John Kerry

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate votes on the three amendments, as provided under the previous order, those votes occur in the order listed in that agreement.

Mr. KERRY. That is a good suggestion. I ask unanimous consent that the second two votes be 10 minutes in length.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, let me first compliment my colleague from Arizona, who has been dogged, if nothing else, in his advocacy with respect to his points of view regarding this treaty. And while I and other Senators may disagree with a specific amendment he proposes because of its impact as well as, in some cases, because of something else, that doesn't mean the Senator isn't raising valid questions for future discussions and things on which we ought to be focused. I know he spends a lot of time with this. I think all of us have a lot of respect for the ways in which he has already impacted this treaty. I give him credit for that. This particular amendment is a combination of about four different amendments that have come together. I understand why that happened. I am not complaining about that at all. It is just that there is a lot in it, and therefore there are different reasons one ought to oppose this amendment. Let me say that, first of all, the New START, I think in most people's judgment, addresses the concerns that have been raised by the Senator from Arizona. The purpose of warhead inspections is to count the number of warheads on the missile. Neither side is comfortable with the other actually seeing the warheads, looking into it and seeing it. We are not comfortable with them doing that to us, and they are not comfortable with us doing that to them. That is not so much about the counting of the warhead as it is often the issue of failsafe devices or counter- shoot-down devices and other kinds of things that might be in there that we don't necessarily have a right to see and they don't want us to see. So neither side is sort of looking at the actual warhead. The START treaty--the original START treaty, therefore, to deal with that issue, lets the inspected party cover the warheads on the front of the inspected missile, but it allows us to inspect any cover before it is used so that we know what it can and can't conceal. We know what that cover is permitting us to see. What is more, paragraph 11 of section (2) in the treaty's annex on inspections says explicitly--this is in New START: The covers shall not hamper inspectors. We did not have that previously. That is new to this treaty. As a result of what we have learned in START, we have learned how to look and how to ask for things more appropriately, and our negotiators worked that into this treaty so as to protect our interests. In fact, the covers are not allowed to hamper the inspectors in ascertaining that the front section contains a number of reentry vehicles equal to the number of reentry vehicles that were declared for that deployed ICBM or deployed SLBM. The virtue of the New START treaty is that these declarations and the specific alphanumeric numbers that are going to be attached to the launchers and these warheads allow us enormous certainty in the randomness of our choices of where we go. If the Russians are cheating or somebody is over for one reason or another, we have great capacity to decide where that might be, where we think the best target of opportunity is, and to lock that place down and go in and check it. There are enormous risks of being discovered as a consequence of the way we have set that up. The treaty already forbids Russia from using covers that interfere with warhead counting. It would create a very dangerous precedent, in my judgment, to require that we negotiate now, before we put the treaty into effect, a side agreement on the very same thing. That might suggest that other New START provisions do not need to be obeyed because there is no side deal reinforcing them. What is the impact of the side deal? Does the side agreement, incidentally, have to be ratified by the Senate before it goes into effect? There are a lot of imponderables here. With respect to the agreement on telemetry, the requirement for a legally binding agreement with Russia that both parties have to provide telemetry on all flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs, which is what the Senator is seeking, would also delay the START treaty into force by the same months or years about which we talked. That argument has been hammered around here the last 7 days adequately. This delays the treaty. It does not act to increase the security of our country, and it already is in the resolution of ratification in the treaty. Given what we already understand, we know that the Russians do not like trading in telemetry. I find it hard to believe, therefore, that if we make this treaty condition precedent on the agreement of a side agreement, which we know the Russians hate to do, that is a way of buying into gridlock, deadlock, nothing. I do not think anybody would suggest--we have already been through this a little bit, incidentally. I and others strongly urged the President and his negotiators to seek as significant telemetry as possible. For a lot of reasons, it did not turn out that it was achievable from their side, but it also did not turn out it was desirable on our side altogether. Russia is testing new systems such as the Belava SLBM, and the United States may test only existing types of missiles during the next decade. That is a reason why the Russians obviously resist this very significantly. A lot of people have suggested that our military does not want to share the telemetry on all our flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs. They are pretty happy the way the treaty is structured now, including the provisions for telemetry which allow us five telemetry exchanges. We have to agree on them, but they are allowed under the treaty. If that were not true, there is no way the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen would have sent the letter he sent to the entire Senate where he stated he wants this treaty ratified now, he wants it implemented now, and he believes, consistent with everything people said within our national security network, that this treaty is both verifiable and enhances our capacity to be able to count and know what the Russians are doing. The requirement for Russian agreement not to deny telemetry on the new ballistic missile systems it develops during the duration of the treaty is redundant with the previous part about which we just talked. Again, the amendment requires a side agreement with the Russians. It is the absolute equivalent of amending the treaty itself and, therefore, I would oppose that. The New START's telemetry exchange regime involves negotiating the beginning of next year, assuming this goes into effect, which missile tests from the past year we are willing to share. May I ask how much time I have?

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I want to reserve time for the Senator from New Hampshire. The New START regime requires us to negotiate at the beginning of next year what we are going to share. If we do not offer anything interesting, Russia is not going to offer anything. That is the nature of a negotiation. You have to give to get. This amendment would change that basic principle from a negotiated exchange to a literally ``give me something for next to nothing.'' It does not work. The Russians would have to give us the good stuff while we would give them telemetry from launches that were no different from 30 other tests over the last 20 years. I have to tell you, that sort of agreement is not going to happen. It is in a fantasy land, and the President would never get that side deal with Russia. The New START treaty would never come into force. I yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. KERRY. I yield all that time to the Senator from Michigan, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, if any time remains, we yield it back.

Mr. KERRY. What is the parliamentary situation, Mr. President?

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, before he does that, do we have time remaining on either of those amendments?

Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair.

Mr. KERRY. How much times remains?

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, is Senator Wicker here? I wonder, Senator Kyl, if we can yield back time. I know colleagues are waiting to vote. Mr. President, by unanimous consent we yield back all time on both sides and go to regular order.

Mr. KERRY. I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. KERRY. I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, we just have to jump through a few hoops over here. We will not object ultimately, but if I could ask the Senator if we could just wait a little longer, I would object at this time but not ultimately. We need to get this cleared and put all the next steps together into one effort, if we can. It doesn't mean we can't talk about some of the other issues, if you want to, while we are waiting for that to be ready. It might be better to just wait until we have the agreement. So, in the meantime, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I know the Senator from Florida wants to speak on this amendment. I ask unanimous consent that the following two amendments be considered and agreed to: Senator Kyl No. 4864 and LeMieux No. 4908, as modified.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, does the Senator wish to speak?

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator. This is a constructive amendment. We all agree that we need to reduce tactical nuclear weapons. Everybody who testified to us reiterated the importance of that being the next step in terms of our relationship and increased stability. NATO allies also said it was essential to proceed to that. The Senator's amendment helps us to make it clear that is the direction in which we need to go. I thank him for his efforts.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I say to the Senator, let's commit to work to make sure that happens. I certainly will do that on my part. I look forward to those hearings next year. Perhaps the Senator would even want to find a way to take part in them. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, Senator Reid asked me a few minutes ago if I would communicate where we are with respect to the START treaty, and I will do so. As it stands now, we have two amendments that remain. One is an amendment by Senator Kyl on modernization, which I believe is the intention, though not yet locked in, of the majority leader to try to take up around 9 o'clock in the morning. We expect to spend somewhere in the vicinity of an hour on it, maybe a little bit longer than that, to accommodate the speakers for Senator Kyl. Then there will be one other amendment after that on missile defense, I believe an amendment that will be offered by Senator Corker and Senator Lieberman together. That amendment will be the last barrier remaining before we can get to the final vote on the treaty itself. It would be my hope, depending on the negotiations going on and discussions with respect to the 9/11 first responders--those are discussions taking place now--depending on that, we will have a better sense of when that final vote will be able to take place. I know a lot of colleagues are trying to figure that out in the context of flights, family, and other things. Our hope is that will become clearer in the next minutes, hours, moments of the Senate. That is the lay of the land. I know the chairman of the Armed Services Committee and the ranking member have made their request to the Senate regarding the Defense authorization bill. Our hope is that tomorrow morning we can move rapidly through the remaining two amendments. It may even be possible for us to accept the amendment on the missile defense. We are working on that language now. If that happens, obviously it will clear the possibilities of a final vote to an earlier hour, again dependent on this discussion regarding the 9/11 first responders. That is the state of play.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed as in legislative session and as in morning business to process some cleared legislative items.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of H.R. 5470, received from the House and at the desk.

Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be read a third time, passed, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that any statements relating to the measure be printed in the Record.

Mr. KERRY

Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 720, H.R. 4445.