John Kerry

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to be added as a cosponsor.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, no issue is more important in America than focusing on the urgent needs of young children. This country must rededicate itself to investing in children, an investment which will have tremendous returns. Early intervention can have a powerful effect on reducing government welfare, health, criminal justice, and education expenditures in the long run. By taking steps now we can significantly reduce later destructive behavior such as school dropout, drug use, and criminal acts. A study of the High/Scope Foundation's Perry Preschool found that at-risk toddlers who received preschooling and a weekly home visit reduced the risk that these children would grow up to become chronic lawbreakers by a startling 80 percent. The Syracuse University family development study showed that providing quality early childhood programs to families until children reached age 5 reduces the children's risk of delinquency 10 years later by 90 percent. It's no wonder that a recent survey of police chiefs found that 9 out of 10 said that America could sharply reduce crime if government invested more in these early intervention programs. These programs are successful because children's experiences during their early years of life lay the foundation for their future development. Our failure to provide young children what they need during this period has long-term consequences and costs for America. Recent scientific evidence conclusively demonstrates that enhancing children's physical, social, emotional, and intellectual development will result in tremendous benefits for children, families, and our Nation. The electrical activity of brain cells actually changes the physical structure of the brain itself. Without a stimulating environment, the baby's brain suffers. At birth, a baby's brain contains 100 billion neurons, roughly as many nerve cells as there are stars in the Milky Way. But the wiring pattern between these neurons develops over time. Children who play very little or are rarely touched develop brains 20 to 30 percent smaller than normal for their age. Mr. President, reversing these problems later in life is far more difficult and costly. I want to discuss several examples. First, poverty seriously impairs young children's language development, math skills, IQ scores, and their later school completion. Poor young children also are at heightened risk of infant mortality, anemia, and stunted growth. Of the 12 million children under the age of 3 in the United States today, 3 million--25 percent--live in poverty. Second, three out of five mothers with children younger than 3 work, but one study found that 40 percent of the facilities at child care centers serving infants provided care of such poor quality as to actually jeopardize children's health, safety, or development. Third, in more than half of the States, one out of every four children between 19 months and 3 years of age is not fully immunized against common childhood diseases. Children who are not immunized are more likely to contact preventable diseases, which can cause long-term harm. And fourth, children younger than 3 make up 27 percent of the 1 million children who are determined to be abused or neglected each year. Of the 1,200 children who died from abuse and neglect in 1995, 85 percent were younger than 5 and 45 percent were younger than 1. Unfortunately, Mr. President, our Government expenditure patterns are inverse to the most important early development period for human beings. Although we know that early investment can dramatically reduce later remedial and social costs, currently our Nation spends more than $35 billion over 5 years on Federal programs for at-risk or delinquent youth and child welfare programs. Today we seek to change our priorities and put children first. I am introducing the Early Childhood Development Act of 1997 to help empower local communities to provide essential interventions in the lives of our youngest at-risk children and their families. I am delighted that Senators Rockefeller, Murray, Kennedy, Hollings, Wellstone, Moseley- Braun, and Harkin are joining me as cosponsors of this bill. This legislation seeks to provide support to families by minimizing Government bureaucracy and maximizing local initiatives. We would provide additional funding to communities to expand the thousands of successful efforts for at-risk children ages zero to six such as those sponsored by the United Way, Boys and Girls Clubs, and other less well- known grassroots organizations, as well as State initiatives such as Success By Six in Massachusetts and Vermont, the Parents as Teachers Program in Missouri, Healthy Families in Indiana, and the Early Childhood Initiative in Pittsburgh, PA. All are short on resources. And nowhere do we adequately meet demand although we know that many States and local communities deliver efficient, cost-effective, and necessary services. Extending the reach of these successful programs to millions of children currently underserved will increase our national well-being and ultimately save billions of dollars. The second part of this bill would provide funding to States to help them provide a subsidy to all working poor families to purchase quality child care for infants, toddlers, and preschool children. We would not create a new program but would simply increase resources for the successful Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG). Child care for infants and toddlers is much more expensive than for older children since a higher level of care is necessary. Additional funding would also pay for improving the salaries and training level of child care workers, improving the facilities of child care centers and family child care homes, and providing enriched developmentally appropriate educational opportunities. The bill would also establish a scholarship fund for child care workers who earn a degree in early childhood development and then work with infants and toddlers in child care settings for 2 years. Child care providers now are underpaid and frequently receive inadequate training, which causes higher turnover and lower quality care for children. The bill would also expand the uses of time allowed under the Family and Medical Leave Act [FMLA] to promote parental involvement in schools and child care centers. Parents or guardians would be allowed to use up to 24 hours per year of FMLA time to participate in school and center activities such as parent-teacher conferences, interviewing for a new school or child care center, and getting an assessment for services in a family literacy program. This leave would be within the maximum 12 weeks of time currently allowed under the FMLA. Finally, the bill would increase funding for the Early Head Start Program. The successful Head Start Program provides quality services to 4- and 5-year-olds. The Early Head Start Program, which currently is a modest program funded at $200 million annually, provides comprehensive child development and family support services to infants and toddlers. Expanding this program would help more young children receive the early assistance they need. I was delighted to be joined yesterday by Governor Dean of Vermont and Governor Romer of Colorado in announcing this legislation. I also am happy to have a wide range of groups and individuals endorsing this bill including the Association of Jewish Family and Children's Agencies, Boys and Girls Clubs of America, Catholic Charities USA, Children's Defense Fund, Child Welfare League of America, Coalition on Human Needs, Jewish Council for Public Affairs, National Black Child Development Institute, Inc., National Center for the Early Childhood Work Force, National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, and Rob Reiner of the I Am Your Child Campaign. Children need certain supports during their early critical years if they are to thrive and grow to be contributing adults. I look forward to working with both sides of the aisle to pass this legislation and ensure that all children arrive at school ready to learn. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, before the Senate this afternoon is the task of taking the appropriate action, in fulfillment of the Senate's vital constitutional advice and consent responsibility and power, to adapt the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty to the constant change that affects our world--change which has been more sweeping and profound in Europe in the past 7 or 8 years than at any time in the preceding 40. In 1990, after years of grueling negotiations to control the historically unprecedented conventional weaponry arrayed on opposite sides of the Iron Curtain in Central Europe, the CFE was signed. It entered into force in November of 1992. The long, difficult journey that led to the CFE treaty included one failed effort--the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Treaty episode--where negotiators eventually had to throw up their hands and acknowledge defeat in their efforts. But fortunately that failure was not permitted to become permanent. With U.S. leadership, efforts recommenced, and the CFE is the result. The CFE treaty is the first in the post-World War II period to succeed in limiting and reducing conventional weaponry. While understandably strategic weapons treaty negotiations captured greater attention, since those negotiations addressed weapons of mass destruction each of which can annihilate great numbers of people and large cities, the CFE arguably addressed the greater threat to peace in Europe, because I believe it always was more likely that any conflict there would start as a conventional conflict. The CFE negotiating effort was successful in large part because it approached the issue of obtaining multilateral agreement to limitations of key offensive- capable weapons systems on an alliance-to-alliance basis--addressing on the one side the armaments possessed by not only the Soviet Union but all the Warsaw Pact nations taken together, and on the other side the armaments possessed by all the NATO nations taken together. The CFE placed numerical limits on the numbers of five types of weapons systems critical to effective offensive operations which each alliance could possess in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals region of Europe where the Warsaw Pact confronted NATO: tanks; artillery pieces; armored combat vehicles; attack aircraft; and attack helicopters. It also contained sublimits based on geographical regions--in realization of the fact that while a certain number of the covered items might not be a threat to peace or indicate diabolical intentions if spread evenly across the entire geography of each alliance, that same number if massed in a subregion could be threatening indeed and could indicate intentions to launch an attack or engage in other destabilizing behavior. The treaty has been a notable success. It has resulted in reductions of over 50,000 items of heavy military equipment, verified by an intrusive verification regime that has included nearly 3,000 on-site inspections conducted to date under treaty auspices. It has worked and worked well. It is not a prospective treaty about which we all must guess or predict. It is a here-and-now, real-world treaty that has resulted in tangible reduction in armaments and consequently in real reduction in the threat of conflict. It is a treaty that we would do well to preserve and protect. Its underlying premise remains valid. If buildups of a critical mass of the categories of treaty-limited equipment can be prevented, it will be very difficult for any nation to launch an attack against another with a significant prospect of success. And even if a nation seeks to flaunt the treaty's terms, and engage in a buildup of these weapons systems for the purpose either of conducting offensive military operations or engaging in a form of extortion, the treaty's verification procedures will reveal those efforts so that appropriate diplomatic and military responses can be made, and its terms give the other parties to the treaty the means to condemn violative activities and to enlist the community of nations in efforts to prevent escalation into conflict. The implementation and ongoing administration of every treaty result in cases of different interpretations and various disagreements, and the CFE Treaty is no exception. But the mechanisms included in the treaty for resolving such conflicts or disagreements have worked reasonably well. And one can presume that the treaty would have continued to make a significant contribution to the security of Europe and, in turn, of the globe in a relatively smooth manner had the world remained as it was when the treaty was negotiated and entered into force. But, of course, the world has not stood still. The Soviet Union imploded. The Warsaw Pact disintegrated. Some of the very nations and armies that stared across the Iron Curtain at NATO's forces and their key United States components have become great friends of the United States and other NATO nations. Several of these appear to be on the verge of becoming a part of NATO itself. That, of course, is a matter of considerable controversy which should be and I trust will be debated separately and thoroughly. But our focus today is or should be on the CFE treaty. In addition to the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, and the realignment of some of the former pact nations with the North Atlantic Alliance, other components of the Eurasian security picture have changed dramatically. No longer is Russia's biggest concern the need to be ready for full-scale battle with NATO troops on the German and Benelux plains. Today ethnic conflict in some provinces and efforts of other provinces to obtain independence require much greater Russian attention. The ferment in the Middle East, and activities in Iran and Turkey south of the Russian Caucasus region also are of greater concern to Russia. Not surprisingly the alterations in Russia's view of its own security picture resulted in alterations in what it believed to be the vital disposition of its security forces. Other nations of the former Soviet Union, including Ukraine, and of the now-defunct Warsaw Pact were faced with unanticipated anomalies resulting from the new maps of Eurasia. The changes occurred in and affected primarily one of four zones to which the CFE Treaty applies, the so-called flank region which consists of Norway, Iceland, Turkey, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and parts of Ukraine and Russia. To address the desires by Russia, Ukraine, and others to reallocate their forces, but to ensure that those reallocations protect the accomplishments and security provided by the CFE, the parties to the CFE Treaty negotiated the so-called flank agreement consisting of amendments to the original CFE treaty. The parties agreed to the flank agreement on May 31, 1996. It will enter into force if approved by all CFE Treaty party states by May 15, 1997. The agreement does not change numerical limits for either of the two major sides of the post-World War II European alignment. Instead, it adjusts the boundaries of the flank, providing Russia and Ukraine more flexibility than they had before with respect to deployment of equipment limited by the treaty. The flank agreement is in NATO's security interest, and, specifically, it is in the security interests of the United States. Without the adjustments it provides, it is likely Russia and possibly Ukraine would feel so impeded in their ability to meet their own national security requirements that they either would leave the treaty altogether or fail to comply with some of its provisions. The implications of neither of these outcomes would be acceptable, and would weaken or destroy the protections and added security offered by the CFE Treaty. The judgment that the flank agreement is in our national interest is not just a judgment of our diplomatic community. It is fully endorsed by our Armed Forces leadership. On April 29 of this year, Brig. Gen. Gary Rubus testified: In the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Flank Agreement is militarily sound. It preserves the CFE treaty and its contribution to U.S. and Allied military security. The additional flexibility permitted Russia in the flank zone does not allow a destabilizing new concentration of forces on the flanks of Norway, Turkey and other States in that area. Moreover, the agreement includes significant new safeguards, including greater transparency and new constraints on flank deployment: The benefits of this agreement are apparent. The Foreign Relations Committee last week approved the resolution of ratification by a unanimous vote of 17-0. I am confident that a great majority of Senators approve of the flank agreement. But I am very troubled by how some in the majority seem determined to transform the constitutional treaty advice and consent process into an obstacle course. The Foreign Relations Committee last week approved the resolution of ratification by unanimous vote. Mr. President, as the Foreign Relations Committee last week approved this by unanimous vote of 17 to 0, it doesn't mean that there were not some reservations. I just want to speak to them. I am confident that the great majority of our colleagues will support the Flank Agreement. But I am troubled by the way in which some have transformed the constitutional treaty advise and consent process into something of an obstacle course that involves things that aren't directly in the treaty. The conditions for ratification which the majority required before it would permit the Foreign Relations Committee and then the full Senate to perform the advice and consent role, fall into four rough categories. I find several of them--primarily those which the Senate appropriately and routinely attaches to treaties--beneficial and desirable. I find several others reflect a degree of fear and anxiety on the part of some Members, the basis for which I cannot ascertain-- but which, all things told, appear unlikely to do fundamental damage to what should be our objective here: To keep the CFE Treaty in operation in order to continue to derive its benefits to security in Europe and a reduction in the risk of conflict there. The third category, Mr. President, consists of a condition whose objective may have been desirable but which inadvertently or inadvisedly singles out one nation for implicit criticism when the kinds of actions it is implicitly criticized for taking may place it in the company of other nations in its region, and when it would be more appropriate to address these situations as a group so that all nations are held accountable to the same treaty standards. I speak of paragraph F of condition 5 which, in the form approved by the committee, singles out Armenia and requires a report directed solely at its activities and whether they comply with the terms of the treaty. I will address that matter separately, and will offer an amendment to establish what I believe is an important balance and equity with respect to the entire Caucasus region. Then, Mr. President, there is condition 9 which forms a special category all its own. I understand why a Senator who has not been deeply involved in the Senate's processing of the CFE Flank Agreement may be puzzled by the fact that condition 9 pertains to the ABM Treaty. In fact, I have been involved in the effort to move the Flank Agreement to Senate approval, and I cannot discern a reasonable or defensible rationale to link the issue of multilateralization of the ABM Treaty to action on the CFE Flank Agreement except for the reason of taking something that ought to happen that is important to our security and linking it to something that is not necessarily yet thoroughly considered by the Senate. But even so, I do believe I understand what is going on here. Proposed condition 9 is hostage-taking, pure and simple. I think there are some who have a fundamental aversion to arms control agreements and want the United States to simply go it alone in the interdependent world of the last decade of the 20th century. Unfortunately they insist that unless the President concedes to their position on the unrelated issue of ABM multilateralization, they will refuse to let the United States ratify the CFE flank agreement. I readily agree that the issues surrounding the ABM Treaty are both vital and very controversial. The Committee on Foreign Relations, with the contribution of the Committee on Armed Services, should devote considerable time and energy to thoroughly exploring those issues, and then the Senate as a whole should carefully determine how to proceed with respect to them. But I want to register the strongest possible dissent from this tactic of hostage-taking. In my judgment these issues are separate and ought to be treated separately. Treaties are fundamentally different than bills on which this Congress acts on a daily basis. We ought to approach our advice and consent responsibility--a solemn constitutional duty--with more abstract side bar process. We should not load up resolutions of treaty ratification with essentially nongermane amendments. Further, purporting to resolve the complex and very important ABM issues by attaching a condition to a wholly unrelated treaty--and without thoroughly airing and deliberating on those issues at the committee level via hearings and other means--is risky and ill-advised. Because I understand the power of the majority, perhaps the most significant feature of which is its considerable control over determining whether and when the Senate will address important issues, and because I believe it is of great importance that this flank agreement be considered and acted on by the full Senate, and that the Senate do so prior to the May 15 deadline which is imminent, I did not seek because of my aversion to condition 9 to derail the Foreign Relations Committee's action on the resolution of ratification last week, but I expressed my concerns which were published as additional views in the committee's report on the resolution. Mr. President, as Senators, every one of us is sworn to uphold the Constitution. In my judgment that requires maintaining the separation of powers which plays so critical a part in maintaining the equilibrium of our unique form of government which has permitted it to survive and function successfully for over 200 years. Maintaining the separation requires a careful allegiance to preserving and protecting not only the constitutional obligations, responsibilities, and prerogatives of the legislative branch, and the Senate in particular, but also of the judicial and the executive branches. We in this Chamber are most accustomed, understandably, to rising to the defense of the responsibilities, role, and prerogatives of our own branch and our own Chamber. I have joined many times in such efforts. Indeed, the very fact that the CFE Flank Agreement is being considered by the Senate is attributable to an effort to assert that the Senate properly should act on that agreement under the treaty clause of the Constitution because it substantively alters the original CFE Treaty. Itis my view, and, I believe, the view of most Senators on both sides of the aisle who have carefully examined the issue, that the ABM Demarcation Agreement also makes a substantive change in a treaty to the ratification of which the Senate previously gave its advice and consent--thereby necessitating that U.S. ratification of the Demarcation Agreement can occur only if the Senate gives its advice and consent by means of the complete constitutional process. But the ABM Succession Agreement is a different matter entirely. It effects no substantive change in the ABM Treaty or any other treaty. It does one and only one thing: It codifies the status with respect to the treaty of the states which succeeded to the rights and obligations of the former Soviet Union. It is a function of the executive branch, not the legislative branch, to determine if new nations which descend from a dissolved nation inherit the predecessor nation's obligations such as those under a treaty. This is not a matter of defending a Senate right or obligation or prerogative; the Senate has no right, obligation, or prerogative to defend with respect to determination of succession. This principle has been illustrated on many occasions by its application. Recently, and of direct relevance, it has been applied in a number of circumstances with regard to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. I believe I understand the objective here, Mr. President, and I do not believe it is the defense of a nonexistent constitutional principle or a nonexistent constitutional right or prerogative of the Senate. This is a wolf in sheep's clothing--a maneuver by opponents of the ABM Treaty to gain strategic advantage in their quest to demolish the ABM Treaty. The objective is to give them one additional shot at killing the Treaty. I am prepared for the debate on the ABM Treaty. I look forward to thoroughly assessing whether this treaty continues to serve our Nation's security interests as I strongly believe it has well served those interests since its ratification. I look forward to examining in detail the probable reactions in Russia and elsewhere if we abandon the treaty. But let me return to an earlier point that ABM opponents have shown they are willing to ignore. The Senate is not currently debating the ABM Treaty. The matter that is before us today is the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Flank Agreement. Condition 9 is an unwise, unnecessary, destructive digression from what we should be doing here today. It is yet another example of distressing political expediency too often illustrated in this Chamber in recent years. Fortunately, that expediency rarely has sunk to the level of sacrificing a vital constitutional principle--such as the separation of powers--for the sake of tactical gain. But, Mr. President, let there be no mistake: It is sinking to that level today in condition 9. When we do such things, Mr. President, there is a price to be paid. Either we who serve here today will pay that price at a later time, or those who follow in our footsteps will pay that price. We disserve the Constitution we are sworn to uphold when we permit that to occur. I must remark, Mr. President, on the peculiar and troubling silence of the administration on this issue. The administration, by position and motivation, is best situated to defend the constitutional prerogatives and responsibilities of the executive branch. And yet, for some unknown reason, perhaps a tactical calculus, or exhaustion, or distraction--for some reason--the administration never even joined this issue. I say to the administration: Despite the appearances given by your silence and inaction on this issue, this truly does matter in the long run. And this administration, and others to follow it, will regret this day. Much more is being ceded here than the authority to decide what nations properly hold the obligations of the ABM Treaty that previously were held by the Soviet Union. Mr. President, I strongly support the ratification of the Flank Agreement. Before we vote on the resolution of ratification, I will offer the amendment I referenced earlier to address the Caucasus region, which I hope will be approved. Then, despite the reservations about condition 9 I have enunciated, because of how important I believe the CFE Treaty is and will continue to be to European security and stability and therefore to world security and stability, I will vote to approve the resolution of ratification and urge all other Senators to do so. questions of treaty adherence in the caucasus Mr. President, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty was negotiated to limit the numbers and geographical distribution in Europe of five key types of offensive-capable weapons systems. The treaty contains sublimits for portions of the Atlantic-to-the-Urals region covered by the treaty that apply to the five types of treaty-limited equipment. The treaty, when it was negotiated, was focused on the protracted cold war and the confrontation at the Iron Curtain that ran through Central Europe. Its design was to make it less likely that the cold war would turn hot, by making it more difficult to amass sufficient quantities of the weapons systems that would be needed for a successful attack of one side on the other, or, at the very least, to amass such weaponry without the other side being aware of the preparations for such an attack. The weapons limitations and the transparency are the treaty's keys. But as the astonishing events of the late 1980's and early 1990's unfolded, the entire structure of Europe changed in such a fashion as to be virtually unrecognizable. For the most part, this was a very welcome change. For the first time in 40 years, there was no tense face-off of the world's greatest armies at the Warsaw Pact/NATO border. But the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which was one of the most prominent of the changes in the region, removed the authority and control that had kept a lid on ethnic conflicts and territorial disputes in several regions of what had been the Soviet Union. Ancient tensions and hatreds soon began to bubble to the surface, and nowhere moreso than in the Caucasus region. The Russian province of Chechnya sought to secede from Russia. Ethnic Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan sought to gain independence so they could align with Armenia. Abkhaz separatists in Georgia have fought a long-running civil war with the central government. Wars and revolutions are fought with weapons, of course. All parties to these conflicts have done all in their power to increase their firepower. Not surprisingly, these actions, when they involve treaty- limited equipment, have implications for the CFE Treaty even though contending with such situations was not the primary purpose for which the treaty was negotiated. Responding to an allegation made publicly by a Russian Army general who now serves in the Duma, the majority included in the text of the resolution of ratification of the CFE flank agreement, as a part of condition 5 titled ``Monitoring and Verification of Compliance,'' paragraph F, which is a requirement that the President submit a report to the Congress regarding ``whether Armenia was in compliance with the treaty in allowing the transfer of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the treaty through Armenian territory to the secessionist movement in Azerbaijan.'' Mr. President, wherever there are credible allegations or concerns that the provisions of any arms control treaty have been violated, those allegations or concerns should be explored thoroughly and the truth determined. That, certainly, applies in this case. However, I believe this portion of condition 5 is too limited in its scope, and because of that limitation, leaves the impression that the Senate is not as concerned about the effects on the treaty of arms transfer and acquisition actions in other areas of the Caucasus region. If we are to carefully examine alleged violations of treaty provisions in one specific location in this conflicted region, we should direct the same level of inquiry at all portions of the region. We know that arms buildups in other Caucasus locations have violated provisions of the CFE Treaty. Some of those violations, in fact, have been openly acknowledged. It is my belief that the Senate should address this matter directly, and do so by expanding the scope of the report that will be required by paragraph F of condition 5. Together with Senator Sarbanes, and with the support of several other Senators, I have prepared an amendment to do this. The amendment inserts a new subparagraph ii requiring that the President's report address ``whether other States Parties located in the Caucasus region are in compliance with the Treaty.'' The President also must indicate what actions have been taken to implement sanctions on any of these states found to be in violation. I believe this change will make this provision of the resolution of ratification more useful. Because the report the Congress will receive will give a more complete picture of the level of compliance with or violation of the CFE Treaty in the Caucasus region, the United States can formulate a response that will be more complete and suitable. Amendment No. 279 (Purpose: To require a compliance report on Armenia and other States Parties in the Caucasus region)

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I believe we have an agreement on this particular amendment. I thank the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee for working, as he always does, in order to find a common ground in these matters.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the amendment that I send to the desk is an amendment that seeks very simply to create the equity and balance that I sought with respect to the question of Armenia. I believe that we have an agreement on this language. It will simply reflect that we ought to hold all nations in the area to the same standard. In my judgment, it is self explanatory. I believe it has been approved by both sides as a consequence of that. Mr. President, I send the amendment to the desk.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the amendment offered today by Senator Snowe and me represents an important and urgently needed step in our efforts to protect marine mammals. The provision amends the Marine Mammal Protection Act [MMPA] to encourage life-saving and well- intentioned efforts to free marine mammals from entanglement in fishing gear and marine debris. Under existing law, fishermen and others who come to the assistance of a marine mammal that has become entangled in fishing lines or debris technically are in violation of the MMPA's moratorium on the taking, or incidental killing, of a marine mammal. This situation is a true example of the old axiom that no good deed goes unpunished. However, Federal officials have recognized that while such incidents may violate the letter of the law, they are entirely consistent with the goals and objectives of the MMPA to protect marine mammals and reduce injuries. Consequently, the Federal Government has exercised discretion and has never prosecuted individuals for such rescue efforts. This amendment simply codifies the existing practice of allowing good Samaritans to free entangled marine mammals without fear of prosecution under the MMPA. I think it is an idea that is long overdue and to which both conservationists and fishermen can agree. The MMPA revision authorized by this amendment is particularly important for our ongoing efforts to forge partnerships with New England fishermen in the protection of endangered right whales. I know that Massachusetts lobstermen and fishermen are concerned about threats to these magnificent whales. This amendment should provide them needed reassurances that they will be protected in their efforts to reduce whale entanglement, injuries, and deaths. I recognize that this is just one step in developing a comprehensive solution to the problem of interactions in New England waters between endangered whales and fishermen. We still must deal with substantial and well-justified concerns raised by New England fishermen about the effect of recent court decisions and proposed federal regulations on their economic well-being and ability to continue to pursue their traditional livelihood as we seek measures to enable the preservation and rebuilding of the seriously depleted right whale population. As a New Englander and the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Oceans and Fisheries, I look forward to working with the distinguished chairwoman, Senator Snowe, other members of the New England delegation, the fishing industry, conservation groups, and the Clinton administration to ensure that the final regulations are fair and balanced. Toward that goal, I will convene a meeting in Boston next week with other members of the Massachusetts delegation to hear from fishermen, whale conservationists, and the administration. While significant work remains to be done, I am confident that together we can resolve the current uncertainties and develop a solution that preserves both whales and fishermen.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, recently our colleague, Senator Moynihan, secured, or maybe not so recently, his FBI file, and it is interesting that in 1961, in a memorandum suggesting a meeting between himself and a then very youthful Daniel Patrick Moynihan, J. Edgar Hoover wrote, ``I am not going to see this skunk.'' Now, the Senator from New York has been called many things, as we all have in the course of our careers, but after considerable amount of reflection I concluded that the only way in which this moniker could stick would clearly be in a way that J. Edgar Hoover did not intend, and that is that the distinguished Senator from New York has long and often been a skunk at the garden party of the intellectually comfortable, challenging our thinking about the status quo. Most recently, he has brought this very considerable skunk-like presence to the matter of America's intelligence bureaucracy in the post-cold-war era. He has asked why it is that our vast intelligence apparatus, built to sustain America in the long twilight struggle of the cold war continues to grow at an exponential rate? Now that that struggle is over, why is it that our vast intelligence apparatus continues to grow even as Government resources for new and essential priorities fall far short of what is necessary? Why is it that our vast intelligence apparatus continues to roll on even as every other Government bureaucracy is subject to increasing scrutiny and, indeed, to reinvention? Our colleague's answer is an important one for all of us to reflect on. The answer is secrecy and bureaucracy. It is secrecy that conceals structure, budgets, functions, and critical evaluation from the public, the executive branch and most Members of Congress, including those on appropriate oversight committees. It is bureaucracy, the nature of the self-perpetuating institution like any of our intelligence agencies, that leads to an ongoing redefinition of purpose and ongoing creation of redundant systems and ongoing expansion of scope. The first component, secrecy, means that the normal active tools of democracy, that is, press scrutiny, public debate, and appropriate oversight from executive and the congressional branches, are absent. And the second component, bureaucracy, means that reform, downsizing, reorganization, and elimination of redundancies cannot come from within because, as the Senator from New York demonstrates, our intelligence apparatus is merely following the norms of all agencies. This suggests that the intelligence bureaucracy will not, indeed cannot, change until we act on the cultural barriers to reform. I ask unanimous consent that excerpts of the remarks of our colleague, the senior Senator from New York, at Georgetown University's Marvin H. Bernstein Lecture be printed in the Record. I commend this important commentary on the problems of bureaucracy and secrecy to all of my colleagues.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to proceed as if in morning business.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair. I will speak for a few moments on the motion to proceed. Mr. President, I would like to comment, if I can--I was sitting here actually thinking about some other remarks--but I want to comment on the remarks of the distinguished Senator regarding voluntarism and sort of the special spirit of America that we talk about, which many of our colleagues in the Senate fall back on as a place to suggest we can deal with a lot of these problems of children. I heard my colleague say that it is really not a problem of money, it is not a problem of resources; what we need is this special spirit, we need to tap into this spirit. Mr. President, I am all for tapping into that special spirit, but I have to tell you, in too many communities that I visited, it is also a question of resources. I mean, I went to the middle school in Charlestown the other day with the drug czar and asked a bunch of kids in the middle school, aged 10 to 14 years old, what time they leave school. They said, ``Well, we leave school at 1:30 or 2 o'clock in the afternoon.'' And then I asked them, ``Well, how many of you are home alone with nothing to do, with nobody at home, no parent between the hours of 2 o'clock and 6 or 7 in the evening?'' And 50 percent of the hands went up, Mr. President. I then asked, ``Well, how many of you have access to an afterschool program, Boys or Girls Club, parenting, or some sort of program?'' Well, they did not. More than 50 percent of the very same kids who had to go to a home that had nobody home raised their hands. You know, we can talk about the special spirit of America, and we can talk at great length about the capacity to be able to tap into voluntarism. But first of all, volunteers have to be organized. Volunteers have to be trained. I mean, volunteers cannot just show up one day and say, ``Hey, I'm qualified to take care of a kid who is an infant or a toddler or kids in the middle school'' and not know how to show up at the school, not know what to do, not even know if there is a program for them. Somebody has to work through that process. In a lot of communities we are lucky enough to have some entities that try to do that. But I can show you a lot of communities where, despite the fact that they have the entities that are trying to do that, they are just absolutely overwhelmed by their lack of private resources and private commitment and private individuals to be able to reach out and grab these lives and bring them back from the precipice. I do not want the Government doing it. I am not suggesting that we are better off having some big Government program come down and do this for those things. But I am suggesting that unless you empower some of those entities at the local level with the resources necessary, this is all one great farce. It is a masquerade. In Brockton, MA, we have 22,000 kids under the age of 18. We have a converted armory in Brockton that is their Boys and Girls Club. I have been there many times talking to their peer leaders who tell me that for the 2,000 kids who get access to it, it is very helpful. But then you ask the question, the really pregnant question, what happens to the 20,000 kids who do not get access to it? And the answer is, they are hanging around the streets. So, you know, I mean, does anybody in America believe that voluntarism is going to rescue a generation where almost four-fifths are out there, outside of access to these kinds of entities? And to make matters worse, I can take you to school district after school district where they have shut the library or it is part time, where they no longer have a sports program, they no longer have arts and music, and they no longer have even some remedial programs for some of these kids. I can take you to schools where they Xerox materials because they do not have books. So we can talk about sort of, you know, all this, quote, ``thousands of points of light'' and other kinds of things. But the fact is--I am going to say a lot more about this in the next days--the fact is, there are some fundamental responsibilities that we have to try to deal with on these things, and we are not living up to those responsibilities. I would like to empower the YWCA, the YMCA, the Boys Club, the YouthBuild, City Year, and thousands of organizations and entities out there. But, Mr. President, we cannot meet the demand. And not one of them have sufficient resources--not one of them. You can go to YouthBuild in Boston and find 80-some kids coming out of the court program, coming out of gangs, coming off the streets, the very thing they are talking about. Some adult is finally coming into their life to give them some kind of affirmation, some kind of self-esteem for the first time in their lives, but it is happening because of a dollar that has been decided to be spent here. And for the 80 kids who are in the program, I will show you 400 who are not. So you can decide, you know, how you are going to decide telling which 400 get what, which 80 get what. For all the rhetoric in this country, the bottom line is, Mr. President, we are not living up to our obligations in order to provide the fundamentals of child development and child growth. And that is the great debate for this country. We have one child every 8 seconds who drops out of school. We have one child every 10 seconds who is reported neglected or abused. We have one child every 34 seconds born low weight. We have one child every 2\1/2\ minutes arrested. We have one child every, I think, 2 hours or 2\1/2\ hours shot by gunfire. And we have one child every 4 hours who commits suicide. And what do we do? Well, we kind of are talking about it. We have this big thing going on in Philadelphia that will heighten some participation, I have no doubt. Some additional people will come and take part in some additional alternatives. But there is no way we will sufficiently rescue a generation where 33 percent of the children of this country are currently born out of wedlock. It will take a massive intervention in the lives of rural and urban dispossessed and disenfranchised in order to help pull that back from the brink. The alternative is, we can wait 10, 15, or 20 years and pay $55,000 per prison cell, or $25,000 per drug treatment program, or deal with the disabilities that come from children who do not get to see a doctor when they have asthma when they are young so they wind up with permanent disabilities here or any of the permanent disabilities that come from the lack of medical attention. And 10 million kids in America have no medical care whatsoever. We are talking about children. Half the kids who have no medical care who have asthma never see a doctor. A third of the kids who have an eye infection or ear infection never see a doctor. And we are the only industrial country on the face of this planet that treats its children this way. Notwithstanding the fact that we have seen the gross domestic product of this Nation double since 1969, we have seen child poverty increase by 50 percent. So as we go on in this debate, Mr. President, I intend to come to this floor and make certain that we deal with the realities of what are happening to the children of this country. I cannot think of anything more important. And I think this is an important part of the debate.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, what is the parliamentary status at the moment?

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, last Friday, April 25, the Senate passed by voice vote the Senior Citizens Home Equity Protection Act which will enable the Department of Housing and Urban Development to protect seniors against aggressive and unethical practices by firms who charge senior homeowners exorbitant fees for obtaining a home equity conversion mortgage. I was not able on that day to voice my support for this legislation, and I want to do so today. I commend Senator D'Amato and the other cosponsors of this legislation for their swift and timely action on this important piece of legislation. I also want to thank Secretary Cuomo for bringing the problem which this legislation addresses to our attention. The FHA home equity conversion mortgage program, implemented in 1989, has given 20,000 senior homeowners the opportunity to turn the valuable equity in their homes into direct cash payments. This borrowed equity can be used to satisfy any number of needs, and in the case of seniors, escalating medical costs colliding with fixed-incomes often make additional financial resources a necessity. Seniors who obtain reverse mortgages have median incomes of only $10,400. The ability of low- income seniors to access their home equity and increase their incomes is essential for enabling many seniors to continue living in their own homes. This legislation is necessary to protect vulnerable seniors who have been unscrupulously targeted by certain estate planning services who charge fees of 6 to 10 percent of the cost of the reverse mortgage loan. Many homeowners are simply unaware that the process of receiving a reverse mortgage through the Department of Housing and Urban Development is actually free. HUD recently revealed that seniors have been bilked for thousands of dollars by unregulated companies that have taken a Federal program intended to serve one of our most vulnerable populations and used it for exploitation and financial gain. S. 562 will provide important safeguards for seniors by requiring that the mortgagor receives full disclosure of any costs pertaining to the origination of a reverse mortgage. Additionally, the Secretary of HUD will be empowered to impose restrictions and prohibit firms from charging excessive fees. Again, I would like to extend my appreciation to Senator D'Amato and the rest of my colleagues for their swift action that will ensure senior homeowners will be no longer be victimized by exploitive reverse mortgage tactics.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, every one of us here in the Senate are very privileged to be able to do what we do at the request of the citizens of our State and with their trust. And we often get a lot of credit and occasional brickbats for it. But the truth is, none of us could do what we do without the capacity of able staff. We are all blessed with that. It is the way that we succeed, knowing what we know when we vote or being able to pursue some legislation that we pursue. I have been particularly blessed to have an individual work on my staff since I arrived in the U.S. Senate, a person who came as my scheduler when I arrived in 1985, and who, until this day, was my scheduler. When I arrived here 12 years ago as a new Senator and began to assemble a staff, I was extraordinarily lucky to be introduced to a person by the name of Patricia Gray, Pat Gray as she is known to those who have worked with her here in the Senate. She came to me as a professional's professional, Mr. President. She had come to Washington a number of years before having been initiated into public service by one of the all-time great Senators, Paul Douglas of Illinois. After arriving in Washington, she worked for Senator Douglas, for Senator Hubert Humphrey, for the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, for a host of Democratic Presidential campaigns over the years, and for some other congressional offices. She took important time off during her career at various points to give birth to and to raise two sons, and worked in both nonprofit and for-profit private sector organizations. A complete recitation of her extraordinary career would require a separate speech. But let me just say that it was my extraordinary good fortune 12 years ago to have Pat Gray be willing to take a place in my office and help to create order out of chaos. I realize there are a lot of people on the outside who might wonder, not having worked in close proximity to someone in public life, or even somebody as a high private official, why somebody would need sort of a full-time professional scheduler, and in the case of some offices I suppose more than one person. But literally, as all my colleagues know, it is a very special talent to be able to make people feel good who you have to say no to. And you have to say no. It is a very special talent to be able to balance the scores of invitations with the schedule here, which we can never quite determine, to be able to balance the when and if as a Senator--you might be able to appear--without making people feel somehow that you are either indifferent or lack caring with respect to their concerns or desire to have you come. And we, all of us, receive hundreds of invitations, not only by the week, but by the days sometimes. It is extraordinarily hard to contend with the need to balance 5 or 10 committee meetings in the course of a week, overlapping with votes that occur whenever they might occur, and to keep all of the people happy who you are trying to balance as that schedule changes. I really cannot think of a tougher job, while simultaneously trying to enhance an individual Senator's ability to be able to meet their legislative agenda, not to mention as all of us struggle so much with a personal life, our home agendas. So the absence of that very, very special talent is literally the absence of order and capacity in a Senate office. For these past 12 years, Pat has applied her remarkable storehouse of information that she brought with her to Washington about the Congress, about life here, about those who animate both this city and this institution. She readily acquired the same degree of sophisticated knowledge about my State of Massachusetts and those who animate our State and our politics and our lives. And she learned my preferences and patterns in personal and family needs and incorporated those into the schedule process. That is a very potent package, Mr. President. It is one for which many elected officials, for that competence, would give their right arm and leg in an effort to find that kind of person. But I want to emphasize something. She brought a great deal more to the job than simply her capacity to be able to run the schedule. It is a special skill and it is a special knowledge. But I would like to just very quickly mention a couple of other very special traits. First, she, among many people--and I have been blessed to have scores of people who have worked for me since I have been in the Senate--has a deep constitutional commitment to the principle that anything worth doing at all is worth doing well. No matter how long it took, no matter how early she had to come in in order to make it work, no matter what the complexity of the scheduling matter of which I or other staff members were depending on her to see us through, she saw it through. I cannot begin to relate the number of days, Mr. President, on which when I arrived in the office--and I often arrive early--I found Pat there, the first person in the office and often, I might say, the last person to leave on the same day. When I was flying out of Washington to Boston or elsewhere in the country, she was at her phone until she knew the plane had taken off, until she knew there was no delay, no cancellation, no crisis to rearrange. All who dealt with her and those who work in my office and those who work in other Senate or House offices or elsewhere in government, constituents in Massachusetts, and all others, knew her to be an utterly and remarkably dependable person. It was her responsibility to make certain people understood. And because it was her responsibility, they did understand that they could depend on her. That is a very special brand of devotion, and I would respectfully suggest different probably from a lot of the mores that currently circulate at large in our country. I also want to underscore that she did not just stumble into government by accident. This was not a place where she had to find a job. This was not a place where she wound up because she did not have the talent to find any kind of work anywhere else. This was a place that she worked for more than a quarter of a century with a purpose because she believed devoutly in the ability of this place to make a difference in the lives of other people and in the ability of the democratic government, and more importantly, the fundamental responsibility of a democratic government to serve people. Unlike those who hold the philosophy that government is just somehow inherently incapable of ever helping somebody, she believes intently that bureaucracy aside, government has the ability, well delivered, efficient, and well thought out, to be able to help people to do things for themselves, not to do things for them. I think that she also shares a deep belief that corporately good things can happen that improve the quality of life that individuals sometimes simply cannot do on their own. She believes that government has, just as individuals have, a very special obligation to those who do not share the good fortune that others enjoy, and she particularly always shared and I think her work for Hubert Humphrey and Muriel Humphrey and Paul Douglas, and I hope she will feel for me, were part of her commitment to the impoverished, the illiterate, sick, elderly, the disabled, and those for whom life is hard in many ways, that others never know or know only in mild terms. This foundation energized Pat Gray, and I think over all the years they gave her a stamina and the ability to persevere even when others would have thrown up their hands and walked away. It led her to spend her entire career in public service, when she really could have chosen a dozen other courses. Recently, and to my benefit, Mr. President, that commitment caused her to remain at her post even after she was entitled to full retirement benefits. Her dedication to improving government, to making it work better, for the benefit of those who need and depend on its wide variety of services, is visible to everybody who ever came in contact with her. She knows that every person who works in government, regardless of his or her specific position or responsibility is a part of the whole, and therefore the effect of the whole, and she has been determined that her contribution would be measured as positive. Finally, Mr. President, Pat has been nothing if she has not been tenacious. Surrender is simply not a word in her lexicon. If she believes it is her duty to accomplish something, all of us in my office, or in offices around her--including I might say, at peril several times learned--it is best not to inadvertently be standing between her and her goal. When it came to keeping that schedule, despite the uncontrollable interruptions, despite all the forces that tugged at it, no one could have mustered or demonstrated greater energy or commitment than she did. It is a blessing, Mr. President, at the right time, after a lifetime of work, to leave the workplace for the pleasures of her retirement. But that time has now arrived for Pat. So, no longer every week will she have to leave her husband Ken, himself a veteran of public service with Senator Douglas, Senator and Vice President Humphrey, Senator Stevenson, Senator Tydings, several Presidential campaigns, and a number of other posts, who has been retired for a couple of years, no longer will she have to leave him in their home on the side of Old Rag Mountain in the Blue Ridge in order to commute here for long days in the office and short nights in an Arlington apartment. No longer will she be unable to join him in Colorado at their mountain cabin for the few weeks of the summer that she gets, as she did forgo on occasion because of the Senate schedule. Ultimately her friends, her family, and above all, her garden that she cherishes will be the winners for this moment. In my office, we will take a very, very special pleasure in knowing that she will be enjoying this well-earned time so much. After her many years of contribution to the U.S. Senate and to the country and to my State and to my office personally, we wish her, as I know everyone who has come in contact with her in the Senate and in Washington does, we wish her well. She has made her mark and we should all wish that we could live a life as clearly committed and devoted as hers. I ask unanimous consent that a letter from Muriel Humphrey be printed in the Record.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, with the active participation of the President and his National Security Council and other foreign policy and national security representatives, Senator Biden, the Foreign Relations Committee ranking Democratic member and his staff have worked diligently to remove as many of the objections and doubts about the Chemical Weapons Convention held by a number of Republican Senators as they possibly could remove. Working together, they sought to do this by providing official data and information about the convention, about Defense Department plans, and about intelligence sources and methods; by obtaining official commitments from the President; and by negotiating conditions to the treaty. This negotiating effort centered on Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Helms and his staff and Senate Majority Leader Lott and his staff as well as other Senators who have voiced major concerns about the treaty. I believe the evidence is unassailable that the effort to negotiate conditions acceptable to both treaty proponents and opponents produced great progress--in fact, a degree of progress few thought was attainable when the process began. As a result, this afternoon the Senate has unanimously agreed to 28 conditions that address a sweeping range of treaty facets. One measure of how successful this effort has been is that yesterday, former Senate majority leader and 1996 Republican Presidential nominee Bob Dole announced that, given the assurances and insurance those 28 conditions provide, he now supports the convention and believes it is in our Nation's national security interest to ratify it and participate in its ongoing efforts to eliminate chemical weapons from this Earth. Senator Dole was clear in noting that the treaty remains imperfect in his mind, a fact that comes as no surprise to treaty proponents but still is loudly professed to be a shocking fact by some treaty opponents. But despite the herculean effort that has resulted in agreement on 28 conditions to the treaty, Senator Helms and some other Senators have been relentless in insisting on 5 other conditions. While the stated purpose of each of these conditions appears on the surface to be laudable, and that stated purpose could be readily embraced by virtually every Senator if not every Senator, ranging from stalwart treaty proponent to stalwart opponent, the practical effect of four of these conditions in the form in which their drafters insist on them would be to prevent the United States from ratifying the CWC, even if the Senate were to vote 100 to 0 for ratification with any of these conditions attached to the resolution of ratification the Senate approved. For that reason, Mr. President, these proposed conditions to which treaty proponents could not possibly agree, which are contained in the substitute resolution authored by Senator Helms along with the 28 conditions to which the agreement of both treaty proponents and opponents was secured, have come to be known among treaty proponents as the killer amendments. This afternoon, under the terms of the unanimous-consent agreement that governs Senate action on the CWC, the Senate will take up these disputed conditions one at a time. Treaty proponents will move to strike each of them, and the Senate will vote on each of those motions to strike. It is not possible to overemphasize the importance of these motions and the vote on them, Mr. President. Because regardless of what is said about the rationale for insisting on these disputed conditions, Mr. President, the fact is that the United States will be unable to ratify the CWC now or any time in the immediate future--and quite possibly never--if the effort to strike any one of them from the resolution fails. That is the gravity of what we will be doing on the Senate floor for the next 5 or 6 hours. The first of the disputed conditions that we will take up is Condition 30, titled, somewhat antiseptically, Chemical Weapons in Other States. The text of this condition is quite short. Let me quote it verbatim: Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall certify to the Congress that countries which have been determined to have offensive chemical weapons programs, including Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, China, and all other countries determined to be state sponsors of international terrorism, have ratified or otherwise acceded to the Convention. Now let me translate that text into simple English. Under the terms of that condition, were it to be attached to the resolution of ratification and the Senate were to pass it in that form, regardless of how many votes the resolution receives, and regardless of the strong support of the President of the United States for ratification, the United States could not formally ratify the Convention or be a part of its efforts to remove chemical weapons from the Earth until and unless the President could and did certify to the Congress that all the rogue nations of the Earth had first ratified the Convention or formally agreed to abide by its provisions. Mr. President, I certainly applaud those who drafted this condition for the objective they seek. There is no Senator who more fervently wishes than this Senator that Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea, China, Cuba, and Sudan--and, in fact, all nations on the Earth--will ratify the CWC and fully abide by all its provisions. Were that to be the case, Mr. President, the world would be a far, far safer, healthier, and more stable place for the human race. Indeed, were that to be the case, the effect would be so profound that the CWC probably would no longer be needed, because we would have reached the unreachable, achieved the unachievable. We would have reached a near-Utopia. But the hard, cold fact, Mr. President, is that while one or two or even more of these nations, some of which are often referred to as rogues, may ratify the CWC, and, if they do, we certainly hope and expect they will abide by its terms and destroy their chemical weapons arsenals and foreswear the production of any more chemical weapons, it is a safe bet that several of these nations will not ratify the Convention in the foreseeable future. That absolutely cannot come as a surprise to anyone in this Chamber. I do not believe a single Member of the Senate could look me in the eye and make a genuine claim that he or she is surprised to learn that most close observers of these nations do not believe that several of them will ratify the CWC anytime soon. Indeed, much of the 10 years during which the Reagan administration and Bush administration negotiating teams spent in exhausting and exhaustive negotiations to develop this treaty was spent to structure sanctions that will apply to trade in chemicals conducted by nations that do not ratify the CWC, in the full expectation that some if not all of these very nations will not ratify it. Think about it, and it will be painfully apparent. The CWC was not carefully negotiated and crafted to apply principally to those nations that ratify it and genuinely want to rid the Earth of all chemical weapons, though, of course, we must hold all nations accountable. It was negotiated and crafted to apply the pressure of world opinion, diplomatic pressure, and economic pressure on recalcitrant nations whose leaderships flaunt the civilized norm and equip themselves with these horrific weapons, and where even this pressure does not attain reformed behavior, to make it as difficult as possible for those nations to carry on their deadly efforts--to isolate them in all possible ways. The Senator from North Carolina is absolutely correct when he says the rogue nations, or at least some of them, have these materials. In a number of cases, I am convinced they will continue to produce them, Chemical Weapons Convention or no Chemical Weapons Convention. But the issue before the Senate is how can we best try to pressure them to reform their behavior. How do we make it as difficult as possible for them to continue to do that? It is not, I assert, by means of this condition. It will not directly have that effect. And, more destructively, it will prevent U.S. participation in the CWC, period. Plainly, Mr. President, the authors of this condition know that if the condition we now are debating is not defeated, they have succeeded via the backdoor when they could not succeed through the front door in preventing U.S. ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. That is an outcome that must not be permitted. This condition has other destructive consequences. Let me note a few of them. First, this condition places control of a critical U.S. foreign policy and national security decision wholly in the hands of other nations, and not just any other nations. It places total control of whether the United States will ever ratify the CWC and participate in its vital efforts to rid the Earth of chemical weapons in the hands of the very group of nations that are led by those who are our avowed or de facto adversaries--our enemies if you will. What kind of sense does it make to give control of this key U.S. decision to any other nation, much less to any one of these nations? And yet this is the unintended consequence of action by Senators who in every other circumstance most vehemently insist that U.S. sovereignty must never be weakened or trampled. Second, this condition either fails to recognize or ignores the reality that at midnight next Tuesday--April 29--the Chemical Weapons Convention takes effect with or without U.S. participation. The question of whether the Convention is the best that can be designed is not the salient question at this point. The principal question now relevant is whether the United States, its people, and its security interests are better served by being a part of the Convention and working from within its organization to pursue abolition of the world's chemical arsenals, or to remain outside the Convention, which already has been ratified by 74 nations and is sure to be ratified by others of the over 160 signatories. If we fail to ratify, which emphatically will be the result of failing to strike this killer condition, guess which nations the company of which the United States ignominiously will join? Mr. President, in bitter irony, the United States, which under Presidents Reagan and Bush initiated, animated, and led the effort to negotiate this Convention, will join the company of precisely the group of nations this condition identifies as the world's villains and rogues. Rather than continuing to provide global leadership and rallying the world's community of nations to establish a new standard of behavior which proscribes all chemical weapons and engineers effective movement toward reducing them dramatically and ultimately, we hope, eliminating them entirely, we turn a sharp 180 degrees in the opposite direction, and refuse to be a part of this critical effort. In my judgment and the judgment of other people, U.S. prestige and respect around the world will be tragically tarnished. The ability of the United States to effectively lead the community of nations in myriad ways will be severely damaged. Our national credibility will suffer a serious blow. Third, those who insist on this killer condition have claimed that they cannot countenance U.S. participation in the CWC because they are certain that some nations will not participate in it or, if they do ratify it, they will not abide by its terms--notably, they believe, including the nations listed in this condition or at least some of them. As the Senator from Delaware noted earlier, as he quoted Secretary of State Albright, this is analogous to saying that we should have no laws because we are certain that some people will break them. Mr. President, I want to note what three of our most respected voices in this country with respect to national security affairs have said in agreeing that the United States should ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention and specifically addressing the linkage of our actions on the CWC to those of the outlaw states that is made by Condition 30. Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of United States and coalition troops in Desert Storm, said, ``I am very, very much in favor of the ratification of that treaty,'' referring, of course, to the CWC. ``We don't need chemical weapons to fight our future warfares. And frankly, by not ratifying that treaty, we align ourselves with nations like Libya and North Korea, and I just as soon not be associated with those thugs in this particular manner.'' I think that is a pretty strong statement about precisely what this condition would do. Gen. Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who served in that role during the Bush administration and during the Desert Storm operation, has already been quoted by my colleague. He, too, made it very clear that we should insist on this linkage. Former Assistant to President Reagan and Secretary of State James A. Baker III said: [S]ome have argued that we shouldn't commit to the treaty because states like Libya, Iraq, and North Korea, which have not signed it, will still be able to continue their efforts to acquire chemical weapons. This is obviously true. But the convention, which . . . will go into effect in April whether or not we have ratified it, will make it more difficult for these states to do so by prohibiting the sale of materials to non-members that can be used to make chemical weapons. . . . It makes no sense to argue that because a few pariah states refuse to join the convention the United States should line up with them rather than with the rest of the world. Mr. President, that is not company that I want our Nation to be in. It would be a step that would have precisely the opoposite effect of that sought by its authors. Our failure to ratify the CWC will give any nation in the world all the cover it needs to fail to ratify. One need not have a great imagination to know what will result. When those nations that have ratified seek to point the finger of opprobrium at nonparticipants, very few will fail to respond that the United States has determined that it does not support this treaty or what it is designed to accomplish. Accepting this killer condition is playing right into the hands of the rogue nations that want no limits on their macabre chemical activities. I would think that reality would send shivers up and down the spines of all who recoil at the idea of troops from one or more of these rogue nations employing an instantly fatal gas against American troops, or an aerosol compound that leads to the slow, wretched, excruciating death of thousands of American service men and women. If we in the Senate do not remove this killer condition, we will be knowingly driving a stake through the heart of the first successful effort in human history to declare that manufacture or possession of chemical weapons is illegal under international law and to put unremitting pressure on those nations. Over time, if the United States puts its full weight behind the CWC effort as an active participant, the nations that refuse to participate will be shut out of the market for many dual use chemicals that can be used to make both chemical agents and commercial products as harmless as writing ink. Such nations will find it considerably more difficult to produce or acquire chemical weapons. This will produce cumulative pressure to join the community of nations by ratifying the treaty and living up to its requirements. To those who say that is not sufficient, or that it will happen too slowly, or that there will be cheaters in the treaty as well as nonparticipants, I say what is your alternative that will work more surely or more rapidly? The reality is that those who are insisting on this killer amendment have no alternative, much less one that will work more surely or rapidly. It must be remembered that currently it is not even illegal to make or stockpile chemical weapons, and there is no other effort on the horizon to make these actions illegal or to effectively halt them. If the United States chooses not to ratify this treaty after leading the world to it, you can rest assured the community of nations will not be running to us to seek our leadership in some new effort to do that. In addition to all the reasons I have cited for rejecting this killer condition, it is both appropriate and accurate to add every reason advanced by dozens of Senators of both parties during yesterday's and today's sessions for ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention. Because the only practical effect of this condition is to make it impossible for the United States to ratify. Everything else that is said to justify accepting this condition is eyewash, window dressing, camoflage. Only one thing about this condition matters, I say to all my colleagues. If this condition is not defeated, the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention is. There can be no hiding from this central truth. Reasonable people can differ on substantive or policy grounds. Some Senators, albeit for reasons I believe are not meritorious or even logical, may conclude that they do not believe the United States should ratify the CWC. Presumably those Senators, whose number I hope is very, very small, will vote against the resolution of ratification. But no Senator can claim with veracity that he or she wants the United States to ratify the CWC now or in the foreseeable future, and participate in its vital activities to rid the world of chemical weapons, while voting to retain this condition. The two are mutually inconsistent, mutually incompatible. To place it in the vernacular, that does not compute. I urge all my colleagues to consider and understand the gravity of the vote we are about to take. Those who support the CWC must vote to strike this condition.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair. I thank the distinguished minority manager. We have now finally arrived at the first of a series of real confrontations on this treaty, and we will vote shortly on this striking of the first reservation. It really is not possible to overemphasize the importance of each of these votes. There are four votes, each of which would cripple this treaty. If there are 100 Members of the Senate prepared to vote for this treaty--and we know there are not--but if there were and we subsequently were to adopt one of these reservations, those 100 votes would be absolutely meaningless because we would have denied ourselves the capacity for this treaty to go into effect if we do not strike these reservations. The fact is that the United States would be simply unable to ratify now or at any time in the immediate future, and quite possibly never, if the effort to strike any one of these four fails. That is the gravity of what we are going to be doing in this Chamber in the course of this afternoon. The first of these conditions, condition 30, which the Senator from Delaware has ably discussed, has been called, somewhat antiseptically, ``Chemical Weapons in Other States.'' The text is very short, and I just want to quote it verbatim. It says: Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall certify to the Congress that countries which have been determined to have offensive chemical weapons programs, including Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, China, and all other countries determined to be state sponsors of international terrorism have ratified or otherwise acceded to the convention. Let me translate that into simple English. Under the terms of that condition, we will hold ourselves hostage to the very outlaw, rogue states that we seek to control by passing this convention. Under the terms of that condition, we would in fact do nothing to change the status quo. The distinguished chairman of the committee said we have to hold on to this amendment and defeat the treaty essentially because Iraq, Iran, Libya, these countries have chemical weapons today. Well, if we do not pass this treaty, nothing whatsoever will change with respect to the threat versus the United States. Each and every one of those countries will continue to produce and we will continue on the path that we have been on for some years which is destroy our chemical weapons stocks. Why? Because we have decided, and appropriately I believe, that we do not need and do not intend to fight a war with chemical weapons. Now, this particular reservation has a noble objective. I do not think any of us would argue, the real objective is to get those rogue states to get rid of their chemical weapons. We are all in favor of that, if that is the real objective. But I respectfully suggest the real objective is to come around through the back door and do through the back door what they may not be able to do through the front door. There is no Senator in this Chamber who does not hope that Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea, China, Cuba, and Sudan, in fact, every nation on Earth, is going to someday ratify the CWC. If that was the case or it was about to happen or had happened, there would be a lot less concern about how we are going to go about clarifying, inspecting, or challenging during the course of this treaty. But that is not the case. There is not one of those Senators who has drafted this resolution who can look any other Senator in the eye in this Chamber and say today that they believe that any of those rogue states are about to ratify tomorrow, the next day, or the next day. That is not going to come as any surprise to anybody here in the Chamber, Mr. President. There is not one who would do that. In fact, during most of the 10 years during which the Reagan administration and the Bush administration negotiated over exhausting amounts of time and developed this treaty, they developed it to structure sanctions that would apply to trade in chemicals conducted by nations that do not ratify the treaty. Let me be clear about that. The primary purpose of the strict requirements for challenge inspection and the process of tracking precursor chemicals is not necessarily to keep track of the people that we know are going to live up to this treaty. It is precisely to keep track of the people that are most likely to break the treaty, and every one of the experts has suggested that with respect to the rogue states you are better off having that tracking process, the declarations of sales, the ability to be able to track the fingerprint of chemicals through the globe in order to be able to hold those countries accountable. That is the purpose of this treaty. So we have sort of a double negative here. If we allowed this particular reservation to stand, not only would we hold ourselves hostage to the very countries that we want to have eliminate the weapons, but we also would eliminate the means that we have created to be able to get them to eliminate those weapons. So, Mr. President, I respectfully suggest this treaty was negotiated and crafted precisely to apply the pressure of world opinion, the diplomatic pressure, the economic pressure on the recalcitrant nations whose leadership flaunts the civilized norm. The Senator from North Carolina is absolutely correct. These nations do have these materials. These nations will, I am convinced, in a number of cases continue to produce them. But the issue is how you best try to pressure them to reform their behavior. How do you make it as difficult as possible for those nations to do that? How do you isolate them in the greatest manner possible? Plainly speaking, the authors of this amendment have to know the distinction between having those mechanisms in place, which the Defense Department and others have all said will help them more to be able to do the tracking, than not to have them. I want to emphasize also that there is an irony in this because some of the people who are advocating that we wait until the rogue nations turn around and change their mind are, frankly, the very same people who usually say never give up any sovereignty of the United States to another nation. Here we are turning over the entire sovereignty of the United States to make a decision in our best interests to the very rogue states that have indicated already no willingness to try to adhere to these standards. Second, the condition either fails to recognize or ignores purposefully the reality that at midnight of next Tuesday, April 29, no matter what the Senate does today, the Chemical Weapons Convention takes effect with or without U.S. participation. So the question of whether or not this convention is foolproof, is absolutely the best convention in the world, really begs the issue. The real question before the United States is are we better off with this treaty in terms of protecting our security interests by being part of the convention, within its organization able to change it, which has already been ratified by 74 nations and signed by over 160? If we fail to ratify, or if we fail to ratify by not taking out this reservation, then where are we? We have joined the outlaw nations. We will have joined the very nations that we want most to affect the behavior of. I think it is important to note that some of our most respected voices in this country with respect to military affairs and national security affairs have all agreed that it is significant for the United States to be able to not align itself with those nations. General Schwarzkopf said: I am very, very much in favor of the ratification of the treaty. And he said: We don't need chemical weapons to fight our future wars. And frankly, by not ratifying that treaty, we align ourselves with nations like Libya and North Korea and I would just as soon not be associated with those thugs in this particular measure. I think that is a pretty strong statement about precisely what this reservation would have the effect of doing. General Powell, who has already been quoted by my colleague, made it very clear that we should not do this and made the analogy to NATO, to our not joining NATO simply because Russia was not a member.

Mr. KERRY. Former Assistant to President Reagan and Secretary of State Jim Baker said: Some have argued that we shouldn't commit to the treaty because states like Libya, Iraq and North Korea, which have not signed it, will still be able to continue their efforts to acquire chemical weapons. This is obviously true, but the convention, which will go into effect in April whether or not we ratify it, will make it more difficult for those states to do so by prohibiting the sale of materials to nonmembers that can be used to make chemical weapons. He said: It makes no sense to argue that because of a few pariah states refusing to join the convention, the United States should line up with them rather than the rest of the world. This is a bipartisan sentiment, Mr. President, and I hope the Senate will recognize the gravity of the vote we are about to take.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, it is interesting. I have been here on the floor listening to this debate for a period of time, and it is almost as if the arguments kind of pass each other in a strange way. I have, also, on the Foreign Relations Committee, been at the hearings. We keep hearing the same mantra repeated with respect to a number of objections, notwithstanding the fact that either the language of the treaty is going to be changed by virtue of agreements made between Senator Helms and Senator Biden and the administration, or the treaty itself addresses those specific arguments. One of the most interesting repetitive arguments is that this is somehow going to be dangerous for the chemical companies. We keep hearing people say that this is going to be terrible for American industry. But American industry has signed off on it. The Senator from Delaware represents many chemical companies. Fifty-six percent of the economy in the State of Delaware is represented by chemical companies. He hasn't heard from them in opposition. Nevertheless, we hear people repeat that. Now, obviously, this convention, despite its attributes, is not a panacea for the threat of chemical weapons. None of us who are proposing this convention, I think, are suggesting that this is the panacea. But what it does do, Mr. President, is it contributes, on balance, more to the effort to have deterrence, to expose cheaters and to detect chemical weapons production and proliferation of any kind of significant military nature than not having it. Mr. President, although crude chemical weapons have been around for centuries, poison gas unfortunately came of age as a tool of warfare in World War I. First chlorine, then phosgene, mustard gas, and lewisite were introduced onto the battlefields of Europe, burning, blistering, and choking unprotected soldiers and civilians alike. Both because with chemical weapons so closely associated with World War I there is a perception they are an anachronistic threat and are therefore of less concern, and because we became accustomed during 40 years of the cold war to living with the threat of a global nuclear Armageddon, some fail to recognize the magnitude of the threat now posed by chemical weapons. This is a terribly serious mistake. Modern chemical weapons--nerve agents like sarin, soman, tabun, and VX--are so lethal that a dose as small as 15 milligrams can kill a person. Equally as troubling, chemical weapons are the most financially and technically attractive option for a country--or a terrorist--that sets its sights on developing and producing a weapon of mass destruction. The ingredients for chemical weapons are chemicals that are inexpensive and readily available in the marketplace, and the formulae to make nerve and blister agents are well known. It is no coincidence that chemical weapons are known as the poor man's atom bomb. The U.S. intelligence community estimates that more than 20 nations possess chemical weapons or the capability to make them readily. Still other countries are working to acquire a chemical arsenal. Chemical weapons have proliferated far more widely than the two other types of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear and biological weapons. We ignore this threat at our peril. It is this threat that the Chemical Weapons Convention confronts. And the Senate today and tomorrow has an historical opportunity to address and reduce that threat--to our civilian citizens, to our armed forces, and to the entire world--as we perform our constitutional responsibility of advice and consent with respect to the convention. Our Nation's highest military and intelligence officials repeatedly have stated that while the Chemical Weapons Convention is no panacea for these threats, America will be safer and we will have greater ability to reduce chemical weapons proliferation, and to identify and remove chemical weapons threats, if the United States and a majority of the world's nations ratify this treaty. The number of signatories is up to 161. Seventy-four nations, including the majority of our allies in NATO and the European Union, have already ratified the convention. The public outcry over the use of chemical weapons in World War I compelled diplomats to begin work to ban these weapons. These post-war efforts fell short of a complete prohibition. They resulted, however, in the 1925 Geneva Protocol that outlaws the use of chemical weapons. Negotiations on a more far-reaching prohibition resumed in 1968, focusing on a treaty that would prohibit the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons as well. In 1969, the United States renounced the first use of chemical weapons and initiated a moratorium on their production that lasted 18 years. Five years later, the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of both the Geneva Protocol and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. International negotiation toward a Chemical Weapons Convention, however, made little progress until the United States again took the initiative. In the 1980's, Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons against Iran and against his own Kurdish people horrified the international community. Iraq clearly violated its obligations under the Geneva Protocol, but the international community did nothing to punish Saddam for his outlaw behavior. This failure to enforce the Geneva Protocol was a failure of international political will, not of the treaty itself. America's leaders at that time, including many of us in this Chamber, must bear part of the responsibility for not having insisted that Saddam pay a price for his outrageous behavior. Just like a domestic law, an international agreement, no matter how good, is of little use unless it is enforced. Iraq's flagrant violation of the Geneva Protocol did, however, serve as a catalyst for the negotiators' attempt to complete the Chemical Weapons Convention. Working from a draft treaty text first introduced by then-Vice President George Bush in 1984, the 39 nations hammering out the treaty in the Conference on Disarmament reached agreements on intrusive and far-reaching verification provisions that were included in the Bush draft text. For example, Vice President Bush proposed on behalf of President Reagan ``anytime, anywhere'' on-site challenge inspections to deter and catch treaty violators. At the time the concept of challenge inspections was first advanced, no nuclear arms treaty yet included even routine on-site inspections of declared nuclear facilities. Vice President Bush asked for these tough verification measures for good reason. It is much more difficult to monitor a chemical weapons treaty than a nuclear accord. The capabilities of our national technical means--including intelligence satellites--enable us to track the production and deployment of nuclear weapons in other countries with a considerable degree of confidence. Chemical weapons production, however, cannot be monitored from afar with anywhere near the same level of confidence. Aside from using large government facilities to churn out chemical weapons, a government could coopt a commercial chemical firm into making chemical weapons, or manufacture chemical weapons in a factory purported to be involved in the commercial production of legitimate products. The legitimate chemical industry around the world makes products that are important to modern life. Some of the same chemicals and technologies that this industry employs to manufacture fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, pesticides, herbicides, and countless other products could also be used to make chemical weapons. There are literally thousands of industrial facilities worldwide, and we know all too well from the inspections in Iraq in the aftermath of the 1991 gulf war that a determined rogue proliferator can and will use the industrial sector to mask efforts to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction. For these very reasons, the Reagan administration not only pushed for routine data declarations and inspections of government and industry facilities; it also insisted on these unprecedented challenge inspections. After George Bush was elected President, the Bush administration took a variety of steps to give impetus to the international negotiations. Perhaps most importantly, in May of 1991, President Bush, without waiting for or depending on completion and ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, unilaterally forswore any use of chemical weapons by the United States, even as in-kind retaliation on the battlefield. A year and a half later, as one of the last acts of his Administration, Bush sent Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to Paris in January, 1993 to join more than 130 states in signing the Chemical Weapons Convention. Pushing these negotiations through to a successful conclusion stands as one of the most important foreign policy achievements of the Bush administration. We owe the dedicated negotiators from the Reagan and Bush administrations, most notably Ambassador Stephen Ledogar and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Ronald Lehman, a debt of gratitude for their far-sighted proposals and their persistence at the negotiating table. We owe Presidents Reagan and Bush a debt as well--for their leadership and consistent support of this historic arms control initiative. The convention that President Bill Clinton presented to the Senate on November 23, 1993, which is before us today, is a feasible and pragmatic treaty. Given the inherent difficulty of curtailing the proliferation of chemical weapons, America's negotiators did not insist on obtaining a flawless pact--an effort that would have been certain to fail. Instead, the U.S. delegation worked closely with our allies in Europe, Japan, Australia, and Canada to create a realistic treaty with verification provisions that offer a significant likelihood of identifying militarily-significant violations and that will force cheaters to incur higher costs and endure greater inconvenience in order to accumulate a covert chemical weapons stockpile. It is important to note that the convention's negotiators and advocates have never claimed that it provides an ironclad assurance that the world will become and remain free from all chemical weapons. That is an impossible standard to meet, so it should come as no surprise the convention does not meet it. Instead, the convention makes identification of cheaters more likely; it requires all non-cheaters to dispose of all chemical weapons--which, of course, the United States already was unilaterally committed to doing by law; and it will make it more difficult and expensive for cheaters to cheat. A very important ally in the negotiations leading to the Chemical Weapons Convention was the U.S. chemical industry. It is counterintuitive to think that the chemical industry would participate in a negotiation that would ultimately bring additional regulation, notably data declarations and inspections, upon itself. To its credit, that is exactly what the U.S. chemical industry, and many of its counterparts in other nations, did. For well over a decade, the U.S. chemical industry provided invaluable assistance to the U.S. delegation and all of the negotiators in Geneva, opening their facilities to test verification concepts and proposing workable solutions for how the data declarations and inspections should operate. With the help of the U.S. chemical industry, the CWC emerged with sufficient provisions and restrictions to make trade in chemical weapons materials more visible and more difficult. The convention's inspectors will watch closely over the global industry, guarding against the diversion of commercial chemicals for purposes of weapons proliferation. At the same time, the treaty contains numerous safeguards that enable the industry to protect its confidential business information to its satisfaction, despite claims to the contrary that are made by some treaty opponents. I want to be clear that despite all of its attributes, the treaty is not a panacea for the threat of chemical weapons. It can't be. But the convention's primary merit is that it will contribute to deterrence, exposure, and detection of chemical weapons proliferation of a militarily significant nature. By requiring the destruction of existing arsenals and making it much more difficult for future adversaries to acquire or increase chemical weapons stocks, the CWC greatly reduces the prospect that U.S. troops will encounter chemical weapons on the battlefield. Following in our footsteps as we move to unilaterally destroy our chemical weapons stockpile, the CWC will begin to level the international playing field by requiring other countries to eliminate their chemical weapons as well. That is the balance. That is the judgment we are called on to make in the Senate. Is this, as the Senator from Alaska was just saying, in the interest of our country to protect our troops and the long-term interests of our Nation? I believe this convention makes identification of cheaters more likely. It requires all noncheaters to dispose of all chemical weapons, something we can't do today. And, of course, we have already unilaterally decided that we are going to get rid of all of our chemical weapons. So here we are going down the road of getting rid of all of our chemical weapons, and here you have finally some form of legal structure that will hold other nations accountable. Clearly the United States must never be complacent about the threat of adversary nations or terrorists armed with chemical weapons. I respectfully suggest that nothing in this convention and none of those of us who advocate this convention begs complacency. The convention's critics claim that the treaty will lull us into a false sense of security, resulting in a weakening of our defenses. To the contrary, the convention stipulates that each of its member nations is allowed to maintain defensive programs to develop and test antidotes, gas masks, and other protective gear and to train its troops in how to use them. So it is really a question of us. I mean that there is nothing in the treaty that lulls us to sleep. The treaty specifically allows us to have defenses. And if we are, indeed, concerned about it, as we ought to be, we will have those defenses, precisely as this administration is offering us with an additional $225 million of expenditure this year. So how can you continually come to the floor and say, ``Oh, my God, this is going to lull us to sleep'' when the administration is providing an additional $225 million? It is our responsibility as elected officials to ensure that we maintain a robust U.S. chemical weapons defense program. To do less would be an injustice to our troops, a threat to our security, and a failure on our part to exercise fully our rights under this treaty. One of the 28 conditions to the treaty negotiated by Senators Helms and Biden, and agreed to by the administration, condition 11, explicitly states this determination, and requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that U.S. forces are capable of carrying out required military missions regardless of any foreign threat or use of chemical weapons. The Pentagon's view of the convention is unambiguous. In his testimony, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John Shalikashvili stated: From a military perspective, the Chemical Weapons Convention is clearly in our national interest. The convention's advantages outweigh its shortcomings. The United States and all other CW-capable state parties incur the same obligation to destroy their chemical weapons stockpiles . . . if we do not join and walk away from the CWC an awful lot of people will probably walk away from it as well, and our influence on the rogue states will only decrease.'' So here you have the general of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman, coming before us and saying, indeed, the problem of the rogue states is not passing the convention. The problem is not having a convention because, if you do not have a convention, you don't have the kind of legal structure and inspection and tracking and accountability that help put pressure on those rogue states and limit the access of the rogue states to the materials with which they make chemical weapons. The truth is that until the convention enters into force, the actions of any nation, signatory or not, to manufacture or to stockpile chemical weapons will be objectionable but it won't be illegal. Mr. President, it won't be illegal. And it is very hard for this Senator to understand how, against the regimen that we have for inspection-- against the intrusiveness that we are acquiring that we don't have today, and measured by the level of destruction of existing stockpiles that is required, the people who today are under no obligation whatsoever to destroy those stockpiles--you could be better off without it against those who have it is really very, very difficult to understand. General Shalikashvili's last point alludes to an argument often made by the treaty's opponents, who are quick to point out that not all of the countries believed to have chemical weapons will join. Indeed, that is true. Libya, Syria, Iraq, and North Korea have not signed the convention, but three-quarters of the nations on the intelligence community's list of probable proliferators have signed. The truth is that until the convention enters into force, the actions of any nation--signatory or not--to manufacture or stockpile chemical weapons will be objectionable, but not illegal under any international law or agreement. Some colleagues in this Chamber suggest we defer United States ratification until after Libya, Syria, Iraq, and North Korea have joined. To them I would respond that failure to ratify gains us absolutely nothing with respect to those rogue states. We are in no way aided in meeting our intelligence and military obligations regarding those nations and their chemical weapons activities by failing to ratify the CWC; conversely, we are in no way impeded, and in fact are assisted, in meeting those obligations by ratification. Rather, I agree with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter: We increase our leverage against these hold-out states by ratifying the Convention. We also make it more difficult for those hold-outs to obtain materials they can use in their chemical weapons programs. Some opponents of the CWC, suggest that it is fatally flawed because adherence to or violation of its requirements cannot be verified. We keep hearing this. It is interesting. At the hearings I kept hearing two arguments coming out from the people who said you can't verify it. They say it is too intrusive, that we will give away all of the trade secrets of the businesses, so we can't allow obtrusive verification. They object to it because they think it is going to prevent business from conducting its business. And they go to the other side of the coin, and say, ``If we get more intrusive, we are going to be verifying sufficiently but then you lose on the other side.'' You can't have it both ways. Either it is a balanced effort at verification and at the level of intrusiveness, which is why the chemical companies support this treaty. Mr. President, the fact is that the very people who have argued for that intrusiveness--the Reagan administration, and most of the principal critics who are making that argument today --are the very people who insisted that the challenge inspections would be essential to the integrity of this convention. Ironically, the handful of principal critics making this argument served in the Reagan administration and, fortunately, insisted that challenge inspections would be essential to the CWC's integrity. Virtually every inspection provision that the Reagan administration proposed was included in the treaty text when the negotiations concluded in 1992. Their proposals having been accepted, these critics now want to raise the bar even higher. The CWC's verification provisions will put inspectors on the ground with sensitive equipment and the right to review records, ask questions, go to any part of a facility, and take and analyze samples. These powerful inspection tools are needed to get the job done, and it would be sheer folly for the Senate to deprive the U.S. intelligence community of the information that these inspections will provide. According to former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey: What the Chemical Weapons Convention provides the intelligence community is a new tool to add to our collection tool kit. It is an instrument with broad applicability, which can help resolve a wide variety of problems. Moreover, it is a universal tool which can be used by diplomats and politicians, as well as intelligence specialists, to further a common goal: elimination of the threat of chemical weapons. Another argument used by critics of the treaty is that Russia does not comply with other arms control treaties and that more of the same can be expected with the CWC. Reports from whistleblowers who worked in the Soviet chemical weapons production complex indicate that in the late 1980's and on into the 1990's, the Soviet Union was developing and testing a new generation of nerve agents. More recent reports suggest chemical weapons research, if not limited production, continues. Russia has declared a stockpile of 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons--the world's largest--but reports indicate that even these numbers may be incorrectly low. Mr. President, to the extent these reports of continuing Russian chemical weapons activity are true, I join treaty critics --and, I confidently expect--all Senators in abhoring this Russian activity. I take second place to no Senator in wanting to use all capability at the disposal of the United States to obtain cessation of those activities, and destruction of all Russian chemical weapons. But treaty opponents seem to have stepped through the lookingglass in Alice in Wonderland. Simply insisting that Russia tell us the truth is no way to get the bottom of this situation. Refusing to ratify the CWC because we are piqued at their behavior is a classic example of what the old cliche refers to as ``cutting off one's nose to spite one's face.'' The United States greatly increases its leverage by ratifying the CWC, which will put pressure on Russia to follow suit. When Senate debate of the CWC was scheduled in the fall of 1996, it became evident that Moscow was feeling the heat of a pending Senate vote on the CWC. Suddenly, Russian officials backpedaled from a 1990 bilateral destruction agreement, which had not yet entered into force, and stated the CWC's activation should be delayed until the bilateral agreement was underway. This strategy belies Moscow's eagerness to postpone U.S. ratification. I, for one, am not buying it. The longer we wait to ratify the CWC, the more breathing room Moscow has. The time has long since passed to put some real pressure on Russia. Senate ratification of the CWC will do just that. Another of the treaty opponents' claims is that the treaty requires the United States to share chemical and chemical weapons defense technologies and capabilities with even those party States that are rogue nations or adversaries of our Nation. Some claim that we would be forced to remove our current export controls applicable to chemicals with respect to all other parties to the CWC. Articles X and XI of the Convention are frequently referenced in this context. What is going on here, Mr. President, is very regrettable. The black and white language of the convention itself contradicts that view. And if the convention itself were not sufficiently clear in enabling the United States to refuse to provide any technology or other information or data that could be misused by rogue nations or adversaries, several of the 28 conditions to which bipartisan agreement has been reached directly address these concerns and should lay them to rest in all minds. Condition 7 requires the President to certify before the ratification documents are deposited that the CWC will in no way weaken the Australia Group of nations, of which the United States is a participant, that has established a cooperative export control regime, and that every single nation that participates in the Australia Group must concur that there is no CWC requirement that would weaken the Group's export controls. Then, annually, certification is required to the Congress that the Group's controls have not been weakened. Further, the condition requires the President to block any attempt within the Australia Group to change the Group's view of its obligations under the CWC. Condition 16 requires the President to notify Congress if he ever determines the Convention's secretariat, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, has willfully divulged confidential business information that results in a financial loss or damage to U.S. company, and to withhold half the United States' annual assessment toward the OPCW's expenses if such a breach occurs and the OPCW does not waive immunity for prosecution of any OPCW official involved in the breach, or if the OPCW refuses to establish an investigatory commission to investigate the breach. Condition 15 requires the United States not to contribute to the voluntary fund the CWC establishes for providing chemical weapons defense assistance to other parties to the treaty, and, with regard to the CWC requirement for all treaty parties to assist other party nations who have been attacked with chemicals or are threatened with such an attack, the same condition limits U.S. assistance to those nations determined to be adversaries to medical antidotes and treatments. Perhaps the least credible argument raised by the CWC's opponents is that this treaty would place unreasonable burdens on America's chemical industry. It would seem that those making this argument have not been listening to what the chemical industry itself has been saying for the last two decades. The chemical industry's reasons for supporting the convention are not altogether altruistic, but they are imminently logical. First and foremost, the chemical industry seeks to disassociate itself from the odious practice of making chemical weapons. Equally important, the U.S. industry long ago decided that the Chemical Weapons Convention would be good for business. The convention contains automatic economic sanctions that preclude treaty members from trading in controlled chemicals with states that do not join. The U.S. chemical industry, which is America's largest exporter, views the convention as a way to a more open marketplace. Industry representatives describe their obligations under the treaty as manageable and acceptable; to wit, the CWC will not impose inspections, regulations, intrusions, or costs greater than those already required by other Federal laws and standards. But it is very important to go beyond the fact that the chemical industry believes the CWC will not impose significantly difficult burdens on its companies--and look closely at the critical fact that U.S. failure to ratify will result in tremendous financial and market share losses--grave in the near term and likely even worse in the longer term--for the U.S. chemical industry. In a letter dated August 29, 1996, the CEO's of 53 of America's most prominent chemical companies bluntly stated: ``Our industry's status as the world's preferred supplier of chemical products may be jeopardized if the United States does not ratify the convention.'' The American chemical industry would be marked as unreliable and unjustly associated with chemical weapons proliferation. If the resolution of ratification of the CWC were to be defeated, it would cost the U.S. chemical industry significant portion of its $60 billion export business--many in the industry have agreed on an estimate of $600 million a year--and result in the loss of thousands of good-paying American jobs. Under the terms of the CWC, some 2,000 U.S. industry facilities--not companies--will be affected by the treaty. Of that group, some 1,800 will be asked to fill out brief data declaration forms and the remaining 200 are likely to undergo inspections. Assertions that the neighborhood ``Mom and Pop'' dry cleaners, cosmetics firms, and breweries will be involved in this are wildly inaccurate. In addition, although the industry's representatives explained patiently to Senators that the CWC's onsite verification and inspection procedures will not violate a U.S. company's constitutional protection against undue search or seizure, there is included in the 28 agreed conditions condition 28 that requires the United States to obtain a criminal search warrant in the case of any challenge inspection of a U.S. facility to which the facility does not give its consent, and to obtain an administrative search warrant from a U.S. magistrate judge in the case of any routine inspection of a U.S. facility to which the facility does not give its consent. The U.S. chemical industry led by the Chemical Manufacturers Association, the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association, and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America have repeatedly and unequivocally requested that the Senate approve the resolution of ratification and pass its associated implementing legislation. Industry's support of this treaty should not be questioned, it should be applauded. It's suprising to see nonindustry people shouting industry concern when the industry itself was intimately involved in developing the convention and the proposed implementation legislation and is urging the Senate to approve the resolution of ratification. The CEO's or other senior executives of seven major chemical firms with significant operations in my home State of Massachusetts are among those who have repeatedly urged the Senate to approve the resolution of ratification. Frankly, in my judgment, the statements of these executives concerning the effects this convention will have on their businesses are more credible than the contradictory statements of the opponents of the CWC. Also among the arguments against the convention used by its critics is the assertion that the CWC will cost the American taxpayers too much money. On the contrary, the U.S. share of the CWC's monitoring and inspection regime, approximately $20 million annually, is far less than the $75 million annual cost to store America's chemical weapons. This $20 million of support for the international inspection agency is minuscule in comparison to the amounts we spend for U.S. defenses. This is a small price to pay to institute and maintain an international mechanism that will dramatically reduce the chemical weapons threat that faces U.S. service men and women and establish an international norm for national behavior which is so apparently in the interests of this Nation and, indeed, all the world's people. And, lest the estimates of the costs of U.S. participation prove to be low, included in the 28 agreed conditions is a condition that limits the U.S. annual contribution to no more than $25 million a year, to be adjusted every third year based on changes in the Consumer Price Index. The United States led the international community throughout the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Three administrations-- two Republican and one Democratic--have labored to develop and place before the Senate a carefully crafted instrument that will increase the safety and security of U.S. citizens and armed forces and will do so at very reasonable costs to taxpayers, companies that make and use legitimate chemicals, and American consumers. Former Presidents Ford, Carter, and Bush have spoken out strongly in favor of ratification. Today 1996 Republican Presidential nominee and former Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole announced his support for the CWC coupled with the 28 conditions to which bipartisan agreement has been secured. Rarely does one see a situation in which it is more important to apply the admonition that we would be wise not to let the perfect become the enemy of the good. Perfect security against chemical weapons is unattainable. I have great hopes that wise Senators will not permit a group of Senators who will not be satisfied by the greatest achievable increase in our security, and many of whom have a basic objection to any international arms control treaty to scuttle a carefully engineered agreement that our military leaders, our intelligence community senior executives, former Presidents of both parties, President Clinton, and 1996 Presidential nominee Dole agree will make all Americans and, indeed, the entire world safer and more secure from chemical weapons. In closing, I want to commend those who have labored diligently to bring the Senate to this point. Former Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar, with the assistance of his able staff, has done yeoman service and again demonstrated his capacity as a leader and statesman. Senator Joe Biden, the ranking Democratic member of the Foreign Relations Committee, has labored, also with the help of his staff, to bring this treaty before the Senate. Senator Carl Levin, ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee, and Senate Democratic Leader Tom Daschle, each knowledgeable and dedicated, have made considerable contributions to this effort and to the debate. Majority Leader Trent Lott's leadership has permitted negotiation of 28 conditions designed to reassure those who in good faith had questions and concerns about various aspects of the treaty. I compliment and thank all of them. Mr. President the compelling logic of this convention and the breadth and depth of support for it should produce an overwhelming vote to approve the resolution of ratification. I have great hope that the Senate will demonstrate its ability by taking this important step of ratifying this treaty. I urge my colleagues to vote for the resolution.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, we have had a long history in the world of attempts to rid the planet of the scourge of chemical weapons. That effort began after World War I, as a result of the searing experiences of troops in Europe during that war near the beginning of this century when chemical weapons were used for the first time in a general way in warfare. Those efforts in the early part of the century resulted, in 1925, in the negotiation in Geneva of an accord that bans the use of chemical weapons. Since that time, the world's more powerful nations have not used them in war, including World War II. There are a couple of rogue states that have used them. Iraq's use against the Kurds and in its war with Iran is the instance most often cited. But despite the progress in seeking to eliminate the use of chemical weapons, the fact is that efforts to ban the manufacture and storage of poisonous gas has hit one brick wall after another over the years. In the past 25 years a substantial effort has been made to achieve an international agreement to ban manufacture and storage of chemical weapons. The Nixon and Ford administrations--both of whom, of course, were Republicans--worked toward this objective, albeit without success. The administration of Republican President Ronald Reagan reinvigorated international efforts to achieve such an agreement during the early 1980's. When Vice President Bush was elected President, his administration assumed the responsibility for continuing those negotiations that were handed off by the predecessor administration in which he had served as Vice President, and I believe most people ultimately will judge that President Bush and his administration's negotiators acquitted themselves well in this regard. After intense and lengthy negotiations, initial success was achieved in 1992 when the Chemical Weapons Convention was completed in Geneva and was approved by the United Nations. In early 1993, shortly before leaving office, the Bush administration, representing the United States, joined with 129 other nations to sign the convention, and the process of ratification of the treaty began. On November 23 of that year, the Clinton administration submitted the convention formally to the Senate for its advice and consent. So here we are now, 4 years from the time when the convention became available for ratification, finally about to exercise our constitutional responsibility in the Senate. I wish that we had acted sooner. But it is my understanding that we now are going to act--that the majority leader has made a commitment to bring up the resolution of ratification on the Senate floor next week so that we can act prior to the critical day of April 29. Let me digress to address the subject of the importance of April 29 to this treaty. April 29, less than 2 weeks from today, is the day on which the convention takes effect. Some Members and others have suggested in hearings and elsewhere that this is not a critical date; that we somehow have an extraordinary power to unilaterally dictate the United States can impose changes in the convention beyond that date. The fact is that April 29 is the date on which all the nations that have ratified the convention expect the convention to take effect, per its terms to which all signatory nations including the United States agreed. They believe they have a right to expect that others will have lived by the same rules by which they have lived. There is a certain contradiction in suggesting that you are going to take the leadership in drafting and seeking support for a treaty which is designed to become international law, and which establishes a set of rules that you and others propose to follow, and before it even takes effect you unilaterally decide you are going to break the first rule it contains which is the date by which you must agree to be a full supporter and participant in order to have a part in setting up on the ongoing procedures and regulations that will apply its terms to all participants. I think those who suggest the United States can simply ignore this deadline--while still seeking international support for some treaty to address the chemical weapons concern, a treaty they believe should be altered in various ways from the treaty that is now before the Senate--are evidencing a kind of arrogance on behalf of our country that often gets us in trouble with our allies and friends and with nations we would like to have as allies and friends. Even more troubling, Mr. President, is the fact that there are some in the Senate, some Members of the Republican Party, who seem to have a deep-seated aversion to any kind of arms control treaty. As we draw close to the point where the Senate will exercise its constitutional role of advise and consent, we are seeing a desperate effort launched to grab onto any kind of straw to suggest that this treaty is not good for the United States of America. We are seeing a host of problems conjured up, and I do mean literally conjured up, to prevent the assembly of a two-thirds majority of the Senate to approve the resolution of ratification. I only have a brief amount of time in the Chamber today, but I want to address some of the principal arguments that are being advanced as a rationale for suggesting that this treaty is not in the best interests of the United States. I have spoken previously at some length in this Chamber about the convention, and I will speak again as we formally take up the debate, but today I want to address briefly several of the claims made by opponents. First, opponents say that the convention could jeopardize confidential business information through frivolous so-called challenge inspections that the critics claim would provide international inspectors with extraordinary access to files, data, and equipment of U.S. chemical companies, and that the inspectors themselves could be spies for adversary nations or for nations whose chemical industries compete with our own. These critics, in effect, are anointing themselves the great protectors of the U.S. chemical industry from an espionage threat they perceive. Mr. President, I do not believe there is a person in this Chamber that does not want to take all needed steps to thwart espionage, but let me note the facts. The Chemical Manufacturers Association strongly supports the Chemical Weapons Convention. Its representatives helped write the rules contained in the convention pertaining to treatment of confidential business information. Not surprisingly, protecting trade secrets was at the very top of their priority list during the treaty negotiations. Further, the CMA conducted seven full-fledged trial inspections of chemical facilities just as would be conducted under the treaty's terms, to make certain that the protections against industrial espionage were strong. The Chemical Manufacturers Association is satisfied that those protections are sufficient to safeguard U.S. trade secrets. Furthermore, the treaty gives our Government the right to reject ahead of time for any reason whatsoever any inspectors that we believe would try to spy at U.S. facilities. Second, Mr. President, opponents say that the convention inspection requirements may involve unreasonable search and seizure which would violate the fourth amendment to the Constitution. Again, they are wrong. The facts are that at the insistence of our own negotiators who were fully cognizant of issues of search and seizure, the Chemical Weapons Convention explicitly allows party nations to take into account their own constitutional obligations when providing access for a challenge inspection. Constitutional rights in the United States have not been weakened or relinquished. Both the CWC and its draft implementing legislation fully protect U.S. citizens, including businesses, from unreasonable search and seizure. In addition, the treaty allows sensitive equipment information or areas of an inspected facility not related to chemical production or storage that are the subjects of the inspection to be protected during any challenge inspection by adhering to approved managed access techniques. Further, treaty proponents are prepared to accept, and Senator Biden has negotiated with Senator Helms, a condition of ratification which will provide that search warrants will be obtained through the normal process for all challenge inspections. A third issue: Opponents say that adherence to the convention's provisions by party nations cannot be perfectly verified. What is occurring here is that the opponents are trying to make the perfect the enemy of the good. I can say that, in the 12 years I have been in the Senate as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and deeply involved in work on a number of arms control agreements, I do not think I have ever seen an arms control agreement that is absolutely, perfectly, 100 percent verifiable. I do not think anybody who negotiates arms control agreements believes such perfection is attainable. Perfection is not the standard by which we should make a judgment as to whether we have a good or bad treaty. Both our national defense leadership and intelligence community leadership have testified repeatedly that this treaty will provide them with additional tools that they do not have today which will help them gain more and better knowledge about what is happening in the world regarding chemical weapons and their precursors. So the test is not can you perfectly verify compliance with the Convention's requirements; the test is do you enhance the security and intelligence interests of your country beyond where they would be without the treaty. Our defense and intelligence community leaders answer a resounding yes to that question. Fourth, opponents say that the nations about whose chemical activities we are most greatly concerned, the rogue nations like Iraq and Libya and North Korea, will not become parties to the treaty and, if they are not parties to the treaty, it will not give us enough protection from chemical weapons to warrant our being a party to it. This is a red herring of enormous proportions for the following reasons. As I stand in the Chamber today and the Presiding Officer sits on the dais, there is absolutely nothing to prevent those rogue nations from doing exactly what people say they fear. There is not even an international regime in place that makes manufacture and storage of chemical weapons illegal, or that provides a way to track the movement of such chemicals and their precursors so that there is a greater likelihood the world will know when rogues are engaging in conduct we believe should not occur, or that gives the world a way in which to hold such nations accountable. I pose a simple question: Is the United States in a stronger position if it is a party to an international treaty in force, to which most nations of the world are trying to adhere, when a nation not a party to the treaty is seen to be engaging in behavior violating the treaty's terms, or is the United States better off with every nation just going about its own business without any protocol at all, without any international standard, without any means to obtain accountability when a nation violates a standard of behavior to which the great majority of the world's nations have formally decreed they believe all nations should adhere. I think most people would say that if the United States ratifies this Convention, our circumstance relative to rogue nations is in no way worse than it is now. We give up nothing, but we gain important advantages. What are they? First, under present circumstances, the manufacture and storage of chemical weapons is not illegal under international law or custom. The Convention will provide that law and custom. It will then be possible to focus international opprobrium on nations violating its standards, be they participant or nonparticipant nations. Moreover, with 72 nations already having ratified, and others certain to follow, especially if the United States ratifies before April 29, there will be a quantum leap forward in the capacity to track the manufacture and sale of chemicals that can be used as weapons, or precursor chemicals, and this enhanced capacity will help us determine what nations might be acting in a way that ultimately could do injury to our country. It is important for everyone to remember that this treaty will greatly assist our efforts to impede the production and storage of chemical weapons. Therefore, it will make it less likely that our troops or our civilians will ever be put in harm's way by being subjected to an attack by chemical weapons. I might remind my colleagues that, no matter what we do with respect to this treaty, we are not going to be manufacturing chemical weapons in the United States. That is the track we are on under our current law. The logic seems unassailable to me that the United States will be a lot better off if we bring the family of nations into a regimen which helps us guard against trafficking in those chemicals and which requires party nations to dispose of their own stocks of chemical weapons and not manufacture others. Fifth, opponents say that participating in the chemical weapons treaty will make the United States less vigilant about the risks of chemical attacks by organized armies or by terrorists and about the need to maintain defenses against those threats. Well, shame on us if that were to be true. I do not think anybody who is supportive of this treaty wants--and I know I do not want--to let down our guard with respect to the possibility of another nation, rogue or otherwise, creating a chemical weapon and using it against us. I absolutely believe it is vital that we have a robust defense which will protect us in the event that someone were to try to break out and do that. But I think this is a tactic of desperation, because if you follow the logic of this criticism to its conclusion, we ought to make certain that our adversaries have chemical weapons to be sure we have sufficient incentive to defend against them, if that is what it takes in order to build our defenses. I emphasize two points here. First, there is nothing whatsoever that any arms control agreement does that necessarily lessens our resolve to defend against the threat that the agreement is intended to reduce. And, second, neither the Clinton administration nor this Congress is going to play ostrich on this issue. The Clinton administration's budget calls for $225 million in increases in the Defense Department's funding for chemical and biological defense over the next 6 years. A $225 million increase hardly equates to a notion that we are being lulled to sleep or into some kind of complacency. I am willing to bet with any Member of this body that the ratification of the CWC will not result in a reduction of our chemical weapons defense efforts. Mr. President, in the next few days we will face a debate which I hope will be conducted on the facts. I devoutly hope that we do not waste time debating the question of whether this treaty is a perfect treaty--of course it is not. Instead, I hope we squarely face and debate the question of whether the security of the United States of America and of the entire world is improved by United States ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. I respectfully submit to my colleagues that when they look at the facts, when they measure what the U.S. chemical industry has done to protect itself, when they measure what we are doing to strengthen our defenses against chemical weapons, when they measure what being a party nation to the Convention will provide us in terms of intelligence and information, when they measure what this does in terms of the ability to track chemicals throughout the rest of the world, when they measure the importance to the United States of our being part of this effort before the Convention takes effect on April 29, I believe our colleagues will decide that the answer to the question of whether the Convention improves the security of the United States is an unequivocal yes, and that they will respond by voting to approve the resolution of ratification and against any debilitating amendments that any treaty opponents offer to it. I yield back any remaining time.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to speak for 15 minutes in morning business.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, no gun works without a bullet. Yet for no good reason, Congress in the early 1980's--which were marked by terribly troubling increases in gun-caused fatalities and injuries-- repealed laws that regulate ammunition. And while a background check is required to stop felons from purchasing guns, no such background check is required to stop them from buying ammunition for guns they already may have. In the meantime, bullets are getting meaner and more deadly. Law enforcement officers know all too well the danger they face each and every time a gun is pointed at them. Advances in technology only promise to make matters worse. When a large percentage of gun-related deaths involve handguns, and a larger percentage of gun-related deaths is accidental, it is not sensible to allow unrestricted manufacture, sale, and use of new, more destructive bullets. In 1994, 157 police officers and State troopers were killed in this country. Five lost their lives in my home State of Massachusetts. Additionally, more than 200 people die from the accidental use of handguns every year. In 1992 alone, 233 accidental deaths occurred because of handguns. This included 6 babies, 36 children under the age of 14, and 8 senior citizens, 2 of whom were over the age of 80. In light of these sad and disturbing facts, there is no good reason to permit ever more dangerous bullets to come on the market. And there is every good reason to keep off our streets and out of our homes bullets that supply handguns with the approximate destructive power of assault weapons. That is why I am today reintroducing the Ammunition Safety Act that I introduced previously in the 104th Congress. The Ammunition Safety Act of 1997 does two things: it reestablishes reasonable regulations for the sale of handgun ammunition, and it outlaws all exceedingly destructive handgun ammunition by expanding and updating the ban on armor-piercing handgun ammunition. This bill would provide a weapon for law enforcement to crack down on crime and would make ordinary people safer from handgun violence and accidental shootings. The bill accomplishes these goals in three steps. First, the bill reinstates and strengthens ammunition control language that Congress repealed during the Reagan era. The bill would require dealers of handgun ammunition to be licensed by the Federal Government and would restrict interstate sale and transportation of handgun ammunition to licenced dealers. The bill also would double the maximum penalties for sale of handgun ammunition to and possession of such ammunition by felons and persons under age 21. Second, the bill would apply Brady Bill provisions to handgun ammunition. To prevent the sale of handgun ammunition to felons, every purchaser of ammunition would have to pass a background check before ammunition could be sold to him or her. These regulations would be a vital tool for law enforcement to use in investigating crime, and would provide equity to a system that currently monitors and restricts the flow of guns, but, inexplicably, not of ammunition. Third, the bill expands the definition of illegal armor-piercing handgun ammunition to include any new conceivable kind of armor- piercing bullet. The bill establishes a new method to accomplish this goal. To date, no law has been able to effectively ban all armor- piercing bullets. It is impossible to ban what cannot be defined because vague laws are constitutionally void--and definitions to date have failed to cover all armor-piercing bullets. All that existing law does is ban bullets based on the materials of which they are made. Consequently, bullets made of hard metal are illegal in the hope that this definition will cover most armor-piercing bullets. But the existing composition-based definitions fail to prevent the sale of certain bullets that pierce armor like large lead bullets that are not intended for handguns but can be used in them. This bill calls on the Treasury Department to define major armor- piercing bullets. Fulfilling this new responsibility would entail four steps: First, within 1 year, the Treasury Department is charged to determine a standard test to ascertain the destructive capacity of any and all bullets. This will probably result in something along the lines of a system that has been employed for some testing purposes that calculates the width times the depth of the hole a projectile bores in a block of gelatin when it is shot with no extra powder from a standard handgun at a distance of 10 feet. Second, utilizing this destructive capabilities rating test, the Treasury Department would then test and determine the destructive rating of every bullet available on the market. Third, all manufacturers of bullets for sale in the United States would be required to cover the costs incurred by the Treasury Department in this testing. Fourth, the bill would make it illegal to manufacture, sell, import, use, or possess any bullet--existing or newly invented--that has a destructive rating equal to or higher than the armor-piercing threshold. This would be in addition to the existing composition-based definition. This bill contains reasonable exemptions. Those bullets exclusively manufactured for law enforcement would be exempt; so would be those bullets designed for sporting purpose that Congress specifically exempts by law; and so would be those bullets that are proven by their manufacturer at its expense to have a destructive rating below the armor-piercing threshold. By setting the legal standard at the armor-piercing threshold, all armor-piercing bullets would be illegal. And there is an additional advantage to setting a legal threshold in this fashion: The threshold would ban more than armor-piercing bullets. It would ban any bullet invented in the future that explodes on impact, that turns to shrapnel, that does things today's technology cannot yet fathom, or that by any other means is exceptionally destructive. Setting a legal standard this way draws a hard and fast line between those bullets currently on the market and future bullets that do more damage that we can image today. This bill says that America is satisfied that the bullets of today are dangerous enough, and America will tolerate no greater likelihood of accidental death as a result of new bullets. This bill recognizes the fact that regulating only guns is naive. Those who want to kill or injure others will always be able to find guns, but they must purchase ammunition. When they do this, this bill will be there to stop them. Mr. President, I recognize that there is a limit to what the Government can do to stop gun violence and accidental death. But today, our Government is shirking its responsibility. This bill is a vital step toward ensuring that our Government does what is necessary to save lives. The law enforcement community and the public will never again have to react to advertisements like the one for the famous Rhino bullet. This ad states: ``The Rhino inflicts a wound of 8 inches in diameter. Each of these fragments becomes lethal shrapnel and is hurled into vital organs, lungs, circulatory system components, the heart and other tissues. The wound channel is catastrophic. Death is nearly instantaneous.'' If this bill is enacted, opportunistic manufacturers like the one who created the Rhino bullet will have nothing to gain from advertising the dramatic innovations of their bullets. If an advertisement claims that a new bullet is unusually destructive, the public will know that the advertisement is either an outright lie or that the product is illegal. Either way, the public will know in advance that no such bullet will ever hit the street, and the public will have no cause for alarm. When this bill becomes law, no new bullets that are more dangerous than those of today will make it to market. When this bill becomes law, bullets now available for purchase end up in the wrong hands. This bill is a solid step toward returning sanity and safety to our Nation's streets and households. The Government has no greater responsibility than to work toward this goal. I welcome the support of colleagues who share my concerns, as many do. I urge them to join me in sponsoring this legislation. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the legislation appear in the Record.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, if I could just clarify one thing, I am not sure we did allow any of our time.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I yield myself such of the remaining time as I may use. I thank the majority leader for his efforts to bring this nomination to the floor this week so that the Senate may act on it rapidly. It is a nomination that has been overdue, and it is important that we proceed. I think it is safe to say that with this nomination and with the approval of the Senate, which I expect, we really begin the process in earnest of ceasing to treat Vietnam as a war and beginning in earnest to treat it like a country. That is an enormous transition for this country, and we have traveled a difficult journey through these years. As a friend and one who has worked closely with Pete Peterson on the POW-MIA issue, I really cannot think of a better person to be our Ambassador to Vietnam. Pete Peterson, Senator McCain, Senator Smith, myself, and others have spent an enormous amount of time, energy, and a great deal of the taxpayers' money of this country trying to ensure that the families of American servicemen missing from the war in Vietnam get answers. There is absolutely no doubt, Mr. President, that many families have gotten those answers in the last years as a result of the accounting process that we now have in place. But I recognize that for some whose loved ones were lost in that wrenching war questions remain. I am convinced personally that having an ambassador in the country, having an American flag again flying in Hanoi and elsewhere in the country will provide us with the opportunity to be able to leverage those answers. Having a man who himself served, as both of my colleagues so eloquently stated, 6\1/2\ years of his life as a prisoner of war in Vietnam will enhance our credibility and greatly facilitate our ability to be able to find those answers. As a fighter pilot, as a POW, Pete Peterson has served this Nation with enormous distinction and courage. When he returned from the war, as we know, he became a successful businessman and served in Congress. During that period he served as chairman of the Vietnam working group of the United States-Russia Joint Commission On POWs. He returned to Vietnam twice already in order to meet with Vietnamese officials and travel throughout the countryside, both to find answers as well as to understand what Vietnam is like today. It is entirely appropriate that Congressman Peterson should therefore return to Vietnam as our first ambassador since the war and literally help to bridge the gap that remains between our two countries. He went once in war, and as our ambassador he would now go in peace. I cannot think of greater poetic symmetry. I know he has the ability as well as, if not better than, anyone to understand and explain to the Vietnamese, and to others, the full breadth of the emotions that the Vietnam war has generated among us in this country for 30 years or more. His experience as a prisoner gives him the extraordinary standing and importance to represent our country in all of the ramifications of the war. No one in Vietnam could doubt his word or his intentions, because he has gone through his own personal process of resolution, and he has emerged from that process prepared to return to Vietnam and build a normal relationship between that country and the United States. No one in this country could or should doubt his desire and determination to complete the process of POW-MIA accounting or his commitment to the principles of our country, which he fought for, which are still at issue with respect to our relationship with Vietnam. So, as Ambassador, Congressman Peterson will confront those issues that are personal, and he will confront a set of issues that are critically important to the regional and bilateral interests of the United States: Vietnam's relationships with its neighbors, particularly China; legal and political reform within Vietnam; human rights; trade. I have every confidence in his ability to deal with these issues effectively. He has publicly expressed his willingness and enthusiasm to take on the job, and he comes in with a deep belief in our ability to build a viable and important relationship with Vietnam. I had the privilege of traveling in Vietnam on one of those trips with Pete Peterson. I have witnessed myself his personal journey of rediscovery and his determination to keep faith with his fellow veterans. I know he will represent us extraordinarily well as the first ambassador since the war. And I say to all those who have legitimately expressed concerns--Senator Smith has been as dogged and as determined as any person in the U.S. Senate to get these answers, and I admire that. I would say to him and to anyone else who might fear that sending an ambassador to Vietnam would lessen our ability to get answers, I say look at the record of the last few years and look at Pete Peterson. He and that record show that by having him there, I think families can rest assured that they will have the greatest connection to their past, to his past, and to our past, and to our future. That future will be a future that will sustain this POW-MIA accounting effort and also sustain the principles for which their loved ones, and Pete Peterson, fought. So I look forward to the Senate finally accepting this moment. I thank the Senator from New Hampshire and others who have helped to bring us to this important point.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair. I ask for the similar interpretation of time on our side. I am glad to recognize the Senator from Illinois for 5 minutes.