Henry Hyde

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Michigan and I thank the Chair.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the resolution under consideration.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that during further consideration of House Resolution 611, the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the resolution to final adoption without intervening motion except: (1) debate on the resolution for a period not to extend beyond 10 p.m. tonight, equally divided at the outset and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary, and one further hour of debate on Saturday, December 19, 1998, equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary; (2) after such first period of debate, a motion to adjourn; and (3) one motion to recommit, with or without instructions, which, if including instructions, shall be debatable for 10 minutes, equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent. During consideration of a resolution appointing and authorizing managers for the impeachment trial of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the resolution to final adoption without intervening motion or demand for a division of the question, except 10 minutes of debate on the resolution, equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary. When the House adjourns on Friday, December 18, 1998, it adjourns to meet at 9 a.m. on Saturday, December 19.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on the Judiciary, I call up a privileged Resolution (H. Res. 611) impeaching William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, for high crimes and misdemeanors, and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE. Well, I think the gentleman from Texas is qualified to talk about military service.

Mr. HYDE. In solitary?

Mr. HYDE. Seven years in a POW camp?

Mr. HYDE. And the Korean War. How much time did the gentleman spend in the prison camp in Hanoi or in Vietnam?

Mr. HYDE. The gentleman has some familiarity with our military service. Did he serve in the Vietnam War?

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Hutchinson).

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, my colleagues of the People's House, I wish to talk about the rule of law. After months of argument, hours of debate, there is no need for further complexity. The question before this House is rather simple. It is not a question of sex. Sexual misconduct and adultery are private acts and are none of Congress' business. It is not even a question of lying about sex. The matter before the House is a question of lying under oath. This is a public act, not a private act. This is called perjury. The matter before the House is a question of the willful, premeditated, deliberate corruption of the Nation's system of justice. Perjury and obstruction of justice cannot be reconciled with the Office of the President of the United States. The personal fate of the President is not the issue. The political fate of his party is not the issue. The Dow Jones Industrial Average is not the issue. The issue is perjury, lying under oath. The issue is obstruction of justice, which the President has sworn the most solemn oath to uphold. That oath constituted a compact between the President and the American people. That compact has been broken. The people's trust has been betrayed. The Nation's chief executive has shown himself unwilling or incapable of enforcing its laws, for he has corrupted the rule of law by his perjury and his obstruction of justice. Mr. Speaker, that and nothing other than that is the issue before this House. We have heard ceaselessly that even if the President is guilty of the charges in the Starr referral, they do not rise to the level of an impeachable offense. Well, just what is an impeachable offense? One authority, Professor Stephen Presser of Northwestern University School of Law, said, and I quote: ``Impeachable offenses are those which demonstrate a fundamental betrayal of public trust; they suggest the federal official has deliberately failed in his duty to uphold the Constitution and laws he was sworn to enforce.'' So, Mr. Speaker, we must decide if a President, the chief law enforcement officer of the land, the person who appoints the Attorney General, the person who nominates every Federal judge, the person who nominates to the Supreme Court and the only person with a constitutional obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, can lie under oath repeatedly and maintain it is not a breach of trust sufficient for impeachment. The President is the trustee of the Nation's conscience, and so are we here today. There have been many explosions in our committee hearings on the respective role of the House and the Senate. Under the Constitution, the House accuses and the Senate adjudicates. True, the formula language of our articles recites the ultimate goal of removal from office, but this language does not trump the Constitution, which defines the separate functions, the different functions of the House and the Senate. Our Founding Fathers did not want the body that accuses to be the same one that renders final judgment, and they set up an additional safeguard of a two-thirds vote for removal. So, despite protests, our job is to decide if there is enough evidence to submit to the Senate for a trial. That is what the Constitution says no matter what the President's defenders say. When Ben Franklin, on September 18, 1787 told Mrs. Powel that the Founders and Framers had given us a Republic ``if you can keep it,'' perhaps he anticipated a future time when bedrock principles of our democracy would be mortally threatened as the Rule of Law stands in the line of fire today. Nothing I can think of more clearly illustrates that America is a continuing experiment, never finished, that our democracy is always a work in progress than this debate today, for we sit here with the power to shape and reconfigure the charter of our freedom just as the Founders and Framers did. We can strengthen our Constitution by giving it content and meaning, or we can weaken and wound it by tolerating and thus encouraging lies under oath and evasion and breaches of trust on the part of our chief executive. The President's defenders in this House have rarely denied the facts of this matter. They have not seriously challenged the contention of the independent counsel that the President did not tell the truth in two sworn testimonies. They have not seriously attempted to discredit the facts brought before the committee by the independent counsel. They have admitted, in effect, he did it. But then they have argued that this does not rise to the level of an impeachable offense. This is the ``so what'' defense whereby the Chief Executive, the successor to George Washington, can cheapen the oath, and it really does not matter. They suggest that to impeach the President is to reverse the result of a national election as though Senator Dole would become President. They propose novel remedies, like a Congressional censure that may appease some constituents and certainly mollify the press, but in my judgment betray lack of seriousness about the Constitution, the separation of powers and the carefully balanced relationship of checks and balances between Congress and the President that was wisely crafted by the framers. A resolution of censure, to mean anything, must punish, if only to tarnish his reputation, but we have no authority under the Constitution to punish the President. It is called separation of powers. As my colleagues know, we have been attacked for not producing fact witnesses, but this is the first impeachment inquiry in history with the Office of Independent Counsel in place, and their referral to us consisted of 60,000 pages of sworn testimony grand jury transcripts, depositions, statements, affidavits, video and audio tapes. We had the facts, and we had them under oath. We had Ms. Lewinsky's heavily corroborated testimony under a grant of immunity that would be revoked if she lied; we accepted that and so did they, else why did they not call any others whose credibility they questioned as their own witnesses? Now there was so little dispute on the facts they called no fact witnesses and have even based a resolution of censure on the same facts. Let us be clear. The vote that all of us are asked to cast is in the final analysis a vote on the rule of law. Now the rule of law is one of the great achievements of our civilization, for the alternative is the rule of raw power. We here today are the heirs of 3,000 years of history in which humanity slowly, painfully, and at great cost evolved a form of politics in which law, not brute force, is the arbiter of our public destinies. We are the heirs of the Ten Commandments and the Mosaic law, a moral code for a free people, who, having been liberated from bondage, saw in law a means to avoid falling back into the habits of slaves. We are the heirs of Roman law, the first legal system by which peoples of different cultures, languages, races and religions came to live together in a form of political community. We are the heirs of the Magna Carta, by which the free men of England began to break the arbitrary and unchecked power of royal absolutism. We are the heirs of a long tradition of parliamentary development, in which the rule of law gradually came to replace royal prerogative as the means for governing a society of free men and women. We are the heirs of 1776, and of an epic moment in human affairs when the Founders of this Republic pledged their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honors, think of that, sacred honor, to the defense of the rule of law. We are the heirs of a hard-fought war between the states, which vindicated the rule of law over the appetites of some for owning others. We are the heirs of the 20th Century's great struggles against totalitarianism, in which the rule of law was defended at immense costs against the worst tyrannies in human history. The phrase ``rule of law'' is no pious aspiration from a civics textbook. The rule of law is what stands between all of us and the arbitrary exercise of power by the state. The rule of law is the safeguard of our liberties. The rule of law is what allows us to live our freedom in ways that honor the freedom of others while strengthening the common good. The rule of law is like a three-legged stool. One leg is an honest judge, the second leg is an ethical bar, and the third is an enforceable oath. All three are indispensable to avoid political collapse. In 1838, Abraham Lincoln celebrated the rule of law before the Young Men's Lyceum in Springfield, Illinois, and linked it to the perpetuation of American liberties and American political institutions. Listen to Lincoln, from 1838: ``Let every American, every lover of liberty, every well wisher to his posterity, swear by the blood of the Revolution never to violate in the least particular the laws of the country; and never to tolerate their violation by others. As the patriots of seventy-six did to support the Declaration of Independence, so to the support of the Constitution and laws, let every American pledge his life, his property and his sacred honor; let every man remember that to violate the law is to trample on the blood of his father, and to tear the character of his own and his children's liberty. Let reference for the laws be breathed by every American mother to the lisping babe that prattles on her lap, let it be taught in the schools, in seminaries, and in colleges. Let it be written in primers, spelling books and almanacs. Let it be preached from the pulpit, proclaimed in legislative halls, and enforced in the courts of justice.'' So said Lincoln. My colleagues, we have been sent here to strengthen and defend the rule of law; not to weaken it, not to attenuate it, not to disfigure it. This is not a question of perfection; it is a question of foundations. This is not a matter of setting the bar too high; it is a matter of securing the basic structure of our freedom, which is the rule of law. No man or woman, no matter how highly placed, no matter how effective a communicator, no matter how gifted a manipulator of opinion or winner of votes, can be above the law in a democracy. That is not a council of perfection; that is a rock bottom, irreducible principle of our public life. There is no avoiding the issue before us, much as I wish we could. We are, in one way or another, establishing the parameters of permissible presidential conduct. In creating a presidential system, the framers invested that office with extraordinary powers. If those powers are not exercised within the boundaries of the rule of law, if the President breaks the law by perjury and obstructs justice by willfully corrupting the legal system, that president must be removed from office. We cannot have one law for the ruler and another law for the ruled. This was, once, broadly understood in our land. If that understanding is lost or if it becomes seriously eroded, the American democratic experiment and the freedom it guarantees is in jeopardy. That, and not the faith of one man, or one political party or one electoral cycle, is what we are being asked to vote on today. In casting our votes, we should look not simply to ourselves, but to the past and to the future. Let us look back to Bunker Hill, to Concord and Lexington. Let us look across the river to Arlington Cemetery, where American heroes who gave their lives for the sake of the rule of law lie buried, and let us not betray their memory. Let us look to the future, to the children of today who are the presidents and members of Congress of the next century, and let us not crush their hope that they too will inherit a law-governed society. Let us declare, unmistakably, that perjury and obstruction of justice disqualify a man from retaining the presidency of the United States. There is a mountain of details which are assembled in a coherent mosaic in the committee report. It reads like a novel, only it is nonfiction, it really happened, and the corruption is compelling. Read the report and be convinced. What we are telling you today are not the ravings are some vindictive political crusade, but a reaffirmation of a set of values that are tarnished and dim these days, but it is given to us to restore them so our Founding Fathers would be proud. Listen, it is your country. The President is our flag-bearer. He stands out in front of our people, and the flag is falling. Catch the falling flag as we keep our appointment with history.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, on October 4th of this year, the new Cardinal Archbishop of Chicago delivered the homily at the Red Mass held at St. Matthew's Cathedral here in Washington, DC. The Red Mass is traditionally celebrated on the Sunday prior to the first Monday in October, which marks the beginning of the Supreme Court's new term. Permit me to share Cardinal George's inspiring homily with my colleagues. Homily: 1998 Red Mass St. Matthew's Cathedral; Washington, DC, October 4, 1998 Francis Cardinal George, OMI Archbishop of Chicago Your Eminence, Cardinal Hickey, Your Excellency, Archbishop Cacciavillan, Members of the judiciary and of the bar and of the government and Congress, Members of the John Carroll Society and friends. The picture of Jesus given us by the evangelist Luke places him in the synagogue of Nazareth, his home town, ready to begin his public ministry under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. This was to be his only, his last occasion to preach in Nazareth, for his mission took him elsewhere in Judea and Israel and, finally, to his death outside Jerusalem. In the mission and preaching of his disciples after Jesus' resurrection from the dead, Luke has Jesus taken farther: to Antioch and Corinth and Rome, to the ends of the earth. In Luke's Gospel, Jesus does not preach until after listening and proclaiming the word of God. In the text within our Gospel text, the prophet Isaiah proclaims a time of Jubilee, of deliverance from captivity, a time of liberation; only then does Jesus speak and explain the prophet in such a way--``This day, these words are fulfilled in your hearing.'' That Jesus' friends and neighbors, far from being liberated by his words, took him to the edge of the hill on which their city was built and tried to kill him. Jesus listened, he spoke, he escaped to take up elsewhere the mission given him by his Father. That mission makes possible our coming together today at this end of the earth as we and the entire world, with renewed self-consciousness as a globe, look toward the celebration of a new millennium. If we today believe that where there is Jesus there is Jubilee, how is it that we are still enslaved? Every five years, as you may know, each bishop of the Catholic Church goes to Rome to pray at the tombs of Peter and Paul; then he goes in to talk with Peter's successor. This year, the bishops of the United States are making their visits ad limina apostolorum, and the bishops of Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin made theirs together last May. When I went in to talk with the Holy Father, he listened politely as I explained that the report he had received had been drawn up by my staff since I had only recently come to Chicago. He looked at it, put it aside and asked me a single question: ``What are you doing to change the culture?'' I was surprised, but shouldn't have been, for the Pope has spoken often of how culture liberates us, creates the world in which what is best in human experience can be passed on and celebrated and of how, conversely, culture can also blind us, enslave us and must sometimes be changed in the light of God's word. Taken by surprise, I spontaneously began to speak to the Holy Father about the Church's relation to the legal profession in Chicago, of the many contacts and gatherings, of the several Chicago priests who are also civil lawyers, of the pro bono work for the poor, of the Catholic law schools and of many initiatives similar to what takes place here through the good offices of the members of the John Carroll society. Then I backed up and began to explain that, in the United States, the law is a primary carrier of culture. In a country continuously being knit together from so many diverse cultural, religious, and linguistic threads, legal language most often creates the terms of our public discourse as Americans. A vocation to make and to serve the law is a calling to shape our culture. We live in worded worlds. If there is no common language, very likely there is no common vision and citizens find themselves trapped in separate worlds. Listening to God's liberating word, in this Mass and elsewhere, believers must wonder where the language of civil law and the language of faith might share a common vocabulary. The Catholic Church has tried for some generations to speak here a language of natural law, a language that presupposes God speaks in nature as well as in history, a language, therefore, able to speak of God's ways without explicitly confessional terminology. But our various attempts have not really provided a dictionary shared between American culture and Catholic faith. The National Conference of Catholic Bishops often tries to speak the language of policy, hoping that well argued policy statements will influence legal discussion; but the common understanding generated has clear limitations. There is the language of Holy Scripture itself, common to great extent to all Christians and Jews, but the Bible's phraseology and stories are no longer common cultural parlance in our country. Speaking, in order to be heard today, a language largely shorn of religious nuances, the believer can still ask two questions of the vision behind legal discourse: First, can the vision of courts and legislatures expand to see at least dimly God's actions and purposes in history? Abraham Lincoln of Illinois used public language to speak of God's purpose at the end of a bloody American civil war: ``With firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive to finish the work we are in.'' Lincoln, who wrestled like a biblical prophet with God's purposes in history and his judgment on this nation, grew, because of his public service, in his ability to bring together, always tentatively, the law he defended finally with his own and God's word which, like a two-edged sword, cuts through the rhetoric of public as well as personal deceit. Lincoln knew that God judges nations as well as persons, and he forged a language which, at the end, placed even the personal liberty to which this nation was dedicated second to the designs of God himself. Are we permitted to speak similarly today or must the language of law, rather than setting use free, blind us and leave us mute in any world not constructed by our private interests and intentions.? And a second question, put to use often these days by Pope John Paul II: does the vision of the human person found in public laws and decisions adequately express what it means to be human? Do our laws not only protect contracts but also tend to force all human relations into them? Is the language of contract becoming the only public language of America? Does the model of association which is accorded public rights tend more and more to constrain or even exclude the natural family, the life of faith, cultural and racial groupings, relations which cannot be unchosen without destroying the human persons shaped by them. Christian faith gives us a vision of a person we call the Word of God, made flesh. Crucified and risen from the dead, Jesus sends us the Holy Spirit, who speaks every language and gives every good gift. This vision should set us free from any lesser picture of things; the language of faith should keep us from supposing that we adequately understand reality in its depths and heights. This is a vision that should humble and, in humbling us, open us to other worlds. Approaching a third Christian millennium (using what is now a common calendar), we gather to worship the God we believe to be the Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ and therefore, in Christ, our Father as well. It is good to do so, for if we do not worship God we will inevitably end up worshipping ourselves. Nations worshiping themselves have plagued this last century of the second millennium, and Gods word prompts us now to examine a new ourselves and our history. Without warrant, we have associated ourselves with the biblical city on a hill, not Nazareth but Jerusalem itself. Without right, we too often judge other peoples and nations by our standards and interests, assuming that our interests must be universal. Without sense, we even seriously consider if this nation is the end of history, as if our present political and economic arrangements were surely the culmination of God's designs for the universe. Lincoln, who had the good grace to speak of us only as an ``almost chosen people'', would surely blush, and so should we. Today, as yesterday and tomorrow, the Church speaks a language of respect for public office holders, whose vocation is shaped by the constraints of law; both the Church, today as yesterday and tomorrow, also speaks as best she can to judge the actions and decision of public officials, and the culture shaped by them, when these are inadequate to the vision given us by the truths of faith. ``Faith must become culture,'' Pope John Paul II says. ``What are you doing to change the culture?'' he asks. But how can we speak of change in America today when the law itself blinds us to basic truths? One egregious blind spot is our very sense of liberation construed as personal autonomy. An autonomous person has no need of jubilee, of freedom as gift; he has set himself free. The fault line that runs through our culture, and it is sometimes exacerbated rather than corrected by law, is the sacrificing of the full truth about the human person in the name of freedom construed as personal autonomy. It is a blind spot as deep as that in Marxism's sacrifice of personal freedom in the name of justice construed as absolute economic equality. Such a profound error makes our future uncertain. Will the United States be here when the human race celebrates the end of the third millennium? Not without a very changed, a very converted culture. The Church, however, must also listen first to God's word before she speaks, before she translates God's word into the words of our culture or any other. Hence the Church can speak only with deep humility a language which purports to give definitive access to God's designs in history. Even prophetic judgment, while certain in its proclamation, is tentative in its final outcome. The Spirit is always free, but never self- contradictory. Tentatively, then, let us try the language of prayer and ask that God's judgment fall lightly on us and our nation. Gratefully, I pray that God reward your dedication to public service and your desire to create a common language adequate to the experience of all our people and open to all others. Joyfully, let us hope that the Jubilee introducing the coming millennium may restore to the United States a sense of authentic freedom rooted in an ever-growing generosity of spirit. May God bless us all. Amen

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, the issues surrounding implementation of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA), now nearly four years after enactment, have been especially vexing to law enforcement, the telecommunications industry, privacy groups, and to us, in Congress. Following passage of H.R. 3303, the DOJ authorization bill, in June, pressure was brought to bear on the Federal Communications Commission to extend the October 25, 1998 compliance date, mandated by CALEA, to at least June 30, 2000. Although, I am pleased that this date was extended, I am disappointed that the ``grandfather date'' for equipment cost reimbursements (January 1, 1995) will not be amended into law this year. H.R. 3303, as passed by the House, would have changed the ``grandfather date'' to October 1, 2000. I am encouraged, though, that the conferees on the omnibus appropriations bill have included report language expressing the sincere view that the DOJ, industry and Congress should develop joint recommendations to accelerate the implementation of CALEA as soon as possible at the least cost to taxpayers and consumers and to ensure that law enforcement receives the capabilities it needs to protect our society. I would further suggest that the statutory January 1, 1995 ``grandfather date'' should be altered to be consistent with the revised compliance date as decided by the FCC in September of this year. Mr. Speaker, I look forward to working with my House and Senate colleagues on the Judiciary and Appropriations Committees in the 106th Congress in order to make this vision a reality.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, the Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act (S. 2392) is intended to promote the voluntary sharing of information needed to discover, avoid, or fix problems with year 2000 calculations in our nation's software, computers, and technology products. In all civil litigation including certain antitrust actions, the Act limits the extent to which year 2000 statements can be the basis for liability and it prevents certain evidentiary uses, against the maker, if a subset of such statements. However, the Act ensures that only responsible, good faith information-sharing gets such protection. In particular, the Act protects good faith sharing of two kinds of year 2000 information: a board category called ``year 2000 statements,'' and a narrower subcategory called ``year 2000 readiness disclosures.'' Year 2000 statements and readiness disclosures can include any year 2000 related subject matter, but year 2000 readiness disclosures must be in writing, be clearly labeled, and concern one's own products or services. Certain already-existing year 2000 statements may be designated as year 2000 readiness disclosures and receive the protections applicable to year 2000 readiness disclosures under the Act. The protections given to year 2000 statements and readiness disclosures protect all those who help in any way to make a year 2000 statement or readiness disclosure, so a broad group of individuals and entities are protected. The Act encourages the use of the Internet to provide notice of all matters relating to year 2000 processing. In addition, the Act protects against disclosure and use in civil actions year 2000 information voluntarily provided to the government under a ``special data gathering request.'' Finally, the Act creates a temporary exemption to the antitrust laws for sharing of year 2000 information, unless it results in an actual agreement to boycott, allocate markets, or fix prices. The Act does not create new causes of action or expand any existing causes of action, nor does it create new obligations or duties. The Act does not create any duty to provide notice about a year 2000 processing problem. The intent of this legislation is to promote sharing of year 2000 information. This would be frustrated if any year 2000 statement were the sole basis for any finding of liability on the part of the maker. Furthermore, it is not the intent of this legislation to hold the maker of a year 2000 readiness disclosure liable for the adequacy or sufficiency of its disclosure where such disclosure is not otherwise required by law or contract. The Act also does not affect existing contracts, tariffs, intellectual property rights or consumer protections applicable to solicitations or offers to sell consumer products. The Act's protections are limited. The Act does not change or address in any way liability for a year 2000 processing failure; does not change or reduce any underlying duty, standard of care or liability for a year 2000 failure; does not apply to certain consumer transactions; does not prevent any underlying facts regarding a failure being demonstrated in court; does not prevent any governmental entity from requiring the disclosure of any information; and does not preclude any claim to the extent it is not based on a year 2000 statement. The Act prevents the use as evidence against the maker of only a narrow range of year 2000 statements--year 2000 readiness disclosures-- to prove the truth of the disclosure. They can, however, be put into evidence to demonstrate matters other than their truth. Further, year 2000 readiness disclosures can be used to in contract litigation as part of the evidence necessary to show anticipatory breach, repudiation, or similar actions, although they should not be the sole evidence supporting liability. A judge can limit (but not totally abrogate) this protection in order to prevent an abusive or bad-faith use of the disclosure contrary to the purposes of the Act. Year 2000 statements other than year 2000 readiness disclosures can be brought into evidence for any purpose. However, they may not be the basis for any finding of liability against the maker, except where the maker knew the statement was false, made it with intent to deceive, or made it with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity. In cases of alleged trade defamation, product disparagement, and the like, year 2000 statements generally can be the basis of liability only if the maker knew the statement was wrong or was reckless about the statement's truth or falsity. Internet website notice is generally deemed adequate. Important exceptions exist, however, and Internet website notice alone is not deemed adequate in cases of personal injury or serious property damage. In specified circumstances, in order to obtain the benefits of the Act, sellers, manufacturers, or providers of year 2000 remediation products or services must inform their customers about the effects of this Act during the course of solicitations or offers to sell. For purpose of actions brought under the securities laws, year 2000 statements contained in filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission or Federal banking regulators and disclosures or writings that, when made, accompanied the solicitation of an offer or sale of securities are not covered by the Act. The following section-by-section analysis illustrates important details of the Act. Section 1, Short Title. This section entitles the Act the ''Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act''. Section 2, Findings and Purposes. This section lays out the findings underlying the bill and the board purposes the bill is intended to serve. Potentially millions of pieces of technology can not recognize certain dates around the year 2000. Because year 2000 processing problems could incapacitate government, commerce, and utilities, correcting the year 2000 problem is a matter of national and global interest. Prompt, candid, and thorough disclosure and exchange of information about year 2000 readiness would enhance year 2000 readiness. Concern about liability is impeding the sharing of such information. Uniform legal standards regarding year 2000 information are in the national interest. Enacted under the Commerce Clause power, this Act's purpose is to promote disclosure and exchange of year 2000 information by establishing uniform legal principles. Section 3. Definitions. This section defines various terms. The term ``antitrust laws'' means section (a)(1) of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 12(a)) and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 45), to the extent that section applies to unfair competition, and similar State law. The term ``consumer'' means an individual who acquires a consumer product for purposes other than resale. The term ``consumer product'' means any personal property or service that is normally used for personal, family, or household purposes. The term ``covered action''--used to define the types of litigation subject to the Act--is intentionally broad. It means a civil action of any kind arising under Federal or State law, except one brought by a Federal, State, or other government entity, agency, or authority acting in its regulatory, supervisory, or enforcement capacity. In other words, ``covered action'' does not include regulatory, enforcement, and criminal actions brought by government entities. The term ``maker'' means each person or entity, including a State or subdivision thereof, that issues or publishes any year 2000 statement. It also means each such person or entity that prepares, develops, issues, approves, or publishes any year 2000 statement. The term is defined very broadly to ensure that all entities, public or private, may benefit from the Act, including all those who help to make a year 2000 statement or readiness disclosure by reviewing, advising on, or commenting on it. Fairness requires that anyone who assists in the formulation of the year 2000 statement should receive the same protection given to the entity that actually issues or publishes the statement. The term ``republication'' means any repetition, in whole or in part, of a year 2000 statement originally made by another. The term ``year 2000 Internet website'' means an Internet website or other similar electronically accessible service, clearly designated as an area where year 2000 statements are posted or otherwise made accessible to the public. Elsewhere, the Act specifically recognizes use of the Internet and similar means of communication for purposes of providing notice. This is intended to encourage companies, government, and the public to use all current technologies such as the Internet to address year 2000 processing problems by sharing and widely disseminating year 2000 information in as timely and cost-effective manner as possible. The term ``year 2000 processing'' means processing, transmitting, or receiving of date data from, into, and between the 20th and 21st centuries, and leap year calculations. The ``year 2000 problem'' or ``millennium bug'' is not simply a software problem and is not strictly related only to January 1, 2000. Year 2000 processing includes a wide variety of date-related data processing functions in microchips, software, ``firmware,'' and other products. The term ``year 2000 readiness disclosure'' means any written year 2000 statement (a term defined elsewhere) clearly identified on its face as a year 2000 readiness disclosure, inscribed in a tangible medium or stored and retrievable in perceivable form, and issued or published by or with the approval of a person or entity with respect to year 2000 processing of that person or entity or of products or services offered by that entity. The ``year 2000 readiness disclosure'' is a narrower, more highly protected subset of year 2000 statements. Year 2000 readiness disclosures can include the same year 2000-related subject matter as year 2000 statements. The difference is that year 2000 readiness disclosures must be (a) clearly identified as such, (b) in writing, and (c) about the maker's own products or services. The term ``year 2000 remediation product or service'' means a program or service designed by one person or entity to detect or correct year 2000 processing problems in the product or service of a different person or entity. A ``year 2000 remediation product or service'' is not one that is designed or used to detect or correct year 2000 processing problems in its provider's own products or services. Under this definition, the producer of a software program does not provide a year 2000 remediation product or service if it attempts to fix the product or service it provided, if it provides an upgrade or ``patch'' for the product or service it provided, or if it sells a product that essentially replaces an existing product or service (regardless of who manufactured or provided that product or service). In contrast, a person or entity that sells products or services for the purpose of detecting or correcting year 2000 processing problems in others' products (including programming in microchips, software, and ``firmware''), does offer year 2000 remediation products or services within the meaning of this definition. The term ``year 2000 statement'' mean any communication or other conveyance of information assessing year 2000 processing capabilities, concerning plans to verify year 2000 processing capabilities, concerning testing of year 2000 processing by products, or services utilizing products, or relating to year 2000 processing. A year 2000 statement may contain a very broad array of information potentially useful to anyone seeking to discover, avoid, or correct a year 2000 processing problem. Year 2000 statements may be in any format, oral or written, and address year 2000 processing or readiness in any way. In actions under the securities laws (as that term is defined in federal law), the term ``year 2000 statement'' excludes statements in documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission or with federal banking regulators, as well as statements or writings made contemporaneously with and accompanying an offer to engage in a securities transaction. The latter part of this exclusion is intended to apply to year 2000 statements that are incorporated in an express solicitation--for example, year 2000 statements made by a broker as part of a ``sales pitch'' designed to induce the purchase of shares. Section 4. Protection for Year 2000 Statements. This section and section 5 establish certain protections relating to year 2000 statements and readiness disclosures. The two sections are intended and designed to stimulate voluntary, good faith information-sharing with the public, among companies, and with the government. They limit certain uses in litigation of year 2000 statements and readiness disclosures. However, such limitations are themselves restricted in order to promote--though they cannot guarantee--only the sharing of useful and valid information. Section 4(a). Evidence Exclusion. No year 2000 readiness disclosure shall be admissible against the maker to prove the accuracy or truth of any year 2000 statement in such readiness disclosure, except that a year 2000 readiness disclosure may be admissible in a claim for anticipatory breach, repudiation, or a similar claim against the maker. A court may limit application of this subsection if the year 2000 disclosure amounted to bad faith or fraud or was well beyond what is reasonable to achieve the purposes of the Act. Under this subsection, the narrow category of year 2000 readiness disclosures is given greater protection than year 2000 statements. Year 2000 readiness disclosures may not be admitted into evidence against the maker to prove the truth or accuracy of any matter asserted in them. This is meant to provide protection for disclosure of all information, including accurate and helpful information about the nature and scope of year 2000 problems, solutions, and readiness. Subsection 4(a) does not create any new cause of action, expand or reduce any existing cause of action, or otherwise create any new right or obligation. Neither does this subsection change or reduce any liability for a year 2000 failure, restrict alternative means of obtaining information, or prevent any fact underlying a claim related to failed year 2000 processing from being demonstrated in court through evidence other than year 2000 readiness disclosures. This section does not prevent the maker of the year 2000 statement within a year 2000 readiness disclosure from using its own year 2000 readiness disclosure in litigation for any purpose. For example, in a breach of warranty action against a manufacturer based on damages arising from a failed computer system, a year 2000 readiness disclosure issued by the manufacturer that contained a statement that the system had year 2000 processing problems could not be introduced against the manufacturer to prove that the system had year 2000 processing problems. Where a year 2000 readiness disclosure included a statement that the system had no year 2000 processing problems, that statement could be admitted (along with evidence that the maker knew it was false) to show that the maker intended to mislead. In both cases, any information provided by the manufacturer outside of the year 2000 readiness disclosure or obtained in discovery during the litigation would be admissible to prove the existence of year 2000 processing problems. Subsection 4(a) has two narrow exceptions. First, year 2000 readiness disclosures may be admissible in actions under anticipatory breach, repudiation, and similar contract claims, however designated. In general, a year 2000 readiness disclosure should not be the sole evidence supporting liability in such actions. A year 2000 readiness disclosure suggesting that products or services have year 2000 processing problems should prompt concerned persons and entities to thoroughly investigate the nature and scope of the problem, and whether and how it affects the maker's ability to perform under a contract. A year 2000 readiness disclosure could, however, be specific enough to leave no question about the maker's inability to perform on a contract. Second, a judge may limit (but not totally abrogate) this subsection's evidentiary protection in order to prevent a fraudulent, bad faith, abusive, or similar use of the year 2000 readiness disclosure contrary to the purposes of the Act. A judge cannot admit a year 2000 readiness disclosure at will, but only if use of such disclosure goes clearly beyond the purposes served by the Act. For example, a party should not be permitted to simply mark all of its year 2000-related documents as year 2000 readiness disclosures, send them to a business partner, and claim that they are, thereby, not admissible in an action related to a subsequent year 2000 processing failure. Subsection 4(b). Liability for False, Misleading, and Inaccurate Year 2000 Statements. To the extent an action is based on a false, inaccurate, or misleading year 2000 statement, the maker generally shall not be liable. If it was not a republication, the maker may be liable if the statement was material and if the maker made the year 2000 statement with actual knowledge that it was false, inaccurate, or misleading; with intent to deceive or mislead; or with reckless disregard for its accuracy. The term ``reckless disregard'' was derived from the public figure defamation standard established by the Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). If the year 2000 statement was a republication, the maker may be liable if the year 2000 statement was material and if the maker made the year 2000 statement with actual knowledge that it was false, inaccurate, or misleading; with intent to deceive or mislead; or without notice in such year 2000 statement that the maker has not verified the contents of the republication, or that the maker is not the source (in which case the source must be identified in the year 2000 statement or the republication). In addition to proving all other elements of the action, each of these elements must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Subsection 4(b) addresses protections provided to the entire class of year 2000 statements. The intent is to ensure that good-faith, honest attempts to provide important, needed year 2000 information do not become the basis for liability if the information later turns out to have been inaccurate in some way. In an unprecedented, urgent, changing situation such as dealing with the year 2000 problem, the best information available today may be outdated tomorrow through no fault or dereliction of the information's provider. Subsection 4(b) treats statements differently when they contain information obtained from another source, allowing one source to republish information learned from another if the republisher discloses that is doing so and identifies the original source. When the republication is made on an Internet website, notice provided on the republisher's website can be adequate for this purpose where the website contains clearly identified links to websites maintained by the original source. Subsection 4(c). Liability for Defamation or Similar Claims. In a defamation, trade disparagement, or similar action based on an allegedly false, inaccurate, or misleading year 2000 statement, the maker shall not be liable unless clear and convincing evidence shows that the maker of the year 2000 statement knew it was false or was reckless as to whether it was true or false. Subsection 4(c) addresses the treatment of year 2000 statements alleged to be untrue in litigation based on defamation, trade disparagement, or a similar claim, however denominated. Here, the Act specifies that year 2000 statements, whether the maker is the source or merely passing along information, may be the basis of liability only if all other existing requirements of the claim are proved, and there is a further showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the maker made the statement with knowledge of its falsity, or with reckless disregard for the truth. The standard here is modeled on the public figure defamation standard established by the Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Subsection 4(d). Year 2000 Internet Website. When the adequacy of notice about year 2000 processing is at issue, posting notice in a commercially reasonable manner on a year 2000 website shall be deemed an adequate mechanism for providing notice, unless this mechanism is contrary to prior representations, is inconsistent with a regular course of dealing, or occurs where actual notice is clearly most reasonable. This section does not affect other law, require notice regarding year 2000 processing, preclude or suggest types of notice, or mandate the content or timing of any notice. Subsection 4(d) is intended to encourage the use of the Internet to provide notice of all matters relating to year 2000 processing problems and solutions. Because technologically sophisticated parties have ready recourse to the Internet, and because posting on a website provides a cost-effective and widely accessible means of dispersing information, this subsection makes it clear that, absent contravening circumstances, website notice is appropriate. Thus, subject to exceptions discussed below, use of an Internet website to provide year 2000 information is deemed adequate notice in any litigation in which the adequacy of notice is at issue. The exceptions specified in this subsection include: (a) cases where use of website notice would be contrary to express prior representations regarding the mechanism of notice that were made by the party giving notice; (b) cases where reliance on website notice would be contrary to the regular course of dealing between the parties (This exception would apply where, for example, the party providing notice has in the past engaged in a regular course of communicating with the recipient by mail or telephone. In light of such a regular practice, website notice would not be deemed adequate.); and (c) cases, not involving prior representations regarding notice or a regular course of dealings between the parties, where actual notice is clearly the most commercially reasonable means of providing notice. This last exception envisions circumstances where the cost of providing actual notice is relatively low, the injury that might be caused by a failure to provide notice is known to be relatively high, the party providing notice knows the identities of the potential recipients, and the party providing notice has a practicable means of providing actual notice. For example, this exception could come into play if a vendor sold expensive or custom manufacturing components to eleven manufacturers, knowing that notice of year 2000 processing problems is essential to operation of their plants. In such circumstances, actual notice would likely be the most commercially reasonable means of providing notice. In contrast, actual notice would not be commercially reasonable if a producer sold numerous components or copies of software to numerous third parties, who in turn incorporated those products into products that were sold further down the distribution chain, particularly to numerous or unidentified. customers. In those circumstances, the original producer could not by reasonable effort discover and provide notice to all of the parties who ultimately came into possession of its product and the producer could not know the existence, nature, or scope of potential injury caused by not providing actual notice. Website notice in this case would be deemed adequate. The use of the word ``clearly'' in this exception indicates that the presumption should be weighted in favor of finding website notice to be adequate. Congress recognizes that the Internet and related electronically accessible systems are fast becoming a reliable, standard resource for transmission of information, especially among sophisticated parties. It anticipates that the primary or default means for providing notice of year 2000 processing information, year 2000 readiness disclosures, and other information related to the year 2000 problem will typically be the Internet and similar electronic formats. However, this subsection does not alter Federal or State statutory or regulatory (as distinct from common law) notice requirements, and is not intended to increase the effect of any existing law or duty regarding the method of providing, or the content of notice. Moreover, this provision is not intended to preclude the use of any other means of providing notice. Subsection 4(e). Limitation on Effect of Year 2000 Statements. A year 2000 statement shall not amend or alter a contract or warranty, unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the year 2000 statement was made in conjunction with formation of the contract or warranty, or the contract or warranty provides for amendment or alteration through such a statement. Subsection 4(e) addresses limitations on the effect of year 2000 statements (including year 2000 readiness disclosures). Year 2000 statements do not, in general, amend or otherwise alter an existing contract, tariff, or warranty. Exceptions exist where there is a written agreement to so make amendments, where the year 2000 statement was part of the formation of a contract or warranty, and where the contract, warranty, or tariff specifies that it may be amended by a year 2000 statement. In those cases, other law determines the effect of a year 2000 statement on a contract, tariff, or warranty. Subsection 4(f). Special Data Gathering. A federal entity may designate a request for voluntary provision of year 2000 information as a ``special year 2000 data gathering request.'' Except with the consent of the provider of information, such information shall not be subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (``FOIA''), shall not be disclosed to any third party, and may not be used in any civil action (though the same information, acquired separately, may be so used). Subsection 4(f) is premised on existing government power to request voluntary submission of detailed company-specific information in order to ascertain the year 2000 readiness of an industry or economic sector. The government may request that the information be submitted to a non-governmental entity that agrees to coordinate such data gathering, including providing analyses of that data. The subsection protects any and all information provided to the government or such third party voluntarily acting at the government's request from release to any entity or individual without the consent of the provider. This immunity is accomplished in three ways: (a) All information provided pursuant to this process is deemed exempt from disclosure under FOIA. (To the extent that such provided data could be said to be held by the government acting through a third party, FOIA would still not require the release of such data without the submitting entity's permission.); (b) Neither the government nor a third-party data gatherer may disclose such data without the permission of the providing entity; and (c) Neither the government nor any third party may use the information, either directly or indirectly, in any civil litigation. However, to ensure that this protection is not misused, the subsection provides that information can be used by anyone for any purpose if it has been voluntarily made public or if it is obtained by independent legal means. A litigant may utilize any lawful means to obtain information directly from the providing entity, or from any recipient other than the recipient under the special year 2000 data gathering request. Section 5. Temporary Antitrust Exemption. Consistent with recent year 2000-related Business Action Letters issued by the Department of Justice, this section provides that the antitrust laws shall not apply to conduct or communications solely for the purpose of correcting or avoiding year 2000 processing problems, and only to the extent necessary to achieve such purposes. This broad exemption has certain limitations. First, the exemption protects only conduct occurring between the date of enactment of the Act and July 14, 2001 (inclusive) (as provided in subsection 7(a)). It does not protect conduct occurring thereafter, though the cessation of the statutory exemption need not affect the position taken by the Department of Justice in Business Action Letters. Second, this exemption does not apply to conduct that involves or results in agreements to boycott any person, allocate markets, or fix prices. Section 6. Exclusions.-- Subsection 6(a). Effect on Information Disclosure. The Act does not affect the authority of any government to require provision or disclosure of any information. This subsection clarifies that the intent of Congress is not to limit the ability of a Federal or State entity, agency, or authority to act in an enforcement capacity with respect to any Federal or State statute or regulation governing the disclosure or non-disclosure of information. Subsection 6(b). Contracts and Other Claims. The Act does not alter any right under contract or tariff. In an action brought by a consumer, the Act does not apply to a year 2000 statement made in the course of a solicitation. The Act does not apply to a year 2000 statement about a year 2000 remediation product or service made in a solicitation unless the maker provides notice that the year 2000 statement is subject to the Act and that the Act may reduce the purchaser's legal rights. Subsection 6(b)(1) reiterates that a basic premise of this Act is to leave any contractual relationships (public or private), and any enforcement of rights under those relationships, unaffected. Where the terms or effect of a contract are in conflict with the provisions of this Act, the contract or agreement will control. Conversely, nothing in the Act affects the enforceability of provisions that limit the liability of contracting parties. Moreover, Congress does not intend that plaintiffs use this provision to evade the protections provided by this Act by restating as contract claims causes of action that actually sound in tort. One example of the appropriate use of this provision would be where a contract provided one party with the explicit contractual right to receive from another party an accurate year 2000 statement or a year 2000 statement which is the product of the exercise of ``reasonable efforts'' by the other party. In that situation, subsection 4(b)--which provides a different standard of performance--would not apply. Similarly, where a contract provides for delivery of notice by means other than an Internet website, this Act would not treat notice delivered via an Internet website as adequate. In addition, the evidentiary exclusion of subsection 4(a) would not apply in a situation where a party provides a year 2000 readiness disclosure pursuant to a contractual obligation to provide year 2000 readiness information. Subsection 6(b)(2)(A) provide that the Act does not apply in actions by consumers against persons or entities that make year 2000 statements directly to them in solicitations (including advertisements) or offers to sell consumer products--in other words, activities that are entirely ancillary to requests for purchases. Subsection 6(b)(2)(B) provides that sellers, manufacturers, or providers of year 2000 remediation products or services, in soliciting remediation business or offering to furnish their remediation product or service, must provide additional notice to obtain the benefits of the Act. Such notice is specified in the Act and is intended primarily to alert unsophisticated clients of such remediators that, in any litigation, this Act may affect the buyer's ability to use the remediators' statements in court. This provision does not require or imply that every written or oral statement be accompanied by the specified notice. Rather, it is intended to require that once, during the solicitation or offering of service, the remediation provider must provide the specified notice to the prospective purchaser or client, consistent with the procedures set out in Subsection 4(d). Subsection 6(b)(3) provides that the Act does not preclude a claim to the extent it is not based on a year 2000 statement. For example, if a lawsuit advanced causes of action both for negligent misrepresentation based on the alleged inaccuracy of a year 2000 statement and for product defect (based on a year 2000-related product failure), the first cause of action would likely be precluded by the Act, but the second would not. Subsection 6(c). Duty or Standard of Care. The Act does not impose any more stringent standard of care on the maker of a year 2000 statement. The Act does not preclude any disclosure additional to a year 2000 statement or disclosure. The Act does not alter the standard or duty of care owed by a fiduciary. An essential purpose of the Act is to reduce liability concerns about release of year 2000 processing information. Consistent with that purpose, Subsection 6(c)(1) provides that nothing in this Act should be interpreted as imposing liability where none would exist absent the Act. Specifically, it is the intent of Congress that a maker not be liable for the adequacy or sufficiency of a year 2000 readiness disclosure regarding the maker's products or services, where notice of the maker's year 2000 readiness is not otherwise required by law or contract, unless section 4(b) standards are not met. Also, Subsection 6(c)(3) is intended to clarify that Congress did not intend the Act--except to the limited extent specified in Subsection 4(b), regarding false, misleading or inaccurate year 2000 statements, and in Subsection 4(c), regarding defamatory or disparaging year 2000 statements--to preempt, alter, or affect in any way existing State law regarding any duty or standard of care owed by a fiduciary. For instance, the duty of loyalty owed by a fiduciary is not affected by this Act. Intellectual Property Rights. The Act does not affect any party's intellectual property rights of any kind whatsoever. Injunctive Relief. The Act does not preclude injunctive relief. Thus, for instance, while a claim for damages resulting from a false, inaccurate, or misleading year 2000 statement is governed by subsection 4(b), that subsection has no impact on the right of a claimant to receive injunctive relief preventing further communication of false or misleading information contained in a year 2000 statement. Section 7. Applicability.-- Effective Date. The Act is effective on the date of its enactment. It applies to lawsuits brought after July 14, 1998 that deal with (a) year 2000 statements made between July 14, 1998 and July 14, 2001 (inclusive); (b) year 2000 readiness disclosures made between the date of enactment of the Act and July 14, 2001 (inclusive); and (c) year 2000 statements designated as year 2000 readiness disclosures (as described below). Previously Made Readiness Disclosure. A year 2000 statement made between January 1, 1996 and the date of enactment of the Act (inclusive) may be designated a year 2000 readiness disclosure if it complied with the requirements of a year 2000 readiness disclosure (other than being designated a ``year 2000 readiness disclosure'') at the time it was made and if, within 45 days of the enactment of the Act, the maker gives individual notice of the designation to prior recipients or posts such notice on its year 2000 website and gives such notice by the same method the year 2000 statement was previously made. Designation of a year 2000 statement as a year 2000 readiness disclosure shall not have effect against any person or entity who proves by clear and convincing evidence that it would be prejudiced by the designation and who timely objects to the designation. Section 8. Year 2000 Council Working Groups. The President's year 2000 Conversion Council (see Exec. Order 13,073, 63 Fed. Reg. 6,467 (1998)) may establish working groups who will engage outside organizations to address year 2000 problems. The Council shall maintain public information on the working groups and their members. The Council shall seek balance among the working groups. The Council shall maintain and publish information on attendance and participation at meetings. Meetings shall be announced in advance and held publicly, to the extent consistent with the Act's purposes. The Federal Advisory Committee Act shall not apply to working groups. This section replaces the Federal Advisory Committee Act requirements which otherwise might have been applicable to some of the work of the Council. Though the Act gives the Council no new powers, working groups may be established by the Council to advise it, discuss year 2000 problems in various sectors of the nation's economy, share information, and otherwise promote the purposes of this Act. Congress expects that the Council will disband, rendering this section inoperative, reasonably promptly after the turn of the century. Section 9. National Information Clearinghouse and Website. In cooperation with other Federal agencies and with the private sector, the General Services Administration (``GSA'') shall establish and maintain until July 14, 2002 a national year 2000 website, designed to assist consumers, small businesses, and local governments in obtaining various year 2000 information. GSA shall consult with a variety of federal entities. GSA shall report to Congress 60 days after the enactment of the Act on compliance with this section.

Mr. HYDE

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I must insist on regular order or we will not get through with this, so I cannot yield for a unanimous consent request. General Leave

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on the Judiciary, I call up H. Res. 581, and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks. (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, today we will vote on an historic resolution to begin an inquiry into whether the President has committed impeachable offenses. All of us are pulled in many directions by our political parties, by philosophy and friendships; we are pulled by many competing forces, but mostly we are moved by our consciences. We must listen to that still small voice that whispers in our ear, duty, duty, duty. Some years ago Douglas MacArthur, in a famous speech at West Point, asserted the ideal of our military forces as duty, honor and country. We do not have to be a soldier in a far-off land to feel the force of those words. They are our ideal here today as well. We have another ideal here, to attain justice through the rule of law. Justice is always and everywhere under assault, and our duty is to vindicate the rule of law as the surest protector of that fragile justice. And so here, today, having received the referral in 17 cartons of supportive material from the Independent Counsel, the question asks itself: Shall we look further or shall we look away? I respectfully suggest that we must look further by voting for this resolution and thus commencing an inquiry into whether or not the President has committed impeachable acts. We do not make any judgments, we do not make any charges, we simply begin a search for truth. My colleagues will hear from our opponents that, yes, we need to look further, but do it our way. Their way imposes artificial time limits, limits our inquiry to the Lewinsky matter, and requires us to establish standards for impeachment that have never been established before, certainly not in the Nixon impeachment proceedings, which we are trying to follow to the letter. We have followed the Rodino format. We will move with all deliberate speed. Many raise concerns about that proposition. Let me speak directly to those concerns. Some suggest the process to date has been partisan, yet every member of the Committee on the Judiciary voted for an inquiry in some form. We differ over the procedural details, not the fundamental question of whether we should go forward. Many on the other side of the aisle worry that this inquiry will become an excuse for an open-ended attack on this administration. I understand that worry. During times when Republicans controlled the executive branch and I was in the minority, I lived where they are living now. With that personal experience, I pledge to my colleagues the fairest and most expeditious search for the truth that I can muster. I do not expect that I will agree with my Democratic friends at each step along the way, but I know that to date we have agreed on many things. In fact, we have agreed on many more things than is generally known. I hope at the end of this long day we will agree on the result. I am determined we will continue to look every day for common ground and to agree where we can. When we must disagree, we will do everything we can to minimize those disagreements. At all times, civility must be the watch word for Members on both sides of the aisle. Too much hangs in the balance for us not to rise above partisan politics. I will use all my strength to ensure that this inquiry does not become a fishing expedition. Rather, I am determined that it will be a fair and expeditious search for truth. We have plenty enough to do now, we do not need to search for new material. However, I cannot say that we will never address other subjects, nor would it be responsible to do so. I do not know what the future holds. If substantial and credible evidence of other impeachable offenses comes to us, as the Independent Counsel hinted or suggested in a letter we received only yesterday, the Constitution will demand that we do our duty. Like each of my colleagues, I took an oath to answer that call. I intend to do so, and I hope my colleagues will join with me if that day comes. I do not think we want to settle for less than the whole truth. Some are concerned about timing. Believe me, nobody wants to end this any sooner than I do. But the Constitution demands that we take the amount of time necessary to do the right thing in the right way. A rush to judgment does not serve anybody's interest, certainly not the public's interest. As I have said publicly, my fervent hope and prayer is we can end this process by the end of the year. That is my new year's resolution. However, to agree to an artificial deadline would be irresponsible. It would only invite delay and discourage cooperation. For those who worry about the timing, I urge them to do everything possible to encourage cooperation. No one likes to have their behavior questioned. The best way to end the questions is to answer them in a timely and truthful manner. Thorough and thoughtful cooperation will do more than anything to put this matter behind us. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Solomon.) (Mr. SOLOMON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen).

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on House Resolution 581, the resolution now under consideration.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, general leave was objected to?