Jim Inhofe

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I rise today in opposition to the nomination of Dr. David Satcher to the position of Surgeon General of the United States. In my view, Dr. Satcher represents many of the problems undercutting the moral fabric of American life. Too many, including myself, Dr. Satcher is outside the mainstream of public opinion. I understand that Dr. Satcher is a remarkable man, with many years of distinguished service as a doctor. My position on his nomination does not stem from his history of service or his qualifications. Rather, my opposition comes from the ideals that Dr. Satcher represents. It is unfortunate that the office of the Surgeon General, America's family doctor, has become politicized. Due to this increasing political role, Dr. Satcher remains unfit to fulfill the position of Surgeon General. As head of the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Dr. Satcher's actions and decisions have wandered into the political arena time and again. Dr. Satcher has publicly supported the President's position on partial-birth abortion. His position is completely at odds with over 80% of the American public and the America Medical Association. The AMA has said that there is never any medical circumstance where this particular procedure should be used to terminate a babies life. I find the elitism and arrogance of Dr. Satcher on this issue completely irresponsible. When asked by the Labor and Human Resources Committee about his support of the President's position, Dr. Satcher re-affirmed his support for this procedure. I need not remind my colleagues the description of this outrageous procedure. Even Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, an abortion rights supporter, has termed this procedure ``infanticide.'' Continued support for this barbaric procedure borders on the ridiculous. Dr. Satcher also has apparently adopted the opinions of his predecessor, Dr. Jocelyn Elders, on many sensitive cultural issues as well. As head of the CDC, Dr. Satcher has endorsed the distribution of condoms to our children in public schools. This is Dr. Satcher's way of teaching our kids how to deal with problems like teen pregnancy and AIDS. Mr. President, I must say I am appalled at this blatant attempt at undermining the concept of abstinence as the best form of disease prevention and birth control. Are we truly teaching children responsibility by providing them with condoms in their classrooms? Dr. Satcher also supports using tax-payer dollars to promote this dangerous agenda. In 1994, Dr. Satcher began an $800,000 national advertising campaign aimed at out nation's youth promoting condom usage. This was all done in the name of AIDS prevention. I find this egregious use of precious resources disturbing. By promoting condom usage, we are simply encouraging our children to become sexually active. I understand the issue of responsibility, however, I have never heard the word abstinence associated with Dr. Satcher. To me, abstinence is truly the responsible way to prevent unwanted pregnancies and AIDS. It is interesting to that note Dr. Satcher's view of responsibility is convenienent when it conforms with his political beliefs, when in reality his actions often appear to be irresponsible from both a moral and scientific point of view. I say this because much has been made recently of Dr. Satcher's morally questionable African HIV study. As we have all become aware, as head of the CDC, Dr. Satcher approved of research conducted in Africa and Asia that called for a groups of HIV positive pregnant women to receive placebos (sugar pills), without their knowledge, while others knowingly received valuable lifesaving medication (AZT). Those receiving the placebo served as the control group and those receiving the medication the study group. All this, despite the fact that it was known that AZT decreased by \2/3\ the likelihood that the disease would be transmitted from the mother to the child. This experiment is both repulsive and morally questionable. It violates every know protocol from the Hippocratic Oath to the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki which requires doctors to provide any and all lifesaving measures. The Declaration of Helsinki states: ``In a medical study every patient--including those in a control group, if any, should be assured of the best proven diagnostic and therapeutic method.'' Apparently, Dr. Satcher viewed his research outside established international ethical protocols. A September 1997 New England Medical Journal of Medicine editorial, our most recognized medical journal in the United States, declared Dr. Satcher's actions unethical and likened the study to the Tuskegee Incident, where medication with known benefits was withheld from a control group. Truly, this represents a dark day in American history. However, sadly, one we chose not to learn a lesson from. In responding to the criticism, Dr. Satcher admitted that this human experiment would not have taken place in the United States because all participants in any clinical trial must be given at least small amounts of AZT. He argued, however, that cost and efficiency dictated that the experiment be done in developing countries. Did he really mean to imply that those childrens' lives are any less of value than our own? As a grandfather, I feel for those grandparents who lost grandchildren and potential grandchildren because of Dr. Satcher's experimentation. I wish that this was the first and only time Dr. Satcher had promoted blind testing in regard to HIV. Sadly, it is not. Dr. Satcher has also endorsed anonymous testing of domestic newborns. In 1988, the CDC began collecting anonymous blood samples from newborn children right here in the United States. The results of these blood tests were subsequently withheld from the parents of the children. Mothers of newborns with HIV were sent home without being told that their child was carrying a fatal disease. Because the results were withheld, important life-sustaining treatment was denied. When this blind testing became public, Dr. Satcher defended the CDC's practices saying the mothers would panic and ultimately leave their health system. These were life and death decisions made by Dr. Satcher. Apparently, he did not appreciate that fact as much as he should have. With the public enraged over these unethical tests, Congress quickly sprang into action. Representative Gary Ackerman introduced legislation to prohibit the continuation of the studies. In response to this legislation, Dr. Satcher personally lobbied Representative Ackerman to abandon the bill. Fortunately, Representative Ackerman refused. The CDC was eventually forced to abandon the blind testing due to public outcry. Now just imagine for just a second if you will, what would have happened if the public had not become aware of the CDC's activities? How many countless children would have been denied access to health care. Mr. President, Dr. Satcher's conduct in these cases was not only disturbing, but horrifying. Essentially, depending on which group you were in, Dr. Satcher was playing God. If anything is unethical, this must be. Surely, this sort of behavior cannot and should not be overlooked by this Senate today. If Dr. Satcher's questionable ethical conduct were not enough, the CDC, under Dr. Satcher, has been attempting to subvert our right to keep and bear arms as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. The National Center for Injury Prevention and Control (NCIPC) has begun tracking gun-related injuries and turning the research over to anti-gun liberals with a political agenda. Now, I'm not exactly sure how the NCIPC developed this authority. However, these activities constitute nothing less than an all out political assault on the Second Amendment paid for by the American taxpayer. The director of the NCIPC, Dr. Rosenberg, is a known anti-gun crusader. He is on record equating gun ownership to cigarette usage. Apparently, Dr. Rosenberg's, and presumably Dr. Satcher's, copy of the Constitution differ greatly from mine. My copy of the Constitution talks openly about the right and the freedom to keep and bear arms. Dr. Rosenberg has openly and repeatedly said that firearms are ``dirty, deadly, and [should be] banned.'' All of this is done with the tacit approval of Dr. Satcher and at taxpayer expense. In fact the very agency Dr. Satcher wishes to head, the U.S. Public Health Service, has had since 1979 one of its primary goal ``to reduce the number of handguns in private ownership,'' starting with a 25% reduction by the end of this century. Unfortunately, not enough taxpayers are aware of how their money is being used to promote this activist liberal agenda. In responding to questions about the relevancy of the CDC's work on gun issues, Dr. Satcher predictably defended the agency saying that those who were upset by its work should be more upset about the relationship between firearms and injury. I can assure Dr. Satcher unequivocally, no one is more concerned about gun safety than gun owners. In defending the CDC's practice, Dr. Satcher failed to comment on why the data, collected at taxpayer expense, is not being released to the public. Once again, it is ironic that responsibility has been confused with truthfulness. In closing, Mr. President, I would like to reiterate my opposition to Dr. Satcher's nomination. The position of Surgeon General should be someone the American people can trust to advise them on important health issues. However, through his deeds and words, Dr. Satcher has demonstrated again and again that his ethics must be questioned and that he carries a biased politically driven agenda into a position that requires non-partisan action. Is Dr. Satcher the man for the position of America's family doctor? I cannot and do not come to this conclusion. I would urge my colleagues to evaluate their positions carefully before elevating someone with such a blatant and aggressive political agenda to such an esteemed position. Thank you Mr. President. I yield the floor.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, it is my understanding that tomorrow we are going to be voting on the confirmation of Mrs. Margaret Morrow, Judge Margaret Morrow, who has been nominated for the position of U.S. District Judge for the Central District of California. While I will be opposing her nomination, it is not because of her academic qualifications, nor her credentials, but her philosophy that she has expressed in the past from the bench. Lately a lot of people have said that the state of our judiciary is somewhat deplorable, and I think it is, although I do not think it is because of the lack of judges being confirmed. I do not think that is the problem. I think it is the philosophy, the dangerous philosophy of elitism which pervades the judicial branch of the Federal Government. This elitism is dangerous and undercuts our belief in courts throughout America. Regrettably, Mrs. Morrow is representative of that elitism. I am most concerned more than anything else with statements she has made about direct democracy. It seems to be her position that we in America are not able to rule for ourselves, not able to make intelligent decisions, but those decisions would have to be made in some protected ivory tower. She condemns direct democracy. She says, ``Ballot initiatives,'' and this is a quote, ``render ephemeral any real hope of intelligent voting of the majority.'' What she is saying here is that the people are not capable of making these decisions. And, of course, they do have problems out there in the ninth circuit, and the position she is seeking to gain would put her in a position to actually promote some of those things that have been taking place there. Recently, in Bates v. Jones, a three-judge panel--Reinhardt, Sneed, and Fletcher--affirmed a decision by Judge Wilkins to throw out California's ballot initiative, Proposition 140--that's the term limits for State officials--declaring them unconstitutional. There have been other efforts such as proposition 209. Last year Judge Henderson struck down the voter-approved referendum ending State affirmative action programs, and fortunately for the 20 million California voters Henderson's original ruling has been struck down, restoring their faith in the voting process. Proposition 187. Judge Richard Pfaelzer declared a State law denying benefits to illegal aliens unconstitutional because it conflicted with the 1996 welfare reform law. That was overturned. Proposition 208. Judge Carlton has recently blocked enforcement of the popular initiative that has imposed limits on campaign contributions at the State level. During her confirmation, Mrs. Morrow claimed never to have publicly opposed a ballot initiative in the past decade with one exception and that was proposition 209. In fact, in 1988, Morrow wrote an article urging lawyers to support or oppose various ballot initiatives. She denounces three others later that year and spoke publicly against two others. So I think it is fairly evident that Margaret Morrow, in addition to these problems, has a problem with the truth. And I certainly think if there is anything we do not need in our judiciary it is someone of that philosophy. I like the way Senator Ashcroft said it the other day. He said, ``Morrow's writings make it clear that she believes people cannot be trusted with the fundamental powers of self-government.''

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Chair.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at the hour of 12:30, I be recognized for such time as I may consume as in morning business.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I see the Senator from Texas. I would ask him, although it would elicit probably too long a response, if he has ever done anything that is really politically stupid. And I am sure he has either knowingly or not knowingly--as I am about to do--done something that would fall into the category of political stupidity. Tomorrow an execution is scheduled to take place at 6 p.m. in the State of Texas. The young lady's name is Karla Faye Tucker. It happens we have an individual we know in common, so I became somewhat familiar with this case, and I will just give a thumbnail sketch as to what happened. Karla Faye Tucker, when she was a very, very small child, went into heroine at age 10. She is the daughter of a prostitute. Karla Faye went into prostitution when she was 13 years old. She never had a childhood, I guess we could say. Fourteen years ago, while living in a drug cult, an individual on a motorcycle came riding into her living room, dripping oil and breaking things and stealing things and rode out. And the next day, Karla and an accomplice broke into the apartment of the motorcycle rider, who was in bed with a girl, and murdered both of them--a brutal murder. I do not think there is anyone in the Senate who has a stronger record and background in punishment as a deterrent to crime than I have, nor is there anyone here who has been more active in establishing stronger death penalties than I have. The Furman case took place in 1972, and that is what struck down most of the States' capital punishment laws. I was in the State Senate at that time, and for 5 consecutive years I was the author of the capital punishment bill in the State of Oklahoma. I have always felt that punishment should be severe, it should be swift, and it should be equal. We had a person who became very famous after 15 years on death row, Roger Dale Stafford, who brutally murdered nine Oklahomans. This guy was left on death row for 15 years. No one ever questioned that he was guilty. He never had any remorse. He just sat there and got fat. He gained 100 pounds while he was in there watching color TV. I have often said the longer the length of time between the conviction, the sentence to death and the carrying out of that sentence, the less that punishment serves as a deterrent to crime. So I have always felt that punishment should be carried out immediately. But as I watched developments unfold with Karla Faye Tucker, I came to the conclusion that I have reached in a very unusual way. It is something I never thought I would do. It occurred to me that if Carla Faye Tucker had been a man, Carl Tucker, already either he would have been executed or would have been commuted to life and we would never have even known about it. Nobody would have cared. The controversy that has been stirring around this--which I think probably would have gotten a lot more controversial if it had not been for the sex scandal that has dominated the media in recent days--was, I think, primarily because Karla Faye Tucker is a woman. It would not have happened if Karla Faye Tucker had not been a woman. Now there is all the public and political pressure to execute this person for this heinous crime she committed that I don't think there would be if she had not been a woman. I took the time a few weeks ago through the Richmond Law Review to check to see how many cases have been commuted to life imprisonment from death row since the Furman case of 1972. I found that there have been 76 cases. I have not reviewed all of these cases because I have not had the time to do it, but I did look at several of them. I found that there are a lot of circumstances in the Tucker case that were similar to those which caused these other cases to be commuted, 76 of them since 1972. And I will use as an example, in the State of Georgia, William Neil Moore whose sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. There were several reasons, but the four that kept coming up in his case were, No. 1, an exemplary prison record; No. 2, a strong feeling and expression of remorse for the crime he committed; No. 3, a religious conversion; and, No. 4, pleas from the families of the victims of the crime for clemency. I looked at Karla's case to find that all four of those are there, but it is much more so than it was in the case of William Neil Moore whose sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. In the Tucker case, it is not just the sister of one of the victims and the brother of the other, but three of the four prosecutors who have made a plea for clemency. The homicide detective, J.C. Moser, the guy who put her away, has quite a passionate story that he tells on how he has never felt any kind of remorse for anyone he has sent up and now he is lined up with several others. Even the prison guards have actually passed a petition around asking for clemency. I have a letter here I just received this morning from Mr. W.C. Kirkendall, who is from Seguin, Tx. I will read the first and last two sentences of this letter. This is a letter of December 9 to Governor Bush. ``I have been a prosecutor since 1984, favor the death penalty in the appropriate cases and have prosecuted many people who I believe deserved the ultimate penalty that society can inflict.'' The last paragraph says, ``In sum, there is nothing that her execution will accomplish and much that commuting her sentence to life will do to show both the efficacy and justice of the Texas death penalty system. Please spare her life.'' In this letter he goes into all kinds of detail as to how strong he feels about the death penalty and why he would be asking the Governor for an exception in this case. Having looked at this, I think there can be a case made that if Karla Faye Tucker had been Carl Tucker, there would not have been all of the public and political pressure applied to demand the death penalty. We went through something very similar in Oklahoma. In Oklahoma 2 years ago we had the most cruel, I guess, mass murder or terrorist act in the history of America when 168 innocent Oklahomans were murdered. And Timothy McVeigh went through the necessary trials, and they found him to be guilty, and they gave him the death sentence. And then Terry Nichols, who was an accomplice in the case, went through the trial, and they did not give him the death penalty. I never try to second-guess what juries do. I had an experience myself back in the 1970's after the Furman case. I was in the State Senate, and I was the author of the death penalty bill, and I was called for jury duty. There I was. And it was a murder case. And so when they were trying to decide whether or not we should qualify as jurors, they asked me a series of questions. I said, ``Look, I can save you a lot of time. I am a member of the State senate. I am the author of the death penalty bill. I already know this guy is guilty. I have been reading about it, and the guy ought to fry.'' They did not disqualify me, and I ended up being the chairman of the jury that acquitted him. So a long time ago I stopped trying to second- guess the decision. Anyway, in the case of Terry Nichols, they did not do that. I wondered quite a bit since this case came up if Terry Nichols had been a female, would there have been so much pressure applied to everyone who would be listening to make sure that Terry Nichols got the death penalty because we didn't want an exception being made because Terry Nichols might have been a woman. And so I look at what's happened. Just a few minutes ago, the Texas Pardons and Parole Board made a decision, and I think it was a decision that we all knew they would make, that they would deny any clemency to Karla Faye Tucker. In fact, a guy named Victor Rodriquez--I do not happen to know him, he is the chairman of the Texas Pardons and Parole Board--said way back on the 6th of January on the ``Rivera Live'' show that it did not make any difference what they came up with, that he was not going to be willing to offer commutation to Karla Faye Tucker. And the commutation petition was not even filed until January 22. So that decision has been already made. It was a done deal. And, of course, they came out and said she should not be granted clemency. I do know Governor Bush. He is a very fair and very compassionate individual. I have looked at the constitution of the State of Texas. It is a little bit different. It gives a lot more power to the Pardons and Parole Board than some of the other States, but in the case of the Texas Pardons and Parole Board, after they have said they would deny clemency, article 4, section 11, of which I will read one sentence that is significant, says: The Governor shall have the power to grant one reprieve in any capital case for a period not to exceed 30 days. All Governor Bush can do right now is to make that recommendation. And during that time he would be able to look at some of these cases. What I think I would do, if I were the Governor of Texas, and knowing what I know so far, is go ahead and grant that 30 days reprieve; nothing would really be lost by that, and then in the meantime during that period of time I would send for--in fact, I would be glad to send them to him--the 76 cases in America where clemency has been offered in the form of commutation of a death sentence into life imprisonment and then look at the standards to see if those standards are not at least met or exceeded by Karla Faye Tucker. I think he would be able to do that. In the absence of that, of course, tomorrow at 6 o'clock Karla Faye Tucker will be executed. I hate to think that we would wake up on Wednesday morning and go back and start researching and find that those standards were at least met or exceeded. I guess we could call this gender backlash. The other day I was watching someone on TV--I cannot remember who it was right now, but they said on the 3d of February at 6 o'clock Karla Faye Tucker will be executed in Texas and O.J. Simpson will be playing golf. I yield the floor.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I have a great deal of concern over some of the things that we have been hearing during this interim when we have been considering what we would do if a surplus should become a reality. And we and many people have talked about problems in child care, in Medicare, in the environment, and in education. But the one thing, the one area, that we have the greatest deficiency in America in, and the great threat facing us, is what has happened with the demise of our defense budget and what has happened to our defense system. Being the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee, we have had occasion to go around and pay visits to a number of our installations. Mr. President, this is not something that has just come on recently. Although now is when the public has finally a wake-up call, thanks perhaps to Saddam Hussein and Iraq, and realizes that there is a great threat out there. I would like to read just one paragraph out of the 1998 Defense Authorization Act under, ``The Storm Clouds Are On The Horizon.'' There are two key factors that threaten to undermine the readiness of our forces--a lack of adequate funding and the over commitment of a greatly reduced force structure. Unless we take necessary steps to correct these problems our military capability will incur significant degredation as we enter into the 21st century. Mr. President, during this interim period, I visited a number of installations, including Nellis Air Force Base out in the Mojave Desert, and national training systems: The Army Advanced Training System, the Marine Advanced Training Center at Twentynine Palms, and the San Diego naval operations. Also, I have had occasion to be in Camp Lejuene, Fort Bragg, and Fort Hood, and these installations that are trying to keep us prepared throughout America, and throughout the world. I can tell you that we really have a serious problem. We find that our operations are up, that now we have U.S. forces that have been used in 36 countries in the last 9 years. In the 9 years prior to that there was only 22 countries. We have had over a 300-percent increase in the pace of operations since 1990. We have 26 Army contingency operations in the 7 years since 1991 compared to 10 operations in the 30 years prior to that time. There were 26 operations in just 7 years compared to 10 over the previous 30 years. What this means is we have a ``op tempo,'' or a first tempo, which is a term that is used to measure how busy our people are that are out there and how this is going to affect all of our other operations. So we actually have two problems that we are faced with. One problem is the fact that we have reduced our budget to an artificially low rate that puts us in the position where we cannot carry out the minimum expectations for the American people. And to be specific about it, we have roughly one-half of the force strength today that we had in 1991. I am talking about one-half the Army divisions, one-half the tactical air wings, and one-half of the ships floating out there. So that is a serious problem. Then we have stood on this floor time and again and talked about the problems of our deployment on these contingency operations. I can remember standing on this floor in November of 1995 and saying that we cannot afford to send our American troops into Bosnia, and that if we do send them into Bosnia we will incur an operation and an obligation that will sustain the next two decades. The President assured us and promised us. He didn't estimate it, Mr. President. He said that this operation will not exceed 12 months, and that all of our troops will be home from Bosnia for Christmas in 1996. Of course, we knew that wasn't true. We knew the President was not telling the truth. I remember going over there and talking to them. When I told them up there in the northeast sector, the U.N., that it was going to be a 12-month operation, they laughed, and they said, ``You mean 12 years.'' They said it is like putting your hand in the water and leaving it there for 12 months. Take it out, and nothing has changed. The President also said that the cost would be $1.2 billion. Guess what? It has now gone over $8 billion in that effort. That is not even a part of it. When the American people are told that we only have 8,500 troops over there in Bosnia, that is not true either because if you count the troops as of last week that are in Croatia and the Moravian countries, it is well up to over 12,000 troops. You go over to the 21st Tatical Command in Germany that supplies the logistics for the operation in Bosnia, and they are at 100-percent capacity, and their op tempo rate is 60 percent higher than it should be. What that means in normal terms is that if something happens in Iraq they have to support that logistically on the ground from the 21st Tactical Command. You go 10 miles down the road to Ramstein Air Force Base where they have the 86th Airlift operation, and I defy you to go there and find any ramp space that isn't being used as the C-141s, C-5s and DC-17s that are bringing in everything going to Bosnia are transferring onto C-130s, and off they go. We are using 100 percent of our capacity there. So that is a very, very serious problem that has to be corrected. We cannot do that and continue to try to rebuild a defense operation that has been decimated mostly by this administration. As we go around to these installations, we find that our retention rate is down, the divorce rate is up, and that we are approaching the hollow force days of the late 1970's. We know the two reasons: the budget cuts and the contingency operations. We have stood on this floor for the last 5 years and talked about the threat that is facing the United States of America. It is not just that we are not adequately prepared in our state of readiness to take care of normal operations should something erupt, for example, in Iraq or Iran or Syria or North Korea, but we also do not have a national missile defense system. In 1983 we started one that should have been deployable by the year 1998. That is now. Someone was pretty smart back there. And yet this administration stopped that in 1992. We are now 5 years behind, if we get right back in, which I think we will now because there is a wake-up call that the American people have heard. And that is, I would have to say, some good news, that even right now this administration is agreeing with what they have refuted over the last 5 years. I was very pleased to hear Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen stand up and say that we now know there are over 25 nations that have weapons of mass destruction, either biological, chemical or nuclear, and are working on the missile means to deliver those as far as the United States of America. When Bill Cohen stood up and said Saddam Hussein--keep in mind, here is a guy who murders his own grandchildren--and Iraq under our close supervision still has enough DX gas to kill every man, woman and child on the face of this Earth in 60 seconds, finally America is waking up, and I am very pleased that has happened. I have a couple articles here that I will not read from because my time is running out, but one article is the one that is the cover story of the current U.S. News & World Report that is out on the newsstands today. It is called: ``Can peacekeepers make war?'' And they get into the fact, as we have found, that if we had to bring these troops back and put them in a combat environment, it would take between 4 and 6 months to train them. So that exacerbates our problem. And the other is in the National Review. I ask unanimous consent that both of these articles be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, we are going to have to do something and do that something pretty quick. Unfortunately, as the chairman of the Readiness Committee, I recognize the fact that we are going to have to come up with some money right away, in this coming fiscal year budget, in the defense authorization bill and the defense appropriations bill. We are finding that the Defense Department has engaged in policies that have caused us to foolishly use money that should have been used for readiness. So I am standing here saying we are going to have to do--the money can only come from one place. If we are going to try to keep our retention rate or get it back up, if we are going to stop the divorce rate going up, we are going to have to put some money in quality-of- life and force strength, and the only place that can come from is modernization. As a strong supporter of the F-22, I can only stand on the floor of the Senate and say we are going to have to delay that program unless we are able to come up with some money to put into our budget for the coming fiscal year. People who are very wise say, well, that is what we depend upon for future readiness, the F-22. Yes, we do, but we have to make a tradeoff for current readiness or future readiness. It has to be current readiness, with the threat that faces us. I am here to tell you that we are facing a greater threat today than at any time since World War II. We have a reduced force, and we cannot meet that threat. It has to be changed. I yield back the remainder of my time. Exhibit 1 [From the U.S. News, Jan. 19, 1998] Can Peacekeepers Make War? (By Richard J. Newman) In January 1991, eight Apache helicopters from the Army's 101st Air Assault Division were assigned to fire the first shots of the Persian Gulf war. Flying with their lights out, 50 feet off the desert floor, the Apaches sneaked deep into western Iraq and destroyed two key radar sites. The dangerous mission, which largely blinded Saddam Hussein to the subsequent deluge of attack aircraft, was a complete success. Seven years later, the 101st is not performing so gloriously. During a November mock battle at the Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif., the division's gunners failed to destroy any of the antiaircraft missiles of the ``opposition force.'' As a result, the OpFor shot down all the 101st's Apaches when they tried to mount a deep-strike mission. The OpFor put away half of its antiaircraft missiles, and the 101st tried again. Once more, all its helicopters were shot down. Then the OpFor put all its missiles away--and still shot down six Apaches with tanks and other guns, losing only four tanks in the process. While the OpFor was probably a tougher foe than the Iraqi military, officials familiar with the NTC say the 101st's performance reflects a general deterioration in the last five years in the capabilities of units training at Fort Irwin. It's a ``very sad situation here,'' said one NTC official. Throughout America's armed forces, there is mounting evidence that conventional combat skills--and the warrior ethic that goes with them--are being eroded by a combination of downsizing, budget cuts, and widespread commitments to noncombat operations in Bosnia, the Middle East, and elsewhere. A December report by a Senate Budget Committee analyst cited ``extremely serious Army-wide personnel and training (i.e., readiness) problems,'' such as units half staffed in key positions like infantry and mechanics. With troop levels being cut to free more money for high-tech weapons systems, the report predicted, those problems will get worse. Soldiers seem to agree: In a 1997 ``leadership assessment,'' Army officers in 36 percent of a series of focus groups said their units don't know how to fight; nearly half of those groups expressed concern about the Army's growing ``hollow,'' a provocative allusion to the inept, so- called hollow force of the 1970s. In the Air Force, ``mission capable'' rates for some fighter jets, which measure how many planes can be ready for war on short notice, are more than 15 percentage points lower than they were in 1989. ``We've got some severe stresses,'' says Gen. Richard Hawley, head of the Air Force's Air Combat Command. ``There's not enough resilience in the force.'' Even the Navy and the Marine Corps, which are better structured to endure long deployments, are struggling. Downsizing and budget cutting have left some ships short of parts and crew members and have forced commanders to increase their estimates of how long it would take to be ready to fulfill wartime tasks. Last fall Rear Adm. Daniel Murphy, the Navy's head of surface warfare, said it may be necessary to pay bonuses to sailors in the surface fleet--like those paid to aviators and submariners--to keep experienced sailors in the Navy. Do gaps in the force matter? The U.S. military can obviously afford to relax the hair-trigger posture that became the norm over 40 years in the cold war. U.S. defense funding is roughly equal to that of the next six spenders combined. The once-feared Soviet military has dwindled from 4 million troops in 1990 to a Russian force of 1.2 million-- with such problems that it could not defeat a ragtag rebel force in the tiny province of Chechnya in 1995. Analysts think it will be at least 15 years before a ``peer competitor'' such as China or a resurgent Russia could challenge the United States militarily. No country now poses a serious threat to American territory. More with less. But in many ways the American military has a uniquely demanding job today. Instead of preparing largely for territorial defense, U.S. troops must safeguard vaguely defined American and global ``interests'' in an increasing number of far-flung places. Since 1990, U.S. armed forces have been utilized in 36 foreign missions, compared with just 22 between 1980 and 1989, according to analysis by the Congressional Research Service. And there have been fewer troops and dollars to carry out those missions. Since 1989, administrations of both parties have cut the armed forces by one third, and the defense budget by 30 percent, after inflation. The changes were inevitable, with the demise of the Soviet threat, but they still affect the military's ability to meet increasing demands. The busy pace that results appears to be driving out more experienced service members than ever. In the Marine Corps, 23 of the 175 captains chosen last year to attend the prestigious Amphibious Warfare School in Quantico, Va., decided instead to leave the Marines; statistics weren't kept before 1995, but officials say it used to be rare for more than three or four to drop out. The Army recruited only 70 percent of the infantrymen it needed in the year ending last September, though Army officials expect that to improve. A 1997 report released by Rep. Floyd Spence, chairman of the House National Security Committee, cited Army statistics showing that 125 infantry squads--equivalent to about five 500-man battalions--are unmanned, keeping units from training at the appropriate combat strength. And increasingly, Army and Air Force units put off combat training because they are too busy with ``low intensity'' missions or need the money elsewhere. In the past, military leaders have used readiness ``scares'' to plead for more money for favored weapons or other programs. These days, most Pentagon officials understand that total defense budgets will not rise--and so a gain for one branch comes out of another's share. But they also complain that frequent ``low intensity'' missions--such as peacekeeping, counterdrug operations, humanitarian efforts, and even joint exercises with new Eastern European allies--are diluting the war-fighting capability of U.S. troops by disrupting combat training and breaking down unit cohesion. Ultimately, that is producing an identity crisis: Is the American military's purpose still ``fighting and winning our nation's wars,'' as the Pentagon's national military strategy states? Or are America's enemies so few and feeble that U.S. troops can focus less on war and more on other problems throughout the world? By its own benchmarks, U.S. military manpower and readiness are falling short. Since 1993 the government's national security strategy has called for U.S. troops to be prepared to fight two regional wars, presumably in Korea and Iraq, less than 45 days apart. (Before that, the Pentagon planned for one very large war with the Soviet Union and lesser conflicts elsewhere, but didn't quantify them.) The Pentagon's quadrennial defense review, released last May, said U.S. forces also must be prepared for greater involvement in ``smaller-scale contingencies,'' such as peacekeeping in Bosnia and the ongoing enforcement of the Iraqi no-fly zones--even though at the same time the Pentagon cut the military by 62,000 troops. That reduction was part of a deliberate trade-off to pay for new weapons, such as the joint strike fighter and the F- 22 aircraft, a new carrier, and tank upgrades. Many analysts agree on the need to modernize some fighting platforms that are 15 to 20 years old. Yet to some officials, the Pentagon's reliance on the offerings of defense contractors borders on a dysfunctional dependency. ``We can beat the Chinese or the Russians, but we can't beat Lockheed Martin or Ingalls Shipbuilding,'' says Army Lt. Col. Ralph Peters, an intelligence analyst who has written widely on strategic planning. ``We're spending so much money on aircraft and ships that we'll paralyze the future force.'' Bases that are no longer needed to support a smaller force also suck up cash. The Pentagon wants to close some of them but has met resistance from Congress. Such trade-offs make it harder to meet demands on the military today. A classified Pentagon memo written after a Joint Staff war game last spring said the game ``made it obvious that we cannot sustain current levels of overseas presence,'' citing negative effects on ``maintenance, personnel, and training readiness.'' Frederick Kagan, a history professor at West Point, says downsizing alone would make it difficult for the United States to fight even one regional war today. The Army, he says, has only six heavy divisions--too few to field the six division equivalents that fought in the Persian Gulf war while still leaving one division in South Korea to deter an invasion from the north. John Correll, editor of Air Force magazine, points out that the Pentagon said it would take 24 fighter wings to win two wars when it first scripted that scenario in 1993. The Air Force has since been cut to 20 fighter wings, but the Pentagon says this is still enough. Perhaps most significant is that the declining emphasis on war fighting is not being managed--it is just happening haphazardly as units cut whatever corners on training time and war-fighting preparations they can in order to fulfill assigned missions or meet their budgets. In the Persian Gulf region, for instance, there are usually anywhere from 100 to 300 aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone over southern Iraq. Pilots of F-15, F-16, and A-10 jets typically fly four-hour patrols that consist mainly of ``left-hand turns.'' The flights are so routine and uneventful that pilots pass the time asking each other movie-trivia questions over their radios. During 45- to 90-day tours in the desert, pilots spend so little time practicing combat maneuvers that when they return home, it takes two to three months of training before they are considered fully ready for war again. A 1997 Rand study even suggests that repetitive air patrols may amount to ``negative training,'' desensitizing crews to dangers and degrading their situational awareness. Synergy. Those problems on their own may be manageable. But shortfalls in training, readiness, and manpower often feed on one another, multiplying the impact of each. For the 69th Fighter Squadron at Moody Air Force Base in Georgia--which soon will leave for a 60-day rotation enforcing the Iraqi no- fly zone--a shortage of spare parts means ground crews must regularly ``cannibalize'' jets, taking parts from one to make another fly. That is not a new practice. But the wing's recent cannibalization rate, which measures parts taken from jets versus missions flown, has topped 25 percent, three times higher than its 8 percent goal. Overall, the wing's goal is a mission-capable rate of 80 to 84 percent; but rates have been below 70 percent for over a year. The mission- capable rate for all F-16s belonging to Air Combat Command is 77 percent, down from 90 percent in 1989; for F-15 air-to-air fighters the rate has fallen from 85 percent to 77 percent. With a smaller military, troops are being sent more frequently on drawn-out missions such as those in Bosnia-- which President Clinton last month declared to be an open- ended commitment--and the Persian Gulf, where the U.S. commitment is 7 years old and growing. Increasingly long deployments away from home and aggressive hiring by growing commercial airlines are driving many pilots out of the Air Force once they have fulfilled their seven-year commitment. In the A-10 squadron at Moody, six out of the nine pilots eligible to leave this year decided to do so--despite increased bonuses of up to $22,000 for staying in. Throughout the Air Force, retention rates for pilots fell to an estimated 75 percent in 1997, down 12 points from 1995 levels. The Air Force has had other pilot crunches--in the early 1980s, for example, when airlines were aggressively luring away fliers--but the problem then was not exacerbated by budget cuts and increased missions, as it is now. The Air Force is compensating by running more people through flight school--but with junior pilots replacing senior ones, there could soon be a sharp drop in overall experience levels. Mechanics and other key personnel are also affected. One C-130 pilot says: ``We're getting a lot of [mechanics] with no C-130 experience. They ask, `How do you turn this thing on?' If he's asking how to turn it on and it's his job to fix the system, there's obviously a problem.'' Many pilots fear that such shortages could lead to more accidents. The Army faces similar strains. After one infantry unit returned from a peacekeeping mission in Macedonia in 1994-- where it went without its Bradley fighting vehicles--it received the lowest score in its division on tests of its ability to shoot and operate its Bradleys. A Rand study to be released within the next month found that Army troops sent frequently on peace operations, such as military police and certain transportation units, are underprepared for their wartime tasks. As the service most dependent on people, the Army is particularly vulnerable to ripple effects that begin with personnel shortfalls. A lack of infantrymen, mechanics, and mid-grade officers forces the Army to stitch units together in order to field the appropriate force for missions in places such as Bosnia. That in turn breaks up units, undermining the cohesion needed for infantry, tanks, artillery, and aviation to fight as ``combined arms''--a level of performance critical to success in modern combat. The 1st Armored Division in Germany epitomizes the problem. It has two staffs--one in Germany, one in Bosnia--and troops in at least three different regions. ``The logic of maintaining readiness is thrown astray by this piecemeal discombobulation,'' says an Army general. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have begun to study what would happen if units doing peace operations were suddenly needed in a war--or two wars. Early findings: Moving troops out of one place and into a war zone would ``put a strain on an already fragile transportation system,'' according to one classified Pentagon document. Another cites ``many more risks''--including the potential loss of equipment in a hasty withdrawal and the two to six months it would take to retrain units for war. Above all, some fear that soldiers are not learning the basic lessons needed to succeed in war. Units going through the National Training Center or the Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana are barely more than half staffed, says retired Marine Corps Gen. John Sheehan. That, the Senate Budget Committee report noted, violates the Army's doctrine to ``train just as you go to war.'' ``We're raising a generation of young leaders who are not learning to run large organizations,'' says Sheehan. ``They won't know how to command their troops even if they get them all in a war.'' More important may be the messages sent by top commanders. ``We have no leaders talking to us about how important it is to prepare your soldiers for battle so they don't die in combat,'' says an Army major. ``It's disheartening to many of us.'' That may also be causing deeper problems not easily fixed by more funding, higher-tech weapons, or better training. ``The brass are refusing to stand up for the warrior spirit,'' says John Hillen, a Persian Gulf war veteran and fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Recent imbroglios over the proper role of women in the military have added to the distractions. Hanging touch. Top Pentagon leaders insist the military is not going soft. In an interview last week, Gen. Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dismissed comparisons between the demoralized force of the 1970s and today's. ``There is a world of difference between where we were then and where we are now,'' he said. ``We have a tremendously talented bunch of young men and women.'' Nor does Shelton believe that anecdotal reports of problems, on their own, indicate a readiness shortfall. He and others say that the Pentagon's carefully monitored readiness statistics do not indicate serious degradations in the force. But those figures--which measure how long it would take a unit to be ready for war--are somewhat subjective, based on commanders' own estimates of how well their troops are trained. Some doubt their validity. ``The readiness rates are false,'' one Army colonel flatly states. ``There is a lot of pressure from higher-ups to inflate them. It's like all the students are getting A's, then flunking the final exam.'' Shelton does acknowledge some readiness ``issues,'' particularly problems with highly skilled troops leaving the service. Some senior and retired leaders who served during the 1970s think those are ominous signs. They say that readiness tends to slip gradually at first--but at a point begins to drop precipitously, and then becomes very hard to reverse. The Pentagon has protected some of its key units from cutbacks and other distractions. The 2nd Infantry Division in South Korea, for example, which could absorb the brunt of a North Korean invasion with less than three days' notice, is staffed at over 100 percent, including some ``augmentees'' from the South Korean Army. Commanders are so focused on war they are almost scornful of any other type of mission. ``We don't face the same problems stateside units do,'' says Lt. Col. Robert Sweeney, former commander of the 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment. ``My focus is clear. I'm not going to be doing humanitarian operations.'' Even though assignments to Korea are considered a ``hardship tour''--an entire year's deployment, with no family allowed for most troops-- commanders say a clear focus, and a ready enemy, make it easy to sustain morale. JSTARS, where are you? But even there the tip of the spear may be getting duller, U.S. military planners in South Korea say budget constraints and competing demands elsewhere keep them from getting enough access to ``special mission'' assets such as Joint STARS surveillance aircraft, F-117 stealth fighters, and F-15E strike jets. ``We're being told to be more efficient,'' says an intelligence staffer in Seoul. ``But efficiency doesn't cut it in war. Redundancy does.'' Some analysts think new technology may greatly reduce the numbers of ground troops and conventional platforms needed in a war. But relying on new systems before they are battle tested leaves troops feeling they have less margin for error. Shortfalls appear to be more serious in the Persian Gulf, where a rematch with Iraq would probably come with more advance warning--but still be bloody. A radar operator who has worked at an airfield in Kuwait says there are no longer any backups for the facility's radar, the only ground-based system available for tracking nearby aircraft, including enemy planes. ``We're a forward operating unit and we still don't get what we need,'' he says. ``When that baby goes down and you realize there's no backup, you start saying, `Where is the priority?' '' Troops' morale, an intangible but essential ingredient of success in combat, can weather temporary problems. But persistent shortages and seemingly never-ending commitments take a toll. ``Troops don't understand why, if what they do is so important, they don't give us the tools to do it,'' says Lt. Col. Michael Snodgrass, commander of the 69th Fighter Squadron at Moody Air Force Base. Enthusiasm suffers first. Before Desert Storm, says Col. Billy Diehl, acting commander of Moody's 347th Wing, the Air Force's annual Red Flag aerial combat exercise ``was the highlight of the year.'' But in 1996, when he arrived at Moody, ``everybody was thrilled that it was canceled.'' A more important casualty is confidence. A C-130 pilot says that due to training cutbacks, ``My own skills are nowhere near where they were. Some of the new guys, I'm deathly afraid to go to war with them. They just don't have the training.'' John Stillion, a former Air Force navigator and Rand analyst, says that on a recent visit to an Air Force base, morale was ``far worse than I've ever seen it. I'm amazed at how bitter they sounded.'' Surprisingly, few in the military--which studies show is overwhelmingly conservative today--feel the solution is to withdraw from its peacekeeping missions in the world's trouble spots. One typical Army colonel strongly objects to the political gamesmanship of setting unrealistic deadlines for troop adjustments in places such as Bosnia. But nonetheless, he believes U.S. troops should be there: ``It is appropriate use of the military, mainly because nobody else can do it.'' Some practical steps could help strike a better balance between preparing for war and preserving peace. Many in the Army would like to see the National Guard shoulder more of the burden for peacekeeping, Rand researchers and others argue that a more modular structure would make the Army much more flexible. Ideas include self-supporting combat groups of about 5,000 troops--one third the size of a division--or discrete support units that can each carry out a variety of functions, instead of specializing in transportation or engineering. Some in the Air Force are pushing a ``cop on the beat'' approach, enforcing no-fly zones with random patrols, augmented by sensors that detect air and ground movements. But what America's troops crave most is a clear message from their leaders stating the purpose of U.S. forces. Are they warriors, whose main job is to fight and win wars? Or police assigned to prop up struggling nations and keep the world safe for American commerce? If U.S. forces must fulfill both roles, how can they do each well? Many members of the military believe that before those questions can be answered, there needs to be greater awareness of what U.S. troops accomplish by being everywhere they are--and what risks are involved in spreading them ever thinner. ``We need a better understanding among the American public that we have interests outside the United States,'' says Lt. Gen. Joseph Hurd, commander of the 7th Air Force in South Korea. Once those interests are sorted out, it wouldn't hurt to inform the troops in the ranks, either.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I thank you. I ask that I be recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that after the Senator from Vermont takes his time, I be allowed to have 10 minutes.

Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield for a moment for a unanimous consent request?

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, will the leader yield?

Mr. INHOFE. I want the majority leader to be aware that I did consult with several Democrats and Republicans before taking up the amendment. But I am happy to do this.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, the amendment that we just agreed to is an amendment that addresses the very competitiveness issue that is facing us right now. It is an amendment to the fast-track legislation. What it does, is to delay the implementation of severe changes in the ambient air standards, until such time as the science justifies it. It does impose a 4-year moratorium. I think it is very significant that this be made a part of this legislation. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. INHOFE. I move to reconsider the vote and to lay that motion on the table.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. INHOFE. I was not here when the senior Senator from Texas made his unanimous-consent request. I ask if that would in any way vitiate the time that was given, remaining for the Senator from Alaska, Senator Stevens?

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, it is my understanding that the time remaining for Senator Stevens has been given to me, which is approximately 7 minutes.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, it is unfortunate, since we have a bill that is the most significant bill that we will be dealing with during the course of this year, that it has gotten bogged down into a debate and discussion about depot maintenance. This is very unfortunate. However that has been the case. Let me just devote a little bit of time to that, because, having listened to the arguments as put forth by the two eloquent Senators from California and the Senators from Texas, I didn't hear any new arguments. But I do think that we need to, once and for all, respond to these arguments. I was hoping to be speaking last because I know what will happen, since I am obviously not speaking last. But let me just go ahead and bring up four arguments that I heard. I think these four are pretty much the total argument of those who want to stop competition in ALC's. First of all, I heard the quote saying, ``We are telling the DOD that you can't have real competition.'' This bill does allow competition. This allows competition and takes into consideration all direct and indirect costs. They said that ``The bill was crafted by Members seeking special protection, whose sole purpose is to block private competition.'' I suggest that everyone in this Chamber knows, and certainly everyone on the Senate Armed Services Committee knows, that when we had our language in there that did clearly carry out the intent and the letter of the BRAC recommendations, we felt we were going to lose the bill because the two Senators from both Texas and California wanted an opportunity to privatize in place. Then we agreed to have open competition. I was not even in on that. The ones who agreed to that language--that was drafted by members of the committee who were totally neutral on this subject. They didn't have a dog in this fight. But they got together and came up with the agreement that this is the way to do it. Let's take all costs into consideration. We did that. I think the eloquent remarks of Senator Levin pointed this out. They were the ones who put this together so that, yes, even though this is not what the BRAC committee wanted, still it did open up an avenue for privatization-in-place if they took into consideration all the costs. And then they voted and it was 18-to-nothing, all Democrats and all Republicans voted for it. Closely related to that, I have been quoted as to a statement that I made in Oklahoma. Let me say that is an accurate statement. That is true. I wasn't misquoted. And I was stating it as a businessman. I spent 33 years in the real world and I know, as Senator Bennett has pointed out several times, that you can't operate and leave three out of five ALC's at 50 percent capacity and have any kind of competitive operation. So I said very definitely that, in my opinion, those individuals who were interested in competing in McClellan in California and in Kelly in Texas, wanted to compete on a basis where they had a tremendous advantage which is paid for by the taxpayers. So they did two things. They put two considerations in. First of all, if they want to bid and privatize in place and bid at Kelly or McClellan, they had to pay for a fair value for that facility they are using. In other words, you can't take a $200 million facility and give it to a private contractor for a dollar a year and say now that's fair competition. That is not fair competition. The second thing we did was say, according to the GAO--and this has been pointed out already by several Members here--that if you leave three air logistics centers operating at 50 percent capacity, the cost annually to the taxpayers is $468 million. So that has to be considered. Those are the two major changes that were made. I agree I think they did a good job coming up with these. Even though that would still violate the intent of the BRAC system, that at least made that fair. There is one last thing I will say and then I will put this to rest. I am not going to say anything more about this. I am going to read this one more time, because I think it is really significant. I came to the U.S. House of Representatives, before I was elected to this body, in 1986. That was a year that a Congressman--I might add, and say to the senior Senator from Texas, he also is a Ph.D. He got his from Oklahoma, you got yours from Texas--he came out with an idea how we can close the excess capacity, the infrastructure, and do it without political interference. So he came up with the idea of the BRAC committee. The BRAC committee was supposed to be free from political interference. I hope every Member who is watching on their tube right now, anyone who is going to come down here and vote on this, will listen to this. This is what Representative Dick Armey, the author of the BRAC process, said on June 23, 1997: We had three rounds of base closing, and we are all very proud of the process because politics never intruded into the process. That ended in round four. And all of my colleagues knew at the time, and we know now, that the special conditions for McClellan and Kelly, California and my own State of Texas, where you might think I have a parochial interest, were in a political invention. We talk about this being privatization. No, it is not. It is a new concept. It is privatization in place, created specifically for these two bases in an election year for no purpose other than politics. With that, Mr. President, I think we beat up that issue. We have argued and debated this hours and hours on the floor. I know Senators from Texas and California would like to have an opportunity to have more jobs in their States, but that is exactly what the BRAC process was put in place to prevent. In the remaining time, let me just make a couple of comments. I am the chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, and I can tell you right now, during this process it was very civil, in our Senate Armed Services Committee, but we didn't agree on everything. Quite frankly, I agreed with the Senator from Alaska as far as the National Guard was concerned. I did not agree with Senator Levin, the ranking minority member, as far as the B-2 was concerned, but we voted on it. I lost and they won. So we went through this very arduous process and successfully came up with a bill. In the meantime, I have been spending my time as chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee all over America and all over the world going to our various installations. I can tell you right now, we have a very serious problem in defending America. We can't do it. As pointed out by the Senator from Connecticut, for 13 consecutive years, we have reduced every year our defense budget at a time when most people realize, finally, that we have a greater threat facing America than we have had since World War II. Yet, we are at one-half the force strength that we were in 1991. I am talking about the number of Army divisions, the number of Air Force wings, the number of ships floating out there. So it is a very critical thing, and it is exacerbated by the fact that we have troops in places like Bosnia. It is very, very expensive. The President said it wouldn't be over $2 billion. It is now looking at closer to $6.5 billion to $8 billion. Where does that come from? It comes from the defense budget. While this is not a perfect product--can I have 1 more minute from the Senator from South Carolina?

Mr. INHOFE. I thank the senior Senator from Texas. Mr. President, I will only conclude we do have a very serious problem in talking to the troops out there about tempo. We have these guys operating at about 60 percent higher capacity than they are supposed to be operating. Sure, they can handle it for a while, but the divorce rate is up, the retention rate is down, and we have a serious problem in our underfunding of our military. I would like to have done a better job than we did in this bill, but this was the best we could do in the spirit of compromise on a bipartisan basis. I strongly support the passage of our Defense authorization bill. Thank you. Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to the consideration S. 1269, for the purpose of laying down two first-degree amendments only.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I will make the same request that the Senator from North Dakota did. I will be wanting to come back and take up this amendment. I ask at this time it be set aside.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the Dorgan amendment be set aside.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I understand that the pending business will be amendment No. 1602 to S. 1269.