Herb Kohl

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Privacy Protection Study Commission Act of 1999 with my colleague Senator Torricelli. This legislation addresses privacy protection by creating an expert Commission charged with the duty to explore privacy concerns. We cannot underestimate the importance of this issue. Privacy matters, and it will continue to matter more and more in this information age of high speed data, Internet transactions, and lightning-quick technological advances. There exists a massive wealth of information in today's world, which is increasingly stored electronically. In fact, experts estimate that the average American is ``profiled'' in up to 150 commercial electronic databases. That means that there is a great deal of data--in some cases, very detailed and personal--out there and easily accessible courtesy of the Internet revolution. With the click of a button it is possible to examine all sorts of personal information, be it an address, a criminal record, a credit history, a shopping performance, or even a medical file. Generally, the uses of this data are benign, even beneficial. Occasionally, however, personal information is obtained surreptitiously, and even peddled to third parties for profit or other uses. This is especially troubling when, in many cases, people do not even know that their own personal information is being ``shopped.'' Two schools of thought exist on how we should address these privacy concerns. There are some who insist that we must do something and do it quickly. Others urge us to rely entirely on ``self-regulation''-- according to them most companies will act reasonably and, if not, consumers will demand privacy protection as a condition for their continued business. Both approaches have some merit, but also some problems. For example, even though horror stories abound about violations of privacy, Congress should not act by anecdote or on the basis of a few bad actors. Indeed, enacting ``knee-jerk,'' ``quick-fix'' legislation could very well do more harm than good. By the same token, however, self-regulation alone is unlikely to be the silver bullet that solves all privacy concerns. By itself, we have no assurance that it will bring the actors in line with adequate privacy protection standards. Because it is better to do it right--in terms of addressing the myriad of complicated privacy concerns--than to do it fast, perhaps what is needed is a cooling off period. Such a ``breather'' will ensure that our action is based on a comprehensive understanding of the issues, rather than a ``mishmash'' of political pressures and clever soundbites. For those reasons, and recognizing that there are no quick and easy answers, I suggest that we step back to consider the issue of privacy more thoughtfully. Let's admit that neither laws nor self-regulation alone may be the solution. Let's also concede that no one is going to divine the right approach overnight. But given the time and resources, a ``Privacy Protection Study Commission'' composed of experts drawn from the fields of law, civil rights and liberties, privacy matters, business, or information technology, may offer insights on how to address and ensure balanced privacy protection into the next millennium. The bill I am introducing today would do just that. The Commission would be comprised of nine bright minds equally chosen by the Senate, the House, and the Administration. As drafted, the Commission will be granted the latitude to explore and fully examine the current complexities of privacy protection. After 18 months, the Commission will be required to report back to Congress with its findings and proposals. If legislation is necessary, the Commission will be in the best position to recommend a balanced course of action. And if lawmaking is not warranted, the Commission's recognition of that fact will help persuade a skeptical Congress and public. This is not a brand new idea. Twenty-five years ago, Congress created a Privacy Protection Commission to study privacy concerns as they related to government uses of personal information. That Commission's findings were seminal. A quarter of a century later, because so much has changed, it is time to re-examine this issue on a much broader scale. The uses of personal information that concerned the Commission 25 years ago have exploded today, especially in this era of e-commerce, super databases, and mega-mergers. People are genuinely worried-- perhaps they shouldn't be--but their concerns are real. For example, a Wall Street Journal survey revealed that Americans today are more concerned about invasions of their personal privacy than they are about world war. Another poll cited in the Economist noted that 80 percent are worried about what happens to information collected about them. William Afire summed it up best in a recent New York Times essay: ``We are dealing here with a political sleeper issue. People are getting wise to being secretly examined and manipulated and it rubs them the wrong way.'' One final note: given that privacy is not an easy issue and that it appears in so many other contexts, I invite all interested parties to help us improve our legislation to create a Commission. We need to forge a middle ground consensus with our approach, and the door is open to all who share this goal. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the previously cited material be printed in the Record.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Privacy Protection Study Commission Act of 1999 with my colleague Senator Torricelli. This legislation addresses privacy protection by creating an expert Commission charged with the duty to explore privacy concerns. We cannot underestimate the importance of this issue. Privacy matters, and it will continue to matter more and more in this information age of high speed data, Internet transactions, and lightning-quick technological advances. There exists a massive wealth of information in today's world, which is increasingly stored electronically. In fact, experts estimate that the average American is ``profiled'' in up to 150 commercial electronic databases. That means that there is a great deal of data--in some cases, very detailed and personal--out there and easily accessible courtesy of the Internet revolution. With the click of a button it is possible to examine all sorts of personal information, be it an address, a criminal record, a credit history, a shopping performance, or even a medical file. Generally, the uses of this data are benign, even beneficial. Occasionally, however, personal information is obtained surreptitiously, and even peddled to third parties for profit or other uses. This is especially troubling when, in many cases, people do not even know that their own personal information is being ``shopped.'' Two schools of thought exist on how we should address these privacy concerns. There are some who insist that we must do something and do it quickly. Others urge us to rely entirely on ``self-regulation''-- according to them most companies will act reasonably and, if not, consumers will demand privacy protection as a condition for their continued business. Both approaches have some merit, but also some problems. For example, even though horror stories abound about violations of privacy, Congress should not act by anecdote or on the basis of a few bad actors. Indeed, enacting ``knee-jerk,'' ``quick-fix'' legislation could very well do more harm than good. By the same token, however, self-regulation alone is unlikely to be the silver bullet that solves all privacy concerns. By itself, we have no assurance that it will bring the actors in line with adequate privacy protection standards. Because it is better to do it right--in terms of addressing the myriad of complicated privacy concerns--than to do it fast, perhaps what is needed is a cooling off period. Such a ``breather'' will ensure that our action is based on a comprehensive understanding of the issues, rather than a ``mishmash'' of political pressures and clever soundbites. For those reasons, and recognizing that there are no quick and easy answers, I suggest that we step back to consider the issue of privacy more thoughtfully. Let's admit that neither laws nor self-regulation alone may be the solution. Let's also concede that no one is going to divine the right approach overnight. But given the time and resources, a ``Privacy Protection Study Commission'' composed of experts drawn from the fields of law, civil rights and liberties, privacy matters, business, or information technology, may offer insights on how to address and ensure balanced privacy protection into the next millennium. The bill I am introducing today would do just that. The Commission would be comprised of nine bright minds equally chosen by the Senate, the House, and the Administration. As drafted, the Commission will be granted the latitude to explore and fully examine the current complexities of privacy protection. After 18 months, the Commission will be required to report back to Congress with its findings and proposals. If legislation is necessary, the Commission will be in the best position to recommend a balanced course of action. And if lawmaking is not warranted, the Commission's recognition of that fact will help persuade a skeptical Congress and public. This is not a brand new idea. Twenty-five years ago, Congress created a Privacy Protection Commission to study privacy concerns as they related to government uses of personal information. That Commission's findings were seminal. A quarter of a century later, because so much has changed, it is time to re-examine this issue on a much broader scale. The uses of personal information that concerned the Commission 25 years ago have exploded today, especially in this era of e-commerce, super databases, and mega-mergers. People are genuinely worried-- perhaps they shouldn't be--but their concerns are real. For example, a Wall Street Journal survey revealed that Americans today are more concerned about invasions of their personal privacy than they are about world war. Another poll cited in the Economist noted that 80 percent are worried about what happens to information collected about them. William Afire summed it up best in a recent New York Times essay: ``We are dealing here with a political sleeper issue. People are getting wise to being secretly examined and manipulated and it rubs them the wrong way.'' One final note: given that privacy is not an easy issue and that it appears in so many other contexts, I invite all interested parties to help us improve our legislation to create a Commission. We need to forge a middle ground consensus with our approach, and the door is open to all who share this goal. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the previously cited material be printed in the Record.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order to ask for the yeas and nays on both the Hutchison amendment and the Kohl-Grassley-Sessions amendment.

Mr. KOHL. I asked that it be in order for the yeas and nays on both the Hutchison amendment and the Kohl-Grassley-Sessions amendment.

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to oppose the Hutchinson/Brownback ``opt-out'' amendment, then vote for the Kohl/ Sessions/Grassley $100,000 cap. Let me tell you why; an opt-out doesn't change a thing. A few states have already basically ``opted out'' of reasonable homestead exemptions and that's a problem. This amendment would let these states continue to go on like nothing happened. The Kohl-Sessions-Grassley amendment, on the other hand, will stop this abuse, pure and simple. You can not support our cap and also support an opt-out: It's either one or the other, Mr. President. They say this is really just about states' rights. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Anyone who files for bankruptcy is choosing to invoke federal law in a federal court to get a ``fresh start,'' which is a uniquely federal benefit. In these circumstances, it's only fair to impose federal limits. And don't take my word for it: just listen to one of Texas' leading newspapers, the Austin American-Statesman. It recently editorialized that: ``The U.S. Constitution gives the federal government supremacy over the states in bankruptcy matters, so arguments that the federal government should let states do as the wish on this particular fact of bankruptcy law make little sense.'' The editorial goes on to urge Congress to limit the homestead exemption. Besides, we're only capping the homestead exemptions in states like Florida and Texas as they apply to bankruptcy and not for other purposes. That is, if you lose a multi million-dollar lawsuit in Texas and can't ``pay-up,'' you can still keep your expensive home if you don't file for bankruptcy. While that may not seem right, what state courts do is a matter of state law--and we do not touch it. On the other hand, anyone who wants to take advantage of the federal bankruptcy system should live with a federal $100,000 cap. Now let's turn to why our proposal is so important to effective bankruptcy reform. Our proposal closes an inexcusable loophole that allows too many debtors to keep their luxury homes, while their legitimate creditors--like children owed child support, ex-spouses owned alimony, state governments, small businesses and banks--get left out in the cold. Last year, the full Senate unanimously went on record in favor of the $100,000 cap and emphasized that ``meaningful bankruptcy reform cannot be achieved without capping the homestead exemption.'' Curently, a handful of states allow debtors to protect their homes no matter how high their value. And all too often, millionaire debtors take advantage of this loophole by moving expensive homes in states with unlimited exemptions like Florida and Texas, and declaring bankruptcy--and then continue to live in style. Let me give you a few of the literally countless examples: The owners of a failed Ohio S&L, who was convicted of securities fraud, wrote off most of $300 million in bankruptcy claims, but still held on to the multi-million dollar ranch be bought in Florida. A convicted Wall Street financier filed bankruptcy while owning at least $50 million in debts and fines, but still kept his $5 million Florida home--with 11 bedrooms and 21 bathrooms. And just last year, movies star Burt Reynolds wrote off over $8 million in debt through bankruptcy, but he still held into his $2.5 million Florida estate. Unfortunately, those examples are just the tip of the iceberg. We asked the GAO to study this problem and, based on their estimates, 400 homeowners in Florida and Texas--all with over one hundred thousand dollars in home equity--profit from this unlimited exemption each and every year. While they continue to live in luxury, they wrote off annually an estimated $120 million debt owned to honest creditors. Mr. President, this is not only wrong, I believe it is not acceptable. Without our amendment, the pending bill falls far short. Instead of a cap, it only imposes a 2-year residency requirement to qualify for a State exemption. And while that is a step, it will not deter a savvy debtor who plans ahead for bankruptcy, and it won't do anything about instate abusers such as Burt Reynolds. This $100,000 cap will stop these abuses without affecting the vast majority of States. Let me make one final point. Some opt-out supporters have circulated misleading information about how many States would be affected by this cap. While a few States would be impacted, they are mistaken about eight States in particular; they are: Alabama, Colorado, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oregon, and Rhode Island. We asked the Congressional Research Service to take a look, and CRS concluded that our cap would have ``no effect'' on these States. I ask unanimous consent that the memorandum from CRS be printed in the Record.

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, the facts speak for themselves. Simply put, the Hutchison-Brownback amendment is a bad idea, a backdoor way to allow rich deadbeats to continue to live as kings while their honest creditors go to the poor house. I urge my colleagues to oppose it and to support our bipartisan $100,000 cap instead.

Mr. KOHL. I thank Senator Sessions. I yield 2 minutes to Senator Grassley.

Mr. KOHL. I thank Senator Grassley. I ask unanimous consent to add Senator Harkin as a cosponsor to this amendment.

Mr. KOHL. I ask unanimous consent to reserve the remainder of our remaining time. I yield the floor to Senator Brownback whose time is charged to the other side.

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I yield 4 minutes to Senator Sessions.

Mr. KOHL. I say to the Senator from Texas, we have, I think, 5 minutes. I will not use all of it. If the Senator wants to conclude, I will speak for a couple of minutes, Senator Sessions for 1 minute, and then we are finished. If the Senator would like to go first.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. KOHL. Thank you, Mr. President. I thank the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. KOHL. I thank Senator Durbin very much. Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment with Senator Sessions to eliminate one of the most flagrant abuses of the bankruptcy system-- which is the unlimited homestead exemption. This bipartisan measure will cap the homestead exemption at $100,000, which is more than generous. Last year, the full Senate unanimously went on record in favor of the $100,000 cap and emphasized that ``meaningful bankruptcy reform cannot be achieved without capping the homestead exemption.'' I am proud that Senator Grassley--the underlying bill's lead sponsor--is a cosponsor of this measure. Our proposal closes an inexcusable loophole that allows too many debtors to keep their luxury homes, while their legitimate creditors--like children owed child support, ex- spouses owed alimony, State governments, small businesses, and banks-- get left out in the cold. Currently, a handful of States allow debtors to protect their homes no matter how high their value. And all too often, millionaire debtors take advantage of this loophole by moving to expensive homes in states with unlimited exemptions like Florida and Texas, and declaring bankruptcy--and then continue to live in a style that is no longer appropriate. Let me give you a few of the literally countless examples: The owner of a failed Ohio S&L, who was convicted of securities fraud, wrote off most of $300 million in bankruptcy claims, but still held on the multimillion dollar ranch he bought in Florida. A convicted Wall Street Financier filed bankruptcy while owing at least $50 million in debts and fines, but still he kept his $5 million Florida home--with 11 bedrooms and 21 bathrooms. And just last year, movie star Burt Reynolds wrote off over $8 million in debt through bankruptcy, but he still held onto his $2.5 million Florida estate. Sadly, those examples are just the tip of the iceberg. We asked the GAO to study this problem and, based on their estimates, 4 homeowners in Florida and Texas--all with over $100,000 in home equity--profit from this unlimited exemption and each every year. And while they continue to live in luxury, they write off annually an estimated $120 million in debt that is owned to honest creditors. My favorite GAO example is a Texas bankruptcy attorney who boasts of refusing representation to anyone who piles up credit card debt on the eve of filing bankruptcy. For that stand against abuse, she deserves credit. But when her own finances went sour, she took a dramatically different view: she wrote off $1.2 million in debt, while holding onto her $400,000 home. Mr. President, this is not only wrong, it is unacceptable. As you can see, while the unlimited homestead exemption may not be the most common abuse of the bankruptcy system, it is clearly the most egregious. If we really want to restore the stigma attached to bankruptcy--as this bill purports to do--then these high profile cases are the best place to start. Mr. President, we need to stop this high living at the expense of legitimate creditors. But the pending bill falls short. Instead of a cap, it only imposes a 2 year residency requirement to qualify for a State exemption. And while that's a step, it will not deter a savvy debtor who plans ahead for bankruptcy and it will not do anything about in-state abusers such as Burt Reynolds. This $100,000 cap will stop these abuses, without affecting the great majority of States, two- thirds of which responsibly cap the exemption at $40,000 or less. Let me make one additional point, and respond in advance to the most spurious--of the many spurious--arguments made by the other side: that this issue is really about States rights. Mr. President, that is pure hokum. Anyone who files for bankruptcy is choosing to invoke Federal law in a Federal court to get a uniquely Federal benefit--a ``fresh start'' through a huge debt write-off. In these circumstances, it's only to impose Federal limits. And just because something is in a State ``constitution'' doesn't make it sacrosanct. A cap is not only the best policy, it is sends the best message: That bankruptcy is a tool of last resort, not just a tool for financial planning. And it gives credibility to reform by going after the worst abusers, no matter how wealthy they are. So honestly, this amendment should be a no- brainer. Indeed, if we want to apply antiquated bankruptcy laws, maybe we should resurrect ``the debtors' prison.'' At least then we would be punishing the worst offenders, rather than rewarding them. Amendment No. 2516 (Purpose: To limit the value of certain real or personal property a debtor may elect to exempt under State or local law)

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to set aside the pending amendment, and I send an amendment to the desk.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I rise today to co-sponsor the Hart-Scott- Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1999 and to commend Chairman Hatch for his efforts on this legislation. This measure would amend the Hart- Scott-Rodino Act and make several changes to enhance the merger review process undertaken by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. We believe that reforms to this statute are long overdue--the threshold hasn't been changed since the statute's enactment in 1976--but we also view the proposals in this legislation as a starting point, and not necessarily the last word on this subject. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act is crucial to the enforcement of competition policy in today's economy--it ensure that the antitrust agencies have sufficient time to review mergers and acquisitions prior to their completion. The statute requires that, prior to consummating a merger or acquisition of a certain minimum size, the companies involved must formally notify the antitrust agencies and must provide certain information regarding the proposed transaction. For those transactions covered by the Act, the parties to a merger or acquisition may not close their transaction until the expiration of a thirty day waiting period after making their Hart-Scott-Rodino Act filing. This waiting period may be extended by the antitrust agencies requesting additional information from the parties to the transaction in which case, under current law, the parties may not complete the deal until twenty days after supplying the government with the requested information. While this statute has a very laudable purpose, especially with the tremendous numbers of mergers and acquisitions taking place in recent years, some of its provisions are in need of revision. Most importantly, while inflation has caused the value of a dollar to drop by more than a half in the past 25 years, the monetary test that subjects a transaction to the provisions of the statute has not been revised since the law's enactment in 1976. As a result, many transactions that are of a relatively small size and pose little antitrust concerns are nevertheless swept into the ambit of the Hart-Scott-Rodino review process. This legislation would raise the size of transaction covered by the Hart- Scott-Rodino Act from $15 million to $35 million. This will both lessen the agencies' burden of reviewing small transactions unlikely to seriously affect competition and enable the agencies to allocate their resources to properly focus on those transactions most worthy of scrutiny. Further, exempting smaller transactions from the Hart-Scott- Rodino process will significantly lessen regulatory burdens and expenses imposed on small businesses. The parties to these smaller transactions will no longer need to pay the $45,000 filing fee--or face the often even more onerous legal fees and other expenses typically incurred in preparing a Hart-Scott-Rodino filing--for mergers and acquisitions that usually don't pose any competitive concerns. In exempting this class of transactions from Hart-Scott-Rodino review, however, it is important that we not cause the antitrust agencies to lose the funding they need to carry out their increasingly demanding mission of enforcing the nation's antitrust laws. Therefore, we have attempted to ensure that our measure is revenue-neutral-- indeed, it would raise filing fees for transactions valued at over $100,000,000, which makes sense because these transactions require more scrutiny. In considering this legislation, of course, we will need to carefully study the budgetary implications of this reform to ensure that our goal of revenue-neutrality has been met. As this measure moves forward, however, we ought to consider whether bigger deals of, say, $1 billion or $10 billion and over should require higher fees. This legislation makes other changes designed to enhance the efficiency of the pre-merger review process. The waiting period has been extended from twenty to thirty days after the parties' compliance with the government's request for additional information, a more realistic waiting period in this era of increasingly complex mergers generating enormous amounts of relevant information and documents. As in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when a deadline for action occurs on a weekend or holiday, the deadline is extended to the next business day. This simple provision will eliminate gamesmanship by parties who currently may time their compliance so that the waiting period ends on a weekend or holiday, effectively shortening the waiting period to the previous business day. Mr. President, some have expressed concerns regarding the difficulties and expense imposed on business in complying with allegedly overly burdensome or duplicative government requests for additional information. So we believe that it is reasonable to consider methods to prevent abuse of this process by overbroad or unreasonable requests. Therefore, this legislation includes provisions to amend the statute to add a right of appeal to a U.S. Magistrate Judge to adjudicate disputes regarding the propriety of government requests for additional information. We have not reached any final conclusions regarding the wisdom of these provisions; they are certainly worth ``floating'' as ideas, and the process will determine if they should be included as part of a final product. Further, we should keep in mind that if this right of appeal provision is enacted it will impose significant additional litigation burdens on the antitrust agencies which might require a corresponding increase in funding for these agencies. Our goal, again, is to improve the functioning of the pre- merger review system which is so vital to antitrust enforcement and, in that context, this provision deserves at least a supportive ``look.'' Mr. President, let me make one additional point. We recognize that all will not agree with the necessity or efficacy of all of these reform proposals. We are, of course, willing to consider any modification to this legislation that will advance our goals of a more efficient merger review process. But virtually everyone agrees that Hart-Scott-Rodino needs to be updated and we're pleased that this measure moves us forward.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, this bill was not an easy bill for me to support. While I believe that fostering trade with our neighbors leads to growth both here and abroad, I also know that some companies use trade to take advantage of foreign low wage workers. I had hoped that this bill would take stronger measures to ensure that labor and environmental rights received greater respect. I opposed cloture initially on this bill because it would unfairly limit the ability to improve the bill. After an agreement was worked out to allow trade related amendments, I decided to support cloture to move the legislation forward. I supported amendments that would have required labor and environmental agreements and stricter oversight of imports to avoid trans-shipment. I was disappointed that these amendments were not agreed to, but I encourage the conferees to continue fighting for these important issues. Some important changes were made. The Senate included a provision to help our farmers cope with the negative effects of trade agreements. This Trade Adjustment Assistance for farmers parallels the Trade Adjustment Assistance program that has helped so many industrial workers. Senator Harkin offered an amendment that will go a long way toward eliminating child labor in these developing countries if they hope to take advantage of the benefits in this legislation. This provision makes the bill more humane, and reflects our moral values, not just our economic interests. While the bill is not perfect, increasing opportunity for some of the poorest countries is an important goal and deserves the support of the Senate. The countries of the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa know that trade and investment coupled with aid programs are more effective than foreign aid alone. The countries involved support this bill and look forward to a chance to sell their products in our market. The struggle for labor standards is a long road, but that journey cannot start if people do not have jobs. There is no way to improve working conditions for the unemployed. Only when trade and investment bring jobs to these countries will workers be able to organize and fight for better conditions. Many of these countries are new democracies that have much to learn about the benefits of protecting their workers. We should remember that the United States is a democracy that is 225 years old, and that the backbone of our labor laws are only 65 years old. Those laws did not come easily. There was a long, bitter, and sometimes bloody fight before the United States saw the wisdom of protecting workers rights. We need to continue our efforts, both at the government and non-governmental level, to convince these countries to follow our example. Unfortunately, our trade negotiators have only recently come to the conclusion that labor rights matter to workers here and abroad. Making access to the U.S. market difficult is not going to improve the lot of workers in Africa and the Caribbean. The more we do to engage these countries and improve the climate for investment, the closer these countries get to moving out of poverty and toward prosperity.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I rise today to co-sponsor the Antitrust Technical Corrections and Improvements Act of 1999 with my colleague Mike DeWine. This act makes five miscellaneous technical corrections to the antitrust laws. Companion legislation to this bill has been introduced in the House by Representatives Hyde and Conyers. One of the technical corrections repeals an outdated provision which applies only to the Panama Canal, one clarifies a long existing ambiguity and expressly ensures that the Sherman Act applies to the District of Columbia and the territories, and another repeals a redundant jurisdictional provision. In addition, two other provisions correct typographical errors in two antitrust statutes--the inadvertent mislabeling of an amendment to the Clayton Act passed last year and another a punctuation error in the Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act. The only difference between our bill and the House companion is that the House would repeal an outdated statute--the Taking Depositions in Public Act--which requires that pre-trial depositions in antitrust cases brought by the government be taken in public. This provision was enacted in 1913 at a time when antitrust cases were tried under completely different procedures from today and testimony was usually not taken in open court. In other words, back then antitrust trials were essentially conducted ``on paper.'' This statute was virtually ignored--and unused--until the past year. This provision was revived last year when, as part of its antitrust lawsuit against Microsoft, the government deposed Bill Gates. Now, of course, people need to be deposed if they possess evidence that may be integral to the resolution of the case. But today the 1913 statute seems both unnecessary, counter-productive and, even, voyeuristic--that is, if you can have voyeurism in an antitrust context. Its need has vanished because testimony is now taken in open court in antitrust cases, as it is in any other. Indeed, requiring the depositions of prominent figures such as Bill Gates and Steve Case in controversial and widely publicized cases inevitably creates a media ``feeding frenzy'' contrary to the sound administration of justice and a sober examination of complicated legal issues. So I would support the House provision but, at this point, my belief is that it is more important to move the underlying measure in a timely manner than to wait to develop a consensus on the deposition provision in the Senate. We'll work on that consensus here, or we'll work the differences out in conference. Mr. President, I ask that a summary of the bill be printed in the Record. I look forward to working with my colleagues to turn this bill into law. The summary of the bill follows: Summary of the Antitrust Technical Corrections and Improvements Act of 1999 1. Repeal of the Antitrust Provision of the Panama Canal Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 31)--Section 11 of the Panama Canal Act provides that no vessel owned by someone who is violating the antitrust laws may pass through the Panama Canal. With the return of the Canal to Panamanian sovereignty at the end of 1999, it is appropriate to repeal this outdated provision. 2. Clarification that Section 2 of the Sherman Act Applies to the District and the Territories (15 U.S.C. Sec. 3)-- Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act are two of the central provisions of the antitrust laws. Section 1 prohibits combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, and Section 2 prohibits monopolization. Section 3 of the Sherman Act was intended to apply these provisions to the District of Columbia and the various territories of the United States. Unfortunately, however, section 3 is ambiguously drafted and leaves it unclear whether Section 2 applies to the District of Columbia and the territories. This bill clarifies that both Section 1 and Section 2 apply to the District and the Territories. 3. Repeal of Redundant Antitrust Jurisdictional Provision in Section 77 at the Wilson Tariff Act--In 1955, Congress modernized the jurisdictional and venue provisions relating to antitrust suits by amendment Section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 15). At that time, it repealed the redundant jurisdiction provision in Section 7 of the Sherman Act, but not the corresponding provision in Section 77 of the Wilson Tariff Act. It appears that this was an oversight because Section 77 was never codified and has rarely been used. Repealing Section 77 will not change any substantive rights because Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides any potential plaintiff with the same rights. Rather it simply rides the law of a confusing, redundant, and little used provision. 4. Technical Amendment to the Curt Flood Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-297)--This provision corrects an inadvertent technical error in the statutory codification of the Curt Flood Act of 1998, the statute which provided that major league baseball players are covered under the antitrust law. The Curt Flood Act was codified to a section number of the Clayton Act which was already in use. The amendment corrects this error by redesignating the statute as section 28 of the Clayton Act. This substantive change to the statute is intended. 5. Technical Amendment to the Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act--This provision corrects a typographical error in the statute as enacted by the inserting a missing period in section 5(a)(2). No substantive change to the statute is intended.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I rise today to co-sponsor the Antitrust Technical Corrections and Improvements Act of 1999 with my colleague Mike DeWine. This act makes five miscellaneous technical corrections to the antitrust laws. Companion legislation to this bill has been introduced in the House by Representatives Hyde and Conyers. One of the technical corrections repeals an outdated provision which applies only to the Panama Canal, one clarifies a long existing ambiguity and expressly ensures that the Sherman Act applies to the District of Columbia and the territories, and another repeals a redundant jurisdictional provision. In addition, two other provisions correct typographical errors in two antitrust statutes--the inadvertent mislabeling of an amendment to the Clayton Act passed last year and another a punctuation error in the Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act. The only difference between our bill and the House companion is that the House would repeal an outdated statute--the Taking Depositions in Public Act--which requires that pre-trial depositions in antitrust cases brought by the government be taken in public. This provision was enacted in 1913 at a time when antitrust cases were tried under completely different procedures from today and testimony was usually not taken in open court. In other words, back then antitrust trials were essentially conducted ``on paper.'' This statute was virtually ignored--and unused--until the past year. This provision was revived last year when, as part of its antitrust lawsuit against Microsoft, the government deposed Bill Gates. Now, of course, people need to be deposed if they possess evidence that may be integral to the resolution of the case. But today the 1913 statute seems both unnecessary, counter-productive and, even, voyeuristic--that is, if you can have voyeurism in an antitrust context. Its need has vanished because testimony is now taken in open court in antitrust cases, as it is in any other. Indeed, requiring the depositions of prominent figures such as Bill Gates and Steve Case in controversial and widely publicized cases inevitably creates a media ``feeding frenzy'' contrary to the sound administration of justice and a sober examination of complicated legal issues. So I would support the House provision but, at this point, my belief is that it is more important to move the underlying measure in a timely manner than to wait to develop a consensus on the deposition provision in the Senate. We'll work on that consensus here, or we'll work the differences out in conference. Mr. President, I ask that a summary of the bill be printed in the Record. I look forward to working with my colleagues to turn this bill into law. The summary of the bill follows: Summary of the Antitrust Technical Corrections and Improvements Act of 1999 1. Repeal of the Antitrust Provision of the Panama Canal Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 31)--Section 11 of the Panama Canal Act provides that no vessel owned by someone who is violating the antitrust laws may pass through the Panama Canal. With the return of the Canal to Panamanian sovereignty at the end of 1999, it is appropriate to repeal this outdated provision. 2. Clarification that Section 2 of the Sherman Act Applies to the District and the Territories (15 U.S.C. Sec. 3)-- Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act are two of the central provisions of the antitrust laws. Section 1 prohibits combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, and Section 2 prohibits monopolization. Section 3 of the Sherman Act was intended to apply these provisions to the District of Columbia and the various territories of the United States. Unfortunately, however, section 3 is ambiguously drafted and leaves it unclear whether Section 2 applies to the District of Columbia and the territories. This bill clarifies that both Section 1 and Section 2 apply to the District and the Territories. 3. Repeal of Redundant Antitrust Jurisdictional Provision in Section 77 at the Wilson Tariff Act--In 1955, Congress modernized the jurisdictional and venue provisions relating to antitrust suits by amendment Section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 15). At that time, it repealed the redundant jurisdiction provision in Section 7 of the Sherman Act, but not the corresponding provision in Section 77 of the Wilson Tariff Act. It appears that this was an oversight because Section 77 was never codified and has rarely been used. Repealing Section 77 will not change any substantive rights because Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides any potential plaintiff with the same rights. Rather it simply rides the law of a confusing, redundant, and little used provision. 4. Technical Amendment to the Curt Flood Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-297)--This provision corrects an inadvertent technical error in the statutory codification of the Curt Flood Act of 1998, the statute which provided that major league baseball players are covered under the antitrust law. The Curt Flood Act was codified to a section number of the Clayton Act which was already in use. The amendment corrects this error by redesignating the statute as section 28 of the Clayton Act. This substantive change to the statute is intended. 5. Technical Amendment to the Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act--This provision corrects a typographical error in the statute as enacted by the inserting a missing period in section 5(a)(2). No substantive change to the statute is intended.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I rise to register my support for meaningful campaign finance reform. I will be voting today for cloture on the Daschle amendment which is the broader version of campaign finance reform passed by the House, including provisions to limit issue advocacy advertising during campaigns. Should we have a vote on the Reid amendment, I will also be voting for cloture on a ban on so-called soft money contributions to political parties. Although I was unavoidably absent from the Senate during yesterday's vote, I would have voted against the motion to table the Reid amendment banning soft money contributions. Banning of soft money is the least we can do. This unlimited flow of money into party coffers creates the greatest opportunity for special interests to seek favor with politicians. The reality that businesses or organizations can be tapped for such vast sums has dramatically changed the atmosphere surrounding the work of our legislative and executive branches of government. Even responsible voices in business have said that they want out from this unseemly competition. The Committee for Economic Development, a group of 200 senior executives and college presidents, has put forward its own campaign finance proposal, mirroring many of the ideas we have discussed over the last few days, stating, ``As business leaders, we are troubled by the mounting pressure for businesses to contribute to the campaigns their competitors support, as well as the dangers that real or perceived political corruption pose for business and the economy.'' Whether the presence of unlimited political contributions is corrupting or whether it just creates the appearance of corruption, the damage is done. Americans are disaffected with politics and political campaigns and have voted against the current system with their feet: U.S. voter turnout in elections is in serious decline. According to the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, over the last 30 years we have witnessed a 26 percent decline in voter participation. Fifty-four percent of voting age adults reported voting in the last Presidential election in 1996, the lowest level since the Census Bureau began collecting these statistics in 1964. And these statistics may not even tell the whole story, with some citizens unwilling to admit they did not vote. The official statistics maintained by the Clerk of the House measured voter turnout in 1996 at 49.8 percent. For non-Presidential election years, the numbers are even more discouraging. During the 1998 elections, we witnessed the lowest voter turnout since 1942. Our representative democracy is harmed by eroding participation. As elected officials we have a responsibility to try to address the sources of voter disaffection. According to the Census Bureau, 17 percent of non-voting registered individuals reported they did not vote because of apathy. That number was up from 11 percent in 1980. In response, we should be working to help reconnect the voters with their elected officials and to invest them in the political debates of the day. Campaign finance reform, in one form or another, is an important part of that process. However, there is more we can be doing to bring citizens back to the polls and to engage them in the issues facing our country. We must be clearly responsive to our constituents and not the special interests who often seem to have a stranglehold on the political process. Unfortunately, there are far too many bills which have the fingerprints of special interests all over them. We must take back the process from the special interests and craft bills beholden to no one but our constituents. We should also be working to eliminate barriers to voting. Nearly 5 million registered voters said they did not make it to the polls in 1996 because they couldn't get time off from work or school to vote. In response, we need to explore ways to make it easier for Americans to cast their ballots, and we need to do so in a way that does not encourage voter fraud. One such approach which merits further consideration is longer voting hours at the polls. In the past I have introduced legislation to study the possibility of extending voting hours across the weekend. If polls were open on Saturday and Sunday, people would have more than enough time to vote. Since the mid-19th century we have held election day on the first Tuesday in November, ironically because it was the most convenient day for voters. Tuesdays were traditionally ``court day'' and landowning voters were often coming to town that day anyway. We need to consider the national rhythms of today and determine what framework for voting makes the most sense for the American people. While weekend voting may pose some challenges, others have recommended that we require the states to keep the polling stations open from early in the morning until late in the evening on election day. This more limited proposal would be less costly and more manageable for states and would also provide more opportunities for people to vote. We should consider proposals to create a national voter leave, perhaps just two hours on election day to enable workers to make it to the polls. I am also intrigued by proposals to allow the disabled to vote by telephone, and we should be investigating how we can make use of the internet to make registration and voting easier. The internet is already ushering in a new era in elections, bringing new meaning to the issue of transparency in the financing of political campaigns. Until now, disclosure has been one of the cornerstones of campaign finance reform. The disinfectant of sunshine has always been heralded as a means of keeping politics clean. However, in this era of instant posting of campaign contributions, we are seeing an interesting side effect. The very tool to limit the role of special interests in politics is also highlighting that role and adding to the disaffection of voters. While it is important for us to continue to shine a spotlight on campaign contributions, we must recognize that disclosure is not enough. Ultimately, meaningful campaign finance reform and other efforts to increase voter motivation are the keys to bringing citizens back into the polling booth. Elections are essential to maintaining a robust democracy. Looking at the fragile democracies around the world reminds us that the right to elect our own leaders is a precious right--most valuable if it is exercised. Mr. President, whether we pass campaign finance reform today or at some point in the future, I want to acknowledge the hard work of my colleague from Wisconsin, Senator Russ Feingold in moving this issue forward. Senator Feingold and Senator McCain have persisted in raising campaign finance reform in the face of opposition from a minority determined to block reform. I will continue to support their efforts and look forward to the day when all Americans recognize that they have a stake in our society and are motivated to exercise their civic duty to vote.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I am pleased to join Senators Hatch, Leahy, Grassley, Torricelli, and Schumer in introducing the Multidistrict Jurisdiction Act of 1999. Our bipartisan measure will help give back to Federal judges the authority they need to handle multiple, overlapping cases as efficiently and effectively as possible. This legislation essentially overturns the Supreme Court's decision in Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998). In that case, the Supreme Court rejected 30 years of practice during which trial courts overseeing related cases for consolidated pretrial proceedings had been permitted to retain jurisdiction of those cases for trial. That long-standing routine made plain common sense, because oversight by one court (instead of dozens of courts) is often the best use of resources, regardless of whether the parties are still in discovery or already at trial. Indeed, a consolidated trial may not only be more convenient for the parties and the witnesses, but it also promotes justice by keeping the case before a judge who is already familiar with the underlying facts. Let me just point out that I do not mean to criticize the Supreme Court's decision as a matter of law. It may well be that the original Multidistrict Litigation statute was too narrowly drafted, and ultimately it is the responsibility of Congress to write--or, in this case, rewrite--the law to make sure it says what Congress intends. While this measure is an important step forward, we must recognize that it is just that--a step. There is much more we can do to promote efficiency and fairness in litigation for both victims and defendants. In fact, the proposal to overturn Lexecon was first raised publicly at a hearing on class action reform in the House early last year, as just one of several proposals that would help ensure the fair administration of justice. Ironically, while this measure appears to be on the fast track, we continue to delay consideration of the other more pressing class action measures that were the focus of that hearing. And, while consolidation could be particularly valuable in the class action context, without class action reforms this bill actually won't affect most class actions. The reason is simple: while this bill only applies to cases filed in Federal court, most class actions--even ones that are nationwide in scope and shape nationwide policies--end up in State court. Indeed, increased consolidation would help eliminate one of the most significant class action abuses--that is, the dangerous ``race to settlement'' among competing cases. Currently, overlapping class actions involving the same parties and the same claims put rival class lawyers in competition to get the first--and only--settlement available. The result is all too common: one lawyer lines his pockets with huge fees by taking a quickie settlement, while the class gets the short end of the stick. For example, in one instance involving overlapping Federal and State actions, the class lawyers who brought the State case negotiated a small settlement precluding all other suits, and even agreed to settle federal claims that were not at issue in State court. Meanwhile, the Federal court was outraged, finding that the Federal claims could have been worth more than $1 billion, while accusing the State class lawyers of ``hostile representation'' that ``surpassed inadequacy and sank to the level of subversion'' and of having ``more in line with the interests of [defendants] than those of their clients.'' This danger was recently underscored by the Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on Civil Rules Report on Mass Tort Litigation, which found that ``[T]he risk is considerable that speedy justice may be converted into speedy injustice . . . if two or more courts enter a race to be first to achieve a disposition binding on all courts.'' The report added that, ``This risk is aggravated by the `reverse auction' scenario . . . , in which a defendant may play would-be class representatives off against each other, bidding down the terms of settlement to the lowest level that can win approval by the most complaisant available court.'' This race to settlement, or ``reverse auction,'' shortchanges legitimate victims, while allowing blameworthy defendants to get off easy. Mr. President, we can prevent abuses like this--and encourage efficiency--simply by permitting more overlapping nationwide class actions to be brought into Federal court, the only place where the consolidation procedure is available. Once the cases are consolidated, lead counsel will be appointed, making it impossible to shop around low-priced settlements and to pit competing class lawyers against each other. However, as long as these class actions can be kept in various State courts, this bill won't succeed in bringing consolidation to the complex cases that need it most. That's one of the principal reasons why Senator Grassley and I introduced the Class Action Fairness Act of 1999 (S. 353) earlier this year. Our proposal, which among other provisions allows more nationwide class actions to be removed to Federal court, would--in conjunction with the bill we are introducing today--help eliminate the race to settlement in most class actions, save court resources and promote efficiency by placing related class actions before one court. A similar measure has already passed the House, and we look forward to moving this measure ahead in the Senate. Mr. President, I am proud to join my colleagues today in offering our proposal to return to Federal courts the authority they need to consider multiple, overlapping cases in a fair, expeditious and just manner. This is a necessary step in the direction of real reform, and I hope it will build momentum for more comprehensive reform, like the Grassley/Kohl Class Action Fairness Act.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I am pleased to join Senators Hatch, Leahy, Grassley, Torricelli, and Schumer in introducing the Multidistrict Jurisdiction Act of 1999. Our bipartisan measure will help give back to Federal judges the authority they need to handle multiple, overlapping cases as efficiently and effectively as possible. This legislation essentially overturns the Supreme Court's decision in Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998). In that case, the Supreme Court rejected 30 years of practice during which trial courts overseeing related cases for consolidated pretrial proceedings had been permitted to retain jurisdiction of those cases for trial. That long-standing routine made plain common sense, because oversight by one court (instead of dozens of courts) is often the best use of resources, regardless of whether the parties are still in discovery or already at trial. Indeed, a consolidated trial may not only be more convenient for the parties and the witnesses, but it also promotes justice by keeping the case before a judge who is already familiar with the underlying facts. Let me just point out that I do not mean to criticize the Supreme Court's decision as a matter of law. It may well be that the original Multidistrict Litigation statute was too narrowly drafted, and ultimately it is the responsibility of Congress to write--or, in this case, rewrite--the law to make sure it says what Congress intends. While this measure is an important step forward, we must recognize that it is just that--a step. There is much more we can do to promote efficiency and fairness in litigation for both victims and defendants. In fact, the proposal to overturn Lexecon was first raised publicly at a hearing on class action reform in the House early last year, as just one of several proposals that would help ensure the fair administration of justice. Ironically, while this measure appears to be on the fast track, we continue to delay consideration of the other more pressing class action measures that were the focus of that hearing. And, while consolidation could be particularly valuable in the class action context, without class action reforms this bill actually won't affect most class actions. The reason is simple: while this bill only applies to cases filed in Federal court, most class actions--even ones that are nationwide in scope and shape nationwide policies--end up in State court. Indeed, increased consolidation would help eliminate one of the most significant class action abuses--that is, the dangerous ``race to settlement'' among competing cases. Currently, overlapping class actions involving the same parties and the same claims put rival class lawyers in competition to get the first--and only--settlement available. The result is all too common: one lawyer lines his pockets with huge fees by taking a quickie settlement, while the class gets the short end of the stick. For example, in one instance involving overlapping Federal and State actions, the class lawyers who brought the State case negotiated a small settlement precluding all other suits, and even agreed to settle federal claims that were not at issue in State court. Meanwhile, the Federal court was outraged, finding that the Federal claims could have been worth more than $1 billion, while accusing the State class lawyers of ``hostile representation'' that ``surpassed inadequacy and sank to the level of subversion'' and of having ``more in line with the interests of [defendants] than those of their clients.'' This danger was recently underscored by the Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on Civil Rules Report on Mass Tort Litigation, which found that ``[T]he risk is considerable that speedy justice may be converted into speedy injustice . . . if two or more courts enter a race to be first to achieve a disposition binding on all courts.'' The report added that, ``This risk is aggravated by the `reverse auction' scenario . . . , in which a defendant may play would-be class representatives off against each other, bidding down the terms of settlement to the lowest level that can win approval by the most complaisant available court.'' This race to settlement, or ``reverse auction,'' shortchanges legitimate victims, while allowing blameworthy defendants to get off easy. Mr. President, we can prevent abuses like this--and encourage efficiency--simply by permitting more overlapping nationwide class actions to be brought into Federal court, the only place where the consolidation procedure is available. Once the cases are consolidated, lead counsel will be appointed, making it impossible to shop around low-priced settlements and to pit competing class lawyers against each other. However, as long as these class actions can be kept in various State courts, this bill won't succeed in bringing consolidation to the complex cases that need it most. That's one of the principal reasons why Senator Grassley and I introduced the Class Action Fairness Act of 1999 (S. 353) earlier this year. Our proposal, which among other provisions allows more nationwide class actions to be removed to Federal court, would--in conjunction with the bill we are introducing today--help eliminate the race to settlement in most class actions, save court resources and promote efficiency by placing related class actions before one court. A similar measure has already passed the House, and we look forward to moving this measure ahead in the Senate. Mr. President, I am proud to join my colleagues today in offering our proposal to return to Federal courts the authority they need to consider multiple, overlapping cases in a fair, expeditious and just manner. This is a necessary step in the direction of real reform, and I hope it will build momentum for more comprehensive reform, like the Grassley/Kohl Class Action Fairness Act.

Mr. KOHL

Mr. KOHL. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I am glad to join my colleague, Senator Cochran, in support of the conference report to H.R. 1906, the fiscal year 2000 Agriculture appropriations bill. I congratulate Senator Cochran, chairman of the subcommittee, for guiding us past many obstacles that have stood in the way of final passage of this measure. At the end of today's debate, we will send to the President an agricultural spending bill that will result in immediate aid to hundreds of thousands of farmers across our country. That is an accomplishment of which we can all be proud. At times, work on this bill was contentious. The money we had available to work with made it very difficult to fund adequately the most critical programs at USDA, FDA, and the other agencies in this bill. Senator Cochran did a masterful job in finding a balance of priorities, given the budgetary constraints under which we had to work. In fact, we were even able to increase spending for some critical programs. This conference report provides an increase for the President's food safety initiative, as well as additional funds to help avoid a shortfall in inspectors at the Food Safety Inspection Service. An increase is provided for the WIC Program to help maintain caseload. Other programs, such as research and education, conservation and rural development are all funded at a very healthy level. Most important, we have managed to include $8.7 billion in emergency aid to farmers suffering from the price collapse that has hit too many commodities. I realize some of my colleagues, especially those from the Northeast, will argue that more is needed to address the needs of farmers suffering from the effects of this summer's drought and Hurricane Floyd. I agree. The administration should send us a separate emergency request for these recent disasters, and Congress ought to act on it immediately. But our commitment to help the farmers of the Northeast overcome the natural disasters of the last several months should not stop us from enacting aid for farmers all over the country suffering from the economic disasters of the last several years. I also want to note the efforts made to ensure that harmful legislative riders, such as attempts to undermine USDA reform of dairy policy, did not become part of this conference report. We have spent months putting together a fair bill--not perfect, but fair. Efforts to incorporate dairy compacts into this legislation were defeated more than once. It is time to pass this bill and get much-needed funding to dairy farmers and to hardworking farmers across the country. And let me emphasize that last point. This bill contains almost $9 billion in emergency assistance to struggling farmers everywhere. Within days of the President signing the bill, almost $5 billion of that aid will be on its way to farmers. It is all well and good for us to spend days listening to talk about this money--how it is distributed and how much there should be--but there are hundreds of thousands of farmers who need it now to plant, feed, and operate. All the words in the world will not help farmers get next year's crop in the ground or milk the cows. We have talked enough--it is time now to pass this bill. In closing, let me say how much I have enjoyed working with Senator Cochran. This is my first year as ranking member on this subcommittee and his exceptional leadership, good judgment, and helpful hand has been indispensable in making this a positive experience for all of us. I would also like to thank his distinguished staff, Rebecca Davies, Martha Scott Poindexter, Les Spivey, and Hunt Shipman, for their important contributions to this bill. And, of course, I must thank Galen Fountain of the minority staff for his wisdom and patience. Galen is an invaluable resource to me, to all Democratic Senators, and to the Senate itself. I ask unanimous consent that a letter on the Foreign Market Development Program from the USDA be printed in the Record.

Mr. KOHL. I yield to the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. KOHL. I thank the Chair and yield the floor. Mr. REED addressed the Chair.