Member of Congress
John Kerry
- Role
- Former Senator
- State
- MA
- Party
- Democrat
Speeches
SBIR/STTR REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1999--Continued2010-12-18
Mr. KERRY
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, so I now understand that we now have a revised request, which is that between now and the hour of 3 o'clock, there will be an opportunity for Senators to speak either on the amendment or on don't ask, don't tell, and following the vote at 3 o'clock on don't ask, don't tell, there would then be a vote on the McCain amendment. Is that correct? I agree with that.
Mr. KERRY. I think that makes sense.
Mr. KERRY. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, it is my understanding that the Senator from Pennsylvania is here and wants to speak. Then, I think the Senator from New Jersey is on his way over to speak. Because there have been a number of speeches on the START treaty against it and a number of arguments laid out, I wish to have an opportunity to speak to them. I ask unanimous consent that at 2:30 I be permitted to speak for about 15 minutes.
Mr. KERRY. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, before the Senator gets going, I think we have an understanding. Just so the record is clear, how much Republican time remains at this point?
Mr. KERRY. So it is my understanding they will each have about 10 minutes. I think Senator Kyl and Senator Sessions will speak, at which point I will have an opportunity to speak, and then Senator McCain, since it is his amendment, would have the last 10 minutes at that point.
Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, would you inform me when I have used 4 minutes?
Mr. KERRY. Our colleagues are fighting against a phantom. All of this argument they have been going on for several days with is about language that has no binding impact on this treaty whatsoever. Senator Kyl acknowledged that yesterday. He also acknowledged that if you change it, it requires this treaty to go back to the Russian Government, and then we don't have this treaty. We don't have any verification for whatever number of months that follow. I will come back to that. A moment ago, Senator Kyl said the Russians didn't want to continue the verification methods of START. He somehow insinuates that because they didn't want to continue it, what we have here is something less than what we ought to have for ourselves. We didn't want to continue the verification and process of START as it existed. In fact, the Bush administration was told that. He knows that. This is phantom debate, what we have going on here. The target is the treaty itself, not this language, because this language doesn't have any legal binding impact on the treaty. In a moment, I will share what impact it has. Our friends on the other side of the aisle are supplanting their judgment for the judgment of Secretary Gates. We have the right to do that, and you can do that. But I ask people to weigh whether Secretary Gates, who was appointed by George Bush and held over by President Obama, has anything except the interests of our country at heart when he makes this statement in his testimony: So, you know, the Russians can say what they want, but, as Secretary Clinton said, these unilateral statements are totally outside the treaty. They have no standing. They are not binding. They never have been. Do you know what the Soviets said at the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on nuclear space arms concerning the interrelationship between strategic defensive weapons compliance with the treaty--and this is START I. They said: In connection with the treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on reduction and limitations of strategic defensive arms, the Soviet side states the following: This treaty may be effective and viable only under conditions of compliance with the treaty between the United States and the USSR on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems as signed May 26, 1972. That was their signing statement, just like this signing statement. Guess what. The United States of America saw our national security interests in getting out from under the ABM Treaty. We got out from under the ABM treaty. This language, just like the language we are debating today, meant nothing at all. They stayed in the treaty. They didn't pull out. So we are debating something that has no impact whatsoever on this treaty. Let me go a little further. Secretary Gates said further: So from the very beginning of this process, more than 40 years ago, the Russians have hated missile defense. It's because we can afford it and they can't. And we're going to be able to build a good one, and are building a good one, and they probably aren't. And they don't want to devote the resources to it, so they try and stop us from doing it, through political means. This treaty doesn't accomplish that for them. My God, after several days, either the Secretary of Defense--and how about LTG Patrick O'Reilly, whose job it is to defend the United States against missile attack. He is the man who runs this agency day to day. You know what he said: Relative to the recently expired START Treaty, New START Treaty [this treaty we are voting on] actually reduces constraints on the development of the missile defense program. We have our own leader of the Missile Defense Agency telling us that this is an advantage for the United States of America.
Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair. Let me get to the heart of the argument about why this is so critical. The other side is trying to minimize this, saying you can't say that language has no legal binding authority, it is not that important, and turn around and say we can't change it. That is the nub of their argument--that we have to be able to change it because, if we don't change it, somehow nonbinding language is enough for us to say let's have no verification at all. It is a strange tradeoff. Here is why it matters. Because the preamble is in the instrument that is transmitted to the Senate. Even though it is not the binding component of it, the rules by which we all play are that if you change a comma, or one word, that change has to go back to the Government of Russia, and they have to decide what they want to do. Why is that important relative to this language? Because the public position that they fought for in this negotiation was to achieve binding restraints on U.S. missile defense. That is what they wanted. And as Secretary Gates said--every general and admiral who has looked at this, including Admiral Mullen and General Chilton, have all said they didn't get that. They didn't win that point. We won that point. In any negotiation, when somebody needs something to be able to feel good, or deal with their own politics, sometimes you let them have a little something that is meaningless to you but may mean something to them. That is what we gave them. Take it away and you open this whole treaty. Then they have to figure out how they deal, in other terms, with those politics. I will wait until the classified session that we are going to have on Monday. I can't go into it here, but I will lay out why this treaty is good for the United States and why we believe reopening it would be dangerous. That is why this amendment is dangerous, because it will reopen this and will force--it doesn't constrain us in the least, and the extent to which that is true, I think, will be understood by a lot of colleagues in that session. To make this even more clear, the President of the United States has written a letter today to Majority Leader Harry Reid and to Minority Leader McConnell. In the letter, which Senator Reid has shared with me, it says from the President: The New START Treaty places no limitations on the development or deployment of our missile defense programs. As the NATO Summit meeting in Lisbon last month underscored, we are proceeding apace with a missile defense system in Europe designed to provide full coverage for NATO members on the continent, as well as deployed U.S. forces, against the growing threat posed by proliferation of ballistic missiles. The final phase of the system will also augment our current defenses against intercontinental ballistic missiles from Iran targeted against the United States. All NATO allies agreed in Lisbon that the growing threat of missile proliferation, and our Article 5 commitment of collective defense, requires that the Alliance develop a territorial missile defense capability. It goes on to talk about that capability. Then he says this, which is critical with respect to this debate. This is the President's letter to the leadership: In signing the New START Treaty, the Russian Federation issued a statement that expressed its view that the extraordinary events referred to in Article XIV of the Treaty include a ``build-up in the missile defense capabilities of the United States of America such that it would give rise to a threat to the strategic nuclear potential of the Russian Federation.'' Article XIV(3), as you know, gives each Party the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it believes its supreme interests are jeopardized. The United States did not and does not agree with the Russian statement. We believe that the continued development or deployment of U.S. missile defense systems, including qualitative and quantitative improvements to such systems, do not and will not threaten the strategic balance with the Russian Federation, and have provided policy and technical explanations to Russia on why we believe that to be the case. Although the United States cannot circumscribe Russia's sovereign rights under article XIV, paragraph 3, we believe the continued improvement and deployment of U.S. missile defense systems do not constitute a basis for questioning the effectiveness and viability of the New START treaty and, therefore, would not give rise to circumstances justifying Russia's withdrawal from the treaty. Regardless of Russia's actions in this regard, as long as I am President and as long as the Congress provides the necessary funding, the United States will continue to develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect the United States, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners. My administration plans to deploy all four phases of the EPAA. While advances of technology or future changes in the threat could modify the details or timing of the later phases of the EPAA--one reason this approach is called adaptive--I will take every action available to me to support the deployment of all four phases. Sincerely, Barack Obama, President of the United States. I think this letter speaks for itself. I think the facts are history. I think the testimony of Secretary Gates and all those others who have come before us that makes it clear the United States has no constraints on missile defense whatsoever, makes clear this amendment is not necessary, and this amendment carries with it dangerous implications for the ultimate ratification implication of the treaty. I reserve the remainder of my time.
HONORING AMBASSADOR RICHARD HOLBROOKE2010-12-18
Mr. KERRY
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, today the Senate has been asked to concur with our colleagues in the House and approve a resolution honoring our friend and a great public servant, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, who passed away on Monday. We remember Richard not just as one of America's most distinguished and accomplished statesmen, but as a man who--from Vietnam to his last mission in Afghanistan--really was a warrior for peace. It is fitting that we honor him by approving this resolution. Richard was an incredible combination of the best qualities of the human spirit--a serious thinker who embraced relentless action; a tough-as-nails negotiator who commanded an enormous and infectious sense of humor; and perhaps above all, a diplomat who knew firsthand just how difficult and frustrating engagement could be, but in his life's legacy reminded all of us just how much engagement could accomplish. Richard's passing is almost incomprehensible, not just because it was so sudden, but because I cannot imagine Richard Holbrooke in anything but a state of perpetual motion. He was always working. Always hard- charging in the best sense of the word--he had an immense presence--and a brilliance matched only by his perseverance and his passion. He once complained that the bureaucracy in Washington all too often saw suffering around the world as an abstraction. He took Hannah Arendt's famous phrase and flipped it around, saying that sometimes our biggest battles were against the ``evils of banality.'' Well, Richard waged--and won--his share of battles against banality and inertia. He was always a man on a mission, the toughest mission, and that mission was waging peace through never-quit diplomacy--and Richard's life's work saved more lives in more places than we can measure. He simply got up every day knowing that--even in difficult circumstances where history's verdict is yet to be handed down--every ounce of energy and every drop of sweat held the promise of making things better for people. Yes, Richard had an outsized personality, and it was one that he himself could joke about, even relish. He earned the nickname ``The Bulldozer'' for a reason. But Richard did not push people away. He drew people to him. He was incredibly appreciative of those who worked with him and was unfailingly loyal to them. I remember last January, when Richard came to the Foreign Relations Committee to testify on the war in Afghanistan, he stopped the hearing to introduce his top staff--some 16 people. More than just colleagues, they were his partners. He knew their families and he knew the names of their children. At the State Department he didn't just create an office for Afghanistan and Pakistan, he built a family. His staff returned his affection and loyalty many times over. Foggy Bottom is filled with men and women inspired and mentored by Richard. Ever since Richard fell ill last Friday morning, dozens of friends and family and staff gathered in the lobby of George Washington Hospital to show their support and wait for news of his condition. When I stopped by on Sunday night, I couldn't help but be moved by the love and the concern. And when news of his passing spread, people began spontaneously gathering at the hospital. And then--something that Richard would have understood and appreciated--they went out together and shared stories about him. It was impossible to know Richard and not come away with ``Holbrooke stories.'' Certainly I have my share. Our public careers were intertwined in so many ways, from Vietnam to my Presidential campaign to the conflict in Afghanistan. There were long conference calls, impromptu policy debates when we found ourselves on the same shuttle to LaGuardia, stories shared about our children and lessons learned about being modern Dads, and wonderful wine-filled dinners where we came up with brilliant plans for peace that didn't always seem so brilliant--if they were remembered at all--in the light of day. Richard always made it fun because it is a pleasure to be in the company of someone who loved the job they were doing for the country they loved. And make no mistake--just shy of 70, with a back-breaking schedule--Richard Holbrooke loved what he was doing. And so, wherever chaos and violence threatened American interests and human lives for nearly a half century, wherever there was a need for courage and insight, Richard Holbrooke showed up for duty. He spent his formative years as a young Foreign Service officer in Vietnam, where he worked in the Mekong Delta and then on the staffs of two American ambassadors, Maxwell Taylor and Henry Cabot Lodge. Given the storied expanse of his career, people sometimes forget that Richard wrote a volume of the ``Pentagon Papers,'' the seminal work that helped turn the course of the Vietnam war. And as with all of us who served in Vietnam, Richard's experience there informed his every judgment, and left him with the conviction that time spent working even against long odds to see that peace and diplomacy prevailed over war and violence, was time well-invested for the most powerful of nations and the most determined of diplomats. He was a pragmatist devoted to principle. He believed that the United States could help people around the world at the same time as we defended our interests. Richard once wrote about a meeting he attended in the Situation Room in 1979, when he was Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific. The South China Sea was being flooded with tens of thousands of refugees from Vietnam. They were fleeing the regime there, looking for safe haven somewhere else. But most of them were not making it. Instead, they were drowning. The Seventh Fleet was nearby and could divert to rescue them. But there were those in our government who did not want the Navy to be distracted from its other missions. And besides, what would we do with the refugees? And wouldn't our actions just encourage more people to set sail in rickety boats in an attempt to find freedom? Back and forth the debate went. Ultimately, Vice President Mondale made the decision: America would not stand idly by while people drowned. Richard wrote this: ``At this time and distance it may be hard to conceive that the decision, so clearly right, was almost not made. There are people who are alive today because of Mondale's decision; of very few actions by a government official can such a thing be said.'' Well, we can certainly say that--and more--of Richard Holbrooke. Earlier this week, we marked the 15th anniversary of what was perhaps his greatest legacy. On December 14, 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords brought an end to a 3\1/2\ year war in Bosnia that had claimed tens of thousands of lives and displaced millions. It is a war that would have inflicted far more misery if Richard had not tirelessly shuttled between the Serbs and the Croats and the Bosnians. He laid the groundwork for the peace talks. And then, over 20 days, he charmed, he cajoled, and ultimately he convinced the three principal leaders to end a war. In the years since, ``Dayton'' has become a byword for the kind of aggressive diplomacy that Richard practiced. At Dayton, Richard Holbrooke brought himself and the Nation he represented great honor. We loved that energy, we loved that resolve--that is who Richard was, and he died giving everything he had to one last difficult mission for the country he loved. It is almost a bittersweet bookend that a career of public service that began trying to save a war gone wrong, now ends with a valiant effort to keep another war from going wrong. Over the last 2 years, he and I worked closely together on our policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. His honesty could be bracing, and I loved that about him. He was always solution-seeking--and always so committed to the mission that he never hesitated to leverage the skills of those around him because it was success he sought, not spotlights. Through this resolution, we acknowledge his extraordinary public service and we extend our heartfelt sympathy to his family, especially his extraordinary wife Kati; Richard's two sons, David and Anthony; his stepchildren Elizabeth and Chris Jennings; and his daughter-in-law Sarah. We are reminded how much richer all of our lives have been thanks to the intelligence, humor, and warmth that Richard brought to every day of his life. And we mourn your loss with you. I will miss working with Richard Holbrooke. And I will remember something he said last year about his enduring faith in America despite the many trials we now face. He said, ``I still believe in the possibility of the United States . . . persevering against any challenge.'' It is difficult to imagine wrestling with the challenges of Afghanistan and Pakistan without him, but we are all sustained by the decades-long example Richard set making the possibility of American perseverance more of a reality. And for that our Nation will always be grateful.
Good News (Executive Session)2010-12-17
Mr. KERRY
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, let me say to the Senator it may be we need the Parliamentarian on something, but here is my understanding. There is a distinction, obviously, between an amendment to the treaty and an amendment to the resolution of ratification. Under the parliamentary rules, there is a vagueness, frankly--according, even to the Parliamentarian--as to how you go back and forth. I think in the language in the particular amendment, you can deal with that issue so you can make certain you are either addressing the resolution of ratification or the treaty itself. Technically speaking, the treaty has to be dealt with first and then the resolution of ratification subsequently. We can go back and forth. There is no problem in that. Is that accurate, Mr. President--I ask, through you, the Parliamentarian--that we can take an amendment at any time on either the resolution of ratification or the treaty?
Mr. KERRY. Would the Senator agree with me that we have been open for business for about 2 days now, and this is the third day, and we need to get to a substantive amendment or perhaps to move to close off the debate and have our last 30 hours?
Mr. KERRY. So we could take them at any time; by unanimous consent we could actually be defining what we specifically would be agreeing to deal with. But under the rules, technically, you have to do the treaty and then move that aside and go to the resolution of ratification; is that a fair statement?
Mr. KERRY. I emphasize that if colleagues want to be here, the majority leader has told me he will keep the Senate open Saturday, Sunday, through the weekend, in order to do so. So it is our choice. But I think, in lieu of complaints about the rapidity with which the holiday is arriving, we might spend time on an actual amendment or votes. I yield the floor.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, that is correct, I say to the Senator from Minnesota. I think it was April that it was signed and May when we actually received the submission of the documents themselves.
Mr. KERRY. To simplify matters, let me say this. We are prepared to take any amendment at any time and to proceed to it, and at a time the amendment comes to us and we both get a chance to look at it, we will address the question to the Parliamentarian, whether we need to ask for unanimous consent or to change the initial language of that particular amendment so it fits into that moment. What we will do is abide by the rules and make sure the amendment is appropriate. But we will take any amendment at any time as we always have in dealing with a treaty. We have always been able to resolve this question of where it applies. In the end, once we have moved onto the final 30 hours of debate, it is irrelevant anyway; we simply conclude.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, we have no intention of trying to use any technicality to deny an ability to offer an amendment. When each amendment comes up, we will find a way to make certain it is appropriate. We obviously have to send a signal at this point where you have to go off the treaty and onto the resolution of ratification. That happens automatically when we file cloture. So once that is done, it really becomes irrelevant.
Mr. KERRY. No. There still are germane amendments allowed to the resolution of ratification at that point, providing we have at that point completed issues on the treaty.
Mr. KERRY. Correct. Once it has been invoked, that is correct. Let me say a couple of things to my friend, if I may. I know he has to run, but in his earlier argument with respect to the prompt global strike--we can get into this, and we will a little bit later, but he said something about how you could eliminate the issue of confusion with the Russians because you could just agree with them, and they could agree, and then you have sort of an identification. The whole point is, they won't agree. They are not going to agree. You can't sort of make this supposition all of a sudden that you can erase a problem simply because they will agree to something they don't want to agree to, which is why we are in the place we are with respect to that issue. That is No. 1. No. 2, we made the decision, our generals made the decision, our defense folks, that we are better off with this because it, in fact, gives us a greater capacity to be able to verify what they are doing as well as what we are doing and to understand the makeup of ICBMs as we go forward. I won't go into this at great length, but let me say to the Senator, I urge him to reread the resolution of ratification. In that resolution, condition 6 addresses these questions. Condition 7 addresses these questions. Understanding 5 addresses strategic range nonnuclear weapons systems and declaration 3 addresses them. I will not go through all of that language right now, but we have addressed this question. Any future treaty with respect to this question of global zero that keeps coming back up--I will talk about this later with the Senator, but the Senator must have a very different vision of where he would like to see the world go and of what would be in the long-term interest globally and of what the impact is of multiple nuclear weapons in the world with a lot more fissionable material, a lot more ability for terrorists to be able to access that fissionable material. The fact is that in testimony before our committee, Secretary Baker was very clear about the linkage of the Nunn-Lugar threat reduction program and the START treaty. He said directly to the committee that were it not for the START treaty, we would not have been able to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons and therefore the amount of fissionable material that in many cases was badly guarded or not guarded at all and completely available to the possibility of black market sale and falling into the hands of terrorists. There are many ways to proceed forward. I would also say to my friend, with respect to this global nuclear zero, it is stunning to me that colleagues are coming to the floor fighting against an organizing principle and concept for how you could move the entire world to a safer place, ultimately, none of which will happen, clearly, without extraordinary changes globally in the way nations relate to each other and behave, how you control fissionable material, and what kind of dispute resolution mechanisms might be available in the future. But, for heaven's sake, it is incredible to me that you cannot imagine and have a vision of the possibility of a world in which you ultimately work to get this. That is the purpose of human endeavor in this field, in a sense. It is why we have a United Nations. It is why President after President has talked about a world without nuclear weapons, a world that is safer. Does that mean that all of a sudden we are discarding the present day notion of deterrence? No. Does that mean we are ignoring the reality of how countries have made judgments over the course of the Cold War about peace and war and what the risk is of going to war? Obviously not. One of the things the Navy did for me was send me to nuclear, chemical, biological warfare school, and I spent an interesting time learning about throw weight and the concentric circles of damage and the extent to which one nuclear weapon wreaks havoc in the world. The concept, to me, of 1,550 of them aimed at each other is still way above any sort of reasonable standards, in my judgment, about what it takes to deter. Do you think we would think about bombing China today or going to war with them? China has, in published, unclassified assessments, one-tenth maybe of the number of weapons we have. I do not think they are feeling particularly threatened by the United States in that context, nor we they, because you arrive at other ways of sort of working through these kinds of things. So I just think this concept of a nuclear zero is so irrelevant to this debate, particularly given the fact that we are debating a treaty which is the only way to agree to reduce the weapons that requires 67 votes in the Senate. So even if President Obama wanted to try to do something in the future, this treaty does not open the door to it because it would require a next treaty in order to accomplish it and that would require 67 votes and it is pretty obvious you would never get that in the Senate in the current world. So what are we talking about here? It is sort of a distraction. It is one of these hobgoblins of some folks who are so ideologically narrowly focused that they cannot see the forest for the trees. The choice is between having a treaty that gives you inspection, that every Member of our intelligence community says can be verified, that helps to provide security or not having one and having no inspection and having no verification--none, whatsoever. That is the choice. This is not particularly complicated, unless you want to make it so, for a whole lot of other reasons. So the concept that doing this treaty is a distraction from dealing with terror is absolutely contradicted by the facts. Witness what Jim Baker and others have said about the Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction Program and its linkage to START I, not to mention the myriad of other benefits that come, and there you see what Russia has done with the United States in recent months to move with respect to Iran. If we had not had a reset button, if we had not improved the relationship with Russia, if we had not been able to share information and have a cooperative atmosphere, partly increased by virtue of this treaty agreement, if we had not done that, Russia would not have joined with the United States because the relationship would not have been such that they would have been willing to in order to bring greater sanctions against Iran and try to deal with Iran's nuclear program. So all of these things are linked. To suggest somehow that you can walk in here and just separate them and treat them differently is to ignore the nature of government-to-government relations, to ignore the nature of bilateral relationships, to ignore the nature of human nature in which people react to what other people do, and countries are the same way. They react to the sense of where we are headed. By working together cooperatively, I think we have been able to say we are headed in the same direction, and that is an important message. There is a lot more to be said on all this, but I yield the floor.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Rhode Island. I first of all thank him for his generous comments on a personal level. But let me thank him for his work. I think everybody in the Senate will agree he is, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, one of the most respected voices in the Senate, one of the most diligent, hard- working members of that committee. He knows and understands our weapons systems, our military needs, our security concerns as well as anybody in the Senate. I have enjoyed enormously the history that he provided in his discussion today. I think it is an important predicate to this debate and I thank him for his work very much, and for the comments he made on the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
EXECUTIVE SESSION2010-12-17
Mr. KERRY
Mr. KERRY. We are prepared to vote actually on the treaty, but they have several amendments. We want to give them time to have those amendments. We are prepared to vote on this amendment. In fairness, let me be clear. I want to be clear to the Senator from Illinois. I don't think our colleagues have used the process, in terms of this amendment. They have tried in good faith to line up speakers. I think it is important that they have an opportunity to thoroughly debate it and some other amendments. So I am certainly not joining in suggesting they have delayed this with this amendment. I think we have gotten into a good debate and we ought to be able to finish it.
Mr. KERRY. Absolutely. Madam President, I would say, obviously, that depends somewhat on what the majority leader's decision is with respect to some of that schedule, but in terms of what we are prepared to do, I believe we can work on it tomorrow. It is my understanding the majority leader said he thought we would be, as well as on Sunday. The majority leader is prepared to continue to proceed forward on this agreement.