J. Kerrey

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. That is correct.

Mr. KERREY. Has the Senator examined the Eighth Circuit decision that overturned it?

Mr. KERREY. Can we speak to that later? I don't want to keep you any longer. You were kind enough to stick around a few minutes. I need to leave for a luncheon, as well. Perhaps we can speak later this afternoon.

Mr. KERREY. The language you showed me earlier to modify your amendment was to respond to the Eighth Circuit?

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I accomplished at least the objective of letting people know that: Please, don't put me in the ``no column'' on this immediately. I indicated the last time this thing was around that I have significant reservations about it. I have listened to people and talked to people, especially at home, and under no circumstances do I-- I was Governor for 4 years and have been a Senator for 10 years. The worst thing is to be locked into a position from which people say you can't change, even if you acquire evidence that your previous position is wrong. So I want both the Senator from Pennsylvania and especially the people in Nebraska to understand that I am looking at it. If I conclude I was wrong the other time, I will vote differently this time.

Mr. KERREY. If the Senator will yield for a question in this regard.

Mr. KERREY. This bill, then, is inaccurately characterized as a late- term abortion bill? It is not? I have had people ask me about it: Are you going to support the partial-birth abortion bill because it is going to end this procedure, late-term procedure? This is a bill that would make illegal a specific medical procedure?

Mr. KERREY. The second part, is there precedent for us to do this sort of thing?

Mr. KERREY. I thank the Senator.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. KERREY. I think I have the language that--

Mr. KERREY. The language you gave me earlier said: As used in this section, the term ``partial-birth abortion'' means an abortion in which the person performing the abortion deliberately and intentionally delivers through the vagina some portion of an intact living fetus until the fetus is partially outside the body of the mother for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person knows will kill the fetus while the fetus is partially outside-- Any changes?

Mr. KERREY. I ask the Senator to respond to me. We had a colloquy earlier. I have the Eighth Circuit decision. Earlier all I had was opinions on the Eighth Circuit decision from both opponents and supporters of the Senator's legislation. The Eighth Circuit says, referencing the Nebraska statute, which is the concern I have, that it did create an undue burden because, in many instances, it would ban the most common procedure of second-trimester abortions, and that is the D&E. You are saying you are drawing it more narrowly so it does not.

Mr. KERREY. Here is the language, I say to the Senator from Pennsylvania, that the court found objectionable, and it sounds awfully similar to your amended version. I want to give you an opportunity to talk to me about it. It says: . . . deliberately and intentionally delivering into the vagina a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure that the person performing such procedure knows will kill the unborn child and does kill the unborn child.

Mr. KERREY. May I ask him one more question?

Mr. KERREY. I will get you the comparative language. Again, I will not give the precise Eighth Circuit compared to yours. You have been on this a lot longer than I have, and I know the Senator from California has as well. Perhaps between the two of you, you can clarify if this change meets the Eighth Circuit's test. I understand that this is one circuit, and you may get--I have voted against other circuits before when they have had decisions, so there is certainly precedent for me ignoring what a court says. But in the earlier discussion we had, I expressed one of the concerns I have. And since we talked earlier, I have talked to an OB/GYN from Omaha who does not, in a normal practice, conduct abortions. What she does is work with women who are pregnant and helps them through their delivery. She is expressing a concern that if she is working with a woman who is having some difficulty, because of the penalties that are in here, she finds herself saying: Am I going to be able to do something that I ordinarily might have done? In other words, you said to me earlier, when I talked about this, that this is for people who intentionally make a decision to go in and get an abortion as opposed to somebody, as this doctor described to me, who is not going in for an abortion. I think it is a very important point because the universe consists of people who get abortions but do not want one; they were intending to deliver, and the doctor, for medical reasons, makes this decision, but the woman may prefer that that not have happened. The doctor is making the decision based upon life and health considerations. And you said to me it has to be the intent. Where in the bill does it say that?

Mr. KERREY. It seems to me that can still easily cover a doctor making a decision with a woman who does not want an abortion, but the abortion is selected by the doctor as a consequence of some complications occurring. What this doctor said to me was----

Mr. KERREY. I appreciate that. I will give that some consideration. I say that I have had a very interesting conversation--both the earlier one and subsequent one with this OB-GYN physician in Omaha-- because, again, she is not an abortion doctor. That is not her practice.

Mr. KERREY. Her practice is in working with women who either are pregnant or want to get pregnant; and that is her business.

Mr. KERREY. I just faxed the language to her, both the amended version and the original version. Again, one of the problems that all of us have--I have two problems: One, as a man, I have difficulty trying to figure all this out; but secondly, as a nonphysician, I have a difficult time figuring it out. She starts talking to me and says: Understand, the cervical arteries are at 3 and 9 o'clock. What you are dealing with here is a situation where you can produce damage. You have to be careful not to. In other words, she is saying to me: Understand that delivery itself is a life-threatening process--as the Senator from Pennsylvania knows all too well. Delivery itself is a life-threatening process to the mother, and decisions are being made by the physician as to what to do and what not to do. And she is very concerned that this will make it difficult for her to continue her practice. As I said, I faxed it to her. And I look forward to further colloquies with the Senator.

Mr. KERREY. I appreciate that. I said earlier, when we had our colloquy, that I am comfortable in my position in saying I believe a woman or doctor, physician, should--and her spiritual counselor--be making this decision. I consider myself to be a pro-choice individual as a consequence of that. I supported Medicaid funding because I think it is hypocritical of me not to if I am going to let people who have the means get a legal procedure. But this procedure troubles me. I have voted against you on a number of occasions. And I have promised people in Nebraska I would keep an open mind. I listened, especially last evening, to your arguments. And I am willing to keep an open mind on this.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I had asked the Senator from Oregon if I could speak for no more than 5 minutes. I want to engage the Senator from Wisconsin in a colloquy on campaign finance reform. I will leave and let the two Senators work it out. He was kind to say I could go ahead of him. Is that OK?

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I come to the floor to describe why I think it is very important to hang on to the bill the Senator from Wisconsin and the Senator from Arizona have put before us on campaign finance reform. There will be all kinds of amendments offered to change the bill, some of which I support strongly. It seems to me our only chance of getting this legislation passed is to stick as closely as possible to the bill we currently have in front of us. I have had a fair amount of experience in soliciting soft money contributions from donors. I can say that both the contributors and myself, and anybody else who solicits, would have a difficult time denying they are extremely uncomfortable with the dollar amounts that are coming into political parties, or for that matter--I have never done it--for individual organizations that are spending money in a so-called generic fashion as well. One of the reasons, I say to the Senator from Wisconsin, I feel strongly that change is needed is because we have added a fourth requirement to the Constitution for service in the Senate. The Constitution lays out three requirements for someone who wants to run for office--you have to be a U.S. citizen for 9 years; you have to be 30 years of age; and you have to live in the State for whose office you are running. But there has been a fourth requirement added, and that is you have to be able to raise enough money or you will not be a credible candidate. Those who have been challenged before, those who have run for office will tell you, if you do not have enough money to advertise on television--I know the Senator from Wisconsin ran on an anti-incumbent strategy, but it is very difficult for most citizens. In Nebraska, there are only a handful of people who are eligible given that fourth requirement. I wonder if the Senator from Wisconsin will tell me if what I am saying is true. I like Shays-Meehan. I like the bill. The junior Senator from Nebraska, Mr. Hagel, has an amendment I like as well. The trouble is, when these amendments are adopted, if these amendments are adopted, it reduces the chances of our defeating a declared filibuster. It makes it much more likely we will fail to break a filibuster and, as a consequence of that failure, fail to enact legislation, and as a consequence of that, we will never go to conference and never change the law. I wonder if he can comment on that a bit because there are a lot of us who will be facing amendments coming up on this bill. The comment we will have is: Gee, I like that amendment; why not vote for it? There may be a good answer why not to vote for it. It may be the amendment will make it difficult for us to succeed in changing the law and reducing, in my mind--I understand and appreciate the problem of apparent corruption. I would like to get that out of the system. The big thing I see in the system right now is we have a very high barrier to public service, and it is much harder, as a consequence, to persuade men and women that they ought to take one of us on and try to come and serve their State and Nation.

Mr. KERREY. The Senator is very kind to say I have always been a supporter. Actually I have not always been a supporter. When I came to the Senate in 1989, this was not a very important issue. Indeed, at one point, I joined the Senator from Kentucky, Mr. McConnell, to defeat campaign finance reform. Then I had the experience of going inside the beast in 1996, 1997, and 1998 when I was Chairman of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee--I do not want to raise a sore subject for the Senator from Maine. It changed my attitude in two big ways: One, the apparent corruption that exists. People believe there is corruption. If they believe it, it happens. We all understand that. If the perception is it is A, it is A even though we know it may not be, and the people believe the system is corrupt. Equally important to me, I discovered in 1996, 1997, and 1998 that there are men and women who would love to serve. They say: I can't be competitive; I can't possibly raise the money necessary to go on television; oh, and by the way, my reputation could get damaged as a consequence of what could be said on television against me. I am persuaded this law needs to be changed for the good of the Republic, for the good of democracy. I hope Members, such as myself, who are enthusiastic about changing that law will take the advice of the Senator from Wisconsin and the Senator from Arizona to heart because we may have to vote against things we prefer in order to make certain we get something that not only we want but the Nation desperately needs.

Mr. KERREY

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, in the waning days of his administration, President Eisenhower proposed a test ban treaty to end all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in the oceans, and under the ground. Nearly four decades later, the Senate stands on the verge of a vote on ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I will vote in favor of ratification. I regret the move to postpone a vote because I am of the firm conviction this treaty will help end the proliferation of nuclear weapons and increase the safety of the American people. President Eisenhower proposed the test ban having recognized the increasing danger posed by nuclear weapons. At that time, the threat was very real. The American people had a vivid understanding of the devastating consequences of nuclear weapons. Those of us in our fifties remember the threat and the fear that we had as children--the duck and cover drills, the constant reminders of the devastation that a single nuclear weapon could produce to our cities and to our communities. In many ways, the problem we have today comes from our success because the fear we once had has been displaced by a false sense of complacency, a sense of security that, in my view, is not justified, given the facts. I would like to illustrate this danger by a realistic scenario, in my view, with a single Russian nuclear weapon. It is possible for a small band of discontented or terroristic members of either the Russian society or some other nation to raid a silo of Russian missiles in the Russian wilderness. Soldiers who are poorly trained, sparsely equipped, and irate at not having been paid in a year are easily overtaken or are willing to cooperate. Let's pick one city to illustrate the damage. I, again, call to my colleagues' attention that this kind of game playing, this kind of example was quite common as recently as 10 years ago. But today, when you ask what kind of damage could occur as a result of a single nuclear blast, you are apt to have people scratching their heads, wondering what could happen. So let me take Chicago as an example. First of all, unlike many of the other threats in the world, if a rocket left Russia, it would arrive in Chicago within an hour, probably taking a trajectory over the top of the world across the Arctic pole. It would detonate in Chicago within an hour, and on a bad day it would hit a target within a few hundred yards off Lake Michigan. We spent a great deal of time assessing the danger of the nation of China. Their missiles are not connected to their warheads. Their warheads are disconnected; they are not together. It would take them several days and they are not targeted with the accuracy and would not arrive with the same swiftness as an unauthorized or accidental launch coming from Russia. The first effect of the blast would be the nuclear flash. The air would be heated to 10 million degrees Celsius. The blast would move out at a few hundred kilometers a second and its heat would be sufficient to set fire to anything combustible at a distance of 14 kilometers. People within 80 kilometers would be blinded. The blast effect would follow. It would travel out from ground zero. Within 3 kilometers, those who had not already been killed would die from this percussive force. The details of this kind of a blast needs to be understood by the American people as this debate goes forward, because the good news of the end of the cold war has been replaced with the bad news that we are increasingly at risk of individuals or nonnation state people who choose to do damage to the United States of America and do not care if they die in the execution of their mission. They are willing to attack the United States of America and they are willing to take American lives without regard to the fact that they may die in the execution of their mission. A single Russian nuclear weapon launched accidentally, or a single nuclear weapon assembled by some rogue nation and delivered by whatever the means to the United States of America, would do more damage than any other threat we currently have on the horizon. A single Russian submarine that was taken over by a similar sort of dissident faction could launch 64 one-hundred-kiloton weapons at the United States. I do not come here to alarm anybody about this. I come simply to remind people that nuclear weapons are still the only threat that could kill every single American. It would not take thousands to bring the United States of America to its knees. It would not take the kind of total attack we once feared from the Soviet Union to bring America from being the most powerful economic and military force on the Earth to being somewhat short of No. 1, not only putting us at increasing risk but putting the rest of the world at risk as well. CTBT is by no means the only thing we must do in order to reduce the risk of proliferation. I would like to go through a few ideas prior to talking about both our capacity to verify and the confidence I have that we can maintain our stockpile without the need to test. First, we have to maintain our intelligence capabilities: our ability to collect intelligence, to process, to disseminate, to deliver that intelligence to warfighters is far and away the best in the world. Talk to our allies in Kosovo, in Bosnia, in Desert Storm; talk to any of those whose lives were at risk and were allied with the United States of America in a military effort and they will tell you our intelligence collection and dissemination capability gave us the capacity to do the impossible. Our intelligence agencies, from time to time, make very highly publicized mistakes. Unfortunately, the publicity given to those mistakes gives some a lack of confidence in our capability of doing our mission. That lack of confidence is misplaced. We are an open society. As a consequence, we tend--correctly so--to examine the things we do when we make mistakes. Unfortunately, at times it produces a situation where we are afraid of doing things because we are worried we are going to make a highly publicized mistake and therefore that mistake is going to ruin our career or make it difficult for us to advance. As a consequence, we sometimes are a little too cautious. Americans should not suffer the illusion we currently have the intelligence capacity to know everything that is going on in the world; we simply do not. Indeed, we should not. We are not, as well, allocating enough resources, in my view, to make certain policymakers of the future are informed so conflicts that might occur can be avoided and so nuclear threats can be confronted before they emerge to be challenges. The second tool that must be maintained to confront the emerging nuclear threat is not only a strong military but an intent to use that military to meet any individual or nation state that threatens the United States of America. Our military is the envy of the world. While we must avoid the temptation of using our military forces in situations not vital to U.S. interests, we must also continue to maintain the will to use military force in instances in which our national security is at risk. The third tool is national missile defense. I support the creation of a limited national missile defense designed to protect the United States of America from rogue state ballistic missile launches and accidental launches. While the success of the recent test of a prototype missile defense system demonstrates that limited national missile defense is possible, we must also realize it is not a panacea for the dangers we will confront. The fourth tool in our effort to secure the post-cold-war peace is further reductions in the American and Russian nuclear arsenals. I have argued on the Senate floor previously the President should immediately take bold action to restart the arms control process. If we do not drastically reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, the danger of their accidental use or proliferation will increase exponentially. I recognize that deep reductions--while decreasing the chance of unauthorized or accidental launch--could actually increase the danger of material proliferation. Therefore, any such parallel reductions in our nuclear forces must include arrangements and a U.S. commitment to provide funding to secure and manage the resultant nuclear material. This is the fifth tool. We are fortunate we will not begin from scratch on this problem. We can build on one of the greatest acts of the post- cold-war statesmanship, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. The final piece of the nuclear safety puzzle is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I support the CTBT because I believe it will enhance U.S. national security, reduce nuclear dangers, and keep the American people safe. Let me explain how. First, a fully implemented CTBT will all but halt the ability of threshold states from establishing an effective and reliable strategic nuclear force. The inability of nations such as Iran and North Korea to conduct nuclear tests will make it much less likely for them to become nuclear powers. Along the same line, the inability of existing nuclear states to conduct further nuclear tests will impede, if not stop, their efforts to make technological advances in yields and miniaturization, advances already achieved by the United States. Bluntly speaking, we have the most effective and deadly nuclear force in the world. Therefore, to maintain our existing nuclear edge, it is in our interest to ratify the CTBT and to halt the nuclear development advancement of other nations. In addition, we all have experienced coming to this Chamber to vote on a sanction imposed upon an individual nation as a consequence of us judging correctly that that nation poses a threat and, in many cases, a potential nuclear threat to the United States of America. We struggle with that vote because we know a unilateral sanction by the United States of America will oftentimes be used by our allies as a means for them to capture the market share of some product we were selling to that nation. With this treaty, it is far more likely the Security Council will support multilateral sanctions that will enable us to get the desired effect without us having to suffer adverse consequences as a consequence of unilateral sanctions. In the post-cold-war era, nuclear weapons have become the Rolex wristwatch of international security, a costly purchase whose real purpose is not the service it provides but the prestige it confers. Ratification and implementation of the CTBT is in our national security interest precisely because it will help slow the expansion of the nuclear club and make it more difficult for nations to acquire these deadly weapons. Opponents of the CTBT focus their criticisms on two main points: verifiability of the treaty and the safety of our nuclear stockpile. Let me address each of these issues separately. First, we can effectively monitor and verify CTBT. I purposely say ``effectively monitor and verify'' because absolute verification is neither attainable nor a necessary standard. But it is the standard that some have attempted to establish as a benchmark for ratification. No treaty is absolutely verifiable. My support for this treaty comes from my firm conviction that by using existing assets, the United States can effectively monitor and verify this treaty. I base my convictions on the testimony of Gen. John Gordon, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and on the briefings on this topic received by the Intelligence Committee over the years and, most important, the performance of those men and women who work in a variety of agencies whose task it is to collect, to process, to evaluate, to analyze, and to disseminate intelligence to national customers, as well as war fighters who are defending the people of the United States of America. The United States has the capability to detect any test that can threaten our nuclear deterrence. The type of test that could be conducted without our knowledge could only be marginally useful and would not cause a shift in the existing strategic nuclear balance. In addition, the United States has the capability to detect the level of testing that would be required for another country to develop and to weaponize an advanced thermonuclear warhead. Our intelligence community is the best in the world. This gives us an enormous lead over every other signatory. Public disclosures of intelligence community problems may have shaken confidence in our intelligence capabilities, but let me assure my colleagues that their confidence should not be shaken. U.S. intelligence has the ability to know what is occurring around the world regarding the development of nuclear weapons. It is our intelligence community that largely gives Secretary Cohen and General Shelton their confidence to say the treaty should be ratified because it is in our national interest to do so. I will briefly describe how we will know what is happening when someone tries to cheat. I will use all caution to make certain I give away nothing that will provide our enemies with indications of what our sources or our methods are, but I urge colleagues who doubt this to get full briefings on what our collection capability is and what we are able to do to determine whether or not somebody is in violation of this treaty. I will briefly describe, as I said, and because the existence of this highly secretive organization, the National Reconnaissance Office, has finally been declassified--we are able now to admit that from space, the United States can see you and can gather signals intelligence. I urge colleagues to get a full briefing on what the NRO can do in a classified fashion. I believe my colleagues fully understand the significance of what I just said. Every part of the globe is accessible from space. There you will find satellite reconnaissance either watching or collecting electrical signals from those who would do damage to the United States of America. That is a tremendous capability that no one else can equal. This global accessibility from space is just one feature of a very complicated and complex system of collecting and analyzing information. The National Security Agency is a second feature. They exploit foreign communications. That is the official unclassified description of its mission: NSA exploits foreign communications. Recently, Hollywood has enjoyed making a couple of movies showing how NSA is a threat to our Nation. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is a Hollywood make-believe story that is completely inaccurate and false. NSA is not a threat to us. If you are an unfriendly foreign government wanting to cheat on CTBT, NSA is certainly a threat to you. To quote from their official unclassified agency description: ``They are on the cutting edge of information technology.'' They know what is going on in the explosion of information technology. There is a third area beyond NSA, and that is called MASINT. It is a pretty strange term for most people. It means measurement and signatures intelligence, the recognition that in addition to being seen and being heard, objects, especially electronic objects, have other signatures. Like your personal signature--if we collect enough information about someone's signature, it is not like anything else, it is unique, and we know exactly what it is, and we are collecting MASINT. The Central Intelligence Agency gives us a fourth important feature. The CIA employs a network of agents around the world who constantly provide what is called HUMINT, human intelligence. HUMINT is a term of art which simply recognizes people tend to talk, and when they do talk, we try to have an agent listening. If an agent hears something, it is fed into a fifth and important feature of the agency, and that is the CIA Directorate of Intelligence. The men and women of the CIA DI sift through enormous amounts of data every day and separate fact from fiction, truth from lies. Through their analysis of all intelligence sources, they provide policymakers with crisp statements of what our potential adversaries are doing and not doing. If information is out there to get, we will get it. If it is important, we will analyze it and understand it. Once we understand it, policymakers will make sound decisions if someone decides to cheat on the CTBT. I am trying to paint a picture of just how sophisticated our intelligence community is. It is a community that on occasion has been fooled, but it has not been fooled often, and it has rarely been fooled for very long. We have a world-class intelligence capability. We can count on the intelligence community to monitor the CTBT and effectively verify it. A second argument that has been used against the treaty by some is based upon the suspension of nuclear testing required by the CTBT and the argument that this will jeopardize the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. I have an extremely high level of confidence in the nuclear stockpile even without continued testing. The science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program, on which the United States is spending $4.5 billion a year, is maintaining our technological edge without the need for further testing for the foreseeable future. This program is based on the most advanced science in the world. It is based on over 50 years of nuclear experience. It is based on the results of over 1,000 American nuclear tests. It is a program that relies on the ability and ingenuity of U.S. scientists to maintain our nuclear edge. But it is also a program that recognizes the need to build in adequate safeguards to ensure safety and reliability. The Stockpile Stewardship Program requires a rigorous annual review of the entire nuclear stockpile. As a part of this regime, both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy must certify to the President on an annual basis the stockpile is safe and is reliable. Should either Secretary be unable to offer this certification, the President, in consultation with Congress, is prepared to exercise the right of the United States to withdraw from the treaty and to resume testing. The United States has not conducted a nuclear test for over 7 years, but the American people should understand our nuclear stockpile is safe. Both the safeguards and the science exists to continue to assure its safety well into the future. And since we have made the decision we do not need to test, it only makes sense that we use the CTBT to end testing throughout the world. Reflecting on his time in office, and his failure to achieve the goal of a nuclear test ban, President Eisenhower stated: ``Disarmament . . . is a continuous imperative. . . . Because this need is so sharp and apparent, I confess I lay down my official responsibilities in this field with a definite sense of disappointment.'' The Senate now has the opportunity to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We should ratify this treaty because, just as when it was first proposed nearly 4 decades ago, it is a positive step toward reducing nuclear dangers and improving the safety of the American people. I yield the floor. Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.