Paul Kanjorski

Mr. KANJORSKI

Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Chairman, instead of an ad hominem attack on the floor, let us assume we are both freshmen here.

Mr. KANJORSKI. I appreciate that the gentleman does not appreciate my tenure in office. But I oppose him making an ad hominem attack on the House floor. (By unanimous consent, Mr. Kanjorski was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. KANJORSKI. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. KANJORSKI. It is about 8 cents. So that means the dollar has deflated by 12 times. So if you will multiply $350 billion by 12, you will find today that the debt of the United States is about equal in amount, in dollar amount, real value amount, as it was when we came out of the Second World War. Now, I have been here for 10 years, and I have heard my friends on the other side talk about debt and dollars and failed to relate real dollars and real debt. And I want to point out that the magnificence of what happened from 1945 to 1980 was that this country reduced the real debt of the United States by more than 60 percent, even $800 billion. Its real value, relative to 1945 terms, was about $100 billion. We brought that down 60 percent under a Democrat-controlled Congress from 1945 until 1980. Ronald Reagan entered the Presidency and sold the American people on a campaign that he could double defense expenditures, he could reduce taxation on the wealthy of this country, coming down from 70 percent to 28 percent ultimately during his administration, and he could balance the budget. He did keep two of those promises. He doubled the defense expenditures of this country. Even though Russia in every study in the 1980's was shown as ready to collapse, we still doubled our military expenses. He also cut the income tax on the wealthiest corporations and the wealthiest individuals from 70 percent to 28 percent. He did make one little error, one little error: He took the debt of the United States from $800 billion to $4.2 trillion in his term of administration of office. I hear people relating all these dollar terms, you talk about crisis. I want to make sure that you understand that the debt of the United States coming out of the Second World War was about $350 billion, about equal to our debt today. The only difference is that the population of the United States in 1945 was 120 million people and today the population of the United States is about 260 million people. The number of corporations and businesses existing in the United States in 1945 were less than one-fifth of what they are today. So when anyone in America today, and my conservative friends on that side are talking about dollars and dollars, 1995 dollars and 1945 dollars, they are talking about grapefruits and grapes in size. You cannot have an intelligent, intellectual discussion in finance or economics when you do not come down to real values. So if you say we are in crisis today when we have more than twice the population, we have five times as many eceonomic enterprises in the United States, then I cannot imagine what terms you would use in a description of 1945. The fact of the matter is America is the wealthiest nation on Earth and up until the last 10 to 15 years its population has been benefiting from the increase in productivity in America, but it has stagnated. It has stagnated because of many situations, most of which is the advent of the global market.

Mr. KANJORSKI. The debt at the end of the Second World War was $350 billion. Do you know what the present value of a 1994 dollar is relative to a 1945 dollar?

Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. I would appreciate it if the gentleman from Indiana will stay, because I think he has brought up a tremendous question, a very, very important question, and I think it requires some analysis of history. When you talk about the crisis that we are in, I am not sure that everyone can appreciate, or whether you appreciate, where we are relative to where we have been in the past. I know the gentleman from Indiana probably was not born at the end of the Second World War. I assume that. Well, at the end of the Second World War, do you know what the debt of the United States was? Well, I mean, if we can just have a give and take.

Mr. KANJORSKI

Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Chairman, I say to the gentleman, ``Mr. Solomon, that was a question I couldn't even exact out of my sight.'' One of the reasons I am taking the time today is I sat on the committee that drafted this. We discussed it, I thought about it at great length, and I am satisfied that we can exercise and delegate to the President substantially more authority, but the weakness that we have is we can never reclaim that authority once delegated. Now I am not going to pass on the constitutionality of the delegation authority. That is for the Supreme Court to do. There is no question in my mind we can pass this statute, make this delegation of authority, but our problem, gentleman, is how do we get it back if it has been abused, and that is the point I am pleased my good friend from New York asked the question on. We on our side have found the answer to that, and it is very prevalent in many States of the Union, and that is a sunset provision. I offered it in committee. I offered it with the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Doggett] on the unfunded mandate provision yesterday, and I am going to offer it sometime this afternoon in conjunction with him on this bill. If we really want to see whether an Executive would violate our trust in our delegation of authority, we have to do something substantial; I agree with that. This bill does that. It is somewhat extraordinary, somewhat much larger than I would recommend we do, but I can understand my friends on the majority doing it. But the one way that we can condition the responsiveness and the responsibility of the President to act appropriately with this tremendous delegation of authority is that, if he knows that if he abuses this trust we will put in him, then within 5 years the bill will cease to exist, and the authority given to him will cease to exist. Now we are going to introduce that bill, and I think that is an insurance mechanism with no other repeal of the law because remember to repeal the law it is going to require two-thirds vote of the House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate because, I say to my colleague, ``You can bet your life a President is going to vote this power once you give it to him.'' So we cannot ever reform or repeal this legislation unless two-thirds of the House of Representatives and two- thirds of the Senate agree, and we have not had those majorities existing that think in concert or in activity in this body since my historical memory goes back. I do not recall any time, any party, entertained in both Houses of Congress a clear two-thirds voting majority that they could change this legislation. So the will of the people can never be implemented again unless we have the acquiescence of the President to sign and not exercise this right of veto. What I am suggesting here is this: We have some minor adjustments. We have appropriation earmarks that bother us all. We have sometimes irresponsible appropriations and authority granted when those of us who rely on our colleagues are sometimes misunderstanding or given misinformation as to what the actual appropriation bills stand for, and there is not one of us who has not gone home and been embarrassed. I remember a colleague from one of the southern States who put in an appropriation for a school in France in the late hours of the morning, and I got back to my district and somebody said, ``How could you vote to give $20 million to a school in France that would have been illegal if you had given that money in the United States?'' And quite frankly, I not only would not have voted for it, but I had to do it in one solid package in the entire appropriation. But then, too, I had to admit I did not know it was in there, in a 1100-page appropriation bill, until after the fact. And sometimes we are not even sure when it gets into the bill, whether it is before the vote or after the vote, because the bill generally does not get assembled at 11 o'clock at night when the conference reports are worked out. We have all had those experiences, but to cure those limited experiences, to cure the study of the worm that the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] talked about for $34 million does that cannot be reclaimed in the future except with a two-thirds majority of the Senate. That is unconscionable. We have the opportunity to pass a responsible, strong piece of legislation. I say that although in my basic nature I am against any action that would destabilize the balance of the three branches of government--and I think this will--I will support this bill and put faith in this President and in the next President for 3 years, but if there is an abuse, we know full well that we are going to have that cease and have to take action again to delegate that authority away from that President whoever he may be 5 years from now. I think that is a reasonable proposition I urge my colleagues to stop marching across the bridge in such formation that they are going to bring the bridge and the Constitution down, that they are going to bring the system down. I would urge the 230 Members of the majority to think about the amendment that will be offered this afternoon on the sunset. It does not weaken their provision; it does not weaken the authority of the President. The only thing it does, it buys a 5-year policy, that if a future President or this President abuses that authority, the Congress would have to take to take no further action His authority for so acting would cease to exist 5 years from the passage of this bill. Is that so unreasonable? And let me remind the Members again that there are strong feelings in the House on both sides. Did the President of the United States have the constitutional or statutory authority to act by executive order to appropriate more Federal tax money to guarantee the loans of Mexico, exceeding the total Foreign Affairs appropriation each year of this Congress? I think that is a question to be answered. I do congratulate the President for taking extraordinary executive action, but that does not excuse him if he did it without statutory authority or constitutional authority. Luckily, in our system we will get to try that issue at some future date without affecting his ability to carry on foreign affairs or to reverse the action he has taken. But when we get down to every appropriation of every department, every agency, and every bureau, every program of the U.S. Government, I am not sure that we want to delegate that type of authority. Quite frankly, in States that I have seen, some Governors have used this authority to force members of the legislature to come to their conviction or activity or to punish them by deciding to spend no funds in particular areas by the exercise of their line-item veto. I urge my colleagues on the Republican side and my colleagues on the Democratic side, because this is really a bipartisan effort, to come to grips with our deficit and our debt and the inability sometimes of this Congress to act appropriately. So what I am suggesting, Mr. Chairman, is that the Members on the minority side have a vote for as stringent or as hard a bill as I think we could imagine they can get by statute, delegating extraordinary powers to the President of the United States. The only insurance policy I am asking for is, let us limit that delegation of authority to 5 years, and if there is abuse, we may not be able to change that law because we may not be able to override a veto by a two-thirds vote of the House and a two-thirds vote of the Senate, but at least we can know that that abuse and that arbitrary action of that Chief Executive, whoever he may be, can only occur while the statute will have full force and effect, and that it will be sunsetted by a provision in that statute. I urge my colleagues to support that amendment when it is offered, and further, I urge my colleagues to have a good debate on this question. I think it is important. I think the American people do want to see responsible government. I think we have had an opportunity here in the last days of the unfunded mandate debate, and I want to compliment my friends on the Republican side. I saw an ability to start moderating things by taking the fact that we did have some ideas on this side that did help perfect and improve the legislation. I think the people of the United States, including, quite frankly, people in my district in Pennsylvania that I have talked to, want this center aisle to disappear. They want us to get off the idea that what is good for the Republicans is bad for the Democrats and what is good for the Democrats is bad for the Republicans. They want us to ask the question, ``What is good for America?'' I think what is good for America is to put the tools together to help get control of our fiscal situation in the United States, but, on the other hand, they do not want us to so unbalance the fine-tuned balance between the three branches of the American Government under the Constitution that we might work havoc on the very system we were sent here to defend.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, I did not intend to engage in this debate either, but it is very interesting that my colleague from Pennsylvania says we are confessed sinners. We are confessed sinners. I agree with his proposition and would have supported it if it had been part of the bill in previous years. We do know that one of the most disgraceful things in the Congress of the United States is these special loopholes for wealthy people and wealthy corporations in America. I say to my colleagues: ``Here is the opportunity, if you trust the President, to carry out the stoppage of special loophole provisions. We can give him that authority.'' Now let me suggest that we are about--and I know the majority side with the minority have been working on welfare reform--this is an issue of corporate welfare, of rich persons welfare. As my colleagues know, we can identify a lot of things in this country that the average citizen can learn to hate, but it is a type of corporate welfare with special tax provisions with the very wealthy corporations and individuals of this country that really cause a great portion of the deficit that we are all into the burden of today. Now my colleagues know we can argue it started out in committee, and I happen to sit on the committee. We wanted to stop a tax loophole for five persons; how ridiculous, for five persons. We finally raised a little devil on that. Some of us wanted to make it without limitation because we really believe, and I fundamentally believe, that the Tax Code of America is only to be practiced if it is fair and equitable to all taxpayers of America equally. This idea that wealthy corporations or wealthy Americans can come and hire the Gucci lobbyists that the majority party campaigned against just last November, and they lined up at the Committee on Ways and Means, and they bring in their high- powered, multimillion-dollar lawyers, and they win these special phrases, these special clauses, or, as the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon] indicated, the gentleman who is born in some particular county between the years such and such and such and such that only applies to one known living human being on Earth, and they forgive the tax responsibility of this Government, is insane, it is dishonest, it is intellectually dishonest, and it will bring down this Government. Now, if we are serious, if we are serious about the line-item veto, we ought to stop earmarking for special provisions. We are going to vote for that. We ought to also, on the other side of the ledger, give the President of the United States the authority to strike out special tax provisions for very few people who are smart enough to work the inside Beltway of Washington, DC. Some of us have been here 10 years, and have fought against it for 10 years, and have lost. If, in fact, this is a new Congress with a new breath of fresh air, and if they are going to live by their contract that they signed in September 1994, this is the true test. I joined my friend on the committee, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Barrett], when he said this is the real test of whether or not the majority party is going to do away with special provisions and special loopholes. This is the time when they are going to decide that corporate reform is as important to do away with corporate welfare as it is to do away with misuse and abuse in public welfare in this country, and it is unfair for us to strike up here and sound like we are suddenly reborn from sinners and that we become pure, but when it goes to the wealthy side of America, we refuse to stop the loopholes and the special taxation favors.

Mr. KANJORSKI. It is important. I just want you to recall in 1973 the President, having been dissatisfied with the investigation of the FBI and the CIA in the Watergate scandal, all he had to do was use this provision, if it were in law, and strike the appropriations and do away with the FBI and the CIA. My memory escapes me as to what the impeachment resolution vote on Nixon was in this House, But I highly doubt it was more than two-thirds. I just ask my colleagues on all sides, realize this is not just a housekeeping vehicle we are talking about today, this is a delegation of authority, legislative appropriation authority that is incredible, and allows the chief executive to reach down and punish those elements of the Government that oppose his views, whether his views are legal or constitutional, because we are arming a future President with that capacity.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. KANJORSKI. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Chairman, it was in that period of time in the early 1970's, at the end of the first term of the Nixon administration and the beginning of the second term of the administration, and we are all aware of all of the President's men, we are all aware that we have a tarnished history where a President of the United States, as a result of unconstitutional activity, resigned the office of President. We have the experience that an Executive did exceed his constitutional authority and indeed did abuse legislative authority that was not in his hands. Why would we want to arm and provide for that possibility to occur in the immediate future and ad infinitum until two-thirds of this House or two-thirds of the Senate would be in place to override that? There are 18 Members of this House that have introduced legislation to bring a 5-year sunset to every piece of legislation that is introduced into the House. I call upon those 18 Members, 16 on the majority side and 2 on the Democratic side, that if they are going to be consistent today, there is not any reasons why they would not support this amendment and start with the line-item veto to provide for a reasonable protection of the constitutional values we all hold high, and to protect the fact that if we delegate this authority to the President and if it is abused, we have a built-in mechanism to stop that unusual and extraordinary power or that extraordinary abuse. I urge my colleagues on the Republican side and the Democratic side to think in terms that we came here and took another oath of office to the Constitution of the United States and not to a political party. This is a time not to be a Republican, not to be a Democrat or not to be an Independent, but to be an American, and first of all in American that believes in the Constitution and a constitutionalist. I urge Members to support this reasonable sunset provision.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this amendment of course is to add another section indicating termination date; and it is the purpose to sunset this act as of January 1 of the year 2000, the principle being that we would enact extraordinary powers and transfer of powers from the Congress to the Executive, some of which powers are unknown or unreasonable or unthinkable right now as to what the ramifications of this may be. And I think what it does is allows us the opportunity to have a rein on the Executive, that if over the next 5 years there is abuse in the exercise of the line-item veto this Congress would have an opportunity to oversight the use of the line- item veto to either reform the amount of power that would be delegated to the Executive and if the abuse is so excessive by the Executive, it would terminate as of January 1 of the year 2000. I have never been a supporter of the constitutional amendment of changing the balance of powers between the executive branch of government and the legislative branch of government insofar as the legislative branch would pass over to the executive all of the possibilities that could be used in the appropriation bills and in tax bills. But apparently the will of the Congress is going to be, at least the House of Representatives, is going to be quite firm, that this bill will pass, and that is what the will of the majority is. There is nothing wrong with that. But now we have to look at the Constitution and we have to look at the precedence that we are establishing and the potential abuse. I had the pleasure of serving in this House in the 83d Congress as a page. That is the last Congress that the Republican Party was in the majority. When I look back at the history of the 83d Congress, I find that it did some very successful things in America. It attacked clean water for the first time in navigable rivers. It attacked and thought about the Interstate Highway System. It was a Congress that when it concluded did not have to be embarrassed with its operations. Now we are faced with the 104th Congress and a new majority, and perhaps a new wind in the land. The tool we are about to pass on to the President is a very powerful tool. It does not only affect this generation, but theoretically could affect all generations to come in reverse a veto by a majority of this House and the Senate, in order for that to be effective the President will have the constitutional authority to exercise his veto. If he exercises his veto on any appropriation that this House and the Senate do not agree upon, it will require a two-thirds vote of this House and a two-thirds vote of the Senate to override that veto. I have examined back as far as I can remember from the 83d Congress until now and I have found no Congress where any single party or coalition in this House or in the Senate ever at any particular time commanded a coalition or a number that would exceed two-thirds of this body or two-thirds of the Senate. The likelihood that that will happen in the future is quite remote. Historically, if we study the activities of the Parliaments of Europe during the periods of the 1920's and the 1930's, it was not unusual for the Fascist Party or the Communist Party to exercise a majority in those Parliaments, above a third, but below a majority. If for some reason the Executive authority fell into the hands of a party that has a third, and one vote, falls into the hands of the party that captures the Presidency, and a third and one vote of either the House or the Senate, there will be no way that the Congress can capture its constitutional responsibility to properly appropriate the will of the people and in accordance with the first article of the American Constitution. That is a significant transfer of power. As we go down this contract and as we go down the changes they want to be made, I hope my colleagues on the Republican side and my colleagues on the Democratic side recognize that what we are doing today is not something that is superficial in any stretch of the imagination, it is not something that can be educationally corrected in the future. The only way we could be certain that the extraordinary powers that this Congress is sending to the Executive, if abused could be changed, is if we have this sunsetting provision that allows this act to cease in 5 years, if an Executive who is now in office or the next Presidency were to violate the trust of the American people and this Congress. In my time in life I remember only one period of time where excessive Executive authority was used. It was the end of the first term of President Nixon.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, so that this debate is very clear, in committee the markup started out with only five. It was the minority side of the committee that asked the question, ``Why only five? Why should there be limits?'' So apparently between markup and rules, Mr. Chairman, it was raised to a hundred. I would like the majority to defend why we should allow protection for special tax loopholes for 101 and 102. What is the magic number there? Why?

Mr. KANJORSKI. I thank the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] for yielding this time to me. Mr. Chairman, I listened with great pleasure to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] and his explanation of the legislation we are about to pass here that may be such an assistance to balancing the budget. I wish it were just so simple, and I wish that there had not been a weakness on the part of not only the Congress but the President for these last 14, 15 years to reconcile where America should be. But the worst thing about this debate is we are dealing with the balance of power that the Founding Fathers warned about when they structured the Constitution of the United States. And before we change that balance of power it seems to me even though we may not win, I suspect there are 230 votes at least in this House that will pass this bill, but before we do that I would hope this debate brings out the proposition of what it will do to America and the American constitutional form of government and the intentions of the Founding Fathers as they say down in Philadelphia, in my home State, and evolved how a democratic citizenry could make the proper judgments through their representative officials to spending money, the taxpayers money. Article I of the American Constitution does not say that the President of the United States shall establish such expenditures as he deems necessary and shall carry out those expenditures without any further action. As a matter of fact, Article I says the power to expend money, the taxpayers money of the American people, shall reside in the House of Representatives, the house that represents the people. The President represents the Nation as a whole. We as individuals represent our individual constituents. And we come together as a body by majority consent to expend the taxpayers money. Yes, it is a give and it is a take, it is a moderation. Sometimes it is abused, but let us look at the historical significance of that abuse. In the last 20 years Presidents of the United States have sent rescissions to Congress of no more than $70 billion. That is about $3\1/2\ billion a year out of a $1,500 billion budget. Hardly significant. But the Congress responded by cutting $20 billion more, or $4.5 billion a year on average, a full 25 percent more per year than any President requested. Does that speak well for the Congress or for the President? Quite frankly, I do not think it speaks well or poorly about either. Because when you are talking about $3 or $4 billion in a $1,500 billion budget it is hardly a traceable item, and it is a very fine distinction as to whether or not the peoples' will in one region, area or State of the country have some ability to get relief through the Congress that the President does not necessarily see in the national interest or toward his political agenda. We are putting through a change in the balance of power here so that we take the appropriation process out of the House of Representatives and, to a large extent, we transport it down to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue and we put it on the desk of the President. Now if I had all the faith and courage in the world to believe we would always have a responsible President, a stable President and a President that had no political agenda or ideological agenda, I would say if we wanted to change the constitution that way, there are ways of doing it. But not necessarily being as optimistic as most Members of the House who will approve this bill are, I can foresee the day that what the President decides is a priority of expenditures for the American people may not be consistent with their Representatives' actions or intent. Let us look at some examples: Say California has an earthquake; say New York City has a major fire or destruction. What is the sympathy in the Congress of the United States to allocate amounts of money for California or New York and, if we do it, may have to expend above and beyond the balance of the budget? But a President who looks at those two States and sees no political ramifications if he disavows that expenditure, could just as easily strike that expenditure from the budget, and we would have no recourse unless it were brought back to this House and passed by a majority of the House. And then we say, ``Well, that's not unreasonable,'' and I agree. Mr. Chairman, that would not be bad, but the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] indicated that was the remedy, that the majority of the House of Representatives could overrule the President at will. That is not true, Mr. Chairman, because the President has the opportunity to veto that measure, and to override that veto it requires two-thirds of the House of Representatives and two-thirds of the Senate, a majority that is overwhelming and seldom had, and, quite frankly, if we had that ability today, we would not be talking about a piece of legislation for the line-item veto. We would be talking about a constitutional amendment to the Constitution. Now what are the promises here and what are the threats? The threats, I think, are major. They are a shift of power. I say to my colleagues, ``Now quite frankly, when you look at what's happened in this Congress in the past few days and in Washington for the last few weeks, you begin to realize that my friends on the majority party are saying there is such a mandate swelling from the people that we significantly want to change the structure of our government.'' I am not sure in my district, where 67 percent of the citizens voted for me, they sent that kind of a mandate, that they want a shift of power that is so significant away from the House of Representatives and the Congress to the Presidency. But, my colleagues, just a sidelight here. I say to the gentlemen on the majority side, ``This power you are giving the President today? the President exercised extraordinary power yesterday in solving the Mexican bailout, and I've watched some of the leadership on the majority side and a lot of the new freshman Members start to question it, and I agree with them. That's a question that should be tested. But if we follow down this line that the President should allocate and appropriate funds at whim and will without statutory authority or with statutory authority that cannot be withdrawn, the Mexican bailout is just the beginning of arbitrary power and reckless power exercised by a President if you happen to sit on this side of Pennsylvania Avenue.'' Now, as my colleagues know, we have a remedy. We have several remedies. One, the Congress can come into power and pass one resolution, but the President shall set such taxing rates, as necessary, to accumulate the sufficient revenues of the United States so that he may cover the expenditures made in any appropriate appropriations he deems necessary for the carrying out of the powers of the U.S. Government, and, if we pass that by unanimous consent, and the President signs it, hey, we can go home probably on January 5. It is all over. We do not have to do an awful lot more. A major part of the process of the Congress of the United States is the allocation of expenditures of money, and the receipt of revenues and the rates of how we set that to try to be fair, equitable, in proportion among our people. But if we really want a corporate efficiency where the CEO calls the shots, I ask, ``Why don't we just take the First Article of the Constitution and say, `Henceforth anything exercised in this by the Congress can be exercised by the President? We stand by it' and make it impossible to reverse.'' I know we do not want to do that. There is another remedy. I say to my colleagues, ``Gentlemen, if you really want to change the Constitution to provide for the balanced budget amendment which does an accounting process, a fiscal responsibility process, a process in the most sacred document, if you want to hand off to the Chief Executive the authority to appropriate, if you want to stop the authority of the National Government to have national standards and to require at some times and under proper conditions that States have to conform, municipalities have to conform, if you really want the executive and the legislative branches of this Government to operate in tandem, what you really want is a constitutional convention to change the Constitution of the United States and establish a parliament.'' We are quite distinct from parliamentary forms of government around the world because our framing fathers, I think with exceptional wisdom, recognizing the ability of people who exercised sovereign power to abuse that power sometimes; so, they sever that power into the three branches of government, making us equal and distinct, but counterbalancing one another so that ultimately the will of the people, without revolution, can be heard and make the proper corrections. Now I agree with my friends in the majority that we have had excessive, sometimes wasteful, sometimes abusive, expenditures. To deny that proposition I think would be to face facts and to deny the existence of those basic facts, but the question is: what kind of a repair should we make and how delicate that repair should be. Quite frankly this provision would allow one-third of this Congress to continue down the road and support the President at any execution of his--rescission of appropriations at will, and we could not reverse it, so that 67 percent of the elected Representatives of the people could not carry out the people's work, but one-third of the elected Representatives, in conjunction with the President, could accomplish that.

Mr. KANJORSKI. I will in just one moment. Now the other proposition is that-- As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] because I am moving on to another subject. Mr. SOLOMON, Mr. Chairman, I just want to say this the gentlemen from Pennsylvania [Mr. Kanjorski] is so well respected in this body. But I just want to say to him: ``One of the reasons we are going with a statute, as opposed to a constitutional amendment, is because a law that could be rescinded if it doesn't work. Let's give it chance, and try it, and let's see if it works.''

Mr. KANJORSKI

Mr. KANJORSKI. The gentleman from Texas is absolutely correct. I have sat here for 10 years and I have talked with my friends on the other side. Sometimes the C-SPAN audience does not realize that indeed we are friends, but all of us talked over this legislation and we all know that there are pieces of legislation that we are embarrassed about that do not adequately accomplish what they were intended to accomplish, but the Congress never gets an opportunity to oversight or review and return to that legislation. What will happen with the gentleman's amendment and my amendment here and the ones we intend to attach to future pieces of legislation, it will require the Congress to come back and face the reality of their legislation, to decide that they have to oversight it, to have hearings on it, or to reauthorize it or let it die. and applying sunset on Democratic initiatives or applying it on initiatives that we like and not to those that we do not like we will never get the process in place of having forced periodic review and real oversight, will we?

Mr. KANJORSKI. Certainly, I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, I think we just heard a very broad view of probably some of the problems that some of us see as excesses which could occur in consideration of the program for 100 days or the process of moving that legislation through without hearings and without detailed study and analysis. We that have had an opportunity to serve in Congress more than one term, and I know I have colleagues on both the majority side and on our side, favor an opportunity to exercise what has been less than diligently exercised over the course of years, and that is the oversight review of the Congress. None of us pretend to be the ultimate lawgivers, none of us pretend to have the expertise to know all of the unintended consequences of this legislation or other legislation. We are in a march, in a move now over these next 100 days to make some startling changes. The gentleman from California mentioned we can come back and change this bill if it does not work, we can come back and change other bills that my colleague from Texas and I and other Members of the majority intend to ask to be considered at the end of every bill, the provision to sunset. I think the Congress can always come back and review and repass bills, but those of us who have been here for a number of terms know we never get around to it. The passage of a bill by its very nature constructs an interest group, a special interest group that becomes the promulgators of that bill and the continuers of that bill because they have a special interest in that bill. We are fortunate enough to recognize the gift that we have before us today and start this process, and that is look at every piece of constructive legislation we put forth, say that if it is good legislation and it does not need anything a future Congress will have the intelligence to reenact and reauthorize that legislation. On the other hand, if after a period of time there are inadequacies in the legislation, a future Congress will have the ability to amend and change, to make up for those inadequacies; or if, on the other hand, there is abuse or the legislation appears not to have solved the problem it was tended to solve it will automatically go to a timely death.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Absolutely not. Let me give an example, and I know the gentleman from Texas feels strongly on the wetlands legislation. I know a lot of my friends on the other side and I have seen inadequacies in the legislation, not in the intent but in the application of the legislation as it affects small business people, farmers, residents of our community, all, we have heard those woes. If the Congress got involved in studying those issues, if we took advantage of the modern era of electronics and could hold hearings in Washington, but have people around this country that are directly affected, not the interest groups, not the associations, not the lobbyists, but real, live people that are affected by this legislation, their few stories could set the pace for this Congress to understand the underlying logic to redress, come back and examine legislation. Finally, I would say to the gentleman from Texas and my friends on the other side, do not fear sunset, do not fear sunset, do not fear bringing this to a forced review. America is an evolving nation. Over 200 years we grew from 3 million people to 260 million, from 13 States to 50 States. We have to take the time to review legislation that was even good at the time it was enacted but now may be obsolete. I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to take this as a nonpartisan amendment, and support the principle that we can take 5 years, 2\1/2\ Congresses and give that next Congress, the 107th Congress in its second session the opportunity to review what we do here to today.

Mr. KANJORSKI

Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, this is an important amendment. It was brought up at committee but not brought to a vote because at committee we ran the first amendment which was exempting Social Security, and that amendment received a vote of 39 yeses and 3 noes, and as a result is part of this bill as it appears on the floor. And now what I would like to do is have Medicare exempted as Social Security is exempted from the implications of this bill. I am particularly asking that because we all know that the Medicare fund is in difficulty. As the bill is presently constituted, if we are called upon to increase taxes to shore up the Medicare fund, this bill will say to the States and municipalities that this is an unfunded mandate. If on the one hand the Congress does not provide the funds or override the point of order, the increase in funding would not apply to the States and municipal governments across this land and they would not have to contribute to the Medicare fund, and that additional taxation necessary to bring the Medicare fund up to its actuarial soundness would thereby fall on the private sector of our economy. In order to see that that does not happen, and further in order to see that each individual State or municipality could not ask for judicial review to hold up the promulgation of the rules and regulations, I ask that we now exempt Medicare as we have exempted Social Security so this question cannot arise. Mr. Chairman, I think we all know why we should exempt Medicare, and I can only assume that we will have opposition on the other side, as we have had to every amendment thus far on the floor. I am not going to prolong this debate other than the fact that I am suggesting this: What it appears to me tonight, and we have heard several statements from the majority that we are being dilatory and taking up the time of this Chamber in what appears on our side to be legitimate debate, but as it appears as each amendment has been offered I do not think we have had the benefit of even one Member of the majority breaking, so it is very clear that 230 votes reside on the majority side of the House, and they will be able to accomplish all of the legislation they have intact.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. KANJORSKI. I think the gentlewoman from Connecticut has clearly said what my amendment will do. Suppose, if you will, when Medicare has to be refunded, the point or order is overcome here. It is directed that the proper Federal agency promulgate rules and regulations to increase Medicare. It will go on all employers across America, but under this bill, if the States or any municipality in America disagrees with the promulgation of that rule or regulation, they will have because they have judicial review the capacity to go in and tie up that portion of the increased funding for Medicare for years in court, and what that would necessitate is to make the fund sound, that the increase would have to go out to the private employers of America to make up for those 3 million employees.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?