Jim Inhofe

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. I object.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

Mr. INHOFE. I object.

Mr. INHOFE. I object.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask that you listen again. I am going to pick up on the incredible but true story of the Clinton administration's betrayal of national security and the scandalous coverup that continues as we speak. In doing so, I fully realize that the majority of Americans will not believe me. They have continued to believe our President even after he has demonstrated over and over that he has no regard for the truth. Though you would never realize it by listening to the national media or the Clinton spin doctors, the recently released Cox Report has revealed a wealth of information on how the Clinton administration has undermined national security to simultaneously pursue its misguided foreign policies and self-serving domestic political agendas. On the one hand, there is the mind-boggling story of how the Clinton administration deliberately changed almost 50 years of bipartisan security policies--relaxing export restrictions, signing waivers to allow technology transfers, ignoring China's violation of arms control agreements, and its theft of our nuclear secrets, opening up even more nuclear and high technology floodgates to China and others--thus harming U.S. national security. On the other hand, there is the continuing coverup--the effort to hide from Congress and the American people the true damage that has been done to national security and the Clinton administration's central role in allowing so much of it to happen on their watch. Over three months ago--on March 15--I spoke on this floor about China's theft of the W-88 nuclear warhead. To remind you, this is the crown jewel of our nuclear arsenal. It is the warhead that has 10 times the explosive power of the bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima and yet just a fraction its size. I spoke about how serious this was to our national security--how it was a story with life and death implications for millions of Americans. I told how President Clinton was directly responsible for downplaying the significance of and covering up this story. While the information on the W-88 design--the crown jewel of our nuclear arsenal--was stolen in the late 1980's, the theft was first discovered in 1995 by this administration. So people remember, it was the Chinese walk-in informant to the CIA that gave us all this information. I told how it was this administration and this President who deliberately covered up this vital information from Congress and the American people and, at the same time, lulled our people into a false sense of security by repeating the lie that there were no nuclear missiles targeted at America's children. At that time, I spoke of six proven incontrovertible facts, and let me repeat them now: 1. President Clinton hosted over 100 campaign fundraisers in the White House, many with Chinese connections. 2. President Clinton used John Huang, Charlie Trie, Johnny Chung, James Riady, and others with strong Chinese ties to raise campaign money. 3. President Clinton signed waivers to allow his top campaign fundraiser's aerospace company to transfer U.S. missile guidance technology to China. 4. President Clinton covered up the theft of our most valuable nuclear weapons technology. 5. President Clinton lied to the American people over 130 times about our nation's security while he knew Chinese missiles were aimed at American children. 6. President Clinton single-handedly stopped the deployment of a national missile defense system, exposing every American life to a missile attack, leaving America with no defense whatsoever against an intercontinental ballistic missile. On March 15, I began my speech by asking the American people to listen as I told them ``a story of espionage, conspiracy, deception, and cover-up--a story with life and death implications for millions of Americans--a story about national security and a President and an administration that deliberately chose to put national security at risk, while telling the people everything was fine.'' In the three months since I made these statements, none has been refuted. Now, I come before you to tell some of the rest of the story that we have learned since March 15. And it is a truly astounding story. We thought the W-88 story was bad--and it is. But with the release of the Cox Report last month, the American people have been presented with documented evidence that the harm President Clinton has done to U.S. national security is enormously worse than we thought. On March 15, I said that, as damaging as the W-88 breach was, I believed we had not yet scratched the surface of the national security scandal exposed by this one revelation. I must say that I was right-- even beyond my own worst fears. Let's not be distracted by the self-serving Clinton spin: that everybody does it; that it all happened during previous administrations; that this is only about security at the nuclear weapons lab; that there is equal blame to go around on all sides; that President Clinton acted quickly and properly when he found out; and that the only problem is now being fixed. I am here today to tell you that all of this is wrong. The Clinton spin is nothing more than a dishonest smokescreen designed to divert attention from the real issues. It is also, I believe, an attempt to dissuade people from actually reading the Cox Report and discovering for themselves that the Clinton spin is a snare, a delusion, and a lie. This is why I want to take some time to walk through some of the more important revelations in the Cox Report and to remind my colleagues that we have an obligation to tell the American people the truth--the truth that the media is inexplicably ignoring and that the President seems to hope the people will never find out on their own. First, let us begin with a simple fact: Sixteen of the 17 most significant major technology breaches revealed in the Cox Report were first discovered after 1994. With the lone exception of the W-70 technology that was discovered back in the 1970's during the Clinton administration, all the rest of them were discovered since 1994. Again, that is when they had the individual who came into the CIA and exposed all of those. Let me repeat--sixteen of the 17 most significant major technology breaches revealed in the Cox Report were first discovered during the Clinton administration. Those who tell you otherwise are willfully lying to you. Second, of the remaining 16 technology breaches, one definitely occurred during the Reagan administration--the W-88 Trident D-5. Seven occurred sometime before 1995, though it is unclear exactly when. And eight occurred--without question--during the Clinton administration. Let's take a closer look at these. The seven that occurred before 1995 included breaches of information on all of the currently deployed nuclear warheads in the U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile arsenal: the W-56 Minuteman II; the W-62 Minuteman III; the W-76 Trident C-4; the W-78 Minuteman Mark 12A; and the W-87 Peacekeeper. In addition, there was the breach of classified information on reentry vehicles, the heat shield that protects warheads as they reenter the Earth's atmosphere when delivered by long-range ballistic missiles. Let me repeat that all of these technology breaches were first discovered in 1995. They were discovered when a Chinese ``walk-in'' agent actually approached the CIA at a location outside of China and handed them a secret Chinese government document containing state-of- the-art classified information about the W-88 and the other U.S. nuclear warheads. We still don't know why he did this, but he did. The Cox Report also tells us that the Energy Department and FBI investigations of this matter have focused exclusively on the loss of the W-88, which we know happened around 1988. There have been no investigations undertaken about the loss of the other warheads, the timing of whose loss cannot be as clearly pinned down. Next, we move to the other eight major technology breaches revealed in the Cox Report. All of these were not only first discovered during the Clinton administration, they also happened during the Clinton administration: No. 1, the transfer of the so-called Legacy Codes containing data on 50 years of U.S. nuclear weapons development including over 1,000 nuclear tests; No. 2, the sale and diversion to military purposes of hundreds of high performance computers enabling China to enhance its development of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and advanced military aviation equipment; No. 3, the theft of nuclear warhead simulation technology enhancing China's ability to perfect miniature nuclear warheads without actual testing; No. 4, the theft of advanced electromagnetic weapons technology useful in the development of anti-satellite and anti-missile systems; No. 5, the transfer of missile nose cone technology enabling China to substantially improve the reliability of its intercontinental ballistic missiles; No. 6, the transfer of missile guidance technology (by President Clinton to China) enabling China to substantially improve the accuracy of its ballistic missiles--these same missiles that are targeting U.S. cities; No. 7, the theft of space-based radar technology giving China the ability to detect our previously undetectable submerged submarines; and No. 8, the theft of some other ``classified thermonuclear weapons information'' which ``the Clinton administration'' (not the Cox committee) ``has determined . . . cannot be made public.'' We used to think China was decades behind us in terms of building a modern advanced nuclear arsenal. Now we learn that, later this year, China is planning to test its new JL-2 long range ICBM, a submarine launched ballistic missile with MIRV capability--meaning multiple independently targeted warheads on each missile--almost a replica of our Trident ICBM. This missile will have a range of over 13,000 kilometers and could reach anywhere in the United States from protected Chinese waters. In addition, we know that China has been helping North Korea, among others, with weapons and technology. North Korea is also expected to test its long range Taepo Dong II missile later this year. I am reminded of something that happened last August when I made a request to sort of see where we were and where North Korea was in terms of a threat to the United States. In a letter that I received from General Shelton, who was depending on our intelligence system for his response, he said it would be at least three years before the North Koreans would have a multiple-stage rocket. That was August 24. Seven days later, on August 31, they fired a multiple-stage rocket. I remind my colleagues we have no defense against either of these potential threats, because of the policy decisions of the Clinton administration. Someone very smart back in 1983 determined that we would need a national missile defense system in place by Fiscal Year 98. We were on track to meet the deadline until 1993 when President Clinton, through his veto power, stopped this missile defense system. But as the Cox Report points out, nuclear espionage by China is only one part of the problem. China's efforts to acquire U.S. military related technology is pervasive. Operating through a maze of government and quasi-government entities and front companies, China has established a technology gathering network of immense proportions. The Congressman from Pennsylvania, Congressman Curt Weldon, has done extensive research in putting this together, and other charts to show exactly what capacity China has to collect our nuclear secrets. When there is time to look at it, it shows you operational entities of the Chinese military in red, the Chinese military entities and those in contact involving financial entities in green, and you have the Chinese military front companies in blue. You can see that this is well thought out. It took many years to put it together to make it effective. They are willing and able to trade, bribe, buy, or steal to get U.S. advanced technology--all for the purpose of enhancing their long-term military potential. Their success is often determined largely by our willingness to make it easier for them to get what they want. The Cox Report has shed light on the fact that the Clinton administration has actually helped China in its technology acquisition efforts or made it easier for them to commit thefts and espionage. You know the truth is always difficult and controversy is difficult. It is easier to take polls and tell people what they want to hear. But I have to make a decision--who do I love more--this President or America. I find that to be very easy in this case. The following are just some of the things that the Clinton administration has done. And I want to applaud Congressman Weldon for helping to bring many of these things to light. No. 1, in 1993, the Clinton administration removed the color-coded security badges that had been used for years at Energy weapons labs claiming they were ``discriminatory''--as if that makes any sense whatsoever. Now just a few weeks ago, in the wake of all these revelations, the Energy Department has reinstated the color-coded badges. But during the time that these thefts took place, they were not able to wear these badges. No. 2, in 1993, the Clinton administration put a hold on doing FBI background checks for lab workers and visitors, an action which helped to dramatically increase the number of people going to the labs who would previously have not been allowed to have access. No. 3, in 1995, the Clinton administration took the extraordinary action of overturning its own agency's decision to revoke the security clearance of an employee found guilty of breaching classified information. When this happened, it sent a message to employees throughout the Department, that this administration was not serious about countering breaches of classified information. No. 4, the Clinton administration deliberately, and many would say recklessly, declassified massive amounts of nuclear-related information in what the Clinton administration touted as a new spirit of openness. No. 5., in the W-88 investigation, the Clinton administration turned down four requests for wiretaps on a suspect who was identified in 1996 and allowed to stay in his sensitive job until news reports surfaced in 1999. No. 6, in 1995, someone at the Department of Energy gave a classified design diagram of the W-87 nuclear warhead to U.S. News & World Report magazine which printed it in its July 31 issue that year. Representative Curt Weldon is still trying to get answers about how this leak was investigated and what was determined. He has good reason to believe the investigation was quashed because it was going to lead straight to President Clinton's Energy Secretary. No. 7, career whistle-blowers at the Department of Energy who tried to warn of serious security breaches--including Notra Trulock, the former Director of Intelligence for the Energy Department, and Ed McCallum, the former Security and Safeguards Chief--were thwarted for years by Clinton political appointees who refused to let them brief Congress and others about what they knew. Trulock was demoted but will now get to keep his job. McCallum appears to be on his way to being scapegoated and perhaps fired for trying to tell the truth. Members will remember we had extensive hearings. Notra Trulock testified under oath that he thought that the theft of the W-88 was so significant, he wanted to give it to Congress. He was refused being allowed to do that by the then-Acting Secretary of the Energy Department. No. 8, rejecting advice from his Secretaries of State and Defense, President Clinton approved switching the licensing authority for satellites and other technology from the State Department to the Commerce Department, making it easier for China to acquire U.S. missile technology. No. 9, President Clinton granted waivers making it easier for U.S. companies to transfer missile and satellite technology to China during the launching of U.S. satellites on China's rockets. No. 10, in 1994, President Clinton ended COCOM, the Coordinating Committee on Multinational Export Control, the multinational agreement among U.S. friends and allies that they would not sell certain high- technology items to countries like China. When this happened, it opened the commercial floodgates. Ever since, there has been a wild scramble for competition to sell more and more advanced technology to China. As a result, the proliferation has never been worse than it has been in the last 6 years. No. 11, in a series of decisions throughout his Presidency--and many surrounding the 1996 election--Clinton has consistently relaxed export and trade restrictions on various forms of high technology of interest to China. Again, I applaud Congressman Weldon who put this chart together. This timeline was not put together because President Clinton took office in 1993, but that is when all the compromises took place. This timeline shows categories including machine tools, telecommunications, propulsion. All were compromised, or as we normally say stolen. No. 12, President Clinton has ignored or downplayed numerous Chinese arms control violations by not imposing sanctions required by law. While we are selling more and more high tech to China, China is sending prohibited military technology to countries such as Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Libya and Egypt. What does the Clinton administration do? They do nothing. What are the motives for all this? Why did the Clinton administration act the way it did, with almost total disregard for any traditional concern for U.S. national security? The Cox Report did not answer these questions because it was only concerned with the facts of the security breaches themselves, not what was behind it. But FBI Director Louis Freeh did assign one man to look into this. His name was Charles LaBella, who became head of the Justice Department's China Task Force. He and his investigators spend months looking into the connections, trying to connect the dots with campaign contributions, foreign influences and administration actions. What he found is laid out in a 100-page memo he prepared for Janet Reno. We know this memo argues in favor of the appointment of an independent counsel to carry on the investigation. But the memo itself has reminded secret, even through it has been subpoenaed by Congress. Janet Reno, who rejected its recommendation for an independent counsel, has refused to release the memo to the Congress or to the public. It is time for that memo to be released. FBI Director Freeh has testified that the public knows only about one percent of what the FBI knows about the Chinagate scandal. It is time for the truth to come out. It is time for the public to get some sense of the other 99 percent which is contained in the LaBella memo. Mr. President, over the last six years, President Clinton and his administration have shown a pervasive disregard for national security. In both actions and inactions, this President has broken ranks with the bipartisan consensus about national security that helped us win the cold war. His policies and attitudes-towards export controls, nuclear weapons, militarily important high technology, and dealing with our adversaries in the world--have been strikingly different from those of all of his predecessors in the modern era. His administration has acted as if the end of the cold war gave them carte blanche license to open the commercial and technology floodgates to countries like china simply because it was good for business, or good for getting campaign contributions, or good for other domestic political reasons. The traditional concern about national security--about protecting our nuclear secrets, about maintaining our military and technological superiority, about sanctioning those in the world who engaged in flagrant and hostile espionage and proliferation--all that went out the window, replaced by other priorities this President somehow thought were more important. President Clinton claims he has ``redefined'' national security. In fact--as the Cox Report conclusively documents--he has ``harmed'' national security. This is the message that every American must understand. My hope is that we never again have a President who is so disrespectful of, and inattentive to, traditional national security concerns. Yesterday at the joint hearing of the Armed Services, Energy and Intelligence Committees, I asked whether or not it would be possible to put in place some safeguards so that no future President could ever again so successfully undo the country's national security defenses as this President has. We are working on an answer. Some of us will continue to speak, out--seeing it as our highest duty of public service. As I said on March 15--and repeat again here today-- I only hope America is listening. We have a nation to save. The truth will get out. Winston Churchill said: Truth is incontrovertible: Panic may resent it, ignorance may deride it, malice may destroy it, but there it is. I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Chair.

Mr. INHOFE. All right. No objection.

Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Chair.

Mr. INHOFE. I am reserving the right to object.

Mr. INHOFE. Reserving the right to object.

Mr. INHOFE. I object.

Mr. INHOFE. Yes.

Mr. INHOFE. I am still reserving the right to object.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, after many weeks of intensive negotiations, I am pleased the members of the Environment and Public Works Committee and the administration were able to come to an agreement on S. 880, the Fuels Regulatory Relief Act. I take this opportunity to clarify certain points of this important legislation. One item that is of particular concern is the possibility for circumvention by covered persons. New subparagraph (H)(xii)(II) states that it ``does not restrict the dissemination of off-site consequence analysis information by any covered person in any manner or form except in the form of a risk management plan.'' My concern is that this provision would seem to allow a government official in possession of this information to alter it in some minor, trivial way--like white out the words ``Risk Management Plan'' at the top of the page--and then distribute it with complete impunity. That possibility would obviously undermine the entire purpose of the legislation. The purpose of this part of the bill is simply to clarify that covered persons can talk generally to the public about off-site consequence information--so that they can prepare documents that discuss the overall effect of OCAs in a particular state or locality, or so that they can prepare summaries like the executive summaries of risk management plans. But this provision would not allow them to release OCA information about a particular facility, or in a way that would tend to identify a particular facility, except to the extent allowed by the regulations envisioned in the bill, or in the event that the one-year moratorium expired without any regulations having been promulgated. The only exception would be where the covered person came into possession of information that could be described as ``off-site consequence information,'' but which was generated by some totally different process than the Risk Management Program. I am also troubled about the provision entitled ``Effect on State or Local Law.'' On the one hand, subparagraph (H)(x)(I) states that the bill, and the regulations under it, shall supersede any inconsistent provision of state or local law. But on the other hand, that preemption is ``subject to'' subparagraph (H)(x)(II), which says ``nothing in [the bill] precludes a State from making available off-site consequence analysis information collected in accordance with State law.'' The issue of preemption of State laws is always a concern of mine, and I believe this legislation provides the proper balance of necessary protection of information and the guidance for States to follow. The bill prevents States from disseminating any information that they receive from a facility directly, or indirectly from any other person, that was generated in the course of complying with Clean Air Act section 112(r)(7). The only way a State can disseminate such information is pursuant to the regulations called for by the bill, or if the moratorium created by the bill expires without any regulations having been promulgated. In plain language, what paragraph (H)(x)(II) does is say that where a State enacts its own, completely free-standing statute that calls for the independent collection of information that fits the definition of ``offsite consequence analysis information,'' then the State is allowed to release that information in accordance with State law. So far as I am aware, no such State law currently exists. Obviously, I would hope that before a State enacted such a law, it would carefully consider the reasons that have led us to entertain this legislation today; the need to keep such sensitive information from being put on the Internet or otherwise made widely available without adequate assessment of the security risks created thereby. Many responsible companies regulated by the RMP program realized a long time ago that they needed to reach out and engage their local communities about the possible offsite consequences of releases from their facilities. Many companies started this dialogue process years ago, and many more are engaged in it right now. Clearly this sort of voluntary outreach is precisely the sort of behavior that we want to encourage, not discourage. I am worried about subparagraph (H)(v)(III), which says that where a facility ``makes off-site consequence analysis information relating to that stationary source available to the public without restriction,'' the prohibitions and sanctions created by the bill would no longer apply. I'm concerned that this provision will lead facilities to be very hesitant to reveal any information about offsite consequences, for fear that they will thereby be authorizing government agencies to put their OCA data on the Internet. Under the legislation, ``offsite consequence analysis information'' is a defined term which is defined as ``those portions of a risk management plan, excluding the executive summary of the plan, consisting of an evaluation of 1 or more worst-case scenario or alternative scenario accidental releases * * *.'' So before a facility would lose the protections provided by this bill, it would have to release its risk management plan, or at least the OCA portion of that plan, and do so without any restrictions whatsoever. They would be free to summarize or repackage the information in a different form without triggering the provision in question. I think this creates a real bright-line test that should give facilities the kind of assurance they need to allow them to continue doing the sort of outreach I also want to encourage. Section (H)(ii) of the amendment requires, first, that the President assess the risks associated with posting off-site consequence analyses on the Internet, and second, based on that assessment, to regulate in a manner that minimizes the likelihood of both accidental and criminal releases from covered facilities. At a minimum, these regulations should accomplish the following goals in providing access to off-site- consequence information: Minimize the likelihood of accidental and criminal releases; Allow limited access to paper copies of the analyses; Allow other public access as appropriate; and Provide access for official uses. I note that the ``other public access'' contemplated under this provision relates to the availability of summaries or other discussions of off-site consequence analyses that do not identify the specific facility or location, and to mechanisms such as ``read-only'' approaches that preclude copying. Further, for the access by officials in contiguous states or localities indicated in (H)(ii)(II)(cc)-(ee), the intention is to provide official access to off-site consequence analyses in cases where the affected facilities have worst-case scenarios that impact the contiguous state or locality. Mr. PRESIDENT, I thank the distinguished chairman, Senator Chafee, for his guidance and also the tremendous cooperation by the ranking member, Senator Baucus. Their work has ensured the passage of this important legislation. I yield the floor. exempted substances

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I rise to make a few remarks about S. 880, the Fuels Regulatory Relief Act. This bill is designed to address the listing of certain flammable fuels under section 112(r)(3) of the Clean Air Act. The Committee determined that propane and flammables used as fuels should not be listed as a regulated or extremely hazardous substances because they do not comport with the Act's criteria for such listing. However, the National Association of Fire Fighters are concerned that removing these substances from Federal regulation under section 112(r) of the act will limit information regarding these fuels that would have been available to the public through the Risk Management Plans, RMP required by EPA's final rule implementing that section.

Mr. INHOFE. I also thank my colleague from Montana for his work on this bill. We are very aware of the dangers fire fighters and other emergency response personnel face every day protecting the lives of our people and we want to provide them with the information they need to handle threats posed by extremely hazardous substances. Nonetheless, the substances generally addressed by S. 880, section 3, do not warrant coverage by a Clean Air Act requirement to submit RMPs. A voluntary, non-regulatory approach, such as the voluntary standards of the National Fire Protection Association for Liquified Petroleum Gas (NFPA 58), can better supply the information needed by fire fighters to protect their and the public's health and welfare.

Mr. INHOFE. That is true. There are two reports included in this legislation designed to address those specific problems. The first report will examine the status of amendments to NFPA 58 that will provide to local emergency response personnel information concerning the off-site effects of accidental releases of those substances exempted from listing by section 3 of this legislation. We strongly encourage all the parties involved in this NFPA amendment process to work together in good faith and in a timely manner. The second report is designed to examine the sufficiency of the information local emergency response personnel receive to help them respond to chemical accidents. Specifically, the report will address the level of compliance with all federal and state requirements for submission of this information to emergency response personnel. Also, the report will examine the adequacy of the methods for delivering this information to emergency response personnel.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I bring to the attention of this body the efforts of the Republic of China on Taiwan on behalf of the Kosovar refugees. As a member of the world community committed to protecting and promoting human rights, the Republic of China on Taiwan is deeply concerned about the plight of the Kosovars and hopes to contribute to the reconstruction of their war-torn land. To that end, President Lee Tung-hui announced on June 7, 1999 that Taiwan will grant $300 million in an aid package to the Kosovars. The aid package will consist of the following: 1. Emergency support for food, shelters, medical care and education, etc. for Kosovar refugees living in exile in neighboring countries. 2. Short-term accommodations for some of the Kosovar refugees in Taiwan with opportunities for job training to enable them to be better equipped for the restoration of their homeland upon their return. 3. Support for the restoration of Kosovo in coordination with international long-term recovery programs once a peace plan is implemented. I commend the Republic of China on Taiwan for their commitment to humanitarian assistance for these victims of the war in Yugoslavia. Their aid will contribute to the promotion of the peace plan for Kosovo and will help the refugees return safety to their homes as soon as possible.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Certainly, suppose the power plant were nuclear and--this time--a temperature gauge is broken and the operator does not really know whether the plant is operating in safe mode or not. In such a case, the operator could not, under my amendment, ``drive in the dark with no lights on.'' Clearly operating in such a fashion that could pose a risk to health, safety, or the environment would receive no protection under my amendment, and no sympathy from me.

Mr. INHOFE. I appreciate the Senator from Oregon's interest in my amendment and I thank him for his support and assistance in getting my amendment accepted.

Mr. INHOFE. It is broader only in the following respect. Many federal standards are actually implemented in collaboration with states. For example, it could technically be a state-issued monitoring and data recordation and reporting program that is enforceable federally.

Mr. INHOFE. I thank my colleague from Oregon, Senator Wyden, and I am pleased to answer any questions he might have.

Mr. INHOFE. I would be pleased to. An example of a use of the defense that this amendment would provide would be a federally enforceable reporting requirement on an energy facility. Suppose a plant operator is vigilant at the controls of a conventional power plant. At the stroke of midnight New Year's the plant is operating smoothly, and power is being transmitted to homes, hospitals, and nursing homes right on schedule. Further, the operator can see clearly that the environmental machinery that cleans emissions such as sulfur dioxide (an acid rain precursor) or nitrogen oxides (a contributor to smog) is operating normally in every respect save one. The computer read-out from the continuous emissions monitor at the top of the smoke stack does not seem to be transmitting or storing the emission data verifying that equipment is otherwise in normal function. Repairing the bug in the monitor transmitter may take a few days over the holiday weekend. Without my amendment the plant operator faces a terrible choice. Does he shut down the whole plant and let the people in the nursing homes freeze in the dark, or does he run the risk of severe sanctions for disregarding a requirement that he provide government agencies an unbroken chain of emission monitor print-outs? Mind you, he knows the pollution is being controlled as usual because he or she has hands on the equipment. With my amendment, the plant could keep operating, nobody's lights would have to go out unless--and this is key--doing so does not threaten public health, safety, or the environment. This is not a holiday from environmental quality laws.