John Kerry

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Reserving the right to object.

Mr. KERRY. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Several Senators addressed the Chair.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I want to speak with respect to the amendment that seeks to make it more difficult for large companies to be able to participate in the Advanced Technology Program. As a matter of background, Mr. President, for years in this country, we had a structure where we had the Bell Laboratories, or IBM, and other very large entities who were engaged in major research and technology. And for years, this country's economy benefited enormously because of the remarkable amount of private sector and public sector research. The defense industry and other industries had an enormous amount of spinoff. If you look at something like the experience of Route 128 in Massachusetts, or the Silicon Valley, everybody understands that some of the great technology jobs of the present time come from the 1960's and 1970's spinoffs through that investment. The fact is that our economic structure has changed very significantly in the 1990's. We no longer have that kind of broad-based technology research fueled by the Federal Government. We have a much more specific and targeted kind of research that takes place. And as a result of that, both the Federal Government and the private sector have narrowed the kind of basic science and research that we do, which often results in those spinoffs, which has provided the remarkable foundation of the economic growth we are experiencing now in our Nation. It is also ironic that, at the very time that we are doing that, Japan and other countries are increasing their technology investment. I believe, last year, Japan committed to a 50-percent increase in their national commitment to science and basic technology research. So the truth is that, a number of years ago, the Commerce Committee, with the leadership of Senator Hollings, Senator Rockefeller, myself and others, created what is known as the Advanced Technology Program, which is a way to joint venture in the United States between our universities and our laboratories and various entities in the private sector, in order to maximize what was a diminishing ability to move science from the laboratory to the shelf, to the marketplace. It would be most regrettable to turn around now and reduce the capacity of a large company to be able to be part of a consortium, to be able to joint venture with smaller companies in an effort to fill that vacuum and make up for that scientific research. In point of fact, Mr. President, let me just share a couple of success stories from the Advanced Technology Program from 16 different States in our country. The Advanced Technology Program put together a device that would allow blood cells from a patient to be grown in large quantities, consequently reducing health care costs, requiring fewer blood transfusions and improving treatment possibilities for patients with cancer, AIDS, and genetic blood diseases. It developed manufacturing technologies and practices that substantially improved the fit of auto body parts during automated assembly of metal parts, which resulted in United States auto manufacturers making cars and trucks with less wind noise, tighter fitting doors and windshields, fewer rattles, and higher customer satisfaction, and potentially increasing United States auto manufacturers' gain in the world market. Another example of success was a development of a new way to solder electronic circuit boards that uses less solder, and is more precise, more efficient, and environmentally benign than current technologies. In addition, there was a development of a process to develop ultrafine ceramic powders that can be heat pressed into parts such as piston heads and turbine blades, and those significantly impact parts manufacturing. Somebody might sit there and say, well, OK, Senator, these things are all well and good, why didn't these companies just go do it on their own? Why should the Federal Government be involved in supporting that? The answer to that is the reason that we ought to keep this program going: The reality is that the way money functions in the marketplace, it seems it's the best return on investment, fastest or safest, but it doesn't often commit to take some of the higher risks, particularly given the change within the marketplace today. It is a known fact--you can talk to any venture capitalist, and talk to anybody out there seeking the capital--that it is only because of programs like the Advanced Technology Program, where the Government is willing to share not only in the risk, but in the burden of trying to find the processes and the technologies, that we can advance in helping to bring together the special combinations, where we have been able to make things happen that simply would not happen otherwise. We have created jobs, we have advanced ourselves in the world marketplace. We have maintained our competitive edge as a consequence of this commitment. And to create this arbitrary, sort of means-tested, very precise process of eliminating a whole group of companies that have great technology, but may not be willing to share it with smaller companies absent this joint risk, would be an enormous loss to the American competitive edge. That is the reason that it is so important for the United States to continue this effort. It is also a fact that while large firms are able to pay for their own research and development, they are not always going to pay for the longer term, higher risk, broader applied technology principles that other nations or other companies might benefit from without paying for it. So, Mr. President, I strongly urge colleagues not to respond to the sort of simple view of this adopting a notion that a large company is automatically able to take care of itself and eliminate this program. We need large companies in combination with small, we need large companies lending expertise to our universities, we need large companies to be part of this combination. Without this combination, those companies, Mr. President, will not make this commitment and America will lose in the marketplace. I urge my colleagues to reject the Brownback amendment. I thank the Senator from Pennsylvania again for his courtesy.

Mr. KERRY. I would be pleased to have 6 or 7 minutes.

Mr. KERRY. Well, Mr. President, if I could inquire again of the Senator--and I appreciate his indulgence here. I did want to speak with respect to the amendment that is pending for the vote at 2 o'clock. It is my understanding that the amendment being submitted by the Senator will not be voted on at 2. So I ask the distinguished Senator if he might be willing to agree to permit some period of time--and I don't need a lot-- before 2 o'clock so that I might speak on the pending amendment.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, can I ask the Senator from Pennsylvania what his intentions may be with respect to the floor, timewise?

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed as in morning business.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, today I am introducing the Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers Act of 1997, a bill to place restrictions on military assistance and arms transfers to governments that are not democratic, do not respect human rights, are engaged in armed aggression, or are not participating in the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms. Before I discuss the specifics of the legislation, I want to take a moment to pay tribute to our former colleague and long-time champion of this effort, Senator Mark Hatfield. During his four terms in the Senate, Senator Hatfield developed a reputation as a man committed to the search for peace and a staunch advocate of nonmilitary solutions for international problems. It was natural for Senator Hatfield to take the lead in an effort to make U.S. arms sales policy more reflective of American values. He did not succeed in winning passage of a Code of Conduct, but he placed the issue in front of the Senate and the public, and moved the debate forward. I am sure he is gratified to see that the House of Representatives adopted a version of the Code as an amendment to the bill to authorize State Department activities for fiscal year 1998. I am honored to follow in his footsteps and introduce derivative legislation, the 1997 Code of Conduct Act. The Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers Act embodies a fundamental shift in the way that the United States will deal with the transfer of conventional weapons to the rest of the world. Like many other aspects of our national security structure, arms sales and other military assistance must be adjusted to the realities of the post-cold-war era. The central theme of our foreign policy has changed from containment of communism to expansion of democracy. We no longer need to send massive amounts of weaponry to our surrogates around the world in an arms race against communism. Instead we must evaluate the effect that arms transfers have on regional stability, the promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights. Unfortunately, our arms transfer policies have not adjusted to this reality. The United States continues to be the primary supplier of arms to the world. We ranked first in arms transfer agreements with developing nations from 1988 to 1995. In 1995 the United States ranked first in deliveries to the developing world for the fourth year in row. The United States share of all arms transfers to developing nations rose from 11.1 percent in 1988 to 44.1 percent in 1995. In constant dollars the United States has increased deliveries to developing nations from $5.5 billion in 1988 to $9.5 billion in 1995. It is disturbing to me that an analysis done by the Project on Demilitarization and Democracy revealed that, of the arms transfers to developing nations over a 4-year period, 85 percent went to non- Democratic governments. It is clear that other factors, including short-term economic benefits from sales, dominate the U.S. Government's decision making process concerning arms sales and the nature of the recipient regimes appears to be of little consequence. The Code of Conduct seeks to elevate the consideration of democracy, human rights and nonaggression from their current status as policy afterthoughts to primary criteria for decisions on arms transfers. A quote from a February 17, 1995 press release from the White House illustrates--by what it omits--the unfortunate tendency to ignore these factors. The release states, in part: ``The U.S. continues to view transfers of conventional arms as a legitimate instrument of U.S. foreign policy--deserving U.S. government support--when they enable us to help friends and allies deter aggression, promote regional security, and increase interoperability of U.S. forces and allied forces. * * * The U.S. will exercise unilateral restraint in cases where overriding national security or foreign policy interests require us to do so.'' The criteria denoted in that statement are, indeed, critical components of a sound U.S. policy on arms transfers and should continue to be considered as such. But the statement omits what should be the very important consideration of the effects arms transfers are likely to have on democratization, nonaggression, and human rights. The U.S. is the largest exporter of weapons to developing nations and we must learn to exercise unilateral restraint not just for national security and foreign policy interests, but also for the furtherance of democracy and human rights. By exercising restraint, we cannot only further our foreign policy goal of fostering democracy, but also enhance our security as well. The June 1996 Report of the Presidential Advisory Board on Arms Proliferation Policy concluded that U.S. and international security are threatened by the proliferation of advanced conventional weapons. According to the Report, ``The world struggles today with the implications of advanced conventional weapons. It will in the future be confronted with yet another generation of weapons, whose destructive power, size, cost, and availability can raise many more problems even than their predecessors today. These challenges will require a new culture among nations, one that accepts increased responsibility for control and restraint, despite short-term economic and political factors pulling in other directions.'' The Code of Conduct is a step toward that new culture. The bill I am introducing today differs from past versions of the Code of Conduct in two significant ways. Most importantly, the language no longer requires that Congress pass legislation to accept a Presidential waiver for countries that do not meet the criteria. Under previous versions of the legislation, the President was required to submit to Congress an annual list of countries determined to meet the criteria for human rights, democracy, and non-aggression. For countries that failed to meet this threshold, the President could have requested a national security waiver, but the Congress would have had to enact the waiver through legislation. In my judgment, this approach made granting a waiver pass a very stiff test. Consequently, this provision was a major impediment to passage of the Code. Under the terms of the bill being introduced today, the President will still submit the annual list of countries that meet the criteria, but a Presidential request for a national security waiver does not require further action by the Congress. Congress could, of course, disapprove the waiver through the normal legislative process, but that likely would require overriding a Presidential veto. The design of the waiver process in the bill I am introducing is the same as that passed by the House. The second difference from past versions of the Code is the inclusion of a section to promote an international arms transfer regime. We are far and away the world's biggest arms merchant and we must lead the way for the rest of the world in addressing this issue. But the United States cannot do this alone. We should not deceive ourselves regarding the ability or willingness of other arms-producing nations to rush in and fill any gap we create. Russia, France, China, and other nations all have the potential to provide weapons the United States and its manufacturers will not provide. My legislation will require the President to expand international efforts to curb worldwide arms sales and to work toward establishing a multilateral regime to govern the transfer of conventional arms. It requires the President to notify allied governments when the United States determines a nation is ineligible under the Code for arms transfers, and request that our allies join the United States in refusing to transfer arms to that nation. The bill also requires the President to report annually to the Congress on steps he is taking to gain international acceptance of the principles incorporated in this legislation and on the progress he is making toward establishing a permanent multilateral structure for controlling arms transfers. If some of my colleagues view this effort as naive in a rough and tumble world, I call their attention to a commentary editorial in the June 16, 1997, issue of Defense News which endorses the Arms Trade Code of Conduct as passed by the House of Representatives. The editors concluded that the Code ``would create a useful tool to shine light on some nations' darkest human rights and other unsavory secrets.'' The effort to establish an international Code of Conduct has won the support of former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias and a dozen of his fellow Nobel Peace laureates. Similar legislation has been introduced in the European Union and several of its member nations, and the new government in the United Kingdom has expressed support for the concept. The United States should lead the way and stop selling arms to nations that ignore the rights and needs of their citizens that use those arms to bully their neighbors or their own populations. We should lead the way to establishment of a multilateral regime that will effectively prevent such nations from obtaining arms with which to enforce and administer nefarious activities. This legislation, and the similar legislation already passed by the House of Representatives, can be the vehicle to accomplish this objective. I want to thank Senator Dorgan, who previously has offered a Code of Conduct provision as an amendment to other legislation, for joining as a cosponsor today, along with Senators Feingold, Leahy, Moseley-Braun, Wellstone, Landrieu, Kennedy, and Harkin. With their support, and the support of other Senators whose support I am confident will be forthcoming, I am hopeful that we will see the Congress enact and the President sign into law this year legislation that will ensure that the values of democratization, human rights, and nonaggression--which are so important to our Nation and so often lauded and referenced by elected officials from both parties--will be legally established as criteria for arms sales and transfers to other nations by the United States. I ask unanimous consent the text of the bill be printed following my remarks.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, today I am introducing the Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers Act of 1997, a bill to place restrictions on military assistance and arms transfers to governments that are not democratic, do not respect human rights, are engaged in armed aggression, or are not participating in the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms. Before I discuss the specifics of the legislation, I want to take a moment to pay tribute to our former colleague and long-time champion of this effort, Senator Mark Hatfield. During his four terms in the Senate, Senator Hatfield developed a reputation as a man committed to the search for peace and a staunch advocate of nonmilitary solutions for international problems. It was natural for Senator Hatfield to take the lead in an effort to make U.S. arms sales policy more reflective of American values. He did not succeed in winning passage of a Code of Conduct, but he placed the issue in front of the Senate and the public, and moved the debate forward. I am sure he is gratified to see that the House of Representatives adopted a version of the Code as an amendment to the bill to authorize State Department activities for fiscal year 1998. I am honored to follow in his footsteps and introduce derivative legislation, the 1997 Code of Conduct Act. The Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers Act embodies a fundamental shift in the way that the United States will deal with the transfer of conventional weapons to the rest of the world. Like many other aspects of our national security structure, arms sales and other military assistance must be adjusted to the realities of the post-cold-war era. The central theme of our foreign policy has changed from containment of communism to expansion of democracy. We no longer need to send massive amounts of weaponry to our surrogates around the world in an arms race against communism. Instead we must evaluate the effect that arms transfers have on regional stability, the promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights. Unfortunately, our arms transfer policies have not adjusted to this reality. The United States continues to be the primary supplier of arms to the world. We ranked first in arms transfer agreements with developing nations from 1988 to 1995. In 1995 the United States ranked first in deliveries to the developing world for the fourth year in row. The United States share of all arms transfers to developing nations rose from 11.1 percent in 1988 to 44.1 percent in 1995. In constant dollars the United States has increased deliveries to developing nations from $5.5 billion in 1988 to $9.5 billion in 1995. It is disturbing to me that an analysis done by the Project on Demilitarization and Democracy revealed that, of the arms transfers to developing nations over a 4-year period, 85 percent went to non- Democratic governments. It is clear that other factors, including short-term economic benefits from sales, dominate the U.S. Government's decision making process concerning arms sales and the nature of the recipient regimes appears to be of little consequence. The Code of Conduct seeks to elevate the consideration of democracy, human rights and nonaggression from their current status as policy afterthoughts to primary criteria for decisions on arms transfers. A quote from a February 17, 1995 press release from the White House illustrates--by what it omits--the unfortunate tendency to ignore these factors. The release states, in part: ``The U.S. continues to view transfers of conventional arms as a legitimate instrument of U.S. foreign policy--deserving U.S. government support--when they enable us to help friends and allies deter aggression, promote regional security, and increase interoperability of U.S. forces and allied forces. * * * The U.S. will exercise unilateral restraint in cases where overriding national security or foreign policy interests require us to do so.'' The criteria denoted in that statement are, indeed, critical components of a sound U.S. policy on arms transfers and should continue to be considered as such. But the statement omits what should be the very important consideration of the effects arms transfers are likely to have on democratization, nonaggression, and human rights. The U.S. is the largest exporter of weapons to developing nations and we must learn to exercise unilateral restraint not just for national security and foreign policy interests, but also for the furtherance of democracy and human rights. By exercising restraint, we cannot only further our foreign policy goal of fostering democracy, but also enhance our security as well. The June 1996 Report of the Presidential Advisory Board on Arms Proliferation Policy concluded that U.S. and international security are threatened by the proliferation of advanced conventional weapons. According to the Report, ``The world struggles today with the implications of advanced conventional weapons. It will in the future be confronted with yet another generation of weapons, whose destructive power, size, cost, and availability can raise many more problems even than their predecessors today. These challenges will require a new culture among nations, one that accepts increased responsibility for control and restraint, despite short-term economic and political factors pulling in other directions.'' The Code of Conduct is a step toward that new culture. The bill I am introducing today differs from past versions of the Code of Conduct in two significant ways. Most importantly, the language no longer requires that Congress pass legislation to accept a Presidential waiver for countries that do not meet the criteria. Under previous versions of the legislation, the President was required to submit to Congress an annual list of countries determined to meet the criteria for human rights, democracy, and non-aggression. For countries that failed to meet this threshold, the President could have requested a national security waiver, but the Congress would have had to enact the waiver through legislation. In my judgment, this approach made granting a waiver pass a very stiff test. Consequently, this provision was a major impediment to passage of the Code. Under the terms of the bill being introduced today, the President will still submit the annual list of countries that meet the criteria, but a Presidential request for a national security waiver does not require further action by the Congress. Congress could, of course, disapprove the waiver through the normal legislative process, but that likely would require overriding a Presidential veto. The design of the waiver process in the bill I am introducing is the same as that passed by the House. The second difference from past versions of the Code is the inclusion of a section to promote an international arms transfer regime. We are far and away the world's biggest arms merchant and we must lead the way for the rest of the world in addressing this issue. But the United States cannot do this alone. We should not deceive ourselves regarding the ability or willingness of other arms-producing nations to rush in and fill any gap we create. Russia, France, China, and other nations all have the potential to provide weapons the United States and its manufacturers will not provide. My legislation will require the President to expand international efforts to curb worldwide arms sales and to work toward establishing a multilateral regime to govern the transfer of conventional arms. It requires the President to notify allied governments when the United States determines a nation is ineligible under the Code for arms transfers, and request that our allies join the United States in refusing to transfer arms to that nation. The bill also requires the President to report annually to the Congress on steps he is taking to gain international acceptance of the principles incorporated in this legislation and on the progress he is making toward establishing a permanent multilateral structure for controlling arms transfers. If some of my colleagues view this effort as naive in a rough and tumble world, I call their attention to a commentary editorial in the June 16, 1997, issue of Defense News which endorses the Arms Trade Code of Conduct as passed by the House of Representatives. The editors concluded that the Code ``would create a useful tool to shine light on some nations' darkest human rights and other unsavory secrets.'' The effort to establish an international Code of Conduct has won the support of former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias and a dozen of his fellow Nobel Peace laureates. Similar legislation has been introduced in the European Union and several of its member nations, and the new government in the United Kingdom has expressed support for the concept. The United States should lead the way and stop selling arms to nations that ignore the rights and needs of their citizens that use those arms to bully their neighbors or their own populations. We should lead the way to establishment of a multilateral regime that will effectively prevent such nations from obtaining arms with which to enforce and administer nefarious activities. This legislation, and the similar legislation already passed by the House of Representatives, can be the vehicle to accomplish this objective. I want to thank Senator Dorgan, who previously has offered a Code of Conduct provision as an amendment to other legislation, for joining as a cosponsor today, along with Senators Feingold, Leahy, Moseley-Braun, Wellstone, Landrieu, Kennedy, and Harkin. With their support, and the support of other Senators whose support I am confident will be forthcoming, I am hopeful that we will see the Congress enact and the President sign into law this year legislation that will ensure that the values of democratization, human rights, and nonaggression--which are so important to our Nation and so often lauded and referenced by elected officials from both parties--will be legally established as criteria for arms sales and transfers to other nations by the United States. I ask unanimous consent the text of the bill be printed following my remarks.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I want to thank Senator Bond, Senator Mikulski, and all the members of the VA-HUD Appropriations Subcommittee for all their hard work in bringing this bill to the floor so quickly and with such widespread support. I want to add my voice to the many others offering you congratulations for such a good product. I appreciate the understanding and expertise both of you bring to this bill. Your sensitivity to the need to create new affordable housing and homeownership opportunities serves every Member of the Senate well. Unfortunately, no amount of good intentions and hard work can make up for the basic lack of funding for housing programs in this bill. While the bill maintains funding for most crucial programs, existing funding levels will not really solve the housing problems we face in this country. Let us take a moment to put the problem into a broader context. There are about 16.5 million families that are eligible for housing assistance in America. Yet, only 4.3 million of these families receive any housing assistance whatsoever. This includes households living in public housing, assisted housing, housing built with the tax credit and HOME funds. Of the 12 million unassisted families, about 5.5 million are faced with desperate housing needs, yet are receiving no help at all from the Federal Government. These families are paying over half their incomes every month to keep a roof over their heads. Or, they live in housing that is falling down around them. These families teeter on the edge of homelessness. One unanticipated problem--a temporary layoff, an illness of a parent or child, even an unexpected car repair bill--can force these families to choose between paying the rent and buying groceries. The committee did a good job of addressing many competing needs and interests that go far beyond housing programs. But they have simply not been given enough resources to address the larger need for adequate affordable housing. The fact is, we are facing a likely reduction in the total affordable housing stock in America. We expect about 100,000 units of public housing to be demolished in the next several years. Private owners of some assisted housing are likely to prepay their subsidized mortgages to get out from under the affordable housing restrictions. Many owners of section 8 project-based housing will simply choose not to renew their contracts, eliminating some of the highest quality affordable housing stock in the inventory. We cannot continue to go in this direction unless we are prepared to face a huge increase in the problem of homelessness. Already, in a time of low unemployment and strong economic growth, we have seen an increase in homelessness of 5 percent, according to a Conference of Mayors study. Mr. President, one casualty of the fiscal constraints that the committee labored within is the Low Income Housing Preservation and Homeownership Act [LIHPRH], better known as the Preservation Program. This program has preserved over 80,000 units of affordable housing permanently. Another 30,000 units in 37 States await funding. While the GAO has raised some concerns about this program, I want to make sure the facts get in the record. The average cost of preserving this housing is $30,000 to $33,000 per unit. This housing could not possibly be replaced for such a cheap price in my home State of Massachusetts, nor, I suspect, in many other States, either. Given the overall reduction of affordable housing, the modest investment it would take to preserve this housing, housing that is unlikely to otherwise be replaced, is a wise investment indeed. I urge the committee to work in conference to find some funding for this crucial program. I know Senator Bond's interest in accomplishing this goal, along with appropriate reforms to the program. In doing so, I urge the chairman to adopt a priority for direct sales to tenants. One of the key elements of the Preservation Program has been to empower residents to participate in the decisionmaking regarding how their homes are to be preserved. Sales to the residents who live in these communities is the most direct way to achieve this important goal. It gives the tenants the opportunity to build equity, like other homeowners; it gives tenants a greater stake in the management of the property. In sum, Mr. President, it builds a bridge to the middle class for the residents of these projects. I would be happy to work with the chairman to achieve this goal. Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for all their hard work. I support this bill and urge my colleagues to do so, as well. I will continue to work for more funding for housing programs, and look forward to the day when the chairman and ranking member are able to fully fund the needs of public housing, assisted housing, and the many other demands they face as well.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I am pleased once again to join with my friend, the distinguished Senator from Nevada, as a cosponsor of his amendment to reduce funding for the Market Access Program [MAP]. I urge my colleagues to support this effort to scale back funding for the Market Access Program by $20 million for fiscal year 1998. I would like to eliminate totally the Market Access Program, formerly known as the Market Promotion Program. This is a subsidy program which has been roundly criticized by research institutes across the political and economic spectrum--the National Taxpayers' Union, the Progressive Policy Institute, Citizens Against Government Waste, the Cato Institute, and others. The MAP Program makes possible some of the most obvious cases of corporate welfare to which we can point in the Federal budget today. But, as my friend from Nevada knows, we have tried year after year to terminate this program which has funneled more than $1 billion of taxpayer money into the advertising budgets of some major American corporations. Unfortunately, our efforts to eliminate this program have been unsuccessful, but we have proscribed some of the more egregious uses of MAP funds. For example, American taxpayers no longer will be subsidizing the advertising expenses of the mink industry to promote fashion shows abroad. My amendment to the MAP passed the Senate last year and I am pleased that the distinguished chairman and ranking member of the Agriculture Subcommittee have agreed to continue this prohibition another year. In addition, last year, the distinguished Senator from Arkansas, Senator Bumpers, and Senator Bryan successfully led the fight to limit this program to small businesses and agricultural co- operatives. That was another giant step in the right direction-- taxpayers should not be subsidizing the foreign advertising accounts of McDonald's, Gallo Wines, M&Ms, Tyson's and all the other corporate giants that have received MAP funds in the past. American taxpayers also should not be asked to subsidize foreign firms. And this program has benefited foreign companies. From 1986- 1993, $92 million of MPP funds went to foreign-based firms. Senator Bryan successfully passed an amendment that will keep MAP funds from going to foreign corporations. Yet, as we heard while he described his amendment today, more than 40 foreign companies received funding from the MAP last year. This is outrageous, and makes obvious the necessity for the distinguished Senator's amendment. At a time when we are asked to cut back on education funding, on Medicare, on environmental programs, how can we justify paying the advertising expenses of foreign agricultural companies? Our work to eliminate corporate welfare from this program certainly is not finished. As long as foreign-owned companies with subsidiaries in the United States are still able to receive subsidies to advertise their products in their own countries, I will be back in this Chamber arguing against this program. I am hopeful that the Senate will pass this amendment today, because it will take us a long way toward the goal of removing the nonsensical from this program by eliminating funding for foreign-owned subsidiaries and for large corporations. I think most Americans are not even aware that this kind of egregious subsidy is taking place, and when I discuss this program with people in my state, they express astonishment and dismay. They know it is inappropriate and unnecessary, and measured against the other choices we are making here, it is plainly and simply wrong. I commend my distinguished colleague from Nevada, Senator Bryan, for his continuing leadership fighting inappropriate Federal subsidies, and the MAP in particular. He and I have joined forces in this effort on so many occasions, fighting against the wool and mohair subsidy, fighting the mink subsidy, fighting wasteful subsidies in the MAP Program. I urge all my colleagues to vote for this amendment to reduce funding for the Market Access Program.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, today I am introducing the Accessible Transportation Act of 1997. This legislation will continue the progress we have made improving access to transportation services for individuals with disabilities. There are 25 million Americans with disabilities who are transit dependent. Access to transportation for these Americans is the critical factor that determines whether they can pursue opportunities in employment, education, housing, and recreation. I believe that assuring access to transportation is critical to promoting maximum independence and achieving meaningful integration for persons with disabilities. In 1987, Congress created Project Action to promote transportation accessibility and to enhance cooperation between transit providers and the disability community. In 1990, Congress passed the Americans With Disabilities Act [ADA] to ensure that every American has access to transportation, buildings and other necessary locations, services, and activities which are essential to lead an active life. The ADA guarantees equality of accessibility for all Americans regardless of the challenges that their disabilities present. In order to facilitate the implementation of the transportation provisions included in ADA, I sponsored the Accessible Transportation Action Act of 1991 which was included in the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991. This legislation authorized funding of $2 million each year for the Easter Seals Society to undertake a national program of research, demonstrations, and technical assistance to provide new solutions to the problems of providing transportation for persons with disabilities. Project Action has become the Nation's foremost resource for information and guidance on implementing the transportation provisions of ADA. The National Easter Seals Society has administered Project Action and has assisted in building strong working relationships between transit operators, disability organizations, and the U.S. Department of Transportation in order to find cost-effective ways to promote transportation accessibility. Project Action has developed an impressive resource center of informational materials for a wide variety of transit and disability community audiences on the nature and progress of ADA implementation. It has initiated consumer campaigns to insure that people with disabilities are aware of their rights. The positive effects that have developed from Project Action activities have been impressive. Nationwide bus fleet accessibility has grown. Rail station access has increased. Paratransit services have improved and expanded. And the disability and transit communities have learned how to work together to promote accessible transportation. However, there are a number of challenges which remain in order to assure that the disabled have full access to transportation services. The chief concern is how to insure the implementation of ADA in the most cost-effective manner. Paratransit costs are high and resources are limited. At the same time, overall Federal assistance for transportation and mass transit has been limited. America needs Project Action to continue to find innovative ways to allow every disabled person to gain equal access to our Nation's public transportation systems. Therefore, I am today introducing legislation which will continue the Project Action for the next 5 fiscal years to continue the vital process of implementing the transportation facets of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, today I am introducing the Accessible Transportation Act of 1997. This legislation will continue the progress we have made improving access to transportation services for individuals with disabilities. There are 25 million Americans with disabilities who are transit dependent. Access to transportation for these Americans is the critical factor that determines whether they can pursue opportunities in employment, education, housing, and recreation. I believe that assuring access to transportation is critical to promoting maximum independence and achieving meaningful integration for persons with disabilities. In 1987, Congress created Project Action to promote transportation accessibility and to enhance cooperation between transit providers and the disability community. In 1990, Congress passed the Americans With Disabilities Act [ADA] to ensure that every American has access to transportation, buildings and other necessary locations, services, and activities which are essential to lead an active life. The ADA guarantees equality of accessibility for all Americans regardless of the challenges that their disabilities present. In order to facilitate the implementation of the transportation provisions included in ADA, I sponsored the Accessible Transportation Action Act of 1991 which was included in the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991. This legislation authorized funding of $2 million each year for the Easter Seals Society to undertake a national program of research, demonstrations, and technical assistance to provide new solutions to the problems of providing transportation for persons with disabilities. Project Action has become the Nation's foremost resource for information and guidance on implementing the transportation provisions of ADA. The National Easter Seals Society has administered Project Action and has assisted in building strong working relationships between transit operators, disability organizations, and the U.S. Department of Transportation in order to find cost-effective ways to promote transportation accessibility. Project Action has developed an impressive resource center of informational materials for a wide variety of transit and disability community audiences on the nature and progress of ADA implementation. It has initiated consumer campaigns to insure that people with disabilities are aware of their rights. The positive effects that have developed from Project Action activities have been impressive. Nationwide bus fleet accessibility has grown. Rail station access has increased. Paratransit services have improved and expanded. And the disability and transit communities have learned how to work together to promote accessible transportation. However, there are a number of challenges which remain in order to assure that the disabled have full access to transportation services. The chief concern is how to insure the implementation of ADA in the most cost-effective manner. Paratransit costs are high and resources are limited. At the same time, overall Federal assistance for transportation and mass transit has been limited. America needs Project Action to continue to find innovative ways to allow every disabled person to gain equal access to our Nation's public transportation systems. Therefore, I am today introducing legislation which will continue the Project Action for the next 5 fiscal years to continue the vital process of implementing the transportation facets of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. I know the Senator from Georgia wants to speak. I will take 2 quick minutes, if I may. I answer the question the Senator from Arizona asked, which was the question about the effectiveness and price. The test of whether or not certification is effective is not just a reflection of what happens to the price of drugs or their availability. Everybody knows that interdiction is ultimately an impossible task. Drugs will come in. The question is, are you raising the cost of business sufficiently that the risks are great enough for those who engage in it that you have a legitimate effort to reduce it from scourge to nuisance? The truth is, Mr. President, there are a whole set of other questions you have to ask to really test that effectiveness. For instance, do they extradite people? Do they have a law of extradition? Do they have asset seizure and forfeiture laws? Have they implemented the laws of asset seizure and forfeiture? What kind of sentencing structure do they have? Do people actually serve time? Do they trade evidence with you? Do they create a mutual legal assistance treaty? There are a whole series of judgments here where, I suggest respectfully to my colleagues, the vast majority of the evidence is on the side of those who say this certification process is working because it has produced results in every one of those other areas of measurement. Now, the other point I make--I know that you have editorials. Sure you have editorials. I have read some of them. One comes from my own newspaper in Massachusetts. Most people that I have talked to about this process make the judgment that the reason they viscerally feel it is not a fair thing to do is they think we are implementing a standard that is just American, that we are sort of judging them and then, in a high-handed fashion, coming in and saying, ``Hey, you are not good enough for America.'' The point that I think needs to be reemphasized over and over that many are not aware of is, it is not an American standard, it is the internationally arrived at standard which they have agreed to live up to themselves. So we are really finding only one tool existed in the process. The last point I make is that this does not have to be as difficult as it was made this year with respect to Mexico. Most people, I think, came to the conclusion ultimately that, while they wanted to avoid a politically sticky situation, Mexico was not, in fact, capable of cooperating fully, and there were plenty of ways to praise the democratic process, plenty of ways to praise President Zedillo, plenty of ways to bolster those who wanted to make it happen and provide a waiver that allowed them to be certified, but on the basis of national interest. Had that happened, there would have been no great fight in the U.S. Senate, and had that happened, we would not be here today putting to the test the one tool that has worked in helping us to hold the Vienna Treaty accountable.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask my colleagues to step back carefully and to analyze, as closely as possible, the realities that surround this question of certification. Two of the more capable and knowledgeable Senators with respect to international affairs--and I respect both of them enormously--are bringing this amendment to the floor. On most issues, we agree. This is one where I am convinced of the bona fides of their intent, but where I am equally as convinced that the effect of what they are doing, the effect of this amendment will be to take a serious step backward in whatever level of war on drugs you want to determine exists. I do not believe that that is anything but an inescapable conclusion based on a number of different realities: based on what countries are doing today because of the certification process, based on the choices available to the President within the certification process and, most important, based on what they are proposing, as opposed to the road that we have already traveled. What do I mean by that? Mr. President, the Senator from Arizona and the Senator from Connecticut are proposing that we just chuck the certification process for a 2-year period, a suspension they call it, while we gather a task force and ultimately, hopefully, a summit. Who will attend the summit is totally up for grabs. Who will appoint a task force is totally up for grabs. But I ask every Senator here who has traveled the journey of drug fighting over the last years to ask themselves if what they need is another task force when, in fact, everything that we are asking other nations to do is part of an international convention today. The certification process is not some American-dreamed up notion of taking an American standard and asking Mexico or some other country to live up to the American standard. We are asking countries to live up to the standard that they have signed, that they have agreed to live up to already, that they already got together on at a global summit under the United Nations and agreed would be the standard of their behavior. That is what this is all about. If the Senate wants to come here today and vote to say that they can better the Vienna Convention, the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, then I would like to know how. The countries that have already signed the international agreement are the very countries about whom today we are making a judgment about whether or not they are cooperating: Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Haiti, Panama, Paraguay, Nigeria, Mexico, the Russian Federation, Syria --they are all signatories. They already came together. They already signed an agreement. They said they would behave by a different standard, and all we are doing in the certification process is saying we are going to make a judgment about whether or not the taxpayer dollars of U.S. citizens ought to go to a country that signed an international agreement, said it would do X, Y, and Z, but isn't doing it. What are we being offered instead? Instead, we are being offered the notion that we are going to chuck the process of certification so we can take a couple of years to meet again and come to agreement again on the very thing we agreed on, presumably, a number of years ago. What are the things we agreed on in this convention that we have already signed? Let me give you one example. Here is one called extradition. Each of the offenses to which this article applies shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offense in any extradition treaty existing between the parties. We have an extradition treaty with Mexico. It is an agreement as part of the 1990 accord. We already ratified it. We signed it. They signed it. But they don't do it. So what is the response? The response is to come to the floor and say, ``Oh, gosh, these countries get really upset because we try to hold them to the standard they said they would live by, so we better pull back because they don't like the fact that we want to hold them to their word, and we're going to go talk about what we might do in order to, once again, get them to do what they already said they would do.'' It is the most incredible thing I have ever heard. Of course, they don't like the certification process, because it works. This is not a stale annual event. It is anything but stale. It is working, and it is working, Mr. President, because we have taken it seriously. Senator Grassley just quoted the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report of the United States of America, this year, this March, 1997. This is what our State Department said only a few months ago: The certification process has proved to be a remarkably effective diplomatic instrument for keeping all governments aware of the need to pull their weight in the international antidrug effort. By now, most governments are aware that U.S. law requires the President to provide an annual assessment. . . And so on. ``Proved to be remarkably effective.'' This is Mexico driven, because we had a difficult time, frankly, because many of us thought that the administration made the wrong decision. They could have certified Mexico with a waiver, and that would have permitted Mexico to continue to get its aid because, as a matter of national security interests, most of us thought it should, but we also knew there were problems in cooperation. Mr. President, if my colleagues believe that the next step in the drug war is to come to the floor and take 2 years to go through some kind of task force effort to dream up some better way of holding these countries accountable, I would be amazed if there is any response from those other countries except continued delay, obfuscation. If they want our money and they are willing to do something to get our money, but we take away that whole requirement, what is going to leverage that cooperation? More talk? More good wishes? More signatures on a piece of paper that they have already signed? Let me share with my colleagues some of the things that they have already said they would agree to do. They would agree to promote cooperation among the parties so they may address more effectively the various aspects of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. They will carry out their obligations under this convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity. Each party shall adopt measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offenses the production, manufacture, and so forth. There are still nations struggling to do that. Each party is supposed to make the commission of the offense established in this treaty subject to imprisonment or other deprivation of liberty. They are supposed to ensure that their courts will have jurisdiction. They are supposed to ensure that they trade evidence. They are supposed to extradite. They are supposed to provide mutual assistance and the transfer of evidence and people. They are supposed to enter mutual legal assistance treaties. There are a whole bunch of things here that we already agreed we are going to do. And under the certification process, all we do is make a judgment as to whether or not they are doing it and as to whether or not we are going to give them continued American aid if they are not. Mr. President, let me just share with you, our colleagues have come to the floor and they have said, ``Gee-whiz, people are complaining. And this doesn't work.'' But they have not shown you how it does not work. There is no showing that this does not work. The fact that drugs still enter the United States is more a reflection of our unwillingness to commit adequate resources to drug treatment, to drug testing, to education, to alternatives for children, to police in the streets and all the things that would make more of a difference than it is to the certification process. But the fact is, that on the international front the certification process has worked. Let me be very specific about it. In the Bahamas, effective counternarcotics cooperation specifically intensified with the implementation of the certification process in 1987. The Bahamian Government's willingness to accept more of our assets, U.S. Government assets, and to provide additional resources of its own in the fight increased the moment they knew they were subject to certification. In December of 1986, the Bahamas passed a new, tougher drug law. And more recently, in 1995 and 1996, the Bahamas passed money-laundering laws and implemented regulations based on U.S. Government certification related to demarches. The fact is, we had issued demarche after demarche to those countries, and they have responded to those because they knew there was a process in place that created accountability for the first time. Another example. Jamaica. The Jamaican Government was particularly slow to pass money-laundering legislation or to even ratify the very treaty that I just talked about. But as a result of the demarches that we issued, and using the leverage that existed in the certification process, Jamaica specifically reversed that situation in 1995 and 1996. Jamaica is now a party to the convention and has a new money- laundering law. In 1995, the President gave Peru a national defense certification because their record was mixed. They had successful interdiction but they had no reduction in the coca crops. Since that time, the Government of Peru has implemented a strong coca reduction, an alternative development program which has resulted in an 18 percent reduction in the total of Peruvian coca cultivation. So that worked as a result of the decertification process. What about Colombia which we heard talk about? Colombia was decertified in 1996 and 1997. It received a national interest certification waiver in 1995. There is no question that the Colombians were very unhappy with the original decertification. Who would not be? But the fact of the matter is, that when they were faced with the ramifications of that decertification, the Colombian Government's law enforcement efforts have improved ever since then. Key Cali syndicate leaders have been arrested, and there is the aerial eradication of coca and opium and poppy which has improved. In addition to that, the longstanding constitutional prohibition against the extradition of Colombian nationals has now been reopened in the form of legislation presented by the Colombian Government to the Colombian Congress. Let me emphasize that. Colombia took away one of the principal ingredients of the international convention. The international convention required people to be able to extradite. Colombia wrote that in at the insistence, Mr. President, of the cartel. How do we know that? We know that because subsequent raids uncovered documents that showed the cartel's own drafting of the constitutional amendment to do away with extradition. So as a result of our decertification, we have been able now to move toward the process of changing the one thing that the cartel members fear the most, the possibility of being extradited to serve time in an American prison, not in one of their prisons of comfort and of personal convenience that they negotiate in Columbia. That is why they took it away. And now we are on the road to getting it back. Why? Because we had the certification process in place. That is why. I talked to General McCaffrey today. And I understand how administrations work and the marching orders are, but I will tell you, I sensed no great overpowering conviction that this is the right step to take, notwithstanding the letter that he has written. In addition to that, I believe that this process is being foisted on the Senate in a way that does not adequately permit for alternative possibilities. I am not suggesting the certification process is the only way to proceed. I am not suggesting that it is the best thing in the world. I am not suggesting that it cannot be refined. What I am saying, Mr. President, is that rather than just suspend it altogether with some high hope that you are going to come back and somehow do what we have already done, we ought to at least leave it in place until we offer some concrete alternative or put together a task force that works while it is in place so we can continue this process, and then if there is a legitimate substitute, open our minds to substituting it. But what we are being offered is a suspension with a hope that some future photo opportunity or some future meeting will produce what meetings heretofore have not been able to produce. I say to my colleagues, that even in Mexico--even in Mexico--the possibility that we might have decertified them actually produced last- minute steps in an effort to try to say, gee, we really are cooperating. And so they dismissed some 1,250 Federal law enforcement officers, they removed the drug czar for narcocorruption in February, they passed the organized crime bill and the criminalization of money laundering and chemical diversions, and they reorganized Mexico's whole antidrug structure. How can you say it is not even working in Mexico when the fact is, that those steps were taken precisely because the decertification process is in place? I am not going to go through all of them now, but while my colleagues come here and talk about the discomfort that is created or talk about how uncomfortable it is for our relationship with these countries, you can look at every single other country, and you will see progress that is being made as a consequence of the existence of this bill. You can see it in Panama. You can see it in Bolivia. You can see it in Paraguay. And you can see it elsewhere, Mr. President. So the point is, the certification process is not a substitute for a comprehensive strategy to deal with drugs, but it is an effective tool which the State Department only a few months ago was lauding as an effective tool. And it seems to me that the hue and cry you hear from these countries, ``Gee, we don't like you holding us accountable,'' is in fact its best argument for the reality that this works. Is it a rough tool? Yes, I will admit, sure it is. It has its element of hardness in that sense. But Mr. President we have traveled this road for a long time--a long time. We have written a number of drug bills in our country. We have put additional cops on the streets. We are trying to augment our own drug strategy at home. But the fact is, that the domestic side is only one piece of any strategy to deal with drugs. You need effective law enforcement at home, you need effective education at home, and you need effective treatment at home. And we have been negligent with respect to a number of those. But that does not mean that you can turn around and throw away the other side of the coin, which is the interdiction and international cooperation which is also an important tool. And I respectfully suggest to my colleagues that the certification process deserves better than simply to be put into hanging suspension, with some promise of more talk that will only result in ratification ultimately of the very international agreement that it is based on. I emphasize to my colleagues, this is not some ``Yankee from the North'' standard. That is how they effectively play those politics. They very effectively do that. And then they complain to our diplomats when they go to Mexico, and they say, ``Oh, boy, you guys are stirring up the politics of our country because you're sort of imposing this standard on us.'' Mr. President, it is not our standard. It is their standard. They signed the international treaty. And all we are doing is making a judgment of whether our tax dollars ought to be given to those countries that signed the agreement and then do nothing to live up to the standard. This is not our standard. It is the world's standard. They have signed on to it. They ought to live up to it. And we should not walk away from the one effective tool we have put in place that helps us hold on to that standard. I yield the floor. Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. KERRY. I do not think there is any further debate. We are ready to proceed to a vote.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, this is a modification mutually arrived at together with Senator Smith of New Hampshire and Senator McCain in an effort to try to improve the intelligence-gathering process with respect to POW/MIA matters, and I thank Senator Smith of New Hampshire for his cooperation and Senator McCain. I think we have strengthened the ability of the process to guarantee that intelligence is going to be properly and fully vetted in the process but at the same time be able to continue the cooperative effort that we have achieved over these last years in that process. I think the compromise we have arrived at is a thoughtful one and an appropriate one with respect to the best intelligence gathering and control. So I think we have served the process well. I yield the floor. Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire addressed the Chair.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to modify the amendment at this time, and I send such a modification to the desk.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent I be permitted to call up amendment No. 680.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, what is the order at this point?

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from California, Senator Feinstein, be added as a cosponsor.