Darrell Issa

Mr. ISSA

Mr. ISSA. I yield myself 2 minutes. Mr. Speaker, it appears as though we agree on certain things. We agree that some transparency is required. We certainly agree, on a bipartisan basis, that what the GAO did, under Dodd-Frank, at a minimum, was a good thing. I think there's no question my colleague who was here earlier, Mr. Frank, certainly would agree to the numbers, the expansion of the Fed in that period that Mrs. Lummis talked about between 2008 and now. I think we would all agree the Federal Reserve is the people's bank. It is broadly owned by 316 or 320 million Americans. I served on the board of a public company, one that I founded. I understand that if you have more than 500 stockholders, you have an obligation to considerable disclosure. Although the Fed is audited to see whether, basically, some numbers are correct or not on a limited basis, the truth is the Federal Reserve is not open and transparent, not even years after they make decisions. I think the American people have a piercing question right now, one that is not the question that Dr. Paul was asking when he first wanted to audit the Fed. The question is, Will we be like Greece? Will we be like Germany? Will we be like the trauma that's sweeping over the European Union? Do we, in fact, know the true numbers? Do we know the extent of the leverage and the policies and the accuracy and the knowledge of the Federal Reserve? I think calmly we have to ask that question. Do we know what we need to know, or are we willing to not know, in hopes that we won't be political because we don't know? I've been in Congress for 12 full years at the end of this term, and I've learned one thing: Congress has a tendency to do two things well: nothing at all, and overreact. I trust today will be a day in which we're in between.

Mr. ISSA. I now yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Montana (Mr. Rehberg).

Mr. ISSA. History records that Democrats broadly voted for it when it was voted out of this body. Nothing more need be said. With that, I yield 1 minute to the gentlelady from Tennessee (Mrs. Blackburn).

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, the rules of the House prohibit going after someone's motivation. I'm very concerned that a bill that, in a substantially similar form, was placed into Dodd-Frank by then-Chairman Barney Frank is now being characterized as somehow ill-intended and mischievous activity by the proponent. I would trust that that is not the intent of the speakers on behalf of that side of the aisle about this bipartisan bill. It is virtually identical to the language that Barney Frank put into Dodd-Frank.

Mr. ISSA. It is now my honor to yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Farenthold).

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, can I inquire how much time we both have remaining, please.

Mr. ISSA. I now yield 1 minute to the gentlelady from Kansas (Ms. Jenkins).

Mr. ISSA. It is now my honor to yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Amash).

Mr. ISSA. Reclaiming my time, I would like to yield 15 seconds to the gentleman from Texas, the author of the bill.

Mr. ISSA. I thank the gentleman. Would you suggest that we should do both of those?

Mr. ISSA. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous materials on the bill under consideration.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 459) to require a full audit of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal reserve banks by the Comptroller General of the United States before the end of 2012, and for other purposes, as amended.

Mr. ISSA. As I introduced my good friend and leader on this issue, Mr. Chaffetz, I might note that when the word ``Democrat'' and ``Republican'' are used in this Hall, hopefully when there are 45 Democratic Members on this bill as cosponsors, we would recognize this is a bipartisan bill. I now yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Utah (Mr. Chaffetz).

Mr. ISSA. I yield myself such time as I may consume. H.R. 459, the Federal Reserve Transparency Act, directs the GAO to conduct a full audit of the Federal Reserve. The Dodd-Frank legislation mandated a GAO audit of the Fed, but that audit, issued by the Government Accountability Office in July of 2011, focused solely on the issues concerning emergency credit facilities. GAO remains restricted, under the current law, from conducting a broader audit of the Fed that includes, for instance, a review of the Fed's monetary policy operations and its agreements with foreign governments and central banks. The bill remedies this situation by permitting GAO, the investigative arm of Congress, to conduct a nonpartisan audit that will review all of these transactions. The findings of the audit are to be reported to Congress. It is particularly appropriate that we consider this legislation at this time. While Congress should not manage or micromanage details of monetary policy, it needs to be able to conduct oversight of the Fed. The Fed was created by Congress to be a central bank, independent of the influence of the U.S. Treasury. It was never intended to, in fact, be independent of Congress or independent of the American people. In recent years, the Fed's extraordinary interventions into the economy and financial markets have led some to call into question its independence. We do not ask for an audit for that reason. We ask for an audit because the American people ultimately must be able to hold the Fed accountable; and to do so, they must know, at least in retrospect, what the Fed has done over these many years that it has been without an audit. That is why I support H.R. 459, a bipartisan bill with 273 other cosponsors. I urge my colleagues' support, and I reserve the balance of my time. Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

Mr. ISSA. I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, it's now my honor to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Paul), the author of this bill and the man who understands that not knowing should never be an answer.

Mr. ISSA

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I submit the following letters to Ranking Member Elijah Cummings regarding H. Res. 711. Congress of the United States, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Washington, DC, May 30, 2012. Hon. Elijah E. Cummings, Ranking Member, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Dear Ranking Member Cummings: This letter is a follow-up to my letter dated May 24, 2012 regarding the March 15, 2010 application for a wire intercept that the Justice Department authorized in support of Operation Fast and Furious. Additional Wiretap Applications Obtained by the Committee The Committee has obtained three additional wiretap applications from the Fast and Furious investigation, dated April 19, 2010, May 7, 2010, and May 18, 2010, respectively. These three applications pertain to four target telephone lines. Each application includes an accompanying memorandum, dated April 15, 2010, May 6, 2010, and May 14, 2010, respectively, from Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division Lanny A. Breuer to Paul M. O'Brien, Director, Office of Enforcement Operations, authorizing the interception application. The memoranda from Breuer were marked specifically for the attention of Emory Hurley, the lead federal prosecutor for Operation Fast and Furious. In response to your personal request, I am enclosing copies of these three wiretap applications. Please take every precaution to treat them carefully and responsibly. I am hopeful that they will assist you in understanding the extent of information brought to the attention of senior officials in the Criminal Division who were responsible for reviewing the contents of the applications to determine if they were legally sufficient and conformed to Justice Department policy. The information is as vast as it is specific. These wiretap applications, signed by the late Deputy Assistant Attorney General John C. Keeney under the authority of his supervisor, Assistant Attorney General Breuer, provide additional insight into who knew--or should have known--what and when in Operation Fast and Furious. To assist you in better understanding the facts, I appreciate the opportunity to provide relevant and necessary context for some of the information in these wiretap applications. Due to the sensitivity of the documents, individual targets and suspects will be referred to with anonymous designations. Nonetheless, you will see that the individuals referred to in the wiretap applications are well- known to our investigation. Facts Learned from the First Wiretap Application As I understand it, the wiretap application authorized on March 15, 2010 was the first in this controversial case. Like many federal wiretap applications, the affidavit provided significant details about the controversial operational tactics used in the case, such as breaking off surveillance of a suspect who had illegally purchased firearms. As we now know, as early as December 2009 agents from ATF and DEA knew that the main target of the case, Target 1, planned to acquire firearms for the purpose of transporting them to Mexico. In fact, the affidavit in the first wiretap application provides entire conversations obtained through a separate DEA wire intercept detailing Target 1's efforts. The affidavit acknowledges that while monitoring the DEA target telephone numbers, law enforcement officers intercepted calls that demonstrated that Target 1 was conspiring to purchase and transport firearms for the purpose of trafficking the firearms from the United States to Mexico. At the time it was preparing the first wiretap affidavit, ATF was aware that from September 2009 to March 15, 2010, Target 1 acquired at least 852 firearms valued at approximately $500,000 through straw purchasers. As of March 15, 2010, ATF had identified 21 of these straw purchasers. Between September 23, 2009 and January 27, 2010, 139 firearms purchased by these straw purchasers were recovered--81 of those in Mexico. These recoveries occurred one to 49 days after their purchase in Arizona. The document reflects that the Justice Department should have been fully aware that large sums of money were being used to purchase a large numbers of firearms, many of which were flowing across the border. In fact, ATF even knew the tactics the smugglers were using to bring the guns into Mexico. The straw purchasers would purchase the firearms in Arizona and then transport them either to Mexico or a location near the U.S.-Mexico border from which others would drive the guns into Mexico. The first wiretap application in Fast and Furious contains rich detail about the transactions by many of the straw purchasers. Given this detail, it shocks the conscience that federal law enforcement officials intentionally abandoned surveillance. Even more shocking is that upon reviewing these facts, senior Justice Department officials authorized the wiretap applications instead of shutting down the investigation. New Information Contained in Additional Wiretap Applications These three additional wiretap applications further demonstrate that senior officials in the Justice Department's Criminal Division failed to sound the alarm, despite being presented with unmistakable evidence of the extent of the Fast and Furious gun trafficking ring. Given the danger involved, these officials should have intervened without hesitation. Throughout this investigation, one of my goals has been to hold these officials accountable for their management failures. In public statements, you have indicated you agree with this objective. Given this new evidence obtained by the Committee, I expect you to join me in seeking to hold these officials accountable. Senior DOJ Officials Knew by May 2010 That At Least 1,500 Firearms Were Involved, and Recoveries in Mexico Were Ongoing The affidavits for the additional wiretap applications demonstrate that senior officials at both ATF and Justice Department headquarters knew that Target 1 was continuing to acquire firearms illegally and traffic them to Mexico. By April 19, 2010, Target 1 had acquired at least 1,217 firearms through straw purchasers, costing approximately $800,000. By May 17, 2010, less than a month later, Target 1 had acquired nearly 300 additional firearms. Between September 23, 2009 and March 23, 2010, 302 of these firearms were recovered, including 182 in Mexico and 116 along the U.S.-Mexico border. These recoveries occurred between one and 105 days after the firearms were purchased in Arizona. The affidavits illustrate that ATF allowed Target 1 to continue to operate the firearms trafficking ring despite evidence indicating that they should have shut it down. Senior Department officials also failed to act on these facts. As a result, Target 1 was able to acquire even more firearms. Monitored Phone Calls Detail Large Numbers of Firearms The affidavits include details of phone conversations showing that Target 1 and related straw purchasers were heavily involved in illegal firearms trafficking. For example, one affidavit details recorded conversations over the course of a 30-day period between Straw Purchaser Y and a cooperating FFL. In each of these recorded conversations, Straw Purchaser Y discussed future firearms purchases from the FFL. Following each of those conversations, Straw Purchaser Y later arrived at the FFL and purchased firearms. In that month alone, Straw Purchaser Y bought a total of 120 AK-47 type rifles, 6 FN Herstal 5.7 caliber pistols, a Springfield Armory .40 caliber pistol, a Glock .45 caliber pistol, a Colt model ``El Jefe'' .38 super, and a Barrett .50 caliber rifle. One person's purchase of over 120 assault-type firearms in less than a month should have set off alarm bells for Criminal Division lawyers reading these affidavits. That fact alone should have been enough for a senior Department official to stop this program. Nobody did. This failure to raise an alarm represents a major breakdown in leadership. Surveillance Continues on the Illegal Purchase and Transfer of Firearms In addition to recording conversations of straw purchasers, ATF surveillance units continued to observe them buy guns illegally. For example, on April 16, 2010 surveillance units witnessed Straw Purchaser Y buy three Barrett .50-caliber rifles at a cost of $9,000 each from an FFL. Surveillance followed Straw Purchaser Y and observed him transfer at least one of the rifles into a vehicle registered to Target 1. After the transfer, surveillance followed Target 1's vehicle to the residence of Straw Purchaser V, where the firearm was unloaded from the vehicle. Again, law enforcement did not interdict these guns or make an arrest. On April 24, 2010, surveillance units observed Straw Purchaser Y purchase three FN Herstal 5.7 mm pistols from the same FFL. Later that day, surveillance units followed Straw Purchaser Y to his residence, where the same vehicle belonging to Target 1 was parked. After leaving Straw Purchaser Y's residence, the vehicle was later observed at the residence of Straw Purchaser V. At that point, surveillance was simply terminated. A Barrett .50-caliber is a fearsome rifle that New York City Police Commissioner Ray Kelly has called a ``weapon of war.'' Senior Justice Department officials should have asked tough questions of ATF about the circumstances surrounding each of these purchases. Given the circumstances of these purchases and the subsequent transfer to Target 1's vehicle, senior Department officials had a duty to intervene in the operation to ensure that it was being conducted in accordance with the law and Department policy. Instead, they stood by as the straw purchasing ring continued unabated. Tracking Border Crossings The affidavits also describe Target 1's border crossings, some of which occurred immediately following periods of buying from the straw purchasers. From December 17, 2009 to March 23, 2010, Target 1 made 13 documented crossings from Mexico into the United States. Eleven of these crossings occurred at Texas points of entry. On December 31, 2009, Straw Purchaser Y purchased seven firearms. The following day, Target 1 crossed by vehicle from Mexico into the United States via a port of entry in Fabens, Texas. From December 30, 2009 to January 15, 2010, Straw Purchaser Y and Straw Purchaser Z purchased a combined total of 80 firearms. Then, on January 18, 2010, Target 1 again crossed from Mexico into the United States via the Faben, Texas point of entry. From January 26, 2010 to February 12, 2010, Straw Purchaser B, Straw Purchaser N, and Straw Purchaser Y purchased 62 firearms combined. On February 13, February 15, and February 16, 2010, Target 1 crossed by vehicle from Mexico into the United States via a port of entry in El Paso, Texas. From April 6, 2010 to April 24, 2010, Straw Purchaser Y purchased 24 firearms. On April 26, 2010, Target 1 crossed by vehicle from Mexico into the United States via a port of entry in Lukeville, Arizona. The affidavits also state that Target 1 routinely travelled to El Paso, Texas. In fact, according to the affidavits, intercepted phone calls show that at that time, Target 1 was engaging in conversations relating to firearms trafficking with individuals in and around El Paso, Texas. Moreover, one of the affidavits states that ATF agents believed Straw Purchaser Y was also traveling to El Paso, Texas to receive U.S. currency to transport back to Mexico for future gun purchases in the Phoenix, Arizona area. For example, on March 23, 2010, the day after Straw Purchaser Y returned from El Paso, Texas, Straw Purchaser M, Straw Purchaser N, and Straw Purchaser Q purchased a total of 30 AK-47 type rifles and 7.62x39 caliber ammunition from Phoenix, Arizona FFLs. Straw Purchaser Y traveled to El Paso, Texas on two occasions after March 21, 2010. On both occasions, Straw Purchaser Y drove to El Paso, Texas, stayed at a hotel approximately one day, and then drove back to Phoenix, Arizona. On the second occasion, surveillance units observed Straw Purchaser Y meeting with an unknown individual before returning to Phoenix, Arizona a short time later. Conclusion These wiretap affidavits show that straw purchasers were buying massive numbers of guns from Phoenix area FFLs, and that federal law enforcement officials were contemporaneously aware of many of these sales. By monitoring and recording phone calls and conducting extensive surveillance, ATF tracked the actions of the firearms trafficking ring. ATF knew, and shared with the Criminal Division, that Target 1 facilitated the illegal transfer of these firearms to Mexico for the drug cartels. The volume of firearms distributed by the gun trafficking ring was a major threat to public safety. Despite the volume of information gathered through this field work, no one in ATF or Justice Department headquarters took action. This is inexcusable. The new facts these wiretap applications reveal are dismaying. More than we previously believed, senior officials at the Department of Justice were aware of specific information about ATF's efforts to monitor illegal transactions and subsequently abandon surveillance. Now, more than ever, it is imperative that you join me in demanding that these senior officials be held accountable. Sincerely, Darrell Issa, Chairman.

Mr. ISSA

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I'm not sure if I heard the gentleman right when he said that I ``silenced whistleblowers'' in order to keep them from talking about gun control. Is the gentleman disparaging and falsely claiming that I did something that I know for a fact I did not?

Mr. ISSA. Of course.

Mr. ISSA. Reserving the right to close, I have no further requests for time.

Mr. ISSA. Reclaiming my time, it's pretty clear you are disparaging me, and you are disparaging me by making a claim that's untrue. The bottom line is, in committee, witnesses were told that they need not answer questions that were not the subject of the hearing and, in fact, those witnesses were allowed and did answer questions by the minority having to do with gun control, an issue they prefer to talk about rather than the cause of Brian Terry's death. With that, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. McCaul).

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Lungren).

Mr. ISSA. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.

Mr. ISSA

Mr. ISSA. I yield myself 15 seconds. I respect my colleague from California, as we came in to Congress together some 12 years ago; but the fact is he talked about everything except the fact that Congress was lied to in a false letter and follow- up statement. Ten months went by. We're only asking for the information related to the false statements made to Congress during that intervening period and nothing more. I reserve the balance of my time.