Herb Kohl

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, last year, the administration proposed rules that would force millions of workers to work longer hours for less pay. Firemen, nurses, policeman, factory workers faced 50, 60, even 100 hour work weeks at 40 hour-work-week rates of pay. Two years of technical college education, military training, or even a few administrative duties would have been enough to deny workers overtime--permanently. In response to majority votes in both Houses of Congress--and public outcry throughout the Nation--the administration recently issued a modified rule governing overtime. And that's good, but not good enough. While the new rule is an improvement, it still comes up short. Thousands, maybe millions, will be left working more for less--and that is just wrong. The law governing overtime, the Fair Labor Standards Act, FLSA, was designed in the 1930s to encourage companies to stick to a 40-hour work week. At that time, employers routinely required workers to put in 7 days a week, 10, 12, even 15 hours a day. That left the workers with jobs no time for rest, family, or even their own health. And it left many others in those tough times without jobs at all. The choice was harsh--work yourself to death in order to feed your family, or starve your family and yourself trying to survive jobless during the Great Depression. In passing the FSLA, Congress hoped that the required ``time and a half'' for overtime work would be an incentive to employers to stick to a 40-hour work week. Today, that goal is still distant as companies routinely require workers to work more that 40 hours. American workers work more hours than any other industrialized nation, except South Korea. And the overtime pay, rather than being a disincentive to employers, has become a necessary income source for many American families. That overtime comes at a high price for most American workers. It means less time with family, fewer school events attended, and soccer games missed. Like in our past, the worker's choice is a harsh one-- earn the extra income needed to meet a family's material needs, but sacrifice the family time that meets their emotional needs. If the Administration prevails, thousands, maybe millions, of hardworking families will see their sacrifices seriously devalued. The administration argues it needs to make these changes to make it easier for business to correctly classify its workers. But this rule is unlikely to clarify anything for small business. The rule, with all the support material, is over 500 pages. We have not simplified anything. New court cases will be brought, and new guidance will be written. Employers will still struggle with the issue of who their professional employees are, and who is management. The very people that the administration is trying to help are unlikely to find this easier to understand. The new rule also contains troubling exemptions of entire jobs and industries. It exempts from overtime ``team leaders,'' even though these employees may have no supervisory role, or any real authority over the people they are supposed to be leading. Other groups of workers are classified as exempt by the Department of Labor, with little discussion. Certain industries have worked for years to get out of paying overtime to their workers--and the rule's list of exemptions reads like a roll call of those that succeeded. For reasons unclear, even after 500 pages of explanation, journalists, personal trainers, financial services workers, and computer industry workers--to name just a few classes--are summarily ineligible for overtime. The current overtime rules are not perfect; they were written many years ago in a different industrial age. They should be updated; the wage thresholds should be changed. But the administration's rule--even in its more moderate incarnation--does much more than update. It changes the fundamental nature of the overtime portions of the FSLA-- from rules designed to fairly compensate workers for onerous overwork to a system where certain favored industries can return to a depression-era policy of more work for less pay. We all believe that hard work should be rewarded. Our country achieved greatness through the sacrifices and sweat of our working men and women. Today, sadly, these workers are not celebrated, but squeezed--forced to work more for less by harsh international competition from countries with few or no labor standards and faceless international conglomerates with no concept of family or community. We have a choice in this matter. We can let unfettered economic pressure lower wages in this country and around the world, or we can work to uphold standards here, and demand them around the world. Any weakening of the overtime rules is a step down on the ladder of economic progress.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I rise today to add my voice to the debate surrounding the Internet tax moratorium. I believe strongly we can and should find a reasonable replacement for the expired 1998 moratorium on taxation of internet access, a replacement that balances the fiscal needs and rights of the States and the overwhelming national interest in fostering and growing the internet economy. The McCain substitute is a solid, and I believe well intentioned, first step toward such a compromise. Its provision to extend the moratorium for 4 years seems a reasonable solution to legislating about an industry that is rapidly changing. The McCain amendment's phasing out of the current grandfather provisions over 3 years seems a reasonable compromise with those who would end the grandfather provisions immediately. The McCain amendment's provisions to exempt ``voice over Internet'' services from the moratorium seem a reasonable answer to the States' concerns that their undisputed right to tax the telecommunications base be preserved. In its general framework, the McCain substitute outlines the foundation of a reasonable compromise to the highly contentious issue of taxation of internet access. Unfortunately, the Senate has only had a few days to consider the highly technical and important details of the McCain substitute. And there is legitimate and heated disagreement over exactly what the McCain substitute would do. This is exactly the sort of instance in which the Senate should take the time to debate, consider, and amend where necessary to produce a true compromise that is truly workable. Invoking cloture today would cut off that very legitimate and necessary process, and therefore I cannot support it. But we need to keep working to reach a compromise on the tax treatment of Internet access. As we struggle as a nation to address our eroding manufacturing base, one answer is to make our Nation more attractive to Internet based companies and our companies more willing to employ new Internet-based technologies. This can't happen if States tax every new form of Internet-access technology. That is why I am saddened by having to vote against cloture today. This was an extremely difficult decision. I support many aspects of the McCain legislation. However, as both sides continue to argue about the potential effects of the proposal, the bottom line is that we need more time. We need more time to debate the best possible solution, the way to balance the needs of innovation versus the needs of the States. I remain hopeful that the vote today is not the end, but rather the beginning. That it is the beginning of a solution, of a compromise of which both sides can be proud. That is not out of reach, and I call on the leaders to leave the McCain bill on the floor and let us continue to work on a compromise.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Madam President, today I rise to recognize one of our most prominent Wisconsinites, Gaylord Nelson, the founder of Earth Day, the man who fundamentally changed the way American people view the environment. Before Gaylord Nelson came along, pollution and ecology were fringe subjects, a concern of only a few academics. After Gaylord Nelson created Earth Day in 1970, environmental issues exploded into our public debate. In that first year, almost 20 million people participated in Earth Day events--an instant success. By last year, 500 million people in 167 countries took part in Earth Day, spreading the message of environmental stewardship. Earth Day laid the foundation for landmark environmental legislation. All over the country, Americans heard about the dangers of lead in our water, pesticides in our drinking water, and chemicals in our soil. An informed public brought pressure on Congress and the President to act. The movement that started that first Earth Day led to the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and Superfund legislation. These are the foundations of environmental law today, and they would not have been possible without the work and the vision of Senator Gaylord Nelson. That vision is still necessary today as we struggle to complete the work Gaylord Nelson started in 1970. Congress and the administration still must address arsenic in the water, mercury in the air, and the impact of outdated coal-burning powerplants, just to name a few outstanding environmental problems. Gaylord Nelson's dream is not yet a reality, but it is worth fighting for, as is so much Gaylord Nelson has championed. Senator Nelson entered public service in 1948 after serving 4 years in the military during World War II. He served as a Wisconsin State senator, Governor, and then as a U.S. Senator for 18 years. As Governor, he was known for conservation efforts and preserving wetlands long before those causes became popular nationally. As a Senator, he built on his environmental reputation to further issues, including the preservation of the Appalachian Trail corridor and the creation of a national trail system. While he left the Government in 1981, Gaylord Nelson never stopped fighting for the environment. He joined the Wilderness Society where he has worked tirelessly ever since. Even today at age 87, he is an active advocate for fragile lands around the country. This year, Earth Day is a reminder of how much progress we have made and how much further we have yet to go. In the 1970s, the symbol of environmental decay was the burning Cuyahoga River, a waterway turned into a drainage ditch for industry. While Cleveland suffered much ridicule for that ecological disaster, they were not alone. At that time, our natural resources were being squandered and scarred in community after community. Today such obvious examples of irresponsibility are harder to find. Now we struggle with pollution that is more diffuse and harder to track, but still dangerous. In Wisconsin, our northern lakes contain so much mercury the fish caught there are often unsafe to eat. And in the southeastern part of my State, the air is contaminated with pollutants, many of which traveled hundreds of miles before impacting our environment. Challenges such as these require everyone in the region, the country, and even the world to work together to lower emissions and limit discharge. Global connectedness was what the original Earth Day was all about, and that message still needs to be heard today. Gaylord Nelson wanted us all to realize we could not escape the consequences of pollution by burying our garbage somewhere else or sending it up ever taller smokestacks. Earth Day also reminds us we need to work internationally. We need to engage developing economies, such as China, India, and Russia, to head off major environmental disasters. We are not on this planet alone, and we can no longer pretend environmental damage around the globe does not come back to haunt us here at home. Senator Nelson understood that lesson almost 40 years ago, and he has been teaching it to the rest of us ever since. We have made progress in heeding Gaylord Nelson's call to action over the last 34 years. Water quality is better off than it was in 1970. Many dangerous toxins are off the market, and some large environmental disasters of the past are clean today. But we certainly are not ready to declare we do not need Earth Day anymore, and we are not ready to let Gaylord Nelson retire. We are more aware today of the global and long-term impact our actions have on our Earth, and with that greater awareness comes a greater responsibility to leave the planet cleaner and healthier. Earth Day is an opportunity for Members of Congress to recommit ourselves to that goal, and Earth Day is a day to thank Gaylord Nelson for focusing us on how we impact the environment that sustains us and the legacy we owe to the generations that follow us. Thank you, Madam President. I yield the floor.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I rise to discuss S. 2290, the newest version of the asbestos bill. Like many of my colleagues, we want to support an asbestos bill that ensures that sick people get compensated quickly. The current system is broken, leaving terminally ill victims to spend years waiting for compensation. Congress must act to solve this problem, but it must do so in a bipartisan fashion. I fear that will not happen this week, even though we want to remain optimistic that there is still a chance for this legislation. That said, over the past year we have made more progress than many of us would have thought. But now we are at an impasse. What is most frustrating is that the remaining issues are not irreconcilable. Let's discuss a few of the major outstanding issues that must be resolved in order to broker a compromise. First, more than any other issue, the size of the fund is preventing progress on this bill. We appear unable to negotiate, or have yet to negotiate what this number should be. To be sure, this is a complicated issue and it is especially important to get it right if we want to adequately compensate asbestos victims for the next 50 years. There is just not enough money to cover all the claims that will be made against this fund. As a result, some of us have serious concerns that this bill fails to go far enough to compensate asbestos victims suffering serious disease. Though the base funding in the new bill is roughly the same as S. 1125, $104 billion, the overall funding falls far short because the new version eliminates a contingency amendment I introduced with Senator Feinstein last summer in the committee. Our amendment would have provided up to an additional $45 billion over the life of the fund. The new Frist-Hatch version replaces it with a $10 billion contingency a source of funding which could not even be tapped until year 24 of the fund. Second, in order to reach a better understanding of how much this bill will cost, we must better come to a final agreement on the individual awards that will be granted victims. Quite simply, this agreement will drive the overall cost of the fund, and not surprisingly, projections vary on this point. Proponents of the new bill predict that there will be $114 billion in total claims. The Congressional Budget Office, however, estimates that, based on the new award values present in S. 2290, the fund will need $134 billion to pay out all current and future claims. And labor believes that the number will be even greater if we were to raise award values to a more equitable level. Of course, any increase in award values will require a increase in the overall fund amount. But these are exactly the sort of tough choices and negotiations that need to take place if we are going to find a compromise. Third, those of us opposed to this bill still feel that an unfair risk falls onto the victims if the fund goes bankrupt. Those in favor of the bill will argue that if they underestimate how much money the fund will need, victims can simply return to the court system. But it is not as simple at that. At the earliest, victims cannot return to the courts until year seven and there is a real risk that certain types of victims may be precluded from any further compensation for new injuries related to asbestos exposure. Furthermore, the new version of the asbestos bill also results in unfair treatment of victims with pending claims. There are currently more than 300,000 asbestos victims with pending claims in the court system, many who have been waiting for years for a court date or settlement. The asbestos bill would eliminate most pending claims and even final settlements and throw them into the fund. So some victims who won a large verdict will be forced to start over from scratch in the fund. This hardly seems fair. Finally, it is difficult to support a new bill that is the product of a flawed and one-sided negotiating process. Much of the new asbestos bill we are considering was negotiated by Senators Frist and Hatch with business and insurance representatives. This process, lacking any participation from Democrats or labor, resulted in a bill that is not even as good as the version we opposed last July. To be fair, Senator Specter has been working hard in a bipartisan group mediated by retired Federal Judge Becker. The group has had some modest success in negotiating ``non-economic'' issues, but has yet to broker any deal on award values or overall fund financing. Perhaps a consensus solution is possible if we allow that bipartisan process to proceed. Until then, I cannot support this bill in its current form. The new asbestos bill actually retreats from the progress made last summer in the Judiciary Committee. Until my major concerns regarding the overall dollar amount for the fund--an amount that will adequately satisfy the hundreds of thousands of asbestos victims for years to come--is resolved, I will vote against S. 2290. To be sure, there are several other issues to solve in this bill, but we must reach a consensus on an overall dollar amount, lest we regret supporting a fund that runs out of money, fails to compensate victims, and provides businesses no more certainty than they have today.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I rise today in reluctant support, for the conference report in front of us. The conference agreement makes great strides towards heading off an impending crisis in private pensions. Requiring private companies to measure the solvency of their defined benefit plans with the 30-year Treasury bill as a benchmark has not been feasible for some time. Ever since the U.S. Government stopped issuing these bonds, the market for them, and the interest rates they pay, have been distorted. That forced businesses to contribute more to their pension plans than was really necessary. During a time when private enterprise is under so much pressure from foreign competition and a weak economy, these extra contributions have been a tremendous strain on small and large businesses alike. Without the changes laid out in this bill, many companies would be forced to end their defined benefit plans. Defined benefit plans are too scarce today, and we need to encourage and sustain their use by companies that have chosen to offer them. These plans, which offer a set benefit usually based on how long an employee has worked for a company, provide a kind of security for employees that market-dependent 401(k)s and IRAs cannot. Unfortunately, the benefits the bill handed out to all single- employer plans were not given equally to multiemployer plans. There seems to be little reason for this decision, other than some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle were unwilling to help out plans that benefit members of organized labor. There is some help for multiemployer plans in this bill, but it is not nearly enough. I have heard from many unions, especially the construction trades, who strongly oppose this bill because they believe it is mean spirited and will force their members to make significant sacrifices. I am reluctant to vote against the men and women who build our homes and move our goods, but I am not left much choice. If we delay this bill beyond April 15, businesses across the country will be forced to contribute large amounts of money to their pension plans to meet their quarterly obligations. Some of them will be unable to make those contributions and will be forced to withdraw the plan from their employees. To keep workers from losing their pension benefits, and to remedy a long-overdue policy, I have to support the bill before us. I would like to take this opportunity to highlight a section of the bill that will substantially benefit both businesses and consumers in Wisconsin. Included in the pension legislation is a repeal of an outdated section of the Tax Code, section 809, which limits the ability of mutual life insurance companies to deduct a policy holder's dividends. The intent of the original legislation, as passed in 1984, was to ensure equity between mutual and stock life insurance companies. While this concern has expired as the number of mutual life companies in the Nation has dramatically decreased, the damaging economic impact of the legislation remains. Mutual life insurers have been forced to reduce the amounts paid to policyholders as dividends or benefits, thereby increasing the cost of insurance. Tax savings that will result from a repeal of section 809 will be passed on to policyholders in the form of increased dividends and lower insurance costs. This comes at a critical time for Wisconsinites, where the effect of repeal will be twofold. In addition to providing such benefits to consumers, the mutual life insurance industry employs thousands of workers in my State. At a time when job loss across the country has been severe, this repeal will allow companies to avoid cost-cutting measures often resulting in job loss. Unfortunately, the conferees were not as fair or reasoned in their judgment when they decided to include an antitrust exemption for graduate medical resident matching program in this conference report. This antitrust exemption was not reviewed or debated by either the Senate or the House, much less voted upon. The exemption will end many of the claims in an ongoing lawsuit brought by a number of medical students and residents that has already survived efforts to have it dismissed. The students contend that through the matching program, the hospitals depress wages and cause residents to work inordinately long hours to the detriment of patient care. This exemption appears to eliminate all of the students' claims with the exception of their allegation of price fixing. In general it is bad policy to provide exemptions to the antitrust laws. It is certainly unusual to enact an exemption that ends part or all of an ongoing lawsuit. We should have had the opportunity to debate this issue and determine whether there was any merit to the exemption, rather than see the exemption mysteriously appear on an unrelated bill. It appears that this provision, enacted in this way, is nothing more than a giveaway to one particular special interest. Without judging the merits of the issue, we should have had an opportunity to explore it and make that decision for ourselves. I have to agree with many of my colleagues who have argued that this conference report would have been greatly improved had Democratic conferees been allowed to participate fully in the conference. We have a bill before us now that deserves support, but is not the good and fair work of which this body is capable, nor is it even near the quality of the bill passed overwhelming out of the Senate earlier this year. I hope the Senate approves the measure today and continues to work to address the inequities continued or created in the conference report.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I rise today in strong support of the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2003. It passed the Judiciary Committee unanimously in November 2003. Today, along with Senators Hatch, Leahy, and DeWine, we offer a substitute amendment to H.R. 1086. This legislation will enhance and improve the enforcement of our nation's antitrust laws in several important respects. In light of the importance of this legislation to the administration of our antitrust laws, as well as the infrequency with which we amend major provisions of the antitrust laws, it is essential to describe in detail the reasons we our advancing this bill. Our proposal will accomplish four important goals. First, our legislation will restore the ability of Federal courts to review the Justice Department's civil antitrust settlements to be sure that these settlements are good for competition and consumers. We will amend the Tunney Act, the law passed in 1974 in response to concerns that some of these settlements were motivated by inappropriate political pressure and failed to restore competition or protect consumers. Congress concluded then, and it is still true now, that judicial review will ensure that cases are settled in the public interest. Unfortunately, in recent years, many courts seem to have ignored this statute and do little more than ``rubber stamp'' antitrust settlements. This practice is contrary to the intent of the Tunney Act and effectively strips the courts of the ability to engage in meaningful review of antitrust settlements. Our bill will overturn this precedent and make clear that the courts have the authority to do this vital job. Second, our legislation enhances criminal penalties for those who violate our antitrust laws. It will increase the maximum corporate penalty from $10 million to $100 million; it will increase the maximum individual fine from $350,000 to $1 million; and it will increase the maximum jail term for individuals who are convicted of criminal antitrust violations from 3 to 10 years. These changes will send the proper message that criminal antitrust violations, crimes such as price fixing and bid rigging, committed by business executives in a boardroom are serious offenses that steal from American consumers just as surely as does a street criminal with a gun. Our legislation will give the Justice Department significant new tools under its antitrust leniency program. The leniency program helps the Government break up criminal cartels by encouraging wrongdoers to cooperate with the authorities. Our bill will give the Justice Department the ability to offer those applying for leniency the additional reward of only facing actual damages in antitrust civil suits, rather than treble damage liability. This will result in more antitrust wrongdoers coming forward to reveal antitrust conspiracies, and thus the detection and ending of more illegal cartels. Finally, our bill incorporates a provision in the original House passed version of H.R. 1086. This provision limits the liability that standards setting organizations face under the antitrust laws to single damages in most circumstances. It will protect these important organizations from the threat of liability. However, it will not in any way limit the damages available to any company that is a member of such an organization for antitrust violations, nor limit damages should a standard setting organization engage in conduct that is a per se violation of antitrust law. It is important to explain clearly and specifically why it is necessary to amend the Tunney Act and what we intend to accomplish with these changes. In recent years, courts have been reluctant to give meaningful review to antitrust consent decrees, and have been only willing to take action with respect to most egregious decrees that make a ``mockery'' of the judicial function. Our bill will effectuate the legislative intent of the Tunney Act and restore the ability of courts to give real scrutiny to antitrust consent decree. The Tunney Act was enacted in 1974 and provides that consent decrees in civil antitrust cases brought by the United States must be reviewed and approved by the district court in which the case was brought to determine if they are in the public interest. However, the text of the statute contains no standards governing how a court is to conduct this review. While the legislative history of the law is clear that it was meant to prevent ``judicial rubber stamping'' of consent decrees, the leading precedent of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals currently interprets the law in a manner which makes meaningful review of these consent decrees virtually impossible. Leading cases stand for the proposition that only consent decrees that ``make a mockery of the judicial function'' can be rejected by the district court. The changes in the Tunney Act incorporated in this legislation, as well as the statement of Congressional findings, will make clear that such an interpretation misconstrues the legislative intent of the statute. The amendments to the Tunney Act found in our bill will restore the original intent of the Tunney Act, and make clear that courts should carefully review antitrust consent decrees to ensure that they are in the public interest. It will accomplish this by, No. 1, a clear statement of congressional findings and purposes expressly overruling the improper judicial standard of recent D.C. Circuit decisions; No. 2, by requiring, rather than permitting, judicial review of a list of enumerated factors to determine whether a consent decree is in the public interest; and No. 3, by enhancing the list of factors which the court now must review. The Tunney Act was enacted in 1974 to end the practice of courts ``rubber stamping'' antitrust consent decrees, and to remove political influence from the Justice Department's decision as to whether to settle antitrust cases. There were several prominent decisions in the preceding years in which antitrust settlements by the Justice Department came under strong criticism as inadequate or motivated by illegitimate purposes, and which were not scrutinized by the courts. One of the leading early cases applying the Tunney Act noted that the legislators found that consent decrees often failed to provide appropriate relief, either because of miscalculations by the Justice Department [citation omitted] or because of the ``great influence and economic power'' wielded by antitrust violators [citing S. Rep. No. 93-298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973)]. The [legislative] history, indeed, contains references to a number of antitrust settlements deemed ``blatantly inequitable and improper'' on these bases [citing 119 Cong. Rec. 24598 (1973) (Remarks of Sen. Tunney)]. U.S. v. American Telephone and Telegraph, 552 F.Supp. 131, 148 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom., Maryland v. U.S., 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). While there were several notable cases which gave rise to the concern that the government was settling for inadequate remedies for antitrust violations, see U.S. v. AT&T, 552 F.Supp. at 148 n. 72; 119 Cong. Rec. 24598, Remarks of Sen. Tunney, the most prominent case was the Government's settlement in 1971 of an antitrust suit brought against ITT. Critics alleged that the Nixon administration had been influenced by campaign contributions to the Nixon reelection effort in 1972. The reasons for the settlement were not publicly disclosed, and the settlement was strongly criticized by consumer advocates. The settlement's critics attempted to have the settlement overturned by the district court, but the court rejected these efforts. ``[T]here was no meaningful judicial scrutiny of the terms of the consent decree and no consideration of whether it was in the public interest.'' Anderson, supra, 65 Antitrust Law Journal at 8. The legislative history of the original Tunney Act is clear that the purpose of the statute was to give courts the opportunity to engage in meaningful scrutiny of antitrust settlements, so as to deter and prevent settlements motivated either by corruption, undue corporate influence, or which were plainly inadequate. In introducing the bill, Senator Tunney highlighted his concern that antitrust settlements could result from the economic power of the companies under scrutiny. He noted that ``[i]ncreasing concentration of economic power, such as occurred in the flood of conglomerate mergers, carries with it a very tangible threat of concentration of political power. Put simply, the bigger the company, the greater the leverage it has in Washington.'' 119 Cong. Rec. 3451, Feb. 6, 1973. Senator Tunney also pointed with concern at the lack of scrutiny the courts were applying to antitrust settlements. He argued that ``too often in the past district courts have viewed their rules [sic] as simply ministerial in nature--leaving to the Justice Department the role of determining the adequacy of the judgment from the public's view.'' Id. at 3542. Thus, his legislation was intended to substantially expand the role of the court in considering an antitrust consent decree. Senator Tunney described the criteria in the bill under which the courts to review the settlements, and stated that The thrust of those criteria is to demand that the court consider both the narrow and the broad impacts of the decree. Thus, in addition to weighing the merits of the decree from the viewpoint of the relief obtained thereby and its adequacy, the court is directed to give consideration to the relative merits of other alternatives and specifically to the effect of the entry of the decree upon private parties aggrieved by the alleged violations and upon the enforcement of antitrust laws generally. In a later floor debate on the legislation, Senator Tunney cited the testimony of Judge J. Skelley Wright of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, who had testified at an earlier hearing of the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee expressing concern as to whether antitrust settlements ``might shortchange the public interest.'' 119 Cong. Rec. 24597, July 18, 1973. Commenting on this testimony, Senator Tunney stated that ``I think Judge Wright gets to the heart of the problem--it is the excessive secrecy with which many consent decrees have been fashioned, and the almost mechanistic manner in which some courts have been, in effect, willing to rubber stamp consent judgments.'' Id. at 24598 (emphasis added). The bill passed the Senate that day on a 92 to 8 vote. The later House debate in which the bill was passed echoed Senator Tunney's concern. Congressman Seiberling of Ohio commented that, in considering antitrust consent decrees, ``too often the courts have, in fact, simply rubber-stamped such agreements, and the public or competitors that might be affected have had an effective way to get their views before the court . . .'' 120 Cong. Rec. 36341, Nov. 19, 1974. Similar sentiments were expressed by Congressman McClory, id., Congressman Jordan, id. at 36343, and Congressman Heinz, id. at 36341. Congressman Holtzman of New York commented that these procedures would ``insure that our antitrust laws are not for sale.'' Id. at 36342. The House and Senate Committee Reports on the legislation also echo the floor debate. The Report of the House Judiciary Committee states that [o]ne of the abuses sought to be remedied by the bill has been called ``judicial rubber stamping'' by district courts of proposals submitted by the Justice Department. The bill resolves this area of dispute by requiring district court judges to determine that each proposed consent judgment is in the public interest. House Rep. No. 93-1463, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6535, 6538. In one of the first cases to construe the statute, the Government's case to break up the AT&T phone monopoly, Judge Greene of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed, and then summarized, the legislative history of the Tunney Act. He concluded that: To remedy these problems [that led to the passage of the Tunney Act], Congress imposed two major changes in the consent decree process. First, it reduced secrecy by ordering disclosure by the Justice Department of the rationale and the terms of proposed consent decrees and by mandating an opportunity for public comment. Second, it sought to eliminate ```judicial rubber stamping' of proposals submitted to the courts by the Department,'' by requiring an explicit judicial determination in every case that the proposed decree was in the public interest. It is clear that Congress wanted the courts to act as an independent check upon the terms of decrees negotiated by the Department of Justice. . . . U.S. v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 148-149 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). This conclusion is supported by a recent law journal article co- authored by John J. Flynn, who was special counsel to the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee during the period when the Tunney Act was drafted and adopted. Professor Flynn writes that, in enacting the Tunney Act, Congress rejected the ``notion that courts must give deference to the DOJ when determining if a consent decree is in the public interest. Instead, Congress wanted the courts to make an independent, objective, and active determination without deference to the DOJ.'' Flynn and Bush, The Misuse and Abuse of the Tunney Act: The Adverse Consequences of the ``Microsoft Fallacies'', 34 Loyola U. Chicago L. J. 749, 758 (2003). The early case law that followed the adoption of the Tunney Act in 1974 imposed fairly stringent requirements on courts reviewing antitrust settlements reached by the Justice Department. The leading early case is the district court's review of the Government's proposed settlement with AT&T in the massive antitrust case that broke up the telephone monopoly, U.S. v. AT&T, supra (D.D.C. 1983). Judge Greene of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia rejected an argument for a highly deferential review of the proposed consent decree. The court stated that uIt does not follow . . . that courts must unquestionably accept a proffered decree as long as it somehow, and however inadequately, deals with the antitrust and other public policy problems implicated in the lawsuit. To do so would be to revert to the ``rubber stamp'' role which was at the crux of the congressional concerns when the Tunney Act became law. U.S. v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 151. Instead the standard the court applied to determine if the public interest was served by the consent decree was rather exacting. The court stated it would only enter the proposed consent decree ``if the decree meets the requirements for an antitrust remedy that is, if it effectively opens the relevant markets to competition and prevents the recurrence of anticompetitive activity, all without imposing undue and unnecessary burdens upon other aspects of the public interest.'' Id. at 153. The more recent precedent under the Tunney Act have sharply retreated from Judge Green's opinion in AT&T to a much more deferential standard of review. It is this misinterpretation of the Tunney Act that our bill corrects. In describing the recent Tunney Act precedent, one commentator has called it a ``retreat toward rubber stamping.'' Anderson, supra, 65 Antitrust Law Journal at 19. We agree. It is this overly deferential standard review which makes reform of the Tunney Act necessary so that the legislative intent can be effectuated and courts can provide an independent safeguard to prevent against improper or inadequate settlements. The changes we make to the Tunney Act today address these problems and correct the mistaken precedents. The precedent continues to recognize that the Tunney Act is intended ``to prevent ``judicial rubber stamping' of the Justice Department's proposed consent decree,'' and for the court to `` `make an independent determination as to whether or not entry of a proposed consent decree [was] in the public interest.' '' U.S. v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448, 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1995), quoting S. Rep. No. 298 at 5. Further, in reviewing the proposed consent decree, the court should inquire into ``the purpose, meaning, and efficacy of the decree.'' Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1463. However, these same decisions improperly and strictly circumscribe the role of the trial court and give it little leeway to fail to approve an antitrust consent decree. The D.C. Circuit has stated that: [T]he district judge is not obligated to accept [an antitrust consent decree] that, on its face and even after government explanation, appears to make a mockery of judicial power. Short of that eventuality, the Tunney Act cannot be interpreted as an authorization for a district judge to assume the role of Attorney General. Id., 56 F.3d at 1462 (emphasis added). In other words, under this precedent, unless the proposed decree would ``make a mockery of judicial power,'' the consent decree must be entered by the Court. In another portion of this opinion, in language much cited by lower courts, the D.C. Circuit held that the court should not insist that the consent decree is the one that will ``best serve society,'' but only confirm that the resulting settlement is ``within the reaches of the public interest.'' Id. at 1460, citations omitted; emphasis in original. In a subsequent decision, the D.C. Circuit summarized a district court's review under the Tunney Act, as follows: The district court must examine the decree in light of the violations charged in the complaint and should withhold approval only if any of the terms appear ambiguous, if the enforcement mechanism is inadequate, if third parties will be positively injured, or if the decree otherwise makes ``a mockery of judicial power.'' Massachusetts School of Law v. U.S., 118 F.3d 776, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (emphasis added) (quoting Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1462). This is plainly quite a limited standard of review, which contains no admonition to review the likely effects of the consent decree on competition, and makes it very unlikely that a court would fail to enter almost any consent decree. In the opinion of a leading academic commentator on the Tunney Act, the court of appeals in Microsoft made a potentially serious mistake by formulating a rule that, so long as procedural niceties are followed, all antitrust consent decrees must be approved unless they are a ``mockery.'' Once the real threat of meaningful scrutiny is eliminated, the benefits of deterrence and mediation would be destroyed and the Tunney Act would be nullified. Anderson, supra, 65 Antitrust Law Journal at 38. Professor Flynn, who was involved in drafting the Tunney Act, agrees with this criticism of the D.C. Circuit's approach. Professor Flynn states that ``from the language of the Tunney Act and its legislative history, this is precisely the sort of deferential standard the drafters of the Tunney Act did not want. . . . [T]he D.C. Circuit chose to ignore the legislative intent and cast judicial review of consent decrees back to the days when rubber-stamping was prevalent.'' Flynn and Bush, supra, 34 Loyola U. Chi. L. J. at 780-781. As originally written, the Tunney Act serves two goals deterrence and mediation. The prospect of judicial scrutiny deters the Justice Department from heeding political pressure to enter into a ``sweetheart'' settlement. And real Tunney Act review also provides an opportunity for a judge to act as a mediator, obtaining modifications to deficient settlements. As Professor Anderson points out, ``[i]f the government and antitrust defendants come to perceive that meaningful [judicial] scrutiny is not a real threat, the door will be wide open for attempts to swing sweetheart deals and for the public to lose confidence in antitrust enforcement by the government.'' 65 Antitrust Law Journal at 38. In sum, as the Tunney Act is currently interpreted, it is difficult if not impossible for courts to exercise meaningful scrutiny of antitrust consent decrees. The ``mockery'' standard is contrary to the intent of the Tunney Act as found in the legislative history. Our legislation will correct this misinterpretation of the statute. Our legislation will insure that the courts can undertake meaningful and measured scrutiny of antitrust settlements to insure that they are truly in the public interest, and to remind the courts of Congress' intention in passing the Tunney Act. In an effort to explain how the revisions to the Tunney Act in H.R. 1086 correct the mistaken standard used by certain courts in applying the law, it is important to describe each of the specific provisions of section 221 of H.R. 1086. Today we have introduced, with Senators Hatch, Leahy, and DeWine, a Managers' Amendment to H.R. 1086. These comments address H.R. 1086 as amended. First, section 221(a) of our bill contains Congressional Findings and Declarations of Purposes. These provisions clarify that we are determined to effectuate the original Congressional intent of the Tunney Act. In other words, after the enactment of this legislation, courts will once again independently review antitrust consent decrees to ensure that they are in the public interest. The Congressional Findings expressly state that for a court to limit its review of antitrust consent decrees to the lesser standard of determining whether entry of the consent judgments would make a ``mockery of the judicial function'' misconstrues the meaning and intent in enacting the Tunney Act. The language quoted paraphrases the D.C. Circuit decisions in Massachusetts School of Law v. U.S., 118 F.3d 776, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1997) and U.S. v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1995). To the extent that these precedents are contrary to section 221(a) of our bill regarding the standard of review a court should apply in reviewing consent decrees under the Tunney Act, these decisions are overruled by this legislation. While this legislation is not intended to require a trial de novo of the advisability of antitrust consent decrees or a lengthy and protracted review procedure, it is intended to assure that courts undertake meaningful review of antitrust consent decrees to assure that they are in the public interest and analytically sound. Section 221(b)(2)(A) of our bill amends the existing subsection of Section 5 of the Clayton Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. Sec. 16(e)) containing the requirement that courts review antitrust consent decrees to determine that these consent decrees are in the public interest. Our bill modifies the law by stating that, in making this determination, the court ``shall'' look at a number of enumerated factors bearing on the competitive impact of the settlement. The current statute merely states that the court ``may'' review these factors in making its determination. Requiring, rather than permitting, the court to examine these factors will strengthen the review that courts must undertake of consent decrees and will ensure that the court examines each of the factors listed therein. Requiring an examination of these factors is intended to preclude a court from engaging in ``rubber stamping'' of antitrust consent decrees, but instead to seriously and deliberately consider these factors in the course of determining whether the proposed decree is in the public interest. Our bill, in section 221(b)(2)(B), also revises and enhances the factors which the court is now required to review in making its public interest determination. In addition to the factors enumerated under current law, the court must examine whether the terms of the proposed decree are ambiguous. While complete precision when dealing with future conduct may be impossible to achieve, an overly ambiguous decree is incapable of being enforced and is therefore ineffective. A mandate to review the impact of entry of the consent judgment upon ``competition in the relevant market or markets'' is also added by our bill. This will ensure that the Tunney Act review is properly focused on the likely competitive impact of the judgment, rather than extraneous factors irrelevant to the purposes of antitrust enforcement. Finally, this list is not intended to be exclusive, as the court is directed to review any other competitive consideration ``that the court deems necessary to a determination of whether the consent judgment is in the public interest.'' Under the existing statute, the trial court is granted broad discretion as to how to conduct Tunney Act proceedings. Our amendments make no changes to these procedures. In deciding whether to approve the consent decree, the court may, but is not required to, hold a hearing on the proposed decree. Id. Sec. 16(f). In such a hearing, the court may take the testimony of Government officials or expert witnesses. The court may also take testimony from witnesses or other ``interested persons or agencies'' and examine documents relevant to the case. The court may also review the public comments filed during the sixty-day period pursuant to the Tunney Act. In addition, the court may appoint a special master or outside consultants as it deems appropriate. Finally, the court is granted the discretion to ``take such other action in the public interest as the court may deem appropriate.'' Id. While the court may do any of the preceding, it is not required to follow any of these procedures. Our amendments to section five of the Clayton Act add language stating that nothing in that section will be ``construed to require the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing or to require the court to permit anyone to intervene.'' This language is not intended to make any changes to existing law, but merely to restate the current interpretation of the law. Under the statute, the court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing, but is permitted to do so or to take testimony if it wishes to do so. See 15 U.S.C. Sec. 16(f). This will remain the procedure, a court will be permitted, but not required, to conduct evidentiary hearings in making its Tunney Act determination. Additionally, the statute currently permits in 15 U.S.C. Sec. 16(f)(3) intervention by interested parties in the Tunney Act review proceeding. This will remain the procedure a court will be permitted, but not required, to allow parties to intervene. Our amendments also make two other minor and technical changes to Tunney Act procedures. First, section 221(b)(1) of the bill permits the district court to authorize an alternative means of publication, rather than publication in the Federal Register, of the public comments received in response to the announcement of the proposed consent decree. A court may only authorize such alternative means of publication if it finds the expense of Federal Register publication exceeds the public interest benefits to be gained from such publication. This provision is intended to avoid unnecessary expense in publishing proposed consent decrees if alternate means are available, such as, for example, posting the proposed decrees electronically, which are sufficient to inform interested persons of the proposed consent decree. The second technical amendment, found in section 221(b)(3) of our bill, amends the provision of the Tunney Act codified in 15 U.S.C. Sec. 16(g) which requires that defendants notify the court of all communications with the Government relevant to the consent decree, except for communications between the defendant's counsel of record and the Justice Department. Our bill adds language which clarifies the statute's language to make clear that only communications with the defendant, or any officer, director, employee, or agent of such defendant, or other person representing the defendant must be disclosed. The defendant is not required to disclose contacts with the Government concerning the settlement by persons not affiliated with, representing, or acting on behalf of the defendant, for example, competitors of the defendant. The defendant's obligation to disclose contacts by agents or persons representing the defendant, including outside lobbyists, is unaffected by this technical change. In sum, our bill will mandate that courts engage in meaningful review of the Justice Department's antitrust consent decrees and not merely ``rubber stamp'' the decrees. It will make clear that it is a misinterpretation of the Tunney Act to limit a court's review to limit judicial review of these consent decrees to whether they make a mockery of judicial function, and therefore overrule recent D.C. Circuit decisions holding to the contrary. The bill is expressly intended to effectuate the legislative intent of the Tunney Act and ensure the ability of courts to effectively review consent decrees to ensure that they are in the public interest. It will require, rather than permit, a court to review a list of enumerated factors to determine whether a consent decree is in the public interest. By restoring a robust and meaningful standard of judicial review, our bill will ensure that the Justice Department's antitrust consent decrees are in the best interests of consumers and competition. Mr. DeWine. Mr. President, I rise today, along with Senator Hatch, Senator Leahy and Senator Kohl, as a sponsor of H.R. 1086, the Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2003. H.R. 1086 was passed unanimously by the Judiciary Committee in November 2003, and I am proud to say that H.R. 1086 encompasses many of the provisions of S. 1797, the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2003, which Senator Kohl and I introduced in October 2003. H.R. 1086 is a comprehensive bill that will enhance and improve the enforcement of U.S. antitrust law in four key areas. First, and perhaps most important, this bill will raise the penalties for criminal violations of antitrust law and bring those penalties more into line with penalties for other, comparable white collar offenses. Antitrust crimes such as bid rigging or cartel activity cheat consumers and distort the free market just as surely as any other type of commercial fraud, and should be strongly punished. Under current antitrust laws, the maximum criminal penalties for individuals guilty of price-fixing are three years incarceration and $350,000 in fines. For corporations, the maximum fine is $10 million. This bill will, No. 1, raise the maximum prison term to 10 years; No. 2, raise the maximum fine for individuals to $1,000,000; and No. 3, raise the maximum corporate fine to $100 million. By increasing the prison terms for individuals, this bill brings criminal antitrust penalties closer in line with the maximum penalties assessed for mail fraud and wire fraud, which are both 20 years. Executives and other antitrust offenders need to know that they face serious consequences when they collude with their competitors, and this bill will send that message to the marketplace. Second, this bill improves on an investigative and prosecutorial tool already being employed effectively by the Justice Department. Since 1993 the Antitrust Division has successfully used a revised corporate amnesty program to help infiltrate and break-up criminal antitrust conspiracies. In short, if a corporate conspirator self-reports its illegal activity to the Antitrust Division and meets certain conditions--it must be the first conspirator to confess, it cannot be the ringleader of the conspiracy, and it must agree to cooperate fully with the investigation, among other things--it will receive a ``free pass'' from prosecution. This program has been extremely successful in cracking conspiracies, because it creates a strong uncertainty dynamic among co-conspirators; members of the cartel can never be sure that one of the other conspirators will not confess its illegal activity to the Antitrust Division in order to avoid criminal liability. This uncertainty decreases the likelihood of cartels forming to begin with, and makes cartels less stable when they do form. H.R. 1086 helps to enhance the Division's corporate amnesty program by expanding its reach. The current amnesty program does not affect the civil liability of the conspirators; that is, a corporation cooperating with the Division through the amnesty program receives protection from government prosecution, but may still be sued in court by private parties for treble damages. This bill decreases that liability by limiting the damages a private plaintiff may recover from a corporation that has cooperated with the Antitrust Division. Specifically, the conspirator is not liable for the usual treble-damages; instead, it is only liable for actual damages. This modification recognizes that a corporation that has fully cooperated with the Antitrust Division is less culpable than other conspirators, and provides a far greater incentive for corporations to cooperate with the Antitrust Division. Third, H.R. 1086 addresses a concern raised recently by a string of court opinions that appear to limit the depth of review required by the Tunney Act. In brief, the Tunney Act requires that prior to implementing an antitrust consent decree a court must review that decree to assure that it is in the public interest; historically, that requirement has been understood to require that the courts engage in more than merely ``rubber-stamping'' those decrees. A number of recent opinions have led some to question the depth of review required by the Tunney Act. This bill makes clear that the Tunney Act requires what it has always required, and that mere rubber-stamping is not acceptable. In addition, H.R. 1086 makes a small number of minor modifications and revisions to ensure both that the Tunney Act accurately reflects its original intent and that it effectively functions in the modern legal and economic environment. Finally, this bill will treat Standard Development Organizations (SDOs) more favorably under the antitrust laws. SDOs are private, voluntary non-profit organizations that set standards for industry products--e.g., one SDO sets the standard for the required depth of a swimming pool before a diving board may be installed. Under the bill, qualifying SDOs which pre-notify the Antitrust Division of their standard-setting activities will not be subject to treble damages in private suits brought against them. Moreover, SDO activities will be scrutinized for antitrust violations under the less strict ``rule of reason'' legal standard, and SDOs may be awarded certain costs and attorney fees if they substantially prevail in litigation which is later held to be frivolous. In all of these ways, H.R. 1086 modernizes and enhances the enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws, and I am proud to sponsor it.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, in recent weeks, consumers all across the Nation have watched gas prices rise, seemingly without any end in sight. On March 24, U.S. gasoline prices reached a record high average of $ 1.74 a gallon. And, if consumers weren't paying enough already, just yesterday the OPEC nations decided to cut production by a million barrels a day, an action sure to drive prices even higher. Such blatantly anti-competitive action by the oil cartel violates the most basic principles of fair competition and free markets and should not be tolerated. It is for this reason that I rise today, with my colleagues Senators DeWine, Specter, Leahy, Feingold, Schumer, Coleman and Grassley, to reintroduce the ``No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act'' ( ``NOPEC"). This legislation is identical to our NOPEC bill introduced in the last two Congresses, a bill which passed the Judiciary Committee unanimously in 2000. Real people suffer real consequences every day in our nation because of OPEC's actions. Rising gas prices are a silent tax that takes hard- earned money away from Americans every time they visit the gas pump. Higher oil prices drive up the cost of transportation, harming thousands of companies throughout the economy from trucking to aviation. And those costs are passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices for manufactured goods. Higher oil prices mean higher heating oil and electricity costs. Anyone who has gone through a Midwest winter or a deep South summer can tell you about the tremendous personal costs associated with higher home heating or cooling bills. We have all heard many explanations offered for rising energy prices. Some say that the oil companies are gouging consumers. Some blame disruptions in supply. Others point to the EPA requirement mandating use of a new and more expensive type of ``reformulated'' gas in the Midwest or other ``boutique'' fuels around the country. Some even claim that refiners and distributors have illegally fixed prices. On this issue, Senator DeWine and I have asked the Federal Trade Commission to investigate these allegations. As a result of our inquiries, the FTC has put a task force in place to find out if those allegations were true. While we continue to urge the FTC to be vigilant, the FTC has to date found no evidence of illegal domestic price fixing as a cause of higher gas prices. But one cause of these escalating prices is indisputable: the price fixing conspiracy of the OPEC nations. For years, this conspiracy has unfairly driven up the cost of imported crude oil to satisfy the greed of the oil exporters. We have long decried OPEC, but, sadly, no one in government has yet tried to take any action. NOPEC will, for the first time, establish clearly and plainly that when a group of competing oil producers like the OPEC nations act together to restrict supply or set prices, they are violating U.S. law. It will authorize the Attorney General or FTC to file suit under the antitrust laws for redress. Our bill will also make plain that the nations of OPEC cannot hide behind the doctrines of ``Sovereign Immunity'' or ``Act of State'' to escape the reach of American justice. The most fundamental principle of a free market is that competitors cannot be permitted to conspire to limit supply or fix price. There can be no free market without this foundation. And we should not permit any nation to flout this fundamental principle. Some critics of this legislation have argued that suing OPEC will not work or that threatening suit will hurt more than help. I disagree. Our NOPEC legislation will, for the first time, enable our authorities to take legal action to combat the illegitimate price-fixing conspiracy of the oil cartel. It will, at a minimum, have a real deterrent effect on nations that seek to join forces to fix oil prices to the detriment of consumers. This legislation will be the first real weapon the U.S. government has ever had to deter OPEC from its seemingly endless cycle of price increases. There is nothing remarkable about applying U.S. antitrust law overseas. Our government has not hesitated to do so when faced with clear evidence of anti-competitive conduct that harms American consumers. A few years ago, for example, the Justice Department secured record fines totaling $725 million against German and Swiss companies engaged in a price fixing conspiracy to raise and fix the price of vitamins sold in the United States and elsewhere. Their behavior harmed consumers by raising the prices consumers paid for vitamins every day and plainly needed to be addressed. As this and other cases show, the mere fact that the conspirators are foreign nations is no basis to shield them from violating these most basic standards of fair economic behavior. Even under current law, there is no doubt that the actions of the international oil cartel would be in gross violation of antitrust law if engaged in by private companies. If OPEC were a group of international private companies rather than foreign governments, their actions would be nothing more than an illegal price fixing scheme. But OPEC members have used the shield of ``sovereign immunity'' to escape accountability for their price-fixing. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, though, already recognizes that the ``commercial'' activity of nations is not protected by sovereign immunity. And it is hard to imagine an activity that is more obviously commercial than selling oil for profit, as the OPEC nations do. Our legislation will correct one erroneous twenty-year-old lower federal court decision and establish that sovereign immunity doctrine will not divest a U.S. court from jurisdiction to hear a lawsuit alleging that members of the oil cartel are violating antitrust law. In the last few weeks, I have grown more certain than ever that this legislation is necessary. Between OPEC's decision yesterday to cut oil production and the FTC's conclusion for the last several years that there is no illegal conduct by domestic companies responsible for rising gas prices, I am convinced that we need to take action, and take action now, before the damage spreads too far. For these reasons, I urge that my colleagues support this bill so that our nation will finally have an effective means to combat this selfish conspiracy of oil-rich nations.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, in recent weeks, consumers all across the Nation have watched gas prices rise, seemingly without any end in sight. On March 24, U.S. gasoline prices reached a record high average of $ 1.74 a gallon. And, if consumers weren't paying enough already, just yesterday the OPEC nations decided to cut production by a million barrels a day, an action sure to drive prices even higher. Such blatantly anti-competitive action by the oil cartel violates the most basic principles of fair competition and free markets and should not be tolerated. It is for this reason that I rise today, with my colleagues Senators DeWine, Specter, Leahy, Feingold, Schumer, Coleman and Grassley, to reintroduce the ``No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act'' ( ``NOPEC"). This legislation is identical to our NOPEC bill introduced in the last two Congresses, a bill which passed the Judiciary Committee unanimously in 2000. Real people suffer real consequences every day in our nation because of OPEC's actions. Rising gas prices are a silent tax that takes hard- earned money away from Americans every time they visit the gas pump. Higher oil prices drive up the cost of transportation, harming thousands of companies throughout the economy from trucking to aviation. And those costs are passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices for manufactured goods. Higher oil prices mean higher heating oil and electricity costs. Anyone who has gone through a Midwest winter or a deep South summer can tell you about the tremendous personal costs associated with higher home heating or cooling bills. We have all heard many explanations offered for rising energy prices. Some say that the oil companies are gouging consumers. Some blame disruptions in supply. Others point to the EPA requirement mandating use of a new and more expensive type of ``reformulated'' gas in the Midwest or other ``boutique'' fuels around the country. Some even claim that refiners and distributors have illegally fixed prices. On this issue, Senator DeWine and I have asked the Federal Trade Commission to investigate these allegations. As a result of our inquiries, the FTC has put a task force in place to find out if those allegations were true. While we continue to urge the FTC to be vigilant, the FTC has to date found no evidence of illegal domestic price fixing as a cause of higher gas prices. But one cause of these escalating prices is indisputable: the price fixing conspiracy of the OPEC nations. For years, this conspiracy has unfairly driven up the cost of imported crude oil to satisfy the greed of the oil exporters. We have long decried OPEC, but, sadly, no one in government has yet tried to take any action. NOPEC will, for the first time, establish clearly and plainly that when a group of competing oil producers like the OPEC nations act together to restrict supply or set prices, they are violating U.S. law. It will authorize the Attorney General or FTC to file suit under the antitrust laws for redress. Our bill will also make plain that the nations of OPEC cannot hide behind the doctrines of ``Sovereign Immunity'' or ``Act of State'' to escape the reach of American justice. The most fundamental principle of a free market is that competitors cannot be permitted to conspire to limit supply or fix price. There can be no free market without this foundation. And we should not permit any nation to flout this fundamental principle. Some critics of this legislation have argued that suing OPEC will not work or that threatening suit will hurt more than help. I disagree. Our NOPEC legislation will, for the first time, enable our authorities to take legal action to combat the illegitimate price-fixing conspiracy of the oil cartel. It will, at a minimum, have a real deterrent effect on nations that seek to join forces to fix oil prices to the detriment of consumers. This legislation will be the first real weapon the U.S. government has ever had to deter OPEC from its seemingly endless cycle of price increases. There is nothing remarkable about applying U.S. antitrust law overseas. Our government has not hesitated to do so when faced with clear evidence of anti-competitive conduct that harms American consumers. A few years ago, for example, the Justice Department secured record fines totaling $725 million against German and Swiss companies engaged in a price fixing conspiracy to raise and fix the price of vitamins sold in the United States and elsewhere. Their behavior harmed consumers by raising the prices consumers paid for vitamins every day and plainly needed to be addressed. As this and other cases show, the mere fact that the conspirators are foreign nations is no basis to shield them from violating these most basic standards of fair economic behavior. Even under current law, there is no doubt that the actions of the international oil cartel would be in gross violation of antitrust law if engaged in by private companies. If OPEC were a group of international private companies rather than foreign governments, their actions would be nothing more than an illegal price fixing scheme. But OPEC members have used the shield of ``sovereign immunity'' to escape accountability for their price-fixing. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, though, already recognizes that the ``commercial'' activity of nations is not protected by sovereign immunity. And it is hard to imagine an activity that is more obviously commercial than selling oil for profit, as the OPEC nations do. Our legislation will correct one erroneous twenty-year-old lower federal court decision and establish that sovereign immunity doctrine will not divest a U.S. court from jurisdiction to hear a lawsuit alleging that members of the oil cartel are violating antitrust law. In the last few weeks, I have grown more certain than ever that this legislation is necessary. Between OPEC's decision yesterday to cut oil production and the FTC's conclusion for the last several years that there is no illegal conduct by domestic companies responsible for rising gas prices, I am convinced that we need to take action, and take action now, before the damage spreads too far. For these reasons, I urge that my colleagues support this bill so that our nation will finally have an effective means to combat this selfish conspiracy of oil-rich nations.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Montana. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the amendment offered by Senators Snowe and Dodd to provide an additional $6 billion in childcare funding. The amendment is essential to guaranteeing the safety and health of the children of working families, and if it fails I cannot support the underlying bill. I say that as a strong supporter of positive welfare reform. Wisconsin led the Nation in developing programs to move families off welfare and into employment long before Congress enacted the 1996 welfare reform bill, for which I voted. But the great success Wisconsin has seen would not have been possible without the vital work supports offered to welfare families--families that could not have become self- sufficient without help with childcare, health care, and food stamps. Across our country, wherever you find stable and safe childcare available and affordable, you see parents moving off the welfare rolls and into jobs. Unfortunately, quality childcare is out of reach for too many working families today. According to recent data, the average fee in Wisconsin for full-time care can surpass $7,000 a year--a small fortune to a single parent working at or near minimum wage. The Snowe-Dodd amendment, combined with the funding in the underlying bill, would send an additional $124 million in childcare funding to Wisconsin to help those working parents afford the care their children deserve. That translates into thousands more parents able to work, and thousands more children able to spend their days in a healthy, safe environment. The story is the same in all 50 States. With the addition of the Snowe-Dodd amendment, the Senate can be proud of a welfare bill that lives up to its name--a bill that truly works for the welfare of struggling parents and, more importantly, their children. The Snowe-Dodd amendment builds on the childcare funding already in the bill as well as other important provisions to make sure working families receive the support they need and deserve. One such provision, sponsored by Senator Snowe and myself, would free child support payments from State and Federal red tape and send it straight to the children for whom it is intended. Under current law, Federal and State governments can hold onto childcare payments in order to offset welfare expenses. Our provision gives State options and incentives to deliver child support directly to families. Wisconsin has been doing this since 1997, with great results. Fathers are more apt to pay--and pay more--when they know their children are on the receiving end instead of the Government. And there are no added costs to States, as families that receive child support have more of their own income and are less likely to need other public assistance. Childcare funding and child support are two simple steps towards ensuring families a smoother path towards self-sufficiency--and that is what a reformed, a compassionate, and an effective welfare system is supposed to be about. With the addition of the Snowe-Dodd amendment, the Senate's welfare bill will go a long way toward creating such a system. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the House welfare bill. The draconian penalties it includes would do little to help families move off of welfare and into employment. In addition, the House bill does away with protections for mothers with children under 6--a disturbing policy decision with long-run implications for the future of the infants and toddlers it targets. I urge my colleagues who take this bill to conference to reject the approach taken by the House. Families struggling to make a decent living for their children need a hand up--not a slap down. There is no sense in punishing parents and children for being poor. I also urge the Senate to overwhelmingly accept the Snowe-Dodd amendment today--and say yes to a healthy future for our Nation's most unfortunate children. Mr. President, I thank Senator Dodd and Senator Baucus and yield the floor.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, yesterday the Senate passed the Baucus amendment to strike what would amount to devastating cuts to the Medicaid program. I am pleased that this amendment was adopted, and I believe it was an important step in correcting what I believe was a gross misplacement of priorities in the Budget Resolution before the Senate. At the same time that this budget resolution cuts taxes for wealthier Americans by billions of dollars, it also included a provision that will help clear the way for an $11 billion cut in Medicaid. This cut would be devastating to millions of low-income families, children, disabled and senior citizens who are served by this critical health care program. And to make matters worse, this cut would come at a particularly bad time. States continue to face fiscal crises as a result of a weakened economy. They are already struggling to keep up with the rising demands and costs of Medicaid as more families need help during trying economic times. This budget resolution would have made it even harder for States to meet the needs of families, and would certainly lead to more uninsured Americans as States are forced to make painful cuts in Medicaid. Estimates show that an $11 billion cut in Medicaid would cost Wisconsin approximately $200 million over 5 years. Wisconsin has been a leader in providing comprehensive health services that working families need, but how would our State be expected to absorb a cut of this magnitude and continue to provide the comprehensive services people count on? This provision could force cuts in critical health benefits, preventive benefits, dental coverage, vision coverage, or speech and occupational therapy. It could force States to limit enrollment and lead to an increase in the number of uninsured families. It could lead to higher costs for seniors enrolled in State prescription drug assistance programs. It could limit options for long-term care for the elderly and disabled. And it could lead to cuts in reimbursement to health care providers. We should be appalled by the prospect of cuts in basic safety net programs like Medicaid during a time when many lower-income Americans need more help. We should be especially shocked when the cut occurs at the same time that we provide billions in tax cuts for the wealthy. But this budget resolution would have put $11 billion in Medicaid cuts on a fast track and left low-income working families, children, seniors and people with disabilities out in the cold. I am pleased that the Senate voted to reject these harmful Medicaid cuts and to finally begin to put this budget's priorities in the proper order for our Nation's working families.

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I am in opposition to the budget before the Senate. Many pundits will argue that the Senate budget is meaningless political posturing and a waste of time. After all, no money is appropriated by the decisions we make in this resolution. No taxes are changed. No laws are passed. But those who write off the budget debate are making a real mistake and missing a real opportunity. The Senate's budget resolution is our one chance to demonstrate that we have a coherent plan for our country. The budget is our opportunity to show that we have the courage to face our challenges, the common sense to meet our obligations, and the vision to lead the nation into a brighter future. Sadly, the budget before us fails on all three counts. Our current fiscal situation is a disaster. The Federal balance sheet has swung from a record surplus of $236 billion in fiscal year 2000 to a record deficit of $477 billion projected for this fiscal year. Now-- as the baby boom generation prepares to retire, as our nation faces unprecedented threats to our security, as well-paying manufacturing jobs bleed off our shores--does our budget face our fiscal shortfall with the gravity and seriousness of purpose the situation demands? No, it does not. Instead, we have a document that masks Treasury- draining tax policy with 5-year projections--closing the window to the public before the price tag for the President's ill-considered tax breaks reaches the trillions of dollars. Instead, we have a budget that doesn't include in its bottom line the estimated $280 billion in additional funds over the next 10 years it will take to continue to fight wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Certainly, the cost of the war in Iraq is a contentious issue. The exploding price of the President's tax breaks is unsettling. And the $2.8 trillion the budget before us plans to add to the federal debt in the next 5 years is downright terrifying. A courageous budget would acknowledge those hard, cold numbers honestly. This budget does not. Nor does it contain the sort of common sense that might make it a fiscal plan worth supporting. As school districts everywhere cut back on teachers, academic options, counseling, books, even heat to pay for the mandates of the Leave No Child Behind Act, does this budget meet the government's acknowledged obligation to pays its fair share? As Republican and Democratic Governors alike struggle to meet the health needs of the uninsured, does this budget propose to meet the federal government's obligations to the States under Medicaid? No. As the costs to the government and society of young criminal offenders pile up, does this budget meet its obligation to fund the cost savings juvenile crime prevention programs that keep kids out of jail? No. As farmers and ranchers struggle with shrinking profit margins, violent weather conditions, and market-wrecking diseases like mad cow disease, does this budget meet its obligation to guarantee a safe and available food supply? No. The list of unmet obligations is longer than the budget document itself: TANF reauthorization, transportation reauthorization, higher education reauthorization, Federal nutrition program reauthorization-- health, education, safety, welfare--all needs unmet; all duties undone. If the first rule of commonsense budgeting is pay what you owe, then this budget is a violation of common sense. But perhaps even more than common sense--or courage--what this budget lacks is vision. We should face head on and plan for--the hemorrhage of manufacturing jobs. But this budget merely dabs at the wound with unrelated upper income tax cuts, ill-conceived trade agreements, and empty promises of better times to come. We should face head on--and plan for--the looming crisis in Social Security shoved onto the baby boom generation by our precarious fiscal situation. But this budget merely shortens its time frame to 5 years and ignores the train wreck just around the corner. We should plan for a prosperous future for next generation. But this budget skimps on feeding them when they're born, skimps on teaching them as they grow, and is generous only in loading them down with debt when they enter the working world. We are capable of producing a budget with courage, common sense, and vision. We have not. The people of this country deserve a budget with courage, common sense and vision--everything this budget is not. For those reasons, I oppose the resolution.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Let me quote from that letter: We need to prioritize our economic development initiatives and judiciously place taxpayer dollars in those investments that provide the best return for our state and our country. There are many programs that should not make the cut. However, MEP is one government investment that ranks at the top when evaluated against criteria of national need, effectiveness and results. We should not shortchange or undercut this excellent program. I ask my colleagues, isn't MEP exactly the sort of program a budget with vision would support, a program, as Mr. Haney says, that brings real returns--jobs, economic growth, hope--from our scarce taxpayer dollar, a program that has received strong bipartisan support at the State and national level, a program that faces our challenges head on-- and taps the innovation and work ethic of American businesses to solve them? The Boxer amendment in so many ways adds vision to a budget that is blind when it comes to the trials of the American manufacturing sector. It adds courage to a budget frightened to acknowledge the serious jeopardy our economy faces. And it adds common sense to a budget that calls for short sighted cuts in programs, like MEP, that offer a tenfold return on taxpayer dollars. I urge my colleagues to support the Boxer amendment. I urge the Senate to continue to work to amend this Budget resolution to turn it into the plan that our Nation needs and deserves.

Mr. KOHL. I come to the Senate today as a cosponsor to the Boxer-Dodd amendment. I thank my colleague from California for pulling together this package--and for including a provision I authored to restore the funding for the Manufacturing Extension Program, MEP. I hope my colleagues will join us in resounding, bipartisan vote for the amendment. It remedies a serious failing of the budget before us. A budget worthy of the Senate's support should have vision. It should point the way to a better world for our workers, our families, and our communities. Senator Boxer's amendment has a vision for bringing good jobs back to our shores--and training a workforce able to fill and create such jobs. Without the Boxer amendment, the budget will remain a document whose only answer to the deterioration of the manufacturing job base is upper income tax cuts cloaked in discredited trickle-down economic theory. I am particularly pleased that Senator Boxer's amendment provides the resources to increase funding for the Manufacturing Extension Program from the $39.6 million suggested in the President's budget to $100 million, fully funding the program for fiscal year 2005. I intended to offer this as a free-standing amendment, but in the interest of time, I will defer to my colleague from California. I commend her for allowing the Senate to go on record on this vital program. Manufacturing makes up 25 percent of Wisconsin's economy--making Wisconsin the fourth largest manufacturing State in the Nation, tied with Michigan. While that statistic may conjure up images of huge businesses, in Wisconsin, 89 percent of our manufacturers have fewer than 100 employees. These small- and medium-sized firms are consistent forces for manufacturing job creation and are less likely than larger firms to outsource jobs. Smaller manufacturers pay good wages and contribute to the overall vitality of the local economy. In Wisconsin, the unemployment rate dropped to 5 percent, but these figures hide the disappearance of the solid manufacturing jobs on which Wisconsin's prosperity once rested. In January, the number of factory jobs in Wisconsin fell to the lowest level in more than a decade--even as unemployment fell. Since 2000, we have lost one out of every seven manufacturing jobs--79,000 in total. In Wisconsin, and across our Nation, MEP is one Federal program actively and effectively combating this deterioration of the manufacturing base. By helping small- and medium-sized manufacturers streamline production, integrate new technologies, and improve competitiveness, MEP has created or saved more than 35,000 manufacturing jobs nationwide during the last fiscal year. In Wisconsin, the program is supported--and used--by scores of manufacturers and the largest business association in my State: Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce. I ask unanimous consent that a letter of support for the MEP from Jim Haney, President of Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce be printed in the Record.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Madam President, I rise today in strong support of the Murray amendment. I am proud to cosponsor this amendment, which will finally provide the funding that Congress and the President promised when No Child Left Behind became law. I supported the No Child Left Behind Act because I believed it would provide a real chance for real reform. For the first time, the Federal Government would provide the resources that schools, teachers and principals need to help all students succeed. And in return, we required real accountability for results. Teachers, principals and school boards are working hard to live up to their end of the bargain as they work to meet the requirements of the new law. Now they are counting on us to live up to our end. Unfortunately, the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request--and the budget resolution before the Senate today--fall far short. This budget resolution falls $8.6 billion short of what was authorized under No Child Left Behind. Just when we're asking schools to do more, this budget resolution takes away the very funding they need to succeed. It might be easy to dismiss this shortfall when you talk about it in terms of billions of dollars. So I want to tell my colleagues here what this shortfall in funding has actually meant for schools in my State of Wisconsin. In 2003, Milwaukee Public Schools received an $8 million increase in Title I funds. But the new requirements for supplemental services and transportation for students to better performing schools cost over $10 million. In other words, the new mandates cost $2 million more than the total increase MPS received, and they had to make up the difference. To cover the costs, they were forced to cut their popular summer school program, which had served 17,000 students. This is just one example. Across Wisconsin, school districts are being forced to cut staff and increase class sizes, cut music, art and foreign language education, and cut textbook purchases. Some have even had to keep their schools colder during the winter months to cut down on their heating bills, or restrict how many pages students can print from their computers. These are certainly not the results we want. Problems exist at the State level, too. Our State Department of Public Instruction is working hard to implement the new law. But they believe they will need more funding to create new data systems to meet new data collection and reporting requirements. They will also need more funding for technical assistance teams to help schools and districts in need of improvement. It is time that the Senate and the President lived up to the promises that were made. The Murray amendment would establish a reserve fund to add $8.6 billion to the Budget Resolution for the purpose of fully funding No Child Left Behind. At the same time, this amendment lowers the deficit by $8.6 billion. The amendment is fully offset. I hope my colleagues will support this important amendment and finally provide the funding that our students need to succeed. (At the request of Mr. Daschle, the following statement was ordered to be printed in the Record.)

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, this weekend members of the National Association of Counties will be meeting in Washington for their annual legislative conference. County officials across the Nation deal with a wide variety of issues that affect the day-to-day lives of our citizens and I want to acknowledge their commitment to public service. I also want to take this opportunity to share with my fellow Senators a resolution recently adopted by the Marathon, WI County Board of Supervisors relating to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). Marathon County is in the heart of Wisconsin dairy and beef country and I commend the Board of Supervisors' diligence in this area. I ask that Marathon County resolution R-6-04 be printed in the Record. Resolution R-6-4 The resolution follows. Whereas a case of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) or Mad Cow Disease has been detected in the United States; and Whereas agriculture is a $40 billion industry in the State of Wisconsin; and Whereas Marathon County is a leader in Wisconsin agriculture, notably the dairy and beef industry; and Whereas Marathon County is concerned about the health, safety and economic impacts related to BSE; and Whereas in 1997 the United States Food and Drug Administration banned the use of protein derived from mammalian tissue in food for ruminant animals to prevent the establishment of BSE; and Whereas many countries that export livestock and meat to the United States do not have the same standard of safety. Now, therefore be it Resolved, That the Board of Supervisors of the County of Marathon does hereby resolve and ordain that Federal, State and local agencies continue to judiciously enforce the standards set forth by the Federal Food and Drug Administration; be it further Resolved, That countries that export livestock or meat to the United States, meet or exceed U.S. standards of care regarding BSE; be it further Resolved, That livestock or meat from countries which do not meet or exceed the U.S. standard of care be banned from importation to the U.S. to protect the health and safety of our citizens, livestock, and economy. Be it further Resolved, That this resolution be forwarded to our local, state and federal legislators, as well as the appropriate state and federal agencies and interested consumer and business organizations.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Madam President, as I understand it, there is no need for debate on this amendment. The Senator from California has told me she has no objection to our modifications. So if it is not objectionable to the managers of the bill, I will speak briefly, and then I will yield back our time. I will not call for a rollcall vote, and I hope the Senate will accept these modifications by voice vote. This amendment will make the Boxer amendment virtually identical to the bipartisan child safety lock amendment that passed with 78 votes in 1999. Protecting our children from accidental shooting is a concern that crosses party lines, and I am proud that today we get a chance to express that concern again in an overwhelming and bipartisan way. Every year, children and teenagers are involved in more than 10,000 accidental shootings. Close to 800 of those shootings result in a senseless death. And those 800 deadly accidents do not account for the thousands of additional gun-related deaths of America's youth each year that result from suicide or intentional shootings. Every 6 hours, a young person between the ages of 10 and 19 commits suicide with an available firearm. In all, nearly 3,000 children and young people die every year from gun-related injuries. To many of us, this recitation of numbers and statistics is terribly grim. But for the families, the pain associated with those avoidable deaths is unbearable. What is equally tragic is that so many of these deaths could have been prevented. The use of a child safety lock would have, at the very least, stopped hundreds of accidents each and every year. This legislation is simple, straightforward, and effective. It mandates that a child safety lock device or a trigger lock be sold with every handgun. Most locks resemble a padlock that locks around the gun trigger and immobilizes it, preventing it from being fired. These and other locks can be purchased in virtually every gun store for less than $10. They are already used by tens of thousands of responsible gun owners to protect their firearms from unauthorized use, and they surely have saved many lives. Support for this commonsense approach to gun safety is widespread. In 1999, the same child safety lock provision passed the Senate by an overwhelming vote of 78 to 20. It was an amendment during the juvenile justice debate. This proposal is as popular with the rest of the country and the law enforcement community as it was with the 106th Senate. Polls have shown that 73 percent of the American public, including 6 of 10 gun owners, favors the mandatory sale of child safety locks with guns. In a survey of nearly 500 of Wisconsin's police chiefs and sheriffs, 90 percent agree that child safety locks should be sold with every gun. This legislation has the support of the current administration as well. During his campaign in 2000, President Bush indicated that if Congress passes a bill making the sale of child safety locks mandatory with every gun sale, he would sign it into law. Attorney General Ashcroft affirmed the administration support of the mandatory sale of child safety locks during his confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee. The bill is not a panacea. It will not prevent every single avoidable firearm-related accident, but the fact is all parents want to protect their children. This legislation will ensure that people purchase child safety locks when they buy guns. Those who buy locks are more likely to use them. That much we know is certain. Those who use the locks will be protected from liability if those guns are misused. The Child Safety Lock Act is a modest proposal. Though imposing a minimal cost on consumers, it will prevent the deaths of many innocent children every year. The Senate spoke overwhelmingly in favor of this proposal in 1999. Madam President, I urge my colleagues to support and vote for the amendment before us today.

Mr. KOHL. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. KOHL. Madam President, I rise as an original sponsor of the child safety lock amendment. I thank the Senator from California for offering this important measure today. The Child Safety Lock Act significantly reduces the incidence of gun-related tragedies in our country among the most vulnerable elements of our population; namely, our children. I have a second-degree amendment I wish to offer now. I send the amendment to the desk.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I rise today with Senator Kennedy to introduce the Family Reunification Act, a measure designed to remedy a regrettable injustice in our immigration laws. A minor oversight in the law has led to an unfortunate, and likely unintended, consequence. Parents of U.S. citizens are currently able to enter the country as legal permanent residents, but our laws do not permit their minor children to join them. Simply put, the Family Reunification Act will close this loophole by including the minor siblings of U.S. citizens in the definition of ``immediate relative.'' This legislation will ensure that our immigration laws can better accomplish one of the most important policy goals behind them--the goal of strengthening the family unit. Congress took an important first step in promoting family reunification when it enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act. By qualifying as ``immediate relatives,'' this law currently offers parents, spouses and children of U.S. citizens the ability to obtain immigrant visas to enter this country legally. This we can all agree is good immigration policy. Unfortunately, a ``glitch'' in this law has put numerous families in an uncomfortable predicament. One of these unlucky families lives in my home Sate of Wisconsin. Effiong and Ekom Okon, both U.S. citizens by birth and graduates of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, requested that their parents be admitted to the United States from Nigeria as ``immediate relatives.'' The law clearly allows for this. Their father, Leo Okon, has already joined them in Wisconsin, and their mother, Grace, is currently in possession of an immigrant visa. However, Grace is unable to join her husband and sons in the United States because her six-year- old daughter, Daramfon, does not qualify as an ``immediate relative'' under current immigration law. Because it would be unthinkable for her to abandon her small child, Grace has been forced to stay behind in Nigeria, separated from the rest of her family. This family is truly an American success story, one of first- generation citizens graduating from a top University. They want to continue to contribute to society and want to bring their family with them. Unfortunately, current immigration law only permits some members of their immediate family to join them, but not all. This is clearly wrong. It is difficult to determine the scope of this problem. Because minor siblings do not qualify for visas, the Department of Homeland Security does not keep track of how many families have been adversely affected. However, DHS employees have assured us that the Okons are not unique. In fact, this is an all too common occurrence. If only one family suffers because of this loophole, changes must be made. The fact that there have been numerous cases demands changes now. Many parts of our immigration laws are outdated, unfair, and in need of repair. The definition of ``immediate relative'' is no different. Congress' intent when it grated ``immediate relatives'' the right to obtain immigrant visas was to promote family reunification, but the unfortunate oversight highlighted has interfered with many families' opportunities to do just that. The legislation introduced today would expand the definition of ``immediate relatives'' to include the minor siblings of U.S. citizens. By doing so, we can truly provide these families with the ability to reunite and the chance to take advantage of the many great opportunities our country has to offer. This is a simple and modest solution to an unthinkable problem that too many families have already had to face. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to explain my objections to the transportation reauthorization bill. I want to make it clear to everyone in this chamber, and more importantly, to the people of Wisconsin, the reasoning behind my vote today. This legislation is important to me; I wholly support a 6-year transportation reauthorization bill. I understand the need, on so many levels, for long term transportation funding. This is especially true in Wisconsin, where the harsh winters make transportation planning critical. And across the Nation, I know that investment in our transportation infrastructure is vital to our safety and our economy. I know how a 6-year bill affects planning for cities and States, affects jobs across the country, and the overall impact that a 6-year authorization has on the economy. I have heard the statistics, read the data and seen the charts. But most importantly, I know that if I were to support this bill today, I would not be doing my best to represent the people of Wisconsin. Every time Congress has faced reauthorizing a transportation funding bill, I have had to fight for Wisconsin's fair share. And under TEA-21, Wisconsin received the best possible return over the course of the bill. Under TEA-21, Wisconsin received an average rate of return of approximately $1.02 to every dollar the State contributed to the highway trust fund. This fair return did not come without a fight, however, and prior to TEA-21's passage, I worked diligently to ensure that Wisconsin saw its fair share of transportation dollars. This bill, however, throws those hard-won and well-earned returns away. By the second year of the bill, Wisconsin's rate of return will drop from almost $1.03 to $.95. According to preliminary estimates from my State's Department of Transportation, Wisconsin stands to lose an average of $80 million every year for the 6-year life of the bill under a 95 percent rate of return. In other words, the difference between a hundred percent and 95 percent rate of return results in millions of dollars lost for Wisconsin. How can I support that? That is why I sought to offer an amendment, which would have helped Wisconsin recoup some of the loss under this bill. My amendment would correct one of the largest problems that midwestern States have faced over the past several years. Midwestern States account for almost 70 percent of the loss of funds that is associated with the ethanol tax exemption. Wisconsin's loss has more than tripled within the last 3 years alone. My amendment would change States' TEA-21 average by adding the ethanol losses that occurred between 1996 and 2001. By applying the revised averages to the portion of the bill that calculates the minimum a State can receive, Wisconsin would stand to gain in the range of $50 million every year of the bill. This would help the State gain back the losses that we faced due to ethanol. Unfortunately, because of the rush of leadership on both sides of the aisle to finish the transportation bill, efforts to offer amendments improving the bill were procedurally blocked. I am very disappointed that so many of my colleagues--so many whose States do well under this bill--have shut out the rest of us who want to debate our ideas for making the bill fairer and better. This is politics at its worst. And the result will be a huge amount of public resources divvied up by a formula crafted in secret, unimproved with the ideas from--unresponsive to the needs of--too many States like Wisconsin. Fortunately for Wisconsin and these other States, this bill is far from law despite our work this week. The White House is insisting on bringing the cost of the bill down by billions before the President will sign it. The House is developing a bill including an increase in the gas tax that has little support in the Senate. If a 6-year authorization does become law this year, it will not look anything like the behemoth we have voted on today. And for all these reasons, I could not vote for this legislation-- vote to pass the losses contained in this legislation to my State. I will not be part of a process that puts the Senate stamp of approval on an embarrassing backroom deal that has a lot more to do with log rolling than road building. I will not push through legislation that does not give Wisconsin drivers and Wisconsin taxpayers their fair share. A safe and secure transportation network is important to the people in my State. The Wisconsin highway system requires constant attention and repair, to offset the damage caused by harsh winters and hot summers. Every year during the appropriations process, I have worked to secure funding for on-going projects critical to ensuring safe roads and a stable economy. I support the Senate's decision to pass a 6-year authorization. But not this bill. I cannot in good conscience support this bill, which represents an embarrassment to the Senate and a serious loss to my State.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I rise today with Senator Kennedy to introduce the Family Reunification Act, a measure designed to remedy a regrettable injustice in our immigration laws. A minor oversight in the law has led to an unfortunate, and likely unintended, consequence. Parents of U.S. citizens are currently able to enter the country as legal permanent residents, but our laws do not permit their minor children to join them. Simply put, the Family Reunification Act will close this loophole by including the minor siblings of U.S. citizens in the definition of ``immediate relative.'' This legislation will ensure that our immigration laws can better accomplish one of the most important policy goals behind them--the goal of strengthening the family unit. Congress took an important first step in promoting family reunification when it enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act. By qualifying as ``immediate relatives,'' this law currently offers parents, spouses and children of U.S. citizens the ability to obtain immigrant visas to enter this country legally. This we can all agree is good immigration policy. Unfortunately, a ``glitch'' in this law has put numerous families in an uncomfortable predicament. One of these unlucky families lives in my home Sate of Wisconsin. Effiong and Ekom Okon, both U.S. citizens by birth and graduates of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, requested that their parents be admitted to the United States from Nigeria as ``immediate relatives.'' The law clearly allows for this. Their father, Leo Okon, has already joined them in Wisconsin, and their mother, Grace, is currently in possession of an immigrant visa. However, Grace is unable to join her husband and sons in the United States because her six-year- old daughter, Daramfon, does not qualify as an ``immediate relative'' under current immigration law. Because it would be unthinkable for her to abandon her small child, Grace has been forced to stay behind in Nigeria, separated from the rest of her family. This family is truly an American success story, one of first- generation citizens graduating from a top University. They want to continue to contribute to society and want to bring their family with them. Unfortunately, current immigration law only permits some members of their immediate family to join them, but not all. This is clearly wrong. It is difficult to determine the scope of this problem. Because minor siblings do not qualify for visas, the Department of Homeland Security does not keep track of how many families have been adversely affected. However, DHS employees have assured us that the Okons are not unique. In fact, this is an all too common occurrence. If only one family suffers because of this loophole, changes must be made. The fact that there have been numerous cases demands changes now. Many parts of our immigration laws are outdated, unfair, and in need of repair. The definition of ``immediate relative'' is no different. Congress' intent when it grated ``immediate relatives'' the right to obtain immigrant visas was to promote family reunification, but the unfortunate oversight highlighted has interfered with many families' opportunities to do just that. The legislation introduced today would expand the definition of ``immediate relatives'' to include the minor siblings of U.S. citizens. By doing so, we can truly provide these families with the ability to reunite and the chance to take advantage of the many great opportunities our country has to offer. This is a simple and modest solution to an unthinkable problem that too many families have already had to face. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, it is with great disappointment that I rise today to express my objection to moving forward on the bill before us, SAFETEA. The cloture vote that we will have in the next few hours is the first step towards debating a bill with which few in this body are completely familiar. Essential elements of the bill came out of the Finance Committee today, and Senators have clearly not had enough time to review these proposals and to assess the effect on their States. I believe that debating and voting on this legislation this week would be irresponsible, and potentially damaging to many States, including the State of Wisconsin. The leadership has made it clear that they intend to push this measure through under artificial time constraints. Yet, members of the Environment and Public Works Committee were not given essential information before the transportation bill was brought for a vote on November 12, 2003, and now Members of the Senate will be debating a formula we haven't seen and are told we can't change. The unknowns, at this point, outnumber the areas of understanding. Many Senators still haven't seen crucial information from the Finance and Banking Committees. Questions of how to pay for this bill and how transit funding will be distributed among the States were debated in Committee as recently as today. I fail to see how we are acting responsibly to vote on legislation the same day it comes out of Committee. I want to make my self clear. I support a 6-year authorization of transportation dollars. And I support a bill that would be funded at the levels the Senate supported in last year's budget resolution, and that is fiscally responsible. During every previous authorization, I have fought to give my State equitable--equitable, not favorable-- treatement under the various formulas. I could not, in good conscience, move forward with a bill that would be a step backwards for my State. I understand that moving forward today does not eliminate all the opportunities to alter this bill and make it better. However, the complexities of the formulas that the Senate will be dealing with require additional time for review. I am particularly troubled by possible effects on Wisconsin of the proposed amendment dealing with the distribution of highway funds among the States. This formula was not released until just over a week ago, and yet this is what determines every State's level of transportation funding for the next 6 years. This amendment contains the new ``equity bonus'' program, dictating the State's percentages of formula funding. The State of Wisconsin is a loser under this formula. According to charts from the Federal Highway Administration, Wisconsin's rate of return will drop to $.95 by the second year of the bill, and remain there for 4 years. I understand that the formulas involved are complicated and difficult to alter. In my mind, this provides all the more reason granting Senators additional time to review and amend them. A 6-year authorization bill should not move forward under an arbitrary time limit. As a Senator whose State could be harmed by this legislation, I will use all the procedural tools at my disposal to give myself more time to understand and amend the bill. In addition, I will use any legislative means to fix the inequities that exist in the proposed formula amendment. I am hopeful that the leadership will work with me in the coming weeks to protect my State and advance the best possible reauthorization bill. cloture motion

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I join my colleague from Wisconsin in support of this resolution. I remain deeply concerned about the direction the President's negotiators are headed in the U.S.-Australia Free Trade negotiations. I know there are lots of moving parts to this or any trade negotiation. But if recent reports are correct the U.S./Australia negotiations seem to be boiling down to a handful of critical issues-- among them are dairy and drugs. Australia is angling for more access to our dairy markets. The Bush Administration, on behalf of pharmaceutical manufacturers, is pushing for greater access to Australia's Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. I suspect I know who wins if the Bush administration has to make a trade-off between the interests of dairy farmers and huge pharmaceutical corporations. The Bush administration demonstrated remarkable loyalty to pharmaceutical manufacturers during debate on the Medicare bill. I suspect those loyalties are alive and well and fear they may trump the interests of thousands of dairy producers and processors across the country. Out of an abundance of caution, I will reserve judgment on the final package until we have something more concrete to review. But the President's negotiators should be on notice that we will be closely following these negotiations to assure that dairymen's concerns are given every consideration.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. I thank the Senator from Vermont. In addition, as specified in the Economic Research Service section of the House report, $500,000 is provided for the analysis and compilation of data related to organic production, marketing and trade. The Senate report further elaborates on this matter within the Agricultural Marketing Service section, and ``encourages AMS to work with ERS, NASS and RMA on the collection of segregated data on the production and marketing of organic agricultural production and marketing, as directed in the 2002 Farm Bill. Specifically, data should be collected on prices, yields, acreage and production costs in the organic sector.'' It is critically important that all USDA collection data agencies coordinate in the effective use of these funds to meet the requirements of the Organic Production and Market Data Initiative--Section 7407--of the Food Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002. However, I would like to add that it is my intention that the Senate report language be used to provide guidance to USDA in the use of the $500,000 provided under the Economic Research Service account in the House report, and that ERS be the lead agency in coordinating this effort. Again, I would ask my friend from Vermont, if he would concur with my comments regarding the organic data collection provisions of the AMS and ERS accounts of the Agriculture portion of this omnibus appropriations bill?

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I am very pleased that the conference agreement with regard to the fiscal year 2004 Agriculture Appropriations bill includes funding for important programs addressing organic agriculture. However, many of the important details regarding Congress' intent for the administration of USDA organic programs were enumerated in the House and Senate reports, without reiteration by the statement of managers. As stated in the preface of the statement of managers: [T]he House and Senate report language that is not changed by the conference is approved by the committee of conference. The statement of the managers, while repeating some report language for emphasis, does not intend to negate the language referred to above unless expressly provided herein. Therefore, in keeping with this general rule, it seems appropriate to engage in a colloquy to assure that there is no confusion regarding congressional intent on the important USDA programs affecting organic agriculture. First, as stated in the Senate report, $1.5 million is provided for the National Organic Program, within the Agricultural Marketing Service account. I would like to reiterate that it is my intent, as ranking member of the Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee, that some of the increased funding provided for this important organic program at USDA be used to more fully comply with some of the requirements of the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, the authorizing statute for this program. Consistent with the Senate report on this matter, part of this funding should be used to hire an Executive Director for the National Organic Standards Board, NOSB, to create an ongoing peer review panel to oversee the USDA accreditation process for organic certifiers, and to improve scientific technical support for the NOSB. I would ask my colleague from Vermont, the ranking member of the Agriculture Subcommittee on Research, Nutrition, and General Legislation if he concurs with my comments on this matter?