Henry Hyde

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing the Intellectual Property Antitrust Protection Act of 1997. I am pleased to be joined by my colleagues on the Judiciary Committee, Mr. Sensenbrenner, Mr. Gekas, Mr. Smith, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Canady, Mr. Bono, and Mr. Frank who are original cosponsors of this legislation. Because of increasing competition and a burgeoning trade deficit, our policies and laws must enhance the position of American businesses in the global marketplace. This concern should be a top priority for this Congress. A logical place to start is to change rules that discourage the use and dissemination of existing technology and prevent the pursuit of promising avenues of research and development. Some of these rules arise from judicial decisions that erroneously create a tension between the antitrust laws and the intellectual property laws. Our bill would eliminate a court-created presumption that market power is always present in a technical antitrust sense when a product protected by an intellectual property right is sold, licensed, or otherwise transferred. The market power presumption is wrong because it is based on false assumptions. Because there are often substitutes for products covered by intellectual property rights or there is no demand for the protected product, an intellectual property right does not automatically confer the power to determine the overall market price of a product or the power to exclude competitors from the marketplace. On May 14, 1996, the Judiciary Committee held a thorough hearing on H.R. 2674, an identical bill that was introduced in the last Congress. At the hearing, the bill received support from the Intellectual Property Owners, the American Bar Association, and the Licensing Executives' Society. The administration agreed that the bill reflected the proper antitrust policy, but hesitated to endorse a legislative remedy. Despite the administration's reluctance to endorse the bill fully in last year's hearing, the recent antitrust guidelines on the licensing of intellectual property--issued jointly by the antitrust enforcement agencies, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade commission-- acknowledge that the court-created presumption is wrong. The guidelines state that the enforcement agencies ``will not presume that a patent, copyright, or trade secret necessarily confers market power upon its owner. Although the intellectual property right confers the power to exclude with respect to the specific product, process, or work in question, there will often be sufficient actual or potential close substitutes for such product, process, or work to prevent the exercise of market power.'' Antitrust guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, April 6, 1995, p. 4 (emphasis in original). For too long, Mr. Speaker, court decisions have applied the erroneous presumption of market power thereby creating an unintended conflict between the antitrust laws and the intellectual property laws. Economists and legal scholars have criticized these decisions, and more importantly, these decisions have discouraged innovation to the detriment of the American economy. The basic problem stems from a lower Federal court decision that construed patents and copyrights as automatically giving the intellectual property owner market power. Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 908 (1984). The sheer size of the Ninth Circuit and its location make this holding a serious problem, even though some other courts have not applied the presumption. Abbott Laboratories v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1205 (1992); A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit covers nine States and two territories, and it has a population of more than 45 million people. In addition, it contains a significant portion of the computer industry, including Silicon Valley in California and Microsoft in Washington. So, in this very important area, the law says one thing in the Ninth Circuit, a different thing in other circuits, and in still other circuits, the courts have not spoken. See Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, p. 4 n. 10. This lack of clarity causes uncertainty about the law which, in turn, stifles innovation and discourages the dissemination of technology. For example, under Supreme Court precedent, tying is subject to per se treatment under the antitrust laws only if the defendant has market power in the tying product. However, the presumption automatically confers market power on any patented or copyrighted product. Thus, when a patented or copyrighted product is sold with any other product, it is automatically reviewed under a harsh per se standard even though the patented or copyrighted product may not have any market power. As a result, innovative computer manufacturers may be unwilling to sell copyrighted software with unprotected hardware--a package that many consumers desire--because of the fear that this bundling will be judged as a per se violation of the prohibition against tying. The disagreement among the courts only heightens the problem for corporate counsel advising their clients as to how to proceed. Moreover, it encourages forum shopping as competitors seek a court that will apply the presumption. Clearly, intellectual property owners need a uniform national rule enacted by Congress. Very similar legislation passed the Senate during past Congresses with broad, bipartisan support. S. 438 passed the Senate once as separate legislation and twice as an amendment to House-passed legislation during the 100th Congress. S. 270, a similar bill, passed the Senate again during the 101st Congress. During the debate over that legislation, opponents of this procompetitive measure made various erroneous claims about this legislation--let me dispel these false notions at the outset. First, this bill does not create an antitrust exemption. To the contrary, it eliminates an antitrust plaintiff's ability to rely on a demonstrably false presumption without providing proof of market power. Second, this bill does not in any way affect the remedies, including treble damages, that are available to an antitrust plaintiff when it does prove its case. Third, this bill does not change the law that tying arrangements are deemed to be per se illegal when the defendant has market power in the tying product. Rather, it simply requires the plaintiff to prove that the claimed market power does, in fact, exist before subjecting the defendant to the per se standard. Fourth, this bill does not legalize any conduct that is currently illegal. Instead, this bill ensures that intellectual property owners are treated the same as all other companies under the antitrust laws, including those relating to tying violations. The bill does not give them any special treatment, but restores to them the same treatment that all others receive. In short, the time has come to reverse the misdirected judicial presumption. We must remove the threat of unwarranted liability from those who seek to market new technologies more efficiently. The intellectual property and antitrust laws should be structured so as to be complementary, not conflicting. This legislation will encourage the creation, development, and commercial application of new products and processes. It can mean technological advances which create new industries, increase productivity, and improve America's ability to compete in foreign markets. I urge my colleagues in the House to join us in cosponsoring this important legislation. If you would like to join as a cosponsor, please call Joseph Gibson of the Judiciary Committee staff at extension 5- 3951.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, please permit me to share with my colleagues the text of a report prepared by high school teacher Pat Feichter. Pat, a teacher of American government at Maine South High School in Park Ridge, IL, recently returned from a humanitarian mission to Bosnia. He and other civics teachers from the United States and Western Europe organized and led seminars for Bosnians who teach government and civics. The seminars, sponsored by the Center for Civic Education, are part of the center's ongoing mission--here at home and abroad--to advance our collective knowledge about the institutions of western-style democracy: Observations on Bosnia When the Center for Civic Education asked me to volunteer to teach in Bosnia this summer, I jumped at the opportunity. Many people thought I was crazy, but I knew it would be a unique experience and one in which I could make a positive contribution in promoting democratic values. As one enters Bosnia, it does not take long to experience destruction. Our seven hour bus trip to Sarajevo passed through dozens of war ravaged villages and towns. Some were selectively damaged, with only certain areas felled by artillery shells, others were totally leveled. The once beautiful city of Mostar was one of the worst. Everywhere, in this Muslim-Croatian divided city, was evidence of war. Sarajevo, once the proud host of the 1984 Winter Olympic Games, is a city of burnt-out hulks. Over 1,300,000 artillery shells have struck Sarajevo. The effects were extensive and devastating. The Holiday Inn, where we stayed while in Sarajevo, is still marked by the effects of war. There are elevators and guest rooms with bullet holes and a stairway being repaired from a direct artillery hit. I was assigned to teach in the Canton of Travnik, 60 miles north of Sarajevo. I worked with one other American teacher from Minnesota and two Europeans, one from Germany and the other from Switzerland. This was the first time any of us had worked together. Flexibility and a willingness to compromise was a basic need. We were able to work together well. Our class had thirty participants. These were teachers of Muslim, Croatian, and Serbian ancestry. We worked entirely through interpreters. Our facility was a Jesuit founded secondary school 114 years old. Apprehension is the best way to describe our feelings going into this two week course. Would the class understand us? Would they like us? Would they be willing to participate in simulations and group projects? The answer to this was a resounding yes! The Bosnian teachers, our students, were a joy to work with. They had a great sense of humor and an incredible interest in learning about democracy. Our mock trial and simulated election were two of the most popular activities. We became so close to members of our class that we were frequently invited to their apartments. People often ask me if I was frightened being in Bosnia. The answer is no. As long as you use common sense, there was nothing to fear. I walked the streets of both Travnik and Sarajevo in the evenings without a worry. However, you could not plan picnics in the countryside. Landmines, as estimated 8 to 11 million, are a danger. You must stay on paved roads and sidewalks. One of the saddest effects of the war is the huge number of refugees living in squalor. They have very little food to eat. One man showed me a small plate of goat cheese which was his only allotment of food for the day. These displaced people have in many cases been living in refugee centers for more than two years and often don't know where their loved ones are or even if they are alive. The most we could do for them was to offer clothes, some food, and a small amount of money. Ethnic tensions do exist in Bosnia and are usually just below the surface. One evening on the streets of Travnik, I was approached by an irate group of Croatians. They were very upset because the person who selected the Bosnian teachers to attend our program was a Muslim. They were concerned about bias in the selection process. From time to time, we would hear stories about churches and mosques being bombed. Yes, ethnic tensions are a fact of life in Bosnia. Would I return? In a heartbeat! Working with the Bosnian teachers was one of the most rewarding experiences of may life. In a small way I feel I may have helped further democracy and peace in this troubled land.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I would say to the gentleman that the bill is the identical bill with the one we just passed in the House. It is the Senate version.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 4164) to provide for the extension of certain authority for the Marshal of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Police.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on the bill under consideration.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to bring to the consideration of the House H.R. 4164, a bill to extend the authority for the Marshal of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Police to provide security to Justices, court employees, and official visitors beyond the Court's buildings and grounds. It is crucial that we take favorable action on this legislation before adjourning this Congress, since authority to provide this protection is slated to expire on December 29, 1996. The authority for the Marshal of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Police to provide security beyond court grounds appears at 40 U.S.C. 13n(a)(2), and was first established by Congress in 1982. Congress has periodically extended that authority--in the past 14 years, there has not been an interruption of the Supreme Court police's authority to provide such protection. Congress originally provided that the authority would terminate in December 1985, and extensions have been provided ever since. In 1985, authority was extended through December 26, 1990; in 1990, it was extended through December 29, 1993; and in 1993, it was extended through December 29, 1996. Chief Justice Rehnquist has written to me requesting that Congress extend this authority permanently. As the Chief Justice correctly pointed out to me in his letter, ``As security concerns have not diminished, it is essential that the off-grounds authority of the Supreme Court police be continued without interruption.'' The Supreme Court informs me that threats of violence against the Justices and the Court have increased since 1982, as has violence in the Washington metropolitan area. Accordingly, I support a permanent extension of this authority to provide for the safety of the Justices, court employees, and official visitors. Given the late date in the Congress, however, and the fact that we must pass an extension before December 29, 1996, the bill we are considering today would provide for only a 4-year extension, until December 29, 2000. My colleague in the Senate, Senator Hatch, has introduced a similar, stopgap bill, which will allow for the orderly continuation of Supreme Court security measures until the time that we can consider a permanent authorization. Yesterday, the Senate approved that bill. This provision is without significant cost, but provides great benefits to those on the highest court in the land and those working with them. According to the Supreme Court, from 1993 through 1995, there were only 25 requests for Supreme Court police protection beyond the Washington, DC, metropolitan area, at a toal cost of $2,997. I am also informed that off-grounds protection of the Justices within the D.C. area is provided without substantial additional cost, since it is part of the officers' regularly scheduled duties along with tasks on court grounds. I encourage my colleagues to support this much-needed extension so as to preserve the security of the Supreme Court. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume to pay tribute to my friend, the gentlewoman from Colorado, Pat Schroeder. This may be our last clash on the floor. We have had several over the past 22 years anyway, and they have all been civil. They have been fervent but they have been civil. The gentlewoman makes a great contribution to this body, and she will be missed by this Member. I wish her Godspeed in her future endeavors. Mr. Speaker, I have no requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's table the Senate bill (S. 2100) to provide for the extension of certain authority for the Marshal of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Police.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, the cost and length of traditional litigation is increasingly leading to the settlement of claims through alternative means. Many different techniques, such as mediation, arbitration, minitrials, and partnering have been found effective in reaching expeditious and consensual resolutions to matters which would have otherwise been adjudicated through our courts. The benefits of these alternative dispute resolution techniques are equally apparent where one or more of the parties to the dispute is a governmental entity. In order to promote their use by agencies, we are today considering H.R. 4194, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, which will reauthorize that act. In addition to providing a permanent authorization for the act, H.R. 4194 contains several provisions which will improve procedures governing alternative dispute resolution, and give parties incentives to use these techniques. First, it eliminates the provision of current law which gives the Government 30 days to vacate the award of an arbitrator. The practical effect of this provision was that no private party would agree to arbitration with the Government. This change is anticipated to dramatically increase the use of binding arbitration. Under the bill, an agency cannot use binding arbitration if doing so would exceed its otherwise applicable settlement authority in alternative dispute resolution proceedings. An arbitrator would not be permitted to grant an award that is inconsistent with law. In addition, prior to the use of binding arbitration, the head of each agency, in consultation with the Attorney General, must issue guidelines on the use and limitations of binding arbitration. Second, H.R. 4194 increases the confidentiality of dispute resolution communications between a party and a neutral. While current law sets out in great detail what communications in an alternative dispute resolution may be disclosed by the neutral and the parties, and under what conditions, it fails to ensure that such documents are also protected from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act [FOIA]. If either a party or the neutral is a Government agency, a dispute resolution communication would be potentially available to the public through FOIA dispute the intent of the ADR Act that it be kept confidential. This confidentiality is of vital importance to reaching a voluntary agreement, because it encourages a candid exchange between a party and a neutral. H.R. 4194 provides an exemption from FOIA disclosure for communications between a party and a neutral, so long as they would also be confidential according to the terms of the ADR Act. The bill clarifies that, under 5 U.S.C. section 574, a dispute resolution communication between a party and a neutral or a neutral and a party that meets the requirements for confidentiality in section 574 is also exempt from disclosure under FOIA. In addition, a dispute resolution communication originating from a neutral and provided to all of the parties, such as early neutral evaluation, is protected from discovery under 574(b)(7) and from disclosure under FOIA. A dispute resolution communication originating from a party to a party or parties is not protected from disclosure by the ADR Act. The intent of this provision not to exempt from disclosure under FOIA a dispute resolution communication given by one party to another party could be easily thwarted if a neutral in receipt of a dispute resolution communication agrees with a party to in turn pass the communication on to another party. If the neutral attempts to circumvent the prohibitions of the ADR Act in this manner, the FOIA exemption would not apply. As with all other FOIA exemptions, the exemption created by section 574(j) is to be construed narrowly. Parties should not be allowed to use the new exemption as a mere sham to exempt information from FOIA. Thus, for example, litigants should not resort to ADR principally as a means of taking advantage of the new exemption. In such case the new exemption would not apply. Mr. Speaker, H.R. 4194 also reauthorizes the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, which encourages agencies to use negotiated rulemaking when its use would enhance the informal rulemaking process. The bill requires the President to designate an agency or to designate or establish an interagency committee to facilitate and encourage the use of negotiated rulemaking, and to do the same to facilitate the use of alternative dispute resolution. Hopefully, the President will designate the same entity for both purposes. This would promote the coordination of policies, enhance institutional memory on the relevant issues, and make more efficient the use of ADR and negotiated rulemaking. In addition, the bill requires the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to take action to expedite the establishment of negotiated rulemaking committees and committees to resolve disputes under the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act. The Federal Advisory Committee Act [FACA] would apply to proceedings under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, but not to proceedings under the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act. Mr. Speaker, I strongly support H.R. 4194 and urge its swift adoption.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, recently, I have received complaints from parties who have been involved in proceedings in Indian tribal courts. These complaints suggest that non-Indian civil litigants in these courts may face unfair treatment, but, yet, are unable to seek protection from violations of their Federal rights in any other judicial forum. For example, earlier this year, a Crow Nation tribal court entered a judgment for $250 million in compensatory damages against the Burlington Northern Railroad. This case deals with a railroad grade- crossing accident which occurred on the Crow Reservation in Montana in 1993. The accident involved the death of three members of the Crow Tribe. However, the crossing was well-marked, and no accident had ever occurred there in the entire 50-year history of the crossing. A blood alcohol test revealed that the driver and one of the passengers were intoxicated at the time of the accident. Burlington Northern alleges that various violations of basic due process occurred during the trial, including, the use of jurors who should have been struck for cause, improper prejudicial comments to the jury venire by a member of the appellate court, use of evidenced that was barred by Federal law, and the barring of evidence relating to the proper amount of compensatory questions. I have not had the opportunity to review the complete record of this case, and I do not know all of the details. Further, I do not seek to affect the outcome of this particular case and I believe it should continue in due course under existing law. However, these allegations do raise serious questions about the overall fairness of the Indian tribal court system, which calls for further review by the Congress. I understand that there are now more than 200 of these types of courts across the Nation and that they process thousands of cases per year. Many of these cases involve persons who have no particular connection to the tribe other than that they have traveled across Indian country on an interstate highway or railroad. Although the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. Sec. 1302, requires these courts to provide basic constitutional rights, it does not provide any means by which litigants may seek to vindicate these rights in a Federal court. In fact, litigants have no way to vindicate these rights except through the tribal court system. This situation sharply contrasts with the situation in State courts. State court decisions regarding the protection of Federal rights may be reviewed on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court and by actions under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Current law provides that Federal courts may review the decisions of tribal courts only to determine whether the case was within the jurisdiction of the court, and they may only conduct that review after all avenues of relief have been exhausted in the tribal court system. I do want to stress that I believe in the Indian tribal court system. It is only right that Indians should be able to have their own courts to judge their own affairs. By the same token, I want to say emphatically that it is only right that those courts should provide all of the constitutional protections required by law, including basic due process. The consistent enforcement of constitutional norms is particularly important if the tribal courts are to have jurisdiction over nonmembers who have only tangential relationships with the tribes. This is a subject that both the Judiciary Committee and the Resources Committee should review in the next Congress.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to inform the House of the serious problem that has come to my attention as chairman of the select subcommittee of the House Committee on International Relations established to look into the Clinton administration's policy of giving Iran a green light in setting up military assistance programs in Croatia and Bosnia. We are well along in our investigation and hope to have a report ready to share with the House and the public next month. I can guarantee you that if we can manage to get the administration to cooperate concerning the rules of classification, that report will make very interesting reading. It will document an incredibly ill-advised policy that was conceived and executed in an incredibly inept manner. Moreover, and more importantly, it will lay out for all to see the tragedy in the making that is its legacy, a well-entrenched and hostile Iranian foothold in Europe. The Iranian presence and influence, pervasive in some of the highest circles of the Bosnian Muslim political leadership, is now playing havoc with our policymakers trying to implement the Dayton accords and our military trying to keep the lid on violence in the region. This cloud of Iranian influence and the terrorist infrastructure it has fostered in this part of Europe are, and will remain, very real threats to the West for years to come. The problem I wish to bring to your attention concerns the difficulty our subcommittee has had in trying to pry loose information that must be shared with the American people if they are to understand our findings. The administration is doing this by hiding behind the rules of classification. That is, they are insisting that important information is classified and cannot be shared with the American people due to concerns of its compromising national security. What sort of information am I talking about? The names of intelligence agents? No. Information on our military's capabilities? No. What we are talking about are embarrassing little comments and facts. We are talking about secrets that look like this. This is one of three documents we asked the administration several months ago to declassify for our report. After over a month of deliberation, the State Department refused to declassify two of them, and, for this one, they selectively declassified 60 percent of the text. What then is in the 40 percent they deleted? Well, I cannot tell you exactly, because the administration says it is classified. I can let you know in the most general terms it includes such things as an embarrassing comment by a senior Department of State official on his department's performance in formulating the policy that gave Iran a green light into coming into the Balkans. It contains an embarrassing statement about the administration's ability or inability to reach a decision on policy guidance to issue an ambassador. It contains an statement whether or not to interpose itself between a foreign government and the Iranians. It also contains an embarrassing statement about whether or not the administration would advise our allies who have troops on the ground in Bosnia of a decision that could affect the safety of those troops. I ask then, is this classification to protect the national security, or is it to avoid embarrassment and avoid admitting mistakes? This administration has made a great hullabaloo about declassifying information. Openness has been its byword. When it comes to sensitive military information, the motto has been when in doubt, declassify. Well, unfortunately, that is not how it works in practice. I invite the administration to live up to its fine rhetoric. In its public pronouncements of openness, the administration went so far as to issue a new executive order specifically stating it shall be illegal to use the rules of classification to ``conceal violations of law, inefficiency or administrative error,'' or ``to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization or agency.'' That is from Section 1.8 of the Clinton Administration's Executive Order 12958. Accordingly, I have referred this matter today to the Information Security Oversight Office and the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel for investigation and appropriate action. Finally, I wish to assure the House that we will continue to investigate the administration's efforts at providing the Iranians a unique opportunity, that amounted to a franchise for insinuating and entrenching themselves into a very vulnerable and volatile part of Europe.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to proceed out of order with my 5-minute special order.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I listened to the last gentleman in the well and I am a little bewildered because we marked this bill up, it took us 9 days, and we dealt with 103 amendments, 39 of which were decided by rollcall vote. The bill, when we finally got it to the floor, passed 333 to 87 in the House and 97 to 3 in the Senate. Prior to introducing the bill, the House Immigration Subcommittee heard from more than 100 witnesses and the Democrats were present and participated fully. So the gentleman, I think, is mistaken. In any event, this is among the most important pieces of legislation this Congress will handle. A country has to control its borders. A country has the right to define itself. I think this is a good bill. It cannot please everybody, but it pleases a lot of people and I think it ought to pass. I am pleased to speak in support of the conference report on H.R. 2202, because I believe it will facilitate major progress in addressing one of our Nation's most urgent problems--illegal immigration. In reconciling House and Senate versions of this landmark legislation, we provide for substantially enhanced border and interior enforcement, greater deterrents to immigration related crimes, more effective mechanisms for denying employment to illegal aliens, and more expeditious removal of persons not legally present in the United States. The most difficult matter for the conferees to resolve concerned public education benefits for illegal aliens. Because public education is a major State function, the House had recognized the interests of each individual State in issues involving public school attendance at State taxpayer expense. In that connection, we appreciated the fact that concerns about the welfare of unsupervised children and adolescents might lead many States to continue providing free public education to undocumented aliens--and we did nothing to discourage such choices at the State level. The compromise House and Senate conferees initially developed, both gave expression to the right of a State to choose a different course and extended important transitional protections to current students. Because of an explicit veto threat from the President, however, we subsequently decided that it would be preferable to address this entire issue in the context of other legislation rather than place at risk the many needed enforcement-related provisions of this bill. The conferees also struggled with the issue of how to fairly and expeditiously adjudicate asylum claims of persons arriving without documents or fraudulent documents. We recognized that layering of prolonged administrative and judicial consideration can overwhelm the immigration adjudicatory process, serve as a magnet to illegal entry, and encourage abuse of the asylum process. At the same time, we recommended major safeguards against returning persons who meet the refugee definition to conditions of persecution. Specially trained asylum officers will screen cases to determine whether aliens have a ``credible fear of persecution''--and thus qualify for more elaborate procedures. The credible fear standard is redrafted in the conference document to address fully concerns that the ``more probable than not'' language in the original House version was too restrictive. In addition, the conferees provided for potential immigration judge review of adverse credible fear determinations by asylum officers. This is a major change providing the safeguard of an important role for a quasi-judicial official outside the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The conference document includes a House provision I offered in the Committee on the Judiciary to protect victims of coercive population control practices. Our law--which appropriately recognizes persecution claims in a number of contexts--must not turn a blind eye to egregious violations of human rights that occur when individuals are forced to terminate the life of an unborn child, submit to involuntary sterilization, or experience persecution for failing or refusing to undergo an abortion or sterilization or for resisting a coercive population control program in other ways. A related well-founded fear clearly must qualify as a well-founded fear of persecution for purposes of the refugee definition. Our modification of the refugee definition responds to the moral imperative of aiding victims and potential victims of flagrant mistreatment. We also take a public stand against forcible interference with reproductive rights and forcible termination of life--a stand that hopefully will help to discourage such inhumane practices abroad. This omnibus legislation includes a number of miscellaneous provisions that are responsive to a range of problems. For example, certain Polish applicants for the 1995 diversity immigrant program reasonably anticipated being able to adjust to permanent resident status; by facilitating their adjustment in fiscal year 1997 we effectively rectify a bureaucratic error. We also recognize the equities of certain nationals of Poland and Hungary who were paroled into the United States years ago--and thus entered our country legally--by affording them an opportunity to adjust to permanent resident status. I welcomed the opportunity to seek appropriate conference action in these compelling situations. This omnibus immigration legislation makes major needed changes in the Immigration and Nationality Act. The primary thrust of the conference document is to respond in a measured and comprehensive fashion to a multifaceted breakdown in immigration law enforcement. I urge my colleagues to support it.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I beg the indulgence of my colleagues not to ask me to yield because I cannot and will not and I would appreciate their courtesy. I also want to say briefly that those who have charge us with politics, invidious politics, for delaying this debate ought to understand that Americans cannot believe this practice exists and it has taken months to educate the American people and it will take many more months to educate them as to the nature and extent of this horrible practice. That is one reason it has taken so long. The law exists to protect the weak from the strong. That is why we are here. Mr. Speaker, in his classic novel ``Crime and Punishment,'' Dostoyevsky has his murderous protagonist Raskolnikov complain that ``Man can get used to anything, the beast!'' That we are even debating this issue, that we have to argue about the legality of an abortionist plunging a pair of scissors into the back of the tiny neck of a little child whose trunk, arms and legs have already been delivered, and then suctioning out his brains only confirms Dostoyevsky's harsh truth. We were told in committee by an attending nurse that the little arms and legs stop flailing and suddenly stiffen as the scissors is plunged in. People who say ``I feel your pain'' are not referring to that little infant. What kind of people have we become that this procedure is even a matter for debate? Can we not draw the line at torture, and baby torture at that? If we cannot, what has become of us? We are all incensed about ethnic cleansing. What about infant cleansing? There is no argument here about when human life begins. The child who is destroyed is unmistakably alive, unmistakably human and unmistakably brutally destroyed. The justification for abortion has always been the claim that a women can do with her own body what she will. If you still believe that this four-fifths delivered little baby is a part of the woman's body, then I am afraid your ignorance is invincible. I finally figured out why supporters of abortion on demand fight this infacticide ban tooth and claw, because for the first time since Roe v. Wade the focus is on the baby, not the mother, not the woman but the baby, and the harm that abortion inflicts on an unborn child, or in this instance a four-fifths born child. That child whom the advocates of abortion on demand have done everything in their power to make us ignore, to dehumznize, is as much a bearer of human rights as any Member of this House. To deny those rights is more than the betrayal of a powerless individual. It betrays the central promise of America, that there is, in this land, justice for all. The supporters of abortion on demand have exercised an amazing capacity for self-deception by detaching themselves from any sympathy whatsoever for the unborn child, and in doing so they separate themselves from the instinct for justice that gave birth to this country. The President, reacting angrily to this challenge to his veto, claims not to understand why the morality of those who support a ban on partial birth abortions is superior to the morality of ``compassion'' that he insists informed his decision to reject Congress' ban on what Senator Moynihan has said is ``too close to infanticide.'' Let me explain, Mr. President. There is no moral nor, for that matter, medical justification for this barbaric assault on a partially born infant. Dr. Pamela Smith, director of medical education in the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at Chicago's Mount Sinai Hospital, testified to that, as have many other doctors. Dr. C. Everett Koop, the last credible Surgeon General we had, was interviewed by the American Medical Association on August 19, and he was asked: Question: ``President Clinton just vetoed a bill on partial birth abortions. In so doing, he cited several cases in which women were told these procedures were necessary to preserve their health and their ability to have future pregnancies. How would you characterize the claims being made in favor of the medical need for this procedure?'' Answer: Quoting Dr. Koop, ``I believe that Mr. Clinton was misled by his medical advisors on what is fact and what is fiction in reference to late term abortions.'' Question: ``In your practice as a pediatric surgeon, have you ever treated children with any of the disabilities cited in this debate? Have you operated on children born with organs outside of their bodies?'' Answer: ``Oh, yes, indeed. I've done that many times. The prognosis usually is good. There are two common ways that children are born with organs outside of their body. One is an omphalocele, where the organs are out but still contained in the sac composed of the tissues of the umbilical cord. I have been repairing those since 1946. The other is when the sac has ruptured. That makes it a little more difficult. I don't know what the national mortality would be, but certainly more than half of those babies survive after surgery. ``Now every once in a while, you have other peculiar things, such as the chest being wide open and the heart being outside the body. And I have even replaced hearts back in the body and had children grow to adulthood.'' Question: And live normal lives? Answer: Living normal lives. In fact, the first child I ever did with a huge omphalocele much bigger than her head went on to develop well and become the head nurse in my intensive care unit many years later.'' The abortionist who is a principal perpetrator of these atrocities, Dr. Martin Haskell, has conceded that at least 80 percent of the partial-birth abortions he performs are entirely elective; 80 percent are elective. And he admits to over a thousands of these abortions, and that is some years ago. We are told about some extreme cases of malformed babies as though life is only for the privileged, the planned and the perfect. Dr. James McMahon, the late Dr. James McMahon, listed nine such abortions he performed because the baby had a cleft lip. Many other physicians who care both about the mother and the unborn child have made it clear this is never a medical necessity, but it is a convenience for the abortionist. It is a convenience for those who choose to abort late in pregnancy when it becomes difficult to dismember the unborn child in the womb. Well, the President claims he wants to solve a problem by adding a health exception to the partial-birth abortion ban. That is spurious, as anyone who has spent 10 minutes studying the Federal law, understands. Health exceptions are so broadly construed by the court, as to make any ban utterly meaningless. If there is no consistent commitment that has survived the twists and the turns in policy during this administration, it is an unshakable commitment to a legal regime of abortion on demand. Nothing is or will be done to make abortion rare. No legislative or regulatory act will be allowed to impede the most permissive abortion license in the democratic world. The President would do us all a favor and make a modest contribution to the health of our democratic process if he would simply concede this obvious fact. In his memoirs Dwight Eisenhower wrote about the loss of 1.2 million lives in World War II, and he said: ``The loss of lives that might have otherwise been creatively lived scars the mind of the civilized world.'' Mr. Speaker, our souls have been scarred by one and a half million abortions every year in this country. Our souls have so much scar tissue there is not room for any more. And say, what do we mean by human dignity if we subject innocent children to brutal execution when they are almost born? We all hope and pray for death with dignity. Tell me what is dignified about a death caused by having a scissors stabbed into your neck so your brains can be sucked out. We have had long and bitter debates in this House about assault weapons. Those scissors and that suction machine are assault weapons worse than any AK-47. One might miss with an AK-47; the doctor never misses with his assault weapon, I can assure my colleagues. It is not just the babies that are dying for the lethal sin of being unwanted or being handicapped or malformed. We are dying, and not from the darkness, but from the cold, the coldness of self-brutalization that chills our sensibilities, deadens our conscience and allows us to think of this unspeakable act as an act of compassion. If my colleagues vote to uphold this veto, if they vote to maintain the legality of a procedure that is revolting even to the most hardened heart, then please do not ever use the word compassion again. A word about anesthesia. Advocates of partial-birth abortions tried to tell us the baby does not feel pain; the mother's anesthesia is transmitted to the baby. We took testimony from five of the country's top anesthesiologists, and they said it is impossible, that result will take so much anesthesia it would kill the mother. By upholding this tragic veto, those colleagues join the network of complicity in supporting what is essentially a crime against humanity, for that little, almost born infant struggling to live is a member of the human family, and partial-birth abortion is a lethal assault against the very idea of human rights and destroys, along with a defenseless little baby, the moral foundation of our democracy because democracy is not, after all, a mere process. It assigns fundamental rights and values to each human being, the first of which is the inalienable right to life. One of the great errors of modern politics is our foolish attempt to separate our private consciences from our public acts, and it cannot be done. At the end of the 20th century, is the crowning achievement of our democracy to treat the weak, the powerless, the unwanted as things? To be disposed of? If so, we have not elevated justice; we have disgraced it. This is not a debate about sectarian religious doctrine nor about policy options. This is a debate about our understanding of human dignity, what does it mean to be human? Our moment in history is marked by a mortal conflict between culture of death and a culture of life, and today, here and now, we must choose sides. I am not the least embarrassed to say that I believe one day each of us will be called upon to render an account for what we have done, and maybe more importantly, what we fail to do in our lifetime, and while I believe in a merciful God, I believe in a just God, and I would be terrified at the thought of having to explain at the final judgment why I stood unmoved while Herod's slaughter of the innocents was being reenacted here in my own country. This debate has been about an unspeakable horror. While the details are graphic and grisly, it has been helpful for all of us to recognize the full brutality of what goes on in America's abortuaries day in and day out, week after week, year after year. We are not talking about abstractions here. We are talking about life and death at their most elemental, and we ought to face the truth of what we oppose or support stripped of all euphemisms, and the queen of all euphemisms is ``choice'' as though one is choosing vanilla and chocolate instead of a dead baby or a live baby. Now, we have talked so much about the grotesque; permit me a word about beauty. We all have our own images of the beautiful; the face of a loved one, a dawn, a sunset, the evening star. I believe nothing in this world of wonders is more beautiful than the innocence of a child. Do my colleagues know what a child is? She is an opportunity for love, and a handicapped child is an even greater opportunity for love. Mr. Speaker, we risk our souls, we risk our humanity when we trifle with that innocence or demean it or brutalize it. We need more caring and less killing. Let the innocence of the unborn have the last word in this debate. Let their innocence appeal to what President Lincoln called the better angels of our nature. Let our votes prove Raskolnikov is wrong. There is something we will never get use to. Make it clear once again there is justice for all, even for the tiniest, most defenseless in this, our land.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, this is the customary request which will enable us to go to conference on this bill. I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the motion. The previous question was ordered.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to clause 1 of rule XX and by direction of the Committee on the Judiciary, I move to take from the Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 2977) to reauthorize alternative means of dispute resolution in the Federal administrative process, and for other purposes, with Senate amendments thereto, disagree to the Senate amendments, and agree to the conference asked by the Senate.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, when the cold war ended, Americans rightly hoped that our national security would no longer be threatened. We soon learned, however, that new or previously overlooked threats would replace the Eastern bloc in the struggle for progress and freedom throughout the world. We learned that evil despots in remote regions of the world could shatter the peace and threaten world stability when it suited their selfish interests. We also learned that ruthless terrorists, willing and able to strike anywhere and at anytime, would pose a growing threat to our Nation's security. But largely overlooked as a threat to our national security is the attack being waged against our Nation's economic interests. In my opinion, our economic interests should be seen as an integral part of its national security interests, because America's standing in the world depends on its economic strength and productivity. That's why the measure we are considering today is of great importance. Testimony before the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime indicated that economic espionage crimes cost American businesses approximately $24 billion a year in losses. But of even greater concern than those financial losses, and they are significant in themselves, is the fact that a large portion of these thefts are committed by agents of foreign governments or companies. FBI Director Freeh testified that the FBI currently is investigating allegations of economic espionage conducted against the United States by individuals or organization from 23 different countries. Most disturbing is the fact that a number of these countries maintain friendly relations with the United States, yet take advantage of their access to U.S. information and their ability to steal the innovations of American businesses. Mr. Speaker, we simply cannot allow this type of crime to occur. The Justice Department has told us that the existing laws dealing with the theft of property are insufficient to combat these crimes. And no wonder, those statutes were written in the 1930's. With all of the technological innovation of the computer age, criminals are finding new ways to steal the property--even the intangible property--of others. I support this bill because it will enact a comprehensive statute to combat this crime. It creates criminal penalties for the wrongful copying or control of trade secrets if done to benefit a foreign government or instrumentality. It also penalizes the wrongful diversion of a trade secret to the economic benefit of someone other than its owners. Americans have long been known as the most innovative people in the world. It is entirely appropriate that the Federal Government be equipped with the legal tools for protecting U.S. innovations. After all, it is our creative spirit that has made America the leader of the business and financial world. Protecting this position requires protecting our creative developments from unscrupulous international competitors. Mr. Speaker, simply put, it is in our national interest to prevent economic espionage. This bill will help the Federal Government to fulfill this critical mission. Enacting this measure now is of the utmost importance.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, as every one knows I strongly supported enhanced authority for law enforcement to investigate, prosecute, and punish terrorists. Specifically I believe Federal law enforcement ought to have the necessary tools in terrorism cases, tools that are already available in other types of criminal investigations. I am speaking about multipoint wiretaps, temporary emergency wiretaps and pen registers and trap and trace devices. In the first session of this Congress, I introduced the Comprehensive Antiterrorism Act of 1995, H.R. 1710, which did contain all of these features. My bill was approved by the Committee on the Judiciary June 20, 1995 by a bipartisan vote of 23 to 12. Unfortunately, some of these key elements were stricken from the final version of the law that was signed by the President on April 24 of this year. Today I have introduced similar legislation in the House of Representatives as H.R. 3960, the Antiterrorism Law Enforcement Enhancement Act of 1996. It is cosponsored by the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. John Conyers, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bill McCollum, and the gentleman from New York, Mr. Chuck Schumer. Among other things, it would expand authority for multipoint wiretaps, allow pen registers and trap and trace devices in counterintelligence cases and authorize temporary emergency wiretaps in terrorism cases. Obviously H.R. 3960 is a bipartisan initiative to make it clear we intend to continue the effort to bring about the kind of law enforcement enhancements necessary to effectively confront the terrorist threat in our country. The recent events, TWA flight 800 and the bombing at the Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta, are examples why Federal law enforcement needs these enhanced authorities. Now I want to say the legislation before us, H.R. 3953, does contain some very positive features which will assist us in countering terrorism. Section 201 adds terrorist offenses as RICO predicates. Section 202 provides increased penalties for violations of the Privacy Act and for the unauthorized disclosure of information obtained through a wiretap. Section 205 provides for a study of taggants in black and smokeless powder under the auspices of the National Institute of Justice. Section 206 authorizes the establishment of a National Commission on Terrorism. One important aspect of this issue, that is not part of the bill we are considering this afternoon is funding for digital telephony. This is a pivotal element of the antiterrorism effort that will enable the FBI, the DEA, and other Federal law enforcement agencies to deal with the changing technology in telecommunications. The funding is contained in the Commerce, State, and Justice appropriations bill. Specifically, it will give law enforcement access to digital and fiber-optic telephone technology for criminal investigation purposes. I must admit I have concerns about the implementation plan that is required of the FBI by the language in the appropriations bill. We are not against requiring the FBI to provide Congress with a plan, detailing how they expect to proceed but we did not want to have language in the law which would interfere with the prompt implementation of the digital telephony statute. Again, Mr. Speaker, this is very helpful legislation. But, I do want to again stress that I consider H.R. 3953 to be the beginning and not the end of this effort. The bottom line is that more needs to be done to provide Federal law enforcement with the kind of enhanced tools and authorities they need to effectively deal with the threat of terrorism in the United States and abroad. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Barr].

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am honored to yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum], chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary. (Mr. McCOLLUM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, today we consider the Senate amendment to the National Gambling Impact and Policy Commission Act (H.R. 497). H.R. 497 creates a temporary, 2-year national commission to study the economic and social impact of gambling in our country. The Commission will conduct a study and make recommendations--it will not have any power to regulate the gambling industry in any way. At the outset, I want to give special recognition to our colleague and my good friend, Congressman Frank Wolf of Virginia. This much- needed measure is here today largely because of his advocacy and persistence. Congressman Wolf has identified a very important public policy issue and he deserves high praise for his efforts. I also want to recognize the herculean efforts of Mr. Wolf's outstanding staffer, Will Moschella. During the pendency of this bill, Mr. Moschella has not only been of invaluable assistance in its passage, but he has also graduated from law school, passed the bar exam, and gotten married. When H.R. 497 passed the House on March 5, 1996, I pointed out the extensive record that supports this legislation. On September 29, 1995, the full Judiciary Committee held a hearing on H.R. 497. At that time, we heard from 15 witnesses, including 8 Members of Congress. Subsequent to our hearing, the committee received 15 additional statements for the record from other interested organizations and individuals. During our hearing, we heard virtually every point of view on gambling and its effects. For example, we had testimony on the problem of compulsive gambling. We also heard from a university professor focusing on the economic aspects of gambling--for example, job creation by gambling enterprises, gambling's impact on tourism, and gambling's impact on State and local government revenue. We also heard testimony from the chairman of the National Indian Gaming Association who documented how the emergence of an Indian gambling industry in recent years has had a positive impact on employment, economic development, and overall self-sufficiency for Indian tribes. Still others testified regarding the relationship between gambling and crime, including organized crime. Based upon this extensive committee record and personal study, I concluded that a study commission on gambling in the United States is a good idea. As the Washington Post proclaimed in its headline for an editorial endorsing the bill: ``For Once, a Useful Commission!'' The Post went on to observe that ``commissions can play the useful role of bringing to national attention issues that were previously submerged or debated in fragmentary ways.'' After passage of H.R. 497 in the House, some in the gambling industry continued to have concerns about this bill, particularly with respect to the subpoena power. Congressman Wolf and I worked many hours with Senator Stevens, Senator Lugar, Senator Simon, and other members of the Governmental Affairs Committee in the other body and the interested outside groups to try to resolve these concerns. After lengthy negotiations, we came to the resolution embodied in the Senate amendment to H.R. 497. Although neither side got everything that it wanted, I am satisfied that we have reached a reasonable compromise. The final work product will allow the Commission to conduct its study, while, at the same time, it allays the fears of those who thought the subpoena power would be overly intrusive. These negotiations have only reinforced my view that it is a particularly good time to have a balanced, impartial, and comprehensive look at whether or not the phenomenal growth of gambling is good for this country. Currently, 48 States allow some form of legalized gambling. We have State-conducted lotteries, riverboat gambling, Indian gambling, and casino gambling. We need to know the implications of this growth. Just before House passage of this bill, the Washington Post described the explosive growth of gambling: What had been a mob-infested vice has become state-approved fun--a new national pastime. While 70 million people attend professional baseball games each year, 125 million go to government-sanctioned casinos. Adults now spend more money gambling than they spend on children's durable toys. Three times more pilgrims from around the world visit the pyramid- shaped Luxor Hotel in Las Vegas than visit Egypt. Casinos rake in more profits than movie houses and theaters and all live concerts combined. The Washington Post, March 3, 1996, at A1. This expansion of legalized gambling has undoubtedly had negative effects. For example, many opportunities to gamble are now available to minors who are not ready to make a mature judgment about this kind of activity. Also, compulsive gamblers frequently have a negative, sometimes tragic, impact on their families. The traditional linkage between gambling and crime also concerns me. To give just one example, a GAO report issued in January concluded that ``the proliferation of casinos, together with the rapid growth of the amounts wagered, may make these operations highly vulnerable to money laundering.'' As gambling continues to spread, these negative effects and others spread with it. In addition, H.R. 497 will address the lack of reliable information about the effects of gambling. We need better scientific and behavioral data concerning gambling. Because of the lack of hard information, State and local policymakers, who are considering the legalization of gambling, may often be misled by exaggerated claims about the positive effects of gambling and the prospects for painless revenue generation. Last December, a Maryland State study commission concluded: The Maryland Congressional delegation should support the immediate creation of a national commission to study issues related to commercial gaming and should recommend that the commission complete its work within one year. States are unable to confidently make decisions about casino gaming because of competitive concerns about the decisions of their neighbors and because of the inadequate data and analysis available to them. The Task Force believes that the proposed national commission on gambling currently being considered by Congress, could make a significant contribution to public policy development. Final report of the Joint Executive-Legislative Task Force to Study Commercial Activities in Maryland, December 1995. I have listened to the critics of H.R. 497 during this process-- during Judiciary Committee consideration, during House consideration, and during our negotiations with the other body. They have made some good arguments, and when they have, we have worked hard to address those issues. In my statement during the debate on House passage of this bill, I described the many changes we made in the bill during Judiciary Committee consideration. I will not repeat that discussion here, but I would like to describe briefly the most important ways in which the Senate amendment differs from H.R. 497 as passed by the House. Both versions contain a list of matters to be studied. The Senate amendment compresses the list that was in the House-passed version, but it generally covers the same topics. In addition, the Senate amendment makes clear that the items listed are only the items that the Commission must, at a minimum, study. This list does not in any way limit other topics that the Commission may choose to study. The House-passed version gave the Commission broad subpoena powers for both witnesses and documents. The Senate amendment narrows this power. Under the Senate amendment, the Commission still has broad authority to subpoena documents. However, the Commission must first vote to issue the subpoena and give the Department of Justice 10 days notice. The notice provision does not in any way allow the Department to veto or stop a Commission subpoena. However, it does allow the Department to notify the Commission if the Commission's subpoena has the potential to interfere with a pending investigation. The subpoena power provision states that the Commission may issue a subpoena if a person fails to supply information requested by the Commission. This phrase is intended to encourage the Commission to begin with voluntary requests for information. However, it is not intended to provide any legal basis to challenge a subpoena issued by the Commission. If, after receiving documents, the Commission requires further information necessary to understand the documents, it may ask written questions or take a deposition on the documents. Whether there will be written questions or a deposition is at the option of the recipient. The phrase ``necessary to understand'' should be read broadly to include questions about how a document was developed, who wrote it, and other similar matters of context. Finally, the Senate amendment provides that the Commission may not release, except to its employees and contractors, any nonpublic information it receives unless it is ordered to do so by a court or unless the information is released in an aggregate or summary form that does not reveal the identity of any person or business and does not reveal any information protected under 18 U.S.C. 1905--that is, trade secret and proprietary information. These privacy protections in section 5(d) are not intended to limit in any way the Commission's ability, and indeed, its responsibility, to make criminal referrals to appropriate prosecuting authorities if it discovers evidence of criminal activity. In addition, the privacy protections of section 5(d) apply only to information that the Commission has already received. They do not in any way limit the scope of the information that the Commission may seek. The Senate amendment adds a section 7 that was not included in the House-passed version. This section requires the Commission to contract with the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and the National Research Council for assistance with conducting certain aspects of the study. The Advisory Commission of Intergovernmental Relations will assist in cataloging all of the various laws and regulations governing gambling. The National Research Council will assist in assessing problem gambling. This innovative addition will both reduce the costs of the Commission and take advantage of expertise that already exists within the Government. The Senate amendment also adds a definition section that was not included in the House-passed version. I want to note that the definition of State has the effect of including the U.S. territories within the study. The Representatives of the territories requested that they be included during debate on the House floor. Finally, the Senate amendment contains the requirement from the House-passed version of an advance appropriation before any money can be spent. This language prevents the various authorizing provisions for salaries and expense reimbursement from being construed as entitlements. Although I preferred the subpoena provisions that were contained in the House-passed version, I believe the compromise reached in the Senate amendment is a reasonable and fair one. I further believe that this solution is politically realistic, given the short time left in this Congress. Overall, the bill is balanced, comprehensive, and fair. I appreciate the contributions of Senator Lugar, Senator Simon, Senator Stevens, the other members of the Governmental Affairs Committee of the other body, and the many members of the interested outside groups who have made this bill possible. I want to thank the members of the House Judiciary Committee who took a particular interest in this legislation in committee--Congressmen Hoke, Bono, Gallegly, and Schiff. I appreciate the cooperation of Chairman Young of the House Resources Committee for his cooperation during House consideration of this bill. Finally, I want especially to thank Majority Leader Trent Lott for allowing this bill to come to the floor. I know that he had personal concerns about it, and I appreciate his setting those aside and allowing the other body to work its will. I have discussed the various changes contained in the Senate amendment with Congressman Wolf, and he has indicated his full support for concurring in the Senate amendment so that this bill can become law this year. I urge my colleagues to concur in the Senate amendment to H.R. 497 and send this important piece of legislation on to enactment. Before concluding, I also want to thank Joseph Gibson of our Judiciary Committee staff for his outstanding work on H.R. 497. Joseph's excellent legal work and sound judgment were pivotal in resolving many difficult issues on this complicated matter. I commend him for a job very well done. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendment to the bill (H.R. 497) to create the National Gambling Impact and Policy Commission.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Wolf]. (Mr. WOLF asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)