J. Kerrey

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, in May 1995, it was my distinct pleasure to join the fine, distinguished Senator from Wyoming, the Honorable Alan K. Simpson, to introduce the Kerrey-Simpson Retirement Reform bills. The intent of this series of eight bills has two important goals: Put Social Security and other Federal retirement programs on the path to long term fiscal health; and renew America's commitment to national savings. Today, I rise with Senator Simpson to reintroduce two of these bills, S.824 and S.825, for the purpose of offering technical changes. Specifically, it was our original intent to permit contributors to a personal investment plan to pass the balance of such plan to their surviving spouse upon their death, except if the surviving spouse agrees in writing that such balance should be transferred to a designated beneficiary, such as child or sibling. Our intent was to provide the contributor with the greatest amount of flexibility in his/ her estate planning, while at the same time recognizing the vulnerability of a surviving spouse. The second technical correction would require that in the event of the contributor's death where there is no surviving spouse and there has been no designation of a beneficiary of the proceeds of the personal investment plan, the proceeds should revert to the deceased's estate, not to the Social Security trust fund. It was our original intent to allow contributors to retain ownership of their personal investment plan, even after death. The third technical correction would permit financial institutions-- in addition to banks--to administer personal investment plans. It was our original intent to permit personal investment plans to be administered by the identical institutions permitted to administer individual retirement accounts. Finally, technical corrections are made to S.825 to adjust certain dates in the formula for determining benefits to our original intent. As these changes are technical in nature, we have been assured by the actuaries of the Social Security Administration that such changes should have no effect on the solvency of the Social Security trust fund. Finally, I would like to add what a joy and pleasure it has been to work with my good friend from Wyoming. His leadership and candidness on this issue will be sorely missed. But more importantly, Mr. President, the character and leadership of Alan K. Simpson as a Senator, colleague, and friend will be equally difficult to replace in the U.S. Senate. I wish him all the best in whatever his fine future holds, and I expect he will continue to fight the good fight on this matter of critical importance to our Nation's fiscal future.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I am pleased that the omnibus appropriations bill includes $21.5 million to fund the Telecommunications and Information Infrastructure Assistance Program [TIIAP] under the National Telecommunications and Information Administration [NTIA]. TIIAP is an important part of the ongoing effort to ensure that every American has access to advanced telecommunications services. Unfortunately, many communities do not have access to advanced telecommunications services. This lack of access is pronounced in rural and innercity areas. House appropriators made the wise decision to fund TIIAP at $21.5 million. However, for the second year in a row, the Senate chose to cut TIIAP funding. The chairman's mark included zero funding for this important program. It was only after my insistence, and the cooperation of Senator Stevens at full committee, that $4 million was included for TIIAP. At that time, I made it clear to the full Appropriations Committee that I would offer an amendment on the Senate floor, as I did for fiscal year 1996, to fully fund TIIAP. After negotiating with Senate appropriators and sending a letter of support for TIIAP, along with 13 other Senators to Senator Lott , TIIAP funding was restored to $21.5 million in the omnibus appropriations package. Access to the information superhighway is crucial for economic development and delivery of education, health care, and social services. We can ensure that every citizen has this access, whether they live in rural areas like many residents of my home State of Nebraska or metropolitan centers like New York or Washington DC, by supporting programs like TIIAP. Competing in the world job market no longer simply means working harder than our competitors abroad. Our students and workers must have access to and a strong working knowledge of the advanced telecommunications services that increasingly drive the world economy. Similarly, if we want to continue to provide the best health care in the world, Americans must have access to telemedicine facilities that allow them to work with health care specialists across the country. The importance of TIIAP to developing a strong information infrastructure should not be underestimated. I believe the Senate took a great step forward today in the battle to ensure that every American has access to advanced telecommunications services.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. I am very concerned that in Nebraska and its neighboring States, section 8 projects for the elderly will be disadvantaged under the language in the conference report, unless a special effort is made to preserve them. Fair market rents in these areas for zero and 1- bedroom apartments are low which cause high rents necessary to sustain section 8 projects with appropriate services for the elderly. These projects often have elevators, additional facilities for food, recreation and services, and extra management services such as 24-hour- in-house staff. They are above the 120 percent of FMR threshold for renewal at current rents. In order to bring these project rents down to FMR, all or most of the debt services would have to be eliminated. Debt reduction of this magnitude would most certainly give rise to significant tax liabilities. Is it your intent that debt restructuring occur?

Mr. KERREY. I thank the chairman and look forward to assisting in the oversight of the implementation of these legislative provisions.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, the conference report accompanying the fiscal year 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act highlights the results of significant efforts by many people. This bill creates important changes which will help to improve the Director of Central Intelligence's ability to manage the intelligence community and also improves oversight of the Nation's intelligence activities. It is an important step in reforming and renewing the intelligence community. I would like to thank Chairman Specter for his bipartisan approach to the intelligence community's problems. Intelligence can become the topic of partisan debate if we are not careful to preserve its goal of providing the unvarnished truth to policy-makers--congressional as well as executive branch. Because of the important issues at stake, there have been many opportunities throughout this year for partisan politics to enter the intelligence community's analysis of what threatens our vital interests. But Chairman Specter has steadfastly resisted any effort in that direction. As his term as chairman comes to a close, I salute him for his wise and farsighted leadership during a period of great challenge for the Intelligence Committee. He turned those challenges into accomplishments, including the significant reforms contained in this conference report. Chairman Specter has also acted on behalf of the entire Senate to provide thorough and attentive oversight of this Nation's intelligence activities. In the process he has taken the bold, and I believe correct, course of convening frequent open oversight hearings to acquaint the public with these important issues, all the while protecting the secrecy of intelligence sources and methods. So I am proud to have served with Chairman Specter during this momentous two years, and to have been part of the process which produced the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997. Chairman Specter and I have been supported by a superb staff effort led by a real intelligence professional, Charles Battaglia, the staff director of the Intelligence Committee. Mr. Battaglia followed a distinguished naval career with service at CIA, he knows this complex business from every angle, creates the conditions and prepares the tools Senators can use to get results. He also has every right to be proud of this bill. I would also like to add my sincere thanks to the members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. As some of my colleagues may recall, there was considerable disagreement between the House and Senate in last year's lengthy authorization conference. Not so this year. Although there were important differences between the two Houses at the beginning of the year, we resolved our differences quickly because we realized the significance of our combined efforts. Chairman Larry Combest, Ranking Member Norm Dicks, and the other members of the House Committee worked with us in a spirit of comity and the Senate can be proud of the product. We are returning to the Senate with an important piece of legislation. Naturally, most of the programmatic work is classified. Nevertheless, as I mentioned when I helped introduce the Senate version of the bill, some of the most significant provisions are unclassified. The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence has been strengthened to allow him to manage the intelligence community much better. Among the most prominent of these are improved financial management procedures, strengthened delineation of authorities for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence, and better internal oversight of intelligence activities. In this bill, we have successfully preserved the equities of the Secretary of Defense so that intelligence support of military operations will be stronger than ever. We have also included important provisions to improve intelligence support of law enforcement. And, finally, there are also major improvements in support of our war against terrorism. I cannot over-emphasize the importance of the bill's provisions to strengthen the Director of Central Intelligence's management of the intelligence community. I am aware of some senior intelligence officials to the Oversight Committees efforts to strengthen community management, specifically the creation of three new Presidentially- appointed, Senatorially confirmed Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence. I am reminded of the intense effort by some elements of the Department of Defense some years ago to undermine the Goldwater- Nichols reform of defense. As was the case then, we are told that strengthened management is, on the one hand, unnecessary and, on the other hand, unwieldy. I assure my colleagues that neither criticism is warranted. Mr. President, the management of intelligence suffers from poor senior level management. The culprit is not a person. It is not a comment on the superb abilities of the current Director of Central Intelligence or his Deputy. Rather, it is a comment on the structure they inherited. As the Aspin-Brown Commission noted when it evaluated the intelligence community's readiness for the 21st century, the DCI faces a dilemma on managing the community which the current structure does not solve. He is relatively weak in his ability to manage the community and therefore spends most of his time as the principal intelligence adviser to the President and as the head of the CIA. The bill solves his dilemma by creating a new Deputy Director for Community Management. This new senior level official will be assisted by three Assistant Directors who will be functional managers of the intelligence community. One will handle administration, one will oversee analysis and production, and one will supervise intelligence collection. In deciding which information to collect about our vital interests, four different and independent organizations every day set their own goals, priorities, and allocate resources. Except on a by-exception basis--and also during an annual budget review--neither the Director of Central Intelligence nor his staff have any idea of the duplication which exists, the relative effectiveness of one method of collection over another to break a tough intelligence target, or the marginal utility of procuring new systems to solve new problems. With all of the responsibilities pressing upon their daily lives, neither the Director nor his Deputy have the time to understand or direct daily the community's intelligence collection efforts. In response, the bill gives the DCI help in the form of an assistant whose sole purpose is to help him do what he already is responsible for doing--manage the collection of intelligence. Similar problems exist in the areas of intelligence analysis and production. Today, CIA's analysts analyze military problems. The Defense Intelligence Agency analyzes political problems. The Department of State evaluates political and military problems. On a daily, weekly, or monthly basis, no one reviews--with any hope of changing the community's direction toward new problems--who is analyzing what throughout the community. Certainly, as part of the annual budget process, the DCI makes a quick review of the intelligence analysis structure supporting policy makers. But the DCI's annual review addresses analysis and production in only a cursory manner. He needs help. The bill gives him help in the form an assistant whose sole purpose is to help the DCI do what he already is responsible for doing--analyze and produce intelligence. Perhaps most fragmented of all are the administrative programs of the various intelligence agencies. Each agency maintains separate administrative, personnel, security, and training programs. In 1992, Congress gave the DCI specific authority to consolidate and reduce duplication in these programs, but successive DCI's have done little to make use of this authority. Again, the DCI needs help. The bill gives him help in the form of an assistant DCI for administration. Mr. President, in its confirmation of these new officials, the Senate must be vigilant in protecting intelligence from politicization. I expect the candidates for these positions to be life-long intelligence professionals approaching the pinnacle of their careers. I don't expect them to have political leanings that would affect their professional judgments, any more than I would expect such leanings in the career diplomats the Senate confirms to be Assistant Secretaries of State or in the career military officers the Senate confirms to be flag officers. I have also heard it argued that senatorial confirmation might make these intelligence officials less loyal or less responsive to their superiors. Looking again at the Assistant Secretaries of State and at the military, I see no empirical data to support this concern. I have high hopes that these officials will make our intelligence more timely and useful to all its customers, and I will use my role in the confirmation process to that end. Mr. President, let me note two other provisions in the conference report of special interest to me. One provision modifies the House bill's prohibition on the CIA use of U.S. journalists as intelligence assets unless the President waived the prohibition and made a written certification. This procedure seemed to the Senate conferees to be too onerous and time consuming. We accepted Director Deutch's assurance that any CIA approach to a U.S. journalist would be extremely rare. But it seemed to us that such a rare occasion might also require speed, and the process to obtain a Presidential waiver and certification would take too long. Consequently the conferees agreed to give waiver authority to the President or the DCI. In either case, use of the waiver would be reported to the oversight committees. Second, the conferees agreed to modify a Senate provision denying senior CIA personnel the possibility of accepting employment with a foreign country within 5 years of retirement. It seemed to us that security and the reputation of the service are best protected by a clear prohibition on such employment. Our compromise with the House reduced the period of prohibition from 5 years to 3 and provided authority for the DCI to waive the provision when foreign employment of a former senior official is in the U.S. interest. Nonetheless, I think we are sending a strong message with this provision and I support it. The effort to bring the bill forward for final passage has not been easy. Significant change never is, and there is no object more resistant to change than the baroque bureaucratic structure that our intelligence community has evolved into since 1945. But the effort to bring the bill to this point has been worth it. It has been strengthened by the intense discussions it generated with the Director of Central Intelligence, the Department of Defense, and the other Senate committees. Quite correctly, each had strong concerns, and we have answered those concerns with an excellent bill. I urge my colleagues to support final passage of this important legislation. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, this year's bill once again attempts to help the intelligence community make the transition to a post-cold-war world where the looming military threat of the Soviet Union has been replaced by a more subtle--but increasingly serious--array of threats. The committee has attempted to help intelligence make the transition with a series of provisions in the bill to reform the community's weaknesses and renew its confidence in itself and in the products it provides to policy makers. Chairman Specter has been key in ensuring the committee has moved forward to recommend to the Senate important changes in the intelligence community. Under his leadership, we have examined in detail many shortcomings and failures which can only lead to the conclusion substantial change is in order. Without Chairman Specter's tireless efforts on the part of reform and renewal, the committee would not have been able to get to the point where we are today: recommending improvements that will have far reaching effects and make sure the intelligence community is positioned to understand the threats of tomorrow. This year's bill also seeks to provide an adequate level of funding for the intelligence community, with the committee seeking a modest, 1 percent increase to the President's request. Congress has cut the DCI's request for national intelligence each year for the past 7 years, and I believe stress and strain in our national intelligence capabilities will follow unless we reverse this trend. However, since this bill was marked up in April, the defense authorization conference acted to cut national intelligence by some 3 percent and the ongoing defense authorization conference is likely to redirect funds requested by the administration for national intelligence to other defense programs. I am discouraged that there seems to be no constituency of support for national intelligence, even in a year in which the Congress is adding significant resources to the defense budget. I opened my remarks by saying the committee is once again attempting to reform and renew intelligence because it engaged in a similar effort as part of the fiscal year 1993 National Foreign Intelligence Program authorization process. The committee ran into many roadblocks in the fall of 1992 which prevented it from moving ahead with substantial reforms. Unfortunately, the committee finds itself in somewhat of a similar position today. Nevertheless, we are offering reforms which hopefully will point us in the direction of improved intelligence support to policy makers while at the same time streamlining some of the Intelligence community's procedures so they are more responsive to the evolving international environment. There are many reasons for intelligence reform and renewal. Several of the most significant have found their way into the media. We are all aware of the Aldrich Ames spy case where a CIA operations officer gave some of our most sensitive information to the Soviet Union reportedly resulting directly in the deaths of at least 10 people. We also know about the excess funds retained by the National Reconnaissance Office which prevented this funding from being available for more immediate projects. Incidents such as these help to underscore the need for reform. The need for reform is widely recognized outside of the Congress. Last year Congress authorized a special commission to ``conduct a comprehensive review of American intelligence.'' In March of this year, the Commission issued a 217-page report containing over 36 recommendations for significant change. Similarly, the Council on Foreign Relations this year issued its own report on the need for intelligence reform. Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy added its call for reform in a report entitled, ``Checklist for the Future of Intelligence.'' And the executive branch recognizes the need for reform as well. Their recognition is perhaps captured best by a CIA task force with the foreboding name of the ``Intelligence Community Revolution Task Force'' which called for sweeping changes. The need for reform must be balanced by at least two considerations. First, the intelligence community is full of dedicated men and women who, through a sense of patriotism and a desire to serve their country, will successfully take the intelligence community into the 21st century. They will be mentally ready to confront any challenge. Second, reform does not mean we should create a ``Department of Intelligence.'' Intelligence supports policy. It informs leaders throughout the Government and does not have to be organized as a separate part of the Government in order to be effective. What must be done, however, is to create an organization capable of capitalizing upon the abilities of its dedicated men and women and organize it so the leaders of the intelligence community have the authorities commensurate with the responsibilities for which we hold them accountable. The Congress and many parts of the executive branch expect only the best intelligence, and the community must be prepared to serve all segments of the Government, including the Department of Defense. In this regard, I would like to take this opportunity to thank our colleagues on the Armed Services Committee. We have worked together to make sure intelligence support will be improved in the future and to guarantee our unsurpassed defense capabilities remain intact. Without the support of the chairman and ranking member, we would not be able to present a comprehensive package of reform to the Senate in which we all have confidence we are doing the right thing. This year, we voted a bill out of Committee: First, changing intelligence support to policymakers so the community could better capitalize on the rich resources of its people; second, enhancing some of the powers of the Director of Central Intelligence so he would be able to exercise all of the necessary authorities in the areas for which we recognize his responsibility; and third, reorganizing parts of the intelligence community so that it is better structured for the profusion of different threats endemic to the post cold war world. In order to support policymakers better, the bill we introduce today contains several important innovations. First, it creates a Committee on Foreign Intelligence as part of the National Security Council. This committee would meet at least semiannually to provide broad guidance to the intelligence community on major issues. In addition to ensuring that intelligence would more closely support the needs of all policymakers in the Government, it would be required to document the priorities of the policymaking community so that intelligence would know how to allocate its relatively scarce resources. Second, the bill creates a Committee on Transnational Threats as part of the National Security Council. In many ways, the threats to our national security have changed significantly since the bipolar world where the Free World confronted a Communist bloc. The role of the nation state is evolving into something different and several increasingly serious threats to the United States crossnational boundaries. Among these, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--and their means of delivery--appear as the most significant. The policy community, however, still largely focuses on a world composed of nations which only theoretically control the destinies of all mankind. The intelligence community is struggling to bring the transnational threats to the forefront but, since intelligence supports policy and not vice versa, its warnings sometimes go unheeded. The Committee on Transnational Threats will help to change the focus to the new international disorder. Mr. President, the committee harbors no illusions about the possible destinies of these committees. We all know quite well the usefulness of the Low Intensity Conflict Board, an NSC-level board established by the Congress to force the policy community to address the growing importance of low-intensity conflict. The Committee on Foreign Intelligence and the Committee on Transnational Threats both could become the moribund bodies the low intensity conflict board has become. Nonetheless, our committee feels so strongly that intelligence can support policy properly only if the policy makers change their approach to international threats, we believe it is best to allow the intelligence community to focus its efforts in new and different ways based on NSC-level committees. We recommend the Congress should take the risk and create these two committees so the necessary tools will be available to the President if he chooses to use them. Our bill also requires the President to submit an annual report to Congress on intelligence needs and priorities for the next fiscal year and assess the performance of the intelligence community during the previous fiscal year. We envision this to be a companion document to the national security strategy of the United States which the President is required by law to submit annually to Congress. We believe this will help the Congress decide whether intelligence is supporting policy. As such, it will allow the Congress to make the tough decisions on which programs should be funded and reject those programs inconsistent with the President's national security strategy and congressional priorities. In some respects, the bill has created controversy in the manner with which it addresses the office of the Director of Central Intelligence. Most Americans expect the DCI to be a director. After 49 years of experience, however, it is still painfully obvious he is the coordinator of central intelligence, not the director. Each year, after he negotiates with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy and the FBI Director, the DCI assembles an intelligence budget. It often reflects what is bureaucratically possible instead of what is required. Therefore, he does not direct anything in the fundamental way any leader steers an organization. He does not direct the intelligence community because he does not create a budget based on his own tough decisions. To make matters worse, once he assembles the budget and Congress approves it, the DCI does not control how the money is spent. That control belongs to the people with whom he negotiated in the first place: the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, and the FBI Director. Since the bill's provisions dealing with budget control have created such controversy--sometimes misrepresented in the media as an attempt to create a ``Department of Intelligence''--the committee is reporting a bill at this late date with fewer DCI budget authorities than originally believed to be important. Nonetheless, there are some innovations still in the bill which will help the DCI better execute his responsibilities. Among these innovations is the creation of the positions of three Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence. Generally, intelligence is conducted in three steps. First, information is collected. Second, the information is analyzed and a report is written. Third, the report is disseminated to policy-makers. Today, no one other than the DCI is personally responsible for the collection of the information and its analysis. I think we can all agree the DCI is far too busy to focus on each day's priorities and requirements for collecting information. Further, he cannot personally supervise the daily work of the thousands of intelligence analysts to ensure their reports are properly focused, comprehensive, and delivered on time. Thus, the DCI relies on a series of interagency committees to help him manage intelligence collection and analysis. We all know what it means when someone says a committee is in charge: no one is in charge. The bill attempts to correct this lack of accountability for intelligence collection and analysis by creating assistant directors who will be in charge of those areas important for the production of intelligence. The bill also creates a third Assistant Director of Central Intelligence. Today, most people believe the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for administering an intelligence community consisting of tens of thousands of people. But, like the areas of intelligence collection and analysis, there is no one other than the DCI who is personally responsible for the daily management of the rambling institution we call the intelligence community. In order to assist the DCI in the daily execution of this important responsibility, the bill creates the position of an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Administration. The committee also has attempted in this bill to strengthen the DCI's abilities to discharge his responsibilities by statutorily requiring his participation in important executive branch deliberations. As many of my colleagues will remember, late last year the media carried stories stating the National Reconnaissance Office had amassed a large amount of funds excess to their immediate needs. Responding quickly in the media, senior Defense officials placed blame elsewhere. They accused the congressional oversight committees of being lax. They said a secret agreement between the DCI and Secretary of Defense prevented the Office of the Secretary of Defense from keeping tabs on NRO funding. They said excess funding levels found in the NRO would not be found in DOD programs because the NRO was not ``subject to the annual [DOD] programming and budgeting `scrub'.'' Based on these rapid Department of Defense off the record denials in the press, everyone turned to the DCI and asked, ``Where were you?'' As it turns out Mr. President, there was no secret agreement between DOD and the DCI. In fact, there was no agreement, secret or otherwise. When asked to produce a copy of the supposed agreement, the Office of the Secretary of Defense provided the committee with a memo signed in the early 1980's. In it, the Secretary of Defense simply reminded his staff they could not add or take money away from the National Foreign Intelligence Program without officially coordinating it with the DCI. Further, at the committee's request, the DOD Inspector General looked at eight of DOD's hundreds of procurement programs to see if there were funding levels in excess of annual requirements such as those Congress found in the NRO. The results are quite enlightening. Despite DOD s earlier denials in the media, five of the eight randomly selected programs had more money available than they needed in 1996. On the average, these five programs had almost 3 months extra funding. In fact, one program had 10 months more funding available to it than it could use in 1996. So after only a superficial IG evaluation of several DOD programs and despite DOD's protestations and claims of budget scrubs, we know DOD ends up each year with more funds than they can spend. I do not say this in criticism of Defense managers, but rather to point to a characteristic common to complex multi-year efforts involving new technology, regardless of the Government department responsible for them. What may be a surprise is the answer to the question: where was the DCI when the National Reconnaissance Office was accumulating a backlog of spending authority? The answer is, the DCI has no authority over how the NRO spends its money after Congress authorizes and appropriates the funds. Having no direct authority to move money around or to determine if the money could be spent better elsewhere, it should not be a surprise the DCI was not monitoring NRO's execution of its budget. That authority rested with the Secretary of Defense. The Director of Central Intelligence does not have the authority to execute the intelligence budget. This has many serious consequences both from an internal executive branch oversight perspective and from an operational perspective. Budget execution authority has occupied a lot of the committee's attention. In the original version of the bill, the committee attempted to give the DCI greater authority over his own budget. In order to get the bill to this stage in the annual authorization process, however, we have dropped several provisions which would have ensured greater internal oversight of spending on intelligence. Nonetheless, the bill still gives the Director some insight into the Joint Military Intelligence Program, and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities--programs funded by the Department of Defense. While a modest improvement in aligning the DCI's authorities with his responsibilities, this new authority is important for ensuring better intelligence support of policy and for improving internal executive branch oversight of the Intelligence Community. The bill also has one other significant improvement for ensuring better oversight of intelligence. The committee is recommending the position of General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. As stated in its report, the committee believes the confirmation process enhances accountability and strengthens the oversight process. Currently, all elements of the intelligence community, except the CIA, are part of departments having statutory general counsels who are Senate confirmed. Many legal issues are unique to the CIA. Unlike the other Senate- confirmed general counsels, there is little informed public debate to aid the CIA's general counsel in its deliberations because the issues often involve sensitive intelligence sources or methods. The confirmation process allows the Senate to ensure better accountability and oversight of this important position. Finally, the bill enhances the Director of Central Intelligence's authorities by giving him a formal say in the naming of the directors of two of his most important agencies: the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office. Under current law and regulation, the Secretary of Defense could name the heads of these two intelligence community agencies without seeing if the DCI agrees with the nominations. I think it should be obvious to my colleagues what I meant when I called the DCI the Coordinator of Central Intelligence. Not only does the Director not have much direct control over his budget, he also does not even have a required formal role in the naming of the heads of the intelligence community's agencies. The bill takes a small step forward in giving him the opportunity to formally concur with an appointment made by the Secretary of Defense. Even under the bill's provisions, the Secretary of Defense has sufficient independence he could appoint the heads of the National Reconnaissance Office and the National Security Agency over the DCI's objection. I must add one thing in closing. During the intense discussions over the appropriate authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence, it became clear to some of us there is a basic misunderstanding of intelligence and its relationship to the Department of Defense. Mr. President, as I have said time and time again, intelligence supports policy. It also supports the planning and the operations of our military forces. The Secretary of Defense directly controls the intelligence assets to ensure that this essential function of intelligence will be fulfilled, and our troops will be properly supported. In addition, as a principal customer of the DCI and the most knowledgeable and articulate customer, the Secretary of Defense will correctly ensure that national intelligence fulfills military requirements. This is appropriate and everyone agrees it must occur without exception. But the Department of Defense is only one of many agencies that executes the foreign policy of the United States. And, historically, DOD is the last part of the executive branch the President relies upon when he executes U.S. policy overseas. We are a nation that believes military power is the court of last resort in resolving international disputes, not the first. This makes intelligence support to the warfighter the last step of intelligence support to foreign policy--not the first. Thus, as some push for more and more intelligence support to the warfighter, they in fact risk diminishing the creativity and quality of our foreign policy by forcing the intelligence community to become ``militarized.'' The intelligence community's scarce resources can only do so much and if they focus almost exclusively on the Department of Defense, the other elements of our Government will not have the benefit of their advice and support. This is dangerous for the effectiveness of our foreign policy and could eventually lead to an over-reliance on the Department of Defense to solve our foreign policy problems simply because the best information we have on a foreign policy problem is focused on how to solve it with military force. Intelligence support outside of the Department of Defense is important, and it is critical to the proper functioning of the Government. The Congress must remain vigilant to make sure we do not cripple intelligence by relying too heavily on uninformed criticisms of intelligence support to the warfighter.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Do you want to set it aside and go to the Biden amendment?

Mr. KERREY. Does the Senator wish to request the yeas and nays?

Mr. KERREY. Will the Senator yield for a moment so I can inform colleagues, once again, the objection was offered for the purpose of allowing Senators to come over to offer a perfecting amendment on the Biden amendment. We have 2 hours and 5 minutes. Otherwise, we get votes tomorrow.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the Kohl amendment vote begin at 7:20, immediately followed by the rollcall vote on the Biden amendment.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I know the Senator from Florida is here to offer an amendment. I wonder if he can tell me how much time he has, because what I would like to do is propound a unanimous-consent request. We have two amendments up here that are waiting for votes. We are waiting for Members to come down and speak. In one case, it was an hour ago they were on the way down here. I would like to propound a unanimous-consent request that we proceed to a vote on the Kohl amendment, a 15-minute rollcall vote on the Kohl amendment, immediately followed thereafter by a 15-minute vote on the Biden amendment. How long did the Senator want to speak?

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. KERREY. Sometimes brevity is the best thing to do. I must say initially perhaps it is pride of authorship; when you put a bill together yourself, you think nobody can make an improvement upon it. I have had a lot of experience with it, and especially in the Midwest we have a very serious methamphetamine problem in Nebraska. I just checked with the chairman's staff person on this, and I believe we would be prepared to accept this amendment.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, to underscore again, we had an amendment earlier that Senator Kohl brought down. We were ready to vote on it. A Member somewhere--Lord knows where they are --said, no, we want to come down and speak against it. They still are not here. We would have accepted this amendment that Senator Biden just offered. We have a rollcall vote. I have a couple Members who want to speak against. They are not here. It is quarter to 7. It is one thing to say I want a chance to offer an amendment but if, for gosh sakes, all you want to do is speak on the amendment, put a statement in. Let us go to a vote. Do not tie this thing up forever just because you want to come and make a statement. If you are not prepared to come down to the floor to talk, then put in a written statement. I will put a written statement in for you, speak passionately for you, whatever it takes, but let us get to these votes.

Mr. KERREY. Would the Senator like to have the yeas and nays?

Mr. KERREY. Are you going to need a second amendment?

Mr. KERREY. Apparently there is some Republican on this side of the aisle that has a problem. We are talking about the Rohypnol amendment?

Mr. KERREY. We have just been notified by the majority leader that it is his intention to file and say no more votes past 9 o'clock, which means we would have, unless we are able to finish this bill up tonight by 9, votes on Friday.

Mr. KERREY. Will the Senator yield for just a moment?

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, this is a very good amendment, a change in the law that is needed as a consequence of the Supreme Court decision. I support the amendment fully. If the Senator wants to request the yeas and nays we can move immediately to a rollcall vote.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I urge Senators who would like to get out of here tomorrow to get to the floor and offer their amendments. There are no more than seven or eight amendments on either side. We have worked this down to a relatively small amount, and now all we are doing is waiting. There are a number of Senators who would like to have rollcall votes. It takes time to have rollcall votes. We have been working as diligently as we can. I want nobody to be surprised when it comes to 2 or 3 o'clock in the morning around here, if we wait until 7, 8, 9 o'clock before somebody comes down and offers amendments. This is an age-old problem, and we are heading to a very predictable point here. We have done about all we can from the floor. Now we have to have Members come down and offer their amendments.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. KERREY. I certainly support the amendment. We are waiting for Senator Stevens' view on this amendment. Both he and the chairman are right now at a defense appropriations conference committee. They should be back momentarily. Once they are back, we should be able to wrap this up and get a vote.