J. Kerrey

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, the debate surrounding Y2K Liability is a very important one. The estimated cost associated with Y2K issues vary greatly, ranging from $600 billion to $1.6 trillion worldwide. The amount of litigation that will result from Y2K-related failures is uncertain, but at least one study has guestimated the costs for Y2K related litigation and damages to be at $300 billion. With that in mind, several bills have been drafted which encourage companies to prevent Y2K failures and to remedy problems quickly if they occur, and to deter frivolous lawsuits. It has essentially boiled down to 2 bills: the McCain-Wyden-Dodd bill, and the Kerry bill. Many of the provisions within the bills are the same; however, there are a couple of issues that warrant discussion. I have studied these bills closely. And for me, what it all comes down to is two simple questions: Which bill provides more of an incentive for computer companies to identify and remedy potential Y2K problems? And, second, what effect will this legislation have on consumers? First. Which bill provides more of an incentive for computer companies to identify and remedy potential Y2K problems? To answer that question, one needs to understand what the backers of this bill are so concerned about. The people that are pushing for this bill, namely, some of the computer companies and big business, are not afraid of me. They are not afraid of what Congress might do to them. What they are concerned about, and what they are afraid of, is 12 men and women on a jury. They are afraid of what a jury might do to them if they are sued and their case ends up in court before a jury. Let me be clear: I do think this Y2K liability is a special situation and believe that we should provide computer companies with some type of certainty and protection from these lawsuits. That is why I want to pass one of these bills. However, I think we need to be careful that the protections we provide aren't so great that companies no longer have an incentive to fix their Y2K problems. So, when I hear people asking to ``cap'' the amount of punitive damages that can be imposed against them, I can't help but to wonder, ``Why do you need to worry about that? The only time punitive damages are awarded is if the person has done something flagrantly wrong.'' Similarly, proportionate liability, which provides assurances to the defendant on how much money he would have to pay the plaintiff, is fair and reasonable for most defendants, but not all defendants. Under the Kerry bill, only good corporate citizens will have the benefit of proportionate liability. Under the McCain bill, all corporate citizens, no matter whether they act in good faith or bad faith, will be rewarded with proportionate liability. Computer companies must have an incentive to identify and remedy potential Y2K problems. If we pass the McCain bill, which both caps punitive damages, and rewards all corporate citizens, both good and bad, with proportionate liability, I believe that would provide a disincentive to remedy potential Y2K problems. Therefore, the answer to the first question is clear: the Kerry bill provides more incentive for computer companies to identify and remedy potential Y2K problems. Second. The second question I had to answer is what effect will this legislation have on consumers? To answer that question, we need to look at one provision in particular: the economic loss provision. The economic loss provision has to do with whether a small business owner or the consumer is allowed to recover for lost profits, lost overhead, and out-of-pocket costs. The McCain bill bars the recovery of economic losses for businesses in all Y2K contexts. The economic loss rule that I support, and the rule followed in most jurisdictions, says that if the parties have agreed by contract about the allocation of loss, then that agreement should govern. If there is no contract, then state law would apply. What does this mean? It means that under the McCain bill, consumers and small businesses are going to be at a disadvantage. To illustrate, let's look at a very practical example that would apply to many small businesses in Nebraska. A businessman wants to open a flower shop. He goes into a computer store and talks to a computer salesman. That salesman tells the businessman that the computer is Y2K compliant and that come January 1, 2000, the computer will be fine. The businessman buys the computer for $5,000. The flower shop opens and is doing great. On January 1, 2000, the computer crashes and can not be fixed for four weeks. The businessman relies on his computer for almost everything, including as a cash register, a client database, and record keeping. As a result of the computer crash, his business is severely affected--he pays bills late, he can't meet payroll, and he loses customers, costing him a total of $75,000. Under the McCain bill, the only damages the businessman can recover are the cost of the computer, $5,000. The economic loss rule I support, the Edwards amendment, would allow the businessman to make a case as to why he should be able to recover at least some of his lost profit. Thus, to answer to the second question, the McCain bill would unfairly place small businesses and consumers at a disadvantage to computer companies. Because of these reasons, I will cast a vote against the McCain Y2K Liability bill. I want to reiterate that I support the goals of this legislation--I want computer companies to have an incentive to identify and remedy potential Y2K problems, and I don't want there to be an onslaught of frivolous lawsuits beginning on January 2, 2000. Unfortunately, I do not believe the McCain bill in its current form is the proper way to address these issues. If these issues are properly addressed in conference, I will support the conference report. Until that happens, although the McCain bill may achieve its goal of eliminating frivolous lawsuits, I believe this comes at too high a price to our small businesses and consumers.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I have come to the floor to make a brief statement about the Kosovo situation. I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be laid aside so I can speak as in morning business for 10 minutes.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, like many Americans, I am very pleased with the recent agreement within the United Nations Security Council on a plan that will end the conflict in Kosovo and achieve NATO's primary objective of returning the people of Kosovo to their homes. I take this opportunity to join with many others who have spoken on this subject to thank the aircrews and the support personnel of our Air Force, our Navy, and our Marine Corps. These men and women have demonstrated that American airpower can bring change in the course of history. Their dedication to duty and professionalism makes all of us proud. We have just recently passed the defense appropriations bill, and I had hoped to come to the floor, especially to speak to Nebraskans, who have a big stake in this bill, not just because we are beneficiaries of the security provided to us by the men and women who will benefit from these appropriations, but also because we have significant numbers of people in my State who are part of the effort to keep the United States of America safe. These laws that we pass--the defense appropriations bill and the defense authorization bill--are not merely words on a piece of paper; these laws are converted into human action. While it is true that men and women have to be well-trained, they need to be patriotic in order to be willing to give up their freedoms to serve the cause of peace and freedom throughout the world. It is also true that the beginning point is the kind of dream that we have in this Senate and in this Congress about the way we want our Nation and our world to be. Operation Allied Force was very dangerous and very expensive. It is natural for us, at the moment, to want to celebrate a victory. However, I believe we must recognize the hard work is just beginning. Two immense tasks now confront NATO. The first is to restore a refugee people to their homeland, and the second is to make the Balkan region a modern, democratic, and humane environment in which ethnic cleansing can never again occur. The first task may take a year, given the destruction of homes and farms in Kosovo. The second will take generations and will never occur without democratic change in the Yugoslavian Government. At the outset of the NATO military action, I expressed my concern about the effect the U.S. commitment to this operation would have on our ability to meet our global security obligations. Only the United States of America has the ability to counter the threats that are posed by Iraq, North Korea, or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The stability of this planet depends on the readiness of the U.S. military, and thus we must avoid squandering our capabilities on missions not vital to U.S. national security. NATO has committed itself to provide a peace implementation force of 50,000 troops. Of this force, the United States will supply about 7,000 marines and soldiers. While I have concerns about the overcommitment of United States military forces, I am pleased our European allies have stepped forward and pledged to provide the vast majority of the implementation force. We should work to lessen the United States military involvement, with the goal of creating an all-European ground force in Kosovo within a year. In the meantime, we must be straightforward with the American people. There are risks associated with this mission. This force will be responsible for assisting the Kosovar refugees' return home, disarming the Kosovo Liberation Army, and coping with the myriad issues, such as landmines and booby traps, that will be left behind by the departing Serbian military. American casualties remain a very real possibility. Out of this conflict, I see reason for us to be optimistic. First, our allies in Europe, led primarily by Britain and Germany, have played a leading role in finding a solution to the conflict. It is in the interest of the Europeans to build a peaceful and stable Balkans. Their effort to find a diplomatic agreement and to provide the majority of the troops to enforce this agreement is a positive sign for the future. Second, I am pleased with the constructive role that has been played by the Russians. There will not be a lasting Balkan peace without the active participation of Russia. It is my hope the positive atmosphere that has been created between Russia and the West will be carried forward and will reignite the relationship that has suffered over the past few months. Finally, I hope we have begun to see the future of Balkan stability in a larger context. We cannot continue to fight individual Balkan fires. We must begin to look for preventive measures to avoid the next Balkan conflict before it begins. The United States and our European allies have not done enough to bring the Balkans into the political and economic structures of Europe. We have not done enough to support the latent forces of democracy that exist in the region. Our challenge today is to extend to the Balkans the peace and stability that comes from a society based on democratic principles where the rights of all people are protected, a society based on the rule of law where legitimate grievances among people are honestly adjudicated, a society based on free enterprise where commerce is unleashed to create jobs and prosperity. More than failed diplomacy, Kosovo should have taught us the consequences of failed states. Multiethnic Balkan States are not impossible, but to succeed, they must be free-market democracies. I believe peace and stability is an achievable goal. First, we must work with prodemocracy forces within the various Balkan States to strengthen the emerging democracies and encourage the transition to democracy. Second, we must begin a massive reconstruction effort. This project, led by the Europeans, should restore infrastructure damaged in the war, create opportunities for economic development, and establish conditions that will allow for eventual membership in the European Union. Finally, we should convene a conference of concerned nations that will work together to address the long-term security needs of the Balkans. Let me state that the objective of building a peaceful and stable Balkans will not be achieved as long as Slobodan Milosevic remains the President of Yugoslavia. A man who has started four wars in this decade, killed and ethnically cleansed hundreds of thousands of civilians, crushed democratic opposition, and presided over the ruination of his country can never guide the kind of political, economic, and social change that will be necessary to rebuild Serbia. As long as Milosevic remains in power, he is a threat to peace. As long as Milosevic remains in power, the politics of racism and ethnic hatred will prevail. As long as Milosevic remains in power, the West should not prop up his regime by rebuilding Serbia. In 1996, we missed our opportunity to help prodemocracy forces that gathered in the streets of Belgrade. When the protests began, we hesitated, and Milosevic used the opportunity to consolidate his control by brutally repressing the opposition. Rather than seeing Milosevic as a tyrant and a threat to peace, we saw him as a partner in Bosnia. We should no longer suffer the illusion that Milosevic can be a partner in peace. We should work with the people of Serbia to ensure a quick end to the Milosevic regime. I believe the end could be near. Over 70 days of NATO airstrikes have loosened Milosevic's grasp on the instruments he uses to control his people. It is my hope the democratic forces in Serbia--with Western assistance--will seize this opportunity to remove him. Only with a new democratic leadership will Serbia begin the process of rejoining the community of nations. At the end of a military conflict, it is natural to look back and to assess ways in which the use of force could have been avoided. While many will find fault with U.S. diplomacy in the days and months leading up to the initiation of airstrikes, I believe our failure starts a decade before by not working to extend to the Balkans the peaceful democratic revolutions that swept through Eastern Europe. We must address the problems facing the Balkans by extending the benefits of democracy, or face the prospect of continual ethnic conflict and instability. In addition to praising the men and women of the aircrews of the Air Force and the Navy and the Marine Corps who fought and flew bravely into great danger, and who deserve a great deal of credit for delivering this success, I offer as well my congratulations and praise to the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States, who held the NATO alliance together, who persevered when there was considerable doubt and criticism not only at home but abroad as well, and who must be given great credit for delivering this successful agreement. We have just begun the hard work of rebuilding democracy in this region of the world. We should not forget, as I have said in my statement, we have arrived here because we were complacent. We have arrived here because we ignored the call for freedom inside of Serbia, to our eventual peril as a consequence. I yield the floor. Mr. GORTON addressed the Chair.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, the Department of Defense appropriations bill passed this chamber with my support. It is no small feat that a bill encompassing the size and gravity such as our national security can be addressed and passed through the U.S. Senate within the span of two days, with few amendments and little rancorous debate. The lion's share of the credit for this accomplishment goes to the managers of the bill, the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Senator Stevens, and the Ranking Member, Senator Inouye. Through their efforts, they have again done the work which is the first priority of our government: the defense of American independence, lives, and security around the world. When programs have been consistently successful, it is easy to forget that national security and national defense are not a given in the political equation. But, national security doesn't just ``happen.'' We achieve our national security and defense goals because of the men and women honorably serving in our nation's Armed Forces. That security and defense is also achieved because Congress passes laws which authorize Defense programs and appropriate the funds to pay for them. Our contribution to the debate on these bills and our vote on these bills is an essential contribution to our nation's defense. It is our role in government's most solemn responsibility. Given the importance of this responsibility, then, I am encouraged that in this bill as well as in the Defense Authorization, the Senate has responded to the increased strain on our military caused by today's heightened operation tempo. Kosovo adds another requirement to a long list of regions in which U.S. deployment or U.S. commitment is stretching our military forces and supporting intelligence resources to their limit. I have often argued on this floor for allocating our defense and intelligence resources on the basis of threat priorities, and applying the greatest effort to the most dangerous threat. In the same vein, we should avoid overcommitment to places or situations which do not present a direct threat to American independence, lives, or livelihoods. For example, I think it is a mistake to tie up a significant percentage of our Army and Marine combat power in Yugoslav peacekeeping operations long term, and I hope our European allies will take our places there before very long. But wherever those forces are, they must be ready and fully manned, like the air elements of the Air Force, Navy, and Marines who performed so brilliantly over Yugoslavia these last seven weeks. The Defense Appropriations bill supports them. I would now like to take a few minutes to highlight some of the vitally important work that is being accomplished within this appropriations bill. These are provisions which illustrate that we are on the right track in providing for our military and for providing security for people back home in Nebraska, across the United States, and indeed, throughout the world. The backbone of the United States Armed Forces is the men and women who choose to serve their country in our military. From the lowest grade enlisted soldier to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I salute those who serve out of love for their country. Earlier this year, I was proud to support S. 4, the Soldiers', Sailors', Airmen's, and Marines Bill of Rights Act of 1999, which began to address the problems of pay levels, recruitment, and retention facing our military today. S. 4 was a good beginning, most markedly by increasing base pay by 4.8 percent. The appropriations bill is consistent with that 4.8 percent pay increase outlined in S. 4, and I am pleased to have supported this provision which will directly and immediately better the lives of the personnel of our Armed Forces. Another aspect of this appropriations bill which I would like to mention regards an important provision relating to nuclear weapons. During consideration of the Department of Defense Authorization bill for fiscal year 2000, I authored an amendment which would have lifted the restriction on strategic nuclear weapons levels, allowing the U.S. to lower the number of warheads below the START I level. It is my belief that my amendment would not only have increased U.S. security, but would have freed up billions of dollars for other high priority items. The Congressional Budget Office recently conducted a study in which it found we could save between $12.7 billion and $20.9 billion over the next ten years by reducing U.S. nuclear delivery systems within the overall limits of START II. While I would like to thank the 43 of my colleagues who supported my amendment, it unfortunately did not pass. I do not want to return to that debate at this time. However, there is a related program which I have previously supported which also deals with national security and Russian nuclear weapons--the Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction program, otherwise known as Nunn-Lugar. The Nunn-Lugar program provides assistance to states of the former Soviet Union for safeguarding nuclear materials, dismantling missiles and other weapons, and other demilitarization measures. The DoD Appropriations bill funds Nunn-Lugar in the amount of $476 million. Additionally, this bill allocates $25 million of these funds to support the Russian nuclear submarine dismantlement and disposal activities started in FY 1998. This is an important program that in a very concrete and discernable way, increases our security, and I am happy to have supported it. Along with programs of national concern, there are a number of provisions in this bill that directly allow Nebraska and Nebraskans to continue their vital work in safeguarding U.S. national security. Offutt Air Force Base, located in Bellevue, Nebraska, is responsible for a number of missions which are particularly noteworthy. Offutt, with over 10,000 military and civilian personnel, is home to the United States Strategic Command, the joint command charged with deterring nuclear attacks on our country. There are many threats out there, but only one of them, Russian nuclear weapons, is capable of ending our national life. STRATCOM's mission may not be in the news that often, but it the most essential of all defense missions, and it is commanded from Nebraska. Offutt Air Force Base also hosts the U.S. Air Force's premiere reconnaissance and command-and-control unit, the 55th Wing, the largest wing within the Air Force's Air Combat Command. The Fighting 55th's aircraft provide global situational awareness to military leaders and government officials. It is by now commonplace to say that we live in the Information Age. Information has become a precious commodity which often can mean the difference between success and defeat. The missions that Offutt specializes in focus on gathering this kind of critical information. In a variety of ways, Offutt's missions keep us more informed, more aware, and more safe. Here are some specifics on the various programs. The 55th's workhorse aircraft is the RC-135, also known as Rivet Joint. The RC-135 mission conducts electronic reconnaissance, providing direct, near real-time information and electronic warfare support to theater commanders and combat forces monitoring. Rivet Joint has played an important role in a number of recent military missions, including Kosovo, Bosnia, and Iraq. Information gathered by the RC-135 is made available to theater commanders, the Department of Defense and National Command Authorities. Data is processed, analyzed and stored by Air Combat Command, the Air Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. I am pleased that the bill passed yesterday appropriates $220.4 million for the refurbishing and upgrading of these important aircraft. Reengining these aircraft is a particularly important improvement. The WC-135 fulfills an air sampling mission in support of the Air Force Technical Applications Center at Patrick AFB, Florida, by verifying compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. It gathers information on nuclear tests and conducts baseline air sampling. By collecting particles in the air during flight, the WC-135 is able to detect if and when nuclear tests are conducted or if a nuclear bomb is detonated, even from thousands of miles away. Considering the nuclear weapons testing last year of both India and Pakistan, it is clear that the WC-135 has not outlived its usefulness. The WC-135 is the only aircraft throughout the U.S. Air Force conducting this vital mission, and we in Nebraska are fortunate to have it based at home at Offutt Air Force Base. The OC-135, or Open Skies, is tasked to complete photo reconnaissance fly-overs. This mission supports the Defense Threat Reduction Agency by conducting observation flights in accord with the Open Skies Treaty. This treaty will allow the OC-135 to fly over Russian air space to monitor weapons reductions treaties. Although the Open Skies Treaty has not yet been ratified by all parties, the OC-135 has not been dormant. While the Open Skies Treaty awaits ratification, the OC-135 is heavily involved in additional photo reconnaissance projects, including missions such as weather observations of Hurricane Mitch. The Open Skies mission is fully funded through fiscal year 2004. Additionally, E-4B aircraft also stationed at Offutt provide transport and command and control for the President, the Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State. Much more than simply a transport aircraft, the E-4B allows senior officials complete access to critical information and communications in a secure fashion, keeping the President and others ``in the loop,'' even while in mid-flight. Along with Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska continues to make important contributions to our national security through components of the National Guard and the Reserves. Most recently, these components have played important roles in Kosovo alongside their active component counterparts. The 155th Wing of the Nebraska Air National Guard has been very active during the Kosovo mission, flying KC-135s--fuel tanker planes-- above and around Kosovo. These KC-135s perform the remarkable task of mid-air refueling for a variety of aircraft, including the B-52 Stratofortress and the E6. Indeed, over the last several months, the Nebraska unit led the KC-135 refueling effort, involving hundreds of aircraft, and also was the last volunteer unit engaged in the region before the reserve call-up was instituted. This has all been done, even though the 155th Wing is the smallest of all the Air Guard wings across the country. I applaud their efforts and their successes. As well, the Nebraska Army National Guard is currently serving in a nine-month deployment in Bosnia as part of the NATO peace-keeping forces. The 24th Medical Company is working alongside Guard units from across the country to transport patients from the field to hospitals. At a time when a robust economy and opportunities in the private sector can pull people away from public service, I salute these men and women who continue to make sacrifices so that we may be safe. The examples I have given here of the hard work being done by our Armed Forces are not the exception, but the rule. In a time of tight budgets and increased missions, I am proud to say that our Armed Forces are second to none around the globe. Even when we continue to ask more of our military men and women, they always rise to the challenge. We must never forget the risks they take for our sake and the freedoms they forego, and we must provide them the best support, conditions, equipment, and training possible in return. I am proud to have supported passage of the defense appropriations bill yesterday, and I hope and expect that we will continue the strong support of those who are willing to sacrifice all for the cause of your freedom and mine, the men and women of our Armed Forces.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, today, I join with my colleagues to introduce the Yankton Sioux Tribe and the Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska Development Trust Fund Act. This legislation will provide compensation to the Yankton and Santee Sioux Tribes for damages incurred by the development of the Pick-Sloan Missouri River Basin program. As a result of the construction of Pick-Sloan development projects on tribally-held land adjacent to the Missouri river, Tribes were subjected to forced land takings, involuntary resettlement of families, and the loss of irreplaceable reservation resources. The Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska lost approximately 600 acres of Indian land located near the Santee village and an additional 400 acres on the Nebraska Island of the Santee Sioux Tribe Indian Reservation. Congress provided compensation to other Native American Tribes for losses caused by the Pick-Sloan projects. However, the Yankton and the Santee Sioux Tribes were not provided opportunities to receive compensation by Congress. Instead, they received settlements for the appraised value of their property through condemnation proceedings in U.S. District Court. But these Tribes did not receive rehabilitation compensation. As a result, the Yankton and Santee Sioux Tribes are entitled to this additional compensation. This legislation seeks to utilize revenues from the sale of hydropower generated by the Pick-Sloan dams to redress tribal claims for land takings. Congress has endorsed this approach on three separate occasions by enacting legislation which established compensation for several other Tribes adversely impacted by the Pick-Sloan projects. We propose to establish trust funds for the Yankton and Santee Sioux Tribes from a portion of the revenues of hydropower sales made by the Western Areas Power Administration. More specifically, the Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska would received a yearly payment of interest earned on the principal in the trust fund. Our legislation encourages the Santee Sioux Tribe to craft an economic development plan for use of the interest income. This self-governance approach will enable the Santee Sioux Tribe to continue to address improving the quality of life of its tribal members. This legislation values the importance of redressing tribal claims and self-governance for Nebraska Native American Tribes. It will enable the Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska to address past grievances and look forward to investing in its future.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, today, I join with my colleagues to introduce the Yankton Sioux Tribe and the Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska Development Trust Fund Act. This legislation will provide compensation to the Yankton and Santee Sioux Tribes for damages incurred by the development of the Pick-Sloan Missouri River Basin program. As a result of the construction of Pick-Sloan development projects on tribally-held land adjacent to the Missouri river, Tribes were subjected to forced land takings, involuntary resettlement of families, and the loss of irreplaceable reservation resources. The Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska lost approximately 600 acres of Indian land located near the Santee village and an additional 400 acres on the Nebraska Island of the Santee Sioux Tribe Indian Reservation. Congress provided compensation to other Native American Tribes for losses caused by the Pick-Sloan projects. However, the Yankton and the Santee Sioux Tribes were not provided opportunities to receive compensation by Congress. Instead, they received settlements for the appraised value of their property through condemnation proceedings in U.S. District Court. But these Tribes did not receive rehabilitation compensation. As a result, the Yankton and Santee Sioux Tribes are entitled to this additional compensation. This legislation seeks to utilize revenues from the sale of hydropower generated by the Pick-Sloan dams to redress tribal claims for land takings. Congress has endorsed this approach on three separate occasions by enacting legislation which established compensation for several other Tribes adversely impacted by the Pick-Sloan projects. We propose to establish trust funds for the Yankton and Santee Sioux Tribes from a portion of the revenues of hydropower sales made by the Western Areas Power Administration. More specifically, the Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska would received a yearly payment of interest earned on the principal in the trust fund. Our legislation encourages the Santee Sioux Tribe to craft an economic development plan for use of the interest income. This self-governance approach will enable the Santee Sioux Tribe to continue to address improving the quality of life of its tribal members. This legislation values the importance of redressing tribal claims and self-governance for Nebraska Native American Tribes. It will enable the Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska to address past grievances and look forward to investing in its future.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. He is here.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise unfortunately to speak in opposition to the amendment offered by the Senator from Florida, Senator Graham. Let me say, first of all, I think the intent of this bipartisan commission is right on target; that is, that we take care not to rush to judgment, and in our rush to judgment----

Mr. KERREY. I answer emphatically yes. It needs to be Governmentwide. Indeed, I would say to the Senator, as he no doubt knows, there is also vulnerability with contractors, current and former employees. There is a significant amount of vulnerability. Let me point out in the case of the transfer of these designs that have been reported to the public, we are not 100 percent certain that they were transferred out of Los Alamos. That is the problem. This design was held by many other people other than Los Alamos. So that is one of the problems here. When you take this particular situation, if you are 100 percent certain it is Los Alamos, tighten up security at the Lab. If you are not 100 percent certain and we tighten up security in the Lab, we may be tightening up security in a place that is not the problem. So I think there is reason to believe the changes that have been suggested thus far will not damage us. But I think what the Senator is saying is exactly right. It needs to be Governmentwide. It needs to look at the contractors. Another thing I think needs to be considered, there was an op-ed piece written by Edward Teller, published in the New York Times. Mr. Teller can best be described as somebody whose lifetime has been devoted to the task of making certain the United States of America has a robust nuclear deterrent and that nuclear deterrent was adequate to protect the people of the United States of America and our interests. Mr. Teller says, and I agree with him, by the way, by the time you put all other security measures in place, the most important deterrent against losing our technological superiority is not defensive measures but making certain we allocate enough for research and development and we keep the pointy edge of our technological spear sharp. So long as we continue in research and development, not just in design but construction and deployment, Mr. Teller is saying you decrease the possibility that espionage or some other transfers--in some cases transfers you do not even think about--will do damage to the security of the United States of America.

Mr. KERREY. Yes.

Mr. KERREY. It depends on the question.

Mr. KERREY. Yes, I do. I have to answer the first part of the Senator's question no. I do not think we are in any danger of following Adolf Hitler's example, but I do think we need to be careful that in an effort to restrict who gets to know things we do not create an additional security problem. We have had many examples, as we try to figure out what goes wrong with a national security decision, especially intelligence, where we discover that the problem was Jim knew it; Mary didn't know it. Neither one of them had a right or need to know what each other was doing. As a consequence of them simply walking from one cubicle to the other talking, a mistake is made. We have to be very careful in exercising our judgment in what ought to be done in tightening things that we do not actually create additional security problems.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, the Senator from Florida has identified a very serious potential problem, which is that we have now, in the aftermath of the report that was produced and made public by Congressman Cox and Congressman Dicks, a great deal of interest in doing something, to take some action to look like we are solving the problem. What I understand the Senator from Florida to be saying is we should take a collective deep breath, and I quite agree with him. Because I think not only is it possible, it is likely, if we are not careful, we will, in our actions, do things that will make the country less safe, not more safe and secure. Perhaps the most important thing to be saying about the Cox and the Dicks report is that there is a lot less there than meets the eye. By that, I don't mean to say I am critical of the report, although there are three or four conclusions they reach with which I do not agree, that I do not think are supported by the classified report they have filed. I see in the Cox-Dicks report--and in fact in their own evaluation they say: This was not a comprehensive study; there were a lot of things we were not able to check out. I believe that is essentially what the Senator from Florida is saying. There is still a lot that neither the Cox-Dicks committee, the Temporary Special Committee, nor the House and the Senate Select Committees on Intelligence, have examined. Indeed, one of the people we asked to do an evaluation of the damage, Admiral Jeremiah, has said in the report he gave to us it is terribly important that we do a net assessment; we try to establish what the gains were, what the losses were, before we move on. I am just not persuaded, I say to my friend from Florida, that this commission he is proposing--that would be essentially similar to the Brown-Aspin Commission; I think it is modeled after that commission--is the right way to do it. I propose as an alternative, No. 1, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence try to come up with a scope of study similar to the Jeremiah study, try to put it in the intelligence authorization bill, but, in other words, challenge our committee to do something similar to what we did with Admiral Jeremiah. He started to do a damage assessment for us. I think much more needs to be done before the Congress knows for certain, A, what the damage was and, B, for certain what exactly it is we ought to do. I know the majority leader has, and I am cosponsoring with him, some changes he is recommending that we will be recommending to be made. But these are pretty limited. Many of these things can be done administratively. They really are just based upon what we know right now. So, while I find myself unpersuaded by this amendment--although maybe with a little bit more time I could have been persuaded--I am not persuaded we need a commission of this kind. I am persuaded we do need further examination, in fact a more thorough examination, than done to date. The damage has been done. So we make certain in our response to this story of espionage and story of lax security, not just at the Labs but in monitoring and watching the satellites that were being launched in the Chinese Long March program, and the whole export regime we have established to make certain we do not export things that are then used against us in some fashion, that we do not presume, in short, that we know everything that happened and we do not take action that could make the problem worse. I believe what the Senator from Florida is suggesting to us is right on target. We have to be very careful that we do not rush to judgment and do things that will make things worse. So I recommend an alternative that I think will enable us to accomplish the same objective. Again, I have great respect for the Senator from Florida and what he is trying to do. I think I vote with him 9 out of 10 times and do not like to be in a position where I am opposing his amendment.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. You can go first. I would love to hear your remarks.

Mr. KERREY. I would love to hear the Senator's remarks.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, does the Senator from Virginia want to speak?

Mr. KERREY. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. KERREY. I yield the Senator 2 additional minutes.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I regret that Senators are on opposite sides of this issue, but we clearly are. I have offered this amendment because I believe our current strategy to deal with the threat of nuclear weapons is flawed in many serious ways. First of all, this amendment has the support of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Secretary Cohen. They have not announced any intent to go below the START I levels, but we are not asking for unilateral disarmament. We make decisions about how many men and women we are going to have in our Armed Forces, how big our Navy is going to be, how big our Army is going to be, our Marine Corps, our Air Force is going to be. Sometimes it goes up, sometimes it goes down. Nobody accused President Bush of unilateral disarmament at the end of the cold war when he drew our defense forces down. I happen to believe we have gone too far. I support reinvigorating our Armed Forces. I don't support giving the Russian Duma a veto over that decision. That is basically what this is all about. I do not know whether the President would exercise the authority, but in my view this amendment would allow the President to make a decision independently and say, this is the level of nuclear weapons that we need. I have heard knowledgeable patriots who have served their country, who have spent a great deal of time on this subject, say to me that we are, as a consequence of this law, maintaining a level higher than we need to keep the people of the United States of America safe, spending money that is needed in other areas, especially in the conventional area, forcing the Russians to maintain a level of nuclear weapons higher than their economy gives them the capacity to control, and dramatically increasing the risk of an unauthorized launch as a consequence. That is the new risk. In the old days when we had arms control agreements--and I am not as optimistic about arms control agreements any longer. The Senator from Virginia asked if I supported the policy inherent in this language. Frankly, I do not believe START II is going to be ratified by the Duma. And even if it is, it has been overtaken by events, in my judgment. Even at that level, the Russians would be required to maintain a force structure of nuclear weapons that their economy does not allow them to safely maintain. I think we would see continued deterioration and continued increased risk to the people of the United States of America not from a hypothetical risk here. All of our armed services have been vaccinated now against anthrax. The Chairman knows there are conferences about all kinds of new threats that are very real and very present. But there is no threat greater than the threat of Russian nuclear weapons. There is no threat that would arrive here faster, that would arrive here more accurately and more deadly than any one of a number of weapons systems that I could describe in the Russian nuclear arsenal. In my view, what this does, quite the contrary to unilateral disarmament, is it allows the United States of America to decide what is in our interests. If I had reached a conclusion that I thought we ought to have 10,000 nuclear warheads in our arsenal, that that was in our interests, I would be on the floor arguing that we ought to; that rather than having a 6,000 floor, we ought to say that arms control is not going to work at all. If the Russians were doing something that caused me to conclude that I thought we ought to have a higher level, I would argue for that. I am arguing that the United States of America should make its own decisions when it comes to nuclear weapons. And right now, in my view, that decision would cause us to go below the statutory floor that we currently have and a further benefit would occur as a consequence enabling us to reduce the threat of an unauthorized launch. Again, I have a great deal of respect for the chairman and admire his work and agree with him on lots of things that are in this bill, but I come to the floor to offer this amendment because I believe very passionately that it will make the people of the United States of America safer and more secure if it is adopted.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, let me describe an event that occurred on September 11, 1998. Maybe colleagues didn't notice it; it was written up with a fairly small amount of attention. There was an 18-year-old Russian sailor who seized control of a Russian nuclear submarine near Murmansk. He killed seven fellow crewmembers and held control of the submarine for 20 hours. Russian authorities say that there were no nuclear weapons aboard the submarine. But it would not be difficult to imagine a scenario in which a similarly distraught member of the Russian navy might choose to express his frustration by seizing control of a submarine loaded with long-range, nuclear-tipped missiles. It is widely recognized that command and control of weapons on Russian submarines is much more problematic than even with their ground-based forces. There was a recent article in the New England Journal of Medicine, which conducted an analysis of the effects of an unauthorized launch against the United States from a--and I emphasize just one--Russian Delta IV submarine. This submarine is capable of carrying 16 SS-N-23 missiles. Each of these missiles is equipped with four 100-kiloton warheads. The study examined the consequences of 48 warheads being detonated over eight major U.S. cities. It is likely that this scenario may not be right. It is likely that they would say we have 64 warheads and will put one in each State in the United States of America--that leaves me 14 more--and they will put a couple in New York, a couple in Florida, a couple in other States. Imagine 64,000 kiloton weapons being detonated within a couple of hours in the United States. That is a scenario that could be very real. Is such a scenario likely to happen? It is less likely to happen than the sun coming up tomorrow, but it could happen. It is a scenario that we need to think about as we think about the danger of these nuclear weapons. And because we don't think about them, it is not likely that we will consider an amendment like this terribly important. We will sort of drift along, as I think we are doing now, saying we are going to wait for the Duma to ratify START II. They are threatening not to ratify for every possible reason. I don't know what the next anger point is going to be. I personally don't believe that the ratification of START II by the Duma is necessarily terribly important. That we need to look for an alternative way to reduce these threats, to me, is painfully obvious if you examine the danger that this threat poses to us. When you think about the danger of an accidental or a rogue nation or a sabotage launch, I think you come immediately to the conclusion that, my gosh, we have far more than we need to keep America safe, and the Russians clearly have far more than they need not only to keep their country safe but to reduce this risk of accidental launch. They do not control their weapons in the same way that we do. They don't have the capacity to control them in the same way that we do, as well. Imagine, I ask my colleagues; put it on your radar screen. You have a Delta IV submarine with 64 100-kiloton weapons that could be in the United States in 2 hours. They are not like the Chinese nuclear weapons. The Chinese nuclear weapons take several days to get together. Again, part of the published reports is that they have 13 or so aimed at the United States--aimed at our cities. They are nowhere near as accurate as the Russians, or as deadly as the Russians, and nowhere near as likely to be launched either through an accidental launch or through an organized effort to come through sabotage and take over a single facility, or to take over one of these submarines that are much more at risk as a consequence of their lax security. If you do not think the scenario is possible, I would like to quote the words of former a Russian Navy captain following this particular incident with the Russian sailor that I described earlier on the 11th of September 1998. He said, ``It is really scary that one day the use of nuclear arms may depend on the sentiments of someone who is feeling blue, who has gotten out of bed on the wrong side and who does not feel like living.'' The probability of this today is higher than ever before. The news has been filled recently with stories regarding nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the stories have been causing us to be concerned about our security relative to the Nation of China. The findings that China, over the past 20 years, has methodically stolen U.S. nuclear secrets from our National Laboratories are very disturbing, to put it mildly. We were very lax in our security in our Laboratories. We are very lax in our security with our export control licenses. We are very lax in our security in monitoring satellites that are being launched on the Long March system of the Chinese, and as a consequence, the United States of America suffers. There is no question that is true. But U.S. security has suffered against a nation with considerably less capability than Russia and considerably less risk of an accidental launch as a result of the way the two nations organize their weapon systems. In the uproar surrounding this story, I fear that we may be losing touch with reality concerning the size of the threat we face in China relative to the far greater Russian nuclear threat. Press accounts indicate that China may have no more than 20 land-based nuclear missiles capable of reaching the United States. Also, again, according to the media, as I said, Chinese nuclear weapons aren't kept on continual alert. Their nuclear warheads and liquid fuel tanks are stored separate from their missiles. Again, it would take them a considerable amount of time to fuel, to arm, and to launch these weapons. That just one of these weapons would cause immense pain and devastation to the United States of America ought to be obvious. But, again, it is a much smaller threat than the threat of an accidental rogue nation, or a sabotage takeover of a Russian site that could be launched with a devastating impact against the United States of America and would put our people at considerable risk. As of January 1999, my colleagues, with reference to this issue--I remember campaigning for the Senate in 1988. In 1988, you had to know all of this stuff. You had to know all of these in numbers, because arms control advocates were asking you, and opponents of arms control were asking. The freeze was going on. The MX missile was being debated. It was a hot issue in 1988. In 1999, it is not a hot issue. It is not on the radar screen. You have to hunt around to find someone who cares about it and asks you about it and express a concern about what I, again, consider to be the most dangerous threat to the people of the United States of America. I repeat that this is the only threat that could kill every single American. Just a single Delta IV submarine that I talked about earlier--you put 64 100-kiloton weapons on top of 64 sites in the United States of America, and you are no longer the strongest economy on Earth. We would have considerably more, to put it mildly, than 4.2 percent unemployment. We would not be screaming along with an economic recovery. The stock market would react, I would hazard a guess, rather adversely to that piece of news. There would be devastation and destruction and considerable loss of life, and the United States of America would be set back a considerable amount of time. We would not be as safe and as secure as we once were, and the world, as consequence, would suffer the loss of our leadership. A single Delta IV submarine owned by the Russians in a very insecure environment, in my judgment, would set the U.S. back considerably. I keep citing it only because I believe that we have taken nuclear weapons, unfortunately, off our radar screen, and we don't think about this much. I say to the distinguished chairman and to the ranking member, Senator Levin, and Senator Smith, who is the chairman of the Strategic Subcommittee, that I know each of you are very concerned about this. I am talking about the general population. I would hazard a guess that if one of these news media outlets that does polls all the time did a poll and asked the question about whether the Chinese nuclear threat is a greater threat to the United States of America than the Russian nuclear threat, it is likely to be that a large number of the people would say yes, given what they have heard recently in the news. China may evolve into a serious military threat to the United States in the future. They are unquestionably a proliferator of weapons, and all of us should be dismayed and angry at the lax security that we have discovered through the Cox report and other reports over the last 20 years, and should move with legislation and action to tighten up and make sure that we reduce that threat. But the Chinese threat is nowhere near the danger that the Russian nuclear threat poses to the people of the United States of America. What I am attempting to do with this amendment by striking the floor that we have imposed for 3 years in a row in the defense authorization bill--this provision that prohibits the United States from going below START I force levels until START II enters into force--is that I am suggesting that this floor increases the threat to the United States of America because we are waiting for the Russian Duma to ratify START II. We are still, in my view, in the old way of thinking about how to deal with nuclear weapons and how to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons and keep the people of the United States of America safe. Let me provide a little bit of history of arms control. Again, the chairman of the committee asked for some time to respond. Earlier, I was asked if I was going to wrap this thing up at 11:45. I say to my friend from Virginia that I had much more to say on this matter, and it may be that I am not able to agree to a time agreement and have the vote at 11:45. I would like to be able to do that. Maybe what I should try to do is abbreviate my comments and give the chairman a chance to respond briefly, if he chooses to do so. I see the chairman of the subcommittee is here. He may have some opposing points of view that he would like to offer. I want to give him a chance to do that. I think it is highly unlikely that I will be able to agree to a vote immediately after the BRAC vote at 11:45.

Mr. KERREY. Yes.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I appreciate that. Why don't I take another 5 or 10 minutes here.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, first of all, let me say that this piece of legislation being considered right now, in my view, of all the laws we write and all the laws we consider, is the one that is most vital. If we do not have a defense that is able to defend not just the United States of America but our interests, all the rest of it is secondary, in my view. I am very impressed--I came to this Senate in 1989, and I came to the Senate without the experience of having gone to law school. I was trained in other matters. The longer I am here, the more impressed I am both with the law itself and the power of this law. I cannot help but, as I begin to describe my own amendment, take a little bit of time to describe the connection between the law and things people see in their lives that they may not see as having been caused by the law itself. We do not have an Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps without this piece of legislation, which is, I think--I don't know--500-and-some pages long, with a report with it as well. This law creates our military. It authorizes appropriations to be made. It authorizes us to go out and recruit people to serve in our Armed Forces. We are going into the Memorial Day weekend during which I guess many, if not most, of us are going to be called upon to comment upon the meaning of Memorial Day--what does this day mean to us in our lives. For me, it is a time to reflect and say that these 1,360,000 men and women who are currently serving our Nation, and the half million Reserve and Guard men and women who are out there as well, are part of a long tradition of American men and women who have given up their freedom, because in the military they have a different code than we have in the private sector. The standards of justice are different. The expectations are different. In the military, the command structure is such that if I have command--which I did many, many years ago--if I have command and do well, I get a medal. But if I do poorly, my fitness report will be so bad I will be looking for a private sector opportunity. We have a responsibility we cannot delegate. That imposes upon an individual who is in the military real burdens that are different from what we have in the private sector--real responsibilities that are completely different. A man or woman who serves us today, who serves the cause of freedom today in our Armed Forces, does something that is much different from most private sector citizens. I begin my comments on this amendment by saluting them, by thanking them for taking what, unfortunately, today is almost a nonmainstream action, and that is based upon their love of country and their love of freedom, saying: We're willing to sacrifice our freedom; we're willing to give up rights that most private sector citizens have. Furthermore, nobody should doubt that in normal training operations it is possible to be injured or to even lose your life. A lot of these training operations are dangerous. So they are risking their lives on a day-to-day basis. Obviously, they are involved today in Kosovo; they are involved in the Balkans; they are involved with containing Saddam Hussein; they are involved on the Korean peninsula; they are forward deployed in areas around the world where we have interests, not just interests that are only of the United States, but interests in values that we hope will spread worldwide. All of us had the opportunity--I did; I took advantage of the opportunity--to sit and listen to Presidents Kim Dae-jung of South Korea and Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic and Nelson Mandela of South Africa when each spoke at a joint session of Congress across the way in the House of Representatives, and looked down to every representative of the people and said: Thank you, American people. You put your lives on the line, and we are free in South Korea today as a consequence. You put your lives and resources on the line, and we are free in the Czech Republic because of it. You have put your lives and resources on the line in South Africa, and we are free there as well. Your efforts enabled us to be free, these three individuals said. Many others have said the same thing. It is not a cliche that freedom is not free. This piece of legislation, this important piece of legislation, has us supporting 1,360,000 men and women in the military, and half a million Reserve and Guard people who are actively involved in the cause of defending freedom in the United States of America and throughout the world. This is an extremely important piece of legislation. I argue if we don't get this one right, all the rest of it is secondary. If this piece of legislation, if this law is not written correctly, all the rest of it doesn't matter. I begin my comments this morning praising Chairman Warner and the ranking member, Senator Levin, who have led the Armed Services Committee to give us this piece of legislation. They understand this piece of legislation keeps America safe. This is about security. We can't cut corners. We can't scrimp. We can't say we will just go partially there. We have to answer the question: What do we need to do to keep the people of the United States safe? How do we keep them secure and try to write laws that accomplish that objective? With great respect to the committee, there is one provision in subtitle D called ``Other Matters'' on page 357 that I am proposing to strike. That language provides a 1-year extension of a requirement that I think causes the United States of America to be less safe than it would without this provision. Let me get to it specifically. What this provision does is say that the United States of America must maintain a nuclear deterrent that is at the START I levels, that we have to have warheads deployed, land, sea, air, that are at START I levels; that the President of the United States cannot go below those START I levels. In the cold war, perhaps even a few years after the cold war was ended, when we were trying to err on the side of safety, this made sense because the No. 1 threat then was a bolt out of the blue, an attack by the Soviet Union that might occur when we least expected it. We had to maintain an active deterrence and prevent that. The capacity to survive that bolt-out-of-the-blue attack and counterattack was an essential part of our strategy. Today, the No. 1 threat is not a bolt-out-of-the-blue attack. The No. 1 threat today is an accidental launch, a rogue nation launch, or a sabotage launch of a nuclear weapon. One of the things that causes me a great deal of concern in this new era of ours is that I think we in Congress and the American people as well have forgotten the danger of these nuclear weapons. We have been talking about new threats to America. We have a threat in the form of chemical weapons, a threat in the form of biological weapons, a threat in the form of cyber warfare, lots of others things like that, terrorism, that cause people to be very much concerned. My belief is that the only threat out there that can kill every single American, and thus the threat that ought to be top on our list of concerns is nuclear weapons. The nation that possesses the greatest threat of all in terms of an accidental launch, a rogue nation launch, or a sabotage launch is Russia. I appreciate the fine work that Congressman Cox and Congressman Dicks did. They presented a report yesterday. I think they have laid out a roadmap that will enable us to change our laws and increase security at the Labs, increase the security of the satellite launches and increase the security, in general, with the transfer of technology through export licenses. I think they gave us a good roadmap, but one of the concerns I have with the report--I think it is unintentional--strike ``I think.'' It is unintentional--it has left the impression that China is a bigger threat to the United States in terms of nuclear weapons than Russia is. Nothing can be further from the truth. In China, they prevent the possibility of an accidental launch by saying we are not going to put our warheads on the missile. According to published reports, it would take at least 24 hours and probably a minimum of 48 hours, from the moment an order was given to launch, to put the warheads on the missiles. In China they have no more, according to published reports, than 13 weapons headed in our direction. They are categorized as city busters. They are not as accurate as the Russians are. They are not as deadly as the Russians are. They are not as likely, as a consequence of organized systems, to be launched in an accidental fashion. Even though they can reach us, even though China is a serious threat as a consequence of their behavior in the proliferation area--and we should not have trimmed in areas of export licenses or satellite launches on Long March or the operations of our Laboratories or other areas that would put America at risk--the threat assessment today says that the No. 1 threat to us is the threat that is posed by Russia as a consequence of their having strategic weapons that could reach the United States in a matter of hours and could reach the United States in a devastating fashion not through intentional launch but accidental launch, rogue nation launch or sabotage launch. I think that part of the problem in all of this is, again, that we have been lulled into a false sense of security that, well, maybe these nuclear weapons aren't that big of a problem. Let me say that in the former Soviet Union, that may have been the case, because their economy was much stronger than it is today. They had a much greater capacity to control those weapons systems that they have. One of the reasons, the biggest reason that I want to change this is that I believe we are forcing Russia today to maintain a level of nuclear weapons beyond what their financial system will allow them to maintain. They are currently required at START I levels to have 6,000 strategic warheads. Again, according to published accounts from their own military people, they would prefer to be at a level of 1,000 or lower, because they simply don't have the resources. I can go into some rather startling problems that are created as a consequence of that inability, but they simply don't have the ability, the resources to allocate to maintain those 6,000 warheads as we do. Ours are safe. Ours are secure. We have redundant switching systems and all kinds of other protections to make certain that we don't have an accidental launch, to make certain that there is no rogue transfer, to make certain that there is no terrorism that could take over one of these sites and be used either against the United States itself or against some other country. One of the baseline problems that we have as Americans is that we are the most open society on earth. We are the most successful society measured by our economy, measured by our military, measured by even our democracy, which can be a bit frustrating from time to time. We take sides on issues worldwide, which I think we have to do if we want to continue to fight for the freedom of people throughout this world. But as a consequence of all those things, there are lots of people on this Earth who hate Americans, who have in their hearts a desire to do significant damage to us. It is a problem created from our own success. So as we try to decide how we are going to keep our country safe, one of the things that I believe we need to think about when it comes to Russia is, is it possible for somebody who hates America, who is willing to do damage to America and willing to die in the act of doing it--what kind of risk is there as a consequence of a policy under law that requires Russia to maintain a nuclear force that is higher than either they can afford or they want to maintain? Well, I will describe a couple of scenarios in length here, but many years ago, sort of a Stone Age time for me, I was trained in the U.S. Navy SEAL team. I do not argue that I was an exemplary special operations person. I had a relatively short experience in the war before I was injured, so I didn't have enough time on task to become really good at it. But you always have these sort of imaginary fantasies that you are still 25 years of age, and there are times when you sort of think that way. I believe it is possible for somebody who is well trained and well organized to raid a silo site of a Russian missile in the Russian wilderness and take that site over. You will have a scenario on the opposite side that says that it can't be done. I believe it can be done. One of the things that you have to do when you are planning, writing a law to defend the people of the United States of America, is you have to think about that small possibility and you have to plan for it. We didn't expect that the Russians were high probability going to come through the Fulda Gap during the 40-plus years of the cold war, but we defended against it, and it was an expensive defense because it was possible that it could happen. Mr. President, I believe it is possible for a small band of discontents or terrorists to raid a silo site of a Russian missile in the Russian wilderness. I believe that there are soldiers today in Russia who are poorly trained, who are sparsely equipped, and who are irate at not having been paid in well over a year in some cases. I think they are vulnerable and easily overtaken, and as a consequence, willing to cooperate in things that would put the United States of America at risk. What you have to do is sort of then say to yourself: What would happen? Imagine what would happen if that were to occur. Well, I again have to underscore with a story why I think we are lulled to sleep by nuclear weapons. In the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, on which I have the honor of serving as a result of Senator Daschle appointing me to that and serving on behalf of the Senate, I once asked some analysts of the CIA to tell me what the impact would be of a single missile being launched and hitting a U.S. city. The answer was we are really not sure. We haven't thought it through lately. We don't put it up on our radar screen as being the sort of thing to worry about. I find that not only alarming but illustrative of the general problem. We are not thinking about this threat. We are not imagining what could happen in a worse case scenario and, as a consequence, we are sort of allowing ourselves to be dragged along with yesterday's policy, not thinking about how we can do this differently to substantially reduce the threat to the people of the United States of America, and I believe, by the way, in the process, freeing up resources that could be used on the conventional side where there is much more likely scenarios where American men and women are going to be called on to defend the cause of freedom and fight for the cause of freedom. A single Russian rocket could be launched over the top of the world from the north, and it would go across the Arctic pole, and in less than an hour it could be in over Chicago. On a bad day, it might come within 100 yards of its target. On a good day, it would probably come within 10 to 15 yards of its target. I am talking about something about which, again, people will say this is alarmist. It is not an alarmist scenario. This is what nuclear weapons do. We have sort of forgotten that, in my view. Back in the 80s, during the cold war, all of us understood the danger of nuclear weapons, but today I don't think we do. I think we have forgotten what kind of damage they can do. A single nuclear weapon would vaporize everything. The surrounding air is instantaneously heated to a temperature of 10 million degrees Celsius. It looks brighter than the sun and shoots outward at a few hundred kilometers per second. It would be sufficient to set fire to anything in Chicago that is combustible at a distance of 14 kilometers. Anybody within 80 kilometers would be blinded as a consequence of the blast. After the fireball, the blast effect force follows, traveling out from ground zero. Those within 3 kilometers, who had not already been killed, will die from the percussive force. At 8 kilometers, 50 percent of the people will be killed, and every building within 2 kilometers will be completely destroyed. Major destruction of homes, factories, and office buildings would extend out to 14 kilometers. In the farthest reaches of the immediate blast zone--encompassing everything in Chicago--structures would be severely damaged, and 15 percent of the people in Chicago would be dead, 50 percent would be injured, and most survivors would suffer second- and third-degree burns. This is the damage that would be done from a single Russian nuclear weapon exploded above an American city. This is just one city. Again, I point this out not to be alarmist but to say that this is a real threat. This is not an imaginary threat. This weapons system exists. There are 6,000 of these in Russia today that were needed in the cold war; they were needed in a deterrent strategy that the Russians had developed. We have drawn down, and they have drawn down to the 6,000 level--a bit higher than that still today. They are drawing down to that 6,000 level. But, again, if you ask either our intelligence or the Russians directly, they will tell you they don't have the resources to maintain even 1,000. They don't have the resources to maintain 1,000, let alone 6,000-plus, and in the kind of secure environment the people of the United States of America will need in order for themselves to be safe and secure as a consequence. I tell the story out of what I think is a loss of focus on the danger of nuclear weapons. I am very concerned that the American people have been lulled into a false sense of security as a consequence of our elected leaders repeatedly telling them the threat no longer exists. In the Presidential campaign of 1996, the President correctly kept saying that for the first time in the history of the Nation we are not targeting the Russians and they are not targeting us. Well, you can retarget in a couple of minutes, max. This retargeting task is a fairly simple task. Critics of the President pointed that out, and I think correctly. It caused people to be sort of lulled into a sense that, gee, this wasn't a problem. If we are not targeting them and they are not targeting us, this is great news, so we don't have to worry about this threat any longer; thus, we can sort of stop worrying about nuclear weapons. We can worry about other threats that we have to the United States. Again, I am calling my colleagues' attention to this problem not because I believe there is going to be a deliberate nuclear attack from Russia, because I don't think that is likely, or even plausible. Indeed, Russia has made extraordinary progress in their effort to transform their economy and political system. Though they have a long way to go to complete the transition, they need to be applauded for it. But this transition is going to take decades--back, forward, stop, go. It is going to take a fair amount of time to transition from an old command economy to a market economy. In the meantime, they are finding it increasingly difficult to maintain the military infrastructure they inherited from the collapse of the Soviet Union, including, dare I say, their stockpile of thousands of nuclear weapons--estimated to be close to 7,000 on the strategic side and a comparable amount on the tactical side. There are 14 storage facilities, according to published reports, where they store fissile material. We don't know what is going on inside those buildings. It is a serious problem that our former colleague, Sam Nunn, has said is a threat not coming from Russia's might but from its military weakness. If a single one doesn't bother you, there was an incident that occurred recently on September 11, 1998. I appreciate that some will say that Kerrey is dreaming, this isn't a real danger. I don't think there is a greater danger than an accidental launch of a nuclear weapon at the United States of America. I think it is the most dangerous problem we face, and it is a scenario that could happen. If it happens, I believe we are going to regret not having developed a different strategy than the old arms control strategy that we have had in the past. I am not going to describe an alternative strategy. I think one is needed, and I think one is more likely to occur if we strike this language from the defense authorization bill and allow the President to go below 6,000, similar to what President Bush did in the early 1990s, getting a reciprocal response from Russia as a consequence. Let me describe a real time scenario, a situation that happened on the 11th of September--does the Senator want to say something?

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, again I am not trying to make an argument here for or against strategic defense. I will work with Senator Cochran to try to fashion some assistance to bring additional Democrats. I supported what Senator Cochran was trying to do. The problem is, missile defense is not prepared today. The problem is, we don't have missile defense today. We are not sure when we will have it. I don't want to get into necessarily arguing that. I am saying that within a matter of hours it is possible for the United States of America to suffer an attack the likes of which I think very few people are imagining. It is a real threat. It is not an imaginary threat. It is a real threat, and it is a threat that is getting larger, not a threat that is getting smaller. It is not the old threat. The old threat--and I appreciate what I think the administration's stated policy says. They prefer repealing the bill's general provisions that maintain this prohibition first enacted in 1998, but maybe the administration supports this amendment and maybe they don't support the amendment. I believe this floor makes it less likely that we will consider an alternative to arms control as a method to reduce this threat. I am willing to look at alternatives such as star wars for which I voted. The strategic defense system is not in place today. I don't know when it will be in place. In the meantime, the capacity to control Russia's nuclear system is declining and putting more and more Americans at risk as a consequence. This is the third year, as I understand it, that this provision has been here. Let me talk about strategic arms reduction. It has been the leading edge of our effort to try to reduce the threat. Back in the cold war, it was considered to be the only way that we will do it. I am not going to go through all the details of the history, but the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was signed between the United States and the Soviet Union, START I, in 1991 and entered into force in 1994. It commits both sides to reducing their overall force level to 6,000 deployable warheads by December of 2001. Both sides are well on the way to meeting this deadline. The START II treaty signed in January 1993 and requires both the United States and Russia to deploy no more than 3,500 warheads by no later than December of 2007. The Senate ratified START II in 1996, but the Russian Duma has yet to take up the treaty. Section 1041 of this authorization bill extends for another year the limitation on retirement or dismantlement of strategic nuclear weapon systems until the START II treaty enters into effect. Let me put this another way: The bill we are debating allows a foreign legislative body the final say on U.S. nuclear force levels. I do not believe this is how we should set our defense policies. Our military decisions should be based solely on what we need to protect and maintain our national security interests. While I understand this provision was originally intended to encourage Russian ratification of START II, I think it is time to begin to rethink our strategy. For the foreseeable future, START II is dead. We can all make the case that the Duma should have acted, that ratification was more in their interests than in ours, or that the reason it failed was domestic Russian politics. All that is true. But we now need to begin to ask ourselves if the current policy of waiting for Russian action on START II is the best way to confront the dangers presented by the Russian nuclear arsenal. I believe the answer is emphatically no. The provision in this bill I am trying to strike is forcing the United States to maintain an unnecessarily large nuclear arsenal. By keeping more weapons than we need to defend ourselves, we are encouraging the Russians to keep more weapons than they can control. That is the heart of the argument that I am making. We are keeping more in our arsenal than we need, and as a consequence, forcing the Russians to keep more in their arsenal than they can control, increasing the risk of an accidental launch, a rogue nation launch, or a launch that comes as a consequence of an act of sabotage. The determinant of adequate U.S. force levels should be left up to the men and women who are in charge of protecting the United States. While Pentagon officials have said they have no plans to go below START I levels during fiscal year 2000, they have clearly stated their preference for lifting these artificial restrictions. In the recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the current commander in chief of the Strategic Command, Adm. Richard Mies, said: We believe that we ought to report to you on an annual basis on exactly what we plan to do, but we would prefer not to have the specific mandating of the force levels by delivery systems. Our Armed Forces are more than capable of protecting U.S. national security with significantly fewer strategic nuclear weapons. In fact, Gen. Eugene Habiger, former commander of STRATCOM, said: ``There is no reason to stay at the START I level from a military perspective.'' Our nuclear policy has become completely detached from the military requirements of defending America, and is now being used simply as a bargaining chip with Russian politicians. Ironically, this is occurring at a time in which the Russian military is having problems maintaining its current force levels. The Russians foresee a time, in the near future, when drastic cuts will have to be made. In fact, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev has said publicly he sees the future Russian strategic nuclear arsenal in terms of hundreds, not thousands, of warheads. There are even some U.S. analysts who have calculated within 10 to 15 years Russia will be able to maintain a force no longer than 200 warheads. I believe it is clearly in the Russian interest to work with the United States to achieve reciprocal reductions in forces, and I am disappointed the Russian Duma has chosen domestic politics over its best interests. However, it is just as clear that it remains in our interests to work with Russia to find new ways to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in a parallel, reciprocal, and verifiable manner. We have a historical precedent to show that an adjustment in our nuclear forces, based solely on an evaluation of our defense needs, can help achieve the goal of reducing nuclear dangers. There is a precedent for this. On September 27, 1991, then President George Bush announced a series of sweeping changes to our nuclear force posture. After assessing our national security needs, Bush ordered all strategic bombers to stand down from their alert status, he de-altered all ICBMs scheduled for deactivation under START I, and he canceled several strategic weapons development programs. On October 5--just one week later--President Gorbachev responded with reciprocal reductions in the Soviet arsenal. President Bush acted, not out of altruism, but because it increased U.S. national security. In his announcement, he said: If we and the Soviet leaders take the right steps--some on our own, some on their own, some together--we can dramatically shrink the arsenal of the world's nuclear weapons. We can more effectively discourage the spread of nuclear weapons. We can rely more on defensive measures in our strategic relationship. We can enhance stability, and actually reduce the risk of nuclear war. How is the time to seize this opportunity. I believe the same is true today in 1999. The longer we wait to act-- the more years in which we extend this legislative restriction--the more likely it is one of these weapons will fall into the hands of a person willing to use it to kill American citizens. In addition to endangering the safety of the American people, our continued insistence on staying at START I levels is costing the American taxpayer. They are paying more to be less safe. Estimates on the annual cost of maintaining our nuclear arsenal vary widely. The Pentagon contends the total cost is in the neighborhood of $15 billion a year. A more inclusive figure would put the cost in the area of $20 to $25 billion. This represents a significant portion of our yearly national security spending. For now, it continues to be necessary to maintain an effective, reliable nuclear force--a force capable of deterring a wide array of potential adversaries. But if, as our military leaders have indicated, we can maintain that deterrent capability at much lower force levels, I am concerned we are wasting precious budgetary resources. The Congressional Budget Office recently conducted a study in which it found we could have between $12.7 billion and $20.9 billion over the next ten years by reducing U.S. nuclear delivery systems within the overall limits of START II. Both the Pentagon and the Armed Services Committee have already recognized that potential savings exist in this area. The bill before us allows the Defense Department to decrease the number of Trident Submarines from 18 to 14--producing a significant cost savings in our deterrent. I am sure further savings could be realized with further cuts. I am certain our military has the ability to determine the proper formula in which we can reduce our nuclear arsenal, save money, and still maintain a healthy triad of delivery systems that will maintain our deterrent capabilities. I am confident much of this planning has already occurred. I am also confident the distinguished members of the Armed Services Committee would be able to find ways in which to redirect these savings into other defense priorities such as preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combating terrorism and narco-trafficking, or improving the readiness of our conventional forces to confront the challenges of the 21st century. My amendment does not mandate any reductions in the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal. Rather, it simply eliminates the provision in this bill requiring us to maintain our forces at START I levels--a level that is unnecessarily high. The greatest danger facing the American people today is Russian nuclear weapons. We have been given a moment in history to reduce this threat. Rather than acting on this opportunity, we are preparing once again to tie our own hands. The rapid pace of change in Russia and around the world will not wait for us in the United States Senate to debate for another year whether or not to seize this opportunity. We know what our relationship with Russia is today, We can predict, but we cannot know what it will be like in a year, or two, or ten. Circumstances may never again be this favorable for reducing the threat posed by nuclear weapons. We must act. If we do not, history may judge us harshly for our failure. I see the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire is here, the chairman of the subcommittee. I think what I will do is yield the floor and allow my friend to speak for a while, and listen to what is likely to be his considered and well-spoken words.

Mr. KERREY. I would very much like to accommodate and do that, but my problem is----