J. Kerrey

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. But I say to the Senator, the question directly is, Do you think Congress should have passed a similar restriction on President Bush so he could not have done what he did in 1991?

Mr. KERREY. I yield the floor to you.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, if I could make a comment on that subject, very much a part of this effort to try to find a compromise on this memorial, in the beginning I opposed the design and they redesigned it. I am very pleased now to be able to support both the design and construction. One of the things, I say to my friend from Virginia, that happened during this process was that there was a deletion made from this design that I think at some point needs to be corrected --not on this site because its too small a site to accommodate it--and that is the construction of a museum that tells the full story. And I think it has relevance, in fact, to the debate on this bill because when George Marshall accepted Roosevelt's appointment to be Chief of Staff of the Army on September 1, 1939, the Armed Forces of the United States of America were approximately 137,000 people. Marshall had to build the Army to 8 million people in order for it to be an effective fighting force, and it wasn't just the military people who responded. There was a huge civilian effort that supported that buildup. It is a story of how dangerous it is, even though you may not see an enemy on the horizon at the moment, how dangerous it is to stack arms for the United States of America. We had a resolution a couple of years ago, I think, on this bill to try to allocate the resources and do the study to build. There were a number of terrific places in the Senator's State right across the river that were cited. I believe this will be a wonderful memorial, but the missing piece is to tell the full story of what happened from Versailles all the way through the Second World War. There was basically an interruption for 20 years while America tried to withdraw one more time from the world. We paid a terrible price for it. I appreciate very much the Senator's willingness to allocate the money for this.

Mr. KERREY. I know that site fairly well. I think it would be a terrific site for history of the Armed Forces, but I also believe oftentimes the most important decisions aren't the decisions the military is making but that the civilians made prior to the military having to act, at least as I see the history. In the Second World War, there were an awful lot of mistakes made in the 1920s and the 1930s that created the necessity for that terrible war. It is a very important reminder, especially today. It is something I am asked all the time when debating authorization for the military. People say: Do we need it? Who is the enemy? We are spending more than 20 leading nations, et cetera, et cetera. People say: Why do we need to continue to do this? The cold war is over, and so forth. The best answer lies in that 20-year period between 1919 and 1939 during which the United States of America tried, in the face of all evidence to the contrary, to stack arms and withdraw and become isolationist. We have talked long enough on that subject. I appreciate very much the Senator responding to former Senator Dole's request. This is the minimum that the people of the United States of America ought to do to participate in constructing this important memorial.

Mr. KERREY. The junior Senator from Virginia and I actually sponsored legislation earlier. We have been trying to support what it is you are trying to do with this Armed Forces memorial that will tell the story of the Armed Forces of the United States of America.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, the amendment before the Senate now presents to Members of the Senate a series of questions that we have to answer. The first is, Should the Congress, under any circumstances, impose a limitation on the Commander in Chief? As it says, the Commander in Chief can't go below a certain level of strategic nuclear weapons. We imposed this for the first time in 1998. One of the strongest arguments made in 1998 and 1999 was that we needed that in order to put pressure on the Duma to ratify START II. They have now ratified START II. I think it is unwise to impose a limitation. Whether the President is a Democrat, whether the President is a Republican, I think it limits that President's ability to be able to negotiate. As a consequence, it puts the President in a weaker position when he is talking, whether to Russia or other nations--it puts that President in a weaker position and gives him less maneuverability to be able to protect the people of the United States. If we don't like the action a President takes, the Congress can intervene to act. That is question No. 1. Do you think, under any circumstances that you can describe, we ought to pass a law that says a President cannot go below a certain level? In this case, the START I level is not only 6,000 warheads, but as the Senator from Arizona indicated earlier, we describe in the law the precise platform delivery systems for the warheads.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, first, Congress should be making a decision based upon what we think is right. We oftentimes pass defense authorization bills that have things the President doesn't like. My guess is that the Senator from Virginia has urged the President on many occasions: I understand, Mr. President, you don't like this particular provision, but I urge you to sign it anyway. There are many other good things in the bill. Mr. President, we hope you will sign it because we can't get it any better. That happens all the time here. So the fact that the President signed it does not mean the President concurs. Nor should it cause a Senator to say, just because the President signed it, that doesn't mean it is a good act. We disagree with the President all the time around here. We will get behind him when we like what he is doing, and we will get out in front of him when we do not like what he is doing. That is the appropriate way, I suspect, it ought to be done. Members of the Senate should be deciding: Do we think it is a wise thing? Do we want to restrict future President Bush or future President Gore? It is not accidental that was imposed in 1996. It has not been imposed on previous Presidents. It has been imposed only on this particular President. So whether the President signs the bill or not, in my view, is secondary to the question: Do you think it is a sound policy? In a post-cold-war era where we have had three Presidential elections in Russia--and understand, the bulk of our strategic weapons system is for Russia. That is the bulk of our system. What would the Senator say, 75 percent or 80 percent of the SIOP is dealing with the democratic nation of Russia with whom we have relations, with whom we are trying to work to help to be successful in their democratic experiment and their experiment with free markets? The question is, Does it restrict the President and make it less likely he can begin to think in a new way--which, in my judgment, needs to occur? So, regardless, whether the President signs it or not, my guess is the President does not support this provision. But even if he said, ``I support it,'' I would still oppose it. I still think it is unreasonable for Congress to do. So that is question No. 1 that you have to decide. Whether the President signs it or not is secondary. My guess is a lot of folks on that side of the aisle think the President signs a lot of things they wish he would not sign, things they voted against. So it is not, to me, a very compelling argument to say we have to do this because the President signed five previous bills that had this provision in them.

Mr. KERREY. I appreciate that response. I made it clear in questions yesterday posed to the Senator from Virginia and the Senator from Colorado having to do with the issue of whether or not this action could be taken prior to December of 1991, whether or not an accelerated comprehensive review could occur if it was a President Bush or a President Gore. The answer was yes, leading me to say in that situation maybe I would support the amendment because if they can do an accelerated review, so can President Clinton. The answer then came back: No, we do not want President Clinton to do an accelerated view. We are willing to let President Gore or President Bush do it but not President Clinton. That is precisely why it is a bad provision because I believe it is there because of distrust of a single President. It is not wise, in my judgment, for the Congress to impose that kind of restriction because it does send a signal to our allies not to negotiate. It makes it much more difficult for the President to negotiate not only arms control agreements but to take action as President Bush did in 1991 facing a problem of how do we leapfrog the arms control process. I heard my colleagues on the other side say the old arms control process needs to be torn up. That is not inconsistent with this kind of thinking. That is exactly what Governor Bush said in his press club speech surrounded by Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Brent Scowcroft, and Colin Powell. If those four men were part of that new administration and they came out and said we need a review in November, December, and January and we think we can go to lower levels and we want to go immediately, we can get Russia to agree to a robust missile defense, my guess is every single Member of the other side would go along with it immediately, understanding these men are qualified and they understand what is necessary to protect the United States of America. They do not need another review, and they certainly do not need Congress imposing a limitation on where they can go. This is a limitation that has been imposed on a single President. If it becomes policy for Congress to do it, I believe it is going to be very difficult for us to take advantage of this new post-cold-war opportunity, as the other side has done repeatedly. There are times when the President submits a budget for defense and they say it is not enough. They do not say we need a review of this for another 3 or 4 months or a long period of time. They say we have done a review; we are not ready so we have to put more money in the budget, we have to put more weapons systems in the budget that were not in the President's request. We do not have any difficulty confronting the President. We do not ask for reviews when the President is not asking us to do something we want. This is, in my judgment, a provision that was put in here as a consequence of not trusting a particular President, and it is a mistake. It is going to hamstring the next President, whoever that President is. This amendment attempts to soften it a bit, but it still leaves it in place. Senator Kyl, I understand, was speaking for how they now interpret the amendment, saying, no, the review has to be submitted concurrently with a quadrennial review whenever that occurs. Maybe it is not in December 2001. Maybe it is done in January 2002. What if you have a President Bush coming online with Secretary of Defense Colin Powell and George Shultz and Brent Scowcroft and Henry Kissinger as part of that administration, and they do a review in November and December and come to you and say: We decided we want to go to 5,000 in exchange for an agreement; is that sufficient?

Mr. KERREY. I am not implying a political motivation. I am rereading your answers to my questions yesterday. I saw reason I would support this amendment, and the reason I could have supported the amendment is, if you had said to me, yes, a thoughtful and thorough review can be done by civilians in less time than done by a quadrennial review that would allow President Bush or President Gore, and the answer was that would be acceptable. I then said: What if Clinton did the same thing? The answer was no. I am reading back and remembering what the exchange was yesterday.

Mr. KERREY. I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. KERREY. I have enjoyed the debate very much. I wish there was more opportunity to examine the subject. I ask unanimous consent to have two documents printed in the Record.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, in 1968 I had the good fortune, or misfortune, to be given the chance to go down to Fort Benning and go through Army Ranger School. We had a little joke that was keying in on a line from a John Wayne movie. We looked out in the darkness and said: It sure is quiet out there. Somebody else would come back with a punchline: Too quiet. That is precisely my instinct when it comes to strategic nuclear weapons. There is a real danger. For some reason, we understand the danger if it is North Korea maybe getting nuclear weapons or Iraq maybe getting nuclear weapons or Iran maybe getting nuclear weapons. Russia has 7,000 strategic nuclear weapons and 12,000 tactical. These are not inaccurate, unreliable systems. These are very accurate, reliable, and deadly systems. They have more than they need, and we have more than we need. Instead of pressing the President to go to lower levels, the current language of law and this amendment says we want further delay; we want to push the President in the opposite direction. We are pushing this President in the wrong way. We should be pushing the President to go to lower levels because it keeps America safe if we do. Why does it keep America safe? Not only is it sort of odd to be negotiating with Putin on all sorts of things at the same time that we have 160 nuclear weapons aimed at Russian leadership, but in addition, the Russian economy simply doesn't generate enough income to enable them to be able to sustain the investments necessary to control their community system and most importantly, their warning system. So what happens? We are pushing the President to go slow, we are asking for more studies. Mr. President, we don't need more studies. We can make this debate about more and more studies, but for gosh sakes, this is one subject on which we don't need more studies. This has been examined up one side and down the other. We have studies coming out the wazoo. We need decisions. Looking at the current situation, one can reach no other conclusion than that we are requiring the Russians, as a consequence of current law, to maintain a level beyond what they can safely control, increasing the risk far beyond the risk of rogue nations such as Iraq or Iran or North Korea, far beyond that. If there is an accidental or unauthorized launch that occurs as a consequence of a mistake made because of a warning failure, they are not going to send a couple. It will be a couple hundred or a couple thousand. I smell danger. I am glad we have had this debate, but we are pushing the President in the wrong direction both with the amendment of the Senator from Virginia and the existing law. I hope that enough colleagues on the other side of the aisle have listened to this debate and will vote against the Warner amendment. I believe quite seriously that it increases the risk to the people of the United States of America.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, with great respect to the Senator from Virginia, both the underlying law and his amendment push the President in the wrong direction. Both Russia and the United States have more nuclear weapons than we need. This has been studied to death. There are plenty of studies, plenty of reviews, plenty of evaluation. Gov. George W. Bush, with Henry Kissinger, with George Shultz, with Brent Scowcroft, and with Colin Powell, has it right. It requires new thinking. We will not only be pushing President Clinton in the wrong direction, but if Governor Bush wins, we push him in the wrong direction. We are forcing the Russians to maintain nuclear weapons in excess of what they can control. As a consequence, we are increasing the risk, threat, and danger to the people of the United States of America. I urge my colleagues, in as strong a language as possible, to vote against the Warner amendment.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. The Senator's answer is yes, for a new President. He could do it as long as he is satisfied with the definition of ``careful review.'' He could do it prior to December of 2001. According to this amendment, it has to be submitted by 2001. So a careful review could be done before December 2001. I am trying to get the Senator to talk me into voting for his amendment. That is what I am attempting to do here. If the answer is yes, as it appears to be, you may not want President Clinton to make the decision. By the way, I think it is unlikely that he will. He hasn't thus far. I just think it would not be a good thing for us to say that we are going to put a restriction on this President that we are not going to put on the President-elect, whoever that happens to be.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. KERREY. If that is the case, if it does not restrict the next President, it does not restrict this President. He could also do it. I have had a briefing on the review that was done in 1997, prior to the Helsinki meeting between President Clinton and President Yeltsin. That was a detailed review on the minimal deterrent level necessary, done by General Shalikashvili. I believe the chairman has had a briefing of that as well. That was a pretty indepth review, was it not? Do you regard that as a good review?

Mr. KERREY. I presume General Shalikashvili, in 1997, made that review.

Mr. KERREY. I would be very surprised, if the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 1997, reviewing the minimal deterrent level, did not reference that minimal deterrent level to the rest of the conventional forces. This is a conventional Army officer who is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. My guess is that was a pretty detailed review. In fact, he came to the conclusion at that time that 2,500 is the minimal level that is necessary.

Mr. KERREY. Let me get this correctly. So the intent of this amendment is to prevent President Clinton from making any decision and to----

Mr. KERREY. Section 1302 of the Defense Authorization Act.

Mr. KERREY. Staff is searching, trying to get an answer. I do have it.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise today to pay tribute to a life of service devoted to defending the values and ideals of our nation. On July 1, 2000 the country will lose to retirement its Deputy Commander in Chief of the United States Strategic Command, Lieutenant General Phillip J. Ford, USAF. Through his leadership, General Ford has taken the United States and U.S. Strategic Command into a new world environment. During his career, his guidance and foresight helped see the U.S. Military into the new millennium. Throughout a career that spans four decades, General Ford has commanded the 8th Air Force, the 384th Bomb Wing, and the 524th Bomb Squadron. As commander of the 384th at McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas, he transformed and entire installation to bring in and support a new B-1 bomber wing. General Ford has also served as commandant of the Air Command and Staff College and held key staff positions at the Headquarters of the U.S. Air Force, Military Airlift Command, Air Mobility Command and Strategic Air Command. As the nation's top bomber commander supporting the United States Central Command, General Ford directed an unprecedented global power strike against Iraq during Operation DESERT FOX. Despite tactical and weapon system limitations, his bombers succeeded in retargeting their air launched cruise missiles while airborne and en route to their targets. His forces delivered their weapons on time and on target, guaranteeing mission success. As Deputy Commander in Chief of the United States Strategic Command, and as a strong proponent of an enduring, stable, strategic relationship with Russia, General Ford championed the Defense Department's cooperative threat reduction activities, to include military-to-military contacts. General Ford's historic military-to- military exchanges with senior Russian nuclear commanders built a legacy of respect, mutual understanding and cooperation. The general's insight in planning and evaluating the command's communication capabilities assured the nation that the communication between the President, Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs and men and women at the helm of ballistic missile submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear bombers remained intact despite Y2K concerns. His efforts will have an enduring, positive impact on strategic stability for many years to come. Lieutenant General Ford and his wife, Kris leave the military after a distinguished 34 year career serving their nation. The people of the United States salute General Ford and Mrs. Ford and wish them well as they begin a new chapter of their lives after military service.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. That is correct, unless the chairman is going to accept the amendment.

Mr. KERREY. Perhaps we can avoid the vote after he hears my argument. I am prepared to send an amendment to the desk and schedule a vote on it this evening. That is fine. I am ready to go as soon as we vote on the McCain amendment.