Henry Hyde

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. My recollection is he had 52 separate appeals.

Mr. HYDE. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from New York.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. It would not be a lawful arrest if no crime were being committed and no crime was being committed in exhibiting the gun to his friend. There was no crime.

Mr. HYDE. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. HYDE. The key words are ``probable cause.''

Mr. HYDE. Let us say he is hugging his wife and the policeman thinks that sexual harassment is going on in front of him. Incident to arresting or halting that, he discovers narcotics. I want that to go into evidence. You want it suppressed.

Mr. HYDE. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the bill and in opposition to the amendment. Mr. Chairman, I just want to point out that the committee bill does not validate searches and seizures that are made in bad faith. The court will make that determination. It seems to me under the scenario the gentlewoman just recited, she would have a great lawsuit. She is a lawyer, and her husband is a lawyer. I am sure they know lots of lawyers. They must consort with lawyers. I cannot imagine why a good, healthy lawsuit did not ensue. Police are sued every day. If they intrude, if they trespass, they have no more rights than anybody else. However, Mr. Chairman, what we are talking about is a good faith arrest. I can conceive of a situation where two men are on the street with a policeman nearby and one of them pulls a gun. What he is doing is showing his friend his gun that he just bought, but the policeman thinks this is a holdup, jumps the guy with the gun, and in searching him, finds cocaine in his pocket. Mr. Chairman, under the committee bill, that cocaine would be admissible in a trial. Under the exclusionary rule, it would not. Who is penalized by the exclusionary rule as it presently is employed? The people. The people are victimized, nobody else, just the people. The principle of Leon is to be distinguished from the terms of Leon. Leon stands for the principle that there is nothing sacred about the exclusionary rule and if the law enforcement officer made a good faith effort to make a reasonable search and seizure, to be determined by an objectively reasonable standard, then the evidence shall not be suppressed. Yes, it tilts toward the public, it tilts toward the victims of crime. It no longer tilts toward the accused. But what is more unjust than suppressing evidence that should lead to a conviction of a serious crime because of some technical difficulty? We are addressing that. Any time they invade the gentlewoman's house again, I would like that case, and I would do it pro bono for the gentlewoman.

Mr. HYDE. But there could be an unlawful arrest, however, but made in good faith, under misapprehension of the facts, misapprehension even of the law. But if it is made in good faith as determined by the court under an objectively reasonable standard, then we have reached a crossroads. You want the evidence suppressed. We want the evidence admitted.

Mr. HYDE. I yield to the gentlewoman from Colorado.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, I am just saying the present exclusionary rule does not accomplish anything but let the accused go free.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me. I just want to disagree with my good friend, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers]. The exclusionary rule is not wiped out. It is changed from the way it is presently administered. But if the evidence is offered and an unreasonable search and seizure has been made that was not in good faith, I am sure the exclusionary rule in all its glory will be enforced. This does no violence to the fourth amendment. The exclusionary rule is judge-made. It was not made by this Congress. It is a rule the judges thought up to deter the policeman from making unreasonable searches and seizures. And their idea of deterring that was just not to admit the evidence. What happens is, the policeman is not punished. He walks out of the courtroom and the accused walks out of the courtroom. And the evidence of his or her guilt is suppressed. The people who lose on that one, the victims, does not codify Leon. I agree with the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers]. It codifies the principle of Leon, which applies to warrants and may well apply to warrantless searches. If the search was done in good faith, as determined by the court, not by the policeman, by an objectively reasonable standard, then the evidence, the heroin that they got in the trunk of the car, gets admitted, not suppressed. And the judge makes that judgment. Yes, this is a change in emphasis. Heretofore in criminal law, the rights of the criminal, the rights of the accused have been paramount. In the last bill we suddenly awoke to the fact that victims have rights and are entitled to restitution, regardless of the financial solvency or insolvency of the criminal. Now we are saying, with Justice Cardozo, who famously pronounced that a trial should be a search for the guilt or innocence of the accused, not a determination as to whether the constable blundered, if constables are going to blunder, then punish the constables, but do not suppress the evidence. The public out there is also an important factor in this equation. I hope this bill passes unmended, and I thank the gentleman again for yielding time to me.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, does the gentleman think suppressing the evidence punishes the policeman who had made an unreasonable search?

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, the 1994 Omnibus Crime Control Act was not so omnibus. It did nothing for the victims of crime. This bill remembers that crime has victims; this bill remembers that the victims for too long have been forgotten in the sentencing process; this bill remembers that the victims for too long have been without standing to address and advise sentencing judges of the economic harms visited upon them through the criminal actions of the offender. This bill directs Federal judges to impose upon convicted defendants restitution orders to pay back their victims for the harm caused by virtue of their criminal activity. No longer will the defendant's financial situation take precedence over his victim's. Instead, consideration for the victim is a primary consideration in the sentencing process, just where it belongs. Today criminals know that crime pays. Now it will pay the victims. Defendants are financially responsible for physical, emotional, or monetary harm. Victims can be reimbursed for child care, transportation, and other reasonable expenses related to their participation in the prosecution of the offense. The court under this legislation must consider the victim's financial circumstances when determining the manner and method of payment or restitution. The victim will be paid either a lump sum, in interval payments, or in kind. In-kind payments include return of the victim's property and replacement of the property or services rendered. The bill guarantees that the victim of criminal activity will not be overlooked at any point in the criminal justice proceedings. Mr. Chairman, this is a restitution bill with teeth.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say to my friend from Michigan, the first amendment is silent on judicial review. All of the amendments are silent on judicial review. The courts will review or not. They have been doing it since 1791, and unfortunately or fortunately we have limited control over them. As to my friend from North Carolina, the Constitution provides many interesting examples of supermajorities. One of the most interesting is the 25th amendment where the President and his advisers, his Cabinet, have a dispute over whether he is able to continue serving as President, and that dispute can finally be resolved by a two-thirds vote of Congress. We have overriding vetoes, we have treaty ratifications, and so on. The 14th amendment is very interesting. That requires a two-thirds vote to rehabilitate, to remove disqualifications from someone who had engaged in rebellion.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today it adjourn to meet at 9 a.m. tomorrow.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on House Joint Resolution 1, the balanced budget constitutional amendment.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

Mr. HYDE. I think the gentlemen are suggesting I should be institutionalized. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say as to the supermajority on raising taxes: When the government expands its power from one level of gross domestic product to another in terms of its fiscal reach, that ought to be an extraordinary decision because we are reaching into people's pockets and we are taking a great rate of the blood, sweat and tears that they have earned through their own work. So that extraordinary reach ought to be an extraordinary decision, and that ought to call for an extraordinary vote. So to increase taxes, to increase the reach of government, it seems to me is an extraordinary decision. It has not been until now, but we are going to try to make it an extraordinary decision, and not have that left to a simple majority vote. Sixty percent is not that tough to get over 50 percent, but it is a little tougher, and we want to avoid the bias towards increasing taxes as the line of least resistance to balancing the budget. I would say to my friend from North Carolina, the only amendment that the gentleman offered to be brought before the Committee on Rules was one we did vote on in the full committee, and he lost 13 to 19. I will agree the Committee on Rules did not have a relitigation of that issue, and I wish they had because the gentleman is a member of the committee. But the other nine amendments that the gentleman says he had, I never did see them, but he said he had them. He must not have thought too highly of them, because he did not even offer them.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Kim]. (Mr. KIM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Franks]. (Mr. FRANKS of New Jersey asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished deputy majority whip, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hastert]. (Mr. HASTERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Fawell], the head of the pork busters caucus. (Mr. FAWELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, that last activity of the Chair is not debatable, I take it?