectacular growth of waterborne commerce, or the potential problems in coping with this growth. It is estimated that the total volume of domestic and international trade is expected to double over the next twenty years. The doubling of trade also brings up the troubling issue of how the U.S. is going to protect our maritime borders from crime, threats of terrorism, or even our ability to mobilize U.S. armed forces. Security at our maritime borders is given substantially less federal consideration than airports or land borders. In the aviation industry, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is intimately involved in ensuring that security measures are developed, implemented, and funded. The FAA works with various Federal officials to assess threats directed toward commercial aviation and to target various types of security measures as potential threats change. For example, during the Gulf War, airports were directed to ensure that no vehicles were parked within a set distance of the entrance to a terminal. Currently, each air carrier, whether a U.S. carrier or foreign air carrier, is required to submit a proposal on how it plans to meet its security needs. Air carriers also are responsible for screening passengers and baggage in compliance with FAA regulations. The types of machines used in airports are all approved, and in many instances paid for by the FAA. The FAA uses its laboratories to check the machinery to determine if the equipment can detect explosives that are capable of destroying commercial aircrafts. Clearly, we learned from the Pan Am 103 disaster over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988. Congress passed legislation in 1990 ``the Aviation Security Improvement Act,'' which was carefully considered by the Commerce Committee, to develop the types of measures I noted above. We also made sure that airports, the FAA, air carriers and law enforcement worked together to protect the flying public. Following the crash of TWA flight 800 in 1996, we also leaped to spend money, when it was first thought to have been caused by a terrorist act. The FAA spent about $150 million on additional screening equipment, and we continue today to fund research and development for better, and more effective equipment. Finally, the FAA is responsible for ensuring that background checks (employment records/criminal records) of security screeners and those with access to secured airports are carried out in an effective and thorough manner. The FAA, at the direction of Congress, is responsible for certifying screening companies, and has developed ways to better test screeners. This is all done in the name of protecting the public. Seaports deserve no less consideration. At land borders, there is a similar investment in security by the federal government. In TEA-21, approved $140 million a year for five years for the National Corridor Planning and Development and Coordinated Border Infrastructure Program. Eligible activities under this program include improvements to existing transportation and supporting infrastructure that facilitate cross-border vehicles and cargo movements; construction of highways and related safety enforcement facilities that facilitate movements related to international trade; operational improvements, including improvements relating to electronic data interchange and use of telecommunications, to expedite cross border vehicle and cargo movements; and planning, coordination, design and location studies. By way of contrast, at U.S. seaports, the federal government invests nothing in infrastructure, other than the human presence of the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs Service, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and whatever equipment those agencies have to accomplish their mandates. Physical infrastructure is provided by state-controlled port authorities, or by private sector marine terminal operators. There are no controls, or requirements in place, except for certain standards promulgated by the Coast Guard for the protection of cruise ship passenger terminals. Essentially, where sea ports are concerned we have abrogated the federal responsibility of border control to the state and private sector. I think that the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs Agency are doing an outstanding job, but they are outgunned. There is simply too much money in the illegal activities they are seeking to curtail or eradicate, and there is too much traffic coming into, and out of the United States. For instance, in the latest data available, 1999, we had more than 10 million TEU's imported into the United States. For the uninitiated, a TEU refers to a twenty-foot equivalent unit shipping container. By way of comparison, a regular truck measures 48-feet in length. So in translation, we imported close to 5 million truckloads of cargo. According to the Customs Service, seaports are able to inspect between 1 percent and 2 percent of the containers, so in other words, a drug smuggler has a 98 percent chance of gaining illegal entry. It is amazing to think, that when you or I walk through an international airport we will walk through a metal detector, and our bags will be x-rayed, and Customs will interview us, and may check our bags. However, at a U.S. seaport you could import a 48 foot truck load of cargo, and have at least a 98 percent chance of not even being inspected. It just doesn't seem right. For instance, in my own state, the Port of Charleston which is the fourth largest container port in the United States, Customs officials have no equipment even capable of x-raying intermodal shipping containers. Customs, which is understaffed to start with, must physically open containers, and request the use of a canine unit from local law enforcement to help with drug or illegal contraband detection. This is simply not sufficient. The need for the evaluation of higher scrutiny of our system of seaport security came at the request of Senator Graham, and I would like to at this time commend him for his persistent efforts to address this issue. Senator Graham has had problems with security at some of the Florida seaports, and although the state has taken some steps to address the issue, there is a great need for considerable improvement. Senator Graham laudably convinced the President to appoint a Commission, designed similarly to the Aviation Security Commission, to review security at U.S. seaports. The Commission visited twelve major U.S. seaports, as well as two foreign ports. It compiled a record of countless hours of testimony and heard from, and reviewed the security practices of the shipping industry. It also met with local law enforcement officials to discuss the issues and their experiences as a result of seaport related crime. Unfortunately, the report will not be publicly available until sometime in the fall; however, Senator Graham's staff and my staff have worked closely with the Commission, to develop legislation--the bill that we are introducing--to address the Commission's concerns. For instance, the Commission found that twelve U.S. seaports accounted for 56 percent of the number of cocaine seizures, 32 percent of the marijuana seizures, and 65 percent of heroin seizures in commercial cargo shipments and vessels at all ports of entry nationwide. Yet, we have done relatively little, other than send in an undermanned contingency of Coast Guards and Customs officials to do whatever they can. Drugs are not the only criminal problem confronting U.S. seaports. For example, alien smuggling has become increasingly lucrative enterprise. To illustrate, in August of 1999, I.N.S. officials found 132 Chinese men hiding aboard a container ship docked in Savannah, Georgia. The INS district director was quoted as saying; ``This was a very sophisticated ring, and never in my 23 years with the INS have I seen anything as large or sophisticated''. According to a recent GAO report on INS efforts on alien smuggling (RPT-Number: B-283952), smugglers collectively may earn as much as several billion dollars per year bringing in illegal aliens. Another problem facing seaports is cargo theft. Cargo theft does not always occur at seaports, but in many instances the theft has occurred because of knowledge of cargo contents. International shipping provides access to a lot of information and a lot of cargo to many different people along the course of its journey. We need to take steps to ensure that we do not facilitate theft. Losses as a result of cargo theft have been estimated as high as $12 billion annually, and it has been reported to have increased by as much as 20 percent recently. The FBI has become so concerned that it recently established a multi-district task force, Operation Sudden Stop, to crack down on cargo crime. The other issues facing seaport security may be less evident, but potentially of greater threat. As a nation in general, we have been relatively lucky to have been free of some of the terrorist threats that have plagued other nations. However, we must not become complacent. U.S. seaports are extremely exposed. On a daily basis many seaports have cargo that could cause serious illness and death to potentially large populations of civilians living near seaports if targeted by terrorism. The sheer magnitude of most seaports, their historical proximity to established population bases, the open nature of the facility, and the massive quantities of hazardous cargoes being shipped through a port could be extremely threatening to the large populations that live in areas surrounding our seaports. The same conditions in U.S. seaports, that could expose us to threats from terrorism, could also be used to disrupt our abilities to mobilize militarily. During the Persian Gulf War, 95 percent of our military cargo was carried by sea. Disruption of sea service, could have resulted in a vastly different course of history. We need to ensure that it does not happen to any future military contingencies. As I mentioned before, our seaports are international borders, and consequently we should treat them as such. However, I am realistic about the possibilities for increasing seaport security, the realities of international trade, and the many functional differences inherent in the different seaport localities. Seaports by their very nature, are open and exposed to surrounding areas, and as such it will be impossible to control all aspects of security, however, sensitive or critical safety areas should be protected. I also understand that U.S. seaports have different security needs in form and scope. For instance, a seaport in Alaska, that has very little international cargo does not need the same degree of attention that a seaport in a major metropolitan center, which imports and exports thousands of international shipments. However, the legislation we are introducing today will allow for public input and will consider local issues in the implementation of new guidelines on port security, so as to address such details. Substantively, the Port and Maritime Security Act establishes a multi-pronged effort to address security needs at U.S. Seaports, and in some cases formalizes existing practices that have proven effective. The bill authorizes the Coast Guard to establish a task force on port security in consultation with U.S. Customs and the Maritime Administration. The purpose of the task force is to implement the provisions of the act; to coordinate programs to enhance the security and safety of U.S. seaports; to provide long-term solutions for seaport safety issues; to coordinate with local port security committees established by the Coast Guard to implement the provisions of the bill; and to ensure that the public and local port security committees are kept informed about seaport security enhancement developments. The bill requires the U.S. Coast Guard to establish local port security committees at each U.S. seaport. The membership of these committees is to include representatives of the port authority, labor organizations, the private sector, and federal, state, and local government officials. These committees will be chaired by the U.S. Coast Guard's Captain-of-the-Port, and will implement the provisions and requirements of the bill locally, to ensure that local considerations are considered in the establishment of security guidelines. The bill requires the task force, in consultation with the U.S. Customs Service and MarAd, to develop a system of providing port security threat assessments for U.S. seaports, and to revise this assessment at least triennially. The threat assessment shall be performed with the assistance of local officials, through local port security committees, and ensure the port is made aware of and participates in the analysis of security concerns. The bill also requires the task force to develop voluntary minimum security guidelines that are linked to the U.S. Coast Guard Captain-of- the-Port controls, to include a model port concept, and to include recommended ``best practices'' guidelines for use of maritime terminal operators. Local port security committees are to participate in the formulation of security guidelines, and the Coast Guard is required to pursue the international adoption of similar security guidelines. Additionally, the Maritime Administration (MarAd) is required to pursue the adoption of proper private sector accreditation of ports that adhere to guidelines (similar to a underwriters lab approval, or ISO 9000 accreditations). The bill authorizes MarAd to provide Title XI loan guarantees to cover the costs of port security infrastructure improvements, such as cameras and other monitoring equipment, fencing systems and other types of physical enhancements. The bill authorizes $10 million, annually for four years, to cover costs, as defined by the Credit Reform Act, which could guarantee up to $400 million in loans for security enhancements. The bill also establishes a matching grant program to develop and transfer technology to enhance security at U.S. seaports. The U.S. Customs Service may award up to $12 million annually for four years for this technology program, which is required to be awarded on a competitive basis. Long-term technology development is needed to ensure that we can develop non-intrusive technology that will allow trade to expand, but also allow us greater ability to detect criminal threat. The bill also authorizes additional funding for the U.S. Customs Service to carry out the requirements of the bill, and more generally, to enhance seaport security. The bill requires a report to be attached on security and a revision of 1997 document entitled ``Port Security: A National Planning Guide.'' The report and revised guide are to be submitted to Congress and are to include a description of activities undertaken under the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2000, in addition to analysis of the effect of those activities on port security and preventing acts of terrorism and crime. The bill requires the Attorney General, to the extent feasible, to coordinate reporting of seaport related crimes and to work with state law enforcement officials to harmonize the reporting of data on cargo theft. Better data will be crucial in identifying the extent and location of criminal threats and will facilitate law enforcement efforts combating crime. The bill also requires the Secretaries of Agriculture, Treasury, and Transportation, as well as the Attorney General to work together to establish shared dockside inspection facilities at seaports for federal and state agencies, and authorizes $3 million, annually for four years, to carry out this section. The bill also requires the Customs Service to improve reporting of imports at seaports, and to eliminate user fees for domestic U.S.- flag carriers carrying in-bond domestic cargo. Finally, the bill reauthorizes an extension of tonnage duties through 2006, and makes available $40,000,000 from the collections of these duties to carry out the Port and Maritime Security Act. These fees currently are set at certain levels, and are scheduled to be reduced in 2002. The legislation reauthorizes and extends the current fee level for an additional four years, but dedicates its use to enhancing our efforts to fight crime at U.S. seaports and to facilitating improved protection of our borders, as well as to enhance our efforts to ward off potential threats of terrorism.

Mr. HOLLINGS

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may go out of order since the Senator is not here.

Mr. HOLLINGS. I thank the distinguished Presiding Officer because I think I am going to get him to join me. I have had a dynamic debate with the Senators from Washington for over 30-some years because they have Boeing, the outstanding export industry of the United States. Now, they believe in controlled trade, as I do, because they use all the technology and research from our Department of Defense on the one hand, and they use the financing of the Export-Import Bank on the other hand. I believe in that Export-Import Bank, and the subsidization of the Boeing sales, because we have to meet the competition of Airbus. So I support that. But they should not come telling me about free trade because we do not finance textile sales; we do not finance much textile research. So we can look back to last December--a year ago--at the demonstration in Seattle. There was an anarchist group that came up from Eugene, OR, but I am talking about the responsible AFL-CIO demonstration there. That particular demonstration was led by the Boeing machinists--the premium single export industry in the United States. Why? Because much of that Boeing 777 is required to be made in China in order to sell in China. That is not free trade. That is requiring local content provisions. So as they require it there, they require it otherwise in Europe. That is why we have tried, for 50 years, to set the example to have no subsidies, no tariffs, no content requirements, have absolutely free trade. The dynamic of the global competition is one of control for the security interests of the nations involved. I believe if I was running Japan, I would do it the same way, or if I was running China. It works. In 10 years, they have gone from a $6 billion-plus balance of trade with the United States to $68 billion. They are cleaning our clock. With this particular PNTR, will we ever wake up? Our friend John F. Kennedy wrote the book ``While England Slept.'' I am tempted to write the book ``While America Slept.'' Kennedy's book was how the great British empire that brought Germany to its knees, the conqueror, the victor was brought to its knees by the vanquished. That is exactly what is happening to the United States of America. We are going the way of England. They told the Brits at the end of World War II, they said: Don't worry, instead of a nation of brawn, you will be a nation of brains; instead of producing products, you will provide services, a service economy; instead of creating wealth, you will handle it and be a financial center. England has gone to hell in an economic hand basket. London is nothing more than an amusement park. Their army is not as big as our Marines, and they have lost their clout in world affairs. Money talks. So not only are we losing our middle class--as Henry Ford said, ``I want to pay that worker enough to buy what he is producing,'' which helped begin not only the wonderful development of a middle class in America, the strength of our democracy--but our clout in international and foreign policy. I thank the Chair for its indulgence. We will continue in September to try to get everyone's attention, so we can compete. I yield the floor.

Mr. HOLLINGS. I thank the distinguished Presiding Officer. Mr. President, there is no question, as the Senator from Delaware and the Senator from New York have said--the chairman and ranking member-- this is highly important, but for a different reason. There is no question that we are going to have trade with China. The objection I have at this particular moment is with respect to the permanent nature of normal trade relations. I want to eliminate the permanence so we will have annual reviews to see exactly how our investments, our creation of jobs, our trade is coming along with respect to national security. Tom Donohue, down at the Chamber of Commerce, says that it is going to create hundreds of thousands of jobs. I am willing to bet him--and he can name the odds and the amounts--that we are going to lose hundreds of thousands of jobs. This is for an investment agreement in China, so that investments will flow to China and remain undisturbed by possible U.S. retaliation, protected by their joining in the WTO. And then, when we bring up various things to protect the security interests of the United States,--at the WTO level, Cuba votes us out because it has an equal vote. The important point to remember, and President Clinton acknowledged at the very beginning of the summer and the PNTR consideration, although he could not understand it, was what he characterized as ``global anxiety.'' Let me tell him a little bit about that anxiety. Oneida Mills, in Andrews, SC, closed. They had 487 employees. Their average age was 47 years of age. The company moved to Mexico and their 478 employees were out of a job. And what does Washington tell them? They say: Reeducate. They almost sound like Mao Tse Tong. Reeducate, with high skills. Don't you understand, in the global competition you have to have high skills. Tomorrow morning we have done just that. We have 487 high-skilled computer operators. Are you going to hire the 47-year-old computer operator or the 21-year-old computer operator? Those 487 are ``dead- lined.'' They are out of a job. Earlier this week I checked the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Since NAFTA, we have lost 39,200 textile and apparel jobs alone in the little State of South Carolina. Anxiety--there is justified anxiety across the Nation--where we have lost over 400,000 textile and apparel jobs since NAFTA, with the outflow of the industrial strength down south and over into the Pacific rim. They do not understand globali- zation, says the President. They do not understand global competition. Global competition started back at the end of World War II under the Marshall Plan in 1945. We sent over the expertise, we sent over the machinery, and we sent over the money so they could have global competition. Our southern Governors helped hasten along and expedite global competition 40 years ago. I traveled to Germany. We now have 116 German plants in the little State of South Carolina. So we know about global competition. But what has really occurred--with the fall of the wall--is that 4 billion workers have entered the workforce of the world, willing to work for anything. With NAFTA and WTO, and the rise of the Internet, you can transfer your technology on a computer, you can transfer your finances on a satellite. With the Internet, you don't have to go to Mexico, you don't have to go to the Pacific rim; you can operate your plant from a New York office. That is a wonderful operation. As a result, as the Wall Street Journal said, this agreement is for investment in China and not in the United States. There is global anxiety. There should be global anxiety. And we are trying to go and develop a competitive trade policy. Every country in Europe, every country in the Pacific rim has controlled trade, and we, as children, run around still babbling ``free trade, free trade,'' giving away our industrial strength. We have come from that beginning, that at the end of World War II, 41 percent of our workforce was in manufacturing. Now it is down to 12 percent. And as Akio Morita, a founder of Sony, cautioned in a speech back in the 1980s: That a world power that loses its manufacturing capacity will cease to be a world power. And that is where we are. In Washington, we are not discussing paying the bill. They all say, ``pay down the debt,'' but the debt has gone up. I have the figures right here. The debt has gone up exactly $12 billion. Here it is, the public debt to the penny, since the beginning of the fiscal year. There is not any surplus. And otherwise we need to understand the deficit and the balance of trade, where we do not have anything to export. We have a $350 billion deficit in the balance of trade. And little Japan has out manufactured the great United States of America. As we waste our economic strength on spending over $175 billion a year more than we take in, as we have done, since President Lyndon Johnson last balanced the budget. We have drained the tub of industrial strength with this naive ``free trade, free trade, free trade.'' No. I am a competitor. I understand the global competition. We like the investments that we have. We like the global competition. But the United States has not begun to fight. I would be glad to yield when I see someone come to the floor. I just hate to see this valuable time wasted. I ask unanimous consent that I be able to continue until we see the next speaker.

Mr. HOLLINGS

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I rise today, to introduce the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2000. This legislation is long overdue. It is needed to facilitate future technological and advances and increases in international trade, and ensure that we have the sort of security control necessary to ensure that our borders are protected from drug smuggling, illegal aliens, trade fraud, threats of terrorism as well as potential threats to our ability to mobilize U.S. military force. The Department of Transportation recently commenced an evaluation of our marine transportation needs for the 21st Century. In September 1999, Transportation Secretary Slater issued a preliminary report of the Marine Transportation System (MTS) Task Force--An Assessment of the U.S. Marine Transportation System. The report reflected a highly collaborative effort among public sector agencies, private sector organizations and other stakeholders in the MTS. The report indicates that the United States has more than 1,000 harbor channels and 25,000 miles of inland, intracoastal, and coastal waterways in the United States which serve over 300 ports, with more than 3,700 terminals that handle passenger and cargo movements. These waterways and ports link to 152,000 miles of railways, 460,000 miles of underground pipelines and 45,000 miles of interstate highways. Annually, the U.S. marine transportation system moves more than 2 billion tons of domestic and international freight, imports 3.3 billion tons of domestic oil, transports 134 million passengers by ferry, serves 78 million Americans engaged in recreational boating, and hosts more than 5 million cruise ship passengers. The MTS provides economic value, as waterborne cargo contributes more than $742 billion to U.S. gross domestic product and creates employment for more than 13 million citizens. While these figures reveal the magnitude of our waterborne commerce, they don't reveal the spectacular growth of waterborne commerce, or the potential problems in coping with this growth. It is estimated that the total volume of domestic and international trade is expected to double over the next twenty years. The doubling of trade also brings up the troubling issue of how the U.S. is going to protect our maritime borders from crime, threats of terrorism, or even our ability to mobilize U.S. armed forces. Security at our maritime borders is given substantially less federal consideration than airports or land borders. In the aviation industry, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is intimately involved in ensuring that security measures are developed, implemented, and funded. The FAA works with various Federal officials to assess threats directed toward commercial aviation and to target various types of security measures as potential threats change. For example, during the Gulf War, airports were directed to ensure that no vehicles were parked within a set distance of the entrance to a terminal. Currently, each air carrier, whether a U.S. carrier or foreign air carrier, is required to submit a proposal on how it plans to meet its security needs. Air carriers also are responsible for screening passengers and baggage in compliance with FAA regulations. The types of machines used in airports are all approved, and in many instances paid for by the FAA. The FAA uses its laboratories to check the machinery to determine if the equipment can detect explosives that are capable of destroying commercial aircrafts. Clearly, we learned from the Pan Am 103 disaster over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988. Congress passed legislation in 1990 ``the Aviation Security Improvement Act,'' which was carefully considered by the Commerce Committee, to develop the types of measures I noted above. We also made sure that airports, the FAA, air carriers and law enforcement worked together to protect the flying public. Following the crash of TWA flight 800 in 1996, we also leaped to spend money, when it was first thought to have been caused by a terrorist act. The FAA spent about $150 million on additional screening equipment, and we continue today to fund research and development for better, and more effective equipment. Finally, the FAA is responsible for ensuring that background checks (employment records/criminal records) of security screeners and those with access to secured airports are carried out in an effective and thorough manner. The FAA, at the direction of Congress, is responsible for certifying screening companies, and has developed ways to better test screeners. This is all done in the name of protecting the public. Seaports deserve no less consideration. At land borders, there is a similar investment in security by the federal government. In TEA-21, approved $140 million a year for five years for the National Corridor Planning and Development and Coordinated Border Infrastructure Program. Eligible activities under this program include improvements to existing transportation and supporting infrastructure that facilitate cross-border vehicles and cargo movements; construction of highways and related safety enforcement facilities that facilitate movements related to international trade; operational improvements, including improvements relating to electronic data interchange and use of telecommunications, to expedite cross border vehicle and cargo movements; and planning, coordination, design and location studies. By way of contrast, at U.S. seaports, the federal government invests nothing in infrastructure, other than the human presence of the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs Service, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and whatever equipment those agencies have to accomplish their mandates. Physical infrastructure is provided by state-controlled port authorities, or by private sector marine terminal operators. There are no controls, or requirements in place, except for certain standards promulgated by the Coast Guard for the protection of cruise ship passenger terminals. Essentially, where sea ports are concerned we have abrogated the federal responsibility of border control to the state and private sector. I think that the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs Agency are doing an outstanding job, but they are outgunned. There is simply too much money in the illegal activities they are seeking to curtail or eradicate, and there is too much traffic coming into, and out of the United States. For instance, in the latest data available, 1999, we had more than 10 million TEU's imported into the United States. For the uninitiated, a TEU refers to a twenty-foot equivalent unit shipping container. By way of comparison, a regular truck measures 48-feet in length. So in translation, we imported close to 5 million truckloads of cargo. According to the Customs Service, seaports are able to inspect between 1 percent and 2 percent of the containers, so in other words, a drug smuggler has a 98 percent chance of gaining illegal entry. It is amazing to think, that when you or I walk through an international airport we will walk through a metal detector, and our bags will be x-rayed, and Customs will interview us, and may check our bags. However, at a U.S. seaport you could import a 48 foot truck load of cargo, and have at least a 98 percent chance of not even being inspected. It just doesn't seem right. For instance, in my own state, the Port of Charleston which is the fourth largest container port in the United States, Customs officials have no equipment even capable of x-raying intermodal shipping containers. Customs, which is understaffed to start with, must physically open containers, and request the use of a canine unit from local law enforcement to help with drug or illegal contraband detection. This is simply not sufficient. The need for the evaluation of higher scrutiny of our system of seaport security came at the request of Senator Graham, and I would like to at this time commend him for his persistent efforts to address this issue. Senator Graham has had problems with security at some of the Florida seaports, and although the state has taken some steps to address the issue, there is a great need for considerable improvement. Senator Graham laudably convinced the President to appoint a Commission, designed similarly to the Aviation Security Commission, to review security at U.S. seaports. The Commission visited twelve major U.S. seaports, as well as two foreign ports. It compiled a record of countless hours of testimony and heard from, and reviewed the security practices of the shipping industry. It also met with local law enforcement officials to discuss the issues and their experiences as a result of seaport related crime. Unfortunately, the report will not be publicly available until sometime in the fall; however, Senator Graham's staff and my staff have worked closely with the Commission, to develop legislation--the bill that we are introducing--to address the Commission's concerns. For instance, the Commission found that twelve U.S. seaports accounted for 56 percent of the number of cocaine seizures, 32 percent of the marijuana seizures, and 65 percent of heroin seizures in commercial cargo shipments and vessels at all ports of entry nationwide. Yet, we have done relatively little, other than send in an undermanned contingency of Coast Guards and Customs officials to do whatever they can. Drugs are not the only criminal problem confronting U.S. seaports. For example, alien smuggling has become increasingly lucrative enterprise. To illustrate, in August of 1999, I.N.S. officials found 132 Chinese men hiding aboard a container ship docked in Savannah, Georgia. The INS district director was quoted as saying; ``This was a very sophisticated ring, and never in my 23 years with the INS have I seen anything as large or sophisticated''. According to a recent GAO report on INS efforts on alien smuggling (RPT-Number: B-283952), smugglers collectively may earn as much as several billion dollars per year bringing in illegal aliens. Another problem facing seaports is cargo theft. Cargo theft does not always occur at seaports, but in many instances the theft has occurred because of knowledge of cargo contents. International shipping provides access to a lot of information and a lot of cargo to many different people along the course of its journey. We need to take steps to ensure that we do not facilitate theft. Losses as a result of cargo theft have been estimated as high as $12 billion annually, and it has been reported to have increased by as much as 20 percent recently. The FBI has become so concerned that it recently established a multi-district task force, Operation Sudden Stop, to crack down on cargo crime. The other issues facing seaport security may be less evident, but potentially of greater threat. As a nation in general, we have been relatively lucky to have been free of some of the terrorist threats that have plagued other nations. However, we must not become complacent. U.S. seaports are extremely exposed. On a daily basis many seaports have cargo that could cause serious illness and death to potentially large populations of civilians living near seaports if targeted by terrorism. The sheer magnitude of most seaports, their historical proximity to established population bases, the open nature of the facility, and the massive quantities of hazardous cargoes being shipped through a port could be extremely threatening to the large populations that live in areas surrounding our seaports. The same conditions in U.S. seaports, that could expose us to threats from terrorism, could also be used to disrupt our abilities to mobilize militarily. During the Persian Gulf War, 95 percent of our military cargo was carried by sea. Disruption of sea service, could have resulted in a vastly different course of history. We need to ensure that it does not happen to any future military contingencies. As I mentioned before, our seaports are international borders, and consequently we should treat them as such. However, I am realistic about the possibilities for increasing seaport security, the realities of international trade, and the many functional differences inherent in the different seaport localities. Seaports by their very nature, are open and exposed to surrounding areas, and as such it will be impossible to control all aspects of security, however, sensitive or critical safety areas should be protected. I also understand that U.S. seaports have different security needs in form and scope. For instance, a seaport in Alaska, that has very little international cargo does not need the same degree of attention that a seaport in a major metropolitan center, which imports and exports thousands of international shipments. However, the legislation we are introducing today will allow for public input and will consider local issues in the implementation of new guidelines on port security, so as to address such details. Substantively, the Port and Maritime Security Act establishes a multi-pronged effort to address security needs at U.S. Seaports, and in some cases formalizes existing practices that have proven effective. The bill authorizes the Coast Guard to establish a task force on port security in consultation with U.S. Customs and the Maritime Administration. The purpose of the task force is to implement the provisions of the act; to coordinate programs to enhance the security and safety of U.S. seaports; to provide long-term solutions for seaport safety issues; to coordinate with local port security committees established by the Coast Guard to implement the provisions of the bill; and to ensure that the public and local port security committees are kept informed about seaport security enhancement developments. The bill requires the U.S. Coast Guard to establish local port security committees at each U.S. seaport. The membership of these committees is to include representatives of the port authority, labor organizations, the private sector, and federal, state, and local government officials. These committees will be chaired by the U.S. Coast Guard's Captain-of-the-Port, and will implement the provisions and requirements of the bill locally, to ensure that local considerations are considered in the establishment of security guidelines. The bill requires the task force, in consultation with the U.S. Customs Service and MarAd, to develop a system of providing port security threat assessments for U.S. seaports, and to revise this assessment at least triennially. The threat assessment shall be performed with the assistance of local officials, through local port security committees, and ensure the port is made aware of and participates in the analysis of security concerns. The bill also requires the task force to develop voluntary minimum security guidelines that are linked to the U.S. Coast Guard Captain-of- the-Port controls, to include a model port concept, and to include recommended ``best practices'' guidelines for use of maritime terminal operators. Local port security committees are to participate in the formulation of security guidelines, and the Coast Guard is required to pursue the international adoption of similar security guidelines. Additionally, the Maritime Administration (MarAd) is required to pursue the adoption of proper private sector accreditation of ports that adhere to guidelines (similar to a underwriters lab approval, or ISO 9000 accreditations). The bill authorizes MarAd to provide Title XI loan guarantees to cover the costs of port security infrastructure improvements, such as cameras and other monitoring equipment, fencing systems and other types of physical enhancements. The bill authorizes $10 million, annually for four years, to cover costs, as defined by the Credit Reform Act, which could guarantee up to $400 million in loans for security enhancements. The bill also establishes a matching grant program to develop and transfer technology to enhance security at U.S. seaports. The U.S. Customs Service may award up to $12 million annually for four years for this technology program, which is required to be awarded on a competitive basis. Long-term technology development is needed to ensure that we can develop non-intrusive technology that will allow trade to expand, but also allow us greater ability to detect criminal threat. The bill also authorizes additional funding for the U.S. Customs Service to carry out the requirements of the bill, and more generally, to enhance seaport security. The bill requires a report to be attached on security and a revision of 1997 document entitled ``Port Security: A National Planning Guide.'' The report and revised guide are to be submitted to Congress and are to include a description of activities undertaken under the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2000, in addition to analysis of the effect of those activities on port security and preventing acts of terrorism and crime. The bill requires the Attorney General, to the extent feasible, to coordinate reporting of seaport related crimes and to work with state law enforcement officials to harmonize the reporting of data on cargo theft. Better data will be crucial in identifying the extent and location of criminal threats and will facilitate law enforcement efforts combating crime. The bill also requires the Secretaries of Agriculture, Treasury, and Transportation, as well as the Attorney General to work together to establish shared dockside inspection facilities at seaports for federal and state agencies, and authorizes $3 million, annually for four years, to carry out this section. The bill also requires the Customs Service to improve reporting of imports at seaports, and to eliminate user fees for domestic U.S.- flag carriers carrying in-bond domestic cargo. Finally, the bill reauthorizes an extension of tonnage duties through 2006, and makes available $40,000,000 from the collections of these duties to carry out the Port and Maritime Security Act. These fees currently are set at certain levels, and are scheduled to be reduced in 2002. The legislation reauthorizes and extends the current fee level for an additional four years, but dedicates its use to enhancing our efforts to fight crime at U.S. seaports and to facilitating improved protection of our borders, as well as to enhance our efforts to ward off potential threats of terrorism.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Nancy Foster Scholarship Act, legislation to create a scholarship program in marine biology or oceanography in honor of Dr. Nancy Foster, head of the National Ocean Service at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) until her passing on Tuesday, June 27, 2000. I am proud to introduce legislation to commemorate the life and work of such a wonderful leader, mentor, and coastal advocate. I thank my colleagues Senators Snowe, Kerry, Stevens, Breaux, and Cleland for joining me in recognizing Dr. Foster's strong commitment to improving the conservation and scientific understanding of our precious coastal resources. My legislation would create a Nancy Foster Marine Biology Scholarship Program within the Department of Commerce. This Program would provide scholarship funds to outstanding women and minority graduate students to support and encourage independent graduate level research in marine biology. It is my hope that this scholarship program will promote the development of future leaders of Dr. Foster's caliber. Dr. Foster was the first woman to direct a NOAA line office, and during her 23 years at NOAA rose to one of the most senior levels a career professional can achieve. She directed the complete modernization of NOAA's essential nautical mapping and charting programs, and created a ground-breaking partnership with the National Geographic Society to launch a 5-year undersea exploration program called the Sustainable Seas Expedition. Dr. Foster was a strong and enthusiastic mentor to young people and a staunch ally to her colleagues, and for this reason, I believe the legislation I am introducing today to be the most appropriate way for us all to ensure that her deep commitment to marine science continues on in others. Mr. President, we will all feel Dr. Foster's loss deeply for years to come. The creation of a scholarship program in her honor is one small way we can thank a person who did so much for us all.

Mr. HOLLINGS

Mr. HOLLINGS. In this particular company, Deutsche Telekom, one-third of the employees have permanent employment. Wouldn't you and I love that--permanent employment?

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President: The Dutch Government may slash its 43.5 percent stake in Dutch carrier KPN Telecom to just over 20 percent as part of a global share issue slated for the fourth quarter, an industry source said on Wednesday. If a foreign government owns more than 25 percent of the telephone company, they are not welcome. If they own less than 25 percent, they are welcome. We love the Germans. Tell them to come to America. One addendum. This won't take but a couple of minutes because the distinguished chairman of the Budget Committee is on the floor. I hold the earlier announcement from a newspaper this week that the surplus forecast has doubled. We heard the distinguished Senator, Mr. Roth of Delaware, the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, putting through his budget. We had a vote this morning on the marriage penalty. Tax cut, tax cut, tax cut. To this Senator who lives in the real world, that is an increase in the debt. When they announced this, I went to what they call the Budget and Economic Outlook of the Congressional Budget Office. That is what the article quoted that said the surplus doubled. On page 17, we can see the debt, as reported by the CBO, goes from $5.617 trillion to $6.370 trillion, an increase of $753 billion. It wasn't there that they found the surplus. I said, the President is always good at finding surpluses, so I went to his Mid-session Review, table 23 on page 49 in the back, and I see instead that the debt increased $1 trillion. Then I called Treasury and I asked them. I have now the most recent report from this morning. It shows the public debt to the penny. It has increased $22 billion according to the U.S. Treasury. I reiterate the Budget Committee's wonderful offer: If you want to become a millionaire--and I am sure the distinguished chairman can find that million in the surplus; I have heard him mention it, also--we will give $1 million to anyone who can find a real surplus that Congress and all the media are talking about. I yield the floor.

Mr. HOLLINGS. The Senator's question concludes--as astute as our distinguished chairman is--the answer. It is that Deutsche Telekom is government regulated and controlled. That is the best answer. We were trying to continue the competition, but we cannot compete with the government coming in. If they are going to allow that, I vote under your budget and mine that we go over there and take over China's communications. If we can take over China's communications, we can cut the defense budget in half. They wouldn't know where to go or how to do it. We would be in charge over there in Beijing. I thank the distinguished chairman.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, since the distinguished Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission was rather elusive in that conversation, I then prevailed on 29 other colleagues in the Senate in a letter of June 29--the next day--and again on July 12, since I had not received a response. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record those particular letters dated June 29 and July 12 to the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, sections 310(a) and 310(b) are very clear. It could be noted historically--because there has been an ongoing intramural debate with respect to the turning over of our telecommunications to foreign governments by the White House, by this administration, by the U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Barshefsky, and its minions--that we have had to struggle with, and I included those documents. I reference also that particular letter of July 12 because in there I cited the ongoing concern of then former Ambassador Mickey Kantor with respect to German government participation in America's telecommunications. I also cited in there that the head of the international bureau, Mr. Scott Blake Harris, in 1995, testified before the Senate Commerce Committee that section 310(a)'s outright ban on foreign government ownership should be retained. Of course, we had the act in February of 1996. Subsequent to that, later in 1996, the head of the FCC's former international bureau, just retired, included a very instructive article in the National Law Journal: More problematic, however, are the restrictions placed by the Communications Act on ownership of wireless licenses by a foreign government or its representative. Section 310(a) flatly prohibits a foreign government or its representative from holding any wireless license, directly or indirectly. This limitation is not subject to an FCC waiver. Mr. President, there is no question that law has not been changed. I know about the attempts made by Ambassador Barshefsky and the global telecommunications agreement in 1997--that if you are a Member of the WTO, then you automatically qualify under the public interest requirement of the telecommunications law to own U.S. telecommunications assets. They say it's in the public interest, that it promotes competition. That has been the wag, or argument, that I have heard from time immemorial. But that is not the case at all. You take Deutsche Telekom, which recently had a bond issue. It was very successful--$14 billion. Mind you me, they wouldn't have collected some $14 billion if it were a private company. But this is ``a government cannot fail'' with one- third of the employees having permanent employment. You cannot fire them. That is Deutsche Telekom, and by the Chairman's own acknowledgment, with 58-percent German government ownership. We are not talking about German entities. We are talking about the German government. You can't let foreign governmental ownership enter the free market here, a market that has been deregulated by the 1996 Telecommunications Act, and say: Oh, yes, we are ready to compete. We have a strange situation whereby Deutsche Telekom under Ambassador Barshefsky and some in the White House--and perhaps some at the FCC-- say: Yes. It is already in the public interest. They are competitive; we are promoting competition. But Deutsche Telekom can take over, let's say, AT&T, but under the law, categorically, Bell South cannot. Let me mention why I emphasize the German government--because there was a letter by the distinguished chairman of our committee, the Senator from Arizona, Mr. McCain, in which he referred to ``entities.'' He didn't refer to the government. Let's get right to entities and globalization. There was a recent article that said, after all, Senator Hollings was a veteran of World War II where he fought against the Germans. It suggested that Sen. Hollings was anti-German and that he thought maybe the German government wouldn't be friendly. You know, coming from South Carolina, we are supposed to be dumb, and Senator Hollings just didn't understand that we have moved into globalization, the world economy, and world competition. I don't want to sound like Vice President Gore, but I am constrained to acknowledge that maybe I helped start globalization. As the Governor of South Carolina in 1960, I went to Europe in order to attract German industry investment in South Carolina. As I stand on the floor, I have 116 German industries in the State of South Carolina. I have the headquarters of British Bowater. I have the North American headquarters of Michelin. They have 11,600 employees. I have Hoffman-LaRoche from Switzerland. You ought to come down there and join the smorgasbord of global competition. That is not the case that concerns the Senator from South Carolina. What concerns me is ``governmental.'' We certainly didn't deregulate American control to put it under German control. It is that clear. It does not require any careful review. The law is the law. We refuse to change it. The White House acts like it has been changed. Some on the FCC act like it has been changed. The law and the policy have not been changed. Several things have occurred. We have a bill in with 15 cosponsors, with the distinguished majority and minority leaders as cosponsors. We have over on the House side Congressmen Dingell and Markey who introduced a similar bill. We put a rider on the Commerce-Justice-State appropriations bill, which is an appropriations bill that lasts for only one year, and no money is to be expended to give licenses to foreign governments under Section 310. You would think that they would get it. The Dutch got it. It is very interesting that KPN tried to take over Telefonica d'Espana. They were rejected. Incidentally, Deutsche Telekom tried to take over Telecom Italia. Italy voted them out. Singapore Tel tried to take over Hong Kong Telephone. Hong Kong voted them out. I ask unanimous consent to have this article dated July 19 printed in the Record.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, finally, on July 20, I received a letter from the Honorable William E. Kennard, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, which I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, two Saturdays ago, Mr. Peter S. Goodman reported in the Washington Post on the design of Deutsche Telekom, a German government company, which is designed to take over any and all U.S. telecommunications. In the final paragraph of that particular story, the head of Deutsche Telekom said, no, they were not interested in joint ventures. They were interested in total control. This Senator from South Carolina participated in the 1996 Telecommunications Act, deregulating and decontrolling the American telecommunications industry. We certainly didn't take it out from under American control to put it under German government control. I placed a call to the head of the Federal Communications Commission. We had a conversation. I ask unanimous consent that my letter of June 28 denoting that conversation be printed in the Record.

Mr. HOLLINGS. That has caused part of the economic boom we are enjoying at this particular time. All this stirring of investment and expansion and services and competition is a wonderful dynamic that we all enjoy. Let's keep it going.

Mr. HOLLINGS. I have been here 34 years just about, and I am still the junior Senator. And Senator Thurmond said, ``Get used to it.''

Mr. HOLLINGS. You are my best friend.

Mr. HOLLINGS

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I speak to the amendment of the Senator from Tennessee. There is no question that China proliferates. The very interesting feature to the entire picture here is that they object, of course, to us defending ourselves. As I see it, in essence, they are saying: Wait a minute. If you get a strategic defense initiative, if you get an antiballistic missile defense, that is going to deter or retard our proliferation, our sales to Pakistan, our sales to Iran. A nation's defense should never be negotiable. It is totally out of the question. We should not be running around talking to the Europeans or those in the Pacific rim when it comes to what is necessary and fundamentally needed for the defense of the United States. I support the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. HOLLINGS

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I rise today to remember our friend Paul Coverdell. The state of Georgia and the United States have lost a talented and dedicated statesman. Senator Coverdell's workmanlike approach to government was a breath of fresh air in today's atmosphere of glamour politics. He didn't aspire to be in the spotlight, but he fought tirelessly to spotlight the issues in which he believed. Whether you agreed with his position on those issues or not, you admired his style--his lack of pretense, willingness to complete tedious, but important tasks, and pleasant demeanor during a tough debate. His office was one floor above mine in the Russell Building and we often rode the subway together over to the Capitol. His easygoing nature always struck me as particularly Southern. We shared a love for that slow, gracious lifestyle of our home states and enjoyed working together when it served the similar needs of our constituents. Paul had a deep appreciation for the office of U.S. Senator having persevered in his quest for a Senate seat in 1992 despite a highly- competitive race that featured two runoffs. For the next eight years, he never took the privilege of serving the people of Georgia or the nation lightly. We can all learn something from his example. Service was an evolving theme in Paul Coverdell's life, beginning with an overseas stint in the U.S. Army, later followed by almost two decades in the Georgia state Senate and a post in President Bush's administration as Director of the U.S. Peace Corps. He was well- prepared when he arrived in the Senate chamber and used his experience to advance an aggressive legislative agenda. It was a pleasure to serve in the U.S. Senate with Paul Coverdell. He fought fairly, was gracious in victory and honorable in defeat. My sympathy goes out to his wife, Nancy, and other family members and to the people of Georgia.

Mr. HOLLINGS

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, do you want to make $1 million? Do you want to become a millionaire? All you have to do is find the surplus that is in the headlines. This morning, USA Today said ``surplus doubles.'' That crowd knows how to write, but they do not know how to read. I have the Congressional Budget Office report that they quoted. On page 17, the debt goes from $5.617 trillion to $6.370 trillion. The debt is going up. The surplus is going down. I thought maybe they had gotten it from the President's midyear review just given 2 weeks ago. Of course, you know how they mix these things up. The last page tells the truth. On page 23, President Clinton finds that the debt goes up to $1 trillion--no surplus. The debt increases. I then go to the public debt to the penny. Call up Treasury. They give this out every day. You find how the debt goes up. What they are trying to do is increase the debt with this $248 billion. I am for paying down the debt. Vote for the amendment if you are for paying down the debt, please.

Mr. HOLLINGS

Mr. HOLLINGS. I also ask unanimous consent that the public Interest Expense on the Public Debt Outstanding, issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, be printed in the Record.

Mr. HOLLINGS. I ask unanimous consent that table 23 of the midsession review by the President of the United States, dated June 26, be printed in the Record.

Mr. HOLLINGS. I ask unanimous consent the Public Debt to the Penny, issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, dated as of last Friday, July 14, be printed in the Record.

Mr. HOLLINGS

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I rise to commend the Surface Transportation Board for issuing its rail merger moratorium, which has just been upheld by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. We on the Commerce Committee have been watching the railroad industry closely these last several years and we believe time is needed to reevaluate where the industry has been and where it should be going. To have moved forward with a new round of mergers now would have been shortsighted and not in the public interest. I am pleased that the Board had the courage to call a time-out on rail mergers to reexamine its rail merger policy before proceeding further at this important crossroads for the rail sector. I am also gratified that the Court shared my view, and the view of many of us in the Senate, that the Board has the authority to do what needs to be done.