Joseph Hoeffel

Mr. HOEFFEL

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman would yield, is the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. Abercrombie) suggesting that there is some similarity between the behavior of the British 90 years ago and their colonial ways and the behavior of America in Iraq?

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, good evening. I am happy to be back here with my colleagues to conduct another hour of Iraq Watch. We have been meeting one day a week, one evening a week for 1 hour for about 8 months now, since the invasion of Iraq was conducted and problems became apparent; and we have been trying to raise those questions here on the floor, asking for answers, and trying to educate the American public about the problems and challenges in Iraq. Since our last time on the floor, there have been amazing developments that I would like to talk about for a few minutes before turning to my colleagues and engaging in a discussion with them. The big news is that President Bush, at long last, has agreed to appoint an independent commission to investigate the question of weapons of mass destruction and their presence in Iraq and to try to answer the unanswered questions about the weapons of mass destruction. Now, on behalf of Iraq Watch, all I can say is, it is about time. We have been individually and as a group calling for an independent commission to investigate the controversy surrounding weapons of mass destruction since the very beginning of the Iraq Watch 8 months ago. I know, in particular, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Strickland) and the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt) never miss an opportunity to call for such a commission to be appointed; and I have lent my voice to that as well. Finally, the President has agreed that such a commission is needed. Well, let us take a quick review of the situation and find out why President Bush now believes it is important for an independent commission to investigate the weapons of mass destruction and the performance of his administration, because I can tell my colleagues, President Bush does not like independent commissions. I do not think he did this lightly. I think he realizes that there is a huge question here, and it is not a political question; it is a question of national security. The issues that we are raising are not designed to raise political controversy, but to deal with our national safety. These are matters of national security. Well, we all remember that President Bush and his administration stated in the summer and fall of 2002 with complete certainty that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and those weapons of mass destruction posed an imminent threat to America, to world peace, and to our national safety. There was not any hedging; there was not any doubt in the President's comments. There were not any hesitations or uncertainties expressed by any of the policy-makers in the Bush administration. They stated as fact that these weapons of mass destruction existed. They identified on maps where the weapons of mass destruction were located in Iraq. They even indicated how much those weapons weighed. They told us, we have 500 pounds over here; we have 300 pounds over there. Now comes a year and a half later, Dr. David Kay, the CIA's chief weapons inspector in Iraq. And after working there for 7 or 8 months, he has announced, upon his retirement from that job, that the weapons of mass destruction do not exist and, in his opinion, did not exist during 2002 or at the time we went to war in 2003. Now, it is, by the way, undeniable, Mr. Speaker, that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction in the 1980s. We know that. He used them in murderous ways against his own civilians, innocent civilians, the Kurds in Iraq. He also used them in murderous ways against the citizens in Iran, during the Iraq-Iran War. But the question is not whether he had them in the 1980s. The question is during the 1990s and the period of international sanctions and international inspections, did Hussein give up those weapons and did he have them at the time we went to war in 2003. David Kay says no. He has concluded they did not exist. In addition to our general memory of how positive the President was, I can share with the House, as I have before, that I attended a briefing at the White House on October 2, 2002, 1 week before this House voted on the war resolution. That briefing was for a bipartisan group of Members, about 20 of us attended. It was one of several briefings the White House conducted during that time. The briefing was conducted in the Roosevelt Room of the White House by CIA Director George Tenet and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. Ms. Rice and Mr. Tenet told us with complete certainty that weapons of mass destruction existed, that they believed Hussein was giving them to terrorists, that there was a link between Hussein and al Qaeda and, again, they knew where the weapons were. It was just a matter of invading and uncovering them and seizing them. One of my colleagues specifically asked George Tenet, Mr. Tenet, on a scale of 1 to 10, how certain are you that Saddam Hussein has reconstituted his nuclear weapons program? And Mr. Tenet answered, without hesitation, 10. He was completely certain. Well, we now know that information was simply incorrect. In fact, we had a glimmer of the amount of exaggerations and deception when in the spring of 2003 rank-and-file Members of the House were finally allowed to see the classified intelligence reports from the fall of 2002, the Defense Intelligence Agency report of September of 2002, that said, in part, there was no credible evidence of a chemical stockpile of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and the national intelligence estimate of October of 2002 that was filled with uncertainties. That report said that we think, according to the CIA, that Hussein has weapons of mass destruction. We believe he may have this. We believe it is possible he has that. Then we discovered in the spring of 2003, when we saw these reports 6 months after they were made available to the White House that the President, when he talked to the public, forgot about all that uncertainty and told us, without a hesitation, that these weapons existed. Well, it seems clear to me, and it has for some time, that we were led to war on half truths and deception and that America was misled and the Congress was misled by these statements regarding weapons of mass destruction. Now, Saddam Hussein is in custody. Iraq and this country are better off with him in custody. But the fact of the matter is, our challenges in Iraq have been made much harder and much riskier because of the arrogance, the unilateralism, and the cowboy diplomacy of this administration. Now, a few final comments about the commission, and I know my colleagues are anxious to join in this discussion. The President has finally called for an independent commission, something that all of us have called for; and we have been joined by the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. Abercrombie), who has called for an independent commission as well. There are questions remaining about how to set this up. One, of course, is who will be the members, and this will be critically important for the President to pick a bipartisan and independent group of commission members. The timetable for reporting is important. Obviously, this commission should be given sufficient time to do its job. I certainly hope, though, that there will not be any artificial attempt made to delay the report until after the election to protect anybody who may be embarrassed by its findings. But most importantly of all is the scope of the commission's work. In my view, it must do two fundamental things. Certainly, it must review the accuracy of the intelligence-gathering and why our intelligence agencies were wrong about the possession and existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. But secondly, and just as importantly, this commission must review the use of that intelligence by the Bush administration to delve into why this material was so badly stated; why, when the Bush administration was told there were uncertainties about the weapons, why did they tell Congress and the American people that there was no uncertainty about the existence of those weapons. This commission must delve into both the intelligence-gathering and the use of that intelligence by the Bush administration. Let me at this point turn now to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt), who has been waiting patiently and who is a senior member of the Committee on International Relations and a leader on this issue.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I welcome the questions of the gentleman, but I hope he is not turning to me to give him some answers because I cannot begin to answer these very legitimate questions he has raised about what comes next, what does the Bush administration think will happen at the end of June when we turn over civil authority at this point to a completely unknown local or international or some form of alternative government or group. These questions are important, and we are nowhere close to having an answer.

Mr. HOEFFEL. I am afraid to ask.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I agree with the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt) on that point. That is an excellent point, and part of the problem we are having is that the President and the Vice President continue to spin the issue of weapons of mass destruction. The Vice President in the last couple of weeks still talks about those trailers being the place where weapons of mass destruction were being manufactured. David Kay laughs about that and says, no, they were not.

Mr. HOEFFEL. They were perhaps making rocket fuel. More likely, making helium for weather balloons, but they were not making weapons of mass destruction. But the Vice President continues to suggest that that was happening. The President himself in the State of the Union address that the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt) just referenced, in the face of the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, in my view, continued to try to confuse the situation and fool the American people by talking about the fact that Mr. Kay himself, who was in the process of saying there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the President quoted Mr. Kay as talking about weapons of mass destruction- related program activities. And I do not have a clue what is a weapons of mass destruction-related program activity.

Mr. HOEFFEL. At last, an answer.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Let me respond or add on to the comments of the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. Abercrombie) about the Iraqi scientist, because Dr. Kay has also reported on what he believes may explain part of the incredible inaccuracy of our intelligence work regarding the weapons of mass destruction. He believes that some of those Iraqi scientists that you referred to were actually conning Hussein; that they were telling Hussein that they had had these programs; they needed more money; they were on the verge of developing the weapons that this murderous dictator was interested in developing. Hussein apparently believed that con, and kept giving them money for their research and for their development, and some of that money was skimmed off the top through base corruption by these scientists and all the rest. What is amazing is the suggestion from Dr. Kay that our intelligence agencies fell for the con, too. We were conned by the con. We picked up the communications of the Iraqi scientists to Hussein, and we believed those communications, and so that is why we felt that the weapons of mass destruction were well developed and in existence when, in fact, they were not.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleagues for joining in Iraq Watch this week. We will be back next week. We are going to look at the commission and what happens June 30th, and we look forward to talking next week.

Mr. HOEFFEL

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, last week during the State of the Union address President Bush spoke to us about the Iraqi War and described how the Kay report, the Dr. David Kay report, indicated dozens of instances of what the President called weapons of mass destruction- related program activities. Now, I am not sure what a weapons of mass destruction-related program activity is, but I do know what it is not. It is not a weapon of mass destruction, because we have not found weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. And, in fact, David Kay himself has said so. He has resigned his position as the United States Chief Weapons Inspector in Iraq, working for the CIA. He has stated that in his opinion, Iraq does not have stockpiles of chemical weapons of mass destruction or biological weapons of mass destruction, that Iraq does not have nuclear weapons, and any nuclear program was rudimentary in nature, according to Dr. Kay. He feels that these stockpiles do not exist now and did not exist before we went to war with Iraq in March of 2003. Now, this is a startling conclusion from our Chief Weapons Inspector because it is so different from what the Bush administration told us in the fall of 2002 in the run-up to the congressional vote of whether or not to give congressional authority to the President to use military authority to deal with what was described as the imminent threat to peace, to regional peace and world peace and to the United States, the imminent threat of the use of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Speaker, I voted to give the President that authority based upon the representations of the administration because I wanted to disarm Saddam Hussein of those weapons of mass destruction. Now, we have finally captured Saddam Hussein, and I am glad that we have; I am glad he is out of power. I believe both Iraq and America are better off now that he is in custody. But, Mr. Speaker, we have not found those weapons of mass destruction; and we now have a report from Dr. Kay that those weapons of mass destruction did not exist and they do not exist today. Hussein had weapons of mass destruction in the 1980s. We know that because he used them in murderous ways against his own citizens, the Kurds in northern Iraq, and he used them to murder tens of thousands of Iranian citizens. But the issue is not what he had in the 1980s. The issue is whether he had such stockpiles in 2002 and 2003. We were told with complete certainty by the President, by the Vice President, I was told with 20 other Members of the House in a briefing in the White House on October 2, 2002, by Condoleezza Rice and George Tenet that there was complete certainty that Iraq possessed these weapons of mass destruction. And based upon those representations, I voted with many of my colleagues to give the President that war authority. Now, it is now clear that there were half-truths and deceptions from the administration as well as mistakes from the Intelligence Community. And I stand here tonight to call for an independent investigation, an independent review, of both the work product of the Intelligence Community of the United States and the work of the administration policymakers that stated with such clarity that we faced an imminent threat from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Clearly the American people were misled. Clearly the Congress was misled. I was misled by the Bush administration and by the United States intelligence agencies. The President and the Vice President continue to want the American people to believe that there was this threat and is this threat of weapons of mass destruction. The President talked about WMD-related program activities last week without clarifying what they were. The Vice President continues to insist that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. These statements are contrary to the report of the Weapons Inspector, Dr. Kay. I call for an independent investigation and review so that we can get to the bottom and find out the truth.

Mr. HOEFFEL

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, last night the President gave his State of the Union address to the Nation and to the Congress; and he brought up, rather surprisingly, weapons of mass destruction. The President said that American inspectors have ``identified dozens of weapons of mass destruction-related program activities'' in Iraq. Mr. Speaker, I do not know what a weapons of mass destruction-related program activity is. I would like to find out. I do know this: it is not weapons of mass destruction. We have not found weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. David Kay, the American inspector, has not found them. The international inspectors did not find them. Like many Members of this House, I voted in favor of the war in Iraq. I did so in order to disarm Saddam Hussein of weapons of mass destruction. I am glad that we have defeated Hussein. I am glad he is in our custody. We and the Iraqi people are better off with him in custody. He was a murderous tyrant. But we have not found the weapons of mass destruction, and it is clear that an extraordinary amount of exaggeration and deception occurred from the White House on the subject of weapons of mass destruction before we went to war in order to win congressional support for going to war. The President talked last night about our international coalition. The President would like us to believe that we have a broad-based and effective international coalition in Iraq to move forward with securing what is still an unstable country and to move forward with reconstruction. He listed a long number of nations that have supplied some number of troops to the efforts in Iraq. The fact is that well over 90 percent of the troops in Iraq are American. About 95 percent of the money being spent in Iraq is American taxpayer dollars, well over $160 billion to date. The fact is that we did not turn effectively to our traditional and historic allies and move forward with the international community in order to build a coalition to defeat Hussein in Iraq. The President, when he won his authority to go to war, made a number of commitments. He said that he would exhaust diplomatic options before going to war. He did not. He said he would allow the international inspectors the opportunity to complete their work in Iraq. He did not. He said he would go to the United Nations and build a coalition, and he did not. And now the President would still have us believe that we are on a successful hunt and are turning up weapons of mass destruction in Iraq as part of a broad-based coalition in that country, and neither of those statements is true. The fact of the matter is, Mr. Speaker, that the arrogance, the unilateralism, and the cowboy diplomacy of the President and the White House have made our challenges in Iraq much harder than they should have been and have made our war on al Qaeda and terror riskier and harder than it should be.

Mr. HOEFFEL

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to recognize and honor the Salem Baptist Church of Jenkintown for its 120 years of worship and community development. Founded in 1884, the Salem Baptist Church emerged from its modest, singleroom origins and flourished into a thriving church community. Through the immense effort of its congregation and the esteemed leadership of its pastors, Salem has grown consistently in both size and impact. Outgrowing each new building in which it resided, Salem expanded its presence in the community. Throughout its history, Salem has welcomed into its ministries such esteemed guests as Martin Luther King, Jr., Samuel Proctor, Rosa Parks, Jesse Jackson, and Pricilla Evans. Today Salem includes the Church, a parsonage, Section 8 housing facilities for low-income residents and the elderly, and the Robert Johnson Smith Educational Center. In addition, there are plans to build a Family Life Center and nursing home facility. From its inception, the Salem Baptist Church has been committed to community development through the faith and determination of its congregation and pastors. I congratulate the members of the Salem Baptist Church on their 120th anniversary.

Mr. HOEFFEL

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, Taiwan has been a close and valuable ally of our nation since its inception as the Republic of China in 1949. In contrast to the People's Republic of China, both democracy and capitalism have flourished in Taiwan, as demonstrated by its peaceful transition to a multi-party political system and its thriving free market economy. I support the notion of a united China, but not if it means the assimilation of Taiwan into anything resembling the current People's Republic. Rather, I look forward to the day when both peoples are united in a truly democratic state, and are able to share in the political and economic freedoms of Taiwan. Until this is possible, the United States must use the tools at our disposal to maintain the status quo, guaranteeing the people of Taiwan the freedom they currently enjoy. Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian has called for a nationwide referendum in March regarding China's deployment of hundreds of missiles aimed at Taiwan. Asking the Taiwanese people whether Taiwan should purchase more anti-missile defenses in response to this obvious threat does not represent an escalation of tensions with China. On the contrary, this ``defensive referendum'' is an affirmation of Taiwan's democratic system. We must support this exercise of the right of free expression, which is consistent with our own values. In this instance, China's inflammatory statements, not Taiwan's referendum, threaten to upset the delicate balance that exists in the region. The United States must remain firm in its support for the people of Taiwan. And until China is ready to adopt a democratic system of government and a free market economy, that means maintaining the status quo.

Mr. HOEFFEL

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I was absent for four votes on Wednesday, November 19, 2003. Had I been present, I would have cast my votes as follows: Rollcall No. 641 (H. Con. Res. 288): ``aye.'' Rollcall No. 642 (H. Res. 393): ``aye.'' Rollcall No. 643 (H. Res. 423): ``aye.'' Rollcall No. 644 (H.R. 3140): ``aye.''

Mr. HOEFFEL

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I am here tonight with my colleagues to resume the Iraq Watch we have been conducting almost every week on the floor since sometime last spring. I believe it was April that we started speaking every week on the floor about our concerns about our policies in Iraq, trying to ask questions, trying to seek answers from the administration regarding the policies that we have been pursuing. Also, we have been suggesting changes that we would like to see in those policies. Of course, a lot has happened in Iraq since last spring, since the very impressive and brave work of our military men and women, the impressive victory that they won over Saddam Hussein, a victory no one thought was in doubt, but everyone was happy to see with minimal loss of life. We thought that the military performed with great courage and great skill. Since that time, of course, it has become clear as the military battle was conducted, the planning for and the actual reconstruction and security of Iraq has been very poor. We have all been disappointed in the difficulties. The continuing casualties have been heartbreaking. The inability to get the American-appointed Governing Council to work effectively to try to bring the Iraqi society together has been disappointing. I think the Bush administration finally understands they need to change their plan for the ultimate creation of a new government and a representative democracy and hopefully a pluralistic society in Iraq. Recently the administration has announced a change. They will no longer ask that the Governing Council in Iraq be responsible for writing a new constitution and holding new elections before America gives up authority for the reconstruction and the occupation of Iraq. Instead, Mr. Speaker, we are now putting time limits on our occupation. We have apparently announced that we will give to the Iraqis the responsibility for their reconstruction next summer, although the President has been clear, and I agree with the President that we must continue to keep our forces there to make sure the tyrants and the murderers do not come back if the Iraqi democrats-to-be fail to move forward and secure their country. The question is what is the best policy for this country? How do we best achieve a stable and secure Iraq, which is a goal all of us share? How do we best achieve the creation of a pluralistic society? How do we best establish a representative government based upon principles of self-government and tolerance and cooperation with the rights of women protected, with sharing of responsibility between the three great ethnic groups in Iraq, the Sunnis, the Shiites and the Kurds? How do we best achieve this in the face of a security threat in Iraq where our troops are not safe, where the guerilla attacks against our troops continue, where there is no Iraqi Army yet ready to step forward to provide for its own security, where the Iraqi police are not yet capable of providing for security domestically? How do we best proceed? Some fear that the President after holding on to power and not allowing the Iraqi Governing Council or any other group to have any decision-making power, some fear that the President now is moving too quickly to give up power to the Iraqis; and I think it is a very legitimate question because if we leave too early, if we leave a vacuum in any way in Iraq, only bad things can happen, whether Saddam Hussein or his followers attempt to come back, whether a new group of lawless thugs attempt to take over, whether forces from other countries attempt to infiltrate and take over Iraq, none of that would be good. None of that would be good for the Western democracies; none of that would honor the sacrifices that brave young Americans have made, including those who have made the ultimate sacrifice and have died serving their country. A premature departure from Iraq by this country could lead to a less stable country in Iraq. It could lead to a less stable Middle East. It could allow Iraq to become a haven for terrorists, which is a process, unfortunately, already under way, a haven which did not exist when Saddam Hussein was in power. As murderous a tyrant as he was, he operated in a secular fashion and did not apparently have relationships with the religious fundamentalists and extremists that form al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. But now with the instability in Iraq, it has become a magnet for those who want to attack Americans and disrupt the search for peace in the Middle East. It is my view, Mr. Speaker, the way to best achieve our national goals in Iraq is to recognize that while this country is uniquely capable of winning military victories and facing down tyrants and working for the liberation of oppressed people, we are perhaps not best suited for nation-building; that we are probably not using our resources and our skills to our highest potential when we get bogged down in having to administer a country. It is admirable that we are willing to pay for the reconstruction or some of the reconstruction of a nation, and that is a great and wonderful American tradition of rebuilding vanquished foes and those less fortunate. But how do we best achieve this stabilized society, representative government and the creation of a pluralistic society where tolerance and economic freedom and personal liberty can flourish? I am here tonight to say that I continue to believe that we should turn to our multinational organizations such as the United Nations, NATO, and others, to help us with nation-building in Iraq. I would point out that the United Nations is perhaps uniquely qualified through experience and organization to be responsible for reconstruction and nation-building. In fact, this is what the United Nations was created to do in 1945. I fear that an almost irrational opposition to the notion and the concept of the United Nations from some on the other side of the aisle is preventing this country from calling upon the United Nations to assume this burden. There are many reasons why I would like to see this happen. It is not only to get out from under the financial burden of reconstructing Iraq on our own. It is partly that; it is also partly to share the responsibility for the reconstruction of Iraq. It is to share the credibility that is needed, to call upon other nations and multilateral organizations like the United Nations to provide the stability and take away from the equation some of the animosity that has wrongfully built up against America, but nonetheless exists in some part of the world. Frankly, the United Nations is designed to do this kind of work. It is designed to relieve the United States from taking on all of the burden of reconstructing a country and building a new Nation. If we turn to the United Nations, we will still be the senior partner. We pay 25 percent of the bills of the United Nations. We will still have tremendous influence over what happens, but we would be in a position where the responsibility and accountability and the burden of reconstruction would be shared with an organization that is created to do that very thing. Secondly, I do not believe, Mr. Speaker, that anyone, the United States, the United Nations, or anyone else, will have success in the stabilization of Iraq, not the least of which I would include the Iraqi Governing Council itself, unless we establish security in Iraq, and that has not been done. Again, I think it is asking too much of our American military to become a long-term occupying power, to have our young men and women serving in what, in parts of Iraq, seems to be, literally, a shooting gallery, with 20 or 25 daily attacks on American Forces and our Coalition Forces. We are not in a position to have secured Iraq. We clearly need more troops to do that. Yet, in my view, it should not be America's burden to send more troops. So I would say that it is by far the best strategy to turn to NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is a military organization, to provide security in Iraq. NATO, of course, historically never fired a shot, was designed as a defensive alliance to keep the world safe from any hostility from the Soviet Union. In the conflict in Kosovo, the NATO forces were used for the first time out of the traditional confines of Europe, or at least on the southern stretches of Europe, used for the first time in a proactive way to defeat another tyrant, another dictator, Milosevic, in Kosovo. And NATO performed brilliantly and was able to liberate that country from the abuses of that dictator and has also now moved into Afghanistan to take over some of the security functions in that country. I believe that NATO would be the appropriate international organization to provide security in Iraq while we turn to the United Nations to take primary responsibility for the reconstruction of Iraq. Now, none of this will happen, Mr. Speaker, none of this will happen until the United States is willing to give up some authority in Iraq. We cannot continue to call all of the shots in Iraq and expect our traditional allies to send troops or money or advice or anything else. It is time for us not just to put Iraqis back in charge, because it is not yet clear Iraqis are able to be back in charge, particularly, with the insecure conditions that exist there; but it is time for us, in concert with our traditional allies, in concert with international organizations that we created at the end of the Second World War, that we established for the very purpose of Nation-building. Nation-building was not a phrase then, it is a newer phrase, but the concept is exactly why NATO was established, and, particularly, why the United Nations was established. It is time for us to use our diplomatic skill to give up the necessary authority and responsibility, to share the obligations with these two international organizations, so that we can more quickly and more effectively and more safely stabilize Iraq, establish a pluralistic society, and move them towards self-government. Now, Mr. Speaker, I would like to turn to my colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt), one of the senior members of the House Committee on International Relations and a founding member of Iraq Watch, my good friend.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman refers to the latest plan as the French plan. The New York Times on Sunday, in looking at the plan that they characterize as throwing the problem to the Iraqis, called it the ``hot potato plan.'' French, hot potato french fries perhaps, whatever.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, may I interrupt the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt) again? There was additional polling information made available over the weekend from a European pollster, I do not know the name, saying that a majority of citizens in virtually every European country except, I believe, Italy, view the United States as the most likely country to start a war or to create instability. Now, I reject that view completely. We are the peacemakers and we are not the war makers; but I wanted to emphasize the gentleman's point that something has gone wrong with the way we are viewed by our friends around the world, let alone how we are viewed by our enemies. I am not so concerned about how the enemies look at us, but when the Western European democracies have a negative view of our President and our country, a negative view that I do not share, but that they have come to that conclusion, something is dramatically wrong. Mr. Speaker, would the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt) mind if we bring our colleague into the conversation?

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I agree with the gentleman. The problem is not with our troops. It is with the policymakers and our planners here in Washington. I referred earlier to the New York Times article this Sunday. They entitled it ``Iraq Goes Sour.'' And I take issue, actually, with one of the claims they make here. They blame the intelligence agencies for the failures to understand what was actually happening in Iraq. The editorial said, for example, the Central Intelligence Agency we now realize had no idea what was going on inside Iraq. They continue, the CIA's estimate regarding weapons of mass destruction were basically worst-case scenarios of what the Hussein regime might have been up to in the interim, in 1998 when inspections were cut off. They continue, that was apparently a mistake, if an understandable one. The reality I think is different. I think that while the intelligence agencies clearly did not get it right, they were telling the policymakers last fall before Congress voted on whether or not to authorize the war, they were telling the White House that there was great uncertainty about what Hussein had and what he did not have. We know that now. We did not know it then. This past Spring, 6 months after we voted, and after the war was fought and won, at least according to the President's proclamation on May 1, at least the military's battle was won, if not the guerilla battle. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence made available to rank and file members 18 or 20 boxes of intelligence information, most notably the Defense Intelligence Agency report of September 2002. And then the great summary report the national intelligence estimate of October of 2002. And I have read the executive summaries of those documents. It is very long, and I spent a couple of hours reading it. It would take days to read all of those boxes, but those summaries which are still classified are replete with uncertainties, with the agencies saying, well, we believe he has got this. We believe he has got that but we are not sure. He had this amount of weapons in the past and we are not quite sure where they are today. They have made the case, as the Vice President has said, that Hussein was trying to do certain things, but they were full of uncertainty. And my objection is none of that uncertainty was communicated to Congress and to the American people. The President and all of his people, and I want to give an example in a second, told us with complete clarity and certainty that Hussein had these weapons. We knew where they were. We knew how much they weighed. We knew everything about them. We were going to get them and we could not trust him for another moment. And it is my view that it is not the intelligence agencies that failed, but the politicians.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, let me introduce our colleague who has been waiting patiently. The gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott).

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his comments. I believe our hour is up. I thank all of my colleagues for taking part in Iraq Watch tonight, and we will be back next week.

Mr. HOEFFEL

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I was absent for votes on Tuesday, November 4, 2003. Had I been present, I would have cast my votes as follows: Rollcall No. 602 (H. Con. Res. 176): ``aye.'' Rollcall No. 603 (H. Con. Res. 94): ``aye.''

Mr. HOEFFEL

Mr. HOEFFEL. Madam Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 2443, the Coast Guard and Marine Transportation Act of 2003. This legislation highlights the need to expand our Coast Guard aviation assets to fight the war against drugs. I strongly support the provision in this measure which permits the Coast Guard to establish a West Coast fleet of HITRON drug interdiction helicopters. This provision will afford the Coast Guard the opportunity to select a new state-of-the-art, multi-mission helicopter to assist in its drug interdiction efforts. The HITRON MH-68A Sting Ray was designed, built, and maintained by the Agusta Aerospace facility in Philadelphia. Constructed on the frame of an A109E Power civilian helicopter, the Sting Ray employs state-of- the-art navigation, communication, and avionics equipment. In 2000, eight Sting Rays were leased to the Coast Guard for the purpose of establishing an armed HITRON Squadron in Jacksonville, specifically for drug interdiction efforts. This Fleet has enjoyed a fabulous success rate in its missions. HITRON aircrews have interdicted 30 tons of illegal drugs on the high seas valued at more than $2.1 billion. In addition, the Sting Ray is the only Homeland Security helicopter authorized for airborne use of force over civilian populations. Since September 11, the Sting Rays have also been pressed into port security service for all U.S. ports and associated waterways. Therefore, I am pleased to support H.R. 2443 which accommodates the leasing and stationing of six HITRON helicopters in Southern California. The failure to establish a permanent West Coast Fleet will result in a serious shortage of armed assets for drug interdiction and homeland defense. Thank you for your consideration of this important piece of legislation.

Mr. HOEFFEL

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Maine (Mr. Michaud) for yielding me time and for his leadership on the subcommittee that has brought this bill forward. I want to also thank the Chair of the subcommittee, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Brown), and also the Chair and ranking member of the full committee, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith) and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Evans). This bill, H.R. 1516, is very good legislation that will create new cemeteries across this country of ours, particularly in southeastern Pennsylvania where a tremendous need for a new veterans cemetery has been demonstrated throughout the years. In southeastern Pennsylvania, nearly 300,000 veterans live over 65 miles from the closest veterans cemetery. And in that congested part of the State, the travel time to that open cemetery is long and arduous. And this veterans cemetery located somewhere in southeastern Pennsylvania will be a tremendous service to the families of veterans and a great way of honoring the service of those who have given so much to this country. Mr. Speaker, I really stood up to, in addition to indicating my support for the bill, my second purpose was to compliment the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gerlach) for the great job he did in breaking the logjam that existed over this issue. My predecessor, Jon Fox, and then I, introduced legislation in prior Congresses to establish a new veterans cemetery at Valley Forge National Historic Park, which is still a site that I would love to see chosen for this cemetery. But there are some legitimate objections to that park, and the dispute that we got into was sidetracking this proposal. The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gerlach) was able to figure out a way to break that logjam by creating a commission and giving the veterans commission some leeway to pick the appropriate site in consultation with veterans organizations back home. As we have moved forward, other areas of the country have decided this is also the right way to go, and so we have before us today a very sound bill that will establish new cemeteries. And that is what we are trying to do, not fight over locations and get hung up on various procedures, but to actually get the job done. So I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gerlach). It was a pleasure to work with him. I was proud to be the leading Democratic co-sponsor of H.R. 1516 when the gentleman brought it forward. I have spoken with our former colleague, Mr. Jon Fox. He is thrilled with the progress on this; and, frankly, Senator Specter in the other body has greatly helped move this forward. So it has been a good bipartisan approach. Again, I thank the Chair, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith), and the ranking member, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Evans), for their great work. And we will be able to provide wonderful service now, hopefully in the next 4 years, in these new locations to create new veterans cemeteries to honor the veterans that have served this country and to remember the need to help their family members and their friends have the convenience of a veterans cemetery that is local to them and easy for them to get to to continue to honor these veterans for years to come.

Mr. HOEFFEL

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I was absent for votes on Monday, October 20, 2003, due to a scheduling conflict in my district. Had I been present, I would have cast my votes as follows: Rollcall No. 563 (H. Res. 356): ``aye''; rollcall No. 564 (H. Res. 400): ``aye''; rollcall No. 565 (H.R. 3288): ``aye.''

Mr. HOEFFEL

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.