Ted Kennedy

Mr. KENNEDY

Mr. KENNEDY. If there is some way we can help clarify it, we are glad to do it. Last week when I was in the Chamber, along with the Senator from Minnesota, the Senator from New York, and the Senator from Illinois, who were fighting for it, we heard asked: Is this the same bill, or how is this different? We are glad to take the time, but the time is going on. We will be glad to sit down with the Senator later on today and go over every bit of it and hopefully get the extension of it. We are troubled. We are troubled by the fact that even though the first President Bush effectively opposed it on two occasions, he did support it on the third, and had Republican support on the third occasion. We hope the good light that is shone--and the common sense and wisdom--on those Republicans and the President when he supported it the third time will be shed on the Republican Senators and the Senator will help us get this supported.

Mr. KENNEDY. If the Senator would--only if they have been exhausted.

Mr. KENNEDY. We are effectively using the trigger that had been used before, which gives the focus and attention on those who are both unemployed and those who have States which have a higher incidence of unemployment, and in those States, those figures would be added to the valuation of the unemployed workers in an attempt to get a true reading on the numbers of the unemployed.

Mr. KENNEDY. To answer the question, this counts people who are unemployed and who have no benefits. Right now if someone is getting extended benefits, they are not counted. We count those people. That is the principal difference. That was the difference in the early 1990s as well, and that is what the Thomas bill did not do. That is what we do. We think there is a sound reason for being able to do it.

Mr. KENNEDY

Mr. KENNEDY. The Senator has asked a number of questions in his comments. I will do my best to respond. As the Senator has rightfully pointed out, the President has not decided on the course of war. If the President has not decided that we have an imminent threat from Saddam Hussein, we have a serious threat. It is a very important threat. For all the reasons that have been outlined on the floor during the course of this debate about Saddam Hussein, we understand that. But the President of the United States has not made a judgment that it is an imminent threat to the United States. He has not made a judgment that he is prepared to go to war today. If that is so, which is what he stated last night, why in the world are we saying, in the Senate of the United States, we will give him this power when he has not made up his mind he wants to use it, without any limitation on time--no sunset of this? That is No. 1. So I am opposed. Second, on the question of the Senator from Virginia, in referring to the Levin amendment, that conforms with the constitutional authorities I have discussed, that we have done in other periods. That does not happen to be my position. I believe in a two-step approach. I believe the Security Council should have a tough resolution with unfettered inspections and we ought to galvanize the international community. I personally believe the way we galvanize the international community is by demonstrating we believe the international community has the responsibility and obligation to take action. I believe if we go ahead and take action as being proposed by the Senator from Virginia, that will be unilateral, where the President says: I have not made up my mind whether there is a necessity for war. I am not even prepared to say we are in an imminent threat. If we had an imminent threat from Saddam Hussein, he obviously would have a responsibility to take action in order to protect the American people. What we are saying to the Security Council is: We are just going to have something over here on the side in case you people up there are not going to be serious. I would like to challenge the Security Council the way the President of the United States did. I commend President Bush for finally going to the Security Council, challenging the Security Council. That is the way to go. The Security Council takes every step, uses every opportunity, and finally comes back and says: There is no alternative, there is an imminent threat. We should be at our desks at that time in making the judgment we will have to make about committing American forces--a two-step approach for those reasons. I have difficulty in accepting the concept that we are going to effectively give to the President of the United States the authority when he has stated, as the good Senator stated, he has not made up his own mind. Lastly, part of the trouble we have been in over the period--and I have great respect for my colleague, and he knows he is my friend and colleague--the debate has been about the resolutions, but not about the war. We are debating the resolutions. My good friend from Florida is talking about changing the resolutions. We ought to be talking about what the implication is going to be in terms of the conflict and the war. The American people ought to understand that more clearly. That is an issue where the administration has failed the American people. What are the best estimates? What should we expect are going to be needed in terms of the forces? What is the best judgment in terms of how Saddam Hussein will react? What will be the enormous impact it will have in our battle against terror around the world? What will it do in terms of inflaming the Muslim world if the United States has a go-alone policy, which this resolution will permit? Will it be effectively a breeding area for al-Qaida terrorists? We ought to be debating those issues. We do not do that. We have been debating the technicalities of these resolutions. I know the Senator has--as I have--listened to many debates, not only on the technicalities but the broad issues of war and peace as well. But it is my regret that we are going to be faced with a cloture motion here to try to insist on a vote on this in another 2 days when we have just barely talked about the issues of war and peace and haven't had that kind of informed debate and haven't had that kind of information that is available to us. That is part of my deep concern about where we are on the floor of the Senate now.

Mr. KENNEDY. Would the Senator be willing to change the words? I don't have it here. Would he be willing to change the words to include ``an imminent threat'' from the language that is included in the resolution which talks about a grave threat or continuing threat?

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I commend President Bush for taking his case against Iraq to the American people last evening, and I agree with the President that Saddam is a despicable tyrant who must be disarmed. As many of us had hoped, the President has now clearly given the Iraqi regime an opportunity to avoid war. The President himself says he has not yet decided war will be necessary. In this situation, it would be wrong for Congress to act now to authorize the President to go to war before the steps the President has outlined are exhausted. The most solemn responsibility any Congress has is the responsibility given the Congress by the Constitution to declare war. We would violate that responsibility if we delegate that responsibility to the President in advance before the President himself has decided the time has come for war. The President acknowledged last night there are major risks in going to war. I do not believe these risks have been adequately described to the American people. General Wesley Clark, the former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, told the Armed Services Committee on September 23 if you are talking to the mothers and the loved ones of those who die in that operation in Iraq, you want to be sure using force and expending American blood and lives and treasure is the ultimate last resort, not because of the sense of impatience with the arcane ways of international institutions or frustrations from the domestic political process of allies. As the Senate continues to debate the use of military force against Iraq, we must do all we can to assess the potential costs of such a war in blood and treasure. The American people deserve to know what a conflict in Iraq might be like. They deserve to know how many casualties there might be. They deserve to know the true preparedness of our troops to fight in a chemical or biological environment. If they are in the National Guard or Reserves, they deserve to know how a conflict in Iraq will affect them and whether they are likely to be called up for duty. Many Reservists who were initially recalled for the war in Afghanistan have been either demobilized or extended for a second year. They are concerned about what the impact of war against Iraq will have on their families and on their jobs. Many employers, who are struggling in the current sagging economy, are also deeply concerned about the stability of their workforce. These patriotic Americans are willing to sacrifice, but they deserve to know all reasonable alternatives to war have been exhausted. None of us can foresee the course of events that will unfold if we go to war. Before Congress acts, the administration has an obligation to explain to the Congress and the American people the potential consequences of war. As of now, it has not. The President is asking Congress to delegate its constitutional power to declare war before he has decided we need to go to war, but he has not adequately explained what this war will look like. How many ground troops will be required? How many casualties can we expect to suffer? How well can we respond to the use of chemical or biological weapons against our troops? How will postwar occupation and reconstruction in Iraq be conducted? How will our ongoing military operation in Afghanistan be affected, and what will the impact be on the overall war against terrorism? Today, our service men and women are helping to combat terrorism in Afghanistan, the Philippines, the Nation of Georgia, and elsewhere around the world. Our purpose is clear; defend our country against the clear and compelling threat to our security posed by al-Qaida. I strongly support the President in the war against al-Qaida and the al-Qaida terrorists. I am proud of the achievement of our Armed Forces in the war against terrorism. Some argue that America's vastly superior military force can easily defeat the Iraqi army, but many of us are concerned that the very strength and success of our Armed Forces in the gulf war and in Afghanistan will lull America into thinking if war with Iraq becomes necessary, it will be a bloodless war with few casualties. The gulf war was fought in the desert a decade ago with an overwhelming superiority of forces in a strong coalition of the United States and other nations. They achieved one of the most decisive victories in the history of warfare. The experts I have consulted believe that a new war with Iraq will not be as easy, especially if we do not have the support of a coalition of nations. Some defense analysts contend the Iraqi regular army is plagued with low morale and poor equipment and may well surrender at the first sight of American might. Other experts believe, however, that unlike the regular Iraqi army, up to 100,000 Republican Guard and special Republican Guard troops of Iraq will defend Baghdad and remain fiercely loyal to Saddam Hussein. Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution believes the Iraqi Republican Guard forces could make a U.S. military attack very difficult. He estimates that our military casualties could be as high as 5,000. By comparison, in the gulf war, just under 400 U.S. service members lost their lives. Many believe our Armed Forces may need to occupy Baghdad, which has over 5 million residents. Testifying before the Armed Services Committee on September 23, GEN Joseph Hoar, former commander in chief of the U.S. Central Command, discussed the potential horrors of urban warfare. He said in urban warfare you could run through battalions a day at a time. All of our advantages of command and control, technology and mobility are, in part, given up and you are working with corporals, sergeants, and young men fighting street to street. It looks like the last 15 minutes of the movie ``Saving Private Ryan.'' Despite the risks of urban warfare, the administration has avoided questions about how a military operation in Iraq may unfold. We have not been told how many ground troops we will need or, again, how many casualties we can expect. The Joint Chiefs should provide Congress with casualty estimates for a war in Iraq as they have done in advance of every past conflict. These estimates should consider Saddam's possible use of chemical or biological weapons against our troops. Unlike the gulf war, many experts believe Saddam would resort to chemical and biological weapons against our troops in a desperate attempt to save his regime if he believes he and his regime are ultimately threatened. In the September 19 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, cited a long list of improvements that have dramatically increased the combat effectiveness of our forces since the gulf war. He said our troops now have improved ability to protect themselves against chemical or biological attacks. However, the General Accounting Office published a report on October 1 which clearly suggests that our forces are not adequately prepared for a chemical or biological attack. The report concluded that although the Defense Department has taken significant actions to provide such protection, serious problems persist. This is what the GAO report found: Chemical and biological defense training continues to be a problem; medical readiness of some units to conduct operations in a contaminated environment remains questionable; some units are critically short of required protective gear. One Air Force wing has only 25 percent of the protective masks required and only 48 percent of required patient decontamination kits. If Prime Minister Blair is correct in saying that Iraq has the capability to launch chemical or biological warheads in 45 minutes, what sense does it make to put our soldiers in the path of that danger without exhausting every reasonable means to disarm Iraq short of war? We do not know whether the military will be able to adequately protect our service men and women from a chemical or biological attack, and this issue should be explained to the American people. The Wall Street Journal reported last week that in addition to chemical and biological chemical deficiencies, there are other notable gaps in the Pentagon's planning. Civilians working at port facilities in the Persian Gulf region, where our forces will be unloading warfighting equipment, have not all received the proper protective gear or training for a chemical and biological attack. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs have not adequately answered such questions about the military operation in Iraq. They both say there will be risks to a conflict, but they have not adequately and fully discussed those risks with Congress and the American people. The Bush administration has also repeatedly claimed that we can fight a war in Iraq without undermining the war against terrorism, but last year, on June 21, 2001, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary Rumsfeld cited significant problems in military readiness. He said we have underfunded and overused our forces, and we are steadily falling below acceptable readiness standards. Yet last month, on September 19, when asked about military readiness in the Armed Services Committee hearing, Secretary Rumsfeld said recent defense budget increases, coupled with the recall of reservists and shifts in the assignment of existing personnel, have reduced the stress on our forces. He did not explain how the budget increases, which only recently took effect, could have reversed the starkest estimate of readiness he provided to the Armed Services Committee last year. In fact, experts say that most of the growth in operations and maintenance spending over the past decade have been for infrastructure-related programs, not military readiness. General Myers, in his September 19 testimony, agreed that the U.S. military was stretched in some key areas. He said if our operations on the war on terror are expanded, we will be required to prioritize the deployment of unique units in high demand such as special operation forces and combat rescue forces. He also said our coalition partners may facilitate our combined operations by having similar units of forces. That, of course, assumes we will have a coalition in terms of a potential conflict. Before the Senate Armed Services Committee 2 weeks ago, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs admitted that because of the high demand placed on some of our forces that coalition partners are necessary to mitigate the risk of war in Iraq. Two weeks ago, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs admitted that because of the high demand on some of our forces that coalition partners are necessary. The way we are going to get the coalition forces is by going to the United Nations and gaining their support for the disarming of Saddam, and if action is necessary in the future. War against Iraq may well undermine the ongoing war against al-Qaida and our continuing operation in Afghanistan by draining resources from our Armed Forces that are already stretched thin. In Afghanistan, U.S. forces continue to search villages, caves, and potential hideouts. The searches are now being conducted by the 82nd Airborne, not the elite special operation forces which are being recalled in preparation for a potential invasion of Iraq. Many of us in the Senate are aware of these concerns with the Reserves and National Guard. We have heard them firsthand. Already, the Nation has mobilized and demobilized thousands of reservists and National Guardsmen to support the current war on terrorism. Massachusetts reservists and reservists from across the country are providing training, intelligence, and security support around the world. Almost 1,500 National Guardsmen from Massachusetts alone are deployed to support the war on terror. Citizen soldiers are now serving in critical security positions throughout the United States and in Afghanistan. They have distinguished themselves for their patriotism and superior service. They have proven ready to meet the challenge of fighting the war on terrorism, despite outdated equipment and funding shortfalls. The phenomenal performance of our forces in the war on terrorism attest to their resolve. But how long can we sustain this high level of operation? Approximately 11,000 of our reservists from across the Nation have been recalled for a second year to support the war on terror. This is the first time in decades that we have needed to take this measure to enhance our military strength. Not even in the gulf war did we recall reservists for over a year. If we open a second front in Iraq, we may be forced to recall even more. Additionally, due to critical shortages of special operations personnel, pilots, intelligence specialists, and security personnel, another 22,000 service members, a number about as high as the entire gulf war, have been involuntarily retained on active duty as part of the current war on terrorism. If we embark upon a premature or unilateral military campaign against Iraq or a campaign with only Great Britain as our ally, our forces will have to serve in even greater numbers for longer periods of time with graver risks. There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein is a despicable tyrant. The international community must work together to disarm him. But the war against terrorism and our wider interests in the region and the world demand a course that relies on war only as a last resort after all reasonable alternatives have been fairly tried. I have no doubt our forces will prevail in any conflict with Iraq. But Congress and the American people deserve to know the true risk of war with Iraq. The administration has the responsibility to state what the real costs of such a war may be. We need that information now, before--not after--Congress exercises its constitutional responsibility to declare war. I yield the floor.

Mr. KENNEDY. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Florida. Amendment No. 4857 To Amendment No. 4856

Mr. KENNEDY

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Barbara Teraji, a congressional fellow in my office, be granted floor privileges for the discussion on Iraq.

Mr. KENNEDY

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, we face no more serious decision in our democracy than whether or not to go to war. The American people deserve to fully understand all of the implications of such a decision. The question of whether our Nation should attack Iraq is playing out in the context of a more fundamental debate that is only just beginning--an all-important debate about how, when and where in the years ahead our country will use its unsurpassed military might. On September 20, the administration unveiled its new National Security Strategy. This document addresses the new realities of our age, particularly the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorist networks armed with the agendas of fanatics. The Strategy claims that these new threats are so novel and so dangerous that we should ``not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting pre-emptively.'' In the discussion over the past few months about Iraq, the administration, often uses the terms ``pre-emptive'' and ``preventive'' interchangeably. In the realm of international relations, these two terms have long had very different meanings. Traditionally, ``pre-emptive'' action refers to times when states react to an imminent threat of attack. For example, when Egyptian and Syrian forces mobilized on Israel's borders in 1967, the threat was obvious and immediate, and Israel felt justified in pre-emptively attacking those forces. The global community is generally tolerant of such actions, since no nation should have to suffer a certain first strike before it has the legitimacy to respond. By contrast, ``preventive'' military action refers to strikes that target a country before it has developed a capability that could someday become threatening. Preventive attacks have generally been condemned. For example, the 1941 sneak attack on Pearl Harbor was regarded as a preventive strike by Japan, because the Japanese were seeking to block a planned military buildup by the United States in the Pacific. The coldly premeditated nature of preventive attacks and preventive wars makes them anathema to well-established international principles against aggression. Pearl Harbor has been rightfully recorded in history as an act of dishonorable treachery. Historically, the United States has condemned the idea of preventive war, because it violates basic international rules against aggression. But at times in our history, preventive war has been seriously advocated as a policy option. In the early days of the cold war, some U.S. military and civilian experts advocated a preventive war against the Soviet Union. They proposed a devastating first strike to prevent the Soviet Union from developing a threatening nuclear capability. At the time, they said the uniquely destructive power of nuclear weapons required us to rethink traditional international rules. The first round of that debate ended in 1950, when President Truman ruled out a preventive strike, stating that such actions were not consistent with our American tradition. He said, ``You don't `prevent' anything by war . . . except peace.'' Instead of a surprise first strike, the nation dedicated itself to the strategy of deterrence and containment, which successfully kept the peace during the long and frequently difficult years of the Cold War. Arguments for preventive war resurfaced again when the Eisenhower administration took power in 1953, but President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles soon decided firmly against it. President Eisenhower emphasized that even if we were to win such a war, we would face the vast burdens of occupation and reconstruction that would come with it. The argument that the United States should take preventive military action, in the absence of an imminent attack, resurfaced in 1962, when we learned that the Soviet Union would soon have the ability to launch missiles from Cuba against our country. Many military officers urged President Kennedy to approve a preventive attack to destroy this capability before it became operational. Robert Kennedy, like Harry Truman, felt that this kind of first strike was not consistent with American values. He said that a proposed surprise first strike against Cuba would be a ``Pearl Harbor in reverse.'' For 175 years, [he said] we have not been that kind of country. That view prevailed. A middle ground was found and peace was preserved. Yet another round of debate followed the Cuban Missile Crisis when American strategists and voices in and out of the administration advocated preventive war against China to forestall its acquisition of nuclear weapons. Many arguments heard today about Iraq were made then about the Chinese communist government: that its leadership was irrational and that it was therefore undeterrable. And once again, those arguments were rejected. As these earlier cases show, American strategic thinkers have long debated the relative merits of preventive and pre-emptive war. Although nobody would deny our right to pre-emptively block an imminent attack on our territory, there is disagreement about our right to preventively engage in war. In each of these cases a way was found to deter other nations, without waging war. Now, the Bush Administration says we must take pre-emptive action against Iraq. But what the Administration is really calling for is preventive war, which flies in the face of international rules of acceptable behavior. There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein is a despicable dictator and that he must be disarmed. But the Administration has not made a persuasive case that the threat is so imminent that we should risk going it alone. We should resort to war only as a last resort. If we work through the United Nations for free, unfettered inspections, we strengthen our hand with our allies, our hand against Saddam Hussein and our ability to disarm him. The Administration's new National Security Strategy states ``As a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.'' The circumstances of today's world require us to rethink this concept. The world changed on September 11, and all of us have learned that it can be a drastically more dangerous place. The Bush administration's new National Security Strategy asserts that global realities now legitimize preventive war and make it a strategic necessity. The document openly contemplates preventive attacks against groups or states, even absent the threat of imminent attack. It legitimizes this kind of first strike option, and it elevates it to the status of a core security doctrine. Disregarding norms of international behavior, the Bush strategy asserts that the United States should be exempt from the rules we expect other nations to obey. I strongly oppose any such extreme doctrine and I'm sure that many others do as well. Earlier generations of Americans rejected preventive war on the grounds of both morality and practicality, and our generation must do so as well. We can deal with Iraq without resorting to this extreme. It is impossible to justify any such double standard under international law. Might does not make right. America cannot write its own rules for the modern world. To attempt to do so would be unilateralism run amok. It would antagonize our closest allies, whose support we need to fight terrorism, prevent global warming, and deal with many other dangers that affect all nations and require international cooperation. It would deprive America of the moral legitimacy necessary to promote our values abroad. And it would give other nations--from Russia to India to Pakistan--an excuse to violate fundamental principles of civilized international behavior. The administration's doctrine is a call for 21st century American imperialism that no other nation can or should accept. It is the antithesis of all that America has worked so hard to achieve in international relations since the end of World War II. This is not just an academic debate. There are important real world consequences. A shift in our policy toward preventive war would reinforce the perception of America as a ``bully' in the Middle East and would fuel anti-American sentiment throughout the Islamic world and beyond. It would also send a signal to governments the world over that the rules of aggression have changed for them too, which could increase the risk of conflict between countries such as Russia and Georgia, India and Pakistan, and China and Taiwan. Obviously, this debate is only just beginning on the administration's new strategy for national security. But the debate is solidly grounded in American values and history. It will also be a debate among vast numbers of well-meaning Americans who have honest differences of opinion about the best way to use United States military might. The debate will be contentious, but the stakes, in terms of both our national security and our allegiance to our core beliefs, are too high to ignore. I look forward to working closely with my colleagues in Congress to develop an effective, principled policy that will enable us to protect our national security, and respect the basic principles that are essential for the world to be at peace. I yield the floor.

Mr. KENNEDY

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation to achieve reforms in our system of oversight for protecting the safety of human subjects in research. As the Institute of Medicine report released today again demonstrates, reforms are long overdue. The moment has come to take action to restore the trust and confidence of those who serve as subjects in clinical trials and other forms of research. We passed the National Research Act over twenty years ago as an important step toward protecting against inhuman research experiments and conditions. We have developed guidelines to ensure that people participating in medical research have clearly agreed to be a part of the study and will be treated humanely during the study. These protections benefit the people participating as subjects in medical research, but they also help those conducting the research. If patients fear that they will not be protected or that the researchers do not have their best interests in mind, patients will not volunteer to take part in these needed tests. As we all know, a revolution is taking place in medicine today. Scientists have mapped the human genome. They have made incredible breakthroughs in treatments for cancer and AIDS. It is not unreasonable to expect that we will see cancer cured, a quadriplegic stand up and walk, new drugs that prevent Alzheimer's and AIDS, and other advances we cannot even begin to imagine. But for all these advances to take place, new treatments will first have to be tested on human subjects. For these studies to succeed, patients must have confidence in our system and must be willing to participate in medical research. We must protect patients when they volunteer for these tests. To do otherwise would jeopardize this very hopeful future. Many of those who participate in these studies are the most vulnerable members of our society and are the most in need of our protection. We are now benefiting from drugs that have been developed and tested outside the United States. Our country is based on the premise that all people are created equal. Basic protections that are good enough for research subjects in the United States should be good enough for research subjects in other nations who volunteer for tests that will benefit all of us. We also must face the fact that medical research is constantly changing. Protections that were put in place 20 years ago no longer cover all human research projects. New studies in areas such as gene therapy have raised safety and ethical concerns requiring special scrutiny. Institutional Review Boards, which review the safety and ethical acceptability of research involving human subjects, are overworked and underfunded. Loopholes in the system allow researchers who have had proposals rejected by one Board to reapply to a second Board in the hope of obtaining a more lenient review--all without notifying the second Board of the decision of the first. We do little to train researchers about methods for protecting human subjects. Many researchers with the best intentions are not knowledgeable of the latest changes to regulations. These shortcomings cry out for a response, especially at this moment in history that holds so much promise for future medical research. The legislation I am introducing addresses these issues by expanding research subject protections and strengthening the review and oversight mechanisms to ensure that all human subjects are properly protected. The legislation will, for the first time, ensure that all participants in such research are protected by a comprehensive and strong set of safeguards. The legislation provides clear statutory authorization for these protections and establishes a central office to review and amend current rules for the protections. The legislation will improve Institutional Review Boards by strengthening firewalls against conflicts of interest and enhancing training for Board members. The bill will provide the Boards with the funding they need to be effective, by allowing human subject protection costs to be charged as direct costs on federal grants. The bill will end ``IRB shopping'', the practice in which a proposal rejected by one Board for ethical reasons is submitted to a second Board in the hope of obtaining a more lenient review. The legislation will require that every Board receives accreditation to assure that it is carrying out its duties effectively and rigorously. The legislation will assist researchers in learning more about the best practices for protecting human subjects, by creating programs to improve training for researchers in good research practices. The bill strengthens the firewalls against financial conflicts of interest for researchers, and will require the establishment of regulations to govern payment of research subjects. The legislation will also enhance the ethical review of clinical trials conducted overseas with federal funding or submitted to FDA for review, by requiring that research conducted overseas that falls within U.S. regulatory jurisdiction must be reviewed and approved by a U.S. Institutional Review Board. The bill enhances the review of areas of research that raise special safety concerns, such as gene therapy and xenotransplantation. We must act now to improve our protections for human research subjects, so that patients will feel confident enough to volunteer for the many vital research projects that will be developed in coming years. These reforms will have a significant role in improving medical care. But even more important, these safeguards will protect our fellow human beings. The people this bill protects are not numbers of statistics. They are someone's mother, daughter, or spouse. Mistakes and abuses that hurt them affect their families, friends, and communities. We are a great people and a great nation. We are a moral people and an ethical nation. We must do all we can to see that our great medical advances of the future do not come at an unnecessary cost of death and suffering by patients who first volunteered to test these new medical treatments. I look forward to working with my colleagues to enact these needed reforms as soon as possible. I ask unanimous consent that a section-by-section analysis of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. KENNEDY

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation to achieve reforms in our system of oversight for protecting the safety of human subjects in research. As the Institute of Medicine report released today again demonstrates, reforms are long overdue. The moment has come to take action to restore the trust and confidence of those who serve as subjects in clinical trials and other forms of research. We passed the National Research Act over twenty years ago as an important step toward protecting against inhuman research experiments and conditions. We have developed guidelines to ensure that people participating in medical research have clearly agreed to be a part of the study and will be treated humanely during the study. These protections benefit the people participating as subjects in medical research, but they also help those conducting the research. If patients fear that they will not be protected or that the researchers do not have their best interests in mind, patients will not volunteer to take part in these needed tests. As we all know, a revolution is taking place in medicine today. Scientists have mapped the human genome. They have made incredible breakthroughs in treatments for cancer and AIDS. It is not unreasonable to expect that we will see cancer cured, a quadriplegic stand up and walk, new drugs that prevent Alzheimer's and AIDS, and other advances we cannot even begin to imagine. But for all these advances to take place, new treatments will first have to be tested on human subjects. For these studies to succeed, patients must have confidence in our system and must be willing to participate in medical research. We must protect patients when they volunteer for these tests. To do otherwise would jeopardize this very hopeful future. Many of those who participate in these studies are the most vulnerable members of our society and are the most in need of our protection. We are now benefiting from drugs that have been developed and tested outside the United States. Our country is based on the premise that all people are created equal. Basic protections that are good enough for research subjects in the United States should be good enough for research subjects in other nations who volunteer for tests that will benefit all of us. We also must face the fact that medical research is constantly changing. Protections that were put in place 20 years ago no longer cover all human research projects. New studies in areas such as gene therapy have raised safety and ethical concerns requiring special scrutiny. Institutional Review Boards, which review the safety and ethical acceptability of research involving human subjects, are overworked and underfunded. Loopholes in the system allow researchers who have had proposals rejected by one Board to reapply to a second Board in the hope of obtaining a more lenient review--all without notifying the second Board of the decision of the first. We do little to train researchers about methods for protecting human subjects. Many researchers with the best intentions are not knowledgeable of the latest changes to regulations. These shortcomings cry out for a response, especially at this moment in history that holds so much promise for future medical research. The legislation I am introducing addresses these issues by expanding research subject protections and strengthening the review and oversight mechanisms to ensure that all human subjects are properly protected. The legislation will, for the first time, ensure that all participants in such research are protected by a comprehensive and strong set of safeguards. The legislation provides clear statutory authorization for these protections and establishes a central office to review and amend current rules for the protections. The legislation will improve Institutional Review Boards by strengthening firewalls against conflicts of interest and enhancing training for Board members. The bill will provide the Boards with the funding they need to be effective, by allowing human subject protection costs to be charged as direct costs on federal grants. The bill will end ``IRB shopping'', the practice in which a proposal rejected by one Board for ethical reasons is submitted to a second Board in the hope of obtaining a more lenient review. The legislation will require that every Board receives accreditation to assure that it is carrying out its duties effectively and rigorously. The legislation will assist researchers in learning more about the best practices for protecting human subjects, by creating programs to improve training for researchers in good research practices. The bill strengthens the firewalls against financial conflicts of interest for researchers, and will require the establishment of regulations to govern payment of research subjects. The legislation will also enhance the ethical review of clinical trials conducted overseas with federal funding or submitted to FDA for review, by requiring that research conducted overseas that falls within U.S. regulatory jurisdiction must be reviewed and approved by a U.S. Institutional Review Board. The bill enhances the review of areas of research that raise special safety concerns, such as gene therapy and xenotransplantation. We must act now to improve our protections for human research subjects, so that patients will feel confident enough to volunteer for the many vital research projects that will be developed in coming years. These reforms will have a significant role in improving medical care. But even more important, these safeguards will protect our fellow human beings. The people this bill protects are not numbers of statistics. They are someone's mother, daughter, or spouse. Mistakes and abuses that hurt them affect their families, friends, and communities. We are a great people and a great nation. We are a moral people and an ethical nation. We must do all we can to see that our great medical advances of the future do not come at an unnecessary cost of death and suffering by patients who first volunteered to test these new medical treatments. I look forward to working with my colleagues to enact these needed reforms as soon as possible. I ask unanimous consent that a section-by-section analysis of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. KENNEDY

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I, for one, am not prepared to sign up for the change in foreign policy where we have one person making a decision to go to war. Today, it is Iraq because we have Saddam Hussein. Khomeini was in Iran. We were going to that country as well. What about Qadhafi? I heard from families in my State of Massachusetts who lost members of their family. Sixty-seven members of the Armed Forces lost their lives in the war against Qadhafi. Why aren't we going after Qadhafi? What about North Korea? They may have murdered millions of their own people. They may have nuclear weapons. Where are we stopping on this? The idea that you had a great deal more time--in the Cuban missile crisis, had the weapons come from Cuba, we had about 11 minutes. You are saying there is no more of a dangerous time now than we had with 11 minutes? I am not prepared to say we are going to turn over to a single individual in our democracy the authority to go to war at any time when a President believes there is a ``continuing threat'' from--you fill in the name of the country. You fill in the name of the country. A ``continuing threat'' from where?--fill in the name of the country-- authorizing the President to go to war. That is not, I think, what our Founding Fathers intended.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I hope he will go to the United Nations and that he will go to the Security Council. Then, if he finds out they will not take the steps, and that we have a clear, present, and immediate danger to the United States, I hope he will come back and that we can debate and pass a resolution so we can take the steps necessary to secure this country. But that isn't what the resolution says. We have been through that. Basically, it doesn't deal with the Security Council of the United Nations. It doesn't deal with that. It says it permits unilateral action without the Security Council taking any steps at all. We want to follow what the Senator from Virginia says. The President has gone to the Security Council. Challenge it, get an international coalition, go for that and challenge with inspections. If that is not successful, come back here to the Senate. And I bet you that Senator Byrd will be the first name that will be on a resolution to take the action and mine will be the second. But that is not where we are now. That isn't what this resolution is all about. It effectively is granting the President the authority to go to war unilaterally if he concludes there is a continuing threat from Iraq--not an immediate, not a clear and present danger--if there is a continuing threat from Iraq. I think he has concluded that today. If you pass this resolution, you are saying, Why even bother with the Security Council? If I were a member of the Security Council, I would say, Why are you even taking the time to talk to us? You have already made up your mind. You are going to war. That is effectively what that resolution says. That is the problem some of us have with the construct and why we are here. I thank the Senator. I appreciate it very much. I am sure we will have more opportunity to talk.

Mr. KENNEDY. I certainly will. If there is a clear and present danger to the United States and an immediate threat, obviously the President has the right to act and should act. But that is not what we have here. That is not the case that has been made by the Secretary of Defense or the President or the Senator from Virginia, that there is a clear and present danger to the security of the American people, and that it is imminent. That case has not been made. When that case has been made, put me down in terms of being in favor of taking immediate action. If the President of the United States makes that determination, fine. But we have been asking: Where is this evidence? In 1962, President Kennedy took it to the United Nations and showed the world what was out there. Every American understood what was at risk. Do you have the information or don't you have the information? Is the information different today than it was a year ago when we never had this proposal? If it is, let's see it. Let's hear about it. We have not seen it in the Armed Services Committee. I haven't attended all the meetings, but I have attended just about all of them, the recent ones that we have had on Iraq. If there is any information there, I would welcome the Senator from Virginia telling me, pointing that out. But we haven't got it. The Secretary of Defense says he does not have to make the case anymore. We ought to know that Saddam is a tyrant. We all agree. The best question is: How are we going to best defend the security of the United States? I maintain that the security of the United States today is threatened as much by al-Qaida as by anything that is immediate now in terms of Iraq. We do not hear anything more about al- Qaida. We don't understand what the threat is. That was all we heard about. The Senator hasn't said anything about that. Yet we find an unsettled situation in Afghanistan with the blowing up of cars, the warlords coming back, and the fact that they are trying to a get a 60,000- or 70,000-man army and they have 1,600 recruits. They want a national army. They have virtually nothing there. We have to ask ourselves: If this doesn't go away--as General McInerney says--in 72 hours, what is going to happen in terms of all of those countries that are helping the United States deal with al-Qaida that was a threat to the United States, and, according to the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, continued to be the principal threat to the security of the United States just 4 months ago? You wouldn't know that. I do not know what has changed. Neither do the American people. That is what they want to hear. They hope they will hear that during this debate. But we haven't.

Mr. KENNEDY. I called him and asked him for the context. We have not received that yet.

Mr. KENNEDY. If I could just finish now, I was at the last intelligence briefing. I will not characterize it as to what new information came out as a result of interviewing detainees in the past few days or weeks, but, very clearly, the statements that I said in characterizing the contacts between al-Qaida and Iraq, by Mr. Scowcroft, by Secretary Powell, by Director Mueller, would indicate that this had not been a contact that was meaningful and significant in terms of a threat to the United States. They also pointed out that, in terms of a country that was providing aid and assistance to terrorists such as Hamas and Hezbollah, it was much higher in terms of Iran than it was in terms of Iraq. Those references--I included two in my statement. I will include the third. The other point I mention is, as the Senator remembers, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Myers, testified before the committee on September 19, 2002 that they would not talk about planning, would not talk about casualties, would not talk about operational issues. Even in the closed session, Secretary Rumsfeld refused to address the issues. So I think it is important to understand that type of information, as was raised, has been denied both to the members of the committee and, most importantly, to the public. Again, I say no one is asking for the military operations, but what we are asking for is basic assessments in terms of the numbers of personnel, their best estimates in terms of the length and what would be involved, in terms of the conflict.

Mr. KENNEDY. It is quite clear what I have said; that is, I think it is a mistake for us to go it alone, unless there is the kind of threat that I have just described--a clear and present danger and an imminent threat to the United States. Then we have to take action. That power is reserved for the President. We had that discussion earlier in the afternoon between the Senator from West Virginia and the Senator from Virginia. That happens to be the case. But that has not been the case, and the case has not been made. It seems to me that we are much better off going internationally and not saying that our first choice ought to be war, the first choice ought to be battle, and the first choice ought to be conflict. I think we ought to try to build a coalition of the United Nations and take concerted action with an inspection regime that does authorize force, that does permit unfettered inspections, that includes the reporting back to the Security Council of the progress that has been made. I outlined that in my speech. That is our position. That is what I thought the President was saying when he went to the United Nations initially. That is what I thought he was saying. That is the course of action that we ought follow, and we ought to hear certainly from the United Nations Security Council on that recommendation and on that challenge.

Mr. KENNEDY. We do not need the hearing to have the administration spell out to the American people what will be involved in this whole undertaking. The President can do this. The Secretary of Defense can do it. The general can do it at any time. We do not need the hearing. These are the questions that the Senator from West Virginia and others have asked on this. We still have not gotten it. The American people have not gotten it. We do not need the hearings just to satisfy ourselves. The American people are entitled to this information certainly if we are going to be going to war.

Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Senator for his comments, which I think make the point that Senator Byrd and I would make, and that is that we ought to have those hearings prior to the time we give the authorization to go to war. I cannot believe that Senator Levin would not welcome the opportunity to have those hearings mentioned by the Senator before the time we would have the vote on it. The Senator from Virginia makes an excellent point. This Congress has not heard from those who are in the authority. It certainly is not because Senator Levin, who has had a series of hearings, is not willing to have them. I would welcome the fact that we have those hearings, and I am going to suggest it to the chairman of that committee that we do that prior to the time we vote.

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes.

Mr. KENNEDY. The Senator is quite correct in terms of his whole analysis, I believe, of the underlying resolutions that are before the Senate and the fact that we were effectively yielding the decisionmaking power of making war or peace--effectively unilaterally turning that over just to the decision of the President of the United States, as the Senator pointed out. The Gephardt-Lieberman-Warner language says they can take unilateral action without a Security Council mandate to defend against a threat posed by Iraq. It talks about the test to defend against the continuing threat from Iraq. The Senator, in his earlier exchange, points out that language is certainly not even implied in terms of whatever authority the President has to provide for the security of the United States. It would have to be an imminent threat. The Senator had a very strong exchange and made that case effectively. The test in the Gephardt-Lieberman-Warner Resolution says to defend against the continuing threat from Iraq--that is the operative word. And in Biden-Lugar it talks about dealing with the threat of Iraq is ``so grave'' that force should be used. New words, ``so grave.'' The President already said it was a grave situation. In effect, if that was to be accepted--the President already said it was a grave situation. It would, in effect, grant unilaterally, without any involvement in the international community, any effort whatsoever to try and bring allies into this, give the authority for the President to go ahead with war, as the President has indicated he may very well do. Back to the Senator's other question about what the general said September 23. General McInerney believed that 72 hours of bombing would effectively break the spirit and the military capability of Iraq. I will let him speak in his own words, and I ask unanimous consent to have pertinent statements printed after my remarks.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I commend my two colleagues and friends for framing this issue as it has been framed over the period of these last hours, and I appreciate the nature of the discussion. I say to my friend from West Virginia and my friend from Virginia, I hope over the period of these next several days as we contemplate this issue, going into next week, the American people will take the time to follow not only the debate here but to understand what is at stake with the various resolutions that are going to be coming before us. I was going to inquire of the Senator from West Virginia. As I understand previous resolutions which have been considered by the Security Council, the only resolution that provided for the use of force was the 1990 resolution, and it was pursuant to that resolution that passed the Security Council where the President then came to the Congress and asked for the Congress' authorization to go to war. I believe when we are talking about resolutions, which was one of the many valid points the Senator was making, on that particular occasion the Security Council authorized the use of force, and then the President came to the Congress to ask for the authorization, and was able to gain the authorization, and the American forces were committed. But that is an entirely different situation, as the Senator pointed out during his exchange with my friend from Virginia. Mr. President, I intend to oppose the Lieberman-Warner resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq. America should not go to war against Iraq unless and until all other reasonable alternatives are exhausted. Just a year ago, the American people and the Congress rallied behind the President and our Armed Forces as we went to war in Afghanistan. Al-Qaida posed a clear, present and continuing danger. The need to destroy al-Qaida was urgent and undeniable. In the months that followed September 11, the Bush administration marshaled an impressive international coalition. Today, 90 countries are enlisted in the effort, from providing troops to providing law enforcement, intelligence, and other critical support. I am concerned that going to war against Iraq before other means are tried will jeopardize the war against terrorism. One year into the battle against al-Qaida, the administration is shifting focus, resources, and energy to Iraq. The change in priority is coming before we have eliminated the threat from al-Qaida, before we know whether Osama bin Laden is dead or alive, and before we know whether the fragile post-Taliban government in Afghanistan will succeed. No one disputes that America has lasting and important interests in the Persian Gulf, or that Iraq poses a significant challenge to U.S. interests. There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein's regime is a serious danger, that he is a tyrant, and that his pursuit of lethal weapons of mass destruction cannot be tolerated. He must be disarmed. Our goal is to achieve this objective in a way that minimizes the risks to our country. We cannot ignore the danger to our young men and women in uniform, to our ally Israel, to regional stability, the international community, and victory against terrorism. There is clearly a threat from Iraq, and there is clearly a danger, but the administration has not made a convincing case that we face such an imminent threat to our national security that a unilateral, pre- emptive American strike and an immediate war are necessary. Nor has the administration laid out the cost in blood and treasure of this operation. With all the talk of war, the administration has not explicitly acknowledged, let alone explained to the American people, the immense post-war commitment that will be required to create a stable Iraq. The President's challenge to the United Nations requires a renewed effort to enforce the will of the international community to disarm Saddam. Resorting to war is not America's only or best course at this juncture. There are realistic alternatives between doing nothing and declaring unilateral or immediate war. War should be a last resort, not the first response. The Bush administration says America can fight a war in Iraq without undermining our most pressing national security priority--the war against al-Qaida. But I believe it is inevitable that a war in Iraq without serious international support will weaken our effort to ensure that al-Qaida terrorists can never, never, never threaten American lives again. Unfortunately, the threat from al-Qaida is still imminent. The Nation's armed forces and law enforcement are on constant high alert. America may have broken up the network in Afghanistan and scattered its operatives across many lands. But we have not broken its will to kill Americans. We know that al-Qaida is still there, and still here in America--and will do all it can to strike at America's heart and heartland again. But we don't know when, where, or how this may happen. On March 12, CIA Director Tenet testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that al-Qaida remains ``the most immediate and serious threat'' to our country, ``despite the progress we have made in Afghanistan and in disrupting the network elsewhere.'' Even with the Taliban out of power, Afghanistan remains fragile. Security remains tenuous. Warlords still dominate many regions, and 17 people were recently killed in fighting between rival warlords in the northern mountains. Our reconstruction efforts, which is vital to long-term stability and security, is in doubt and is cause for continuing concern. Some al- Qaida operatives--no one knows how many--have faded into the general population. Terrorist attacks are on the rise. A bomb exploded near the U.S. Embassy in Kabul last week. A car bomb took 26 lives in that city earlier in September. The U.S. military base in Bagram is under periodic fire. President Karzai, who has already survived one assassination attempt, is still struggling to solidify his hold on power. And although neighboring Pakistan has been our ally, its stability is far from certain. It is an open secret in Washington that the Nation's uniformed military leadership is skeptical about the wisdom of war with Iraq. They share the concern that it may adversely affect the ongoing war against al-Qaida and the continuing effort in Afghanistan by draining resources and armed forces already stretched so thin that many Reservists have been called for a second year of duty, and record numbers of service members have been kept on active duty beyond their obligated service. To succeed in our global war against al-Qaida and terrorism, the United States depends on military, law enforcement, and intelligence support from many other nations. We depend on Russia and countries in the former Soviet Union that border Afghanistan for military cooperation. We depend on countries from Portugal to Pakistan to the Philippines for information about al-Qaida's plans and intentions. Because of these relationships, terrorist plots are being foiled and al-Qaida operatives are being arrested. It is far from clear that these essential relationships will be able to survive the strain of a war with Iraq that comes before the alternatives are tried--or comes without the support of an international coalition. A largely unilateral American war that is widely perceived in the Muslim world as untimely or unjust could worsen, not lessen, the threat of terrorism. It could strengthen the ranks of al-Qaida sympathizers and trigger an escalation in terrorist acts. As General Wesley Clark, the former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, told the Senate Armed Services Committee, that kind of war against Iraq, would ``super-charge recruiting for al-Qaida.'' In a September 10 article, General Clark wrote: Unilateral U.S. action today would disrupt the war against al-Qaida. We ignore such wisdom and advice from many of the best of our military at our own peril. General Joseph Hoar, the former Commander of the Central Command, advised the Armed Services Committee on September 23 that America's first and primary effort should be to defeat al-Qaida. We have known for many years that Saddam Hussein is seeking and developing weapons of mass destruction. Our intelligence community is also deeply concerned about the acquisition of such weapons by Iran, North Korea, Libya, Syria and other nations. But information from the intelligence community over the past 6 months does not point to Iraq as an imminent threat to the United States or a major proliferator of weapons of mass destruction. In public hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March, CIA Director George Tenet described Iraq as a threat but not as proliferator, saying that Saddam Hussein ``is determined to thwart U.N. sanctions, press ahead with weapons of mass destruction, and resurrect the military force he had before the Gulf War.'' That is unacceptable, but it is also possible that it could be stopped short of war. In recent weeks, in briefings and in hearings in the Armed Services Committee, I have seen no persuasive evidence that Saddam could not be deterred from attacking U.S. interests by America's overwhelming military superiority. I have heard no persuasive evidence that Saddam is on the threshold of acquiring the nuclear weapons he has sought for more than 20 years. The administration has offered no persuasive evidence that Saddam would transfer chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction to al-Qaida or any other terrorist organization. As General Hoar told the members of the Armed Services Committee, a case has not been made to connect al-Qaida and Iraq. To the contrary, there is no clear and convincing pattern of Iraqi relations with either al-Qaida or the Taliban. General Clark testified before the Armed Services Committee on September 23 that Iran has had closer ties to terrorism than Iraq. Iran has a nuclear weapons development program, and it already has a missile that can reach Israel. In August, former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft wrote that there is ``scant evidence'' linking Saddam Hussein to terrorist organizations, and ``even less to the September 11 attacks.'' He concluded that Saddam would not regard it as in his interest to risk his country or his investment in weapons of mass destruction by transferring them to terrorists who would use them and ``leave Baghdad as the return address.'' At the present time, we do face a pressing risk of proliferation-- from Russia's stockpile of weapons of mass destruction. America spends only $1 billion a year to safeguard those weapons. Yet the administration is preparing to spend between $100 billion and $200 billion on a war with Iraq. I do not accept the idea that trying other alternatives is either futile or perilous--that the risks of waiting are greater than the risks of war. Indeed, by launching a war against Iraq now, before other alternatives are tried in good faith, the United States may well precipitate the very threat that we are intent on preventing--weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists. If Saddam's regime and his very survival are threatened, then his view of his interests may be profoundly altered. He may decide he has nothing to lose by using weapons of mass destruction himself or by sharing them with terrorists. Such a war would also pose great risks to our armed forces. Some who advocate military action against Iraq assert that air strikes will do the job quickly and decisively, and that the operation will be complete in 72 hours. But there is no persuasive evidence that air strikes alone over the course of several days will incapacitate Saddam and destroy his weapons of mass destruction. Experts have informed us that we do not have sufficient intelligence about military targets in Iraq. Saddam may well hide his most lethal weapons in mosques, schools and hospitals. If our forces attempt to strike such targets, untold number of Iraqi civilians could be killed. In the gulf war, many of Saddam's soldiers quickly retreated because they did not believe the invasion of Kuwait was justified. But when Iraq's survival is at stake, it is more likely that they will fight to the end. Saddam and his military may well abandon the desert, retreat to Baghdad, and engage in urban, guerrilla warfare. In our September 23 hearing, General Clark told the Armed Services Committee that we would need a large military force and a plan for urban warfare. General Hoar said that our military would have to be prepared to fight block by block in Baghdad, and that we could lose a battalion of soldiers a day in casualties. Urban fighting would, he said, look like the last brutal 15 minutes of the movie ``Saving Private Ryan.''

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. KENNEDY. The Senator has asked the right question. The answer is that the best information we have is the President has been given alternatives, but the Armed Services Committee has not been given those alternatives, those estimates, the different possibilities that might occur should forces be engaged. No one is looking at a particular kind of military operation, but people want to gather information of the totality of what might be necessary and what might be expected. That certainly has not been shared with the Armed Services Committee. I repeat, no one has been asking for the details of a military operation. We would not expect it. But the type of issues--the magnitude, what can be expected within the country, what will be expected from our allies, what will be the reaction from many of those countries that are on the front line of helping the United States in the fight against terrorism and deal with the challenges of al-Qaida-- we have not seen any of those estimates, nor have we seen what the burden would be on the United States in a postwar situation. We know of the difficulties and challenges in Afghanistan. We see the tenuousness of that whole regime, the difficulties that we are facing in terms of Pakistan, in terms of its various challenges economic-wise, but we have not received any kind of information about what would be the burden upon the Americans in terms of a postwar period. That is something that should certainly be explained, other than the general figure that it will cost somewhere between $100 billion and $200 billion.