Jim Inhofe

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, it was my understanding that we had an informal arrangement that we would go back and forth. I would like to be recognized.

Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, I do want to be recognized for the purpose of further explaining my amendment No. 4833 and also to respond to the Senator from Massachusetts. Before doing that I would ask if the Senator from South Dakota has any responses he wishes to make at this time, and then I wish to keep the floor.

Mr. INHOFE. I thought that is exactly what I said. I apologize for the misunderstanding. Further, the Senator from Massachusetts made the statement that: Our analysis of the N.I.E. and the potential for Russian cheating or breakout confirms that the treaty's verification regime is effective. I have to always be a little suspect of what comes out of the N.I.E. I think all of us are. We don't take it as gospel. This is actually a true story. Back in the Clinton administration, it was August 24, 1998, I asked the question: How long will it be until North Korea has a multistage rocket? The response that came back in August of 1998 was 5 to 10 years. Seven days later, on August 31 of 1998, they fired a three-stage rocket. I think we need to look at some of the intelligence estimates. They have been wrong in the past. When you are talking about something as significant as the issue we are talking about here, about the threat that is out there, then we have to be right. Then, the Senator from Massachusetts quoted Condoleezza Rice. I actually agree with her. She said: The new start treaty helpfully reinstates on-site verification of Russian nuclear forces which lapsed with the expiration of the original start treaty last year. Meaningful verification was a significant achievement of Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush and its reinstatement is crucial. I agree with that. Obviously, she is not saying she supports this. She is saying she supports some kind of a verification. There is none today, so anything is better than nothing. I think that is what she is saying. She also agreed, in her next statement in the Wall Street Journal of December 7: Still, there are legitimate concerns about New Start that must and can be addressed in the ratification process. . . . Implying that there is nothing wrong with having amendments. Lastly, one of the statements the Senator from Massachusetts made in response to my comments was: Finally, I'd like to point out that we addressed the importance of this verification question in condition of the resolution of ratification. That condition requires that before New START can enter into force and every year thereafter, the President has to certify to the Senate that our national technical means, in conjunction with the verification activities provided for in the New START treaty, are sufficient to ensure the effective monitoring of Russian compliance with the provisions of the New START treaty and timely warning of Russian preparation. Here is the problem I have with that. The President can only certify what he knows. Our intelligence experts are telling him what they are seeing in Russia. This amendment provides that the President will have more information. I would think, if that is the concern, we would want to give the President more information. Lastly, I see the Senator from Arizona is here, and I know he wants to be heard. Let me mention one last thing my good friend, the Senator from Massachusetts, stated. He was talking about the fact that these are killer amendments. I think it is worth restating what we said before. The CRS has outlined in its study on the role of the Senate in the treaty process: Amendments are proposed changes in the actual text of the treaty. [They] amount, therefore, to Senate counteroffers that alter the original deal agreed to by the United States and the other country. If the Senate gives its consent to New START with amendments to the text, the treaty is sent to Russia for its approval with an amendment. That means we go back and forth and hopefully come out with a treaty that would be workable. According to the 2005 and 2010 State Department reports on arms compliance, Russia has a bad habit of cheating on these agreements. In fact, I think we have covered that adequately at this time. I yield the floor.

Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. INHOFE. In addition to what Senator Thune said, there are several people who said they want to go into closed session first and address issues having to do with my amendment and his amendment before a vote.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield for a unanimous consent request?

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I will yield at this moment to the Senator from Wyoming----

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I respond by saying that I will object to a time agreement at this time. Several people, including the Senator from Arizona, want to speak on this amendment. That might create a problem because of his activity on this amendment. Let's keep it moving, and I can assure you that I want to get out of here quicker than you do.

Mr. INHOFE. At this time, I yield to the Senator from Wyoming on a subject of far greater significance than anything we have been talking about. I yield to the Senator from Wyoming to discuss something.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I will yield for a moment for an announcement from the Senator from Montana. (The remarks of Mr. TESTER are printed in today's Record under ``Morning Business.'')

Mr. INHOFE. Reserving the right to object, Mr. President----

Mr. INHOFE. Well, there are two motions. I am objecting to the discussion of the amendment at this time, until we find out how long it will be.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Let me make one last comment. I think the Senator from Massachusetts is right that we have covered enough of this tonight. There are some things that would be worth going into in a closed session. One thing that doesn't have to be in a closed session is the fact that there is a long record of Russians not complying with the first treaty. I would rather use another word than ``cheating,'' but that is one that everyone understands, and that has characterized Russia's behavior in previous treaties. The statement we are making right now, everyone is in agreement that the lower the arsenal becomes, the more significant it is for inspections for verification. I think everyone is in agreement with that. That is something that is probably the strongest point of our argument. The last thing I will say is just to repeat something I said for which I was a little bit overwhelmed when I said it. This is the first in 51 years that we have missed our wedding anniversary. And what I was trying to say before I got choked up is to my wife at home: I love you more today than I did 51 years ago. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, let me make a couple of comments and observations. I know the Senator from Massachusetts started out by saying we have to take someone's word for it. My concern is, and I agree with his statement in reference to quotes that were made by Ronald Reagan, the ``trust, but verify.'' He also said, and when I look at this, I think this is--I think it is flawed in all the ways we talked about this before. But I remember the statement actually, I was here, when Reagan came back from Iceland. He said what Mr. Gorbachev was demanding at Reykjavik was that the United States agree to a new version of the 14-year-old ABM Treaty that the Soviet Union had already violated. I told him we don't make those kinds of deals in the United States. We prefer no agreement than to bring home a bad agreement to the United States. I think we are--most of us who have questions that were unanswered and we want amendments--are those who do not believe this is a good treaty. When the Senator talks about the number of inspections, let's keep in mind when we did the first treaty, we were only inspecting new facilities, existing facilities, facilities that could be used, warheads that could be used, looking at the MIRV situation. But now, on this one, we also want to inspect to make sure those things they had agreed to destroy they actually have destroyed. That is why I talked about the debris--rather than seeing something destroyed, they look at the debris that is left over. On the argument, on the fact that you talked about the one time in Kazakhstan and Ukraine. When you look at the vastness of Russia, I remember--and one thing the Senator from Massachusetts and I have in common is we both are aviators. I had occasion--I will share with my friend from Massachusetts--a few years to fly an airplane around the world, replicating the flight of Wiley Post, a very famous Oklahoman. In doing this, I went all the way from Moscow to Provideniya, all the way across Siberia. I can remember going from time zone after time zone and not seeing anything except vast wilderness and perhaps a few bears now and then. When I think about the areas they have where things can be hidden, compared to any of these other countries, including our own, it is kind of a scary thing. I do believe we need to have the opportunity to increase the inspections because there is so much more area to inspect. The idea that it is not a freebie--I know it is not. I know anything in this treaty that I would change, such as the number of inspections, would apply to us as well as them. I understand that. But in that respect, I don't mind doing it because there is one big difference between the United States and Russia: They cheat and we don't. It is fine with me if we have to subject ourselves to a greater number of inspections so long as we can do the same with them. I will stand by the statements made and also the statements that were discovered in the 2010 Department report which I quoted from having to do with biological weapons, chemical weapons, and conventional forces in Europe. I am glad to repeat the quotes, but I don't think I have to. In 2010, the State Department said that Russia's confidence-building measure declarations since 1992 have not satisfactorily been documented, whether it is biological weapons or any other program, such as chemical weapons. So with the fact that they have not complied as they stated they would in the past--and we are now dealing with that--I think we have to take more precautions, more inspections, more verifications, because they have demonstrated clearly that they are not telling the truth, and they have not complied with commitments in the past. I yield the floor.

Mr. INHOFE. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, we have another amendment that is up that I think is very significant. It is one having to do with verification. I think if we look at all of the problems we are trying to address with amendments--we have been talking about missile defense, which is the one I have been most passionate about; we have been talking about other areas, too--in the case of verification, it is very significant to understand that this New START treaty has remarkably less verification than the START I treaty did. There are only 180 inspections over 10 years under New START versus 600 inspections over 15 years in START I. That is a drop of 40 inspections per year to 18 inspections per year. In a minute, I will tell you why I think it is more precipitous than that because of the significance of the inspections as the arsenals are dropping down in terms of the percentage of inspections versus the arsenals. The New START treaty inspections to verify the elimination of nuclear weapons delivery systems have been fundamentally changed from those in START I, replaced with a lesser provision of twice a year permitting the other party to view the debris from half of the eliminated first stages. In a minute I will break these down, but what I am talking about is that we have a treaty now that addresses two things. Type one is the ICBM bases, the submarine bases and the air bases. These are delivery systems. I think this has to be talked about as well as the actual warheads. The type two refers to the formerly declared facilities to confirm that such facilities are not being used for purposes inconsistent with the treaty. Now, when I say that, we were talking about trying to verify those things that are in existence today but also those that have been eliminated. In the first START I treaty, we were able to actually witness the destruction of these various warheads and of the systems that are under the consideration of this treaty. As it is now under the New START treaty, we cannot witness it. All we can do is look at the debris that remains after something is destroyed. Now, my concern is this: If you keep the debris around from something you have destroyed, you could use the same debris, as evidenced under the New START treaty, to show you have destroyed something that was destroyed in the past and not addressing those that are still there today. So in that area, I think this is very difficult. Finally, under the New START treaty, 24 hours of advance notice is required before an inspection, dramatically increased from the 9 hours of advance notice required under old START. Why is this important? This is important because as we get down to fewer and fewer inspections that would be made because we are limiting the arms under the treaty, then you should actually have a longer period of time of advance notice of the inspections. So I have an amendment that will correct these inadequacies. The amendment triples the number of inspections under New START for the two types of inspections referred to under START I as the type one and type two inspections. I mentioned the type one and type two, and this would actually triple the number of inspections. Type one would increase from 10 to 30 inspections a year; type two inspections would increase from 8 to 24--the total being 54 inspections. On July 20, 2010, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, that is James N. Miller, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee--and I was there--that the Russian cheating or breakout under the treaty would have little effect because of the United States second-strike strategy nuclear capabilities. I wholeheartedly disagree. The whole idea that we would say the current Under Secretary of Defense in the Obama administration--what he is doing is admitting the Russians cheat, but he is saying it does not matter. I would say this: The smaller the size of the nuclear arsenal--that is what we have today as in New START--the larger impact cheating has on a strategic nuclear balance. In other words, if you are cheating with a smaller nuclear arsenal, that is much more significant than if it were a large one. It is a percentage of a smaller figure. So if it is 50 percent of a smaller figure, it would have been 10 percent of the larger figure, of the nuclear arsenals that were there under the original START treaty. Increasing the number of type one and two inspections is critical to New START verification because the total number of inspections has been dramatically reduced in New START from the old START. So as the weapons decreased, inspections should actually increase or be enhanced. Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown explained this when he said why this is the case in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the original START treaty, and that was in October of 1991. He said: Verification will become even more important as the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons on each side decreases because uncertainties of a given size become a larger percentage of the total force as this occurs. That was way back in 1991. Since then you had former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton who stated this year, on May 3: While [verification is] important in any arms control treaty, verification becomes even more important at lower warhead levels. They agree, and we are talking about going all the way back to 1997. In 1997, Brent Scowcroft and Arnold Kantor said, in a joint statement: Current force levels provide a kind of buffer because they are high enough to be relatively insensitive to imperfect intelligence and modest force changes. . . . As force levels go down, the balance of nuclear power can become increasingly delicate and vulnerable to cheating on arms control limits concerns about ``hidden'' missiles and the actions of nuclear third parties. That was 1996. You have 1991, 1997, then present, and, of course, in May of this year in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, former Secretary of State James Baker summarized that the New START verification regime is weaker than its predecessor, testifying to Congress that the New START verification program ``does not appear as rigorous or extensive as the one that verified the numerous or diverse treaty obligations under START I. This complex part of the treaty is even more crucial when fewer deployed nuclear warheads are allowed than were allowed in the past.'' They all are consistent, agreeing No. 1: Russians cheat and, No. 2, verification becomes more important as the arsenals decreased in size. I think we can say Russia has essentially violated every arms control treaty we have had with them in the past. The State Department this year submitted a report on foreign country compliance with their arms control measures. This is a report that came out this year, in 2010. They refer to the last report which was 2005. START: There is a number of long-standing compliance issues--such as an obstruction to U.S. right to inspect warheads--raised in the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission that remained unresolved when the treaty expired in December. This commission endured the time all the way up to December 2009, in different areas. In the biological weapons convention--there are a lot of different kinds of weapons of mass destruction. They are not all nuclear--biological, chemical, conventional. In the biological weapons convention in 2005, the State Department concluded that ``Russia maintains a mature offensive biological weapons program and its nature and status have not changed.'' Then, in 2010, the State Department report said: Russian confidence- building measure declarations since 1992 have not satisfactorily documented whether its biological weapons program was terminated. What they are saying is even back in 2005 they say it was inadequate because they are still continuing, they are violating the accord. This is back in 2005, on biological weapons. Then that was renewed in 2010, saying they are still not doing it today. That was biological weapons. On chemical weapons we find the same thing. In 2005 the State Department assessed that ``Russia was in violation of its Chemical Weapons Convention obligations because its declaration was incomplete with respect to declaration of production and development facilities.'' In 2010 the State Department again stated that there was an ``absence of additional information from Russia, resulting in the United States being unable to ascertain whether Russia has declared all of its chemical weapons stockpile, all chemical weapons production facilities, and all of its chemical weapons development facilities.'' With biological weapons, they have not complied there; in the chemical weapons, they have not complied there; with conventional weapons in Europe, the United States notes in the 2010 report that ``Russia's actions have resulted in noncompliance with its treaty obligations.'' The Wall Street Journal recently reported, according to U.S. officials, the United States believes Russia has moved short-range tactical nuclear warheads to facilities near NATO allies as recently as this spring. I think the Senator from Idaho covered this to some degree. We are concerned about those tactical problems. I guess what we can say is, we know one thing and nobody seems to disagree with this: Russia cheats. But there are five things to be considered. One is there are fewer inspections than there were under the old one. Second, instead of actually seeing the destruction of these warheads, we depend on the debris that remains after the destruction has taken place. I think everyone understands if we are depending on debris, we can be looking at debris from one destruction effort and they can declare that they have done it three or four times since then, using the same debris. Third is, advance notice is three times longer now. It should be shorter now because of more significance. As we get the smaller stockpile, we should have a greater compliance requirement. The fourth is weapons decrease--we should be paying more attention to them. No. 5, Russia does cheat. I believe of all the amendments, the amendments on the missile defense are significant. It concerns me that we have something, as I said on the floor yesterday, and I quoted, several Russians from the very beginning were saying: We don't want the United States--and it is the intent of this treaty--to be able to enhance their missile defense treaties. Right now, I look at this and, as I said several times: This is fine, the treaty, except it is with the wrong people. This treaty is with Russia, not with where the threat is--not with North Korea, not with Iran. That is where the problem is. I have had very strong feelings. I disagreed with taking down the termination of the ground-based system that was to be in Poland because our intelligence tells us--it is not even classified--that Iran will have the capability of sending a nuclear warhead and having a delivery system reaching as far as the eastern part of the United States by 2015. We, with a ground-based interceptor site in Poland, would have had that opportunity. But now that that site is down, we would be dependent, as I showed on a chart yesterday, on a 2-B system that we don't even know--they say maybe it will be done by 2020. We have no assurance it will. Look at that: We the United States will be naked in this effort for a period of time between 2015 and at least 2020. Maybe even longer than that. All these things are important. But this one is equally important because it does not do any good to have a verification system that is as flawed as this system. We will have an opportunity to talk about this in more detail. For that reason it is my understanding, and I assure the Senator from Massachusetts that my being unwilling to agree to a time agreement is not--this is not going to shorten it at all. It is my intention to move on with this as soon as we can get to it. I understand it is pretty well locked in for tomorrow. With that, I yield the floor.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Before my friend from Wyoming leaves the floor, let me just say I can identify with the things he has said, and to prove it, let me put this up here. These are my 20 kids and grandkids. While maybe he has his name they have given him, my name is PopI. The I is for Inhofe, so it is MomI and PopI. Is that OK? That is what all these kids call me. As I was listening to the great words my colleague was sharing for his grandchildren and their lives, I would like to ask unanimous consent those same words go to each one of these little grandkids up here. As you mentioned one after another of your experiences, I remember this little girl here, she was one of them for me. She was only 4 pounds and you could hold her with one hand. The same thing was true with this one over here. So when I look at this, I get very excited. It is what is important. We talk about a lot of things around here, but this is what is important. One of the criticisms I have had in considering this thing is hearing: I want to get back during this Christmas season--and I think most of the others do too--and want to be with them. This little girl right here, she is my wife. Today is our 51st wedding anniversary. So I just want to say that some things are important, and I want to deliver my message to my wife who is back in Oklahoma--where she should be with all the rest of these kids--but, Kay, I love you as much today as I did 51 years ago.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Senator from Massachusetts. Following the disposition of the Risch amendment, we will be scheduling my amendment No. 4833 having to do with verification and numbers of inspections. I will be wanting to speak on this. I don't want to take time from the Risch amendment. I ask unanimous consent to temporarily set aside the Risch amendment for consideration of amendment No. 4833.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, it is my understanding that I have 10 minutes, and I would like to ask the Chair to let me know when I have 1 minute remaining.

Mr. INHOFE. First of all, Mr. President, we have a couple of votes today on things we should have been addressing for a long period of time in order to get to the bottom of them, and one is the DREAM Act. I think the Senator from Alabama did a thorough job of talking about the problems. I would only say this about the DREAM Act. I have been privileged over the past 20 years to probably give more speeches at naturalization ceremonies than anybody else I know. You look at these people who did it the legal way--they came in and learned the language, and I have to say, Mr. President, they probably know more about the history of this country than many of us in this Chamber. They do it the right way. They study, and they are proud. When I see something like this, which I believe is done purely for political reasons, I just can't imagine slapping these people in the face--the people who did it in the legal way--and saying it is all right to open the door. So enough on that. I think that was covered by the Senator from Alabama. I do wish to speak about don't ask, don't tell. I thought back in 1993, during the Clinton administration, that this probably wouldn't work. I was shocked when I found out how well it has worked for this long period of time; that is, the don't ask, don't tell policy. We have a saying in Oklahoma: If it ain't broke, don't fix it. This isn't broke. It is working very well. This is something else I never believed would work, but I was a product of the draft--I was drafted into the U.S. Army. Yet today we have an all-volunteer force. Our recruitment and retention today in all services is over 100 percent. I look at this, and I wonder what effect this is going to have on that. I think we have some pretty good indications on what that effect would be. First of all, the study that was supposed to take place was supposed to have the input of the members of the services. The ones I have talked to felt that it was already over. In fact, it was. We go out and ask them for their input as to the repeal of don't ask, don't tell, how it would affect our military and their operations, and then we turn around and go ahead and pass it. We did that on May 27. So I think they didn't respond, as they normally would to a survey, because the decision was already made. When I look at this and I see things written into this--well, first of all, like 23 percent, even on this survey, said they would leave or think about leaving sooner than they had planned. That is 23 percent. Twenty-seven percent of the military members surveyed said they would not be willing to recommend military service to a family member or close friend. Our studies have shown us that 50 percent of those who join the service do so at the recommendation of someone who is already in the service. So when you look at this report, everyone in the working group--and the working group is made up of a large number of people--says they didn't tabulate the results, but when pressed, they said their sense on the don't ask, don't tell policy is that the majority of views expressed were against repeal of the current policy. I think, if you really want to know, there are four very courageous chiefs of the services who have been willing to stand up and be counted. General Casey is the Chief of Staff of the Army. After a long statement at a hearing we had on the 3rd of this month, he said: As such, I believe that implementation of the repeal of don't ask, don't tell in the near term will, one, add another level of stress to an already stretched force; two, be more difficult in combat arms units; and, three, be more difficult for the Army than the report suggests. At the same December 3 hearing--so this is current stuff--General Schwartz of the Air Force said: Nonetheless, my best military judgment does not agree with the study assessment that the short-term risk to the military effectiveness is low. . . . I remain concerned with the outlook for low short-term risk of repeal to military effectiveness in Afghanistan. He goes on to talk about the implementation. I therefore recommend deferring certification and full implementation until 2012, while initiating training and education efforts soon after you take any decision to repeal. So there is General Schwartz of the U.S. Air Force agreeing with General Casey that this should not be implemented. Then in that same hearing, General Amos said: While the study concludes that . . . repeal can be implemented now, provided it is done in [a] manner that minimizes the burden on leaders in deployed areas, the survey data as it relates to the Marine Corps' combat arms forces does not support that assertion. He goes on to talk about the element of risk, which is a term we use in the military when you change something, and whether that risk will be low, medium, or high. The risk in this case ranges from medium to high in the estimates of these individuals who really know what they are talking about. I also have a quote from General Amos of just 2 days ago. This was actually on December 14, as opposed to the 3rd. He said: When your life hangs on the line, you don't want anything distracting . . . Mistakes and inattention or distractions cost Marines' lives. So the Marines came back and said, ``Look, anything that's going to break or potentially break that focus and cause any kind of distraction may have an effect on cohesion.'' I don't want to permit that opportunity to happen. . . . If you go up to Bethesda Hospital . . . Marines are up there with no legs, none. We've got Marines at Walter Reed with no limbs. This is the statement of General Amos. Let me repeat. He said: When your life hangs on the line, you don't want anything distracting . . . Mistakes and inattention or distractions cost Marines' lives. So we are talking about marines' lives in this case, and that is the significance. I could go on. We have been talking about this now for a long period of time as to some of the very serious problems. I have a letter I read some time ago from 41 retired chaplains who sent a letter to President Obama and Secretary Gates stating that normalizing homosexual behavior in the Armed Forces will pose a significant threat to chaplains' and servicemembers' religious liberty. The letter warned that reversing the policy will negatively impact religious freedom and could even affect military readiness and troop levels because the military would be marginalizing deeply held religious beliefs. I know we are very short on time--votes are going to be coming up-- but I have to respond to something the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee said. He was saying we will not implement this until we find out and make a determination, and he was speaking of himself, Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President; that they are not going to implement this until they have studied this and determined it is not going to have the risks and all that. But wait a minute, let's look at what they have already said. They have already made up their minds. President Obama said this year: I will work with Congress and our military to finally repeal the law that denies gay Americans the right to serve the country they love because of who they are. Secretary Gates said: I fully support the President's decision. The question before us is not whether the military prepares to make this change but how we best prepare for it. And Secretary Gates also said he strongly preferred congressional action as opposed to court action. Admiral Mullen had already made up his mind. These are his words: Mr. Chairman, speaking for myself, it is the right thing to do. That is why, when people stand up and say they are not going to do this until such time as these three people certify that it is the right thing to do, they have already done it. That is what is behind this. I don't want anyone out there to think this is an open process. The last thing I would say is that I will be spending New Year's Eve in Afghanistan with the troops, and I know what they are going to say. They are going to say the same thing they said before: We were under the impression last January that we were going to have input in this. We haven't had input. So I think if you want to pursue this, we should have the time to go ahead and do it the right way, not try to do it at the last minute, before--well, one day before my 51st wedding anniversary. With that, I yield the floor.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, can the Senator amend that to include me for 10 minutes following his remarks?

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I have been here and have listened to the two previous speakers. Let me echo and agree with the remarks made by the Senator from Wyoming about the Senator from Arizona. I serve as his second ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, and I have watched his leadership for quite some time now. Also, I have to say the Senator from Wyoming and I are both on Foreign Relations. I have also watched his leadership in this. I come from a little different perspective than some because I am on both committees. One of the things I have been concerned about for a long time has been that many people don't have a firm understanding as to the threat we are under in this country. We have heard a lot of different explanations about the intent of article V of the treaty. On the one hand, the Obama administration assures us that there are no limitations on our missile defenses. On the other hand, as has been stated by the two previous speakers, the Russian Foreign Minister states that there are obligations regarding missile defense in the treaty that constitute a legally binding package. I think that was covered well by the senior Senator from Arizona. I will mention three things that pretty well lock in, in my mind, this connection that is there. The preamble of the treaty recognized the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, and that interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced. That means it will be increased and that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic effective arms of the parties. I quoted yesterday extensively this. The foreign minister of Russia, Sergei Lavrov, said: We have not yet agreed on this missile defense issue, and we are trying to clarify how the agreements reached by the two presidents could relate with the actions taken unilaterally by Washington. He added that the Obama administration had not coordinated its missile defense plans with Russia. There is a stronger statement made in the very beginning that already has been quoted; that is, that the treaty can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively. I wish to also mention that, as far as this link is concerned, I had occasion to be in Turkey not long ago, and I talked to the Ambassador to Turkey, Eric Edelman. Many of us remember he was the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. A couple months ago, he made a very strong statement: New START, unfortunately, introduces limits and obstacles to further development in precisely these means of defending the country. As part of the ratification process, I would hope that, at a minimum, the Senate will express its sense that no further limitations on either Missile Defense or Prompt Global Strike should be considered as part of the future nuclear arms reduction agreements. He was referring to any other agreements, not just this one. Allowing any further such constraints could well prove a major error in long-term strategy because they would trade away areas of U.S. comparative advantage for reductions in Russian strategic forces that would be likely to happen even in the absence of a treaty. Let me try to break this down. I think an awful lot of people have heard these same words repeated over and over. Yes, certainly there is no one here who can say there is no relationship between any restrictions they are desiring in terms of our ability to have a missile defense system. We know what happened in Poland, and I happened to be over in Afghanistan when the President announced his budget--that was his very first budget. At that time, several of us had been involved with both the Czech Republic, where we were anticipating the building of a radar system, as well as Poland for a ground-based interceptor. One of the things that was very offensive about that was several of us--and I can remember personally the President of the Czech Republic saying to me, in the Czech Republic, are you sure that if we take this risk and we are willing to do this, because we believe it is the right thing to do, that you won't change administrations and come to pull the rug out from under us? And I said, I can certainly give you that assurance. Unfortunately, that is exactly what happened. I think people realize what happened when he gave his military budget. He did away with--he terminated that system. This is a chart that I think most people agree with. It came from the Congressional Budget Office. As you know, we have over here in Alaska and down in California ground-based interceptors. Originally, there were going to be quite a few more. Then they dropped it down to 44, and recently--under this administration--it went down to 30 ground-based interceptors. So we feel, and I feel--and I think most people agree-- that something that is coming in from North Korea and coming across here can be detected, can be shot down, and if missed the first time, you would have another run at it. So I have stated several times we are in pretty good shape for this. But if you look at the footprint of the coverage, it goes over and barely covers the eastern part of the United States, and of course definitely, over here in Western Europe. If this should happen, I don't think there is anyone--and I have talked to a lot of experts--who believes if for some reason we were not accurate, and not right the first time, there would be another chance to do it. All you have to do is look at this chart and I think you can see that threat is out there; that coverage is out there; that certainly there is a question as to whether we would be able to do it with a ground-based interceptor coming from this direction. This is Iran over here. The reason we have this on the chart is because it is pretty well accepted, not even classified, that Iran will have the capability of sending a missile over by--the year they use is 2015. If we had the ground-based interceptor in what we called the third site, which would have been here in Poland, then we would have been in a position to have that deployable, initially, in 2012. That date was then slipped to 2015. Well, 2015 happens to be the same date that the Iranians will have this capability, and that is the scary thing. Let me go ahead and walk through this on this other chart on the timing. According to the phased adaptive approach, which replaced the idea we are going to have a ground-based interceptor in Poland, it says that in phase one, the 2011 timeframe, we would be able to deploy the current and proven missile defense systems available in the next 2 years, including the sea-based AEGIS system, the SM-3 interceptor--that is the Block 1A--which would be down here. This is something we have now. This chart shows here something that is coming from Tehran over to the United States, let's say to Washington, DC. If they have this capability over here, we can see that we would have to have a capability of the ground-based interceptor in Poland. So here we are right now, the capability that they have in Iran would be portrayed right here. This is their capability. This is our capability to kill something coming over. That is where they are today. This is where they are going to be in 2015. This IRBM capability would be sometime around the year 2012 or 2013. When we look at what our capability on this side is, we see that phase one, according to the administration, would be the 2011 timeframe. That is a sea-based AEGIS with the SM-3 interceptor, Block 1A. Phase two would be the 2015 timeframe. That is when we are getting into--they say after appropriate testing--deploying a more capable version of the SM-3 interceptor, Block 1B. This is the Block 1B right here. So this would give us a little greater capability in both the sea- and the land-based, but that would be for a short- or medium-range missile threat. Then phase three. This is phase three here. This is what they state we would be able to have by 2018. That would be an SM-3 Block 2A. In order to gravitate to--not quite sure I am accurate on this--what would be the capability that we would have with a ground-based interceptor in Poland, it would have to be the SM-3, 2B. Phase four, that is the SM-3, 2B, which they are estimating might be as early as 2020. But that is ``might be.'' There is no time range or agreement that it would be. That is in the best scenario. So by eliminating this capability here, that would have been deployable by 2015, and going to something that might be deployed by 2020, when they have the capability, we believe, by 2015, that is the scary thing. I have often said--and I know it is an oversimplification--when you look at the treaty we are talking about, it is with the wrong people. That is not the threat I see out there. I see North Korea. And by the way, North Korea is going to have this same capability, we believe-- well, now, actually for 12,000 kilometers, and 10,000 would reach the United States from Tehran. We know--no one denies--that Tehran and North Korea are trading capabilities and technology. I only wanted to come to say there is a real threat out there. This is something that is real. It is something we have looked at and we were able to accept at one time, before they took down the siting in Poland. So now we have a treaty that I think, by anyone's interpretation--after you have heard the senior Senator from Arizona and the junior Senator from Arizona, and the Senator from Wyoming and others speak on this--that does certainly, at the very least, have the threat of reducing our capability of defending ourselves. I only want to point that out, to get into the Record how serious the threat is, what the timeframe is and why we should be not even considering a treaty unless we have the language incorporated in amendments--that would be offered I believe by a number of Members on this side, including myself--addressing the missile defense. I yield the floor.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I compliment the Senator from Massachusetts for his endurance. I appreciate that. I have to say also to the Senator from Indiana, my good friend, I am kind of in a unique position as one who serves on both the Armed Services and the Foreign Relations Committee. I disagree with most of what was just stated by the senior Senator from Massachusetts. One of the concerns I have had is that we have so many people who want to be in on this, who should be in on this, who have been elected. We have new Senators, one who is occupying the chair right now. We have Senators Kirk and Manchin. We also have Senators-elect Blunt, Boozman, Portman, Moran, Lee, Johnson, Hoeven, Ayotte, Paul, and Rubio. All of them have signed a letter saying: This is very significant. We really need to be a part of this. This is important. It is important in a different way to me than it is to others. I am opposed for a number of reasons. I am one of the few bad guys who came out initially and said I opposed it. We all know what a strategic arms reduction act is. Initially, when we had two superpowers, it made a lot more sense to me. Frankly, I look at this, and I see the concerns I have. Verification--that sounds good. Yes, we will verify. Yet the number of verifications, inspections, is like 18 per year in the New START as opposed to some 600 over a 15-year period. Modernization is one thing on which we all agree. We have to modernize. But there has to be a way of doing it. We haven't done it yet. It was 3 years ago that Secretary Gates said: No way can we maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program. That is an area where we all agree. How are we going to do that? Right now, I think the generally agreed upon number that it would cost over a period of 10 years would be $85 billion. We have right now about $600 million that would be coming up in the next budget cycle. We all know how things work around here. We can only commit funds for the next cycle. There is no assurance at all that we would be able to come through with the other $84.5 billion in that period. The modernization is not set up in a way where we are in the current year demonstrating the commitment we have to modernize our fleet. The fact that we are handling this in a lameduck session--most of the stuff we are trying to cram in right now is what we should have been talking about all year long and have not been. They all fall into a category where it looks as if things are going to change in the Senate. We know the House, after the November election, is now a Republican- dominated House. We know we have gained large numbers in the Senate. We also know there are several of my good colleagues who are up for reelection in 2012. I am not sure they all want to join in all of these issues coming up at the last minute. This is one of them. I look at the quotes we have--the missile defense issue has not been addressed. I know it would take a lot of discussion. There are probably potentially, with the new Congress coming in in January, 40 or 50 different amendments just addressing the missile defense issue. They say: Well, no, this is not a problem. But anytime you have a unilateral statement that was made--which was made by the Russians early on--that this treaty can only operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively and qualitatively--that has been stated, and it has been stated and reaffirmed more recently when Sergei Lavrov said: We have not yet agreed on this [missile defense] issue and we are trying to clarify how the agreements reached by the two presidents. . . . correlate with the actions taken unilaterally by Washington. The problem is that when the American people look at this, they say that maybe back during the Cold War and maybe back when we had two superpowers, this thing made sense. Frankly, I was not as supportive of this concept back then. But there is certainly justification for it. Where are we today? Right now, we are probably in the most endangered position we have been in as a nation. I say this from the experience I have had on both of these committees. We have problems. There are certainly problems with North Korea and what they have developed in their capabilities, problems with Syria, certainly problems with Iran. Our intelligence says--and it is not even classified--that Iran would have the capability of sending a missile to Western Europe and the Eastern United States by 2015. One of the most disturbing things that happened at the beginning of this administration, a year and a half ago, was when the President came out with his budget and did away with our site in Poland which was a ground interceptor site that would have given us the capability of defending the geography I just mentioned. They took a risk. It wasn't easy for Poland or the Czech Republic, in terms of their radar system, to almost defy Russia, but they were willing to do it. I always remember being a part of the negotiation over there when they said: Are you sure, if we take this bold step, we start agreeing to build a ground interceptor in Poland that would protect that area, are you sure you will not pull the rug out from under us? I said: Absolutely. I had no hint that this would happen, but it did. So in February, right after the new President was inaugurated, of the many things he did that I found objectionable with our defense systems, that was the most egregious. We are talking about doing a type of strategic arms reduction with Russia. I am not concerned about Russia; I am concerned about these other places. The threat is there. The threat is real. I don't think there are too many people around since 9/11 who don't know that the terrorists would in a heartbeat come after the United States. When we have something that is written in the preamble--statements have been made over and over again that it would be a violation of this treaty if we were to enhance our missile defense system. Yet we know that Syria is going to have a capability by 2015. To me, that is mind- boggling that people could be sitting around here worrying about this treaty between two countries when I don't look at them as being a threat. Then we have the issue of force structure. I think we know that not only do we have to have a weapon, we have to have a way of sending it. We all know the triad and how they are not being enhanced by this. That is my major concern. I was against it from the very beginning. However, this is where we are today. We are in the middle of it. I know I keep hearing on the radio: You are going to be here until Christmas; you shouldn't do that. I will be spending New Year's Eve with our troops in Afghanistan. I am also concerned about what we are doing here in America. Why are we waiting? Last year, we waited until Christmas Eve. I always remember going home Christmas Eve. It happened to fall at the same time. It was the worst snowstorm in the history of Texas and northeastern Oklahoma. I barely made it in time to get home. Yes, I have 20 kids and grandkids. I would kind of like to see them at Christmas. These are things we could have been doing a long time ago. You wait until the last minute. This is when you want to cram things through that the American people don't want and that should take time. We beat up this thing on this treaty for long enough. But let's look at what we should be talking about now; that is, running government into the next year so we don't have some type of a stoppage, some type of a crisis on our hands. So the liberals have the omnibus bill that they have up, a bill that is $1.3 trillion. Here we are talking about we have come up with $2 trillion--$3 trillion--$2 trillion in the first 2 years. This is unheard of in terms of deficits. Look where we are going right now with $9 billion more in spending than last year, and we thought last year was an absolute disaster. At the same time, where is the spending going? We have such things as their agenda--$1.4 billion for a variety of climate change programs. They are not going to give up on that. They are going to keep coming forth trying to spend money. They are talking about the money for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, talking about zeroing out the efforts in Yucca Mountain. These are things that are in this bill. What it does to the defense system--everything is enhanced except defense. What is this aversion to trying to rebuild America's defense system? Overall, the defense spending cuts in the omnibus bill amount to $10.3 billion. That is from the President's request of 2011. It includes the $450 million to include work on the second engine, the alternate engine. We have already talked about that. We have been discussing that in the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee. We decided, I believe justly--I was on the single engine side of that argument because of the sheer cost. Yet I know the arguments on both sides. We have already done that. We have already debated it. I don't know why we have to come to the floor after we have made these decisions and then look at a bill that cuts the proposed purchase of the F-35s from 42 to 35. Let's remember what happened a year and a half ago. They talked about doing away with the F-22s, which are the only fifth-generation capability we have. The justification was, look what we are doing with F-35s. That is fine. But so it is going to be 42. This bill would cut it down--further cuts. So while we are talking about a bill of $1.3 trillion, it throws money at every kind of social engineering, everything you could have except defense. The CERP--this program used to be called the commander's emergency relief program. It was one that was my program. You talk to the commanders in the field, and they will tell you they have a capability of taking care of some of these needs. Whether it used to be Iraq, now Afghanistan, they can accomplish so much more if they can do it right now. That is called CERP. They are already bringing the funding of that down in this bill. I look at over $1 trillion in funding to implement the very unpopular health care law. If anybody is out there thinking this is going to be an easy lift, I personally think we will be able to defeat this omnibus bill. I think it will be defeated by almost all Republicans and a few of the Democrats, particularly those coming up for reelection in 2012. I would hate to be in a position where I would say: What I am going to run on is the fact that I already voted to put more than $1 trillion into funding this form of socialized medicine. That is where we are right now. I do think we need to take a deep breath and just figure that we have a new Congress coming in, a new Senate coming in right after January. We will have plenty of time to allow other Senators who were elected to weigh in on this very critical issue of the New START treaty. With that, I yield the floor.

Mr. INHOFE

Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, allowing any of the Bush tax cuts to expire would be a dramatic failure of economic policy. These tax cuts, enacted during President Bush's first term in office, delivered major relief to all taxpayers. The nonpartisan Tax Foundation estimates that tax cuts have been worth $2,200 annually for a family of four. They reduced the marginal rates in every tax bracket and created a new 10 percent marginal rate for Americans with the lowest incomes. These individual tax cuts, in addition to giving people additional spending power, had a positive impact on small businesses. The tax cuts also lowered the cost of business expansion for all firms through reduced tax rates on dividends and long term capital gains. Unfortunately, legislative procedures kept these tax cuts from being made permanent when they were created, and unless a new law prevents it, all of them will expire at the end of this year. If this happens, it will reduce Americans' spending power and the capacity of small businesses to grow. With our economy in the middle of a very fragile recovery, proposals to take more money out of the economy run the risk of pushing the Nation back into recession. In the meantime, the Democrat leadership of Congress insists on scheduling votes solely for the purpose of political messaging. For example, the House voted to permanently extend the lower rates on the first $200,000 of an individual's income and the first $250,000 for married couples. In the Senate, we are scheduled to vote on two similar proposals drawing lines at the first $250,000 of a married couple's annual income and the first $1 million of a couple's income. The purpose of these arbitrary income lines is to create political theater. Only earlier today, we understand that the Senate amendments will also include other provisions such as keeping the death tax, albeit at a lower rate and a higher exemption. The amendments will also include important provisions such as another patch on the alternative minimum tax and an extension of a variety important tax provisions which have, in fact, already expired because the Democrat leadership is a year behind in moving the annual tax extenders package. I am simply not going to participate in political games. We have a responsibility to offer serious proposals. We must extend all the Bush tax cuts. The Heritage Foundation reports that in Oklahoma alone, no extension would cost over 8,000 jobs annually, decrease per household disposable income on average by $2,800, and increase individual income taxes by $4.4 million. Any vote to not extend all the Bush tax cuts is simply a tax on small business. Small businesses are the engine of economic growth in this country, and they have historically been responsible for creating more than 70 percent of all new jobs. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, the 750,000 Americans in the highest tax bracket report roughly half of the $1 trillion in total net business income on their personal returns. This is mainly income earned from small business operations. By saddling the cost of a growing government on these Americans, the President is putting the survival of small firms, new job creation, and economic growth at risk. Small businesses are also particularly vulnerable to increases in individual tax rates. Because their businesses are often structured as partnerships, their tax obligations pass directly to their owners, so any tax increases on a small business owner is a tax increase on the small business itself. With small businesses across our nation hanging on by a thread and having difficulty finding the money they need, now is no time to raise their taxes. It is frustrating that the President and Democrats in Congress continue to not hear the American people. If the President is truly interested in the long term economic prosperity of the nation, he will begin adopting and pursuing policies that encourage small business growth and development. Extending all the Bush tax cuts is a promising and necessary start. Unfortunately, until we cease this political theater, we cannot seriously work to ensure the growth of our economy to create jobs for more Americans. I am simply not going to participate in political games this weekend. I will be absent from the political posturing votes tomorrow because I would have simply opposed them. I trust that in this next week, we can get past theater and turn to serious proposals extending all the Bush tax cuts, ensuring that middle-class Americans are not hit with the alternative minimum tax, and extending the annual tax extender package.