Henry Hyde

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 2442) to provide for the preparation of a Government report detailing injustices suffered by Italian Americans during World War II, and a formal acknowledgment of such injustices by the President.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Fossella).

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, simply to comment on the gentleman from North Carolina's statement. It may be a distinction without a difference, but the word ``apology'' is not used. It is an acknowledgment that these events represented a fundamental injustice against Italian Americans. And so that is somewhat different. There is a precedent of sorts for this, 22 U.S. Code Annotated, section 1394, Recognition of Philippine Independence. The President of the United States, if I may read, shall by proclamation and on behalf of the United States, shall recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands as a separate and self-governing nation and acknowledge the authority and control over the same of the government instituted by the people thereof under the constitution then in force. So this statute, which is law and which Harry Truman, I might add, followed through with an appropriate proclamation, required an acknowledgment, a recognition of the independence of the Philippine Islands. I would cite that to my friend.

Mr. HYDE. I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of our time.

Mr. HYDE. I think the gentleman's point is certainly worth making. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from New Jersey (Mrs. Roukema). (Mrs. ROUKEMA asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Maryland (Mrs. Morella).

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield the balance of our time to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Lazio), the chief sponsor of this excellent legislation.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of S. 900, the Gramm- Leach-Bliley Act. For many years, we have been trying to repeal the outdated restrictions that keep banks, securities firms, and insurance companies from getting into one another's businesses. After all the debate, I think we have finally come up with something in this bill that will open up a whole new world of competition. Financial services are becoming increasingly globalized, increasingly computerized, and increasingly seamless. Banking laws passed during the Depression simply will not do in the 21st century. I wish that we could maintain a world where everyone knew their banker on a first name basis and loans were made on a handshake, and I think in the new world some banks will provide that kind of service to those who demand it. But we need not have laws that limit us to that kind of service, as desirable as it may seem. Everyone is better off if the market decides what kinds of services financial firms will offer. Just think about the progress we have made in the past ten years. When I was a child, only the wealthy owned stocks. Now, with the growth of the mutual fund industry and self-directed retirement funds, millions and millions of average Americans not only own stocks, but make their own investment decisions. These developments create wealth, increase people's incentive to produce, and relieve some of the entitlement burden of government. I believe that this bill will bring more such positive developments. I want to say a word about my friends Jim Leach, chairman of the Banking Committee, Tom Bliley, chairman of the Commerce Committee, and Phil Gramm, chairman of the Senate Banking Committee. They have done an excellent job of putting this package together. I commend them for their work in bringing this bill to the floor in a very difficult and contentious environment. I especially want to commend them for working with me on the antitrust and bankruptcy provisions of the bill. These provisions were especially important to me as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, which has jurisdiction over these areas of the law. Let me briefly explain our intent with respect to these provisions. Under current law, bank mergers are reviewed under special bank merger statutes, and they do not go through the Hart-Scott-Rodino merger review process that covers most other mergers. Now banks will be able to get into other businesses which they have not been able to do before. The principle that we have followed is that when mergers occur, the bank part of that merger will be judged under the current bank merger statutes, and we do not intend any change in that process or in any of the agencies' respective jurisdictions. The non-bank part of that merger will be subject to the normal Hart-Scott-Rodino merger review by either the Justice Department or the Federal Trade Commission. This is, in all likelihood, the result that would have been obtained anyway. Hybrid transactions involving complex corporate entities--some parts of which are in industries subject to merger review by specialized regulatory agencies and other parts of which are not--have occurred in the past. In those cases, the various parts of the consolidation were considered according to agency jurisdiction over their respective parts, so that normal Hart-Scott-Rodino Act requirements applied to those parts that did not fall within the specialized agency's specific authority. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. Sec. 802.6. I think the precedents would have already dictated the desired result here. The clarification for the new financial holding company structure contained in Sec. 133(c) is consistent with, and in no way disturbs, those existing precedents. Even so, this is a big change we are making in our banking laws, and I thought it would be most helpful to clarify this point with respect to financial holding companies in the statute. I think we have achieved that clarification with the language in Sec. 133(c) of the Conference Report. Similar language was a part of the House bill, and I appreciate the Senate conferees' accepting this clarification. As the shape of the new activities in which banks were going to be permitted to engage through operating subsidiaries became clear in conference, the conferees ideally would have further revised the House language to make a similar clarification, regarding consolidations of non-banking entities that are operating subsidiaries of merging banks. But the operating subsidiary situations so closely parallels the precedents I have mentioned that a clarification for that situation was probably unnecessary. Of course, whatever aspect of a banking merger is not subject to normal Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger review will be subject to the alternative procedures set forth in the Bank Merger Act and the Bank Holding Company Act, including the automatic stay. So one way or another, there will be some avenue for effective premerger review by the antitrust enforcement agencies. These alternative procedures would be in some ways more potentially disruptive to the merging banking entities, particularly when the antitrust concern involves non-banking entities. But it is our intent that the precedents will be followed. In short, under this bill and the precedents, no bank is treated differently than it otherwise would be because it has some other business within its corporate family. Likewise, no other business is treated differently than it otherwise would be because it has a bank within its corporate family. The conference report also includes conforming language found in Sec. 133(a) to clarify that the Federal Trade Commission's authority in the non-banking sphere is preserved. We though these provisions were advisable in light of the fact that the FTC's enforcement authority specifically excludes banks and savings associations, but does not and should not exclude the non-banking entities that will be brought into the banking picture as a result of the new law. We have clarified that the existing exemption is limited to the bank or savings association itself and that the FTC retains jurisdiction over nonbank entities despite any corporate connections they may have with banks or savings associations. This clarification applies to the FTC's jurisdiction over non-banking firms under the FTC Act, and accordingly under any statute that may provide for enforcement under the Act like the consumer credit laws and the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act. For example, the FTC would continue to have jurisdiction over a telemarketer of financial services, even if it is a subsidiary or affiliate of a bank. The FTC's authority would not be expanded or extended to any new statute that may not be enforced under the FTC Act. These provisions were also included in the House bill, and again, I appreciate the Senate conferees' accepting them in the final conference report. Again, no bank is treated differently than it otherwise would be because it has some other business within its corporate family. Likewise, no other business is treated differently than it otherwise would be because it has a bank within its corporate family. Let me again commend my friends Jim Leach, Tom Bliley, and Phil Gramm, and everyone else who has worked on this legislation, and I ask my colleagues to support it.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, above all else, the death of Walter Payton yesterday calls to mind a simple word: Courage. Nothing I can say could do justice to the man who brought so much joy and class to the City of Chicago for over a decade. On the field, though he often said he ``was not the fastest, not the strongest, not the biggest,'' Walter Payton was truly a giant. For 13 years he ran roughshod over the NFL, shattering records and defenses along the way. A quick perusal of his statistics reveal a career nothing short of legendary. For the first several years of his career, he was the lone high-point of many woeful seasons at Soldier Field. Week after week, he racked up the yards . . . while the Bears racked up the losses. That never seemed to effect him on the field. His hard running, his ferocious blocking, and his indomitable spirit never waned during the lean years of the Chicago Bears. Those years solidified his place in football history as the class act who left it all on the field, even in a hopeless game playing for a mediocre team during a disappointing season. But it was Walter Payton the man--more than the football player--who truly touched the lives of the American people, and especially those of us lucky enough to have lived in and around Chicago, IL, during his career. His old coach, Mike Ditka, said yesterday that ``Sweetness'' was not a nickname describing Payton's playing, but the way he treated other people. His commitment to his family and friends, to children in the Chicago area, and his deep faith were all evident in his day-to-day life. Earlier this year, Payton learned of the liver disease which would eventually take his life. Even as it became clear his health was slipping from him, Sweetness again rose to the occasion, never losing hope, and in fact, by all accounts, growing in his religious faith, displaying all the courage and class we had grown to expect from him. Just as he did during those losing seasons early in his career, his courage reaffirmed Lawrence of Arabia's great lesson, that ``There could be no honor in a sure success, but much might be wrested from a sure defeat.'' Facing the most tragic defeat of his life against the most daunting opponent, Walter Payton was the personification of courage, and that is why we honor him here. Payton once wrote, in a ``practice'' retirement speech to the City of Chicago and his fans, ``If I've done anything that has helped your lives, please use it.'' It is his courage--even in the face of sure defeat--that I hope will be Walter Payton's legacy to the world, and we certainly should use it. I recall that courage was defined by a World War II bomber-pilot as, ``The guy who was afraid . . . but went in anyway.'' Whether a defensive lineman twice his size or the debilitating disease which finally tackled him the other afternoon, Walter Payton never failed to drop his head, lower his shoulder, and drive through for a few more yards. We will truly miss him.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1801, the Antitrust Technical Corrections Act of 1999, which I have introduced with Ranking Member Conyers. H.R. 1801 makes four separate technical corrections to our antitrust laws. Three of these corrections repeal outdated provisions of the law: the requirement that depositions in antitrust cases brought by the government be taken in public; the prohibition on violators of the antitrust laws passing through the Panama Canal; and a redundant and rarely used jurisdiction and venue provision. The last one clarifies a long existing ambiguity regarding the application of Section 2 of the Sherman Act to the District of Columbia and the territories. The Committee has informally consulted the antitrust enforcement agencies, the antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission, and the agencies have indicated that they do not object to any of these changes. In response to written questions following the Committee's November 5, 1997 oversight hearing on the antitrust enforcement agencies, the Department of Justice recommended two of the repeals and the clarification contained in this bill. The other repeal was recommended to the Committee by the House Legislative Counsel. In addition, the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association supports the bill, and I ask unanimous consent to insert their comments in the Record. First, H.R. 1801 repeals the Act of March 3, 1913. That act requires that all depositions taken in Sherman Act equity cases brought by the government be conducted in public. In the early days, the courts conducted such cases by deposition without any formal trial proceeding. Thus, Congress required that the depositions be open as a trial would be. Under the modern practice of broad discovery, depositions are generally taken in private and then made public if they are used at trial. Under our system, this act causes three problems: (1) it sets up a special rule for a narrow class of cases when the justification for that rule has disappeared; (2) it makes it hard for a court to protect proprietary information that may be at issue in an antitrust case; and (3) it can create a circus atmosphere in the deposition of a high profile figure. In a recent decision, the D.C. Circuit invited Congress to repeal this law. Second, H.R. 1801 repeals the antitrust provision in the Panama Canal Act. Section 11 of the Panama Canal Act provides that no vessel owned by someone who is violating the antitrust laws may pass through the Panama Canal. The Committee has not been able to determine why this provision was added to the Act or whether it has ever been used. However, with the return of the Canal to Panamanian sovereignty at the end of 1999, it is appropriate to repeal this outdated provision. The Committee has consulted informally with the House Committee on Armed Services, which has jurisdiction over the Panama Canal Act. Chairman Spence has indicated that the Committee has no objection to this repeal, and the Committee has waived its secondary referral. I thank Chairman Spence for his cooperation. Third, H.R. 1801 clarifies that Section 2 of the Sherman Act applies to the District and the territories. Two of the primary provisions of antitrust law are Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Section 1 prohibits conspiracies in restraint of trade, and Section 2 prohibits monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize. Section 3 of the Sherman Act was intended to apply these provisions to the District of Columbia and the various territories of the United States. Unfortunately, however, ambiguous drafting in Section 3 leaves it unclear whether Section 2 applies to those areas. The Committee is aware of at least one instance in which the Department of Justice declined to bring an otherwise meritorious Section 2 claim in a Virgin Island case because of this ambiguity. This bill clarifies that both Section 1 and Section 2 apply to the District and the Territories. All of the congressional representatives of the District and the Territories are cosponsors of the bill. Finally, H.R. 1801 repeals a redundant antitrust jurisdictional provision in Section 77 of the Wilson Tariff Act. In 1955, Congress modernized the jurisdictional and venue provisions relating to antitrust suits by amending Section 4 of the Clayton Act. At that time, it repealed the redundant jurisdictional provision in Section 7 of the Sherman Act, but not the one contained in Section 77 of the Wilson Tariff Act. It appears that this was an oversight because Section 77 was never codified and has rarely been used. Repealing Section 77 will not diminish any jurisdictional or venue rights because Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides any potential plaintiff with the same jurisdiction and venue rights that Section 77 does and it also provides broader rights. Rather, the repeal simply rids the law of a confusing, redundant, and little used provision. Since the Committee on the Judiciary ordered this bill reported, we discovered two drafting errors that we have corrected in the current managers' amendment that is before the House. One change corrects an incorrect reference to the United States Code. Secondly, we discovered that the language describing the scope of commerce covered by the territorial provision did not precisely parallel that in the existing section 3 of the Sherman Act, and we have changed that language so that the new subsection 3(b) will parallel the existing law. In addition, we realized after reporting the bill that it would be helpful to clarify the effect of these changes on pending cases. Because the public deposition matter does not affect the litigants' substantive rights, we have made that change apply to pending cases. The other three changes could affect the substantive rights of litigants. For that reason, we have not made those changes apply to pending cases, although we believe that it is unlikely that there are any pending cases that are affected. I believe that all of these provisions are non-controversial, and they will help to clean up some underbrush in the antitrust laws. I recommend that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill as amended by the managers' amendment.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. Today, the House considers H. Con. Res. 124, which recognizes the contributions of Asian Americans to American culture and society, and condemns all forms of discrimination and bias against Asian Americans. This resolution has the bipartisan support of 75 cosponsors and was introduced by the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Wu) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell) on May 27, 1999. It expresses the sense of Congress that recent allegations of espionage and illegal campaign financing against certain Asian Americans have brought into question the loyalty and probity of all Americans of Asian ancestry. In an effort to counter this stereotypical view as one of ignorance based on generalizations about people of different ethnic backgrounds, it is the sense of Congress that no American should generalize or stereotype the action of an individual to be representative of an entire group. The resolution calls upon the Attorney General, the Secretary of Energy, and the Commissioner of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to vigorously investigate and enforce all allegations of discrimination in public and private workplaces. General Leave

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary be discharged from further consideration of the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 124) expressing the sense of the Congress relating to recent allegations of espionage and illegal campaign financing that have brought into question the loyalty and probity of Americans of Asian ancestry, and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 1801) to make technical corrections to various antitrust laws and to references to such laws, as amended.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on H.R. 1801.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1801, the ``Antitrust Technical Corrections Act of 1999,'' which I have introduced with the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers), the ranking member. H.R. 1801 makes four separate technical corrections to our antitrust laws. Three of these corrections repeal outdated provisions of the law, the requirement that depositions in antitrust cases brought by the Government be taken in public; the prohibition on violators of the antitrust laws passing through the Panama Canal; and a redundant and rarely used jurisdiction and venue provision. The last one clarifies a long existing ambiguity regarding the application of Section 2 of the Sherman Act to the District of Columbia and the territories. The committee has informally consulted the antitrust enforcement agencies, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission, and the agencies have indicated they do not object to any of these changes. In response to written questions following the committee's November 5, 1997, oversight hearing on the antitrust enforcement agencies, the Department of Justice recommended two of the repeals and the clarification contained in this bill. The other repeal was recommended to the committee by House Legislative Counsel. In addition, the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association supports the bill. Mr. Speaker, I include their comments for the Record at this point. Comments on the ``Antitrust Technical Corrections Act of 1999'' (H.R. 1801) by the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association The Antitrust Technical Corrections Act of 1999 (HR 1801) would bring minor but useful revisions to several provisions of the antitrust laws. The Section of Antitrust Law (``Antitrust Section'') of the American Bar Association (``ABA'') believes that the amendments contemplated in this bill would improve the administration and enforcement of the laws. These views are presented on behalf of the Antitrust Section and have not been approved by the ABA House of Delegates or the ABA Board of Governors and, thus, should not be construed as representing the position of the ABA. 1. contents of h.r. 1801 1. Repeal of the Publicity in Taking Evidence Act of 1913 regarding public depositions for use in suits in equity (15 U.S.C. Sec. 30). 2. Repeal of the provision of the Panama Canal Act which bars the use of Panama Canal to violators of antitrust laws (15 U.S.C. Sec. 31). 3. Addition to 15 U.S.C. Sec. 3 to include prohibitions for restraints of trade in and among the Territories of the United States and the District of Columbia. 4. Technical amendments to the Wilson Tariff Act (28 Stat. 570). 2. the antitrust section of the aba supports h.r. 1801 1. Repeal of the Publicity in Taking Evidence Act of 1913 (15 U.S.C. 30). The publicity in Taking Evidence Act of 1913, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 30, requires public depositions in any suit in equity by the United States under the Sherman Act. In most actions under the antitrust laws, judges have discretion to control public access, and option that can be essential in high profile proceedings. Uncontrolled access increases the potential for discovery proceedings devolving into a circus atmosphere. Unexpected or unmanageable crowds seeking to attend a deposition can cause it to be moved, delayed, or altered in a manner that disrupts the discovery phase of a proceeding. The scheduling of such depositions is already difficult, and the cases in which they occur may be on tight deadlines. Section 30 is an anachronism that removes the ability of a judge to control public access to depositions in cases where such cases could be detrimental to the orderly conduct of a case.\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ See U.S. v. Microsoft, 165 F.3d 952, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1999). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- There is no reason why one type of action brought by the U.S. should have a special rule for the taking of depositions, especially when that rule is likely to be invoked in situations that would cause disruption and delay. There does not appear to be any compelling interest in forcing depositions in equity cases to be open to any and all audiences, since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures (see Rules 43(a) and 77(b)) already insure that the public has access to civil antitrust trials. The Antitrust Section believes the issue of public access to depositions ought to remain a matter for the presiding judge to determine. Therefore, it supports the repeal of this antiquated law. 2. Repeal of antitrust provisions of the Panama Canal Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 31) Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Sec. 31, the Panama Canal is closed to violators of the antitrust laws. Specifically, no vessel owned by any individual or company that is violating the antitrust laws may pass through the canal. Setting aside the ambiguity of the language of this law, any penalty it imposes is in addition to the sanctions available under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Specifically, criminal violations of the Sherman Act are felonies that are punishable by fines up to $10,000,000 for corporations, or $350,000 for individuals, and/or imprisonment for up to 3 years. Fines of much larger amounts are authorized where profit or injury exceeds $10,000,000.\2\ Moreover, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Sec. 6, violators of section one of the Sherman Act are also subject to asset forfeiture. Additionally, section four of the Clayton Act provides treble damages for successful private antitrust claims. Further, section 16 of the Clayton Act allows for injunctive relief. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ See U.S. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche LTV, Crim. No. 99-CR-184-R (N.D. Tex May 20, 1999). Hoffman-La Roche agreed to pay $500,000,000 in fines for involvement in a vitamin price- fixing conspiracy. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Antitrust Section believes it is through the sanctions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts that the antitrust policy of deterrence will be most effectively advanced. There has been a great deal of debate in Congress, in the courts and in the agencies over the proper combination of injunctions, fines, forfeitures, and sentences to ensure competition and deter potential violators. The Panama Canal Act's provision dealing with antitrust penalties is at best unnecessary. At worst it could encourage ill-considered interference with international completion of the foreign relations of the United States.\3\ Therefore, the Antitrust Section supports the repeal of this provision. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ Especially, in view of the fact that control over the Canal reverts to Panama on January 1, 2000, the United States code should not contain provisions such as these. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. Addition to 15 U.S.C. Sec. 3 HR 1801 clarifies that the antitrust laws encompass the District of Columbia and the territories of the United States by adding to 15 U.S.C. Sec. 3 \4\ the following language as section 3(B): --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ Currently, U.S.C Sec. 3 prohibits restraints for trade in and among the District Columbia, United States Territories, and other states. The penalties are the same as those set out in section one of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the Territories of the United States and the District of Columbia, or between any of the several States and any Territory of the United States or the District of Columbia, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishment, in the discretion of the court.\5\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ Compare with section 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 2): Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishment, in the discretion of the court. Current section 3 (to become 3(a) under the amendment) already covers trade between the District or any Territory and the states or foreign countries. The failure of section 3 to address trade among the Territories and the District simply invites arguments that such circumstances remain outside the reach of the antitrust laws. No good reason has been offered for the failure, and the Section is aware of none. Further, current section 3 uses the terms of section 1 (generally applicable to conspiracies), but not section 2 (applicable to monopolization).\6\ Consequently, the new language clarifies that conduct prohibited by section 2 is covered in Washington, D.C. and United States territories. The Antitrust Section supports this correction. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ Section 3 currently reads: Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of the District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory or Territories and any State or States or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia and any State or States or foreign nations, is declared illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or both said punishments in the discretion of the court. 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 3 (1890). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- However, it should be noted that as it stands section 2(c) of the bill refers to the wrong section of the United States Code. The correct section to be amended appears to be 15 U.S.C. Sec. 3 (not 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2 as noted in the bill). The Antitrust Section suggests correcting this minor discrepancy in the bill. 4. Technical amendments to the Wilson Tariff Act (28 Stat. 570). Section 77 of the Wilson Tariff Act of 1894 gives antitrust jurisdiction to any ``circuit court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found.'' \7\ This section was never codified in the United States Code. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ Wilson Tariff Act. ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (Aug. 27, 1894). In its entirety, section 77 reads: That any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this Act may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Section 77 is an antiquated piece of legislation that may confuse those that come across it. It is an anomaly to the traditional jurisdiction of federal district courts in construing claims sounding in antitrust law. The jurisdictional provisions of the United States Code vest jurisdiction over cases arising under the antitrust laws in the United States District Courts. A provision allocating jurisdiction of similar cases in different courts can only complicate proceedings and impede the effective administration of antitrust law. By deleting this section, Congress would preserve the general jurisdictional provisions pertaining to the antitrust laws, and would prevent confusion that this section of the Tariff Act may create. Therefore, the Antitrust Section supports this technical amendment. 3. conclusion HR 1801 is a helpful piece of legislation that helps clarify and update the antitrust laws. The Antitrust Section of the ABA supports the changes contemplated in HR 1801. Mr. Speaker, I believe all these provisions are noncontroversial and they will help clean up some underbrush in the antitrust laws. I recommend that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, as amended by the managers' amendment. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me. Mr. Speaker, among the pantheon of great American patriots belongs the name of the late Zachary Fisher. His countless, and I mean countless, acts of kindness towards our military and their families over a long and full life are legendary. He went out and bought a carrier, the Intrepid, for several millions of dollars, and brought it to New York and turned it into a museum that still operates every day to show people the great exploits of our military. Beyond what he has done for the military, his fight against the dread disease of Alzheimer's led him to found the Fisher Center for Alzheimer Research in New York, and when this dread disease is conquered it will be Zach Fisher and the medical team he has assembled, along with David Rockefeller and the president of the center, Mr. Michael Stern, who will deserve an important share of the credit. Zach Fisher lived a long life and he never stopped helping people, caring for people. He had a giant heart, a giant soul that animated one of God's very special people. I grieve his loss but I am so happy that he ever lived and I knew him and he was my friend. As a veteran, I am very proud to have Zachary Fisher declared through this act, legislative act, an honorary veteran. If anyone should be an honorary veteran, Zach Fisher should be. I want to thank the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Stump), the chairman of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, for his thoughtfulness in bringing this forward, and the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Maloney), whose love and affection and concern for Zach Fisher manifests itself in drafting this marvelous resolution. I congratulate them both.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I want to commend our colleague Bobby Rush for introducing this important bill and working over the last two years to ensure its enactment into law. Two years ago, Representative Rush and I were approached by St. Bernard Hospital and Health Care Center in Chicago. The hospital, which is the only source of health care for an entire impoverished section of the City of Chicago, was having great difficulty attracting sufficient American nurses. St. Bernard's and a number of other inner-city hospitals, perhaps because of the high crime rates in their neighborhoods, were having this problem. So were a number of rural hospitals. St. Bernard's felt that its only viable option to fully meet its nursing needs was to employ foreign nationals. There isn't a nationwide nursing shortage in the United States. So, there does not appear to be the support to implement a broad-based nurse visa program. However, a narrowly crafted program to help out hospitals in need is eminently justified. This is exactly what H.R. 441 accomplishes. The bill would create a new temporary registered nurse visa program designated ``H-1C'' that would provide up to 500 visas a year and that would sunset in four years. To be able to petition for an alien nurse, a hospital would have to meet four conditions. First, it would have to be located in a health professional shortage area as designated by the Department of Health and Human Services. Second, it would have to have at least 190 acute care beds. Third, a certain percentage of its patients would have to be Medicare patients. Fourth, a certain percentage of patients would have to be Medicaid patients. H.R. 441 meets an undisputed need. Thus, it is not opposed by the American nurses association. I was pleased to move the bill through the Judiciary Committee, and I urge my colleagues to support it.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. Coburn) a question. Whenever he prescribes a controlled substance, does not the DEA review that prescription?

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, now did my colleagues hear that? Every time he writes a prescription for a controlled substance, the DEA, that horrible gestapo, reviews the prescription and the purpose for it. Now, therefore, the DEA has a role to play today as we speak in the existing law, and this bill does not change it. It just says to Oregon that they are back in with the rest of the 50 States now. We do not create a gestapo. We simply say that what exists now will continue to exist, but they cannot use controlled substances to execute people, however directly or indirectly.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, let us not make any mistake. The real danger, the real danger if we go down this road, if we leap off the cliff into the abyss is in 10 years, once we make assisted suicide permissible, once we make it possible, once doctors lose the healing, diminish their healing faculty and become an assistant to the hangmen, we put and jeopardize the unwanted people, and we are diminishing the value of human life. We were told, we pro-lifers, that we do not care about people after they are born; our only concern is when they are born. No, but some of us said, You're starting down a slippery slope; you're devaluing human life, and that is what we see here today. But we are just beginning. The unwanted, the uninsured, the poor, the elderly, the frail, the diseased, the profoundly handicapped, they are at risk. They are watching this today, if only they could, to see if they are going to be put at risk. They talk about expanding the authority of the DEA. The DEA has this authority already. We are trying to reinstate it in the one State where it has been removed, and that is Oregon. We are not providing any more authority to any law enforcement that they do not have now, and the doctor, the gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott), talked about these tough decisions. Well, if they are so tough, how is a U.S. Attorney going to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the doctor had a criminal intent? Not so. This is an important bill because it assures the uniform application of Federal law, and I really ought to thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Canady), Senator Nickles, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Stupak), and the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. Coburn), and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Weldon), and so many and all in the hospice and medical communities who have worked so diligently to produce a bill that offers our citizens greater access to palliative care to the management and alleviation of pain and maintains medicine as a healer, a healing force, an alleviator of pain. The bill has 165 cosponsors in the House and in the Senate. The companion bill cosponsored by Senator Lieberman and sponsored by Senator Nickles has 31 cosponsors, so there is bipartisan support in the House and in the Senate. Now we know the Controlled Substances Act was passed in 1970 to establish uniform Federal laws on a uniquely Federal subject, the control, the regulation of controlled substances. Those are drugs that are potentially dangerous. We have got a DEA, we have got a drug car, and we have a national drug problem. The agency's task is to ensure that these potentially dangerous drugs are administered for legitimate medical purposes. Now it happens that Oregon decided to change the traditional time- honored professional purpose of medicine and give Oregon doctors the option no longer to serve as healing forces but as social engineers, messengers of death. So Oregon has passed a State law that gives doctors the right to assist in the intentional killing of patients, patients who may want to die, families who want their older relatives to die, and so doctors are authorized now by Oregon law to put down their stethoscope and pick up the poison pill and proceed to assist in the execution of their patient. Very simple. It comes down to this. Do we want to empower our doctors to intentionally kill a patient even if that is the desire of the patient or the family? Do we want to add executions to the list of healing services they provide? Should Oregon law trump the Federal law? Now some Oregonians resent this Federal intrusion in response to their decision to let doctors do away with the weak, the weary, the fearful of being a burden to their families. Suicide is the ultimate act of despair, and facilitating the intentional killing of a human life is the opposite of healing. The opposite of alleviating pain, it is a surrender to hopelessness when there are other options that reject the culture of death. Physicians have not been taught what medications to prescribe for a suicide. There is no research or case series in medical literature to which doctors of death can refer to find prescribing information and directions. It is doubtful that one standard will fit all. There is no documented scientific literature or guide book on how to kill one's patient. The medical profession is concerned about palliative care, and the debate about assisted suicide which takes place now must be at the forefront of our concerns because to focus on the management of pain in the last months, the last days, the last hours of life, hospice doctors and others in the medical profession study and practice medicine with a clear purpose of making their patients more comfortable even while mindful that administering palliative care sometimes can have the unintended side effect of hastening death. These are difficult decisions faced every day. This bill can help end those decisions by providing what is not there now, a safe harbor, one that is absent in the current law. That safe harbor in this bill protects doctors even if the administration of pain medications result in unintended death. This bill does something more. It provides money and guidance for training and safeguards now absent in current law to educate doctors, caregivers, medical students, health professions, nurses, State, local and Federal law enforcement officials on the practice of palliative medicine. That is why this is an important bill. It deals with the very nature of man, the value of every life, the definition of a physician. It emphasizes the alleviation and management of pain, not reversing the role of doctor from healer to hangman. Some of us here today cry Federal preemption of a State law when really what we are dealing with is State preemption of a Federal law. We can advocate the Federal Government look the other way on this issue, play Pontius Pilate, wash our hands, but we have to think about it because there is a sanctity of life that must be respected and defended. As my colleagues know, there is an insidiousness about the notion of assisted suicide. We make it permissible, then we make it acceptable, and finally it becomes an act of nobility. We plant the idea with the elderly, it is their duty to die, get out of the way. Is that not what the governor of Colorado said a few years ago? The elderly have a duty to die and get out of the way, not to be a burden on the children. Many times the anguishing words ``I want to die'' really mean I do not want to be a burden on my family. We insist that more be done at the Federal level to promote palliative end-of-life care. There are very effective ways to control pain, and I am confident that doctors will not shy from their duty to alleviate pain, and this bill encourages palliative care. It provides that safe harbor for the physician should the palliative care inadvertently lead to the death of a patient. It provides money for training in pain management and requires caregivers adhere to our national policy of administering controlled substances for legitimate medical purposes, not taking a life. A doctor should not be asked to play the role of hired gun. His art and science are in the service of life. In this bill, we expressly permit and encourage the use of controlled substances for pain management, even when it might unintentionally hasten death. We supply money and training. To those who assert we are preempting the laws of Oregon, this bill does not preempt the Oregon law legalizing assisted suicide in specified circumstances. The legal effect of this bill is to forbid the use of certain controlled substances which are federally controlled for the intentional purpose of killing the patient. If you want to use non- controlled substances or some other method to assist the passage of the patient, you can still do so under Oregon law, unfortunately. The single ethic that has provided the moral backbone for Western civilization is one that insists that every member of the human family has equal inherent moral worth. It is called the Sanctity of Life ethic. That is the core of our belief, that the poor and the powerless deserve equal rights and equal protection. One of the frequent criticisms of certain acts or omissions by the government is that it will have a chilling effect on some people. How often we hear that phrase. Well, physician assisted suicide has a chilling effect on handicapped people, elderly people, sick people and the unwanted, because it is an aspect of a philosophy from another time and another place that said it was appropriate to get rid of the useless eaters. It starts us down a real slippery slope, where some of us who do not measure up to someone else's standards become vulnerable, expendable and discardable.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I think we are in the middle of a very interesting discussion. We all agree that we need better law enforcement and we think the practice of community policing is a very effective way to fight crime. Well, what we are arguing about is the subject of flexibility and the efficiency, the efficacy of the 100,000 cops promised. That has a nice ring to it. Those are nice round figures. But the fact is, with less than a year to go in the existing program, less than half of the 100,000 cops we were promised have been hired and some of them are not engaged in active police work but only in ancillary administrative tasks. We think an appropriate way to do this is not to cut the money but to provide flexibility, some ability to go elsewhere than simply hiring cops. A community may have adequate policemen but may lack radio equipment, squad cars, other law enforcement equipment that helps them do the job. We are simply trying to provide adequate funding to hire the cops where they are needed and when necessary but also to have flexibility for other programs that help law enforcement. This is not a policemen's benefit bill. This is law enforcement, safe streets, safer communities. And that means some flexibility in where this money can go. That is an intelligent, useful way to handle this appropriation. There is new spending for COPS, $325 million in new spending, which is $57 million dollars more than the amount that the Democratically controlled Congress authorized for this program when it was put into law. So there are unused monies. There is $250 million unused from prior years which is available only for the COPS program. No, this is intelligent. This will help the big problem of law enforcement. I urge its support.