Ernest Istook

Mr. ISTOOK

Mr. ISTOOK. I appreciate the comments of the gentleman from Missouri and his very excellent insights that he has expressed. I want also to express, Mr. Speaker, and I will not go through the whole laundry list of other organizations that are supporting the religious freedom amendment, but I would like to observe that one of them is, for example, the National Association of Evangelicals which represents some 48 different denominations. This is long overdue, Mr. Speaker, that we recognize that all the problems in America are not solved by doing things with taxes or highways or national defense, that this Nation was founded by people who believed in God and believed that our rights came from God as they stated in the Declaration of Independence, and if we try to sever our freedom and our rights from He who gave our rights to us, and if we say that we have to isolate children while they are required to be at school, they have to be isolated from these references just because there may be some among them or among their parents who are so intolerant that they want to silence other people. Mr. Speaker, if my freedom of speech exists only when everybody around agrees with me, I do not have free speech. If my freedom of religion exists only when I am around people who believe the same things that I do, then I do not have freedom of religion. If I can not express my religious beliefs even when people may disagree with them or express my political beliefs or social beliefs or just flat my opinion, then I do not have freedom any more. The essence of freedom is that we tolerate our differences rather than trying to suppress them, and for the courts to take the First Amendment and twist and distort it, and say this is now a tool for stopping people from expressing their religious belief because they happen to be on public property? My kids are required to be on public property to be at school. Does that mean they are required to leave behind the teachings that we try to give them at home and at church? I hear some people say, oh, my goodness, you ought to be happy, you can pray at home and you can pray at school. Well fine. But I happen to believe in a faith that says pray without ceasing, and it does not say that you have to stop praying when you enter onto government property or when somebody else is around that says, ``Well, I do not like what you are doing.'' I say to them, ``I appreciate that. I am sure that there are some things that you may do which I may not like either, but I respect and would fight for your right to say and do things with which I may disagree, and I would hope that you would have the same understanding, the same belief in our Constitution and our principles, and that you would say whether I agree with your prayer or your religious thoughts or not, I believe you have a right to express them.'' The problem is not with people who want to express the hope and faith of prayers. The problem is with people who are intolerant and do not want to hear it. Mr. Speaker, the religious freedom amendment protects these freedoms and these rights, whether it be first grader Zachariah Hood who was told he could not read the story of the brothers Jacob and Esau reuniting, or whether it be my children or anyone else's or those of us in this Congress or any place on public property. I hope, Mr. Speaker, that people will support the religious freedom amendment and that more Members will proclaim its necessity.

Mr. ISTOOK. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the opportunity to visit with you and other Members of the House and talk this evening about not just a piece of legislation but something that is affecting the way that we live in this country, and what happens when a number of people who are quite unfortunately intolerant of basic values in America got the court systems to go along with them and to start silencing people who are trying to exercise free speech and trying to exercise their right under the First Amendment of freedom of religion. But unfortunately the First Amendment has been twisted against it. Let me share, Mr. Speaker, the story of a young man in Medford, New Jersey. His name is Zachariah Hood. Now he is 8 years old, but things began for him when he was in first grade. First grade, boy, that is a joyful time. I have got five kids. They are in college and high school now, but I recall the life and the energy and the vigor of a first grader. And especially when they get a chance to do something on their own in the class, to be in charge of the class, even for a few minutes. Well, Zachariah Hood was in first grade in Medford, New Jersey, and the class had a reading contest and whoever won the contest would get to read a story to the class. Not only that, they could pick the story they wanted to read. Little Zachariah was happy and he won the contest. Zachariah got the right. He was going to read a story to his classmates and he proudly brought his own book to school to read a brief story. Now, Mr. Speaker, I want to share the story that he wanted to read, because, Mr. Speaker, he was told he could not do it. When the teacher saw the book that he brought in and the story that he wanted to read, the teacher told him, ``Oh, no, the Constitution does not let you read this at public school.'' The book was called The Beginner's Bible. It was not the King James, it was not the Revised Standard or any other edition. It was just a book for kids telling some Bible stories, and this is the story that he wanted to read and he was told was unconstitutional. Mr. Speaker, the story is about Jacob and Esau and here I quote from it. I quote it in its entirety: Jacob traveled far away to his uncle's house. He worked for his uncle taking care of sheep. While he was there, Jacob got married. He had 12 sons. Jacob's big family lived on his uncle's land for many years. But Jacob wanted to go back home. One day, Jacob packed up all of his animals and his family and everything he had. They traveled all the way back to where Esau lived. Now, Jacob was afraid that Esau might still be angry at him, so he sent presents to Esau. He sent servants who said, ``Please do not be angry anymore.'' But Esau was not angry. He ran to Jacob. He hugged and kissed him. He was happy to see his brother again. Mr. Speaker, that is the story. I have finished quoting it, the story about the reunion of Jacob and Esau. Esau, of course most of us know, had previously sold Jacob his birthright for a bowl of pottage. And Zachariah Hood just wanted to read a story to his classmates about Jacob and Esau and the reunion of two brothers. He thought that was a nice story, and I think it is too. But the school system said, ``Oh, the First Amendment will not let you do that.'' They told him, ``We have something called separation of church and State.'' I will comment about that in a minute, Mr. Speaker, about what that really means. But the school said, ``We have separation of church and State and you cannot read in public school this story out of your Beginner's Bible.'' Zachariah's parents were not real happy. They sued the school. Now one would think over something like this the kid ought to win his case. He ought to be able to read a nice simple story about two brothers getting back together. But no, the United States District Court, basing it on rulings that our Supreme Court has been making over the last 36 years, said ``Oh, the school is right. You cannot read that story at public school.'' The story that I just read they held was unconstitutional, that it violated the separation of church and State, and it was prohibited by the very First Amendment which was enacted by our Founding Fathers to protect us. What kind of malarkey is this, Mr. Speaker, when the First Amendment that is supposed to protect faith in America is being used as a weapon against it? Now, I have here, Mr. Speaker, a copy of the story that the Associated Press ran on this from the newspaper in New Jersey, the Star Ledger, which was printed January 29 of this year. I provided a copy to the Clerk, Mr. Speaker, and I submit it for inclusion in the Congressional Record: Medford First-grader's Bible Story Stirs a Battle Over Religious Rights (By Melanie Burney) The case of a New Jersey boy barred from reading a Bible story to his first-grade class is bound for a federal appeals court as the battle continues over religious expression in public schools. The lawsuit centers on whether the Medford elementary school teacher violated the 6-year-old boy's First Amendment rights. U.S. District Court Judge Joseph H. Rodriquez in Camden ruled last month that the teacher was justified and school officials acted appropriately. But an attorney for the boy's family, backed by the Virginia-based Rutherford Institute, filed an appeal Tuesday with the 3rd U.S. Circuit of Appeals in Philadelphia challenging the lower court ruling. While prayer in school has been barred for decades, court rulings have allowed some religious expression in schools. U.S. Department of Education guidelines also permit students to express their religious beliefs in some circumstances through homework, artwork and other assignments. ``This case isn't an attempt to argue that Bible-reading and prayer should be returned to school or anything of that sort,'' said attorney F. Michael Daily of Merchantville, who filed the appeal. . . . This case is really one of trying to obtain some equilibrium in religious rights of students. Some legal experts say the case could ultimately land before the U.S. Supreme Court to define the boundaries for religion in public schools. ``It's potentially precedent-setting,'' said Douglas Laycock, a professor at the University of Texas Law School in Austin. ``I think there's a need to clarify.'' The controversy began in February 1996 when Zachariah Hood chose a story about Jacob and Esau from The Beginner's Bible to read aloud to the class. Students in the class were rewarded for good reading performances by being allowed to read a story of their choice. Zachariah initially selected Dr. Seuss' ``The Cat in the Hat,'' but decided it was too long. Teacher Grace Oliva instructed him to read the story to her privately first, and decided it was inappropriate, said attorney John Dyer, who represents the Medford Board of Education. ``Should a child be able to espouse a belief at any time that child wishes in a first-grade classroom?'' asked Dyer. ``The answer that most people would say is no because the teacher must retain control over the classroom.'' ``The problem is hard because the teacher tells the kids you can choose anything you want and then it turns out there are some things you can't choose,'' Laycock said. ``Once you give kids a choice, discrimination against religion is a real problem. The boy's family filed suit in June 1996. ``I never expected it to become a lawsuit,'' the boy's mother, Carol, said. ``We are not religious fanatics. We are very normal. We are mainstream, religious people.'' The Rutherford Institute--the conservative organization representing Paula Jones in her sexual harassment lawsuit against President Clinton--is paying the family's legal bills. The institute is pressing this case as part of its strategy to clarify the religious expression permitted in public schools, said Kim Hazelwood, eastern regional coordinator. ``We're finding that there's a lot of confusion around the country on what the boundaries are,'' Hazelwood said. ``This case shows that there are still individual students whose religious speech is being restricted.'' Zachariah left the school district shortly after the incident; the family moved to nearby Lumberton, for reasons related to the lawsuit. The lawsuit, which names state and local school officials, seeks unspecified compensatory damages from the school board. It also calls for a new policy to ``protect students who present religious views.'' Mr. Speaker, I think it is really important that people be able to look at this and think upon it and ponder. What has the Supreme Court done? Think about something as simple as the Ten Commandments. The decisions the U.S. Supreme Court has made have not just been against prayer in public schools, but they said that the Ten Commandments cannot be posted on the walls of the public school. Here in the House Chamber we have, and I am facing it right now, we have the image of Moses where we can see it, and it reminds us of Moses as the great lawgiver because he brought the Ten Commandments down from Mount Sinai. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has a depiction of Moses and the Ten Commandments on the wall in the chambers, the official chambers of the U.S. Supreme Court. We have right above your head, Mr. Speaker, ``In God We Trust,'' which we have on our coins and dollar bills and other places as a national motto. But the U.S. Supreme Court said, ``No, you cannot have the Ten Commandments either just posted on the wall of a public school.'' They did that in the case in 1980 of Stone v. Graham, and their reasoning they wrote in their opinion: Because if the Ten Commandments were there, students might read them, might revere them, and might obey them. Just think of what they would be asked to obey, the values that are fundamental to us, commandments such as, ``Thou shalt not kill.'' When we hear, Mr. Speaker, about the terrible thing that happened in Jonesboro, Arkansas just last week, would we not like to be free to teach our kids in public school that it is wrong to kill? I mean they do not get that message on television. Why, why are some intolerant people trying to separate us from our values by stripping out prayer, stripping out references to religion or the Ten Commandments, or stripping out the reunion of two brothers from our public schools, as happened to Zachariah Hood, a first grade student? Mr. Speaker, trying to address this and similar decisions, sad distortions of the First Amendment, is the very reason that over 150 Members of this body have come together as cosponsors of the religious freedom amendment. It is a constitutional amendment, Mr. Speaker. We revere the U.S. Constitution. I hold it as a sacred document. But the U.S. Supreme Court has twisted it beyond recognition. The first amendment, the very first part of it says Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. It does not say you have to strip away religious references in our society. It does not say you cannot have prayer. It does not say you cannot refer to the Ten Commandments. It just says we will not have an official religion. We will not have a government- designated religion in the USA, but we are going to have religious freedom. But we are caught in a Catch 22, devised by the court. If you try to exercise freedom of religion on public property, you are told, no, we are saying that is the same as establishing a national church, and we are going to stop you. And you have this debate that goes on about taking away our heritage. I want to share with you, Mr. Speaker, the religious freedom amendment. The full text, it is pretty straightforward, we tried to track what the first amendment really said and really intended and followed that as our pattern, but at the same time reversed the distortions that the U.S. Supreme Court has made of it. The religious freedom amendment, House Joint Resolution 78, simply states, to secure the people's right to acknowledge God according to the dictates of conscience, neither the United States nor any State shall establish any official religion, but the people's right to pray and to recognize their religious beliefs, heritage or traditions on public property, including schools, shall not be infringed. Neither the United States nor any State shall require any person to join in prayer or other religious activity, proscribe school prayers, discriminate against religion or deny equal access to a benefit on account of religion. That is it, Mr. Speaker. That is the positive statement of our rights and the protection against government trying to create a national church or trying to compel people to pray or tell them how to pray or what to pray, but to secure our rights, which have been stripped away systematically by these series of decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, rights that have not just affected me and my family, but Zachariah Hood, the first grade student of New Jersey, and his family and people all around the country. Mr. Speaker, it is really sad to see and hear about the things going on, like in Ohio, there is a lawsuit now in Ohio, Mr. Speaker, that is related to their State motto. We can say in God we trust as it does in the House Chamber as our motto. In fact, the Star-Spangled Banner states, in one of the verses, and this be our motto, in God is our trust. Ohio, as its State motto, makes a similar reference. But unfortunately it is being sued to take it away. The motto is simply, with God all things are possible. That is it. Pretty straightforward. Pretty simple. But the ACLU does not like that, the same people who are bringing the lawsuits against school prayer, against the Ten Commandments, against all sorts of simple, nonthreatening references, to strip away, to censor them; they are suing Ohio. They are suing West Virginia to stop prayers at football games. They are suing to take things off of city seals and logos. They will get around to our currency in God we trust at one time or another, I am sure, but, Mr. Speaker, the standard ought to be pretty straightforward and simple. You do not compel anybody to participate, just like when we have the pledge of allegiance at school, nobody is compelled to join in. The U.S. Supreme Court has given them that right, and I agree with that decision, but let us apply the same standard to school prayer to say nobody can be compelled to participate, but that does not give you the right to censor those that do want to participate. That is fair. It protects minority and majority. That is what the first amendment is supposed to do, to protect all of us. I think it is fascinating that some people think the first amendment is only meant to protect them, but no one else, and it is to protect their right to be intolerant and not my might to express my faith or the rights of children who want to start the day with a simple prayer, not because they are compelled by the school, the school should not compel them to do that. But if the students say we want to start the day with a prayer, why not? If someone does not want to join in, they do not have to join in, but why tread on the rights of those who want to start the day at school the same way we start the day here in the Congress of the United States, with a prayer; the same way that the Oklahoma legislature and probably every legislature in this country opens every day, with a prayer; the way that city councils begin their meetings, with a prayer; the way that Rotary Clubs will start their meetings, with a prayer, or Kiwanis clubs or Chambers of Commerce or Boy Scouts or Girl Scouts or whoever it might be? It is common. It is ordinary. It is good. It is positive. Yet we have intolerant people saying, oh, it is horrible. It offends me to hear you pray. Mr. Speaker, I think the problem is with the person that chooses to take offense, not with the person that chooses to express hope. Unfortunately, our courts have sided with those who want to suppress simple expression of faith. The religious freedom amendment will be on the floor of this House in the next few weeks. It has been approved by the Subcommittee on the Constitution. It has been approved by the House Committee on the Judiciary. This is the first time that a school prayer amendment has been approved by a committee of Congress, even though the decision against voluntary prayer in public schools was rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court back in 1962, 36 years ago. We have not had a vote in this House on a proposal like that for 28 years. Even then it took some special maneuvering to get it around the committee process. I am appreciative of the Judiciary chairman, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), who has helped to shepherd it through and get it to where now we are about to have an historic vote. Mr. Speaker, it is long overdue that we address the problem of court discrimination against religion. Mr. Speaker, I think that as we do this, we need to focus on the fact that we are doing this because the American people have never accepted what the Supreme Court did. I have a collection of 36 years of public opinion polls and consistently three-fourths or more of the American people say, yes, we support a constitutional amendment to make it possible to have prayers in public schools again. If you ask them to, if you go to another question, you say, well, what about songs around, dare I say it, around Christmastime, because some schools do not even want to call them Christmas pageants they have anymore. They are winter programs. And you will find places where you can go that they will say, you can sing Frosty the Snowman, you can sing Walking in a Winter Wonderland, you can sing Here Comes Santa Claus, but you better leave out Silent Night and O Come All Ye Faithful. The religious freedom amendment says that is an expression of religious heritage or tradition. That ought to be permitted, whether it is a Christian song or it is a Jewish song or that of another faith, let people understand that there is faith as a normal part of life. We may have some differences among us, some people may pray different ways. Let them hear each other pray different ways. Let them be aware that beyond the differences and even more important than the differences is a unity, a unity and a belief in God. The Declaration of Independence states that belief. The founding document of the United States of America says, we hold these truths to be self-evident that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men. Our Founding Fathers wrote the very reason for government is not to create rights or to establish rights, but to protect, to secure the rights which come to us from our Creator, from God. Is that taught? It is in the Declaration of Independence. Yet some people are telling us that that is not a proper teaching these days. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Blunt).

Mr. ISTOOK. I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina.

Mr. ISTOOK. Reclaiming my time, I would say to my colleague that, fortunately, few schools try to actually ban the Bible, although there have been cases of it. At this point, the courts have not gone so far to say the student cannot bring a Bible to school. But the test, of course, is not how many rights do we have left. The test is how many rights have already been taken away from us. Because if that student, with or without a Bible, says we want to have a prayer at graduation or a football game or school assembly or to start the day in class, they are told, oh, no, someone might not want to hear it.

Mr. ISTOOK. I wish I could tell my colleague that he is incorrect; but, unfortunately, he is correct. The high school, I believe, was Ball High School in Galveston, Texas. I read the transcript of the judge's remarks because of an appellate decision, which is still subject to the Supreme Court's changing. But at that time, because of an appellate decision, he felt that he had to honor their request to let them have a prayer at graduation, but he started putting limitations on it saying, if anyone mentions Jesus, I will have the U.S. marshal there to arrest them. So he was telling them, you know, I am going to tell you how to pray. And, unfortunately, most of the court decisions, including the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1992, said we should not have prayers at graduation. That was the Lever v. Weisman case, which came out of Rhode Island. So the gentleman is correct that they are saying we should not have prayers at graduation. They are suing West Virginia now over prayers at football games. There are other lawsuits going on. There are still some schools which, frankly, have students practicing civil disobedience, that they are having prayers during school instructional hours, basically because the ACLU has not gotten around to suing them yet. I will make some more comments on this, but I would like to hear more from the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Jones).

Mr. ISTOOK. Certainly. The Founding Fathers, in their wisdom, understood there could be some problems that would require somebody who misinterpreted the Constitution, as the Supreme Court has done. So they created within the Constitution a mechanism which is a constitutional amendment, which has been used a couple dozen times in this country; and it is a very straightforward mechanism. There is an alternate one with conventions. But basically it says, two-thirds of the House and two-thirds of the Senate approve a constitutional amendment. Then it goes to the States for ratification. Three-fourths of the States must ratify that amendment. Now, they do not need a two-thirds vote in each of those States. They only need a simple majority. But it is done through the legislatures. We notice there is no official role of the President or of the governors of the State. It is done by the House and the Senate of the Congress, and then it goes to the State legislature for the Houses and Senates and Assemblies, as they are called, in the various States. That is the process. That is the process we are following with the religious freedom amendment. I would like to point out that that is the process that has been followed several times when the U.S. Supreme Court had a distortion that Congress thought was necessary to correct. The 11th amendment to the Constitution was to overturn a U.S. Supreme Court decision about whether States could be sued in Federal courts by citizens of other States. And the 14th amendment, the first portion of it, was intended to overturn the Dred Scott decision, which had held that African Americans, whether slave or free, could not become citizens of the United States. So the 14th amendment was a constitutional correction of a U.S. Supreme Court decision. The income tax amendment involved changing a U.S. Supreme Court amendment. That was the 16th amendment. So this is the process that has been followed in other cases. Also, the 26th amendment, to make 18 the voting age. They are all responses to decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. So, too, the religious freedom amendment is in response to a number of decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. We may want to detail some of those in a minute and how this affects some of those decisions. But it is responding to the anti-prayer, anti- Ten Commandments, anti-nativity scenes, and anti-graduation prayer and similar decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court. We are following the process set up by the Founding Fathers.

Mr. ISTOOK. I very much appreciate the comments of the gentleman from North Carolina. Before recognizing another colleague, I would like to elaborate a bit on something the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Blunt) brought up, which was the Founding Fathers' intent. He talked about George Washington. A lot of people do not know that the day after the first amendment was approved by the Congress, Washington asked Congress to declare a national day of prayer and fasting. Obviously, he did not think that was inconsistent with what Congress had just done, because they turned around and they approved a day of prayer and fasting. In fact, when we talk about the intent of the Founding Fathers, I know different people say, well, Thomas Jefferson said this and that. Of course, he did not draft the first amendment. He was not there. But if we want to go to an authoritative source for what the first amendment really intended to do and to look for some guidance on this catch phrase that is used often without thinking, this catch phrase that says, ``separation of church and State,'' what does it mean, why do we not choose for our authority the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, William Rehnquist? I am not talking about the Chief Justice 200 years ago. I am talking about the one today that, as part of his work, has gone through and studied it. And in one of the official decisions, and he was a dissenter in this decision, but he talked about this; and that was the 5-4 decision that came down in 1985 in the case of Wallace v. Jaffrey, where the U.S. Supreme Court said that for a State to permit a moment of silence, for a State to permit a moment of silence in public schools was unconstitutional because it could be used by students to say a silent prayer. That is how outrageous the decisions have gotten. It was a 5-4 decision of the Supreme Court. And Justice Rehnquist, in commenting about what the other Justices were doing, wrote about this term ``separation of church and State.'' I want to tell my colleagues what Chief Justice Rehnquist said. He said, the term ``separation of church and State'' has caused a ``mischievous diversion of judges from the actual intentions of the drafters of the Bill of Rights. The wall of separation between church and State is a metaphor based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging. It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned.'' Those are the words of the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, who wrote them just right across the street from this building as part of an official opinion. Why? Because he studied it. And, as he said, ``The evil to be aimed at, so far as its drafters were concerned, appears to have been the establishment of a national church and perhaps the preference of one religious sect over another. But it was definitely not concerned about whether the government might aid all religions evenhandedly.'' So I take no less authority than the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court to say that that term has been used to twist and distort the real meaning and the real intention of the first amendment. The religious freedom amendment follows what Justice Rehnquist said was the actual intention and should still be the actual intention of the first amendment had it not been corrected. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell).

Mr. ISTOOK. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman would engage in a dialogue on this, because you are exactly right, you are right on target, I believe, with your analysis, because religion has been relegated to a category of speech which must be controlled and limited, because supposedly it carries some danger or some threat. You are familiar, as an attorney, with a number of cases where the U.S. Supreme Court has said, even though the First Amendment states an absolute right of free speech, that does not give you the right to incite a crowd to rebel against the government or to engage in libelous and slanderous comment or to yell ``fire'' in a crowded theater and so forth. So, too, we have some limits on free speech, but we also have freedom of religion. They have placed expression of religion, prayer and similar things in a category that does not have the same protection as you mentioned of wearing a black arm band. There may be some other students in class who say, ``I am offended by your wearing of a black arm band,'' but that does not give them the right to censor the other student. But if the student says, ``I am offended because they offer the prayer,'' then the Supreme Court says, oh, well, in that case, we are going to say you cannot do it. The U.S. Supreme Court has passed decisions protecting the Nazi swastika. They have passed decisions protecting the burning of a cross. The case I am thinking of, the swastika, it was where the American Nazis were wanting to march through Skokie, Illinois, a Jewish community with a number of Holocaust survivors. The U.S. Supreme Court said no, free speech, no matter how insulting or horrible you may see it to be, they still have their right of free speech. But when it comes to religious expression, they have said, oh, it is okay, you can suppress it. In your State of California, the Internal Revenue Service, one of its big district offices is Laguna Niguel. I have got a copy of the memo that was circulated to the employees of the IRS saying you cannot have in your desk or your personal work space a Bible, a picture of Christ, a cross, a Star of David, or other religious symbols. I wrote the IRS. I said what is this about, telling people that in their own desk that they cannot have these? This is part of their personal effects out there. The IRS wrote back and they said items which are considered intrusive, such as, and I am quoting by the way, ``items which are considered intrusive, such as religious emblems or sexually suggestive cartoons or calendars'' had to be controlled and restricted. They have placed religious speech in the same category as pornography, requiring not only restriction but prior restraint by the government. That is the danger. I wanted to share that with you.

Mr. ISTOOK. Certainly.

Mr. ISTOOK. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman would yield a moment, and let us look at this specific example of prayer in public schools. It should not be the role of a principal or a teacher to say we are going to have prayer at school or prayer to start the school day or football game or whatever. But if the students are saying, and it could be individually, it could be collectively, are saying we want to have that, then the government is in the position of accommodating that. So we have here the language that says the people have a right to pray. The government does not prescribe it. It does not prescribe it. It does not say you must have the school prayer. It does not say what the content has got to be. So the government does not prescribe it. But if the people exercising their right say we want to be able to have a prayer, we are required by law to be here at school all day, why should we be isolated from what is normal just because we are required by law to be at school. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart wrote about that in some of these cases. He stated in a society that so structures a child's life where attendance at public school is compulsory, if the child is required to be isolated from normal everyday religious influences, then religion has been placed in an artificial and State-created disadvantage. I think Justice Stewart had it right. I would yield further to Mr. Campbell.

Mr. ISTOOK. I thank the gentleman from California. Mr. Speaker, I would note, too, that it is not only the Founding Fathers of the country as a whole that were so desirous of making sure that we expressed our reliance upon God for our rights and for our values that we teach to our children and want to pass on from one generation to another, it was not just those who founded the United States, but also those who have served as Founding Fathers of our different States have seen fit to incorporate language into our State constitutions that acknowledges our reliance upon Divine Providence. For example, the different State constitutions, each and every one of them, all 50 States include an express reference to God within their State constitutions. I mention that to some who say, why should we mention God in the U.S. Constitution? Why have all 50 States seen fit to mention Him in theirs? For example, the State constitution in Alaska states that its citizens are, ``grateful to God and to those who founded our Nation in order to secure and transmit to succeeding generations our heritage of political, civil, and religious liberty.'' In Colorado, their constitution includes the phrase, ``with profound reverence for the Supreme Ruler of the universe.'' The constitutions of Idaho, California, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin all use this exact phrase, ``grateful to Almighty God for our freedom.'' It goes on. I have got a list of all 50 State constitutions and the different references to them. It is about time that we understand that we have had Founding Fathers, and some of them may have been female as well as male, but in all 50 States that have seen this necessity to reflect a pillar principle upon which this Nation was founded. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. ISTOOK

Mr. ISTOOK. Mr. Speaker, I am thankful for the opportunity to address an extremely significant issue that relates to our schools, that relates to some of our most cherished principles as citizens of the United States of America and that unfortunately involves things which the courts of the United States have thrust upon the people despite the unwillingness of the people, in fact despite great concern and opposition by the public. This relates, Mr. Speaker, to the matter of what happens in our public schools. It relates to the practices that have gone on for generations upon generations in this country involving prayer in public bodies, in particular, in our schools. I am not talking about this just to be talking about it, Mr. Speaker. I am doing it because we are going to have an opportunity in the next few weeks here in the House of Representatives to vote on correcting what the courts in the United States have done, what the U.S. Supreme Court has done in its bans and restrictions and prohibitions on the practice of simple prayers being offered at public school. That particular legislation is the Religious Freedom Amendment, House Joint Resolution 78. I am privileged to be the principal sponsor of it. There are over 150 Members of this body who are sponsors as well. I would like to share with my colleagues the text of that. The Religious Freedom Amendment is very simple and straightforward and tries to return us to what were bedrock principles of this country until the Supreme Court began undercutting those principles some 36 years ago. The text is very straightforward and reads as follows as an amendment to the U.S. Constitution: To secure the people's right to acknowledge God according to the dictates of conscience, neither the United States nor any State shall establish any official religion, but the people's right to pray and to recognize their religious beliefs, heritage or traditions on public property, including schools, shall not be infringed. Neither the United States nor any State shall require any person to join in prayer or other religious activity, prescribe school prayers, discriminate against religion or deny equal access to a benefit on account of religion. It is simple and it is straightforward. It states that just as the constitutions of every single State in this country state, we believe in the people's right to acknowledge God, and expressly mentions him, as the constitutions of the States do. No official religion, but not these restrictions that are put on prayer and positive expressions of religious faith but that are not applied to other forms of speech. Why is religious speech singled out for discrimination? Mr. Speaker, in 1962, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that even when participation was voluntary and even if it was some sort of nonsectarian prayer, it was unconstitutional, they said, for school children to join together in a prayer in their classroom. That was followed by other Supreme Court decisions, Stone v. Graham in 1980, in which the U.S. Supreme Court said that the Ten Commandments could not be displayed on the walls of a public school. Mr. Speaker, I would note that that decision came out of your home State of Kentucky because it was Kentucky schools that had the practice. Groups would make copies of the Ten Commandments available and they would be hung with other important documents as the source of law as well as the source of spiritual guidance. I notice, Mr. Speaker, here in the Chamber of this House as I am facing and as the Speaker faces from the Speaker's dais, right there is the visage of Moses looking down on this Chamber, the great lawgiver who brought down from Mount Sinai the Ten Commandments which cannot be displayed in public schools. The U.S. Supreme Court says it is unconstitutional. They went beyond that. They ruled in a case that came out of Pennsylvania, they ruled that a nativity scene and also a Jewish menorah could not be placed on public property during the holiday season unless right up there next to it you put nonreligious emblems, like plastic reindeer and Santa Claus and Frosty the Snowman. They had to be balanced. But, Mr. Speaker, I have never heard of any community that is required if they want to put out Santa Claus that they have to balance him with a nativity scene or a menorah or whatever it may be. It seems to be a one-way street. The U.S. Supreme Court kept going. They had the case in 1985 of Wallace v. Jaffree. It came out of Alabama. Alabama had a law that said you can have a moment of silence to start the day at school, a moment of silence. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that was unconstitutional, because one of the permitted uses of that moment of silence was to enable students to have a silent prayer, and thus they said the whole moment of silence is even unconstitutional. And then a case upon which I would like to elaborate in 1992. By a 5-4 decision, the case of Lee v. Weisman out of Rhode Island, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled a prayer at a school graduation to be unconstitutional. It was a prayer that was offered by a Jewish rabbi. The court held it was unconstitutional. All of these things, Mr. Speaker, are what the Supreme Court has done to twist and distort and undermine our First Amendment, the very first right mentioned in the First Amendment, Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Now, without even getting into the point of whether a school is creating an act of the Congress, and we are kind of two different bodies at two different levels, but to say that they are ignoring the part of the Constitution that says you do not prohibit the free exercise of religion, because what the Court did, Mr. Speaker, in all of these cases is to say that having a prayer or the Ten Commandments or a moment of silence or a nativity scene or a menorah, that that was the same as creating an official church. How absurd. An official church created just because you have a prayer? We open sessions of this Congress with a prayer. The House and the Senate, just like legislative bodies all around the country, be it State legislatures or city councils or private groups, Chamber of Commerce meetings, Kiwanis Club, Rotary Club, PTA meetings, people commonly open those things with prayer, just as we do here in Congress. It is normal. It does not make us a church just because we have a prayer. But the Supreme Court says, ``Oh, you have a prayer at school and you're turning the school into a church.'' Therefore, they ignore the free exercise clause of the Constitution. We have been living under this for 36 years. The only way that we are going to be able to fix this is with the religious freedom amendment, to straighten out the courts, by saying that the things they have said are somehow wrong are indeed, as the American people believe, right. I said I wanted to focus on a particular case. That was the case in 1992 of Lee v. Weisman. What I would like to do, Mr. Speaker, is in different evenings during these special orders in talking about the Religious Freedom Amendment, I think it is important to dissect and to help Members of this body as well as the general public to understand what the courts said so that we can understand the necessity of correcting it with the Religious Freedom Amendment. After all, that has been the method that we have used to correct Supreme Court decisions ever since the 1800s in America, including, for example, Supreme Court decisions such as the Dred Scott decision that were trying to uphold the practice of slavery. We made sure that it was outlawed. Mr. Speaker, looking at the Lee v. Weisman case, and I would note, it is a 5-4 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. Had one justice, just one of the nine justices of the U.S. Supreme Court gone the other way, we would not have this same problem when it comes to being able to have a prayer at a school graduation. Yet because one justice would not go the other way, we have to get two-thirds of the House of Representatives, two-thirds of the Senate to approve a constitutional amendment, and of course then it has to be ratified by the legislatures in three-fourths of the States, all because by a margin of 5-4 the Supreme Court made this ruling. This was a very strange ruling, Mr. Speaker, because the Supreme Court rested the whole decision on the notion that to expect someone during a prayer is psychological coercion that the majority of the Supreme Court equated with the same as using compulsion on someone to have a particular religion just because at this graduation the students were expected to be respectful, not only respectful of the prayer offered by the rabbi but respectful of the other speakers, respectful of the people as they came in as a group, as part of this graduation, respectful of the other people in attendance. But, oh, if it was respect for the rabbi's prayer, oh, there the Supreme Court said, ``Well, you can't expect people to be respectful of religion. After all, they may disagree.'' Okay. I disagree with many of the things said on the floor of this House. That does not mean that I have a right to silence and to censor the people who may say it. It is common in everyday life. In all sorts of settings, we hear things with which we disagree. That does not give us the right to censor and silence people. But this notion of political correctness which has been extended into schools is saying, ``Oh, but my goodness, if somebody doesn't like it, let's see if we can find an excuse to silence them,'' and they twist and distort the First Amendment to make it anti-religious instead of positive toward religion and use that as an excuse to silence people. Let us look at this decision. The decision came down from the U.S. Supreme Court June 24, 1992. The justices who said that this prayer at a school graduation was unconstitutional were Justices Kennedy, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor and Souder. Dissenting and, boy, did they dissent in very clear terms, dissenting were Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, the Chief Justice, White, and Thomas. I am looking at the Supreme Court decision and for people that look up these things and want to look up the reference, which is called the citation, it is cited as 505 U.S. 577. That is 505 United States Reports, page 577. As the Court wrote, and Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the majority and a lot of organizations got involved in this, and I am glad to say, Mr. Speaker, by the way, that most of those who were arguing in favor of the graduation prayer are also supporters of the religious freedom amendment. The prayer actually happened in 1989. The Supreme Court took 3 years to make its decision. But it was a public school, Nathan Bishop Middle School in Providence, Rhode Island. There was a 14-year-old girl who was one of the graduates of middle school, her name was Deborah Weisman. At the time she was about 14 years old. Now, it was the policy in the schools and the superintendent to permit principals to invite members of the clergy to give invocations and benedictions. Often, it was not always but often they chose to make these part of the graduation ceremonies. The objector in this case was Deborah Weisman and her father Daniel Weisman. The school principal invited a Jewish rabbi to offer the prayer. The rabbi's name was Leslie Gutterman, and he was from the Temple Beth El in Providence, Rhode Island. Now these were the two prayers that he offered Mr. Speaker, which the Supreme Court held were unconstitutional, and I think people can decide for themselves if they think there is something offensive here. The invocation offered by Rabbi Gutterman was as follows: God of the free, hope of the brave, for the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of minorities are protected, we thank You. May these young men and women grow up to enrich it. For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new graduates grow up to guard it. For the political process of America in which all its citizens may participate, for its court system where all may seek justice, we thank You. May those we honor this morning always turn to it in trust. For the destiny of America, we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan Bishop Middle School so live that they might help to share it. May our aspirations for our country and for these young people who are our hope for the future be richly fulfilled. Amen. So the invocation by Rabbi Gutterman even praised the very courts which later said that he violated the Constitution in doing so. Then there is the benediction that the rabbi offered at the close of the graduation. These were the words that he pronounced: O God, we are grateful to you for having endowed us with a capacity for learning which we have celebrated on this joyous commencement. Happy families give thanks for seeing their children achieve an important milestone. Send your blessings upon the teachers and administrators who helped prepare them. The graduates now need strength and guidance for the future. Help them to understand that we are not complete with academic knowledge alone. We must each strive to fulfill what you require of us all, to do justly, to love mercy, to walk humbly. We give thanks to you, Lord, for keeping us alive, sustaining us and allowing us to reach this special happy occasion. Amen. That was the benediction offered by Rabbi Gutterman which again the U.S. Supreme Court, because someone chose to find it offensive, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional. Now in this, Mr. Speaker, do you notice the case was brought by and on behalf of one student? Now the Court does not tell us clearly just how big the class was. It was evidently, from other comments you know, a good-size graduating class from this middle school. No one else joined in the court case to say I also object, just one student, and that is part of the problem with the standard, the erroneous standard that has been created by the Supreme Court. If one person objects, everyone else is censored. In fact, they have even said even if nobody does object, the possibility that somebody could object is enough to make us say that you should not have prayers at school graduations or prayers at the start of the school day. Since when, Mr. Speaker, does something have to be unanimous before we can say it under free speech in the USA? And why should we restrict religious speech? But let me get back to what Justice Kennedy wrote for this five-- four-Court majority. He mentioned * * * the parties stipulate attendance at these graduations is voluntary, and they also note the students stood for the Pledge of Allegiance, and then they remained standing for the rabbi's prayers, and the court wrote that they assume that there was a respectful moment of silence just before and just after the prayers, but despite that, the rabbi's two prayers probably did not last much beyond a minute each, if even that much. Now the school board, and by the way the United States of America through the Solicitor General's Office, sided with the school board. The Solicitor General filed a brief on behalf of the school. The school board argued that the short prayers and others like it are of profound meaning to many students and parents throughout the country. As Justice Kennedy noted, they consider that * * * due respect and acknowledgment for divine guidance and for the deepest spiritual aspirations of our people ought to be expressed at an event as important in life as graduation. Now first the plaintiffs, the Weismans, asked for a court injunction to stop the prayer from taking place. The court said we do not have time before the graduation, did not grant the injunction. They maintained the suit after the prayers were given, the court made the decision, oh, it should not have happened, it was unconstitutional, and they held, of course, a violation of the first amendment. They issued a permanent injunction against the school system there in Providence, Rhode Island, saying you are permanently enjoined, do not do this again, do not have one of these horrible prayers at school graduation. Of course, I do not think it is horrible, I think it is normal. But the court held that it was unconstitutional, and on appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals agreed with the district court, as ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court did. Now Justice Kennedy wrote, well, even though attendance is voluntary at graduation it is really kind of obligatory because you expect students to want to be at their graduation. And they found a lot of criticism with the fact that the actual invitation to the rabbi, rather than coming maybe from a student body officer or something like that, the fact that the invitation was extended by the principal of the school, the Supreme Court thought that was very significant. Now I do not know how that affected necessarily the nature of the prayer that the rabbi gave, but the rabbi was given a copy of different guidelines for civic occasions. And that was the name of the document, Guidelines for Civic Occasions, that the principal gave him and said, I hope your prayers are going to be nonsectarian. And, as the Court said, well, that was a State effort to control the prayer. Now imagine that. They say we hope that you will offer a prayer that will be as acceptable as possible to people, and the Court says that is the same as controlling the content. And then the Court went on to say that it is unconstitutional for the government to try to suggest that a prayer seek common ground. Really, they really said that. This is what Justice Kennedy wrote, these are his words: If common ground can be defined which permits one's conflicting faiths to express the shared conviction that there is an ethic and morality which transcends human invention, the sense of community and purpose sought by all decent societies might be advanced. But though the First Amendment does not allow the government to stifle prayers which aspire to these ends, neither does it permit the government to undertake that task for itself. I find it very interesting, Mr. Speaker, that Justice Kennedy says the first amendment does not allow the government to stifle prayers, and yet that is what the Supreme Court did in this very case. They stifled the prayers. They said that it may have happened that time but do not let us catch you doing it again. Then Justice Kennedy said, ``Let's look at the position of the students, both those who desired the prayer and she who did not.'' Now that is interesting, it is in the plural. Those who desired the prayer, that is plural; and ``she,'' one person who did not want the prayer to occur. Justice Kennedy wrote: To endure the speech of false ideas or offensive content and then to counter it is part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society, a society which insists upon open discourse towards the ends of a tolerant citizenry. Against this background, students may consider it an odd measure of justice to be subjected during the course of their education to ideas deemed offensive and irreligious, but to be denied a brief formal prayer ceremony that the school offers in return. Now, I am glad he noticed that. It does seem strange, Mr. Speaker, all the things that happen in schools, all the things that are advanced as part of school curriculums that so many people find distasteful and objectionable, whether it be things that relate to evolution, some people find offensive same-sex marriages, rainbow curriculums, a lot of the things that are done in public schools today that offend a great many people. But we are told we have to learn to live in a pluralistic society except when it comes to a situation such as a prayer, and then we are told, oh no, tolerance does not go that far, tolerance does not dictate that we listen to or respect religious expression on public property. Here was the linchpin of what Justice Kennedy wrote. He went on to say: The undeniable fact is that the school district's supervision and control of a high school graduation ceremony places public pressure as well as peer pressure on attending students to stand as a group or at least maintain respectful silence during the invocation and benediction. This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion. Of course, in our culture, standing or remaining silent can signify adherence to a view or simple respect for views of others, and no doubt some persons who have no desire to join a prayer have little objection to standing as a sign of respect for those who do. But for the dissenter of high school age who has a reasonable perception that she is being forced by the State to pray in a manner her conscience will not allow, the injury is no less real. What matters is that, given our social conventions, a reasonable dissenter in this milieu could believe that the group exercise signified her own participation or approval of it. Notice what Justice Kennedy said. People, by standing, do not indicate that they are agreeing with the prayer. People, by being quiet and respectful, that does not necessarily mean that they are joining in the prayer, becoming participants in it. But because one individual might think that that is the same as participating in a prayer in which they did not want to join, therefore you cannot have it. You can teach people, you can teach our children at school, and I sure hope they do, Mr. Speaker. You can teach them to be tolerant and respectful and courteous about other things, but not to be respectful of religion or of prayer. Justice Kennedy wrote further: It is, we concede, a brief exercise during which the individual can concentrate on joining its message, meditate on her own religion, or let her mind wander. But the embarrassment and the intrusion of the religious exercise cannot be refuted by arguing that these prayers are of de minimis character. To do so would be an affront to the rabbi who offered them. Can you understand that, Mr. Speaker? The Supreme Court ruled that we cannot say that it was just a minimal intrusion, because otherwise it would be insulting the rabbi, so instead of insulting the rabbi by saying that maybe there is somebody in the audience that did not want to hear the prayer, the Supreme Court says let us insult the rabbi by just saying you violated the Constitution. What a remedy. They say that they knocked out the prayer to avoid insulting the rabbi who offered the prayer. It is really hard for me, Mr. Speaker, to follow this psychological coercion test that Justice Kennedy and the majority of the Supreme Court wrote about in this decision. I think it is much more fruitful to look at what the four Justices wrote when they dissented, that being Justices Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Thomas. This is what they wrote countering what the Supreme Court had done. I would like to advise you, Mr. Speaker, that it is the philosophy that was voiced by four Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in this dissent; it is that philosophy which is embodied in the Religious Freedom Amendment. In fact, in other cases impinging upon religious freedom, there were dissents filed by other Justices of the Supreme Court. We have taken to heart what they said, and what they believe is the proper interpretation of the Constitution and I think what the American people believe is the proper interpretation. We have sought to incorporate that in the religious freedom amendment upon which we will soon be voting. So let us look then at what these four Justices wrote through Justice Scalia. Talking about the majority ruling, they wrote: As its instrument of destruction, the bulldozer of social engineering, the Court invents a boundless and boundlessly manipulable test of psychological coercion; lays waste a tradition that is as old as public school graduations themselves, and that is a component of an even more long- standing American tradition. Today's opinion shows more forcibly than volumes of argumentation why our Nation's protection, that fortress which is our Constitution, cannot possibly rest upon the changeable, philosophical predilections of the Justices of this Court, but must have deep foundations in the historic practices of our people. They went on to discuss, Mr. Speaker, some of the historic practices of prayer in public settings. As they wrote, * * * the history and tradition of our Nation are replete with public ceremonies featuring prayers of thanksgiving and petition. In his first inaugural address, after swearing his oath of office on a Bible, George Washington deliberately made a prayer part of his first official act as President. Such supplication has been a characteristic feature of inaugural addresses ever since. Thomas Jefferson, for example, prayed in his first inaugural address. In his second inaugural address, Jefferson acknowledged his need for divine guidance and invited his audience to join his prayer. Reading further from the Court dissent, * * * similarly, James Madison, in his first inaugural address, placed his confidence in the guardianship and guidance of that Almighty Being whose power regulates the destiny of nations. Most recently, President Bush, continuing the tradition established by President Washington, asked those attending his inauguration to bow their heads and made a prayer his first official act as President. Reading further from Justice Scalia, * * * the day after the First Amendment was proposed, Congress urged President Washington to proclaim a day of public thanksgiving and prayer to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and signal favors of Almighty God. President Washington responded by declaring Thanksgiving for November 26, 1789. Reading further from the dissent in the Lee v. Weisman case, * * * the other two branches of the Federal Government also have a long-established practice of prayer at public events. As we detailed in Marsh v. Chambers, congressional sessions have opened with a chaplain's prayer ever since the first Congress. And this Court's own sessions have opened with the invocation ``God save the United States and this Honorable Court'' since the days of Chief Justice Marshall. In addition to this general tradition of prayer at public ceremonies, there exists a more specific tradition of invocations and benedictions at public school graduation exercises. By one account, the first public high school graduation ceremony took place in Connecticut in July 1868, the very month, as it happens, that the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, when 15 seniors from the Norwich Free Academy marched in their best Sunday suits and dresses into a church hall and waited through majestic music and long prayers. As the Court acknowledges in describing the customary features of high school graduations, the invocation and benediction have long been recognized to be as traditional as any other parts of the school graduation program and are widely established. Yet, Mr. Speaker, despite what 4 dissenting Justices were telling them in the words which I am reading to you, Mr. Speaker, despite that, just by a margin of 5 to 4, the Supreme Court said you should not have prayer at school graduations. Now, these dissenting 4 Justices, Mr. Speaker, they turned their attention then to the argument, this psychological coercion argument that had been made by Justice Kennedy on behalf of the majority. Let me read you what they wrote about this. According to the Court, students in graduation who want to avoid the fact or appearance of participation in the invocation and benediction are psychologically obligated by public pressure as well as peer pressure to stand as a group or at least maintain respectful silence during those prayers. This assertion, the very linchpin of the Court's opinion, is almost as intriguing for what it is does not say as for what it says. It does not say, for example, that students are psychologically coerced to bow their heads, to place their hands in a prayerful position, to pay attention to the prayers, to utter amen, or in fact to pray. It claims only that the psychological coercion consists of being coerced to stand or at least maintain respectful silence. That is all anybody was coerced to do. Nobody was required to join in a prayer. They were just expected to be respectful. Mr. Speaker, it is a sad day when students in public schools are not taught to be respectful even, and perhaps especially, when somebody is saying or doing something with which they disagree. The 4 dissenting Justices called the arguments of their 5 brethren ``ludicrous.'' That is their word for it, ludicrous. But they wrote further, * * * let us assume the very worst, that the nonparticipating graduate is suddenly coerced to stand. Even that does not remotely establish a participation or an appearance of participation in a religious exercise. The Court acknowledges that in our culture, standing can signify adherence to a view or simple respect for the views of others. But if it is a permissible inference that one who is standing is doing so simply out of respect for the prayers of others, then how can it possibly be said that a reasonable dissenter could believe that the group exercise signifies her own participation or approval. The opinion manifests that the Court itself has not given careful consideration to its test of psychological coercion. For if it had, how could it observe with no hint of concern or disapproval that the student stood for the pledge of allegiance which immediately preceded Rabbi Gutterman's invocation? Does that not ring a bell, Mr. Speaker? Is that now how we open our sessions of this Congress? We stand together, and we say the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag that is draped behind you, Mr. Speaker, and a prayer is offered. The Supreme Court said that that simple pattern was unconstitutional in a public school setting. Now, about this requirement of standing, which is the only thing that any student was asked, not compelled, but they said, well, it was coercion. It was coercion to expect him to stand, even though they were not forced to. As Justice Scalia wrote in the dissent, * * * if students were psychologically coerced to remain standing during the invocation, they must also have been psychologically coerced moments before to stand for, and thereby, in the Court's view, to take part in or appear to take part in the Pledge of Allegiance. Must the Pledge, therefore, be barred from the public schools? I mention that, Mr. Speaker, because there is another U.S. Supreme Court decision, it is 50 years old now, 50 years old this year, relating to the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools. I think, Mr. Speaker, that it incorporates the proper standard, whether you are talking about at the graduation or the classroom setting, the proper standard. Because in that case, which came out of West Virginia, West Virginia versus Barnette, the U.S. Supreme Court said no child can be compelled to say the Pledge of Allegiance. That is fine with me, Mr. Speaker. I do not want to compel someone to say the Pledge of Allegiance if they do not wish to say it. But what the Court did not do was to say that, because one child objects or might object, therefore, they can stop the other children from saying the Pledge of Allegiance. That ought to be the standard that applies to prayer, to voluntary prayer at public schools or at a school graduation. No one is compelled to participate. The Religious Freedom Amendment makes that explicit. You cannot require any person to join in prayer or other religious activity, but that does not give you the right to censor and silence those who do. And as Justice Scalia noted here, does this mean that under this test that the Supreme Court applied to graduation prayer, now we are going to have to go back and ban the Pledge of Allegiance from our public schools? Because it is the same coercion to be respectful for that. Mr. Speaker, it is long overdue that we correct decisions like this that have come from the U.S. Supreme Court, decisions that have used the First Amendment not as a shield of protection for religious freedom of the U.S.A., but as a weapon to stifle simple prayers, simple expressions of faith, whether it be at a school graduation or in a classroom. Let me read some of the last words that were written by the 4 Justices who stood strong for our values and our traditions and dissented from this decision in Lee versus Weisman. Here is what they wrote in closing their decision or their dissent: The reader has been told much in this case about the personal interest of Mr. Weisman and his daughter and very little about the personal interests on the other side. They are not inconsequential. Church and State would not be such a difficult subject if religion were, as the Court apparently thinks it to be, some purely personal avocation that can be indulged entirely in secret, like pornography in the privacy of one's room. For most believers, it is not that and has never been. Religious men and women of almost all denominations have felt it necessary to acknowledge and beseech the blessing of God as a people and not just as individuals, because they believe in the protection of Divine Providence, as the Declaration of Independence put it, not just for individuals, but for societies. One can believe in the effectiveness of such public worship or one can deprecate and deride it, but the long-standing American tradition of prayer at official ceremonies displays with unmistakable clarity that the establishment clause does not forbid the government to accommodate it. Nothing, absolutely nothing * * * the closing words of Justice Scalia, Nothing, absolutely nothing is so inclined to foster among religious believers of various faiths a toleration, no, an affection for one another than voluntarily joining in prayer together. No one should be compelled to do that, but it is a shame to deprive our public culture of the opportunity and, indeed, the encouragement for people to do it voluntarily. The Baptist or Catholic who heard and joined in the simple and inspiring prayers of Rabbi Gutterman on this official and patriotic occasion was inoculated from religious bigotry and prejudice in a manner that cannot be replicated. To deprive our society of that important unifying mechanism in order to spare the nonbeliever what seems to me the minimal inconvenience of standing or even sitting in respectful nonparticipation is as senseless in policy as it is unsupported in law. We have had a lot of senseless decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court when it comes to prayer in public schools, at graduation, the ability to have the Ten Commandments displayed in public places, or a nativity scene, a menorah, or it might be an emblem of some other religious holiday at an appropriate time of celebration. But, Mr. Speaker, to strip away the history, the culture, the tradition, the beliefs, the faith and the heritage of the people of the United States of America, not by a joint decision of the people of this country, but by bare majorities or even a 9-to-0 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, to tromp upon the beliefs and convictions of the people of this country is not justified by the First Amendment. Mr. Speaker, I do not want to change the Constitution to fix this, but there is no other way, because the Supreme Court has already distorted our First Amendment, using it as a weapon against public expression of faith; using it to censor and to silence simple prayers of hope and faith by children in our schools. The Religious Freedom Amendment, Mr. Speaker, addresses this, and we will be addressing it in the next few weeks. It has been approved by the Subcommittee on the Constitution; it has been approved by the House Committee on the Judiciary; it will be coming to this floor for a vote, to correct decisions such as this one and others of the U.S. Supreme Court. I repeat, Mr. Speaker, a simple text, the Religious Freedom Amendment: To secure the people's right to acknowledge God according to the dictates of conscience. Neither the United States nor any State shall establish any official religion, but the people's right to pray and to recognize the religious beliefs, heritage or traditions on public property, including schools, shall not be infringed. Neither the United States nor any State shall require any person to join in prayer or other religious activity, proscribe school prayers, discriminate against religion, or deny equal access to a benefit on account of religion. Religion is something that is good in this country. It has had a positive influence ever since it motivated the pilgrims to come to America and to found this Nation, because they sought religious freedom; they sought the protections that the Supreme Court would deny people today. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the Religious Freedom Amendment. To those who have not joined the more than 150 cosponsors, I invite them to join and put their name on this amendment and join with us today in that. I hope that their constituents will call their offices and tell them they need to be supporting the Religious Freedom Amendment, they need to put their name on it. They need to be helping Congressman Istook and the others who are supporting this. Mr. Speaker, this is something that is so vital because our cherished first freedom is being undercut by the Supreme Court that is supposed to be its guardian, and the Constitution sets up a system where if something goes wrong with interpretation of the Constitution, we offer an amendment, because we, Mr. Speaker, are charged to be the protectors of what the Founding Fathers intended, and the Religious Freedom Amendment helps us to provide that protection.

Mr. ISTOOK

Mr. ISTOOK. Mr. Speaker, I am thankful for the opportunity to address an extremely significant issue that relates to our schools, that relates to some of our most cherished principles as citizens of the United States of America and that unfortunately involves things which the courts of the United States have thrust upon the people despite the unwillingness of the people, in fact despite great concern and opposition by the public. This relates, Mr. Speaker, to the matter of what happens in our public schools. It relates to the practices that have gone on for generations upon generations in this country involving prayer in public bodies, in particular, in our schools. I am not talking about this just to be talking about it, Mr. Speaker. I am doing it because we are going to have an opportunity in the next few weeks here in the House of Representatives to vote on correcting what the courts in the United States have done, what the U.S. Supreme Court has done in its bans and restrictions and prohibitions on the practice of simple prayers being offered at public school. That particular legislation is the Religious Freedom Amendment, House Joint Resolution 78. I am privileged to be the principal sponsor of it. There are over 150 Members of this body who are sponsors as well. I would like to share with my colleagues the text of that. The Religious Freedom Amendment is very simple and straightforward and tries to return us to what were bedrock principles of this country until the Supreme Court began undercutting those principles some 36 years ago. The text is very straightforward and reads as follows as an amendment to the U.S. Constitution: To secure the people's right to acknowledge God according to the dictates of conscience, neither the United States nor any State shall establish any official religion, but the people's right to pray and to recognize their religious beliefs, heritage or traditions on public property, including schools, shall not be infringed. Neither the United States nor any State shall require any person to join in prayer or other religious activity, prescribe school prayers, discriminate against religion or deny equal access to a benefit on account of religion. It is simple and it is straightforward. It states that just as the constitutions of every single State in this country state, we believe in the people's right to acknowledge God, and expressly mentions him, as the constitutions of the States do. No official religion, but not these restrictions that are put on prayer and positive expressions of religious faith but that are not applied to other forms of speech. Why is religious speech singled out for discrimination? Mr. Speaker, in 1962, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that even when participation was voluntary and even if it was some sort of nonsectarian prayer, it was unconstitutional, they said, for school children to join together in a prayer in their classroom. That was followed by other Supreme Court decisions, Stone v. Graham in 1980, in which the U.S. Supreme Court said that the Ten Commandments could not be displayed on the walls of a public school. Mr. Speaker, I would note that that decision came out of your home State of Kentucky because it was Kentucky schools that had the practice. Groups would make copies of the Ten Commandments available and they would be hung with other important documents as the source of law as well as the source of spiritual guidance. I notice, Mr. Speaker, here in the Chamber of this House as I am facing and as the Speaker faces from the Speaker's dais, right there is the visage of Moses looking down on this Chamber, the great lawgiver who brought down from Mount Sinai the Ten Commandments which cannot be displayed in public schools. The U.S. Supreme Court says it is unconstitutional. They went beyond that. They ruled in a case that came out of Pennsylvania, they ruled that a nativity scene and also a Jewish menorah could not be placed on public property during the holiday season unless right up there next to it you put nonreligious emblems, like plastic reindeer and Santa Claus and Frosty the Snowman. They had to be balanced. But, Mr. Speaker, I have never heard of any community that is required if they want to put out Santa Claus that they have to balance him with a nativity scene or a menorah or whatever it may be. It seems to be a one-way street. The U.S. Supreme Court kept going. They had the case in 1985 of Wallace v. Jaffree. It came out of Alabama. Alabama had a law that said you can have a moment of silence to start the day at school, a moment of silence. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that was unconstitutional, because one of the permitted uses of that moment of silence was to enable students to have a silent prayer, and thus they said the whole moment of silence is even unconstitutional. And then a case upon which I would like to elaborate in 1992. By a 5-4 decision, the case of Lee v. Wiseman out of Rhode Island, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled a prayer at a school graduation to be unconstitutional. It was a prayer that was offered by a Jewish rabbi. The court held it was unconstitutional. All of these things, Mr. Speaker, are what the Supreme Court has done to twist and distort and undermine our First Amendment, the very first right mentioned in the First Amendment, Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Now, without even getting into the point of whether a school is creating an act of the Congress, and we are kind of two different bodies at two different levels, but to say that they are ignoring the part of the Constitution that says you do not prohibit the free exercise of religion, because what the Court did, Mr. Speaker, in all of these cases is to say that having a prayer or the Ten Commandments or a moment of silence or a nativity scene or a menorah, that that was the same as creating an official church. How absurd. An official church created just because you have a prayer? We open sessions of this Congress with a prayer. The House and the Senate, just like legislative bodies all around the country, be it State legislatures or city councils or private groups, Chamber of Commerce meetings, Kiwanis Club, Rotary Club, PTA meetings, people commonly open those things with prayer, just as we do here in Congress. It is normal. It does not make us a church just because we have a prayer. But the Supreme Court says, ``Oh, you have a prayer at school and you're turning the school into a church.'' Therefore, they ignore the free exercise clause of the Constitution. We have been living under this for 36 years. The only way that we are going to be able to fix this is with the religious freedom amendment, to straighten out the courts, by saying that the things they have said are somehow wrong are indeed, as the American people believe, right. I said I wanted to focus on a particular case. That was the case in 1992 of Lee v. Weisman. What I would like to do, Mr. Speaker, is in different evenings during these special orders in talking about the religious freedom amendment, I think it is important to dissect and to help Members of this body as well as the general public to understand what the courts said so that we can understand the necessity of correcting it with the religious freedom amendment. After all, that has been the method that we have used to correct Supreme Court decisions ever since the 1800s in America, including, for example, Supreme Court decisions such as the Dred Scott decision that were trying to uphold the practice of slavery. We made sure that it was outlawed. Mr. Speaker, looking at the Lee v. Wiseman case, and I would note, it is a 5-4 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. Had one justice, just one of the nine justices of the U.S. Supreme Court gone the other way, we would not have this same problem when it comes to being able to have a prayer at a school graduation. Yet because one justice would not go the other way, we have to get two-thirds of the House of Representatives, two-thirds of the Senate to approve a constitutional amendment, and of course then it has to be ratified by the legislatures in three- fourths of the States, all because by a margin of 5-4 the Supreme Court made this ruling. This was a very strange ruling, Mr. Speaker, because the Supreme Court rested the whole decision on the notion that to expect someone during a prayer is psychological coercion that the majority of the Supreme Court equated with the same as using compulsion on someone to have a particular religion just because at this graduation the students were expected to be respectful, not only respectful of the prayer offered by the rabbi but respectful of the other speakers, respectful of the people as they came in as a group, as part of this graduation, respectful of the other people in attendance. But, oh, if it was respect for the rabbi's prayer, oh, there the Supreme Court said, ``Well, you can't expect people to be respectful of religion. After all, they may disagree.'' Okay. I disagree with many of the things said on the floor of this House. That does not mean that I have a right to silence and to censor the people who may say it. It is common in everyday life. In all sorts of settings, we hear things with which we disagree. That does not give us the right to censor and silence people. But this notion of political correctness which has been extended into schools is saying, ``Oh, but my goodness, if somebody doesn't like it, let's see if we can find an excuse to silence them,'' and they twist and distort the First Amendment to make it anti-religious instead of positive toward religion and use that as an excuse to silence people. Let us look at this decision. The decision came down from the U.S. Supreme Court June 24, 1992. The justices who said that this prayer at a school graduation was unconstitutional were Justices Kennedy, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor and Souder. Dissenting and, boy, did they dissent in very clear terms, dissenting were Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, the Chief Justice, White, and Thomas. I am looking at the Supreme Court decision and for people that look up these things and want to look up the reference, which is called the citation, it is cited as 505 U.S. 577. That is 505 United States Reports, page 577. As the Court wrote, and Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the majority and a lot of organizations got involved in this, and I am glad to say, Mr. Speaker, by the way, that most of those who were arguing in favor of the graduation prayer are also supporters of the religious freedom amendment. The prayer actually happened in 1989. The Supreme Court took 3 years to make its decision. But it was a public school, Nathan Bishop Middle School in Providence, Rhode Island. There was a 14-year-old girl who was one of the graduates of middle school, her name was Deborah Wiseman. At the time she was about 14 years old. Now, it was the policy in the schools and the superintendent to permit principals to invite members of the clergy to give invocations and benedictions. Often, it was not always but often they chose to make these part of the graduation ceremonies. The objector in this case was Deborah Weisman and her father Daniel Weisman. The school principal invited a Jewish rabbi to offer the prayer. The rabbi's name was Leslie Gutterman, and he was from the Temple Beth El in Providence, Rhode Island. Now these were the two prayers that he offered Mr. Speaker, which the Supreme Court held were unconstitutional, and I think people can decide for themselves if they think there is something offensive here. The invocation offered by Rabbi Gutterman was as follows: God of the free, hope of the brave, for the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of minorities are protected, we thank You. May these young men and women grow up to enrich it. For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new graduates grow up to guard it. For the political process of America in which all its citizens may participate, for its court system where all may seek justice, we thank You. May those we honor this morning always turn to it in trust. For the destiny of America, we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan Bishop Middle School so live that they might help to share it. May our aspirations for our country and for these young people who are our hope for the future be richly fulfilled. Amen. So the invocation by Rabbi Gutterman even praised the very courts which later said that he violated the Constitution in doing so. Then there is the benediction that the rabbi offered at the close of the graduation. These were the words that he pronounced: O God, we are grateful to you for having endowed us with a capacity for learning which we have celebrated on this joyous commencement. Happy families give thanks for seeing their children achieve an important milestone. Send your blessings upon the teachers and administrators who helped prepare them. The graduates now need strength and guidance for the future. Help them to understand that we are not complete with academic knowledge alone. We must each strive to fulfill what you require of us all, to do justly, to love mercy, to walk humbly. We give thanks to you, Lord, for keeping us alive, sustaining us and allowing us to reach this special happy occasion. Amen. That was the benediction offered by Rabbi Gutterman which again the U.S. Supreme Court, because someone chose to find it offensive, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional. Now in this, Mr. Speaker, do you notice the case was brought by and on behalf of one student? Now the Court does not tell us clearly just how big the class was. It was evidently, from other comments you know, a good-size graduating class from this middle school. No one else joined in the court case to say I also object, just one student, and that is part of the problem with the standard, the erroneous standard that has been created by the Supreme Court. If one person objects, everyone else is censored. In fact, they have even said even if nobody does object, the possibility that somebody could object is enough to make us say that you should not have prayers at school graduations or prayers at the start of the school day. Since when, Mr. Speaker, does something have to be unanimous before we can say it under free speech in the USA? And why should we restrict religious speech? But let me get back to what Justice Kennedy wrote for this five-- four-Court majority. He mentioned the parties stipulate attendance at these graduations is voluntary, and they also note the students stood for the Pledge of Allegiance, and then they remained standing for the rabbi's prayers, and the court wrote that they assume that there was a respectful moment of silence just before and just after the prayers, but despite that, the rabbi's two prayers probably did not last much beyond a minute each, if even that much. Now the school board, and by the way the United States of America through the Solicitor General's Office, sided with the school board. The Solicitor General filed a brief on behalf of the school. The school board argued that the short prayers and others like it are of profound meaning to many students and parents throughout the country. As Justice Kennedy noted, they consider that due respect and acknowledgment for divine guidance and for the deepest spiritual aspirations of our people ought to be expressed at an event as important in life as graduation. Now first the plaintiffs, the Weismans, asked for a court injunction to stop the prayer from taking place. The court said we do not have time before the graduation, did not grant the injunction. They maintained the suit after the prayers were given, the court made the decision, oh, it should not have happened, it was unconstitutional, and they held, of course, a violation of the first amendment. They issued a permanent injunction against the school system there in Providence, Rhode Island, saying you are permanently enjoined, do not do this again, do not have one of these horrible prayers at school graduation. Of course, I do not think it is horrible, I think it is normal. But the court held that it was unconstitutional, and on appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals agreed with the district court, as ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court did. Now Justice Kennedy wrote, well, even though attendance is voluntary at graduation it is really kind of obligatory because you expect students to want to be at their graduation. And they found a lot of criticism with the fact that the actual invitation to the rabbi, rather than coming maybe from a student body officer or something like that, the fact that the invitation was extended by the principal of the school, the Supreme Court thought that was very significant. Now I do not know how that affected necessarily the nature of the prayer that the rabbi gave, but the rabbi was given a copy of different guidelines for civic occasions. And that was the name of the document, Guidelines for Civic Occasions, that the principal gave him and said, I hope your prayers are going to be nonsectarian. And, as the Court said, well, that was a State effort to control the prayer. Now imagine that. They say we hope that you will offer a prayer that will be as acceptable as possible to people, and the Court says that is the same as controlling the content. And then the Court went on to say that it is unconstitutional for the government to try to suggest that a prayer seek common ground. Really, they really said that. This is what Justice Kennedy wrote, these are his words: If common ground can be defined which permits one's conflicting faiths to express the shared conviction that there is an ethic and morality which transcends human invention, the sense of community and purpose sought by all decent societies might be advanced. But though the first amendment does not allow the government to stifle prayers which aspire to these ends, neither does it permit the government to undertake that task for itself. I find it very interesting, Mr. Speaker, that Justice Kennedy says the first amendment does not allow the government to stifle prayers, and yet that is what the Supreme Court did in this very case. They stifled the prayers. They said that it may have happened that time but do not let us catch you doing it again. What a remedy. They say that they knocked out the prayer to avoid insulting the rabbi who offered the prayer. It is really hard for me, Mr. Speaker, to follow this psychological coercion test that Justice Kennedy and the majority of the Supreme Court wrote about in this decision. I think it is much more fruitful to look at what the four Justices wrote when they dissented, that being Justices Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Thomas. This is what they wrote countering what the Supreme Court had done. I would like to advise you, Mr. Speaker, that it is the philosophy that was voiced by four Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in this dissent; it is that philosophy which is embodied in the religious freedom amendment. In fact, in other cases impinging upon religious freedom, there were dissents filed by other Justices of the Supreme Court. We have taken to heart what they said, and what they believe is the proper interpretation of the Constitution and I think what the American people believe is the proper interpretation. We have sought to incorporate that in the religious freedom amendment upon which we will soon be voting. So let us look then at what these four Justices wrote through Justice Scalia. Talking about the majority ruling, they wrote: As its instrument of destruction, the bulldozer of social engineering, the Court invents a boundless and boundlessly manipulable test of psychological coercion; lays waste a tradition that is as old as public school graduations themselves, and that is a component of an even more long-standing American tradition. Today's opinion shows more forcibly than volumes of argumentation why our Nation's protection, that fortress which is our Constitution, cannot possibly rest upon the changeable, philosophical predilections of the Justices of this Court, but must have deep foundations in the historic practices of our people. They went on to discuss, Mr. Speaker, some of the historic practices of prayer in public settings. As they wrote, the history and tradition of our Nation are replete with public ceremonies featuring prayers of thanksgiving and petition. In his first inaugural address, after swearing his oath of office on a Bible, George Washington deliberately made a prayer part of his first official act as President. Such supplication has been a characteristic feature of inaugural addresses ever since. Thomas Jefferson, for example, prayed in his first inaugural address. In his second inaugural address, Jefferson acknowledged his need for divine guidance and invited his audience to join his prayer. Reading further from the Court dissent, similarly, James Madison, in his first inaugural address, placed his confidence in the guardianship and guidance of that Almighty Being whose power regulates the destiny of nations. Most recently, President Bush, continuing the tradition established by President Washington, asked those attending his inauguration to bow their heads and made a prayer his first official act as President. Reading further from Justice Scalia, the day after the First Amendment was proposed, Congress urged President Washington to proclaim a day of public thanksgiving and prayer to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and signal favors of Almighty God. President Washington responded by declaring Thanksgiving for November 26, 1789. Reading further from the dissent in the Lee v. Weisman case, the other two branches of the Federal Government also have a long- established practice of prayer at public events. As we detailed in Marsh v. Chambers, congressional sessions have opened with a chaplain's prayer ever since the first Congress. And this Court's own sessions have opened with the invocation ``God save the United States and this Honorable Court'' since the days of Chief Justice Marshall. In addition to this general tradition of prayer at public ceremonies, there exists a more specific tradition of invocations and benedictions at public school graduation exercises. By one account, the first public high school graduation ceremony took place in Connecticut in July 1868, the very month, as it happens, that the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, when 15 seniors from the Norwich Free Academy marched in their best Sunday suits and dresses into a church hall and waited through majestic music and long prayers. As the Court acknowledges in describing the customary features of high school graduations, the invocation and benediction have long been recognized to be as traditional as any other parts of the school graduation program and are widely established. Yet, Mr. Speaker, despite what 4 dissenting Justices were telling them in the words which I am reading to you, Mr. Speaker, despite that, just by a margin of 5 to 4, the Supreme Court said you should not have prayer at school graduations. Now, these dissenting 4 Justices, Mr. Speaker, they turned their attention then to the argument, this psychological coercion argument that had been made by Justice Kennedy on behalf of the majority. Let me read you what they wrote about this. According to the Court, students in graduation who want to avoid the fact or appearance of participation in the invocation and benediction are psychologically obligated by public pressure as well as peer pressure to stand as a group or at least maintain respectful silence during those prayers. This assertion, the very linchpin of the Court's opinion, is almost as intriguing for what it is does not say as for what it says. It does not say, for example, that students are psychologically coerced to bow their heads, to place their hands in a prayerful position, to pay attention to the prayers, to utter amen, or in fact to pray. It claims only that the psychological coercion consists of being coerced to stand or at least maintain respectful silence. That is all anybody was coerced to do. Nobody was required to join in a prayer. They were just expected to be respectful. Mr. Speaker, it is a sad day when students in public schools are not taught to be respectful even, and perhaps especially, when somebody is saying or doing something with which they disagree. The 4 dissenting Justices called the arguments of their 5 brethren ludicrous. That is their word for it, ludicrous. But they wrote further, let us assume the very worst, that the nonparticipating graduate is suddenly coerced to stand. Even that does not remotely establish a participation or an appearance of participation in a religious exercise. The Court acknowledges that in our culture, standing can signify adherence to a view or simple respect for the views of others. But if it is a permissible inference that one who is standing is doing so simply out of respect for the prayers of others, then how can it possibly be said that a reasonable dissenter could believe that the group exercise signifies her own participation or approval. The opinion manifests that the Court itself has not given careful consideration to its test of psychological coercion. For if it had, how could it observe with no hint of concern or disapproval that the student stood for the pledge of allegiance which immediately preceded Rabbi Gutterman's invocation? Does that not ring a bell, Mr. Speaker? Is that now how we open our sessions of this Congress? We stand together, and we say the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag that is draped behind you, Mr. Speaker, and a prayer is offered. The Supreme Court said that that simple pattern was unconstitutional in a public school setting. Now, about this requirement of standing, which is the only thing that any student was asked, not compelled, but they said, well, it was coercion. It was coercion to expect him to stand, even though they were not forced to. As Justice Scalia wrote in the dissent, if students were psychologically coerced to remain standing during the invocation, they must also have been psychologically coerced moments before to stand for, and thereby, in the Court's view, to take part in or appear to take part in the Pledge of Allegiance. Must the pledge, therefore, be barred from the public schools? I mention that, Mr. Speaker, because there is another U.S. Supreme Court decision, it is 50 years old now, 50 years old this year, relating to the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools. I think, Mr. Speaker, that it incorporates the proper standard, whether you are talking about at the graduation or the classroom setting, the proper standard. Because in that case, which came out of West Virginia, West Virginia versus Barnette, the U.S. Supreme Court said no child can be compelled to say the Pledge of Allegiance. That is fine with me, Mr. Speaker. I do not want to compel someone to say the Pledge of Allegiance if they do not wish to say it. But what the Court did not do was to say that, because one child objects or might object, therefore, they can stop the other children from saying the Pledge of Allegiance. That ought to be the standard that applies to prayer, to voluntary prayer at public schools or at a school graduation. No one is compelled to participate. The religious freedom amendment makes that explicit. You cannot require any person to join in prayer or other religious activity, but that does not give you the right to censor and silence those who do. And as Justice Scalia noted here, does this mean that under this test that the Supreme Court applied to graduation prayer, now we are going to have to go back and ban the Pledge of Allegiance from our public schools? Because it is the same coercion to be respectful for that. Mr. Speaker, it is long overdue that we correct decisions like this that have come from the U.S. Supreme Court, decisions that have used the First Amendment not as a shield of protection for religious freedom of the U.S.A., but as a weapon to stifle simple prayers, simple expressions of faith, whether it be at a school graduation or in a classroom. Let me read some of the last words that were written by the 4 Justices who stood strong for our values and our traditions and dissented from this decision in Lee versus Weisman. Here is what they wrote in closing their decision or their dissent: The reader has been told much in this case about the personal interest of Mr. Weisman and his daughter and very little about the personal interests on the other side. They are not inconsequential. Church and State would not be such a difficult subject if religion were, as the Court apparently thinks it to be, some purely personal avocation that can be indulged entirely in secret, like pornography in the privacy of one's room. For most believers, it is not that and has never been. Religious men and women of almost all denominations have felt it necessary to acknowledge and beseech the blessing of God as a people and not just as individuals, because they believe in the protection of Divine Providence, as the Declaration of Independence put it, not just for individuals, but for societies. One can believe in the effectiveness of such public worship or one can deprecate and deride it, but the long-standing American tradition of prayer at official ceremonies displays with unmistakable clarity that the establishment clause does not forbid the government to accommodate it. Nothing, absolutely nothing, the closing words of Justice Scalia, nothing, absolutely nothing is so inclined to foster among religious believers of various faiths a toleration, no, an affection for one another than voluntarily joining in prayer together. No one should be compelled to do that, but it is a shame to deprive our public culture of the opportunity and, indeed, the encouragement for people to do it voluntarily. The Baptist or Catholic who heard and joined in the simple and inspiring prayers of Rabbi Gutterman on this official and patriotic occasion was inoculated from religious bigotry and prejudice in a manner that cannot be replicated. To deprive our society of that important unifying mechanism in order to spare the nonbeliever what seems to me the minimal inconvenience of standing or even sitting in respectful nonparticipation is as senseless in policy as it is unsupported in law. We have had a lot of senseless decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court when it comes to prayer in public schools, at graduation, the ability to have the Ten Commandments displayed in public places, or a nativity scene, a menorah, or it might be an emblem of some other religious holiday at an appropriate time of celebration. But, Mr. Speaker, to strip away the history, the culture, the tradition, the beliefs, the faith and the heritage of the people of the United States of America, not by a joint decision of the people of this country, but by bare majorities or even a 9-to-0 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, to tromp upon the beliefs and convictions of the people of this country is not justified by the First Amendment. Mr. Speaker, I do not want to change the Constitution to fix this, but there is no other way, because the Supreme Court has already distorted our First Amendment, using it as a weapon against public expression of faith; using it to censor and to silence simple prayers of hope and faith by children in our schools. The religious freedom amendment, Mr. Speaker, addresses this, and we will be addressing it in the next few weeks. It has been approved by the Subcommittee on the Constitution; it has been approved by the House Committee on the Judiciary; it will be coming to this floor for a vote, to correct decisions such as this one and others of the U.S. Supreme Court. I repeat, Mr. Speaker, a simple text, the Religious Freedom Amendment: To secure the people's right to acknowledge God according to the dictates of conscience. Neither the United States nor any State shall establish any official religion, but the people's right to pray and to recognize the religious beliefs, heritage or traditions on public property, including schools, shall not be infringed. Neither the United States nor any State shall require any person to join in prayer or other religious activity, proscribe school prayers, discriminate against religion, or deny equal access to a benefit on account of religion. Religion is something that is good in this country. It has had a positive influence ever since it motivated the pilgrims to come to America and to found this Nation, because they sought religious freedom; they sought the protections that the Supreme Court would deny people today. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the Religious Freedom Amendment. To those who have not joined the more than 150 cosponsors, I invite them to join and put their name on this amendment and join with us today in that. I hope that their constituents will call their offices and tell them they need to be supporting the Religious Freedom Amendment, they need to put their name on it. They need to be helping Congressman Istook and the others who are supporting this. Mr. Speaker, this is something that is so vital because our cherished first freedom is being undercut by the Supreme Court that is supposed to be its guardian, and the Constitution sets up a system where if something goes wrong with interpretation of the Constitution, we offer an amendment, because we, Mr. Speaker, are charged to be the protectors of what the Founding Fathers intended, and the Religious Freedom Amendment helps us to provide that protection.

Mr. ISTOOK

Mr. ISTOOK. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

Mr. ISTOOK

Mr. ISTOOK. I think the gentleman has stated things very well. I appreciate your recognition and expression of the fact that this amendment is about tolerance. Some people have developed the mistaken notion that if they are present when somebody says something with which they disagree, that they have been put upon. Well, hearing something with which you disagree and being respectful of it does not mean you agree with it. It happens all the time on the floor of this House. It happens all the time in classrooms at school. And to single out religion and say, you cannot say something that does not have unanimous approval because it infringes on someone else's rights, what you are really doing is stomping on the rights of almost everyone just because somebody there is intolerant. I think of the case, this was the graduation prayer case, the prayer there was said by a Jewish rabbi. The Supreme Court said it was unconstitutional to expect people to be there because they would be expected to be respectful. That interfered with their constitutional rights. I suggest to you and to everyone that if they said, well, we expect students to be respectful when somebody is speaking, we expect them to be respectful if the school choir is singing a song, we expect them to be respectful of all the occasions, but if it is a prayer, you cannot expect respect. What a terrible doctrine the Supreme Court unleashed there. We have to correct it. You do not have free speech if you can only say things with which people agree. If I could close and just share a thought expressed recently, just about 3 months ago by Pope John Paul II, concerned with religious freedom in the United States of America, when he received the new American ambassador to the Vatican just in December. He said this: ``It would truly be a sad thing if the religious and moral convictions upon which the American experiment was founded could now somehow be considered a danger to free society, such that those who would bring these convictions to bear upon your Nation's public life would be denied a voice in debating and resolving issues of public policy. The original separation of church and State in the United States was certainly not an effort to ban all religious convictions from the public sphere, a kind of banishment of God from civil society.'' Those were the words of Pope John Paul II just in December, expressing concern about religious freedom being stripped away in America. The religious freedom amendment will correct that. I thank the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop). I thank the Chair for having the time to present it. I look forward to the day in the next few weeks when we will have a chance to debate and to act upon this House floor on the religious freedom amendment.

Mr. ISTOOK. I appreciate the gentleman from Georgia's comments. In fact, I would like to exchange a couple of thoughts with the gentleman. I would like to engage in a colloquy, if I can, with the gentleman from Georgia, because I was struck by something he said about some people, the way they treat it, in essence, equate religion or religious expression with pornography. Now, let me explain what I mean by that, because pornography is a special category where free speech does not apply. Free speech is not absolute. We cannot yell ``fire'' in a crowded theater. That is kind of the classic. We cannot advocate for people to rush out and take up arms and violently overthrow the government or otherwise incite people to riot or rebel. I do not know if that is truly what we are trying to do. Of course, then, there is limitations on things that are pornographic. Now, the courts in doing this, I can think of an example that involves the Internal Revenue Service. One of their big district offices in California put out a memorandum to its employees. They said, you cannot have a religious item in your personal work space or on your desk. We are talking about things that could be a picture of Christ. It could be a Star of David. It could be a nativity scene. It could be lots of different things. I wrote the IRS, and I said, why are you doing this? They wrote back, and they said in their letter, items which are considered intrusive such as, and they gave two examples, and these are the only examples they gave, items which are considered intrusive such as religious items or sexually suggestive cartoons or calendars are prohibited. Look how they juxtaposed things. Look how they categorized a Bible or a menorah or a cross or whatever as though it were pornographic. I was struck by that when the gentleman from Georgia made the comment that he did. I wanted to share that with the gentleman and get your reaction to that.

Mr. ISTOOK. I certainly agree with the gentleman. Unfortunately, some people seem to have this notion that tolerance is a one-way street. They expect us to tolerate expressions by people who are way out of the ordinary, and certainly I believe in protecting the rights of minorities of whatever type they may be, but that does not mean that you disregard the rights of the majority because the first amendment was meant for all of us. I hear some people say, the first amendment and the religious protections in it were intended to protect the minority from the majority, but I think that cuts both ways. Yes, it is intended to protect the minority from the majority, but it is also to protect the majority as well. And to say that it only protects some of us and not others is certainly not equal protection of the laws and it is not what the Founding Fathers intended. Yet I think of instances, in Denver, Colorado, a year or two ago, this organization known as Americans United for Separation of Church and State got involved really in an incredible way, because they were going to have a prayer luncheon and the governor was going to be a part of it, and they put out this press release saying, oh, it is terrible for a public official to be involved in a prayer breakfast or a prayer luncheon because they are public officials and, therefore, I guess supposedly they are not supposed to have any religious expression of religious freedom. Yet they were condemning the idea of having a community prayer luncheon and letting public officials be a part of it. That was outrageous to me. You look, right now the State of Ohio, Ohio has a State motto. Their State motto is, ``With God all things are possible.'' They are being sued by the ACLU saying. You cannot use the State motto; you cannot put it up. Like I mentioned before, we have ``In God We Trust'' over the Speaker's chair here in the Chamber of the House of Representatives. But they are suing, saying the State of Ohio better not say, ``With God all things are possible.'' Look at the State seal of Florida; it says, ``In God we trust'' on the State seal of Florida. There are other expressions on other State seals and State flags. I look at West Virginia, where the ACLU is suing there to say you cannot have prayers to start football games. What kind of intolerance is this? Yet in this topsy-turvy world, some people try to say, oh, we are practicing tolerance by telling people to be silent. That is not tolerance. That is intolerance of the worst order because it picks on people's religious faith. I know when it comes to saying that it is once again possible for students at school and, if they wish, in the classroom to have a prayer at the start of the day and, as you mentioned, you protect everybody's rights, you have it rotated and you make sure that it is not just one faith that gets to say a prayer and others do not, the religious freedom amendment does not countenance that sort of thing, but it gives people the opportunity. I think back on my experience, and I am 48 years old; maybe once or twice in 48 years of life thousands and thousands of prayers I have ever heard, only maybe once or twice in my life has there ever been a prayer that I heard that I thought was out of place. I think when you talk about having prayers in public schools and thousands of public schools, what turns out to be millions of times a year probably, that it is going to be extremely rare if there is going to be any sort of prayer that is offensive. Do you say that if you are afraid that somebody is going to say something wrong, you force everyone to be silent? That is not the American way. If something happens that is wrong, that is how you learn. You learn from those experiences. These scare tactics that some people are using, the ACLU-type groups, saying, people are going to be coming into our schools to do this and that; no, they are not. This amendment does not give anybody the right to walk into a public school. It talks about the rights of those who have a right to be there, just as everybody does not have the right to come in and disrupt the proceedings of this House or to go into some other government office and be disruptive, there is no right to be disruptive just because you have a right to free speech.

Mr. ISTOOK. I agree with the gentleman. I think through the different symbols. Because it is not just the Internal Revenue Service. They are acting in response to these horrible court decisions. In San Francisco, in a city park there, for 65 years, there was a large cross. It was on public property there. It had been there for 65 years. It had been praised by people. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, when he was President, made a national address where he singled it out. A U.S. Supreme Court ruled last year it was unconstitutional. Now, I do not know if it was unconstitutional to them 65 years ago or if it first became unconstitutional to them in 1997 or when. There have since become cases in San Diego, cases in Oregon, cases in Hawaii. I mentioned the one in Edmond, Oklahoma. For the U.S. Supreme Court to single out emblems of a particular faith and, yet, that same U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that an emblem like a Nazi swastika is protected. I am thinking of a case in Skokie, Illinois, a Jewish community with a lot of members of the Jewish faith who were survivors of the Nazi Holocaust, and American Nazis went to parade in Skokie, Illinois, through the streets emblazoning their Nazi swastika all over the place. The court said, oh, that is protected. A symbol of hate is protected, but a symbol of love, of hope, of faith, it is not. What kind of standard is the Supreme Court using?

Mr. ISTOOK. Mr. Speaker, I wanted to take the time this evening to talk about one of the most significant problems that has plagued America because of a multitude of Supreme Court decisions, which the American people have never accepted. You see, there is a problem with lack of respect for our Constitution and for the history and the heritage which brought our Constitution to us. In fact, what brought so many people to America originally was their desire for religious freedom. We look at the stories of the Pilgrims and Puritans, and we recognize that they were motivated by a desire to be in a land where they could be free to worship as they pleased to worship. And that has been so much of the bedrock of American values, but it has been under attack by the United States Supreme Court. In 1962, the Supreme Court said it did not matter if it was voluntary; students could not come together and pray at school the way that they had since the founding of the republic. In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court said the Ten Commandments could not be on the wall of the public school because, and this is what the U.S. Supreme Court said, the students might read and obey the Ten Commandments. So, thanks to the court, of course, our students do not read the Ten Commandments and certainly there is a problem in getting people to obey them. In 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court said even a moment of silence was wrong. A law to permit a moment of silence, they declared, was unconstitutional because it said that this was okay for students to use that time to pray silently. In 1992, the Supreme Court said that a rabbi broke the law by offering prayer at a public school graduation. And in 1995, the same Supreme Court, which has ruled that a Nazi swastika is protected on public policy, ruled that a cross could not be included in a group of symbols on a city seal to show the heritage of that community. In fact, I know that case very well, Mr. Speaker, because it happened in my congressional district in Edmond, Oklahoma. The city seal had five emblems on it: A pair of hands clasped in friendship; an oil derrick, symbolizing the importance of oil to Oklahoma's economy; a covered wagon, indicating the heritage of the Oklahoma land run; a tower that is at the university, the University of Central Oklahoma, in Edmond; and a cross depicting a portion of the religious heritage of the community. And I will bring it on another case, Mr. Speaker, that city seal has a blank spot because the other courts ruled and the Supreme Court said, oh, yes, you cannot have a cross displayed on public property. Now, that is the same Supreme Court that had said that you could not have a nativity scene in Pennsylvania in Allegheny County. They said a nativity scene, or for that matter a menorah, were unconstitutional because they were not sufficiently balanced by emblems like Santa Claus and Frosty the Snowman and the reindeer. Because of that, they said it was unconstitutional to have the Christmas displays that so many places have had. I know there are many places in this country where people still do things like have a prayer at a high school football game or as part of the school assembly or maybe in a classroom. But often, Mr. Speaker, that is because the ACLU and their friends have not got around to suing that particular community yet. And, indeed, I see in this Chamber of the House of Representatives right above the Speaker's chair, it reads, ``In God we trust.'' And if the Speaker looks directly across the Chamber from his chair on the back wall here, he sees the visage of Moses, the great lawgiver. And yet, if we had those displayed in public schools, they would likely be held by the U.S. Supreme Court to be unconstitutional. These decisions started in 1962. There is a whole series of them. I have not even mentioned all of them. But, Mr. Speaker, the time has come to end the judicial misinterpretations of the U.S. Constitution. The first amendment says, ``Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.'' But the Supreme Court has misconstrued that to say, ``Oh, well, if you have a prayer at public school, that is the same thing as establishing an official church.'' Of course it is not. Common sense tells us it is not, but it is used by people who are intolerant of religion. That is why over 150 Members of this body, of the House of Representatives, have so far joined together with me in sponsoring the religious freedom amendment. It is a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution to tell the Supreme Court it is time that we straighten out these things. It has been approved by the House's Subcommittee on the Constitution. Just last week it was approved by the House Judiciary Committee. We will be voting in the House of Representatives on the religious freedom amendment in not too many weeks from now, a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution to correct the mistaken rulings of the Supreme Court against voluntary school prayer, and in so many other ways where they have misconstrued the first amendment. Now, the text, Mr. Speaker, of the religious freedom amendment is pretty straightforward. I would like to share it with Members. It reads, ``To secure the people's right to acknowledge God according to the dictates of conscience, neither the United States nor any State shall establish any official religion, but the people's right to pray and to recognize their religious beliefs, heritage or traditions on public property, including schools, shall not be infringed. The government shall not require any person to join in prayer or other religious activity, prescribe school prayers, discriminate against religion or deny equal access to a benefit on account of religion.'' It is pretty simple. It is pretty straightforward. It expresses that we have a right to acknowledge God in America according to the dictates of our own conscience, and neither the United States nor any State is to establish any official religion. Government is not going to tell us how to believe or what faith we must profess or indeed if we must profess any faith, but the people have a right to pray, even when they are on public property, and that is an individual right and a collective right. We can do it as individuals. We can do it as a group. Government can accommodate that and make it possible for it to occur. And also if it is a recognition of religious belief, heritage or tradition, that is okay. I have kids in public school or that have graduated from public school, and I cannot tell you how I, as so many other parents have done, have gone to school at different times, you think you are going to a Christmas program, but you find that the songs that are sung are Frosty the Snowman, Here Comes Santa Claus, Walking in a Winter Wonderland, but what happened to O Come All Ye Faithful? What happened to Silent Night? People are afraid to sing them because they think they may get sued by the ACLU. And indeed the policies have gotten so restrictive, whether it is Christmas or a song about Hanukkah or a hymn of Thanksgiving, whatever it may be. It happens not just at school assemblies, it happens at school graduations. After a case in Utah where a Federal court told them not to sing a simple song about friends because the court thought it had too many religious connotations, the Washington Post wrote in an editorial, it is now an open question, is it okay anymore in public school to sing America the Beautiful, because the chorus says, ``God shed His grace on thee.'' Is it not absurd in the United States of America, a land with such a beautiful, rich history and heritage of religious freedom, when we wonder if somebody is going to get sued for singing America the Beautiful? The religious freedom amendment says religious heritage, traditions, belief, yes, the people can express those on public property, and that includes schools. It says also, because we want to make sure people know that they are protected, they are not compelled, government is not going to force anybody to join in prayer. We start sessions of Congress with two things, the Pledge of Allegiance and a prayer. That used to be common in public schools as well. There are some people in this country who do not want to say the Pledge of Allegiance. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on that 50 years ago. They said no child can be forced to say the Pledge of Allegiance. I agree with that. That is common sense. You do not force them to. But they did not give somebody the right to censor and halt the children who did want to say the Pledge of Allegiance. That is the standard we should be applying to prayer in public schools. You are not forced to join in; if you do not want to, you do not have to, but that does not mean that if you are so intolerant of other people's beliefs, you can force them to stop, because there are millions of people in this country, Mr. Speaker, millions of Americans, who think they should be starting a day at school with a prayer, a simple expression of hope and faith and desire for guidance at the start of the day. But we do not want to force anybody. And so it is explicit. Government shall not require any person to join in prayer or any other religious activity. And the government does not prescribe school prayers; it does not say, you must pray, and if you choose to pray, it does not say what your prayer shall be. Instead, follow the basic rule. Rotate, take turns, give different students their opportunities. Let them enjoy the understanding that comes from praying together and hearing and sharing in the prayers of others. And we have a protection in the religious freedom amendment. You are not going to discriminate against religion and you are not going to deny equal access to a benefit on account of religion. I recall in Oklahoma City, Mr. Speaker, after the bombing and when there was Federal assistance to rebuild the area of downtown Oklahoma City damaged by the blast of the Murrah Building, there were hundreds of other structures that also suffered damage in that. Several of them within a block or two of the blast were churches. The Department of Housing and Urban Development had to get their arms twisted frankly, Mr. Speaker, to accept the idea that a church, just like any other business or enterprise or building nearby, could receive the rebuilding assistance that came from the Federal Government to the properties damaged by the Murrah Building blast. I think that is proper. We do not say that we are going to help this building over here because it is a copy business or a printing business or a restaurant but, oh, we will help everybody except those that are institutions of faith. We are not going to pay them for their religion or for their religious ceremonies, but we are going to treat them equally if there is some sort of Federal assistance program. Because churches are involved in so many things; they are involved in welfare assistance, they are involved in housing assistance, they are involved in programs against drinking and drugs and rehabilitation. Why should we say that when we have a Federal grant that is available to help somebody get on the right track again, if they have a spiritual component as part of their program, they are going to be disqualified? The religious freedom amendment is not about supporting churches. It does not enable that to happen for religious activity. But when they have a program that meshes with what we are trying to accomplish to help people get on the right track and to get a hand up and a helping hand in their lives, you do not disqualify someone. Just like, for example, take Federal education assistance, Pell grants, Federal college loans, GI bill benefits, we do not tell somebody, look, if you go to the University of Oklahoma or the University of Virginia or the University of Michigan, you can have the Federal assistance in education. Oh, but if you are going to go to Notre Dame or some other Catholic institution, or if you go to Baylor, which is where I went to college, since it is a Baptist institution, you cannot do that. Or Brigham Young or Southern Methodist, we do not say that we are going to disqualify you because you are going to a school that has a religious affiliation. No, we understand that the purpose is education. So the religious freedom amendment also seeks to cut down on the attacks that people are making, trying to stop normal, everyday assistance programs just because they want to discriminate against people's religion. It is long overdue, Mr. Speaker, that we correct the decisions that the U.S. Supreme Court has heaped upon us. I think it is important that we look at a particular term that is often used by people in this discussion. I hear people say, well, what does this mean about separation of church and State? I understand the questions. But I also worry when people pay more attention to a catch phrase than to what are the words of the U.S. Constitution. Because that phrase, ``separation of church and State,'' although it has some use, is not found in the Constitution of the United States of America. No matter how many people try to claim that it is, all you had to do is pick up a copy of the Constitution and read it. What does it say about religion? ``Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.'' That phrase, ``separation of church and State,'' is not found in the Constitution. So the religious freedom amendment does not violate the concept of separation of church and State in the proper sense of that term, but unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, people who are intolerant of other people's religions have distorted the proper meaning of that phrase. In the process, they have persuaded our courts to distort the first amendment. Under their approach, because the government keeps expanding, everywhere, whether you are talking about schools or roads or if you are talking about drug counseling programs, if you are talking about trade, if you are talking about the price of apples and eggs and butter, the government is involved. When you have a constantly growing government, if you put in place a mistaken notion of separation of church and State and make an improper use of that term, then as government gets bigger, you are saying that religion has to leave the room. When government comes in the door, religion must exit. So as government keeps growing, religion and its place in our lives has to shrink. That is not what the Founding Fathers intended. That is not what that phrase was intended to mean. I want to share with Members what the phrase properly means. This is not according to Ernest Istook; this is according to the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, William Rehnquist. Justice Rehnquist is not one of those who has been trying to push religion and religious expression out of the public square. But Justice Rehnquist has dissented from what the court has done in so many ways. Justice Rehnquist wrote an official dissent, and this was in the case of Wallace v. Jaffree in 1985. He wrote that the wrongful focus on the term separation of church and State has caused, and here are his words on what it has caused, ``a mischievous diversion of judges from the actual intentions of the drafters of the Bill of Rights. The wall of separation between church and State is a metaphor based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging. It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned.'' Those are the words of the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Because people, instead of talking about the Constitution and our rights under the Constitution, have sought to persuade people that instead you just talk about this phrase, ``separation of church and State.'' The religious freedom amendment does not abandon the notion of separation of church and State. It just corrects it to the proper meaning; the original and correct meaning of it is what we focus upon. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote about the actual intent of the first amendment, ``Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.'' This is what Justice Rehnquist says was the actual intent of the Founding Fathers. And I quote his words again, ``The evil to be aimed at, so far as its drafters were concerned, appears to have been the establishment of a national church and perhaps the preference of one religious sect over another, but it was definitely not concerned about whether the government might aid all religions evenhandedly.'' So the religious freedom amendment follows the correct interpretation and meaning. We do not establish any sort of official religion. We are not going to have a national church in the USA. But that does not mean that we cannot have evenhanded treatment of different religions, of all religions rather than suppressing them, rather than having this current, horrible standard that says you go into a classroom and if a child wants to pray, you silence them. We silence them. We censor them, we shut them up. That is wrong. That is not tolerance, that is not diversity, that is censorship. But that is what the U.S. Supreme Court has been telling us for 36 years, and it is long overdue that we correct what they have done to twist and distort the First Amendment. Now, it is really embarrassing, Mr. Speaker, that Congress has taken so long to act on this crucial issue which goes to the heart of the matter; it goes to the essence of our liberties as Americans. We have not had a vote on a school prayer constitutional amendment in this House of Representatives since 1971, and that is the only time we ever had it. The Supreme Court made its decision in that area in 1962. Now, after 36 years, we only had one vote on the floor of this House, and that was 27 years ago. They have not had a vote in the Senate since 1984. And yet, year after year, month after month, we have public opinion polls, I have a collection of 36 years of public opinion polls in the U.S.A., and 75 percent plus, 75 percent and up of the American people say they want a constitutional amendment to address this, to make it possible to have voluntary prayer in public school again. And the House has been unresponsive. That is why I am so pleased that 150 and more Members of this House have come together in sponsoring the religious freedom amendment to correct this. It is so long overdue. As we look at this, let us compare the difference between what we do on a Federal level and the States. If we look at the preamble of the religious freedom amendment, to secure the people's right to acknowledge God according to the dictates of conscience, is that not what we want? Is that not the freedom we want? We can acknowledge God according to what our conscience tells us ought to be the manner of doing so. I hear some critics say, oh, my goodness, we cannot refer to God in the Constitution of the United States of America. What do we think the Founding Fathers did and the Declaration of Independence when they talked about a due regard for nature's God, when they said in the Declaration of Independence that we hold these truths to be self- evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights, and that among these rights are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men. Now, is that not something? The Founding Fathers said our rights do not come from government, they come from God, from our Creator, and the purpose of government, the whole reason for setting up government is to secure the rights given to us by God. Now, to some people today perhaps that appears a strange notion, and so when we say let us put in the Constitution that people have a right to acknowledge God according to the dictates of conscience, they seem to think it is something strange. But yet, Mr. Speaker, I have looked through the constitutions of all 50 States. I ask my colleagues if they know that every one of our 50 States in their State constitutions refer to God. They do. We can look at any State, pick a State. The gentleman from California (Mr. Cunningham), from that Golden State, California's constitution includes the words that they are grateful to Almighty God for our freedom. Pick another State. Let us take another western State. Arizona, in its Constitution it says, grateful to Almighty God for our liberties. Idaho, grateful to Almighty God for our freedom. Kansas, grateful to Almighty God for our civic and religious privileges. Maine, oh, listen to this in Maine: Acknowledging with grateful hearts the goodness of the sovereign ruler of the universe in affording us an opportunity so favorable to the design, and imploring God's aid and direction in its accomplishments. That is in a State Constitution in Maine. Connecticut says that it acknowledges with gratitude the good providence of God. Indiana, grateful to Almighty God for the free exercise of the right to choose our own government. Nebraska, grateful to Almighty God for our freedom. Michigan, grateful to Almighty God for the blessings of freedom. New York, grateful to Almighty God for our freedom. My home State of Oklahoma, invoking the guidance of Almighty God. Rhode Island in its State Constitution says, grateful to Almighty God for the civil and religious liberty which he hath so long permitted us to enjoy and looking to him for a blessing upon our endeavors. South Carolina in their State Constitution says that they are grateful to God for our liberties. Vermont says that part of the reason for their Constitution is to worship Almighty God. We could go on and on, Mr. Speaker, through the different States, through what the people of the States have thought was so important that they needed to write it into their constitutions, and they did not mince words. They said, we as a people believe in Almighty God, and we want to protect people's rights to worship God Almighty. In this age when so many people are trying to suppress religious expression in everyday life, is it not overdue that we make it clear in the national Constitution of the United States of America that people should be secure in their right to acknowledge God according to the dictates of conscience? And that is a phrase that appears also in a number of State constitutions: according to the dictates of conscience. So the people that did so much to establish this Nation and the States and to establish and then to preserve our freedom and our liberty, they recognized that it is because of God Almighty that we have been able to do these things. Yet, Mr. Speaker, it is sad that so many people want to wipe it out. They say, well, look, if we want to express something about religion, do it in the privacy of your own home, do it only at church. But, Mr. Speaker, if our constitutional rights only exist when we are in private and we cannot proclaim them in public, are they really a right anymore? If we were told we have a right of free speech, but not in public, we would have the media so up in arms about it saying, wait a minute, free speech is something one takes with them wherever they go, and in fact it is supposed to be more protected on public property than on private property. Is that happening? A sad case recently, this is a Federal court, a Federal court in New Jersey, there was a first grade student in Medford, New Jersey, and he wanted the right to read a story to his classmates and he brought a book to school the next day to read a story to his classmates. The book was The Beginner's Bible. The story was about Jacob and Esau, their reunion together, two brothers coming back together. In fact, I have read the text of that story. It does not even mention God, but because it is from a beginner's Bible, the teacher said, ``You cannot read it in school,'' and the U.S. District Court agreed and said that is right, you cannot read it. That is the first grader. In Alabama right now, in a court ruling issued by a Federal judge in Alabama, over 70 students have been expelled because the judge has said it does not matter what sort of school activity it is, classroom, school assembly, football game, pep rally, you name it, school officials cannot permit a prayer to occur. And students that do not go along with that have been expelled. Now, what kind of religious tolerance is that? I recall the words of another Supreme Court Justice, Potter Stewart. He dissented, Mr. Speaker. He dissented when the Supreme Court said that students should not be allowed to join together in prayer at school as part of a normal activity, and he wrote that he did not see that there was a danger in letting students that wanted to say a prayer to say one. In fact, he said if we really believe in diversity, students are only going to learn about diversity if they are exposed to it at school where they know it is normal, where they realize different people pray different ways, different people have some differences among their faiths, but yet they are more united than they are separate on those things. In fact, Justice Stewart went farther, because I hear some people talk about what they call a captive audience at school, they say, oh, you cannot have prayers at school because the children are captive audiences there. The people that first came up with that concept did not think about all of the students, they only cared about maybe a child who did not want to hear someone else's prayer. But how about the vast majority of students that say yes, that is something good, that is something positive, what about their rights? Because Justice Potter Stewart wrote, in a system of compulsory attendance at public school, to deny children the right to have a prayer, which is an everyday occurrence in so many other places in life--this Congress, legislatures, city council meetings, city club meetings, you name it--to deny them the right, Justice Stewart wrote, to have a prayer while they are required to be at school is to place religion at an artificial and State-created disadvantage. It is not being neutral, it is being negative toward religion, and that is not what the Founding Fathers intended.

Mr. ISTOOK. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. ISTOOK. Yes.

Mr. ISTOOK

Mr. ISTOOK. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 9, I was unavoidably detained en route by traffic. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yea''.

Mr. ISTOOK

Mr. ISTOOK. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

Mr. ISTOOK. Mr. Chairman, I certainly hope I misunderstood the gentleman from Rhode Island, because I am sure he did not intend to suggest that, because somebody is doing something that he likes, it is okay to lie. Because the Court did not say Mr. Magaziner erred by holding meetings in secret. No, the Court found that his position was dishonest, deceitful, preposterous, in the words of the judge's findings, because he lied to the court in order to try to justify having those meetings in secret with hundreds and hundreds of people. In fact, if we look at the list of the people that were meeting in secret, they even included representatives from the insurance industry. This was not something about one industry versus another and supposedly it is okay for one group to lie, because they question the motives of another. No, this is someone coming before a Federal judge saying under oath things that were blatantly untrue. Since when are we going to say the means justifies the ends? Since when is the White House going to say that it is okay for people in the highest levels of the White House to lie under oath to the courts of this Nation? What would happen if that is the standard? And that is the question before us. Those who vote against this resolution are saying it is okay to do nothing about it. Mr. Magaziner is still on the payroll. Mr. Chairman, I checked the most recent figure we have showing that he is making $110,000 a year of taxpayers' money. He filed this affidavit the first week of March in 1993. That means that, since he has filed the affidavit, he has been paid by the taxpayers almost half a million dollars; and he remains on the payroll. Nothing has been done about it. Mr. Chairman, should we not send a message to the White House that they ought to do something about keeping somebody on the public payroll at an expense to taxpayers of half a million dollars whose lies and deceits have cost us $280,000 in court-awarded sanctions and fines and legal fees? Mr. Chairman, I submit that nobody would be kept on the payroll of any private business that did such a thing. However, it is not just Mr. Magaziner. As I mentioned earlier, the White House representative to come before Congress and talk and testify to our subcommittee repeated the same lies about saying, oh, these are all Federal employees, they are not private citizens from other walks of life involved in this task force. Patsy Thomasson lied to us. She is still on the public payroll. Attorneys that were involved in the preparation of this at the White House and the Justice Department. And the Court properly said that they failed for years afterwards, even though they knew, they failed to correct the deceit and the lie practiced by Mr. Magaziner in the White House. Attorneys at the Justice Department are also culpable in this. We have all of these people who in the Clinton administration remain on the public payroll that were involved in this deceit. Their collective salaries are not just half a million dollars but probably a few million dollars. Now, should we not fashion a remedy where these people that the White House chooses to keep on the public payroll, despite their deceit, should be the ones who have to have this money taken out of their pay in some form or fashion? Maybe we ought to, as a second step in this process, say that those persons should not be paid more than minimum wage. Maybe there is some other mechanism. But for Congress to do nothing is to say that Congress goes on record saying that it is okay for officials at the White House to lie to Federal courts under oath. We cannot have standards such as that. The Nation cannot afford a standard like that. Under any other President, what is the watchword? What are Washington and Lincoln known for? They are known for being honest with the American people. And part of being honest is also if we make a mistake, if it is an innocent mistake, we correct it. That was not done. Multiple people have been kept on the payroll who were involved in a pattern of deceit, deliberate deceit to the Federal court. This is the first step in correcting that process. Congress cannot stand idly by, cannot do nothing, cannot say it is only $285,000. I heard someone before in this Congress saying that it was only $1 million. Well, next thing we know they will be saying it is only $100 billion or some similar figure. If we find that deceit is being practiced by White House officials, we have the obligation to the American people to root it out, to say we cannot continue to let those persons continue on the public payroll. Mr. Chairman, I urge adoption of the resolution.

Mr. ISTOOK. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Speaker, I have been working on this particular matter for 5 years as a member of the subcommittee that handles the White House appropriations; and we are here because there is a question about does Congress care when an official at the highest levels of the White House lies under oath in a civil proceeding and it costs the taxpayers a ton of money. Mr. Magaziner, a senior adviser to the President of the United States, according to the orders issued by the Federal judge, clearly, unquestionably lied, trying to keep information secret about this White House task force that was trying to remake one-sixth of the American economy in private confidential meetings, not letting us know even who the members were. Ultimately, when they were able to look beyond Mr. Magaziner's affidavit, they found that, instead of everybody being a Federal employee and, therefore, no Federal money going to private individuals in this endeavor, they found there were hundreds, hundreds, of people working directly with Mr. Magaziner who were not Federal employees at all. Mr. Magaziner should have been fired. The President of the United States should care if people at the White House are truthful to our courts. He does not seem to care. Therefore, Congress is saying, do we think the burden ought to fall upon the people who cause the problem or upon the taxpayers generally? Now why have an initial resolution such as this? Well, it is the first step. Maybe in the appropriations process we should say Mr. Magaziner and everyone else who was involved in the deceit of the court should not be paid anything more than, say, the minimum wage if the President is going to keep them on the payroll. One of the other presidential assistants, Patsy Thomasson, lied to our subcommittee about the makeup of this organization when we directly questioned her, lied under oath to the court, lied to Congress, lied to the newspapers, all of these people involved with deceit. Now the President of the United States, we read in today's papers, is looking at raising millions of dollars of private money for his personal legal defense funds, unlimited amounts from different individuals. If the President cares about proving the truth to the American people, let the President come forward and say, we will make sure that while we are raising these millions of dollars for legal fees we will raise another $285,000 to pay the plaintiffs who brought this action. Would that not be a nice refreshing approach for the President to take? Because it was the White House that was involved in lying under oath, and it was the Justice Department that permitted it. And then the Justice Department investigated itself as to whether or not perjury charges would be brought. Read the court decision. Officials in the Justice Department, officials in the White House were intimately involved in this. The court said there might be a problem prosecuting it because one of the White House lawyers involved, Vince Foster, is now dead and one of the Justice Department lawyers involved, Webb Hubbell, has been convicted of felony since then. Well, it does not matter that the taxpayers still have this bill and these people still are on the public payroll who the court found do not care to tell the truth under oath. This is the first step in a process of this Congress, Mr. Speaker, where we will find out which Members think that it is important to honor the principle of truth in testimony to our courts and, yes, to say that principle applies to the White House and everyone there, as well as to the rest of us. I urge adoption of the rule and of the underlying resolution.