Henry Hyde

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Madam Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), and I ask unanimous consent that he be permitted to control that time.

Mr. HYDE. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Wasserman Schultz).

Mr. HYDE. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I would like to say to the gentlewoman from Florida who remarked that God forgot to come to Auschwitz, if she would read Elie Wiesel's book ``Night,'' she would find an instance where the Nazis lined up the Jewish prisoners in front of the gallows and they were having a hanging of some person who tried to escape and a low voice said, ``Where is God?'' Someone said, ``He's up there on the gallows.'' He was there. He was just being punished. The gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith), the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Cardin), the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Wolf), there is a long, honorable list of people who are really the conscience of this Congress and, hence, of our country on this matter of human rights. God must look down on this globe and see the killing that goes on in the Sudan, that went on in the gulag, that goes on in China. We just honored Ukraine's accession to democracy. Well do we remember the collectivization of the farms in the early thirties when millions of Ukrainians were starved to death. Life is very cheap. I think every human being should visit Auschwitz. It is an education. It makes you understand the depths to which human nature can sink. Someone said when Napoleon died it was because God got bored with him. I wonder that God is not bored with us, the cheapening of life. Democracy is more than a way of establishing rules for lawsuits, for litigation. It ascribes value to every human being, intrinsic value. That is the important thing about democracy. I remember as a young man, I thought education was the cure for bigotry, but Germany had one of the highest literacy rates in Europe when Hitler ruled that country and they marched with their swastikas. So it is a little more than education. It is, as President Bush said in his inaugural, we have to change hearts. This has been a good debate. We are going back to principles. We are going back to the value of human life and how capable we are of abusing it and of denigrating it. Let us hope that this resolution elevates people's ideas, focuses on how terrible we have treated other human beings, and resolve to do better.

Mr. HYDE. Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that during the first session of the 109th Congress: One, on legislative days of Monday when the House convenes pursuant to House Resolution 8 the House shall convene 90 minutes earlier than the time otherwise established by that resolution solely for the purpose of conducting morning hour debate; and Two, on legislative days of Tuesday when the House convenes pursuant to House Resolution 8: (a) before May 16, 2005, the House shall convene for morning hour debate 90 minutes earlier than the time otherwise established by that resolution; and (b) after May 16, 2005, the House shall convene for morning hour debate one hour earlier than the time otherwise established by that resolution; and Three, on legislative days of Monday or Tuesday, when the House convenes for morning hour debate pursuant to an order other than House Resolution 8, the House shall resume its session 90 minutes after the time otherwise established by that order; Four, the time for morning hour debate shall be limited to the 30 minutes allocated to each party, except that on Tuesdays after May 16, 2005, the time shall be limited to 25 minutes allocated to each party and may not continue beyond 10 minutes before the hour appointed for the resumption of the session of the House; and Five, the form of proceeding for morning hour debate shall be as follows: (a) the prayer by the Chaplain, the approval of the Journal and the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag shall be postponed until resumption of the session of the House; (b) initial and subsequent recognitions for debate shall alternate between the parties; (c) recognition shall be conferred by the Speaker only pursuant to lists submitted by the majority leader and by the minority leader; (d) no Member may address the House for longer than 5 minutes, except the majority leader, the minority leader or the minority whip; and (e) following morning hour debate, the Chair shall declare a recess pursuant to clause 12(a) of rule I until the time appointed for the resumption of the session of the House.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I offer a resolution (H. Res. 12) expressing condolences and support for assistance to the victims of the earthquake and tsunamis that occurred on December 26, 2004, in South and Southeast Asia, and ask unanimous consent for its immediate consideration.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on H. Res. 12, the resolution under consideration.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield half my time to the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) and ask unanimous consent that he may control that time.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I stand in support of House Resolution 12 which the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Leach) and I introduced earlier today with numerous of our colleagues. It expresses the deep condolences of the House of Representatives for the victims of the massive earthquake and tsunamis that struck South and Southeast Asia on December 26, 2004, and affirms our commitment to additional generous support for relief and reconstruction efforts. The destruction wrought by this disaster is nearly incomprehensible. The confirmed death toll is nearly 150,000, approximately one-third of whom were children. Those countries that were hardest hit, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India and Thailand, each lost many thousands, and the deadly effects were felt as far away as the eastern coasts of Africa. Millions of people are affected and lack the basic food, water, shelter and medical care necessary for survival. But, as the resolution notes, the human cost of this disaster transcends mere statistics and has resulted in deeply personal tragedies for countless families in the region and throughout the world. Our prayers are with the victims, their families and the many men and women working tirelessly to provide critical assistance to those still at risk. I am proud of the swiftness and the magnitude of the relief effort that has been organized during the past week and a half. The United States has stepped forward with an initial commitment of $350 million, and we are providing crucial transportation and logistic support for the larger relief effort. The current total of international commitment stands at approximately $2 billion. I fully expect additional resources will be required, and we must all recognize that reconstruction from this epic catastrophe will not be a short-term project. It is fitting we consider this resolution on the first day of this new Congress. This effort is the latest instance in a long American tradition of humanitarian generosity, and our actions demonstrate our belief that the earthquake and the tsunamis of December 26 were not primarily an Asian tragedy but a human tragedy. The people of the United States and all people of goodwill stand in solidarity with the many victims. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Leach).

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton), my learned colleague.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher).

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Ferguson).

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Royce).

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Weller).

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, now that Congress is close to passing landmark legislation that will help our intelligence community, it is time to take a closer look at streamlining congressional intelligence oversight responsibilities. I believe the time for change is now and I am pleased to share with my colleagues a recent editorial in the News-Leader, Florida's oldest weekly newspaper, which explores some of the options once again available to us: [From the News-Leader, Dec. 3, 2004] Joint Intelligence Committee Overdue The collapse of Congressional efforts to reform the intelligence community dominated the news just before Thanksgiving. The proposed legislation embodied many of the major recommendations of the 9/11 Commission for fixing the executive branch's intelligence problems. Largely overlooked in this reform debate is Congress' failure, so far, to do enough to address its own problems. Yet the 9/11 panel noted that ``of all of our recommendations, strengthening Congressional oversight may be the most difficult and important.'' The commission also pointed out that, ``Congressional oversight for intelligence and counterterrorism is now dysfunctional.'' The main reason this critically important congressional responsibility is malfunctioning is because it is spread amongst too many committees. That is why the 9/11 Commission urged Congress to replace the current fragmented oversight arrangement with either a House-Senate joint committee or single panels in each congressional body with exclusive oversight and legislative power. Consolidation along these lines would drastically reduce the time high level intelligence community officials spend on Capitol Hill repeating over and over again the same briefings and testimonies to the various committees now exercising jurisdiction over intelligence activities. Redundant congressional demands are becoming so time-consuming that it is increasingly difficult for these senior officials to discharge their primary duties of attending to the many security issues confronting this nation. The need to reform Congress' oversight of the intelligence community has been recognized by some members of Congress for years. Henry Hyde, currently chairman of the International Relations Committee in the House of Representatives, proposed legislation to create a Joint Intelligence Committee in 1984. He spelled out what he had in mind in numerous forums, including op ed pieces that appeared in major newspapers. Nearly 17 years ago, Hyde's idea was the top recommendation of the Republican members of the Iran/Contra Committee. Among those endorsing the Hyde initiative were Dick Cheney, Mike De Wine and Orrin Hatch, who served with Hyde on the Iran-Contra Joint Committee. All of these political figures remain major players in Washington. The reluctance of Congress to get its own house in order is politically understandable. A Joint Intelligence Committee would require a number of committees and their powerful chairmen to sacrifice their jurisdictions over intelligence matters. But given what is at stake, it is time to subordinate such parochial concerns to the national interest. To really, be effective, a Joint Intelligence Committee must have both oversight and legislative authority. Otherwise, those committees with an interest in intelligence issues will try to recapture their lost purviews. Historically, those committees have been Armed Services, Judiciary, Appropriations and Foreign/International Relations. To mollify these traditional bailiwicks, membership on the joint committee should include representatives from each of these committees. The panel must be small to ensure secrecy and promote individual responsibility and accountability. To encourage bipartisanship, neither political party should have more than a one-vote edge. The committee staff should be composed of apolitical professionals. In summary, the time has come to think outside of the box and adopt radical congressional reforms to meet national security challenges in the post 9/11 world. The 9/11 Commission put it best when it warned that ``the other reforms we have suggested--for a national counter-terrorism center and national intelligence director--will not work if congressional oversight does not change too. Unity of effort in executive management can be lost if it is fractured by congressional oversight.''

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, the following provides a summary and the legislative intent of the provisions included in the conference report on S. 2845, the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, that are within the jurisdiction of the House Committee on International Relations and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. As a member of the conference on S. 2845, and Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations, it is appropriate to provide guidance to those who will be responsible for faithfully executing this important statute. The inclusion in the conference report of several provisions of interest to the International Relations Committee reflects our work to implement the recommendations of the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, July 2004, hereafter referred to as the 9/11 Commission. As a practical matter, I consulted with Mr. Lantos, the Ranking Democratic Member of the House Committee on International Relations (who was not a member of the Conference Committee), Senator Collins, Senator Lieberman and, through them, with Senator Lugar on these provisions included in the legislation. We reached agreement on the text of those provisions, and following is further elaboration of the most significant provisions that shall be considered to have the effect of a statement of managers. Sec. 7102--Terrorist Sanctuaries. This section transforms the broad recommendations of the 9/11 Commission into action. The 9/11 Commission stated, ``The U.S. Government must identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries. For each, it should have a realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using all elements of national power.'' (Pg. 367) In response, this section provides a comprehensive statement articulating the sense of Congress that U.S. policy should have such a focus or mandate. It establishes reporting requirements to enable the Congress to monitor patterns relating to terrorist sanctuaries and to assess successes or setbacks in our efforts, in order to correct any deficiencies that may exist. Further, this section amends the Export Administration Act (EAA) to add terrorist sanctuaries to determinations relating to states that ``repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.'' It is in keeping with the underlying criteria in the Export Administration Act which says that, when imposing, expanding or extending export controls under the EAA, the President ``shall consider the compatibility of the proposed controls with the foreign policy objectives of the United States, including the effort to counter international terrorism, and shall consider the foreign policy consequences of not imposing controls.'' This section merely updates U.S. law to reflect the post-9/ 11 world. It provides legislative authority to the goals outlined in the National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism to deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists, and to choke off the lifeblood of terrorist groups from their access to territory, funds, equipment, training, technology, and unimpeded transit. Through the definition of ``terrorist sanctuary,'' the section seeks to encompass a broad range of activities including training, financing (which includes fundraising), recruitment, and the use of a nation-state territory as a transit point for terrorists, funds, or equipment. Governments of terrorist sanctuaries are knowledgeable about the recurring use of their territory for terrorist purposes and are ignoring or tolerating such activity. Their failure and unwillingness to take action against such use of their territory contributes to the spread of global terrorism and, in turn, augments the threat to U.S. national security and interests. This provision seeks to serve as an inducement for cooperation with U.S. counterterrorism efforts, as well as a deterrent to keep governments from allowing their territories to be used as terrorist sanctuaries. Asked about this provision, 9/11 Commission Co-Chair Lee Hamilton said, during an August 24, 2004 hearing of the House International Relations Committee, ``There must be a strategy developed in dealing with wherever these sanctuaries are; economic sanctions, of whatever kind, would certainly be one of those tools to deny those sanctuaries.'' Sec. 7104--Assistance for Afghanistan. This section is largely derived from Sections 4061--4070 (Subtitle D of Title IV) of H.R. 10 as passed by the House of Representatives (the House amendment), and Section 1004 of the Senate bill. Sec. 7104(a)--Short Title. Sets out a short title for this section; derived from the House amendment. Sec. 7104(b)--Coordination of Assistance. Derived from section 1004 of the Senate bill, this subsection sets out Congressional findings, consistent with the Commission's Final Report, relative to the United States assistance program for Afghanistan and related topics. Expresses the sense of Congress on actions to be taken. Sec. 7104(c)--Coordinator for Assistance. This section's findings note that the 9/11 Commission criticized American assistance to Afghanistan as overly divided among specific programs and note that the flexible funding mechanisms put in place by the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 have not been used to date. The provision requires the appointment of a powerful coordinator for assistance to Afghanistan. This coordinator would have powers similar to those used effectively by such persons as Deputy Secretary Armitage when he served in a similar role with respect to the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The coordinator would be a locus of responsibility, as contemplated by the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act, but the intent of which was frustrated when no government-wide coordinator was appointed. This provision was derived from section 4062 of the House amendment. The Senate bill contained no comparable provision. Sec. 7104(d)--Assistance Plan: International Coordination. The coordinator would submit the Administration's plan, or program, for assistance to Afghanistan in the form of a program plan. The plan should be submitted as early as possible after the beginning of the fiscal year or after the enactment of the relevant appropriations acts, whichever is later, and certainly before a significant portion of the year's appropriations are obligated. The plan should indicate its relation to the Administration's long-term strategy for Afghanistan. The coordinator would work with the international community and the Afghan government to ensure that assistance to Afghanistan is implemented coherently and efficiently. The coordinator would, in general, work through the Secretary of the Treasury and the United States Executive Directors at the international financial institutions (as defined in Sec. 1701(C)(2) of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(C)(2)) in order to effectuate his or her responsibilities with respect to international financial institutions. This provision was derived from section 4062 of the House amendment. The Senate bill contained no comparable provision. See. 7104(e)--General Provisions Relating to the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA) of 2002. (1)(A) and (2) These provisions set out a general declaration of policy reaffirming the commitment of Congress to the authorities of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 and establishes some key policies underlying the bill-- the commitment of the United States to its undertaking in April 2004 when it supported a development program of Afghanistan, the forthcoming parliamentary elections, and the necessity for additional nations to step forward and shoulder additional economic and military burdens. (1)(B) This subparagraph broadens an inappropriately narrowed ``notwithstanding'' provision from the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 which had the effect of limiting certain flexible authorities for the implementation of Title I of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002. It is consistent with the flexibility recommended by the 9/11 Commission. The only ``notwithstanding'' authority currently applicable to Title I of AFSA relates to the Brooke Amendment. (3) The Conference agreement, in a provision similar to the House amendment, permits reports to Congress required under the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act to contain a classified annex. (4) This paragraph amends AFSA to require the President to prepare and submit to Congress a long-term strategy for United States policy toward Afghanistan, as well as an annual statement of progress made in executing that plan and of changes to it. These provisions were derived from section 4063 of the House amendment. The Senate bill contained no comparable provisions. Sec. 7104(f)--Education, Rule of Law, and Related Issues. Derived from section 4064 of the House Amendment, this subsection updates the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA) of 2002 with respect to programs to help courts, prosecutors, and others in reflecting the information gathered by Congress in the course of its oversight of conditions in Afghanistan, as the situation in Afghanistan has evolved since late 2002. Provisions emphasizing the need to assist Afghanistan with respect to aiding democratic political parties, renovating and otherwise supporting secondary schools and universities, improving the physical infrastructure of the justice system, and providing for professional education for Afghanistan's officials have been added in the conference process. The section of AFSA (Sec. 103(A)(5)) in which all of these provisions are found is restated and re-enacted in its revised form for the sake of clarity. The Senate bill contained no comparable provision. Sec. 7104(g)--Monitoring of Assistance for Afghanistan. This subsection provides that the Secretary of State shall provide an annual report to the Congress describing assistance to Iraq, including a report on activities and their funding sources by agency, program, and fiscal year, obligations incurred, the participation of each government agency, and any other information the Secretary considers necessary to fully inform the Congress on assistance to Iraq. This report would become a responsibility of the coordinator provided for in section 104 of AFSA. All government agencies involved in assistance to Afghanistan shall provide the Secretary information the Secretary reasonably requires to prepare and submit this report. Sec. 7104(h)--United States Policy to Support of Disarmament of Private Militias and Expansion of International Peacekeeping and Security Operations in Afghanistan. This subsection is derived from Section 4066 of the House amendment. The Senate bill contained no comparable provision. This subsection, in paragraph (1), establishes that it shall be United States policy to take immediate steps to provide active support for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of armed soldiers, particularly child soldiers, in Afghanistan, in close consultation with the President of Afghanistan. ``Active support'' does not necessarily mean the deployment of military assets, but all appropriate means to help the Government of Afghanistan rid the country of private militias should be considered. The semi-annual report provided under section 206 of AFSA is to contain a report on activities taken pursuant to this subsection. Paragraph (2) of the subsection addresses the need to increase the area in which security is provided by international security forces in Afghanistan. To that end, it is established that it is the policy of the United States to make every effort to support the expansion of international peacekeeping and security operations within Afghanistan. The purpose of that expansion is to allow international security forces to undertake vital tasks related to promoting security, such as disarming warlords, militias, and irregulars, and disrupting opium production. Moreover, a force spread over a larger area might safeguard highways in order to allow the free flow of commerce and to allow material assistance to the people of Afghanistan, and aid personnel in Afghanistan, to move more freely. Sec. 7104(i)--Efforts to Expand International Peacekeeping and Security Operations in Afghanistan. Subsection (i), derived from section 4067 of the House amendment, addresses the issue of encouraging and enabling additional countries to participate in international peacekeeping and security operations in Afghanistan. (This is not to be confused with subparagraph (h)(2), which addresses the issue of helping those forces within Afghanistan to expand their reach.) Subsection (i) provides that the President shall encourage, and, as authorized by law, enable other countries to actively participate in expanded international peacekeeping and security operations in Afghanistan, especially through the provision of military personnel for extended periods of time. It also provides for semi-annual reports to the Congress on the President's efforts in this regard, which may be submitted with the reports required by AFSA section 206(c). The Senate bill contained no comparable provision. Sec. 7104(j)--Provisions Relating to Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan. Subsection (j), derived from section 4068 of the House amendment, amends AFSA to provide assistance for a variety of non-military measures to disrupt the opium trade, such as technical assistance, credit, and farm-to-market facilities for alternative crops, and training for counternarcotics police. The Senate bill contained no comparable provision. A second section to be added to AFSA expresses the sense of Congress that the President should make the substantial reduction of illegal drug production and trafficking in Afghanistan a priority in the Global War on Terrorism; that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, should expand cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan and international organizations involved in counter-drug activities to assist in providing a secure environment for counter-drug personnel in Afghanistan; and that the United States, in conjunction with the Government of Afghanistan and coalition partners, should undertake additional efforts to reduce illegal drug trafficking and related activities that provide financial support for terrorist organizations. The provision also requires a joint report to Congress from the Secretaries of Defense and State within 120 days of the date of enactment that describes the progress made toward substantially reducing poppy cultivation and heroin production capabilities in Afghanistan, and the extent to which profits from illegal drug activity in Afghanistan are used to financially support terrorist organizations and groups seeking to undermine the Government of Afghanistan. This provision makes needed changes in the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act to update it from late 2002. Since the fall of the Taliban, there has been a tremendous resurgence of narcotics cultivation and trafficking in Afghanistan. Money made dealing in narcotics has flowed to the neo-Taliban and to al-Qaeda terrorists. Those criminals seek to kill members of Afghanistan's army, of our Armed Forces, and of our Coalition. Unchecked, they will destroy Afghanistan's economy and environment, its nascent government, and Afghan society itself. Today, half of the economic activity in Afghanistan is based on narcotics. If the narcotics trade is not suppressed, Afghanistan will become a narco-state that will once again become a sanctuary for terrorists: the United States and its allies will have gained little if anything for the valiant efforts of those who struggled on America's behalf in this difficult theater of war. Sec. 7104(k)--Additional Amendments to the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002. This subsection, derived from section 4069 of the House amendment, makes a technical change in AFSA to reflect the change in the name of an Afghan institution and extends AFSA's main reporting provision through 2010. The Senate bill contained no comparable provision. Sec. 7104(1)--Repeal of Prohibition of Assistance. Section 620D of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 bans aid to Afghanistan. This section repeals that provision of law, which has outlived its usefulness. This law is no longer needed, given the efforts of the American-led Coalition and the Afghan people. This subsection is derived from section 4070 of the House amendment. The Senate bill contained no comparable provision. Sec. 7104(m)--Authorization of Appropriations. This subsection amends the AFSA to authorize the appropriation of such sums as may be necessary for each of FY05 and FY06. The Senate bill, in section 1004(c), provided for the appropriation to the President, for each of the Fiscal Years 2005 through 2009, ``such sums as may be necessary to provide assistance for Afghanistan, unless otherwise authorized by Congress,'' for development assistance, children's health programs, economic assistance, international narcotics and law enforcement, nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining and related programs, international military education and training, foreign military financing program grants, and peacekeeping operations. Assistance provided by the President under this subsection ``shall be consistent with the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002,'' and shall be provided with reference to the ``Securing Afghanistan's Future'' document published by the Government of Afghanistan. Sec. 7109--Public Diplomacy Responsibilities of the Department of State. This section amends the State Department Basic Authorities Act to provide a description of the Secretary of State's public diplomacy responsibilities. It also directs the Secretary of State to make every effort to coordinate public diplomacy activities of federal agencies subject to the direction of the President. As the foreign policy agency for the United States, the State Department should also take the lead role in U.S. international public diplomacy. The provision states that the Secretary of State shall coordinate with the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) to develop a comprehensive strategy and measurable objectives for public diplomacy. Although this section is designed to ensure the highest level of attention by our foreign policy agencies to public diplomacy needs and objectives, it does not provide new authority to the Secretary of State over the programs of the BBG. The role of the BBG as a firewall against political interference in the content of the broadcasts remains unchanged, as does the independence of the agency. Numerous studies of U.S. public diplomacy provide recommendations to improve the current system and strategic direction at the State Department. This provision seeks to support the State Department and others involved in public diplomacy by establishing a clear set of responsibilities. Sec. 7110--Public Diplomacy Training. This section seeks to enhance the quality and depth of public diplomacy capabilities within the State Department. The findings emphasize the recruitment by the Foreign Service of individuals with expertise and professional experience in public diplomacy, and enhanced training in the range of public diplomacy activities. The findings also emphasize the role which chiefs of mission should assume in designing and carrying out public diplomacy strategies. This section encourages the State Department to be more creative in its recruitment strategies in the area of public diplomacy. To meet a serious foreign language gap, the section requires the Secretary of State to provide special consideration for individuals with such language abilities, and sets a goal to increase the number of Foreign Service officers proficient in languages spoken in predominately Muslim countries. In addition, a change is made in the precepts for promotion in the Foreign Service so as to reward the willingness and ability of officers to participate in public outreach efforts related to their jobs as well as other aspects of public diplomacy. Expressing and explaining U.S. policies and the breadth of American values is an important element of the professional skills necessary for Foreign Service officers. It should be recognized within the promotion precepts. Sec. 7111--Promoting Democracy and Human Rights at International Organizations. Sec. 7111(a)--Support and Expansion of Democracy Caucus. Derived from section 4032 of the House amendment, this subsection calls on the President to continue to strongly support and seek to expand the work of the nascent Democracy Caucus at the United Nations and the United Nations Human Rights Commission; and to seek to establish a Democracy Caucus at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament and at other broad-based international organizations. The purpose of the Caucus is to forge common positions, revise outmoded systems of membership selection and regional voting, and establish a rotational leadership agreement. Sec. 7111(b)--Leadership and Membership of International Organizations. This subsection, derived from section 4033 of the House amendment, urges the President, acting through the Secretary of State, to use United States influence and vote to: (1) reform criteria for membership and leadership positions within all United Nations bodies and other international institutions so as to exclude countries which violate the principles of the specific organization; (2) make it the policy of the United Nations and other international organizations and multilateral institutions in which the United States is a member that a member country may not stand in nominations for membership or significant leadership positions if the member country is subject to sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council; and (3) ensure that no country stand in nomination for membership or in rotation for significant leadership positions in such organizations, or for membership on the United Nations Security Council, if it has been determined by the Secretary of State that a member country has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. Sec. 7111(c)--Increased Training for Multilateral Diplomacy. This subsection, derived from section 4034 of the House amendment, states that it shall be the policy of the United States that training courses should be established for Foreign Service officers and civil service employees for the State Department, including appropriate chiefs of mission, on the conduct of multilateral diplomacy. It specifies that the Secretary of State shall ensure that multilateral diplomacy training is provided at various stages of the careers of members of the service, including as part of their training upon entry into the service; and for officers, including chiefs of mission, who are assigned to United States missions representing the United States to international organizations and other multilateral institutions or who are assigned in Washington, D.C., to positions that have as their primary responsibility formulation of policy towards such organizations and institutions or towards participation in broad based multilateral negotiations of international instruments, receive specialized training in multilateral diplomacy prior to the beginning of service for such assignment or, if receiving such training is not practical at the time, within the first year of the beginning of such assignment. It also directs the Secretary of State to ensure that employees of the Department of State who are members of the civil service and who are assigned to international organizations or multilateral institutions also receive multilateral diplomacy training. Sec. 7112--Pilot Program to Provide Grants to American- sponsored Schools in Predominately Muslim Countries to Provide Scholarships. This section authorizes the Secretary of State to initiate a scholarship program for grade school kids in predominately Muslim countries to attend American- sponsored schools. The Office of Overseas Schools assists many schools overseas, therefore this grant program would operate through this office. The purpose of the provision is to complement other U.S. Government efforts to broaden the understanding of American values and support a wider use of English. Numerous studies of U.S. public diplomacy point to the need for creative, measurable programs. This trial scholarship program provides a new option for American outreach efforts. The provision allows the Secretary of State to start a pilot program to provide full or partial scholarships to children of low and middle-income families to encourage them to attend an American-style school. The pilot program is intended to determine whether such a scholarship program can be more broadly used in the region and whether such a program is supported by the participating parties: the American- sponsored schools, the families, the State Department, and the Congress. Sec. 7118--Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This section amends section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189) by making two principal changes to the current law regarding the designation of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs). First, it would replace the requirement to formally re-designate FTOs every two years with a procedure allowing these groups to petition the Secretary of State at two-year intervals to have their designation revoked. It would also require the Secretary of State to review the designation of each FTO every five years. Second, section 7118 would establish a new procedure for handling the situation in which a terrorist organization changes its name or uses new aliases. This provision allows the government to amend the underlying administrative record instead of re-creating a voluminous document every time this occurs. A group will be able to appeal these additional designations. Under existing law, the U.S. government must devote significant amounts of its counter-terrorist resources to the time-consuming and burdensome FTO re-designation effort. Section 7118 changes the re-designation process to allow the State Department and other government agencies to focus more of their scarce resources on responding to new terrorist threats or tracking and analyzing newer groups that emerge on the horizon. Sec. 7120--Case-Zablocki Act Requirements. The 9/11 Commission report states that of all the recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may be among the most difficult and important. Recently, the House Committee on International Relations learned that, due to numerous management failures within the Department of State, over 600 classified and unclassified international agreements dating back to 1997, had not been transmitted to Congress, as required by the Case-Zablocki Act. This failure by the Department of State covers a variety of sensitive international agreements, including intelligence and military cooperation agreements. The full knowledge of these agreements by the Congress is not only required by United States law, but is also critical to the ability of Congress to execute Constitutional oversight responsibilities. This strikes at the heart of the relationship between the two branches of government, severely inhibiting our ability to carry out effective foreign policy objectives to prevent foreign terrorist operations. Although the Department of State is working to immediately address these management shortcomings and produce the remaining outstanding international agreements to Congress as soon a possible, this has reached crisis proportion which demands immediate Congressional attention and oversight. In 1972, the Case-Zablocki Act (1 U.S.C. 112a and 112b) was passed as a result of the Executive Branch's failure to adequately inform Congress of the international executive agreements entered into by the President and other officials on behalf of the United States. At that time, the Symington Subcommittee on National Commitments uncovered contemporary examples of secret agreements entered into without adequate reference to Congress. The provisions of the Yalta Agreement at the end of World War II were also not publicly disclosed for three years, or published until some time later. These actions prompted great Congressional and public discourse and controversy. Congress stated that each incident in which such secret agreements become known creates tensions and irritations between the Congress and the Executive Branch which severely inhibit carrying out an effective foreign policy. (House Report 92-1301.) Currently, the Case-Zablocki Act requires that the Secretary of State publish an annual report of all treaties and international agreements to which the United States became a party during each calendar year, unless the publication would be contrary to the national interest of the United States. It further requires the transmission to Congress any international agreement, other than a treaty, no later than 60 days, with classified agreements transmitted under a secrecy agreement. The Conferees support the tightening of the Case-Zablocki reporting requirement in an effort to conduct more rigorous congressional oversight over the Executive Branch. Specifically, it clarifies the types of agreements subject to Congressional transmittal and further requires the State Department to compile an annual classified index containing all executive agreements acted upon during the past year by country. Not only does it require the transmission of any bilateral or multilateral counterterrorism agreement, it requires the notification of any agreement the United States enters into with a country designated by the U.S. government as being a state sponsor of terrorism. Last, it requires the expedited publishing of agreements, when possible. Therefore, this section makes it clear that Congress is concerned about not being fully informed regarding international agreements entered into by the Executive ranch, particularly sensitive agreements. While the Secretary of State has discretion over determining the which agreements are considered significant enough to be reported to Congress, Congress considers certain agreements of such import that it desires to be notified during contemplation of, and as soon as practicable after, signing the agreement, although by strict interpretation of Case-Zablocki, notification would not have to be made until after the agreement was entered into force. However, many of the agreements do not enter into force for years after they are signed. Congress wants to be informed about the significant agreements prior to that time. In general, these types of agreements would consist of any agreement which would: (1) significantly broaden our commitments with another country (regardless of duration of agreement); (2) concern co-production of weapons systems, transfers of defense equipment, cooperative research, development and testing of weapons systems; (3) grant access to foreign military facilities, installations, or bases; (4) involve the deployment of the U.S. military forces; or (5) involve covert intelligence operations. Similarly, Congress expects that significant political undertakings should not be disguised as non- binding agreements in order to avoid Case-Zablocki's reporting requirements. Effective foreign policy is not created in a vacuum whereby individually-requested briefings on narrowly-selected topics of interest will adequately explain the depth necessary for making important legislative decisions on how to fund the executive branch's foreign policy programs. Foreign policy is best conducted through a prolonged process of sharing objectives and information which leads to informed discussion and context, ultimately concluding in Congress' support of the President's initiatives. In order to strictly enforce this provision, no funding may be made available during 2005-2007 for any international agreement if Congress is not notified pursuant to statute. Sec. 7202--Establishment of Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center. The 9/11 Commission Report found that terrorist travel and facilitation issues should be further studied and emphasized in order to confront terrorists at their weakest points, when they travel. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General currently exchange information on human smuggling and trafficking through the interagency Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (``The Center''). This section would specifically establish The Center and codify The Center's responsibilities. The Center will increase integration and overall effectiveness in the U.S. Government's enforcement and other response efforts, and work with other governments to address the separate but related issues of alien smuggling, trafficking in persons, and smuggler support of clandestine terrorist travel. Migrant smuggling, clandestine terrorist travel and trafficking in persons are transnational issues that threaten national security. The Center will continue to provide a mechanism to bring together all appropriate U.S. agency representatives from policy, law enforcement, intelligence and diplomatic areas to work together on a full-time basis to achieve increased effectiveness and to convert intelligence into effective law enforcement and other action. The Center shall be supported by signatories to the original Memorandum of Understanding (in existence on October 1, 2004), which shall provide appropriate personnel, resources, and funding to the Center. All other appropriate U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies are encouraged to support The Center and its mission. Participating agencies shall utilize The Center to: (1) facilitate broad dissemination of all-source information by serving as an information fusion center and clearinghouse; (2) prepare strategic assessments; (3) identify issues for interagency coordination or attention; (4) coordinate select initiatives and provide support; and (5) conduct related activities. The Center shall be governed by an inter-agency steering group in such a manner as agreed upon by the participating agencies. All relevant U.S. agencies shall disseminate the information to the front-line personnel as appropriate. Sec. 7203--Responsibilities and Functions of Consular Officers. This section consists of four parts aimed at increasing the resources of the Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs and improving the training and operation of U.S. consular officers in detecting fraudulent documents and preventing the entry of terrorists. Subsection (a) increases the number of consular officers from 65 (FY04 and FY05) to 150 per year for FY06-FY09. Since the 9/11 attacks, consular officers have changed their policy and now are required to interview almost all visa applicants between the ages of 14 and 80. Subsection (b) places limitations on the use of foreign nationals to screen both immigrant visa and nonimmigrant visa applications by stating that all such applications shall be reviewed and adjudicated by a U.S. consular officer. This provision does not preclude the assistance of foreign nationals in the review of visa applications. However, it assures that a U.S. Government official is involved in the decision on such applications. Subsection (c) requires that the training program for consular officers include training in detecting fraudulent documents and working directly with Department of Homeland Security immigration inspectors at ports of entry. Subsection (d) requires the Secretary of State to conduct a survey to determine which consular posts have the greatest frequency of presentation of fraudulent documents. An anti- fraud specialist employed by the Department of State must be assigned to each such post unless the Department of Homeland Security has already assigned a person to the post who has both sufficient experience training and experience in the detection of fraudulent documents. This provision will provide consulates with expertise in the detection of fraudulent travel documents and other papers that are submitted by visa applicants as part of their immigrant visa or nonimmigrant visa applications. Sec. 7204--International Agreements to Track and Curtail Terrorist Travel Through the Use of Fraudulently Obtained Documents. This section calls upon the President to lead efforts to reach international agreements to track and stop international travel by terrorists through the use of lost, stolen or falsified documents. Section 7204 states that one agreement should require the establishment of a system to share information on lost, stolen and fraudulent passports, the establishment of a real time verification system of passports with issuing authorities, the sharing of this information by governments with officials at ports of entry, and that parties to the agreement criminalize the production or use of fraudulent travel documents. In addition, Section 7204 calls upon the United States to continue to support efforts at the International Civil Aviation Organization to strengthen the security features of passports and other travel documents. Sec. 7205--International Standards for Transliteration of Names into the Roman Alphabet for International Travel Documents and Name-based Watch List System. This section is a sense of Congress that the President should seek to enter into an international agreement to modernize and improve standards for the translation of names into the Roman alphabet in order to ensure one common spelling for such names for international travel documents and name-based watch list systems. Section 7205 is a direct result of findings of the 9/11 Commission. In its Report, the Commission found that the current lack of a single convention for transliterating Arabic names enabled the 19 hijackers to vary the spelling of their names to defeat name-based watch list systems and confuse any potential efforts to locate them. While the introduction of biometric identifiers may lessen this problem, that process will take many years, and a name-based watch list system will always be useful. Therefore, a standardized way of translating names into the Roman alphabet should be a top priority. Sec. 7206--Immigration Security Initiative. This section expands the Immigration Security Initiative, which is a Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-operated program that assists and trains airline personnel at foreign airports in identifying fraudulent travel documents. Currently, the Immigration Security Initiative is operating in two foreign airports. Section 7206 expands the program to include at least 50 additional foreign airports by December 31, 2006. This section authorizes $25,000,000 in FY 05, $40,000,000 in FY 06, and $40,000,000 in FY 07 to carry out the expansion of this program. The program's objective is to identify and stop passengers, including potential terrorists, who seek to enter the United States using fraudulent documents. Stopping terrorists at foreign airports provides another line of defense in the U.S. Government's border security strategy. Further, as we saw with the shoe bomber, Richard Reid, preventing terrorists from even boarding a flight can forestall a terrorist attack. Sec. 7209--Biometric Entry and Exit Data System. This section states that, consistent with the 9/11 Commission Report, Congress calls on the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to develop a plan to accelerate the full implementation of an automated entry and exit data system at U.S. ports of entry as required by existing law. The Secretary of Homeland Security must report to Congress on the plan no later than 180 days after the enactment of this legislation. Section 7209 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to integrate the biometric entry and exit data system with other databases maintained by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services that contain information on aliens. This section also calls for the Secretary of Homeland Security to implement a plan to expedite the processing of registered travelers at ports of entry. Section 7209 also contains specific requirements and goals with respect to the entry-exit system, as well as additional reporting requirements on the part of the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State. Sec. 7211--Exchange of Terrorist Information and Increased Pre-Inspection at Foreign Airports. This section expands the pre-inspection program to at least 25 additional foreign airports. The additional locations should be operational by January 1, 2008. The pre-inspection program allows Department of Homeland Security immigration and customs inspectors to screen passengers at airports located outside the United States instead of inspecting them when they arrive at U.S. airports. This program is currently operating in eight airports in Canada, four in the Caribbean nations, and at airports in Shannon and Dublin, Ireland. In addition, the selection criteria for pre-inspection locations is based on reducing the number of aliens who arrive to the United States who are inadmissible. Section 7211 changes the selection criteria for pre-inspection locations to include the objective of preventing the entry of potential terrorists and facilitate the travel of admissible aliens. Section 7211 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State to submit a report to Congress on the progress being made in establishing these locations no later than June 30, 2006. Section 7211 also contains findings with respect to the exchange of terrorist information and pre-inspection at foreign airports. Subsection (c) of section 7211 requires a report regarding the exchange of terrorist information. The pre-inspection program allows U.S. Government officials to conduct a thorough screening outside the United States. Not only is this an important tool for preventing the entry of inadmissible aliens, but the pre-inspection program can also help prevent terrorists from boarding flights bound for our country. Sec. 7217--Increase in Penalties for Fraud and Related Activity. This section amends section 1028 of Title 18 to increase penalties for the possession and transfer of fraudulent government identification documents that are used to further an international terrorist attack. Specifically, it increases the maximum term of imprisonment for the production, use or transfer of fraudulent government documents from 25 years to 30 years if the crime involving fraudulent government documents was used to facilitate an act of 14 international terrorism. Sec. 7218--Study on Allegedly Lost or Stolen Passports. This section requires the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security to jointly conduct a study on the feasibility of establishing a system, in coordination with other countries, so that border and visa issuance officials will have access to real-time information on newly-issued passports to persons who alleged that their previous passports were lost or stolen. If developed, the system studied in Section 7218 will assist consular officers and immigration inspectors in preventing the movement of terrorists who obtain new passports to hide indicators of travel to certain countries. This study must be completed by May 31, 2005. The 9/11 Commission found that three of the 9/11 hijackers, including Mohammed Atta, obtained new passports prior to seeking visas to enter the U.S., possibly to eliminate evidence regarding their previous travel. Each claimed that his old passport had been lost. Sec. 7219--Establishment of Visa and Passport Security Program in the Department of State. This section establishes a Visa and Passport Security Program within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the Department of State. The Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security will designate an individual, who has experience in the investigation and prosecution of visa and passport fraud, to be in charge of this Program. Section 7219 will require the Assistant Secretary of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with officials of the Bureau of Consular Affairs, the Coordinator of Counterterrorism, the National Counterterrorism Center and the Department of Homeland Security, to develop a strategic plan to target and disrupt individuals and organizations that are involved in document fraud. The objective of the Visa and Passport Security Program is to increase awareness within the Department of State regarding document fraud crimes and their links to terrorism.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, at the end of the 108th Congress, Sharon Hammersla will be retiring from government service after thirty-two years as a dedicated and distinguished public servant. Sharon has served as the Information Resource Manager for both the House Committee on International Relations and the House Committee on the Judiciary under my chairmanship. In fact, Sharon worked for the House Judiciary Committee during the impeachment of President Clinton. Her efforts at that time toward making the Committee's work on related events accessible to the public will be instrumental to historians when studying that period of our Nation's history. Prior to working on the Judiciary and International Relations Committees, she served seventeen years with the House Science Committee. Just because Sharon is leaving The Hill doesn't mean that she won't be busy. She will maintain her position in history-making and continue to serve as a member of the Board of Directors of the Dr. Samuel A. Mudd Museum in Bryantown, Maryland, where she has been a docent, and she will be publishing her first book on her family's genealogy early next year. Most importantly, however, she will be joining her husband, Don, in catching up with family and friends and enjoying life with their grandchildren. Mr. Speaker, Sharon Hammersla has served her country with honor and distinction. Please join me in congratulating her on an illustrious career in federal service and wishing her well as she embarks on new adventures.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this conference report. I believe that this important legislation provides the necessary resources and policy guidance to protect America's national security. I congratulate the gentleman from California, the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Mr. Hunter, for his usual outstanding work in putting this important legislation together. I want to address one provision in particular, section 1225, regarding commercial exports of defense articles and services to the United Kingdom and Australia. For the first time, we will give our two closest allies in the war on terror preferential treatment in the U.S. licensing process. By requiring regulations to accelerate export licenses for these countries--rather than eliminating licenses as some had proposed--this provision establishes exactly the right balance: we will wisely maintain control and supervision over weapons shipped through commercial channels while the war on terrorism continues. But we require the State Department to do it rapidly, and ensure that longstanding allies who fight alongside our armed forces are always at the head of the line. I would note that section 1225 allows other Federal departments or agencies to seek referral of licenses when the defense article or service being exported involves classified information or when exceptional circumstances apply. As a conferee on this section, I expect that referrals to other departments or agencies would be granted under the ``exceptional circumstances'' clause, among other reasons, when the proposed export involves items related to the war on terror or affects U.S. nonproliferation policy. Additionally, it should be absolutely clear that the ``exceptional circumstances'' clause does not prejudice referrals to those departments or agencies seeking referrals on law enforcement grounds.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of S. 2883, the Prevention of Child Abduction Partnership Act. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction is the diplomatic tool which creates a civil cause of action for the return of an abducted child to his or her habitual residence. Under this international treaty, the U.S. Department of State is the central authority responsible for discharging the duties as outlined by the Convention. For the past 9 years, pursuant to a cooperative agreement between the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, NCMEC, and the Departments of State and Justice, NCMEC has played a vital role by assisting the Department of State in performing certain obligations under the Convention, thereby helping the United States fulfill its international treaty obligations under the Convention. In sum, NCMEC helps parents seeking the return of or access to a child in the United States to process an application under the Convention and to pursue remedies as provided by statute. Secretary of State Colin Powell has written to NCMEC that its expertise and national networks make NCMEC uniquely effective in helping us give force to the Hague Abduction Convention in the United States. NCMEC's credibility and the success of our work together also give us a decided advantage when we press other governments for changes of practice, policy, legislation, and resource allocation to deter international parental child abduction and send abducted children home to the United States. In May, I introduced H.R. 4347, the International Assistance for Missing and Exploited Children Act of 2004. Among many other important issues, this legislation provides a mechanism for granting NCMEC employees, who are working on Hague Convention cases under the direction of the State Department, the same limited immunity enjoyed by those employed by the Department of State. This legislation is currently being negotiated with the administration and other congressional committees, and I intend to reintroduce it again in the 109th session of Congress. As a product of this negotiation, an agreement has been reached on language which would provide NCMEC with the limited immunity necessary to be able to continue performing its obligations under the Hague Convention, which is the substance in S. 2883. This measure has the support of the relevant House and Senate Committees and the Departments of State and Justice. If this measure is not enacted into law, NCMEC may not be able to continue its operations on behalf of the Federal Government since its resources would be lost in the defense of frivolous lawsuits. Left-behind parents would suffer the prolonged loss of their children, and our Nation potentially would lose its advantage in pressing other nations to return abducted children. I wish to extend my personal gratitude to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children for its critical work on reuniting families, to Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner of the House Judiciary Committee, and to Senators Hatch and Leahy of the Senate Judiciary Committee and to Senators Lugar and Biden of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for working tirelessly to implement this measure.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. The final report of the 9/11 Commission made recommendations on how best to confront the threat of terrorism in the 21st century. Of these 44 recommendations, one-third of them fell within the jurisdiction of the House Committee on International Relations. H.R. 10 will prepare us to better respond to this threat using all available tools as recommended by the commission, including diplomacy, public diplomacy, international cooperation, foreign aid, sanctions, covert action, security enhancement, and military force when necessary. H.R. 10 goes beyond the mere urging of the issuance of a report or a ``sense of Congress'' as many of the other legislative initiatives propose. It offers practical, focused, and concrete initiatives that take effect immediately. Although some foreign policy issues are addressed in the Menendez substitute, it mainly addresses only intelligence reform efforts while H.R. 10 delves more deeply into foreign policy and diplomacy efforts which, I might add, were developed in a bipartisan fashion with my good friend from California, the ranking member of the House Committee on International Relations. For example, I refer Members to the response to the commission's recommendation to define and defend our ideals abroad. H.R. 10 places the emphasis on training, language proficiency, and a creative recruitment process to fulfill our various public diplomacy needs. The Menendez substitute has no comparable provisions. The commission remarked on the need to develop a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism. The Menendez substitute offers no comparable response, while H.R. 10 has a series of provisions to strengthen the capabilities of the State Department to engage in multilateral diplomacy and to build working relationships with like- minded democratic nations. Another difference between H.R. 10 and the Menendez substitute is how we propose to deal with countries that provide sanctuary for terrorists. H.R. 10 requires the President to develop a strategy to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and, most importantly, requires that U.S. exports be regulated to countries that act as sanctuaries. The Menendez substitute includes no such provision. Another example of how H.R. 10 translates the broad recommendations of the 9/11 Commission into concrete action is the creation of a terrorism interdiction initiative modeled after the successful proliferation security initiative, and the establishment of regional counterterrorism centers and terrorism prevention teams. The Menendez substitute contains no such provisions. The commission could not have been clearer that targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as targeting money. H.R. 10 includes specific language which expands two important programs that screen passengers and inspect passports and visas of U.S.-bound visitors prior to their departure at foreign airports. The Menendez substitute has no comparable provisions. H.R. 10 also increases staffing and improves training of our consular officers who are the first line of defense in screening out potential terrorists. In addition, it increases penalties for convictions involving fraudulent government-issued visas and passports. Again, the Menendez substitute is silent. In line with the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, H.R. 10 explicitly requires the State Department to make denial of terrorist mobility a top priority of the Department's chief counterterrorist official. No similar provision exists in the other legislative option. With regard to Afghanistan, which is just 2 days away from its first national elections, the provisions included in H.R. 10 are far superior to those in the Menendez substitute. The commission concluded that the allocation of reconstruction funds in Afghanistan was too compartmentalized. We have solved that problem with the appointment of a coordinator tasked with broad authority. H.R. 10 also restates our commitment to the rule of law and vital education programs in Afghanistan. Mr. Chairman, although the Menendez substitute represents a serious effort to address a few of the problems posed by terrorists to the security of this country, its unspoken premise is that difficult problems can be easily solved by the simple act of throwing money at them. In the final analysis, we cannot substitute money for careful thought, nor can we buy our way out of the difficult task of crafting wise and effective policies. H.R. 10 does not just throw money at the problem, it defines priorities by which to eliminate fragmented management and operations structures, redirecting resources to where they are most necessary in order to build intelligence capabilities to counter terrorist threats through the best possible means, exactly as the commission recommended. It is time to enact these concrete solutions to confront the threat head-on. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States criticized the United States Government on is fragmented management and operations structures and questioned its ability to direct resources where necessary to best build intelligence capabilities to counter terrorist threats or to address broader issues of national security challenges. The final report issued 44 recommendations on how to best confront this threat. Of these 44 recommendations, one-third of them, or fifteen, fall within the jurisdiction of the House International Relations Committee. In sum, these recommendations suggest that the United States use all tools available to respond to this threat, including: diplomacy, public diplomacy, international cooperation and coordination, foreign aid, sanctions, covert action, security enhancement and military force when necessary. With each of these instruments, the United States should focus its efforts on attacking terrorists and their organizations, preventing the continued growth of terrorism, and protecting against and preparing for future attacks. H.R. 10 goes beyond the mere urging of the issuance of a report or a ``Sense of Congress,'' as many of the other legislative initiatives propose. It offers practical, focused and concrete initiatives that take effect immediately, rather than waiting for another study to determine whether the full recommendation of the Commission should be implemented. To put it simply, the authors of H.R. 10 did not stop reading the Commission's report halfway through, but instead, crafted thoughtful solutions to the tough recommendations. We took the abstract and made it concrete. Although some foreign policy issues are addressed in the Menendez Amendment, it mainly addresses the first ``track'' on the intelligence reform efforts, while H.R. 10 delves more deeply into foreign policy and diplomacy efforts. In fact, many of the provisions of H.R. 10 were developed in a bipartisan fashion, gaining the expertise and guidance of my dear friend from California, the Ranking Member of the House International Relations Committee, Tom Lantos. For example, I refer you to the response to the Commission's recommendation to ``define and defend our ideals abroad,'' or conduct better public diplomacy. H.R. 10 places the emphasis on training and the creative recruitment process to find the skill-set needed, such as language proficiency, for the various public diplomacy needs. The Menendez Substitute does not offer anything more than reporting requirement or non-binding ``Sense of Congress'' language. H.R. 10 directs the State Department, in coordination with other government agencies involved with communications or public outreach, to collaborate on a strategic plan and conduct annual assessments to measure progress. Expanded broadcasting to the Muslim world is too new to fairly evaluate. Sufficient time is necessary to determine the appropriate course corrections, if any. However, I recognize that professional, contemporary communications are ``a must'' as we compete against satellite networks feeding misleading news to the region. The Commission remarked on the need to engage other nations in developing a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism. The Menendez Substitute offers virtually no response to this suggestion, while H.R. 10 has a series of provisions designated to specifically strengthen the capabilities of the State Department in the multilateral arena. It addresses the systemic weaknesses of the Department on the multilateral front by increasing training and education. H.R. 10 also addresses the importance of building working relationships with like-minded democratic nations through the work of such organizations as the Community of Democracies and through the establishment of a democracy caucus at the United Nations. Another difference between H.R. 10 and the Menendez Substitute is how we propose to deal with countries that provide sanctuary to terrorists. H.R. 10 provides a clear policy statement on terrorist sanctuaries, requires the President to develop a strategy to address and eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and, most importantly, requires that U.S. exports be regulated to countries that are found to be terrorist sanctuaries. This provision puts meat on the bones. It directly implements the 9-11 Commission charge to ``use all elements of national power'' by saying that if a foreign country provides sanctuary for terrorists, then we will condition the trade of our goods and services with that country. There is no such provision in the Menendez Substitute. It contains only identical findings, non-binding policy language and a one-time report. Another example of how H.R. 10 translates the broad recommendations of the 9-11 Commission into concrete actions is the creation of a Terrorism Interdiction Initiative, modeled after the successful Proliferation Security Initiative. The 9-11 Commission calls for expanded collaboration with other governments on terrorism. Other legislative initiatives only have ``Sense of Congress'' provisions suggesting the establishment of a contact group. By contrast, H.R. 10 mandates the negotiation, on a bilateral basis, of international agreements to secure global support, cooperation and coordination, and to maximize and integrate resources for attacking terrorists and terrorist organizations. It establishes specific requirements for these agreements under the Terrorism Interdiction Initiative which include ``Interdiction Principles;'' establishment of Regional Counter- terrorism Centers; and establishment of Terrorism Prevention Teams to address current and emerging terrorist threats. On the important question of curtailing terrorist travel, the Menendez Substitute falls short of the provisions contained in H.R. 10. The Commission could not have been clearer that ``targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as targeting money.'' H.R. 10 includes specific language which expands two important programs that screen passengers and inspect passports and visas of U.S.-bound visitors prior to their departure from foreign airports. This keeps terrorists away from our shores, and perhaps most importantly, it prevents those who want to do us harm from even boarding flights headed for the United States. The Menendez Substitute has no comparable provisions. H.R. 10 also increases staffing and improves training of our consular officers who are the first line of defense in screening out potential terrorists. In addition, the legislation increases penalties for convictions involving fraudulent, government-issued visas and passports, Again, the Menendez Substitute does not address these problems. In line with the 9-11 Commission's recommendation, H.R. 10 explicitly requires the State Department to make denial of terrorist mobility a top priority of the Department's chief counterterrorist official. No similar provision exists in other legislative options. With regard to Afghanistan, which I might add is just two days away from its first national elections, the provisions included in H.R. 10 are far superior to the Mendendez Substitute. The Commission concluded that the allocation of reconstruction funds in Afghanistan was too compartmentalized. We have solved that problem with the appointment of a coordinator tasked with broad authority. H.R. 10 also restates our commitment to the rule of law and vital educational programs in Afghanistan. Mr. Chairman, although the Mendendez Substitute represents a serious effort to address a few of the problems posed by terrorists to the security of the United States, its unspoken premise is that difficult problems can be easily solved by the simple act of throwing money at them. We have no shortage of examples of government programs were this approach has not only failed, but actually rendered our problems worse. Here, the greatest danger stems from the complacency that will result from our merely having increased spending while congratulating ourselves for having taken swift action. In the final analysis, we cannot substitute money for careful thought, nor can we buy our way out of the difficult task of crafting wise and effective policies. H.R. 10 doesn't just throw money at the problem. Instead, it defines priorities by which to eliminate fragmented management and operations structures, redirecting resources to where they are most necessary in order to build intelligence capabilities to counter terrorist threats through the best possible means--exactly as the Commission recommended. It is time to enact these concrete solutions to confront the threat head-on. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith).

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, on the afternoon of October 6, 2004, I was unable to make two votes. I regret missing them and had I been present, I would have voted: vote No. 497, on passage--H.R. 5107, ``yea''; vote No. 498, on agreeing to the Conference Report--H.R. 4850, ``yea.''

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend to the House for its edification a recent event of note, that on the 3rd of September of this year, in Exeter, New Hampshire, Thaddeus Robert Stebbins celebrated his 17th birthday. Although still in the formative period of his life's journey, Mr. Stebbins has already demonstrated remarkable abilities across a broad range of endeavor, from academics and music to sports and debate. These preternatural accomplishments must command our attention and admiration. But even more noteworthy are the maturity of thought and manner already manifest and the generosity of spirit evidenced by the unhesitating respect granted others. The birthday was celebrated quietly at the Phillips Exeter Academy where Mr. Stebbins is currently enrolled in his Upper year and where he is manfully displaying talents and capacities notable even at that prestigious institution. Although they were not physically in attendance on that day, Mr. Stebbins was very much in the thoughts of his proud parents and sisters, of his godfather, and of his many admiring friends. I cannot speak to Mr. Stebbins' religious beliefs, but I have no doubt that the Almighty has prepared great things for him and ever watches over him. And that he has entertained angels, unaware. Mr. Speaker, Wordsworth wrote that ``the Child is the father of the Man''. We will be fortunate indeed to know the Man he will become.