Henry Hyde

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Pete Geren.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. In our ongoing classes on Marxian philosophy, Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Missouri has proposed the thesis. I propose the antithesis and in conference we will get the synthesis, and if that needs any further explanation, we can do it after the debate. Nobody has ever said there are too many punitive-damage awards. I certainly have not. I do not know if there are or not. That does not enter into my calculus. But what does bother me is the possibility of wild, runaway punitive damages which are not to compensate the plaintiff, the injured party, and the case immediately comes to mind in Alabama where a doctor bought a BMW, and had to take it in for some servicing, and learned that it had been repainted, and so an award of $2 million punitive damages was awarded against the automobile company. Now I suppose automobile companies, especially if they are foreign companies, are not entitled to much justice over here, but that is the sort of capricious action that we are trying to straighten out in this legislation. So I hope the gentleman's motion to instruct is defeated.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on the Judiciary, pursuant to House rule XX, I move to take from the Speaker's table the bill H.R. 956, to establish legal standards and procedures for product liability litigation, and for other purposes, with a Senate amendment thereto, disagree to the Senate amendment, and request a conference with the Senate thereon.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, one of the principal goals of civil justice reform legislation is to restore fairness, rationality and predictability to our Nation's legal system. We want our legal system to be even-handed. The notion that these reforms will adversely affect particular groups, women, the elderly and children, is just not accurate. Mr. Speaker, it is an emotional device used by opponents of legal reform to confuse the issues and to divide supporters. The much-needed reforms contained in the Common Sense Legal Reform Act treat all plaintiffs the same. The motion fails to recognize the distinction between economic damages, that is reimbursement for actual out-of-pocket losses on the one hand, and noneconomic damages, which are damages for intangible items such as emotional distress or pain and suffering on the other. Because noneconomic damages are not based on tangible economic losses, such as medical expenses or lost wages, there are no objective criteria for determining the amount of such an award. As a result of their subjective nature, noneconomic damages vary widely, the awards vary widely, even for similar or identical injuries. This introduces an issue of unpredictability and caprice into the civil justice system. Mr. Speaker, because there are no objective standards for assessing noneconomic damages, jurors often pick figures out of the air. It depends on how well the plaintiff's lawyer can play the violin. For the same reason, judicial review of noneconomic damage awards is virtually nonexistent. Noneconomic damage awards may well be disproportionately high. Jurors in many jurisdictions routinely make excessive awards for intangible losses. Similarly, the motion to instruct fails to distinguish between compensatory damages and punitive damages. Mr. Speaker, under our legal system, punitive damages are not intended to compensate injured parties. Instead, they are intended to be a punishment and a deterrent. Punishment for particularly reckless or egregious acts and deterrence against similar reckless acts in the future. Using economic damages rather than noneconomic damages as a measurement for appropriate punitive damages to me makes sense. Like criminal fines, civil punishment in the form of punitive damages should bear a reasonable relationship to the conduct for which the defendant is punished. Economic damages are susceptible to fairly accurate determination and, therefore, provide an appropriate basis from which to calculate punitive damage awards, ensuring that similar cases are treated alike. By contrast, using inherently subjective noneconomic damages as a basis for calculating punitive damages could ensure that defendants in similar cases will be subject to widely varying punitive damage awards. Because noneconomic damages may be exceedingly high, they provide no meaningful limit on the size of punitive damage awards. Basing punitive damages on noneconomic damages would enhance the windfall nature of punitive damages and increase plaintiffs attorneys' contingency fees and unduly inflate punitive damage awards. It is important to note there is no right to punitive damages. Again, punitive damages are not about compensating the injured party. Those who would use noneconomic damages as a basis for calculating them seek only to increase punitive damage awards at the expense of rationality and predictability. A number of States that permit punitive damages have enacted statutes using economic damages as the basis for such awards. For these reasons, I strongly urge this House to reject the gentleman's motion to instruct conferees on H.R. 956. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, the class struggle goes on. Every time some of the outstanding spokesmen for the other side take the well on almost any issue, we find ourselves in some nuanced version of dialectical materialism. Does the minority really want to help the elderly? Then let them join us in helping to reform a confusing and irrational liability lottery that is almost totally unpredictable. It makes many injured victims wait years, years before they receive any compensation for their injuries. Does the minority really want to help women? They sure say they do. Then let them join us now in overthrowing the system that is discouraging the development of new beneficial and lifesaving treatments for breast [[Page H 11985]] cancer, ovarian cancer and other deadly diseases that afflict women. A recent report by the American Medical Association contained the following quote: Innovative new products are not being developed or are being withheld from the market because of liability concerns or inability to obtain adequate insurance. That is pretty clear, who is standing in the way of protecting women. How many more Americans, men and women, will lose their lives because our current system discourages new and lifesaving products from ever being developed? Well, does the minority really want to help our children? To hear them, they sure do. They are the only ones that do. Then let them help us pass legislation and cut the lawyers tax on childhood vaccines. Ninety-five percent of the price of a vaccine today goes solely for liability costs. The current liability system adds cost to virtually every product purchased by every American. Children suffer from the current system in many other ways. One only has to visit the many recreational parks that have been closed, little leagues that have been disbanded, swimming pools that have been altered or shut down, charitable groups such as the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts where parents are afraid to risk volunteering, all because of liability fears. We should be working together to pass this bill to help American children. Mr. Speaker, it is not the elderly, women, and children who are threatened by these reforms. It is the wealthy personal injury lawyers who are threatened by reform. It is they who are pushing a small minority of our colleagues to derail these reforms in any way possible. I urge my colleagues to defeat this motion and let us at long last get onto long overdue reform of the tort system. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, it has always been my understanding of the purpose of a lawsuit to restore the plaintiff to the status that they enjoyed before the injury. It is not an effort to lump all plaintiffs in the country together, so that everyone comes out even. It is to restore the plaintiff to the situation before the injury. Now, under present law, and it will always be thus, plaintiffs are different from each other. If Greg Maddox has an accident and has a sore arm, he is a multi-million-dollar pitcher in the big leagues, his sore arm prevents him from throwing the ball or throwing it as effectively as he could, and that is a tremendous loss. But if I get a sore arm, it is discomfort. I just grit my teeth and live with it. But the differences are enormous in terms of litigation to recover for a sore arm or a sore ankle from an athlete or a musician whose hands are damaged than somebody whose work does not involve that high degree of skill, or that member of the human body. All of this talk is not very logical, and it does not really make a lot of sense. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I just want to respond to one sentence from my dear friend from Texas. He said ``these guys.'' I think he was referring to us. What a contrast to the old days when we used to say ``my learned friends.'' Claude Pepper, where are you when we need you? ``These guys represent the malefactors of great wealth, the bloated bondholders, the economic royalists, the big corporations.'' If I may, in a humble way say, these other guys represent the plaintiffs trial lawyers.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I wonder if I might respond to the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Lofgren], who is one of the very serious and pro-active members of [[Page H 11986]] our committee. I want to agree with her that the matters she mentioned, it seems to me, are not adequately dealt with in our bill, and it is my intention in conference to carve out of the exceptions in this bill crimes of violence, drunk driving, criminal activity that she mentioned as being inadequately compensated, child molestation, and I do agree with her. Mr. Speaker, it is my intention, and I am sure, with the help of the conferees, that we will make that a better situation in conference.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, the gentlewoman from Connecticut said something quite interesting. She asked, ``Is nothing safe from the interference of government?'' Well, when a woman and her doctor decide that her pregnancy is inconvenient or inopportune, where does the tiny little member of the human family struggling to be born in the womb turn for equal protection of the law, for due process of the law? [[Page H 11600]] The facts of life are and the facts of this legislation are the life- of-the-mother exception is in the law as an affirmative defense. The doctor only has to show that he reasonably believed that the woman's life was in danger. He does not have to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. He does not even have to be right. He just has to have reasonable belief that the woman's life would be in danger unless he performed this macabre, gruesome, Auschwitz-like operation, this butchery in the service of infanticide. I am stunned that people are not running from defending this type of gruesome procedure. Yet the only question that this bill asks is yes or no. Never mind the nuances and the highways and the byways. Do you support a process where an infant, a live infant, talk about I feel your pain, a live infant is almost extracted from the birth canal, 3 inches from being a fully-born child, and a scissors punctures the neck and the brains are sucked out. Anybody that can find a word of defense for that is someone I do not understand. The American Medical Association Council on Legislation unanimously approved recommending this bill. The full AMA did not. They did nothing. They took a pass. They washed their hands. But at least the council on legislation unanimously supported it. Look: If one thinks abortion is a good idea, that is fine, go ahead and live with that. But this form of abortion is indefensible. Indefensible. This rule is a focused rule. It asks the question do you or do you not approve of this procedure? That is the only question that needs to be asked. The life of the mother is protected. Prosecutors are not going around indicating people willy-nilly when they have an affirmative defense, and it is an easy affirmative defense. Mr. Speaker, I ask for support for this rule.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I wish I had a lot of time. We got a very short hour of debate on this important issue. I would like to talk about how you would not treat an animal this way. You would not take a coyote, a mangy raccoon and treat that animal that way, because it is too cruel. I would like to talk about Dr. Joseph Mengele or Dr. Kevorkian. We talk about interfering with the doctor. Our job is to protect the weak from the strong. But, no, I want to talk about a love story. Here is a letter that came October 30 to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Canady] from my own district, Oak Park, IL, Jeannie Wallace French. She says: Dear Congressman Canady: Opponents of H.R. 1833, ``The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act,'' claim that partial-birth abortion is justifiable when performed on babies with disabilities. Please consider the personal experience of our family as you debate HR 1833 on the floor of the House. In June of 1993 I was 5 months along carrying twins. My husband and I were notified that one of the twins, our daughter Mary, suffered from a severe neural tube defect. Mary's prognosis for life was slim, and her chance at normal development nonexistent. Her severe abnormality complicated the twin pregnancy and specialists encouraged amniocentesis and Mary's abortion. Though severely disabled, we knew that Mary was a member of our family and was entitled to live out her allotted time without being assaulted by instruments or chemicals. When it became clear that Mary, whose brain had developed outside of her skull (an occipital encephalocele) would not survive normal labor, we opted for a Cesarean delivery. Born December 13, 1993, a minute after her healthy big brother Will, Mary lived 6 hours cradled peacefully in her father's arms. She was with us long enough to greet her grandparents and our close friends. She also gave a special gift to other children: The gift of life. On the day of her funeral we received a letter from the Regional Organ Bank of Illinois. Our daughter's heart valves were a match for 2 Chicago infants, critically ill at the time of Mary's birth. We have learned that even anencephalic babies and meningomyelocele children like our Mary can give life, or sight, or strength to others. The death of a child is the most tragic experience many of us will ever face. As parents, we can do only what we can-- insure that our children do not suffer. As we now know, when their natural time comes it can be comforting that their short life has become a gift to others. Our daughter, living less than a day, saved the lives of two other children. Which of us, even after decades of living, can make the same claim? Sincerely, Jeannie Wallace French.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing the Charitable Gift Annuity Antitrust [[Page E 2025]] Relief Act of 1995 (H.R. 2525), legislation which grants antitrust protection to a charitable organization which issues gift annuities in accordance with the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Charitable giving through gift annuities is currently under attack. For example, a Federal lawsuit in Texas alleges that charities are price fixing when they choose to offer the same annuity rates to their donors. A motion for class certification is pending which, if granted, would add as defendants virtually every charity in America. Regardless of the outcome of the suit, there is no denying that it has had and will continue to have a chilling effect on gift giving and that it is consuming financial resources which would otherwise be allocated to charitable missions. Charitable giving has evolved well beyond the days when we simply put money in the collection plate or gave away our used clothes. There are now many innovative ways in which a donor can benefit a charity with a gift and himself with a charitable deduction. One increasingly popular mechanism is through a charitable gift annuity, which allows a person to give a chunk of money but obtain an income stream from it while alive, and also claim an immediate tax deduction. These gift annuities are attractive to both sides of the transaction: the donor still gets the income produced by his capital, and the charity gets immediate control over the entire amount of the donation. Of course, the operative word here is ``gift.'' Gift annuities are not intended to maximize the value of the lifetime income stream, as one would through a commercial annuity. Rather, they are intended primarily to result in a donation to the chosen charity. In order to accomplish this, the rate of return paid to the donor is intentionally set at a level which will allow the charity to retain a substantial portion of the value of the donation. Our goal should be to encourage gift giving through legitimate means, and particularly through instruments which the IRS approves and regulates. Gift annuities carry this imprimatur. Allowing litigants to use antitrust law as an impediment to these beneficial activities should not be countenanced where, as here, there is no detriment associated with the conduct. In the first instance, it is a misnomer to use the term ``price'' to describe the selection of an annuity rate: an annuity rate merely determines the portion of the donation to be returned to the donor, and the portion the charity will retain. Second, the fundraising activities of charitable organizations are not trade or commerce, an essential predicate for establishing the application of our antitrust laws. Moreover, it is difficult to see what anticompetitive effect the supposed setting of prices has in a context where the decision to give is motivated not by price but by interest in and commitment to a charitable mission. H.R. 2525 would make clear that the conduct alleged in these lawsuits would not be considered illegal under the antitrust laws. The protection it provides is narrowly tailored to cover only those activities required to market and create a gift annuity. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation so as to eliminate further frivolous lawsuits and barriers to charitable giving. If you would like to cosponsor this measure, please call Diana Schacht on extension 53951.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2425, the Medicare Preservation Act of 1995. Mr. Chairman, there is no question that reform of the Medicare Program is imperative if it is to survive. But its mere survival is not the goal of this legislation: What we seek is to preserve Medicare by keeping it solvent while strengthening and improving the coverage and options it provides to this Nation's elderly. We must not squander this opportunity to deal comprehensively with the multitude of issues which bear on the efficient delivery of health care in this country. As the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, I would like to point out some particularly important provisions contained in this bill that fall within our Committee's jurisdiction. Specifically, the bill contains provisions designed to facilitate the operation of the revised Medicare Program--notably, health care liability reform, antitrust relief for provider service networks, and an antitrust exemption for medical self-policing entities. The combined effect of these changes will provide a fertile environment for the delivery of Medicare services in a manner which maximizes consumer choice. Liability reform will generally decrease the cost of providing health care services, and eliminate many of the frivolous lawsuits which are clogging our courts. Antitrust relief for provider service networks, or PSN's, will increase competition for contracts under the Medicare system, thereby increasing choice and decreasing costs. Providing an antitrust exemption to medical self-regulatory entities will encourage physicians and hospitals to police themselves, and will contribute to a reduction in malpractice, fraud, and abuse. health care liability reform Our health care system is clearly being burdened by a number of cost- based pressures. One of these costs is the threat of liability suits facing medical practitioners and health care providers and the large dollar amounts they are forced to spend to protect themselves against these legal actions. The average physician has a 40-percent chance of being sued at some time in his or her career. This increases to 52 percent for surgeons and to 78 percent obstetricians. The estimate is that medical malpractice premiums now total $10 billion annually. The average annual medical premium for a doctor specializing in obstetrics in some urban areas now exceeds $100,000 a year. Many liability cases brought against doctors are frivolous. In fact, two out of three medical liability claims are closed without any payment to the claimant, but only after large legal and administrative fees have already been incurred. Further, the increasing insurance premiums for malpractice coverage represent only a part of this problem. The estimates are that the costs of defensive medicine run from $20 to $25 billion a year. Numerous other entities in addition to doctors and hospitals such as pharmaceutical manufacturers and those that manufacture medical devices or provide blood or tissue services are also impacted by the same liability concerns. Finally, as we move more and more into a managed care system, the scope of third-party liability is also a matter of increasing concern. There is no question but that our health care system is seriously burdened by both the threat, and the reality, of liability suits facing medical practitioners and health care providers. The Health Care Liability Reform legislation that is included in this bill will solve this serious national problem. easing of antitrust barriers for physician service networks Provider service networks--those composed of doctors, hospitals, and other entities who actually deliver health care services--are potentially vigorous competitors for Medicare beneficiaries. The benefits to the Medicare Program of their participation would be lower costs and higher quality of care than in nonprovider sponsored health plans. Costs would be lower because contracting with a PSN instead of an insurer could eliminate a layer of profit and overhead. Quality would be higher because providers, and particularly physicians, would have direct control over medical decision-making. Arguably, physicians and other providers are better qualified than insurers to strike the balance between conserving costs and meeting the needs of the patient. There are obstacles, however, to the formation of PSN's. One of the most serious is the application of the antitrust laws to such groups in a manner which does not allow the network to engage in joint pricing agreements, regardless of whether its effect on competition is positive rather than negative. Antitrust law prohibits agreements among competitors that fix prices or allocate markets. Such agreements are per se illegal. Where competitors economically integrate in a joint venture, however, agreements on prices or other terms of competition that are reasonably necessary to accomplish to procompetitive benefits of the integration are not necessarily unlawful. Price setting conduct by these joint ventures should be evaluated under the rule of reason, that is, on the basis of its reasonableness, taking into account all relevant factors affecting competition. Current Department of Justice-Federal Trade Commission guidelines require that a physician group share substantial financial risk before being considered a joint venture and thus eligible for rule of reason analysis. Their definition of substantial financial risk is too rigid, thereby eliminating from the market PSN's which would provide an expanded set of consumer choices and increase competition in the market for health care services. [[Page H 10352]] The proposed legislation overcomes this barrier by mandating that the conduct of an organization meeting the criteria of a provider service network be judged under the rule of reason. The result will be to permit a case by case determination as to whether the conduct of that PSN would be procompetitive, and thus permissible under the antitrust laws. It is important to understand, however, that this is not an exemption from the antitrust laws. In no event would providers be allowed to set prices or control markets so as to injure competition. Only an organization meeting specified criteria would qualify for this more liberal, rule of reason consideration. The network must have in place written programs for quality assurance, utilization review, coordination of care, and resolution of patient grievances and complaints. It must contract as a group, and mandate that all providers forming part of the group be accountable for provision of the services for which the organization has contracted. antitrust exemption for medical self-regulatory entities Standard setting is a cooperative activity engaged in by the providers of health care services in this country. Those entities have a long history of protecting the public with standards for medical education, professional ethics, and specialty certification. These activities have increasingly been challenged under the antitrust laws in recent years, typically by those who fail to meet the standards. Congress attempted to address this problem with the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 11101 et seq., which provided antitrust protection for peer review actions conducted in good faith. While beneficial, this law shifted the debate in antitrust litigation over peer review to whether the participants acted in good faith and has not served to stem the tide of antitrust law suits. The medical self-regulatory entity exemption included in our legislation would bar antitrust suits against medical self-regulatory entities that develop or enforce medical standards. This would include activities such as accreditation of health care providers and medical education programs and institutions, technology assessment and risk management, development and implementation of practice guidelines and parameters, and official peer review proceedings. The exemption would cover suits against individual members of the groups which undertake these activities as well as the organizational entity on whose behalf they act. The scope of this antitrust protection is not absolute, however, Activities by a medical self-regulatory body that are conducted for purposes of financial gain or which would interfere with the provision of health care services of a provider who is not a member of the profession that sets the standard would not be covered or exempted by this legislation. Mr. Chairman, H.R. 2425 represents a historic step forward in improving the delivery of health care in America. It deserves the support of every Member of this body.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, on Sunday, October 15, hundreds of religious men and women will gather to celebrate the centennial of the Society of the Divine Word. It was on October 15, 1895, that Brother Wendelin Meyer arrived in North America to establish a religious order of Catholic priests and brothers. Settling in northern Illinois, Brother Meyer and other missionaries opened a technical school for boys. Successful in its efforts, the Society continued its growth in 1909 with the establishment of the Nation's first seminary dedicated to educating men for work in foreign missions. Encouraged by Pope Pius XI, the mission in 1920 opened St. Augustine's Seminary in Bay St. Louis, MS, to serve the special needs of African-American men who wanted to become priests. Its alumni include nine bishops and at least 40 percent of the African- American clergy ordained in the United States. Vital, successful and, above all, faithful, the Society continues its mission among America's immigrant Hispanic and Vietnamese populations. Its priests and brothers work among the poor on four continents living and practicing the teachings of the Gospel. With such a record of achievement and a brilliant future to come, the Society may look forward to a second century of unbridled progress.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, we are met today to pay tribute to the millions of Americans who, in the face of tyranny and aggression, answered ``yes'' when their country called. To serve one's nation is always an ennobling experience. That is especially true when that service and the sacrifice it entails is performed in the context of a great struggle for freedom. And that, my friends, is precisely what World War II was: A great struggle for freedom, on whose outcome hung the fate of liberty and justice and decency in the world. The years, now over 50, have had their way with us. We are fewer and grayer and slower, but the words of Lord Tennyson were never more appropriate: Tho' much is taken, much abides; and tho' We are not now of that strength which in old days Moved earth and heaven; that which we are, we are; One equal temper of heroic hearts, Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield. [[Page H 9789]] When you visit the Vietnam Memorial, those 58,196 names overwhelming; but a World War II memorial would contain 291,557 names of U.S. military killed in action. And add to that our war dead in Korea and the First World War and this century, mercifully coming to a close becomes, the bloodiest century in all history. We own an unpayable debt to those heroes of freedom whose gift of self, embodied in the performance of their duty, now rest in cemeteries in Normandy and throughout the islands of the Pacific. We commend their eternal souls to the mercy of God, in whose kingdom every tear will be wiped away. But if we cannot repay the debt we owe our beloved dead, we may at least discharge some portion of it by being better citizens and neighbors ourselves. We may honor their sacrifice by building the kind of America they fought and died for, a land of liberty and justice for all, a decent and tolerant society, a community of civic friendship, a leader in freedom's cause in the world. Every war produces its heroes, not all of them acknowledged. One of my heroes is Congressman Bob Stump of Arizona who, at barely 16 years of age, exaggerated his age so he could enlist in the Navy. We both participated in the invasion of Luzan in the Philippines, January 9, 1945; but we never knew each other back then. Another hero of mine lies buried in a cemetery at Normandy. In June 1994, as a Scottish bagpipe band played the piercing mournful strains of ``Amazing Grace,'' I walked up to a white cross to read his name, but there was no name, just the words: ``Here lies, in honored glory, a comrade in arms--known but to God.'' Sacred scripture tells us there is a time for weeping. Pope John Paul II told us last week that: We shall see that the tears of this century have prepared the ground for a new springtime of the human spirit. And so today, 50 years later, rather than mourn our Nation's war dead, let us thank God that such men lived. Vice President GORE. Senator Daniel K. Inouye entered the U.S. Army 1 year after the attack on Pearl Harbor, joining the legendary 442d Regimental Combat Team, a unit comprised solely of Japanese-Americans. He fought in Italy and France, gaining a battlefield commission to second lieutenant. He was gravely injured on April 21, 1945, when he lost his right arm to a rifle grenade. He won numerous awards for his service, rising to the rank of captain before being discharged in 1947. It is an honor to recognize for remarks the Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Senator from the State of Hawaii and ranking minority member of the Committee on Indian Affairs. Senator Inouye.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Is the gentlewoman saying an appeal is as good as winning the case in the first instance?

Mr. HYDE. But that is costly and cumbersome, and maybe the people who are initiating this do not have the resources that some of the special interests who want to set it aside do. But an appeal is never as good as winning it in the first place; the gentlewoman knows that I am sure.

Mr. HYDE. Reclaiming my time, that is another issue, and we can debate that on another day, but one of the things that I have never particularly felt favorably toward is no change of venue in the Federal courts, and one can get a budget that they are not at all comfortable with, and perhaps with good reason, and there is no way one can change a venue from him if he or she does not choose to grant it on their own. So that is another reason that one can get justice more readily by the collective wisdom of a three-judge panel than one, and I am sure the gentlewoman has much more to say, and she can do it on her own time, and I will listen to her with interest.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I was reading her mind and assuming that is what she really wanted.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate the gentleman from California [Mr. Bono] for initiating this excellent piece of legislation. I cannot imagine anything more startling than to learn that a referendum or an initiative, in which 5 million people have participated has been set for naught by one judge who, as we all know, being people in the real world, judges can be whimsical, judges are not always correct, and one judge who decides against 5 million people, or a large percentage thereof, is really an anomaly. Now what the gentleman from California [Mr. Bono] and what we are seeking in this bill is justice and a fair chance at justice. It is not forum shopping to say that collective wisdom is better than individual wisdom. When my colleagues have surgery, they would like a second opinion, a third opinion. There is nothing wrong with getting opinions of people who are skilled, and who have the judgment and have the knowledge that is important in this field. So, if we are dealing with something of such dignity, and such importance, and such weight, and such significance as a statewide referendum, what in the world is wrong with asking that a three-judge panel decide whether it should be operative or it should be set aside? I think that is justice. Now the gentlewoman, for whom my admiration is boundless, and I mean that, says we are going to close down three drug courts. I suppose she means two; they have to slow one down anyway for the judge who is going to hear the case, but I do not see this as an either/or proposition, and I do not see an individual drug case being delayed a week or two so that the wishes of millions of people can be adjudicated in a reasonable way, as a bad tradeoff. So I think this is a fine idea. The gentlewoman obscures and obfuscates the neat simplicity of this proposal by requiring qualifications where there is only one judge or other procedures for random selection. I think it clutters up the bull. The bill is very plain and very direct, and I think it is the quickest way to justice for millions for people who take seriously their role in a statewide referendum. I yield to the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. Schroeder] my dear friend.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Schroeder]. (Mr. HYDE asked and was given unanimous consent to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, justice delayed is justice denied. If it takes 14 years to process a habeas corpus petition and 52 appeals, there is something very wrong. I would expect the gentleman who is sensitive about burdens on the court to help us lead that fight.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say, sort of in passing, to my friend from North Carolina [Mr. Watt], who is one of the most valuable members of the House Committee on the Judiciary, but I was taken aback by his remarks about the extra cost and the burden on the court. I was somewhat taken aback by the gentleman from North Carolina's concern about the extra burden on the courts for convening a three-judge panel to decide a State referendum or initiative that the constitutionality, because my memory could be faulty, I concede that, but I do not recall the gentleman being at the point in habeas corpus reform where cases go up and down and up and down and up and down. I can think of one that lasted 14 years, with 52 appeals. I just do not recall the gentleman being a leader in trying to reform that burden on the courts.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing a bill to codify without substantive change recent laws related to transportation not included in title 49 and to make technical and conforming amendments to the United States Code. This bill was prepared by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the House of Representatives under its statutory duty--2 U.S.C. 285b--to prepare and submit periodically revisions of positive law titles of the Code to keep those titles current. This bill makes no change in the substance of existing law. Anyone interested in obtaining a copy of the bill should contact the Judiciary Committee document clerk in room B-29 of the Cannon House Office Building. The telephone number is 225-0408. In addition, a section-by- section summary--containing reviser's notes--of the bill may be obtained through Edward F. Willett, Jr., Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives, H2-304 Ford House Office Building, Washington, DC, 20515-6711. Persons wishing to comment on the bill should submit those comments to the law revision counsel no later than October 12, 1995.