J. Kerrey

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Supporters of this amendment are winning converts. Each election cycle seems to bring them closer to the 67 votes they need to send this 17-word amendment to the States for their ratification. And 49 legislatures have already indicated they would ratify this amendment if Congress were to take this action. Mr. President, these 17 words would make it constitutional for Congress to pass a law giving the government the power to prohibit the physical desecration of the flag of the United States of America. Let me say at the beginning that I have deep respect for those who have views that are different from mine. The Senator from California spoke very eloquently in favor of this amendment. I have heard the distinguished Senator from Utah, indeed, submit a personal appeal for me to reconsider my views on this issue. I have a great deal of respect for the purpose of this amendment. I especially pay tribute to the U.S. American Legion. These patriots have done more than any others to help young Americans understand that freedom is not free. I have had the honor, through 16 years of public service, to experience what the American Legion and other service organizations have done, but especially the American Legion and the Girl's State and Boy's State organizations, taking on the people who do not understand the history and the story of the United States of America. They teach them that story, that history, and they teach them to require the respect necessary to be a good citizen. It is the value they add to our community that is immeasurable. I have listened with an open mind to their appeals that I support this amendment. Regretfully and respectfully, I must say no. I fear the unintended consequence of these 17 words and the laws that may be enacted later will be far worse than the consequences of us witnessing the occasional and shocking and disgusting desecration of this great symbol of liberty and freedom. Mr. President, real patriotism cannot be coerced. It must be a voluntary, unselfish, brave act to sacrifice for others. When Americans feel coercion, especially from their Government, they tend to rebel. So none of us should be surprised if one unintended consequence of the laws that prohibit unpopular activity such as this is an actual increase in the incidence of flag desecration. Another unintended consequence of this amendment will be the diversion of police resources from efforts to protect us from dangerous crime. Nobody should underestimate that this fact will happen. The efforts to protect us from those who desecrate the flag will require the training of police officers on when and where to respond to complaints. Mr. President, we pass the laws, but others must implement and enforce them. They will receive complaints about neighbors and friends or people who desecrate the flag. The police will have to respond to every one of them. These laws will give the power of the Government to local law enforcement agencies to decide when some individual is desecrating the flag. There are 45 words in the first amendment and this amendment protects the rights of citizens to speak, to assemble, to practice their religious beliefs, to publish their opinions and petition their Government for redress of grievance. The 17 words that are in this proposed 28th amendment would limit what the majority of Americans believe is distasteful and offensive speech. Though this seems very reasonable because most Americans do not approve of flag desecration, it is only reasonable if we forget that it is the right to speak the unpopular and objectionable that needs the most protecting by our Government. In this era of political correctness, when the fear of 30 second ads has homogenized and sterilized our language of any distasteful truths, this amendment takes us in the opposite direction of that envisioned by our Founding Fathers whose words and deeds bravely challenged the status quo. Last year when I testified about this before the Judiciary Committee, I took the liberty of buying an American flag and gave it to the committee. I bought that flag because every time I look at it, it reminds me that patriotism and the cause of freedom produces widows. Widows who hold the flag to their bosom as if it were the live body of their loved-one. The flag says more about what it means to be an American than a thousand words spoken by me. Current law protects the flag. If anyone chooses to desecrate my flag--and survives my vengeful wrath--they will face prosecution by our Government. Such acts of malicious vandalism are prohibited by law. The law also protects me and allows me to give a speech born of my anger and anguish in which I send this flag aflame. Do we really want to pass a law making it a crime for a citizen despondent over a war, or abortion, or something else they see going on in their country to give a speech born of their anger? Do we really want a law that says the police will go out and arrest them and put them in jail? I hope not. Patriotism calls upon us to be brave enough to endure and withstand such an act--to tolerate the intolerable. I sincerely and respectfully thank all of those who hold views different from mine for their patriotism. I will pray this amendment does not pass. But I thank God for the love of country exhibited by those who do. Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise today to honor Dr. Ernest M. Burgess, a man who has dedicated his life to cleansing sickness from the lives of countless people. When my grandchildren study the events that shaped the development of the twentieth century, the American Century as some call it, they will be learning of the life of Dr. Burgess. I often speak of the admirable sacrifices and tremendous foresight of this generation of Americans: a generation who, more than any before it, left an indelible imprint on the course of human history. Dr. Burgess, like thousands of his contemporaries, was an ordinary citizen who lived an extraordinary life of service and accomplishment. Born eleven years into the new century, Ernie was raised in the character of the rural American West. Influenced by a remarkable aunt who practiced medicine at a time when most women couldn't vote, he became attracted to serving and caring for the sick. Upon completion of his medical degree and residency at Columbia and Cornell Universities, Dr. Burgess served his country in the U.S. Army from 1943 to 1946. Mr. President, one of the bitterest effects of war visits those who suffer debilitating wounds and then live a life forever altered. As an orthopedic surgeon involved in ground breaking advancements in prosthetic surgery, Dr. Burgess has allowed thousands of amputees the opportunity to return to activities unimaginable at the time of the injury. He is a pioneer in the field of prosthetic research and responsible for the establishment of Prosthetics Research Study (PRS), which is one of the leading centers in the world for post-operative care. Through a career that spans six decades, Dr. Burgess has used his medical gifts to improve the health of his fellow humans. As a veteran and amputee, I live with the daily reminder of the costs of war. Because of the work of Dr. Burgess, I and thousands of veterans have a more powerful reminder of our service: one where our lives are complete and rewarding. Through his work with the Prosthetic Research Study, Dr. Burgess pioneered new surgical techniques that allow amputees to move with more comfort and mobility. The development of lightweight and responsive materials have permitted thousands of amputees the freedom to participate in physical activities from skiing to basketball. On a personal note, my passion for running and my ability to ski and play golf and walk these halls could not be a reality without the advances spearheaded by the PRS and Dr. Burgess. Throughout his career, Dr. Burgess has continued to be at the forefront of improving prosthetic techniques. A teacher and author of surgical and rehabilitation texts, he tirelessly emphasizes constructive surgery for amputees. As he often states, ``the way the surgery is performed will affect the rest of his life.'' Dr. Burgess takes this philosophy to heart and I admire his continued pursuit of improving medical care. The effects of war are inflicted mainly on the innocent and young. After American participation in Vietnam ended we slowly realized the breadth of the war's destruction on so many Vietnamese. The existence of thousands of injured civilians highlighted the larger world problem of poor medical treatment in many parts of the world--parts that are also the most war-torn. In 1988, at the prompting of United States Vietnam Veterans who had visited Vietnam, Dr. Burgess and others worked to establish the Prosthetics Outreach Center (POC). This clinic has provided thousands of Vietnamese with free limbs and allowed them to rediscover the completeness of their lives. Mr. President, as the men and women of America's greatest generation, enter a new century, I remain in awe of their continuing achievements. The remarkable career of Dr. Burgess epitomizes the commitment to improving peoples lives through dedicated effort. I am proud to be able to submit this Resolution recognizing a great man and paying tribute to his attainments and his goals. Thank you, Dr. Burgess, and I know my colleagues join me in recognition of your accomplishments.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I yield such time as necessary for this presentation.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, last week, in the middle of a 10-day trip to Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel, I read a story in the International Herald Tribune about a discovery made by a joint Chinese- United States paleontology team in China. The team found 45-million- year-old fossil remnants of an animal the size of a thumb they believe is a key evolutionary link between pre-simian mammals and human beings. From an analysis of the fossils, the team speculated that the animal met an unfortunate fate: He became the regurgitated meal of a hungry owl. Misery loves company and there are times in the Middle East when one feels like that unfortunate animal trying to figure out and understand what our policy ought to be to pursue peace in that turbulent, difficult region. In the Middle East the search for peace can seem as slow to develop and the politics can be as brutal as the rules of natural selection where survival is the most important virtue. For most of the modern era survival in the Middle East has been defined in military terms. However, because the Middle East is not immune from the competitive demands of the global economy, increasingly survival's definition has been modified with economic strategies and analysis. That is among the most important reasons for improved chances of peace between Israel and Syria. To that end President Clinton's decision to fly to Geneva, Switzerland to meet with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad is a very hopeful sign. The President has a high degree of respect from both President Assad and Israeli Prime Minister Barak. As such, he may be able to convince Mr. Assad to make some gesture to the Israeli people which will make possible the eventual surrender of the all-important Golan Heights. The Golan Heights were captured from Syria on June 10, 1967, at the end of the Six Day War, and have been a part of Israel for 33 years; no Israeli leader can surrender this land unless legitimate security concerns are thoroughly satisfied. If the President's discussions with President Assad do help produce a peace agreement between Israel and Syria, it will add momentum to the successful completion of final status talks between Israel and the Palestinians. It will decrease the potential for tragedy in southern Lebanon following Israel's unilateral withdrawal by July 1. And finally, it will increase the chances that Lebanon could become more independent from Syria. Syria's 15 million people are facing a very uncertain future. This uncertainty begins with the nature of their government--a dictatorship with President Assad in absolute control. Mr. Assad has held power since 1970 and has tried to give the impression of popular support with coerced referendums; in 1991 he received a ``vote of confidence'' from 99.9 percent of Syrians. However, Mr. Assad's age and health make it likely that power will be transferred in the next few years. The current leading candidate is the President's son, Bashar, a thirty year old ophthalmologist. Peace with Israel would make it much more likely that President Assad's son would survive in power. A peace agreement would mean normalized relations with Israel and an end to Syria's support of terrorism. It would make it more likely that badly needed investment would enter the country and it would allow Syria to divert much needed resources from defense into health and education. The resulting economic growth would bring new-found opportunities to the Syrian people though not nearly as great as the opportunities they would have if they would begin a transition away from a dictatorship to democracy. From the Israeli point of view, a peace agreement with Syria would bring benefits that could lead to solving regional economic problems as well as contributing to a more favorable agreement with the Palestinians. Peace would mean that all three nations--Jordan, Egypt and Syria--with whom Israel has fought three wars would recognize Israel's right to exist as an independent nation. In theory it would seem like peace is possible, but the Middle East is a place where life is always standing theory on its head. Not only is a U.S. Presidential election coming to a theater near all of us in 8 months, but the political scene in both Syria--a dictatorship with transition difficulties--and Israel--a democracy divided into smaller and less effective political groups than at an time in its 50-year history--makes it most likely that defeat will once more be snatched from the jaws of victory. I would say the chances of success are comparable to making a three- ball pool shot on a pool table littered with debris. However, given the benefits of peace it is a shot work taking. The benefits for the United States of an agreement between Israel and Syria are considerable. They include: Improved security for Israel, our closest ally in the region; Increased openness and opportunity for regional cooperation since Israel would then have peace agreements with Syria, Jordan, and Egypt; Decreased threat of terrorism directed at Israel or the United States; Increased chances that Lebanon can become a fully independent and democratic nation; and, Greatly decreased threat of catastrophic use of weapons of mass destruction in this fragile region. The benefits to the United States must be quickly understood by Congress because when an agreement is reached, there is no doubt that the United States will be asked to spend money in order to give both sides the confidence that peace will make them more secure. The figure of $17 billion over a 10-year period has been raised in the press, specifically directed at funding means to give Israel the security which it currently enjoys from being present on the Golan Heights. The dollar costs are important, but I would like to focus less on the amounts than on what will be needed to make an agreement successful. First, Israel needs the assurance of early warning. It needs to be warned about potential missile attacks--or other use of weapons of mass destruction--so it can deter or intercept such attacks. It needs to be warned of potential ground attacks so it has time to mobilize its ground defenses. Without the assurance of early warning, the Israeli people will not feel secure. To emphasize, Israel is a real democracy. They do not have a dictator making the decision. The people have to feel secure in order for a peace agreement to work. Without real security, the Israeli people, quite rightly, will not support any peace agreement. In my view, monitoring from the high ground overlooking the Golan Heights is essential to achieving any agreement and to maintaining Israel's security. A largely automated equipment set should suffice, but if personnel are required on site, I think American contractors, not soldiers, can and should do the job. Operating on an isolated mountainside, they would be in more danger than are our peacekeepers in the Sinai Multilateral Force of Observers. This is an appropriate task for us. Another potential cost, and one that is rarely mentioned, is economic assistance to Syria. The poverty and lack of economic dynamism in Syria is the fault of the Syrian regime, whose mania for control has largely smothered the entrepreneurial instinct of Syria's talented people. And, unsurprisingly in a regime which has ruled unchallenged for 30 years, there is corruption. But if Syria will agree to a timetable of economic opening and a transition to democracy, U.S. economic aid for Syria would be appropriate. Syrians need to see a peace dividend. Given the business skills and ambition of Syrians, I expect a free-market, democratic Syria to move up quickly in global economic standings and to be a partner with Israel in trade as well as in security arrangements. Lebanon poses perhaps the biggest challenge to a comprehensive peace. If Lebanon is to play a positive role in the peace process, and if Lebanon is to become independent of Syrian domination, many Lebanese are going to have to act with both courage and generosity. As Israel withdraws from southern Lebanon, Lebanese leaders should send their own rebuilt and united army to the south to disarm Hezbollah and the South Lebanese Army and to prevent future attacks on Israel. Lebanon should do this even if Syria objects. It is Lebanon's duty to be sovereign in all its territory, and to prevent attacks on other countries that emanate from Lebanese territory. I am sympathetic to all Lebanon has undergone over the past 25 years, but I am describing only the minimal duties of an independent state. Occupying the south will take courage. Two other big problems--the future of the South Army and the future of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon--will require generosity. The Lebanese Army should integrate the SLA fighters into its own ranks and make them welcome. It should similarly integrate those Hezbollah combatants who request it. Regarding the Palestinians, some of whom have resided in camps in Lebanon since 1948, Lebanon should likewise be generous. Those Palestinians who request it should be accorded citizenship and Lebanon should make a special effort to integrate them fully into its national life. It seems presumptuous of me to advise a country which fought a long civil war over just such issues to now take bold action to integrate its marginalized groups. But if Lebanon fails to do so it will be neither peaceful nor independent, and its weakness will lessen the chances of peace in the region. Let us suppose that this extraordinary long shot works, that all three balls go in their respective holes, and that Israel, Syria, and Lebanon, with American help, make a real peace. There will still be dangers emanating from the Middle East. The weapons of mass destruction now in the arsenals of Iran and Iraq, and the weapons those two states are still developing, present a lethal danger. The Iranian regime seems more rational and more amendable to democratic change than does Saddam's regime in Baghdad, but there won't be true security in the region until Iran and Iraq are free-market democracies and are fully integrated into the family of nations. Furthermore, looming overall these security challenges is the biggest problem of the Middle East: The lack of water. Water is not a respecter of political boundaries; water shortages can only be solved on a regional basis, and if they are not solved diplomatically these shortages will be a longstanding source of military conflict. Despite all of these challenges, it is still worthwhile for us to maintain our patience for peace. The peace we are helping build today will have enormous benefits. Perhaps the greatest benefit is that the burden of fear which overhangs the whole region will be lifted. I am thinking of the fear of a mother whose son has been drafted, the fear of a child in a bomb shelter, the fear that large crowds at a market or sports event might attract a terrorist bomb, the fear with which a family fits and adjust their gas masks, the fear of war that keeps investors away, the fear of the unknown alien race that lives in very similar circumstances just 30 miles away. As many of my colleagues know, the people who deal with these fears are wonderful people. They are our friends, our actual relatives in many cases. For many of us they are our spiritual cousins as well, they are at home in a region many of us call holy, and they have lived with fear for too long. That is why one of our Government's noblest efforts right now is the effort to help the pragmatism, good sense, and good will of the region's leaders bring peace to the Middle East. Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I thank Chairman Lugar. He has done great work in allowing the process to come forward and allowing suggestions on how to improve crop insurance and make it more responsible. There has been some abuse of the program. Senator Roberts talked about it, and he has been a champion on that problem. We don't want a program that encourages people to farm for insurance rather than actually produce a crop. His suggestion to produce a program that gives people a variety of options that includes crop insurance, I think, is an improvement in the risk management offering to provide the farms and ranchers in the United States of America. I also thank Senator Leahy. I understand he spoke yesterday. In the Northeast, although there is only 2 percent of the farm land and 6 percent of the dollar value of crops produced on an annual basis, it is still important. There are farms in New Hampshire, Vermont, upstate New York, and New Jersey. They are concerned; they have expressed those concerns. We have taken their concerns into account. The House bill does not, I should point out to those from the Northeast. We have accommodated those concerns, unlike the House. You will see it if you look at the language of the legislation. I thank Senator Roberts. It has been fun working with him. I think we have produced a piece of legislation that will provide producers with what they have been asking for, at least in Nebraska--the most important. We have been blessed in the United States with a successful agriculture strategy over the last 100 years. But it has lulled us to sleep in many ways. We are hoping to get an agreement on the bill. I ask my colleagues to take this opportunity to discuss agriculture in general. There are so many misconceptions about agriculture. It is seen as sort of an old policy. Agriculture is oftentimes seen as a special interest when, in fact, out of an $8 trillion economy, agriculture still accounts for a trillion dollars of that. Nearly 1 out of 8 jobs--almost 20 million jobs--in the United States are there as a consequence of the food and fiber grown on the farms and ranches of the United States of America. It is quite a remarkable success story. We take it for granted too often. In this morning's New York Times there is an article by an economist by the name of Paul Krugman, talking about an issue that is quite hot: genetically modified organisms. Mr. Krugman, quite accurately, said that many of the opponents of GMOs are people who don't understand that it is the application of technology that has not only made our food better but made it affordable and relatively easy to acquire. It is almost nothing if you want to order the food that you can't get in relatively short order as a consequence not just of the way we produce food, but the way we distribute it, transport it, store it, and the way we process it. It is quite a remarkable success story and still accounts--even with declining sales internationally--for the most impressive part of our trade story. In fact, about the only good news right now in the trade story is we still have a slight surplus with agricultural exports. We tend as a consequence to take agriculture for granted and sort of see it as a marginal part of the economic debate. Agricultural policy should be front and central to any economic strategy. Producing a trillion dollars in output and producing 20 million jobs is obviously significant to those of us who have portions of our economy dependent upon agriculture in our States, and it is obvious to us that it is a part of the new economy. The Senator from Indiana can talk eloquently about it because he still has an active farm. But you don't achieve success on a farm today without applying a significant amount of technology, without being a part of the new economy, without using computers, without being able to know exactly what your costs are, and without being able to know how to market and where the market is. There is almost nothing that is taken for granted today when it comes to production agriculture. So it ought to be a central part of our economic strategy. I know we attempted not just to accommodate but to take into account the concerns of States that don't have as much agriculture but are still important, such as the Northeast, where, as I said, it is only 2 percent of the agricultural land in production and 6 percent of the total dollar output; it is still important for a lot of reasons, both economic and social. As we try to figure out our economic strategy, it ought not to end up on some shopping list down there with a list of 30 or 40 things that people want to get done. The unfortunate part of agriculture is that there is considerably more risk. That is what this legislation does. I want to talk about that risk because I get asked about this in urban environments in Nebraska, such as Omaha, Lincoln, Hastings, or some other smaller communities. Oftentimes, they say: Why do we have a special program? Why do we do crop insurance at all? Why do we have a Government-private sector partnership to help farmers manage risk? What makes them special or different than us? There is an answer that may not be readily apparent, although it is quite obvious to those of us who are from States where there is an awful lot of production agriculture. The answer is, unlike all other manufacturing businesses, agriculture is at risk to the weather. I am in business. I have restaurants and health clubs. In 1975, on the 6th of May, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, a tornado came up out of the Northwest. We had been in business a little over 2 years. The tornado blew us away; it completely destroyed our business. We had to start again from scratch. It happened in May, and we reopened 18 weeks later. We didn't even lose the 4 months sales we thought we were going to lose because we opened with greater volume. But if I am running Dick Lugar's farm and a tornado comes through, it can take away not just 4 months' revenue but an entire year's revenue. It is different. In my restaurant, I control the environment. I don't suffer declines as a consequence of drought, as we are currently experiencing in the State of Nebraska. I don't suffer as a consequence of all the different changes in the weather that can put the crop of a farmer or ranch unit at risk. So there is considerable risk, which is different than in other kinds of businesses. No other manufacturing business produces its product out of doors, and no other manufacturing business is at risk of losing an entire year's revenue as a result of too much water, too little water, rain, hail, and all the other sorts of things that can happen that cause a producer to lose an entire year's income. In addition, very few businesses have the economic situation that agriculture does. That is to say, just a little more supply than what is necessary will cause prices to go down. It is just a slight more supply than is needed--if you produce, say, 15 or 20 percent more than what the market will absorb in a single year's time, the price will go down sharply. There is tremendous sensitivity to excess production. In Mr. Krugman's excellent observation this morning in an op-ed piece in the New York Times, he said the very people who tend to oppose GMOs are the people who are least likely to be able to produce food on their own and who have benefited from the application of technology and the consequence of lower prices, greater quality, and greater accessibility to food. They have no difficulty getting food. They live in relatively wealthy nations, and they are not going to suffer as a consequence of not bringing the GMOs on line. It will be the poor, less developed nations that will suffer the consequence. It is easy for Prince Charles to oppose GMOs. We find ourselves in a short supply-and-demand situation where consumers are basically saying: We don't want our farmers and ranchers to produce less than what we want. We don't want to be short of food. We don't want prices to go up too high. We have a policy--it is especially true with large processors--where processors not only want prices to be stable but prefer prices to be in the lower range, if possible. That is always good business. You try to keep your costs under control. If we overproduce, the prices are always going to be on a downward pressure. This legislation, the Risk Management for the 21st Century Act, allows the continuation of the development of products that are offered to farmers to manage the risks of price declines and revenue losses coming from changes in the market over which they have no control. The Senator from North Dakota talked about currency fluctuations at great length when we discussed trade agreements and trying to get something in trade agreements that allow us to accommodate the sort of things that we saw after NAFTA with the peso decline. We found ourselves at a significant disadvantage as a consequence. These currency declines can have a tremendous impact on the earning ability of our farmers. It is a risk that the farmers of America have to manage. In this new and improved crop insurance proposal, we will have an increased likelihood, in my view, that market-oriented products will enable a producer to manage the risk of loss of income due to unexpected and uncontrolled declines in their income associated with price declines. Also, those products will be developed and available to the market. Not only do we increase the subsidies and make it more likely that people will buy, but we also provide risk-minded options. We make changes in the existing crop program. Key among them is we restructure the risk management agency to make it more likely that products will be brought to market more quickly. It is more likely to be market-oriented as well. My hope is that we can move this legislation--as Chairman Lugar and Senator Roberts have indicated, and earlier Senator Harkin spoke, and we could not have developed this piece of legislation without the distinguished ranking member as well--and pass a good, strong bill that is beneficial to all regions of the country so that it is more likely to come out of conference as a bill that is closer to what the Senate has. The House, as I said, does not have many of the provisions that the Northeastern Senators have been talking about. We did in ours. My hope is that we can pass this piece of legislation with a large influence and in a positive way for the conference.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, did the chairman rise to speak again?

Mr. KERREY. Is he arriving here imminently?

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I intend to vote for this piece of legislation. I think it is good and needed legislation. But I don't think anybody should be deluded as to why we are taking it up. I remember the Boskin Commission. A number of years ago there was a question as to whether or not the CPI was overstating the actual cost of living for seniors who were eligible either for an old age, a survivor, or a disability payment. There was a question as to whether or not it was overstated. So we impaneled this commission to evaluate whether or not it was overstated. They came back and said, yes, it was overstated by a point, 1.1. Out of 535 Members of Congress, maybe 20 people declared they were willing to vote for a 1.1-percentage reduction. If Boskin had come back and said it was understated by a point, there would have been 535 votes for it just like that. Nobody would have minded messing with the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Nobody would have cited philosophy, et cetera. We are a Congress that has been talking about Social Security reform, saving Social Security first. The President had a year's worth of discussions. We have been talking about this for several years now. It is not rocket science. Social Security is not a difficult problem to figure out. It is not like health care. Medicare is very complicated. Teenage violence is very complicated, as is the disintegration of the family. There are a lot of issues which are so complicated that it is hard to come up with an answer. But this one is not. What happened is, from 1983 until approximately 12 months or so ago, the Social Security system was generating some assistance to us in reducing the size of our deficit. So when the Social Security transaction to purchase bonds occurred and the Treasury ended up with some cash, they used the proceeds to pay for general services of the Government. Very few people objected to that, so long as it was helping us. Well, now we are into a surplus. All of a sudden you can't do that anymore. All of a sudden we find ourselves in a position to be able to take care of the earnings test. I will make it clear. I am for ending the earnings test. The Senator from New York and I have a piece of legislation that will eliminate the earnings test all the way to 62. Our proposal brought a problem to the surface. This bill has not been heard by the Finance Committee. We have not considered some of the problems that may be created as a consequence of taking this action. Members should understand that the earnings test isn't just a deduct. It is also an add-on to future benefits. That is why it doesn't cost us anything over 20. Over 10, it costs us $22 billion. Over 10 years, this proposal costs us $22 billion. If I came down and proposed a $22 billion add-on for Americans under the age of 5, there would be a budget point of order offered against it. But because it is for Americans over the age of 65, for some reason, there is silence on that point. I can't quite figure it out. Maybe a colleague will be able to tell me why no budget point of order was filed against a proposal to spend $22 billion more on people over the age of 65, where there would be if one were to be filed on people under the age of 5. I am sure there is an explanation for it. I am not smart enough to be able to figure it out. A consequence of this is going to be largely good. Under Social Security, we have an old age, a survivor, a disability, and a medical benefit called Medicare and Medicaid. The old age benefit is the one to which we are referring. I believe Americans who are over the age of 65--that is who this affects. Eighty percent of all new beneficiaries take Social Security benefits at 62, 63, and 64. So this affects the 20 percent who wait until 65. They are going to have to measure whether or not this is going to be good for them. For most of them, it will be good. For most of them, they will be able to say: Well, I am not likely to be living long enough to benefit from the ``add-back'' that is going to occur later. So perhaps I am going to come out money ahead. Again, understand that the earnings test doesn't only have a subtract. It adds back in future years. One of the interesting things is, when we have proposed to eliminate the earnings test at 62, 63, and 64, some people have come forward and said that that could increase the number of women who are living in poverty because they are going to calculate that that add-back later on is more beneficial to them than the elimination of the earnings test at 62, 63 and 64. I don't know if that is going to happen for people age 65, 66, and 67. It may. There may be some for whom the earnings test is not a benefit. The committee hasn't heard it. It is politically popular. It passed the House, I believe, unanimously. It will pass the Senate 100-0 as well. There will be nary a dissenting vote when it goes through the Senate. But it has not been heard by committee. It was heard by the Ways and Means Committee. It was not heard by the Finance Committee. It has a lot of political steam behind it. This is a good thing to put on an add. This is a good thing to say you support. It is very difficult to be against this proposal. I point out, again, we have not done comprehensive reform of Social Security. People under the age of 40 are going to pay a terrible price for that. We have an unprecedented demographic problem. It is not comparable to the problem the Senator from New York faced in 1983 when Social Security was fixed once before. The last time, we fixed Social Security for a number of reasons. The political environment has changed. I can't imagine enacting what was enacted in 1983, given the current political climate, which is essentially: I want to fix the problem, but I am against any increase in taxes or any cuts in benefits. If you can give me a good solution for Social Security that doesn't increase taxes or doesn't cut benefits, I am for it. Otherwise, don't sign me up for anything. Well, we would not have enacted the 1983 reforms if that was the standard we used to guide us. The problem we face in the future is not the same as the problem we faced in 1983. It is a demographic problem that is unprecedented in this country--a doubling of the number of beneficiaries. We are going to have a very steady increase in the number of people in the workforce of 7 or 8 million people working over the next 30 years, 40 million new beneficiaries. It is not likely that the baby boomers will come to Congress and ask for less. They are probably going to ask for more and say Boskin was wrong, that the CPI should be increased by two or three points because they have lots of things they want to buy. Postponing this problem makes it difficult for us to stand before an audience of people under 40 and say we care about them, because they are going to face a tremendous problem. I heard the Senator from New York mention this change in the law that we had 2 years ago, where the Social Security Administration sent out a notice that wasn't accurate. They should have sent out one to everybody under 40 which said under current law you have a 33-percent cut in benefits heading your way. They did not disclose that. They presumed in that notice that Congress was going to increase the taxes by 50 percent. Well, I daresay if you came to the floor of the Senate now and offered an amendment to increase the payroll tax by a point, you would be lucky to get a half dozen votes. I think this is a good piece of legislation. It is long overdue. The distinguished chairman described it accurately. I think, for the most part, it is going to be beneficial to people over the age of 65. Though I think there will unquestionably be some, as there would be 62, 63, and 64, who, as a consequence of not getting that add-back later on, may find themselves actually not being helped as much as we think. I will support the underlying legislation and look forward at a later point in this debate to offering an amendment.

Mr. KERREY. I send an amendment to the desk, and I ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. KERREY. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. KERREY. I understand under a previous unanimous consent the vote will occur at 4 o'clock. Is that correct?

Mr. KERREY. I am not sure I will take a full 30 minutes on my side. Let me describe the amendment first and see where it goes. My amendment is essentially a conforming amendment. It is an amendment that conforms a change we are about to make with the change in the language relating to earnings that occur between age 65 and 69. Senator Moynihan and I have a proposal to eliminate the earnings test from 62 to 65. Some groups are opposed because they are concerned that for low-income working women there could be an increase in the number of women who are under the poverty guidelines as established by the Federal Government. It is an interesting fact. I am not sure of the validity of the forecast. We are changing the program from a retirement program to an old-age program. I support that change. To change Social Security so that it is no longer a retirement-based program is very important. Since 1935, we have either said to workers: You have to retire before you are eligible; or we have said: If you continue to work, there will be a penalty that will occur as a consequence of whatever earnings you have. That is what we are trying to eliminate. My amendment is a fairly simple, straightforward amendment. I don't know that I need to talk a great deal about it. It merely inserts language that makes it clear that full or semi-retirement is no longer required to collect benefits, that what is necessary is to merely meet a tested age--62, 63, 64, and on and on--and for those currently affected by the earnings test, for 65 through 69, there will no longer be a test of earnings and a deduct that will occur. But, in addition to eliminating the earnings test, we are also fundamentally changing the old-age benefit part of the Social Security program, I believe in a way that is constructive, that will change the program from a retirement-based program to a program based on a test of age. I am attempting with this amendment to merely bring the language of the law in conformance with what we will be doing with the underlying provision, which is to say you no longer have to retire and have little earned income in order to receive benefits. All you have to do under this program is meet a test of age. That one dollar for three dollars--up to $17,000 of income--deferrment of benefits will no longer occur--from 65 to 69. I support the underlying bill. This amendment will bring the language of the law in conformance to what the underlying bill does.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I am going to speak until Senator Robb gets down to the floor. As I said earlier, I support the elimination of the earnings test from 65 to 69, and believe the amendment I have offered would be a positive conforming change that will make it clear, regarding Social Security at age 65, there is no longer a requirement to be retired. That is what the current law says, you have to be retired. ``Retirement benefit at normal retirement age'' is how it is described in the statute. My amendment would conform the changes we are making in H.R. 5 to alter the program that reduces benefits according to income from one that would no longer offer that reduction to beneficiaries. Beneficiaries evaluate their income versus what Social Security is going to do all the time. One of the interesting things about the program is to observe that nearly 80 percent of beneficiaries take an early benefit. They have a 20-percent reduction in benefits. The baby boomers may come in here 15 years from now and want to get rid of that, for all I know, but right now it is a 20-percent reduction in benefits. Mr. President, 80 percent of Americans, when they become eligible for the old age benefit, will opt to take that 20-percent reduction--not all of them are doing it at 62--some are taking a smaller cut in benefits at 63 or 64--because they calculate the benefits will be greater than retiring at 65 if they survive for 10 years. There is a lot of thinking that goes on, including with the earnings test, the calculation of what the deduction will mean and what the add-back will provide in future years. I would like to spend a little time again, until Senator Robb gets down here, to talk about the underlying problem. The earnings test elimination bill, the legislation we are going to pass 100-0 tomorrow, does address one of the problems, though it only addresses it partially. It addresses the earnings test imposed from age 65 to 69. It does not address the earnings test imposed from age 62 to 64. But there are other problems that the status quo creates for future beneficiaries. We need to think about it that way. I would like to show my colleagues the ways delaying reform will cause future workers and beneficiaries to suffer. The biggest problem with delaying reform is that it forces hard working, lower and middle class Americans to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of debt reduction--the same people who bore a disproportionate share of the great deficit reductions in 1980s and 1990s. People being paid by the hour are now being told we are going to use a significant portion of their FICA taxes--which are supposed to be dedicated to benefit payments--to pay down debt. That is basically what this phrase ``saving Social Security'' means when you examine it more closely. It is true the debt will be nearly eliminated by 2013 if we use all of the surpluses to pay down debt--but then it goes right back up again in the 2020s to fund Social Security benefits for the baby boomers. So, if you are under the age of 15 today, when you become eligible you are looking at debt levels that will be somewhere between two and three times what they are today. So the do-nothing plan, taking no action at all--there are still 500 Members of Congress who have not signed onto a specific piece of legislation--results in a substantial increase in the debt out into the future. The other thing that could happen in the future a consequence of this huge demographic bulge of baby boomers is a massive payroll tax increase or a cut in benefits. The baby boom generation will start retiring in 2010. There will be a 40-million-person increase in the number of beneficiaries from 37 to 77, but only a 7 or 8 million person increase in the number of people who are working. Social Security is essentially a tax on people who are working, transferred in a progressive fashion to people who are eligible as a consequence of meeting a test of age, survivorship, or disability. It is a progressive transfer program. We have a trust fund that accumulates as a reserve against contingencies but it is a pay-as-you- go program. It is a tax that is transferred in a very progressive fashion. Indeed, that 12.4-percent tax today, along with the tax on income and the interest that is earned on the debt that is paid with income taxes, there is about $150 billion more--$550 billion of total income coming into the Social Security system this year against about $400 billion in checks that are written to pay for it. That reserve builds up over time. I will not go into that particular problem, but anytime you have to convert any of those bonds, you have to use income taxes to convert the bond. Starting in about 2014, we will have to start drawing the trust funds down with additional infusions of income tax into the program. What does this all mean for today's workers? If you are under the age of 40--there are approximately 150 million Americans under the age of 40--you are looking at the following problem: Congress will either have to reduce your benefits by 33 percent or Congress will have to enact a payroll tax increase of about 50 percent to accommodate the demand that will be there, the liability that will be there, under current law. Obviously, a tax increase of that magnitude seems unacceptable. But this is what current law calls for. So if you are a Member of Congress that supports the do-nothing approach, you support a 33-percent cut in benefits or a 50-percent increase in taxes. The reason I mention that is that with the plan I have introduced with Senator Moynihan, the plan we have introduced with Senators Breaux, Gregg, and Robb, I have received a lot of attacks. People say: You are reducing benefits out in the future. How dare you reduce benefits out in the future, let alone suggest we need some additional revenue with tax increases? None of the proposals out there have called for massive tax increases. Our proposal has a 2-percent reduction in the payroll tax, but it is funded with offsets in benefits out in the future, as well as increased benefits coming from the individual accounts--

Mr. KERREY. Yes.

Mr. KERREY. Two percentage points, that is correct. Not 2 percent of the 12.4; but 2 percentage points overall, from 12.4 to 10.4 percent. Under current law, a substantial increase in the publicly-held debt will occur. In addition, there is a problem with the existing program in that low-income-earning beneficiaries do not have enough of their income replaced by the current benefit formulas. The Social Security reform proposal that I have introduced with a bipartisan group of Senators increases benefits for low income workers by changing these benefit formulas. I hear lots of my colleagues, especially on this side of the aisle, talk a lot about the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer. It is true that the gap is widening, but if you want to solve the problem, you cannot do it just by increasing the minimum wage or increasing the earned-income tax credit. You have to change the law so people of all incomes have the opportunity to generate wealth. The current Social Security program does not offer that opportunity. Our proposal would. Finally, there is growing intergenerational inequity in our Federal budget. We may not be spending too much on people over age 65 today. But by the time I am eligible for Social Security, and the cohort coming right behind me--the baby boomers--in my view, we will be. So colleagues understand, today if you take all Federal and State funding on people over the age of 65 and the people under the age of 18--that is State and Federal spending--we spend three times as much on people over age 65 as we do on people under the age of 18. Again, I do not think it is too much today. I do not think we are spending an excessive amount today. But spending on seniors continues to increase. The year-to-year spending increases are getting larger. Again, nobody should suffer the illusion of where this money comes from. It comes from a tax on wages on today's workers. If we underinvest in the skills and the training and the education of these kids, which in my view we are, in favor of politically popular moves that spend more and more money on people over the age of 65--and understand, there are 50 percent more Americans under the age of 18 than over the age of 65--if we continue to do that for very long, when we get to the year 2030 there will only be two workers per retiree. If I get to pick Warren Buffett and Bill Gates, I am in good shape. But I don't. I pick an average. One of the things we need to consider, as well, is the do-nothing plan is heading in a direction of creating, in my view, substantial intergenerational inequities in the Social Security program itself. Social Security and Medicare are popular because they currently have some semblance of generational equity. People of all ages support Social Security and Medicare because they see them as a fair social contract. But in 10 or 15 years from now, my view is, looking at the numbers, and with there likely to be a decreasing number of young people, they are not going to have to be told by politicians, they are going to look at the contract and say: Wait a minute, this deal is not very good for me. They are not going to like it and will rise up and get angry about it. For these reasons, I would argue that the status quo plan offered by the do-nothing caucus is dangerous. What we need is a comprehensive reform plan--that is bipartisan in nature--to finally fix the problems in the Social Security. Obviously, the elimination of the earnings test is a very popular Social Security reform measure. The other ones are unpopular but require difficult votes in order to make the changes. I hope that we, at some point, are able to come together to solve the larger problem of Social Security that exists in all these different ways.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, my amendment is merely a conforming amendment. If you support the underlying amendment, which changes Social Security from a retirement program to a program that simply has a test of age as opposed to a status of work, I urge colleagues to make this change. It will make it a lot easier to do reform in the future. It has nothing to do with moving the eligibility age; that stays the same. The amendment substitutes the words ``old age'' and ``age test'' for the word ``retirement.'' So they will no longer be required to retire in order to be eligible for this benefit.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, the question of how to write Federal laws and consider treaties that enable our armed forces and diplomats to protect and defend the people of the United States is both important and difficult for Members of Congress to answer. To write laws that keep America safe, we must evaluate today's threats and tomorrow's threats, we must consider the plans presented by our military to meet those threats, and we must be vigilant against the understandable tendency to want to withdraw from the world. We must remember those moments in our past when lack of preparation and planning resulted in terrible loss and then prepare to defend against threats we face. We must also remember that freedom is not free, and that the price paid by those men and women who choose to serve us in active, reserve, and National Guard duty is considerable. They serve the nation. They are not just in the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard; they are in the United States Army, the United States Navy, the United States Air Force, the United States Marine Corps, and the United States Coast Guard. This is a real distinction with a real difference. The difference is that United States forces do not just defend American shores. They defend liberty around the world. In the confused aftermath of the cold war, one thing should be abundantly clear: The fight for freedom is worth the price. From the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 to the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 there was an active debate about the value and importance of this fight. However, the sight of tens of millions of men and women celebrating the end of a political system that denied them freedom thrilled even those grown cynical about the value of cold war expenditures. The intellectual debate about the value of communism ended when we saw and examined the destruction that was done by political tyranny. The human spirit was reduced and squandered. The air, the water, and the health of the people were sacrificed. Even the development of economic standards of living--long thought to be comparable to America's--were shockingly inferior. Four times in my Senate career I have heard world leaders speak to joint sessions of the Congress to praise the price paid by America for their freedom. Duly elected as Presidents of newly freed people, each stood before us and spoke. Lech Walesa thanked us on behalf of the people of Poland. Nelson Mandela thanked us on behalf of the people of South Africa. Vaclav Havel thanked us on behalf of the people of Czechoslovakia. And Kim Dae Jung thanked us on behalf of the people of South Korea. Their message was simple: If the United States had not taken their side in the struggle for freedom, they would not have succeeded. Certainly we have made mistakes. Our actions have not been free of treachery, deceit, and failure. Sometimes our actions have brought shame and disgrace. Yet, we should allow ourselves to learn and be guided by these failures. We cannot permit them to discourage us from continuing the work of writing laws that enable us to hold the ground we have won and to continue, most of all, the effort on behalf of others held captive by the world's remaining dictators or those who choose to terrorize us with their unlawful actions. This rather long opening leads me to a simple discussion of just one of the questions we need to answer before we write the laws and negotiate the treaties that determine the nature, size, and shape of our defenses. The question is this: What nuclear force structure is needed to provide a minimal level of safety to the people of the United States? My intent in beginning this way is to make certain that I approach this question with the requisite seriousness to ensure that my answer will defend America rather than defending an ideology. The person who has been given the authority to command our strategic nuclear forces lives at Offut Air Force Base adjacent to Bellevue, NE. As Commander in Chief of Strategic Forces--or STRATCOM--his responsibility is to carry out the orders and instructions given to him by the President through his Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have had the pleasure and honor of visiting STRATCOM on many occasions. On each of those occasions I have been briefed on the plans and mission of our strategic nuclear forces. On each of these occasions, I have left with pride and enthusiasm for the patriotism, energy, and talent of the men and women who serve at STRATCOM. On every occasion I have left with the impression that Americans are getting their money's worth from this effort. With this in mind, I think it is important to describe for the American people what STRATCOM is and what it does. The mission of STRATCOM is simple, but it is also deadly serious. Their mission is to ``deter major military attack, and if deterrence fails, employ forces.'' In this effort, Adm. Richard Mies, the Commander of STRATCOM, controls the most effective and lethal set of armaments ever assembled by human beings: The strategic nuclear force of the United States of America. Yet, nearly a decade after the end of the cold war, many Americans no longer have an appreciation for the size and power of this force. I would like to take this opportunity to describe the force Admiral Mies controls. First, America's strategic nuclear weapons are based on a triad of delivery systems: Land-based, sea-based, and strategic bombers. The U.S. relies on this triad to ensure credibility and survivability. Because our forces are diversified in this way, a potential enemy must recognize that, regardless of any hostile action, the United States would be able to retaliate with overwhelming force. Currently, the U.S. has about 500 Minutemen III and 50 Peacekeeper missiles in the land-based arsenal. While some of the Minuteman III missiles are being modified to accept single warheads, the bulk of these missiles are armed with three warheads. These warheads have a yield ranging from 170 to 335 kilotons. The 50 Peacekeeper missiles are each armed with 10 individually targetable warheads with a yield of 300 kilotons. In other words, our current land-based force alone can, upon an order and instruction from the President of the United States, deliver approximately 2,000 warheads to 2,000 targets on over 500 delivery vehicles with a total yield of about 550 megatons. In itself, this is an awesome force. But it is only the beginning of what is available to U.S. military planners. At sea, we have 18 Ohio- class submarines. These are the ultimate in survivability, able to stay undetected at sea for long periods of time. As such, our submarine force must give pause to any potential aggressor. Eight of these boats carries 24 C-4 missiles. Each of these missiles are loaded with eight warheads with 100 kilotons of yield. The other 10 subs carry 24 of the updated D-5 missiles. These missiles are also equipped with eight warheads with varying degrees of yield from 100 to 475 kilotons. This is close to 1,500 additional targets that we are able to hit accurately and rapidly, if the President of the United States merely gives the order--an awesome force, again, all by itself to be able to deter individuals or nation states from taking action against the United States. The third leg of the triad, the strategic bomber force, includes both the B-2 and the B-52 bomber. These bombers have the capacity to carry 1,700 warheads via nuclear bombs and air-launched cruiser missiles. Talking about this force, I use--and others do as well--words such as ``yield'' and ``kilotons'' or ``megatons.'' Unfortunately, most of these words to a lot of us have very little meaning. On previous occasions, I have come to the floor to describe what a single 100- kiloton weapon would do to one American city, the kind of destruction not just to that American city but to the American economy, as well as to the psyche of the American people who would, to put it mildly, be terrorized as a consequence of this single action. I don't want to recount that narrative today, but I do think it is important for us to try to put the power of these weapons in perspective. Oftentimes we don't. The numbers are so large and the weapons systems so numerous that we get dulled in our recognition of what they can do. Let me use one example. On August 6, 1945, the Enola Gay dropped the first atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. That and the subsequent bombing of Nagasaki ended World War II. Little Boy was the name of the bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima. It destroyed 90 percent of the city. Instantly, 45,000 of this city's 250,000 inhabitants were killed. Within days, another 19,000 had died from the aftereffects of the bomb. This bomb had a yield of 15 kilotons. A 300-kiloton warhead such as can be found on top of our Peacekeeper missile is 20 times as powerful. We don't have in our strategic arsenal a weapon that is under 100 kilotons. Each of the 50 Peacekeeper missiles in our arsenal carries 10 of these 300-kiloton weapons. In all, Admiral Mies, under orders from the President of the United States, can deliver 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads with an approximate yield of over 1,800 megatons. Mr. President, I think it is very important, as we debate what our nuclear weapons system needs to be, that we understand this concept and that we sort of take a map and use some common sense and try to evaluate what 6,000 nuclear weapons with over 100 kilotons of yield each could do to targets inside of our principal reason for deterrence, maintaining that arsenal, and that is Russia today. I think common sense would cause us to pause and wonder whether or not we are keeping a level of weapons beyond what is necessary. The purpose of this description is to give my colleagues a sense of this force and what this force could do if brought to bear by order of our Commander in Chief. I think it is fair for the American people to ask, first, what is the purpose of this force. According to the 2000 edition of the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to the President and to Congress: Nuclear forces remain a critical element of the U.S. policy of deterrence. Simply put, the United States maintains its nuclear arsenal to guard against an attack from any potential weapons of mass destruction threat. I think it is important for us as well to examine these potential threats and ask if our current nuclear forces are structured to adequately address them. As I see it, there are three main sources of threat for which we must maintain a nuclear deterrent. The first is the threat from rogue nations like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. While the United States must remain vigilant in the effort to confront the weapons of mass destruction programs of these nations, there is no evidence that any of these countries currently possess nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it would be hard to justify the expenditure of approximately $25 billion a year to maintain an arsenal of over 6,000 warheads to defend against the threat posed by rogue nations. If not rogue nations, what about China? While the threat from China has gotten a lot of attention lately, press accounts indicate the Chinese have no more than 20 land-based nuclear missiles capable of reaching the United States. Also according to the media, Chinese nuclear weapons are not kept on continual alert. Rather, nuclear warheads and liquid fuel tanks are stored separate from their missiles. It would take time for the Chinese to fuel, arm, and launch these weapons. Now, just one of these weapons would cause immense pain and devastation, but the likelihood of their use, accidental or intentional, is low. Once again, the maintenance of over 6,000 warheads is hardly justified by China's 20 missiles. The only other threat that can justify our nuclear force levels is the Russian nuclear arsenal. But what is the current state of the Russian nuclear arsenal? The Russian military relies on the same triad of delivery systems as we do. In their land-based arsenal, the Russians have approximately: 180 SS-18 missiles with 10 warheads at 550 kiloton yields each, They have 160 SS-19 missiles with six warheads at 550 kiloton yields each. They have 86 SS-24 missiles with 10 warheads at 550 kilotons yields each. They have 360 SS-25 missiles with a single warhead each at 550 kiloton yield, and they have 10 SS-27 Topol M missiles with a single warhead at 550 kiloton yield. This is obviously an impressive force. Any one of these weapons could devastate an American city or cities. But the Russians are finding that many of these missiles are nearing the end of the service-lives. And budgetary constraints have slowed the pace of acquisition of their latest land-based missile, the Topol M, to the point at which they are having trouble maintaining the numbers of weapons that will be allowed under the START treaties. The collapse of the Russian economy, and the resulting strain on the Russian military budget, has also had disastrous consequences for the Russian Navy. Russia now has less than 30 operational nuclear-armed submarines. In fact, the slow op tempo of Russian submarines has meant that at certain times none of these boats are at sea. Regardless, reports indicate these subs maintain almost 350 nuclear delivery vehicles with more than 1,500 available warheads. The Russian Air Force has also suffered. At the end of 1998, Russia had about 70 strategic bombers, but not all of these were operational. Estimates are Russian strategic bombers have about 800 warheads on both nuclear bombs and air launched cruise missiles. Mr. President, the overall picture of the Russian arsenal force is that it is deadly, but it is decaying as well at an extremely rapid rate. Russian generals have said that they see a time in the near future when the Russian strategic arsenal will be measured not in thousands but in hundreds of weapons. It is this decay in the Russian arsenal which I believe poses the greatest threat to the United States and should encourage us to do more to find ways in which to achieve significant parallel nuclear reductions. Some will argue that we have in the process already a way to achieve those reductions and it is called START. Yet even if START II is ratified by the Russian Duma, the United States and Russia would still have 3,500 nuclear warheads on each side at the end of 2007. We can't afford to wait over 7 years to make reductions that leave the Russians with still more weapons than they can control. In response, some argue not to worry, START II is going to be quickly followed by START III. In discussions with the Russians on a possible START III treaty, the United States has told Russia that we are not willing to go below the 2,000- to 2,500-warhead threshold. This number is based on a 1997 study on U.S. minimum deterrence needs completed by the then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili. While I have no doubt that this report was professionally prepared and evaluated on criteria available at the time, I believe strongly it is time to redo this study. The current size of the United States and Russian nuclear arsenals is not based on any rational assessment of need; rather, it is a relic of the cold war. As the former commander of STRATCOM, Gen. Eugene Habiger, has said, ``The cold war was a unique war. And when the war ended, the loser really didn't lose. We still had this massive military might on both sides staring each other in the face.'' As I have described the accuracy, diversity, and power of our nuclear arsenal, I find it difficult to argue that the men and women at STRATCOM will be able to accomplish their objective of deterring attack with far fewer weapons. I don't know what the magic number is for minimum deterrence, but given our cooperative relationship with Russia, given the fact Russia is about to hold its third democratic election for President, and given our conventional and intelligence capabilities, I am confident we can deter any aggressor with less than 6,000, or 3,500, or even 2,000 warheads. It is time we begin the process to come up with a realistic estimate of our deterrence needs. As long as nuclear weapons remain a reality in this world, the men and women at STRATCOM will have a job to do in defending our Nation. Their contribution to our safety cannot be underestimated. But just as they have a responsibility, we have a responsibility to act in a way that will decrease the danger of nuclear weapons and increase the safety and security of the American people. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I want to call to the attention of my colleagues an issue that is not being raised in the otherwise informative presidential primary campaigns. It is not a theoretical issue, nor is it an issue concerning budgetary decisions. Rather, it is an issue which sends American pilots on combat missions almost daily. It is an issue which throughout the last decade has cost the lives of hundreds of American and thousands of soldiers and civilians of other nationalities. It is an issue which threatens the peace and security of some of our closest allies, and which, if not solved, could threaten the United States with weapons of mass destruction. It is an issue which starves and hold captive twenty-two million people in conditions of unparalleled terror of their government. It is an issue which we have failed to deal with decisively, and that failure calls into question our dedication to the freedom we prize so highly for ourselves. The issue is the continuing rule of Saddam Hussein. Nine years after the United States led a coalition to eject Iraqi forces and liberate Kuwait, Saddam continues to brutalize his people, threaten his neighbors, and develop weapons of mass destruction--earlier versions of which he used on neighboring states, on Israel, and on his own people. The good news is that sanctions have weakened his military, and his political support base has shrunk to his immediate family. All of mountainous northern Iraq and large swathes of southern Iraq are free of his control. Nonetheless, he continues to rule the central part of the country and, as Jim Hoagland pointed out in today's Washington Post, Saddam is likely to outlast yet another American President. The Administration will no doubt point to the restraining effect UN sanctions have had on Saddam's ability to threaten his neighbors. In truth, his regime would have been far more aggressive if sanctions and the no-fly zones guaranteed by U.S. and British airpower had not been in effect. But in choosing policy options against an outlaw like Saddam, restraint is a minimal objective. For example, we and our allies in the former Yugoslavia are not seeking to restrain those accused of war crimes during the ethnic war there; we seek to catch them, lock them up, and get them to The Hague for trial. Saddam has killed far more than any of the wanted Yugoslavs, and he keeps on killing today. Our rhetoric, including mine today, calls for the same response to Saddam. But our real policy is merely to restrain him. The fact that the restraint has endured nine years is what the Administration shows as evidence of its success. But adhering to the policy of restraint is actually taking us farther from our stated goals. Support for the sanctions policy is eroding at the UN. This, along with rising oil prices and Iraq's rising oil production, have made Saddam a key global energy player once again. In addition, Saddam has had thirteen months to develop weapons of mass destruction without the inhibition imposed by outside inspections. Now, a new inspection regime has been voted by the Security Council. If Iraq eventually accepts it, I presume Dr. Blix and his new inspectors will do their best. Yet, they will never be as intrusive, and therefore as effective, as UNSCOM. In sum, the restraints which we have kept on Saddam for nine years are loosening. He is very close to being free of the handcuffs in which both we and his people have invested so much. Restraining Saddam was always a minimal objective. It was a way to avoid the strategic risk many see in the bolder objective of acting in support of the Iraqi opposition to remove Saddam from power and achieve democracy. It is ironic that the minimal objective requires the continual application of U.S. military force, not just for a decade, but presumably forever. The bolder objective, once achieved, would bring U.S. military operations and basing in the Gulf countries to an end. I believe Congress has recognized the need for bold action. In passing the Iraq Liberation Act in October 1998, Congress expressed its frustration with the status quo and provided resources with which the Administration could support the Iraqi opposition in their efforts to remove Saddam from power. In signing the Iraq Liberation Act, President Clinton affirmed that U.S. policy was not merely to restrain Saddam but to see him replaced. Unfortunately, the President's policy pronouncement has not been followed by action. The President and Vice President have encouraging words for Iraqis seeking to free their country, but their words are belied by the inaction of their Administration. Despite unprecedented unity, the Administration has provided only a small proportion of available resources to the Iraqi opposition, and this only on superficialities which will have no effect on opinion inside Iraq. The countries in the region all agree the U.S. is not serious about supporting Saddam's removal. If you don't believe me, call the ambassador of any Middle Eastern country and ask him or her if our actions and rhetoric match. If the Administration actively sought Saddam's replacement, our allies in the region would know it and they would cooperate with us. But the Administration has not asked because the truth is, beneath the rhetoric, we are clinging to the old policy of restraining Saddam. There are now signs that the consensus for even that is fraying. I would hate to think that the boldest hope of our national security establishment is that our policy will hold until noon on January 20 of 2001. I admit to coming late to an understanding of the evil of the Iraqi regime and the imperative of fighting it. After Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, I voted against the Gulf War resolution. My distrust of the Bush Administration's statements regarding the need for the use of force in Iraq were colored by my own experiences in Vietnam. But Iraq is not Vietnam. And I have come to understand the brutality of Saddam Hussein's regime and the overwhelming requirement to support the efforts of Iraqis to replace it. I understand the threat the regime poses to his people, to his neighbors, and to the rest of the world. Most of all, this is about our commitment to freedom. The long night of the Iraqi people will not be ended through a policy of merely retraining the Iraqi regime. Instead, we must work to match our words and our deeds to actively support the Iraqi opposition in their effort to remove Saddam Hussein and establish a democratic Iraq. When the people of Iraq obtain their freedom, it will transform the Middle East. It will create a new region in which brutality, poverty, and unnecessary armaments will be supplanted by security, prosperity, and creative diversity. Mr. President, this goal is within our reach. But the difference between success and failure in this endeavor will be measured by our willingness to act in support of the people of Iraq. I yield the floor.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, a few weeks ago, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger joined what has become a chorus of distinguished citizens and representatives who are suggesting the decision to deploy the national missile defense system be postponed until after the November 7 Presidential election. Although it may be that a delay is necessitated for other reasons, I hope we do not allow the approach of a Presidential election to prevent us from making important foreign policy decisions. Not only do I believe this to be a precedent which would hamper future Presidential decisionmaking, but it also ignores the fact that this is a tough decision for any President to make anytime, regardless of the circumstances. It also ignores that it takes time for a new Commander in Chief at the helm of the ship to get his or her foreign policy sea legs. Such a delay could jeopardize our capacity to deploy NMD in a timely fashion. In his argument, Secretary Kissinger referred to ``congressionally imposed deadline.'' This is a commonly made mistake about what Congress did last year. All we called for was deployment of national missile defense ``as soon as it is technologically possible.'' The administration has said this decision could be made as early as June and has recently indicated this could slip to late summer. Of the four criteria that will be used by President Clinton to make his decision, the most difficult to quantify is the impact on other arms control agreements. Specifically, the impact most feared is that deployment of this missile defense system would be regarded by the Russians as a violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. While I can make a very strong argument that deployment of NMD is permitted under the terms of this treaty, this argument will diminish in importance if the Russian Government abrogates other treaties by modifying their strategic nuclear weapons. This includes the very real and destabilizing prospect of re-MIRVing their missiles or converting single-warhead missiles to multiwarhead missiles. This is why the United States is attempting, and thus far without success, to persuade Russia to allow a modification of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to build NMD and avoid potentially serious conflict between the United States and the Russian Government. We have met considerable resistance, not only from the Russians but also from allies who regard our analysis of the ballistic missile threat to be flawed. To be clear, the new threat is real. We cannot afford to ignore the real threat that an accidental or rogue nation launch of ballistic missiles carrying nuclear weapons poses to the survival of our Nation. The need to build this defensive system, which is still being tested for feasibility and reliability, derives from the national intelligence estimate and an external panel headed by Donald Rumsfeld. Both have concluded that the threat of rogue nation or unauthorized launch of a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon at the United States of America is real. As a consequence, we have begun testing a system which would protect Americans against this threat. A test schedule for May will be critically important to demonstrate feasibility and reliability, one of the four Presidential conditions needed for deployment. Given the risk/ reward ratio of defending against nuclear weapons, the current cost estimates over 10 years of an amount that is less than 1 percent of our national defense budget and the unlikely reassessment of this threat, all that would stand in the way of a Presidential decision to deploy would be the potential adverse impact on other agreements. The President will face this question: Will a decision to deploy NMD result in other nations, especially Russia, reacting in a manner that would produce a net increase in proliferation activity and thus increase the potential for rogue or unauthorized launch of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons? We are more likely to resolve this potential conflict in a way that increases the safety and security of Americans if President Clinton does not delay the decision until after the November 7 election. This is a decision that should be made on the basis of the current facts and the four criteria for deployment previously outlined by the administration. To be successful, we should also consider an alternative negotiating strategy that would pose a win-win for both the United States and Russia. It would reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction. It would improve the relations between the United States and Russia. And it would enable the United States to redirect money from maintaining our current nuclear weapons stockpile to our conventional forces, where a real strain can be seen in recruitment, readiness, and capability. To spur constructive action, we must force ourselves to remember this grim truth: The only thing capable of killing every man, woman, and child in the United States of America is the Russian nuclear stockpile. We must remember the threat no longer comes from a deliberate attack. Instead, these weapons now present two new and very dangerous threats. The first is the possibility of an accidental or unauthorized launch of a Russian nuclear weapon. During the cold war, we worried about the military might of the Soviet Union, but today we worry about the military weakness of Russia and her ever-decreasing ability to control the over 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads in her arsenal. There are numerous stories that have emerged out of Russia over the past few years highlighting the vulnerability of these weapons. There are stories of major security breaches at sensitive nuclear facilities. There are stories of unpaid Russian soldiers attempting to sell nuclear-related material in order to feed their families. And there are stories of the continuing decay of the command and control infrastructure needed to maintain the nuclear arsenal of Russia. Each of these demonstrates the vulnerability of the Russian arsenal to an accidental launch based on a technical error or miscalculation or the unauthorized use of a weapon by a rogue group or disgruntled individual. The second threat posed by the nuclear legacy of the cold war is the danger of the proliferation of material, technology, or expertise. Consider just the case of North Korea. Last summer, North Korea held the world's attention as a result of indications that they were preparing to test a long-range Taepo Dong ballistic missile. Through skillful diplomacy, the United States was able to convince the North Koreans to halt their missile testing program. However, the stability of the entire east Asian region was in jeopardy as a result of the possibility of such a test. North Korea is one of the most backward countries in the world. It is a country where millions of its own citizens have starved to death. Yet this country was able to affect the actions of the United States, Japan, and China as a result of their ability to modify what is, in truth, outdated Soviet missile technology. As has been indicated publicly, the Taepo Dong is little more than a longer range version of the 1950s Soviet Scud missile. One can only imagine the consequences to our security if North Korea had a nuclear capability and the means to deliver it. But this illustrates the threat posed by proliferation. Without real management of these materials and technology--much of it Russian in origin--it will become easier for third and fourth rate powers to drastically affect our own security decisions. Both of these threats--accidental or unauthorized launch and proliferation of these weapons to rogue nations--present a new challenge to the United States. It is a challenge very different from the cold war standoff of two nuclear superpowers. Classic deterrence, better known as mutual assured destruction, was the bedrock of our policy to confront nuclear threats during the cold war. Mutual assured destruction was based on the premise that our enemies would not dare to attack the United States as long as they knew that such an attack would be met with an overwhelming, deadly response by the United States. This theory, however, provides no safety from an accidental launch caused by the failure of outdated technology. It provides no safety net from the use of these weapons by a terrorist state whose only objective is the death of as many Americans as possible. We need to develop a completely new and comprehensive approach to confront these threats. National missile defense will not add to our security if it is built as a stand alone venture. As part of a comprehensive approach it most assuredly can. To succeed, we should work with Russia to develop a new strategic partnership. We need a partnership based on cooperation, not confrontation--a partnership that builds on the many areas of mutual concern, not those that divide--a partnership that recognizes the nuclear legacy of the cold war threatens all of us, and that only by working together can we truly reduce this threat. The possibility of a new approach where our interests intersect with those of Russia can be seen in a proposal made by Russia to our arms control negotiators in Geneva. The Russians offered to reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads to 1,500 on each side. We rejected the offer based on an assessment of minimum deterrence levels that are 500 to 1,000 strategic warheads higher. But this assessment has been overtaken by events in Russia which now make it likely the Russians will be unable to safely maintain more than a few hundred of their own nuclear weapons. As the Russian capability to maintain their stockpile dwindles, it is natural to assume our threshold for deterrence will also significantly decrease. Thus, by keeping more weapons than we need to defend our national interests, we are encouraging the Russians to maintain more weapons than they are able to control. The net effect is to increase the danger of the proliferation or accidental use of these deadly weapons which decreases the effectiveness of national missile defense. So, here is the outline of a win-win proposal to the Russians. We jointly agree to make dramatic reductions in the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenal. We jointly agree that national missile defense is an essential part of a strategy to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. And, we jointly agree that parallel reductions in our nuclear forces must include arrangements--and a Congressional commitment to provide funding--to secure and manage the resultant nuclear material. We are fortunate that we will not begin from scratch on this problem. We can build upon one of the greatest acts of post-cold war statesmanship: the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. To facilitate these dramatic reductions, we must look for ways to expand upon the success of this program, to enlist new international partners, and to work with the Russians to find new solutions to the problems of securing nuclear material. Additionally, we should continue our lab-to- lab efforts that are assisting the transition of Russian nuclear facilities and workers from military to civilian purposes. These are the practical, on the ground programs that will help us reduce the chance of the proliferation of nuclear materials and know-how. In exchange for deep nuclear reductions and technical assistance, the Russians would agree to changes in the ABM Treaty. With this alternative, the President would not have to choose between national missile defense and future cooperation with Russia. Instead, by working in cooperation with Russia on a comprehensive basis, we will be able to deploy a limited NMD system designed to protect the United States from accidental or rogue state ballistic missile launches. We can reach such an agreement with Russia because the Russian people now know they are not immune from the threats of extremism. Their security is also endangered by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists and rogue states. This now presents us with an opportunity to begin to work with Russia diplomatically to confront this emerging threat from countries like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry's success in halting North Korea's missile testing program highlights the potential power of diplomacy to reduce these threats. But by developing a strategic partnership with Russia, and working cooperatively to bring change in North Korea, to end Saddam Hussein's brutal regime, or to foster real reform in Iran, we will reduce nuclear dangers and create a safer world. So as President Clinton considers his decision about NMD, I hope he considers an alternative strategy that embraces a comprehensive approach to the threats we face in today's world. Now is the time to reach out to Russia and to create a partnership that will build the basis for securing the post-cold war peace for our children. Mr. President, in the aftermath of the administration's rejection of the offer to substantially reduce strategic weapons, the issue of a previous analysis of the minimum deterrence done by then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, was raised. I say to my colleagues, I intend to read carefully that report and revisit the floor with an opportunity to discuss what I believe is a rational minimum deterrence level necessary to protect the people of the United States of America. Obviously, that must be a concern of ours as well. But I believe there is a historic opportunity. It will be difficult for us to seize that opportunity if Republicans and Democrats do not agree that still the most important thing for all of us to do is to make certain the safety and security of the American people are secured through not only our policies but our active efforts. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise today to express my sadness at the death of Senator Carl T. Curtis. Senator Curtis was a lifelong public servant best known for his untiring work on behalf of the people of Nebraska. He began his public career in 1930 when he was elected Kearney County Attorney. After failing to be re-elected as county attorney--the only political defeat he would ever face--he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1938. The people of Nebraska returned Carl Curtis to the House of Representatives for an additional seven terms. In 1954, he chose to leave the House and to return to private life. But when then-Senator Dwight Griswold died in office, Carl Curtis was coaxed into further public service. He was overwhelmingly elected to the United States Senate and served as a distinguished member of this body until his retirement from public office in 1979. Mr. President, Senator Curtis brought to the Senate the plain-spoken common sense of rural Nebraska. He understood his roots and he cared deeply for the people he represented. While his style did not lend itself to self-promotion and banner headlines, his influence in Congress was felt on a number of important issues. He was instrumental in shaping tax and agricultural policy, he was a staunch advocate of budgetary discipline, and he was a fervent defender of his political party. Yet, Senator Curtis was most well known for his dedication to the people of Nebraska. As many have noted, Senator Curtis set the standard for constituent service. He often dedicated hours of his personal time to helping individuals and his office was always open to Nebraskans visiting the nation's capital. As the longest serving Member of Congress in Nebraska history, Senator Curtis established a legacy of service unlikely to be matched. After retiring from Congress, Senator Curtis returned to the practice of law and always remained an active participant in Nebraska politics. While Nebraska has lost a statesman, the Curtis family has lost a husband, a father, a grandfather, and a great grandfather. I know my colleagues will join with me in expressing our sincerest condolences to the family of Senator Carl T. Curtis.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise to join Chairman Shelby in urging my colleagues to vote in favor of the intelligence authorization conference report. This report is a culmination of the lengthy effort to fund intelligence activities for fiscal year 2000. It has not been easy to arrive at this point because the committee had to address many significant nonintelligence issues ranging from the reorganization of the Department of Energy to the establishment of procedures for blocking the assets of drug kingpins. We have arrived at this point because we have reached several important compromises with our House colleagues, and the report deserves the Senate's full support. This conference report supports many new initiatives. In my view, one of the most important new initiatives is to make the year 2000 a watershed year for intelligence. The watershed represents a turnaround in spending on intelligence activities. I believe it is time to increase spending because we now have a much better understanding of the threats facing the United States of America and the important role intelligence plays in meeting those threats. One of the most difficult parts of my job as the Intelligence Committee vice chairman has been to talk to people about the importance of intelligence. This job is difficult because most of the information is classified. Therefore, public debate on the condition of the intelligence community is extremely rare and discussing funding levels is almost impossible. My colleagues are well aware that classified conference reports and the classified schedules of authorizations are available for their review in S. 407 but you have to go there to get the details. We cannot talk about them now. Let me say, however, intelligence is stretched very thin. Our global reach is supported by intelligence as global coverage. Without adequate coverage, we make policy mistakes. The Intelligence Community is stretched thin in trying to meet all of its commitments to policy makers. But I can't tell you on the floor of the Senate how thin it is stretched, and I can't tell you how much it's going to cost to fix. I can only tell you I'm glad fiscal year 2000 is a watershed year for intelligence. A second initiative this bill supports is striking the balance between intelligence collection and the subsequent exploitation and dissemination of the information collected. My colleagues should know that one of the problems of insufficient funding is that the Intelligence Community is unable properly to exploit and disseminate all of the information it gathers. If you think about it, this may seem odd. That is, the Community is collecting more information than it is able to analyze and deliver to its customers. But it is not odd. Among other things, it reflects constrained Intelligence budgets. As the Community has moved into advanced technologies, it has invested in the future by developing new intelligence collection systems. The idea was that by the time these new systems were ready to be used, we would have been able to find the funding to exploit and disseminate the information being collected. Well the future is now, and we haven't been able to find the funding to balance collection, exploitation, and dissemination. In this bill we have confronted the issue and proposed important solutions. Again, I urge my colleagues to read the classified report in S-407 in order to get the details. Another important provision in this bill is the creation of a National Commission for the review of the National Reconnaissance Office. Mr. President, the NRO is a national treasure. They acquire and operate the nation's space reconnaissance satellites--the so-called spy satellites. They have a long and proud history of being on the leading edge of technology so that our nation's leaders could be better informed about our adversaries. We all got a glimpse at their extraordinary abilities when the Corona spy satellite imagery was released to the public. It is literally an eye-opening experience to be able to see now what our President was able to see years ago about the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War. This is the type of effort we have come to expect from NRO. But the NRO has come under public attack in the recent past. Unfavorable news accounts have caused some to be unsure about the NRO and the path it is following. Others have questioned whether the NRO should remain an agency resting somewhere between the authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense. Moreover, the end of the Cold War has altered forever the nature of the threats we face. New threats mean a changed emphasis for intelligence. Furthermore, the explosion of information technology has created new opportunities for the collection and the delivery of intelligence. Thus, the Conferees decided there is a need to evaluate the NRO's roles and missions, organizational structure, technical skills, contractor relationships, uses of commercial satellite imagery, acquisition authorities, and its relationships to other agencies and departments of the Federal Government in order to assure continuing success in satellite reconnaissance. I look forward to the Commission's work. Finally, Mr. President, I would like to comment briefly on the ``Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act'' contained in the conference report. This is a significant piece of legislation intended to attack drug traffickers at the heart by blocking all of their assets either within the United States or that are under U.S. control. It establishes a procedure for the President of the United States to publicly identify drug kingpins and to block the kingpin's assets. As my colleagues may recall, a similar provision sponsored by Senators Coverdell and Feinstein was accepted as an amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Bill during floor action. As I mentioned at the beginning of my statement, this provision has made the Intelligence Conference extremely interesting. Several of us joined the Chairman in being concerned about the right of judicial review for U.S. persons whose assets could be seized as a result of being involved in a joint venture with someone later identified as a drug kingpin. This was a matter of debate during discussions leading to the conference meeting and was addressed during the conference. The House Conferees argued strenuously for their vision of the legislation which passed the House by a vote of 385 to 26. Further, the Administration supported the House version. Nonetheless, Chairman Shelby and several of us remained concerned about due process being afforded to those who might unwittingly get caught up in the kingpin designation and subsequent blocking of assets. The Conference agreed the concerns were of sufficient merit to warrant the appointment of a special judicial review panel to evaluate these concerns and report its findings. The commission is charged with the responsibility of reviewing judicial, regulatory, and administrative authorities relating to the blocking of assets. It also is to report on its evaluation of the remedies available to U.S. persons affected by the Government's blocking of assets of foreign persons. I believe their detailed and extended evaluation will provide the Congress insights into both the complexities of the Drug Kingpin legislation contained in the Intelligence Conference Report and the consequences to American persons when the assets of foreign persons are blocked under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. In conclusion, Mr. President, I would like to note this is my last Conference Report as the committee's Vice Chairman. My term on the Committee expires toward the end of January 2000. I have had the privilege of serving under highly distinguished Chairmen and Vice Chairmen: David Boren, Frank Murkowski, Dennis DeConcini, John Warner, Arlen Specter, and Richard Shelby. In every instance, I have experienced a commitment to a bipartisan approach to intelligence. Throughout my time on the Committee, the members always have treated intelligence activities and intelligence policy as serious issues deserving their close attention. Because the issues have always been treated very seriously, committee members have had disagreements. But, Mr. President, in the end we always found a bipartisan answer to our differences. Bipartisanship has been a hallmark of the committee because intelligence is not a partisan issue. If it ever should become a partisan issue, I believe we can look forward to a consequent politicization of intelligence. This can be very bad for Congress and even worse for the country. Again, I thank Chairman Shelby for his leadership in delivering the conference report to the floor and for his commitment to finding bipartisan answers to some very complex questions. I look forward to the opportunity in the future to speak more fully on the floor concerning intelligence and its values. Lastly, I call to my colleagues' attention and to the attention of the American people that the intelligence community is full of highly dedicated men and women who are working under some of the most difficult of circumstances. Their professionalism, their patriotism knows no bounds, and I salute them for their excellent work. Being the committee vice chairman has, indeed, been a great privilege. I yield the floor.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. I thank both leaders for their kind remarks.

Mr. KERREY. The majority leader did not complete his unanimous consent request as a consequence of some observations.