Dennis Kucinich

Mr. KUCINICH

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Schrader amendment to H.R. 10, the REINS Act. The REINS Act makes certain regulations that protect American priorities like public health, our economy, and workers' rights, extraordinarily difficult to enact by requiring Congressional approval even though Congress already has the power to disapprove any regulation. The Schrader Act further hobbles regulatory efforts by requiring an additional cost-benefit analysis, which is heavily biased against regulations which protect things that are not usually monetized like clean air, clean water, and public health protections. I could not support it.

Mr. KUCINICH

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Conference Report on H.R. 2055, the Consolidated Appropriations Act. I support a number of provisions included in this bill such as the $10 million for the Gulf War Veterans' Illness Research Program. Yet I cannot support legislation that includes billions of dollars for our military operations overseas. I remain concerned over the funding for the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) fund at DoD and the State Department included in this bill. H.R. 2055 includes a total of $126.3 billion for the OCO account, which is used to support our military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S. has spent a total of 19 years combined in Iraq and Afghanistan, at a total of more than $1.3 billion. As official military operations in Iraq draw to a close, we have to note that Iraq is not much closer to a democracy than it was when we first invaded the country in 2003. Similarly, we would be foolish to think that our support of the corrupt central government and continued military intervention in Afghanistan would result in stability. I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing this bill.

Mr. KUCINICH

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, this bill authorizes permanent warfare anywhere in the world. It gives the President unchecked power to pursue war. It diminishes the role of this Congress. The Founders saw article I, section 8 of the Constitution, which places in the hands of Congress the war power as essential to a check and balance against executive abuse of power. This legislation diminishes Congress' role in that regard. This legislation authorizes the military to indefinitely detain individuals without charge or trial, including the detention of U.S. citizens on U.S. soil. In short, what this bill does is it takes a wrecking ball to the United States Constitution and gives enormous power to the government or the State. I want friends on both sides of the aisle to understand this. We're giving the State more power over individuals with this bill. It's the wrong direction. Our children deserve a world without end, not a war without end. Our children deserve a world where they know that while their government will protect them, that it's not going to rule over them by invading their very thoughts and going, as the PATRIOT Act does, into their banking records or into their educational records. We've got to keep the government out of people's lives and stop the government from getting more into war, which gives the government more control over people. This is a time we take a stand for the Constitution and a stand for a government which is smaller when it comes to matters of war.

Mr. KUCINICH

Mr. KUCINICH. I would reclaim my time and respectfully suggest to my friend from California that even if you're extending the non- applicability, our friends in Russia will read this as being an attempt to try to put Russia in a position where we are forcing them to put at risk the International Space Station if in fact they wish to have a different kind of diplomacy than we have. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. KUCINICH. Okay. Well, I appreciate your pointing that out. But I would yield to my friend for a question. Does this legislation, or does it not, have a reference to the International Space Station and Russia? Is there a reference to it?

Mr. KUCINICH. And is there any kind of restriction being placed on Russia with respect to payments in connection with the International Space Station? I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. KUCINICH

Mr. KUCINICH. I reclaim my time. Perhaps the President is not restricted, which is good for the gentleman to say; but the very clear and plain reading of that is that it says no U.S. Government employee. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. KUCINICH. Correct.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I rise to claim time in opposition.

Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to place in the Record an article from the Christian Science Monitor entitled, ``Used-car salesman as Iran proxy? Why assassination plot doesn't add up for experts,'' and also from Mother Jones, ``Four Things You Need to Know About the Iran Bomb Plot.'' [From The Christian Science Monitor--CSMonitor.com, Oct. 12, 2011] Used-Car Salesman as Iran Proxy? Why Assassination Plot Doesn't Add Up for Experts (By Scott Peterson) The U.S. has blamed the specialist Qods Force in an Iran assassination plot. But those who track the group say the plot doesn't reflect the careful planning, efficiency, and strategy the Qods Force is known for. How careful is Iran's Qods Force when it comes to covert operations abroad? This wing of the Revolutionary Guard was accused by U.S. military commanders in Iraq in 2007 and 2008 of jeopardizing the efforts of more than 150,000 American troops on the ground, of backing militias of all stripes, and of exercising strong influence on Baghdad's rulers. Yet how many Iranian Qods Force operatives did that take? One U.S. diplomat posted to Baghdad at the time had the consensus answer: There were just eight Qods Force men in all of Iraq. IN PICTURES: Iran's military might Indeed, the Qods Force has a reputation for careful, methodical work--as well as effective use of local proxies, and ultimately their pragmatic deployment by Tehran as covert tools to expand Iran's influence across a region in flux. That explains why Iran experts are raising questions about fresh U.S. charges of an Iran-backed bomb plot, this time to kill the Saudi ambassador to Washington and blow up the Saudi and Israeli embassies. A criminal complaint filed by U.S. prosecutors on Tuesday charge Mansour Arbabsiar--a naturalized U.S. citizen with an Iranian passport from Corpus Christi, Texas--and Gholam Shakuri, ``an Iran-based member of Iran's Qods Force,'' with plotting to kill the Saudi diplomat on U.S. soil in an operation ``directed by factions of the Iranian government.'' Details of alleged plot Those who know Iran well are skeptical, but do not rule out any possibility. Mr. Arbabsiar may have arranged for $100,000 to be transferred from Iran as a downpayment of $1.5 million for the hit, as U.S. charges indicate. Arbabsiar may also have boasted to one alleged accomplice in the plot--an associate of Mexico's Zeta drug cartel, who also happened to be an informant of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration--that his cousin was a ``big general'' in the Iranian military. While also describing a series of potential attacks to the associate, he may even have stated--apparently in secretly taped conversations--that mass American casualties as a result were not a problem: ``They want that guy [the ambassador] done [killed], if the hundred go with him f* *k 'em,'' reads the legal complaint. Why the plot doesn't add up But Iran specialists who have followed the Islamic Republic for years say that many details in the alleged plot just don't add up. ``It's a very strange case, it doesn't really fit Iran's mode of operation,'' says Alireza Nader, an Iran analyst at the Rand Corp. in Arlington. Va., and coauthor of studies about the Revolutionary Guard. ``When you look at Iranian use of terrorism, it has some very specific objectives, whether it's countering the United States in Iraq or Afghanistan, or retaliating against perceived Israeli actions,'' says Mr. Nader. ``This [plot] doesn't seem to serve Iran's interests in any conceivable way,'' says Nader. ``Assassinating the Saudi ambassador would increase international pressure against Iran, could be considered an act of war . . . by Saudi Arabia, it could really destabilize the government in Iran; and this is a political system that is interested in its own survival.'' No apparent cost-benefit analysis Iran has been trying to evade sanctions, strengthen relations with non-Western partners, while continuing with its nuclear program, notes Nader. He says it is ``difficult'' to believe that either Qassim Soleimani--the canny commander of the Qods Force--or Iran's deliberative supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, would order such an attack that ``would put all of Iran's objectives and strategies at risk.'' That view has been echoed by many Iran watchers, who are raising doubts about the assassination plot allegations. ``This plot, if true, departs from all known Iranian policies and procedures,'' writes Gary Sick, an Iran expert at Columbia University and principal White House aide during the 1979 Iranian revolution and hostage crisis. While Iran may have many reasons to be angry at the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, Mr. Sick notes in a posting on the Gulf2000/Columbia experts list that he moderates, ``it is difficult to believe that they would rely on a non-Islamic criminal gang to carry out this most sensitive of all possible missions.'' Relying on ``at least one amateur and a Mexican criminal drug gang that is known to be riddled with both Mexican and U.S. intelligence agents'' appears to be sloppy, adds Sick. ``Whatever else may be Iran's failings, they are not noted for utter disregard of the most basic intelligence tradecraft.'' The odd set of details means that the usual cost-benefit calculation that experts often attribute to Tehran's decisionmaking does not apply here, says Muhammad Sahimi, in an analysis for the Tehran Bureau website. At a time when pressure is building on Iran over ``gross human rights violations,'' sanctions are showing signs of working, Iran is ``deeply worried about the fate of its strategic partner in Syria . . . tensions with Turkey are increasing . . . and a fierce power struggle is under way within Iran,'' says Mr. Sahimi, ``it is essentially impossible to believe that the IRI [Islamic Republic of Iran] would act in such a way as to open a major new front against itself.'' Previous assassinations only targeted Iranians Sahimi also notes that, even at the height of the regime's assassinations of opponents in the past, it did not target non-Iranians. ``It is keenly aware that it is under the American microscope,'' says Sahimi, making even less likely Iran embarking ``on such a useless assassination involving a low- level, non-player individual.'' Such reservations are not the same ones given by Iranian officials when they dismiss the charges of a murder plot. But analysts suggest more information will need to be revealed before judgment can be made. ``Iran does have a history of terrorism, but they also like to go through proxies--and true and tested proxies, not necessarily just anybody,'' says Nader of Rand, citing Hezbollah in Lebanon, for example, or Iraqi Shiite insurgents trained in Iranian camps. The man arrested by U.S. law enforcement at JFK airport on Sept. 29 does not seem to fit that mold. Not your average proxy Arbabsiar, a former used car salesman, would appear to have been a surprise choice of the Qods Force. Yet he apparently traveled several times to Mexico to recruit drug-cartel hit men, had $100,000 from Iran paid into a U.S. account and promised much more, and discussed the plot on a normal telephone. ``The Iranian modus operandi is only to trust sensitive plots to their own employees, or to trusted proxies such as Hezbollah, Saudi Hezbollah, Hamas, the Sadr faction in Iraq, Iran-friendly extremist Muslims in Afghanistan and other pro- Iranian Muslim groups,'' wrote Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional Research Service on Gulf2000 on Wednesday. ``Are we to believe that this Texas car seller was a Qods sleeper agent for many years resident in the U.S.? Ridiculous,'' said Mr. Katzman, who authored a study of the Revolutionary Guard in the 1990s. ``They (the Iranian command system) never ever use such has-beens or loosely connected people for sensitive plots such as this.'' And what kind of man is he? The Associated Press spoke to Arbabsiar's friend and former Texas business partner David Tomscha, who said he was ``sort of a hustler.'' The Iranian- American, the AP reported, ``was likable, albeit a bit lazy.'' ``He's no mastermind,'' Mr. Tomscha told the AP. ``I can't imagine him thinking up a plan like that. I mean, he didn't seem all that political. He was more of a businessman.''

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I would like to place in the Record an article from the Washington Post ombudsman entitled, ``Getting ahead of the facts on Iran,'' which states that the IAEA report does not say Iran has a bomb nor does it say it is building one. [From The Washington Post, December 9, 2011] Getting Ahead of the Facts on Iran (By Patrick B. Pexton) Headlines are tricky and difficult. They're written quickly, with print and Web publishing deadlines always looming, and with space limitations, yet headline writers try to be creative, informative, and occasionally, humorous. Few readers remember the hundreds of well-crafted headlines that entice yet describe a story accurately. But when a headline is bad, it sticks with you, like a burr you can't get out of your sock. So it was with recent headlines that appeared on one of The Post's online photo galleries. I was bombarded--about 1,500 e-mails--with complaints about this headline (it was an organized campaign, but more about that in a minute). The photo slideshow depicted Iran's nuclear research facilities and originally had a headline and subhead that readers felt were misleading: ``Iran's quest to possess nuclear weapons, the main headline said, followed by this subhead: ``Intelligence shows that Iran received foreign assistance to overcome key hurdles in acquiring a nuclear weapon, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency.'' The gallery was linked to two stories by The Post's national intelligence reporter, Joby Warrick, one on Nov. 6 and one on Nov. 8 describing the latest IAEA report, in which the U.N. agency said that Iran's drive for nuclear technology has military aspects that could bring it to the threshold of a nuclear bomb. ``But the IAEA report does not say Iran has a bomb, nor does it say it is building one, only that its multiyear effort pursuing nuclear technology is sophisticated and broad enough that it could be consistent with building a bomb. Iran steadfastly denies it is aiming for a nuclear bomb and says its program is aimed at civilian nuclear energy and research. Of course, Tehran could be lying. But no one knows for sure. This is what the U.S. director of national intelligence, James R. Clapper, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in March: ``We continue to assess [that] Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will evantually decide to build nuclear weapons.'' So are there 1,500 Post readers so attuned to headlines that they wrote me spontaneously to object? Well, no. This was an effort organized by a left-leaning nonprofit goup called Just Foreign Policy. On the group's board, among others, are Julian Bond, longtime NAACP chairman, and Tom Hayden, former California legislator and 1960s activist. Founded in 2006, Just Foreign Policy is a shoestring operation, and it has no staff in Washington. Robert Naiman, a recent master's degree graduate from the University of Illinois, runs the group's online campaigns from his home in Urbana. ``We're not a super-sophisticated operation,'' Neiman acknowledged with a chuckle. But it is savvy enough to use the Web effectively. ``We try to inform and agitate,'' he added. The group works mainly to end the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and to prevent new ones, such as with Iran. ``Most of what I do is read the newspaper and try to tell people about what I read,'' Naiman said. ``I stumbled on the headline, and was astonished, even knowing The Post's editorial line on Iran. I'm old-fashioned. The editorial page is one thing and the news is the other. The gallery headlines belonged more in the former and not the latter.'' So he spotlighted the headline on the top of Just Foreign Policy's home page, with this message: ``U.S. media helped railroad the nation into war with Iraq by treating unproven claims about Iraq's alleged [weapons of mass destruction] program as facts. Now we're seeing the same behavior concerning Iran.'' Visitors to Naiman's site could click on a link that sent a pre-written e-mail urging yours truly to fact-check the headline. Daily Kos and other left-leaning Web sites picked it up, adding fuel to the fire. Pretty soon, the ombudsman's inbox was crammed. I think Naiman and his Web army were right. The headline and subhead were misleading. Photo galleries generally are built by photo editors and then passed to copy editors for captions and headlines. I couldn't identify exactly where in the process these headlines went wrong, but when I raised the issue it was quickly fixed. In a Web-driven world, one bad headline can check the globe in minutes and undermine The Post's credibility. It can also play into the hands of those who are seeking further confrontaion with Iran. I would like to place in the Record an article, ``Experts Cast Doubt on Iran Sanction Strategy'' which raises questions about the Iranian stockpile and how much enriched uranium they actually have. Experts Cast Doubt on Iran Sanctions Strategy Monday, November 28, 2011 (By Ardavon Naimi) Washington, DC.--``We have succeeded in imposing the strongest sanctions to date on the Iranian regime,'' said Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor, last week at the Brookings Institution. Donilon, addressing the administration's concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program in light of the latest IAEA report, stated that sanctions have isolated Iran internationally, helped delay Iran's nuclear program, and facilitated divisions inside Iran's political establishment. But according to some of the experts participating in a panel discussion preceding Donilon's keynote address, the sanctions have largely punished ordinary Iranians and have united, not divided, political factions in Iran. According to Kevan Harris, U.S. Institute of Peace Jennings Randolph peace scholar and Ph.D. candidate at the Johns Hopkins University, the sanctions are ``not as smart as we think.'' Harris described the effects of sanctions inside of Iran. ``Sanctions are having an impact . . . in what I like to call `trickle down' sanctions.'' Sanctions affect the ability of certain banks and large enterprises to obtain foreign exchange and goods, consequently affecting small and medium sized enterprises inside Iran--such as the construction and automobile industry. This process has resulted in the rising cost of business. This trickling down helps to rise ``unemployed to a certain extent, and also decreases wages,'' affecting everyday Iranians. Harris challenged the assumption that sanctions facilitate divisions inside Iran's political elite. ``If you threaten countries . . . all of a sudden they have a real big incentive to start working together,'' said Harris. ``At high peaks of perceived external threat, the discourse of unity raises and the discourse of factionalism dies down.'' We spend a lot of resources on sanctions . . . political and economic . . . we need to ask ourselves, what's the cost benefit of that versus spending resources on diplomatic options.'' Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations believes that ``Iran's nuclear program is driven by domestic political factors.'' Yet, Takeyh takes the argument against sanctions a step further. He believes that Iran's nuclear program is actually the Islamic Republic's only perceived path to ``international legitimacy.'' By withstanding sanctions and obtaining a nuclear weapon, Iran would ``extract tributes from international concession.'' ``This program . . . may be beyond diplomatic mediation . . . underpinned by economic coercion,'' said Takeyh. Harris challenged Takeyh's assertion, stating ``if the goal of the program is their perceived only path to international legitimacy, then it seems like an alternative policy would be to provide a different path to international legitimacy for Iran that they don't perceive as open.'' Charles Ferguson, President of the Federation of American Scientists, discussed the latest IAEA report on Iran's nuclear program. ``Is there anything really new in the annex of the IAEA report?'' asked Ferguson, ``you have to say, not really. There's not a whole lot of new stuff in there.'' Although there are reasons for concern regarding Iran's ongoing efforts, Ferguson says that ``most of the things that are documented, that we know well, happened prior to 2004.'' Iran continues to build up its stockpile of 19.75 percent enriched uranium, yet Ferguson acknowledges that ``even at 20 percent enrichment, it's still going to take a few hundred kilos of that amount of material to have enough for one bomb . . . and Iran so far according to the IAEA, has something like 80 kilograms enriched to that level.'' Even when factoring in Iran's 4900 kilograms of 3.5 percent low enriched uranium, Ferguson concludes that it is ``still not enough material to provide Iran with a true breakout capability.'' Ferguson suggested that the best response to Iran's defiance is not further isolation, but creating openings for dialogue to facilitate increased safeguards and limits on Iran's nuclear program. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).

Mr. KUCINICH. I realize, Mr. Speaker, that there are a number of people who want to speak on this who are in favor of this resolution. In order to make sure that everyone is provided a chance, although I may disagree with what Mr. Sherman is about to say, I'll defend his right to speak, and so I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman).

Mr. KUCINICH. Could I ask, Mr. Speaker, how much time all parties have remaining?

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I would like to place in the Record an article from the Arms Control Association which states that the IAEA board resolution avoided direct censure of Iran, and did not declare Iran to be in noncompliance with its nonproliferation activities. [From armscontrol.org, Nov. 8, 2011] The IAEA's Iran Report: Assessment and Implications The IAEA report and annex released today provides disturbing and ``credible'' additional details regarding Iranian nuclear warhead development efforts that have allowed Tehran to acquire some of the expertise needed to build nuclear weapons, should it decide to do so. The broad outline in the IAEA' s latest report on the military dimensions of Iran's program is not new, but rather, provides greater detail regarding weapons-related activities outlined in previous public reports. The IAEA report and annex reinforce what the nonproliferation community has recognized for some time: that Iran engaged in various nuclear weapons development activities until 2003, then stopped many of them, but continued other. The activities documented in the IAEA report, including research related to nuclear warheads, underscore that Tehran's claims that it is only seeking the peaceful use of nuclear energy are false. Iran's warhead work also contradicts its obligation not to pursue nuclear weapons under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), under which states parties commit ``not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.'' The report suggests that Iran is working to shorten the timeframe to building the bomb once and if it makes that decision. But it remains apparent that a nuclear-armed Iran is still not imminent nor is it inevitable. The report should prompt greater international pressure on Tehran to respond more fully to the IAEA's questions, allow for more extensive inspections of its nuclear facilities, engage more seriously in talks on its nuclear program, and to agree to confidence building steps to help resolve the crisis. Comparison of the IAEA's Findings with Public U.S. Intelligence Assessments Because the IAEA report is based largely on intelligence the United States and other IAEA member states have been sharing with the agency for some time, in addition to the agency's own investigations, the information in the report likely provides greater insight into current U.S. assessments about Iran's nuclear program. The U.S. intelligence community appears to stand by the judgment made in the 2007 NIE that Iran had a nuclear weapons program that was halted in the fall of 2003. Moreover, in his testimony before a Senate committee in March 2011, U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper confirmed that the intelligence community still had a high level of confidence that Iran has not yet made a decision to restart its nuclear weapons program. Because the weapons program is believed to refer to the series of projects the IAEA report details, Clapper's statement is not inconsistent with the notion that some weapons-related R&D has resumed which is not part of a determined, integrated weapons-development program of the type that Iran maintained prior to 2003. Consistent with the finding of the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, the IAEA report says that a comprehensive weapons program (known as the AMAD Plan) ``was stopped rather abruptly pursuant to a `halt order,' '' in late 2003, but that some of the program's activities were resumed later. Key personnel are still involved in those renewed activities apparently tying up loose ends regarding their prior research and development work. Summary of Key IAEA Findings on Weapons-Related Activities The IAEA deserves credit for continuing to press the issue and to present this important information to the IAEA Board of Governors in spite of Tehran's unwillingness to cooperate with the investigation. This resolve helps to bolster the integrity of the agency and show that countries cannot simply get away with nonproliferation violations by denial and obfuscation. According to the report, Iran was engaged in an effort prior to the end of 2003 which ran the full range of nuclear weapons development, from acquiring the raw nuclear material to working on a weapon they could eventually deliver via a missile. Just as important as the type of work being carried out is how that work was organized. The series of projects that made up Iran's nuclear program appears to have been overseen by ``senior Iranian figures'' and engaged in ``working level correspondence'' consistent with a coordinated program. Key components of this program include: Fissile Material Production: As documented in previous reports, Iran ran an undeclared effort to produce uraniumtetrafluoride (also known as Green Salt), a precursor for the uranium used in the enrichment process. The affiliation between this project and other projects directly related to warhead development suggests that Iran's nuclear weapons program included both fissile material production and warhead development Although the report does not detail a uranium enrichment effort as part of the AMAD Plan, the secret nature of the Natanz enrichment plant prior to 2002 suggests that it was originally intended to produce the highly enriched uranium (HEU) for weapons. High Explosives Testing: Iran's experiments involving exploding bridgewire (EBW) detonators and the simultaneous firing of explosives around a hemispherical shape points to work on nuclear warhead design. The agency says that the type of high explosives testing matches an existing nuclear weapon design. Iran admits to carrying out such work, but claims it is for conventional military purposes and disputes some of the technical details. Warhead Design Verification: Iran carried out experiments using high explosives to test the validity of its warhead design and engaged in preparatory work to carry out a full- scale underground nuclear test explosion. Shahab-3 Re-entry Vehicle: Documentation reviewed by the IAEA has suggested that, as late as 2003, Iran sought to develop a nuclear warhead small enough to ft on the Shahab-3 missile. Confronted with some of the studies, Iran admitted to the IAEA that such work would constitute nuclear weapons development, but Tehran denies carrying out the research. The IAEA admits that it has less information regarding warhead-related work Iran has continued to pursue since 2003, but the report has provided some insight into the type of activities that Iran subsequently resumed, which seems to be focused on warhead design verification. The act that the agency was able to detail some of the organizational changes that have taken place since 2003, including the current position of the person who formerly oversaw the AMAD Plan, suggests that intelligence agencies still have considerable insight into Iran's nuclear program. Tehran will likely be concerned about its inability to hide such important information and will likely engage in further restructuring following this report, which may delay its efforts once again. Considering the IAEA's reliance on intelligence information from states, it went through considerable length to demonstrate why it thought this information was credible. It was not just a matter of acquiring consistent information from over 10 countries, but it seems some of the most incriminating evidence comes from the AQ Khan network, which Iran admits it relied upon. The information from the Khan network includes details about nuclear warhead designs the network gave Iran that match up to the research and experiments detailed in the intelligence information. The IAEA Board of Governors Needs to Respond The report will be considered by the IAEA Board of Governors at its next meeting Nov. 17-18, along with a draft resolution censuring Iran for violating its nonproliferation commitments. The Board's 35 members cannot ignore Iran's warhead development activities or Tehran's refusal to cooperate with the IAEA's investigation into that work. It must also insist that Iran improve its cooperation with the agency prior to the next board meeting. A consensus response is unlikely given existing divisions among the 35 countries, and in particular, Cuba's current membership on the board. Beijing and Moscow have also unfortunately played an unhelpful role prior to the release of the report by calling on Director-General Yukiya Amano to limit the information detailed it contains. However, it is important that the board's response receives support from as many countries as possible to demonstrate to Tehran that it cannot engage in work directly related to nuclear weapons with impunity. In particular, developing countries on the IAEA Board of Governors should no longer treat the Iran nuclear issue as a test case for preserving the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Rather, it is time that all states insist that Iran stop abusing that right for the development of a nuclear weapons capability and take meaningful steps to cooperate with the IAEA and suspend enrichment work, particularly enrichment of uranium at the 20% level. Rights and Responsibilities Iran cannot complain that Western states are trying to deny the Islamic Republic its nuclear ``rights.'' The U.S. position, consistent with the 2006 offer by the P5+1, has been that Iran could resume enrichment some time in the future after it reestablishes confidence with the international community that it is not pursuing nuclear weapons. As Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton explained it to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 1, 2011, it is the U.S. Government's position is that ``under very strict conditions'' and ``having responded to the international community's concerns,'' Iran would have a ``right'' to enrich uranium under IAEA inspections. In response to the IAEA's report, the international community should redouble efforts to implement existing U.N. Security Council-mandated sanctions on Iran's nuclear and missile sectors and, if Iran remains unwilling to cooperate with the IAEA and ignore the Security Council, further isolate Iran diplomatically and economically. Maintain Pressure and Engage In response to the report, the White House has appropriately underscored that the United States continues to focus on using diplomatic channels to pressure Iran to abandon its sensitive nuclear activities. To keep open the option for an effective negotiated resolution to the crisis, President Barack Obama should also reiterate the willingness of the United States and its P5+1 partners to follow-through on the recent letter from the EU's Catherine Ashton to Iran's leaders offering to engage them in further talks to address the nuclear program. Continuing pressure through targeted sanctions against Iran's nuclear and missile sectors, coupled with the pursuit of a negotiated agreement to resolve serious concerns over Iran's sensitive nuclear activities and to limit its uranium enrichment capacity provides the best chance of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. Talk of military strikes against Iranian nuclear and military targets is unhelpful and counterproductive. Military strikes by the United States and/or Israel would only achieve a temporary delay in Iran's nuclear activities, convince Iran's leadership to openly pursue nuclear weapons, rally domestic support behind a corrupt regime, and would result in costly long-term consequences for U.S. and regional security and the U.S. and global economy. Ultimately, resolving the nuclear issue will require sufficient pressure and inducement to convince Iran that it stands more to gain from forgoing a nuclear-weapons option and much to lose from any decision to build them. My friend from Oregon earlier mentioned the question of oil prices, and it's something that we ought to be concerned about. I would like to place in the Record an article from Slate that says that this sanction could lead to an increase in the price of gasoline that could be as much as $1.25 a gallon. [From Slate, Dec. 2, 2011] Will Sanctions Against Iran Raise Gas Prices? (By Brian Palmer) The Senate unanimous passed a bill Thursday that would impose economic sanctions on Iran, over the objection of the White House. One of the administration's complaints was that the move could increase oil prices. How much could sanctioning Iran cost us at the pump? The nightmare scenario would be an additional $1.25 per gallon. Iran produces just over 5 percent of the world's crude, which doesn't seem like a lot. But oil demand is price-insensitive--people and businesses refuse to change their fuel-buying habits until the costs go way up. That means a reduction in supply will have a disproportionate affect on prices. In the past, price increases have been about 10 times greater than their precipitating drops in production. Based on the same historical data, and given that oil is currently hovering at around $100 per barrel, a complete shutdown of Iranian exports could force prices as high as $150. (That's 5 percent, times the tenfold multiplier, times the current price of $100.) Since a one- dollar change in the cost of a barrel of oil usually translates to a two-and-a-half-cent surge in retail gas prices, cutting Iran off from world oil markets could increase the price of gasoline by a dollar and a quarter. This theoretical scenario is extremely unlikely, however. The Senate bill permits the president to delay the sanctions if there isn't adequate supply on the market. In addition, the bill would make it harder for foreign banks to deal with the Iranian central bank, which acts as a middle man in oil transactions. But it wouldn't make buying Iranian crude impossible, and sanctioned countries have historically found ways to sell their oil. (Consider, for example, the oil for food program that undermined sanctions against Iraq. The Senate sanctions against Iran also have a humanitarian exemption.) There hasn't been a truly effective, worldwide boycott of a country's oil exports since 1951-53, when Iran nationalized its oil industry. As long as Iranian oil continues to flow to Asia and parts of Europe, the sanctions would have a relatively small impact on prices. There's also the possibility that Saudi Arabia could make up for some of the banned Iranian oil, as it did during the first and second Persian Gulf wars. The Saudis wouldn't be able to plug the gap entirely, because they don't have as much excess capacity as they used to. They could soften the blow, though. There is one long-shot scenario that should be mentioned, in which oil prices go even higher than $150 per barrel. When pressured in the past, Iran has threatened to block oil deliveries through the Strait of Hormuz. Around 17 percent of oil traded globally passes through that waterway. While such an occurrence could theoretically lead to $8- per-gallon gasoline, based on the historic relationship between supply and price, it's a practical impossibility. Demand would drop significantly at those dizzying prices, causing the cost of a barrel of oil to increase more in proportion with changes to supply. More importantly, the economic shock of such a scenario would likely trigger a naval response from the U.S. and its allies. Mr. Speaker, an article in the Wall Street Journal raises this question as well. It says that crude flirts with $100 a barrel on geopolitical unrest. And it also quotes a commodity strategist at the Standard Bank in London as saying the timing of an Iranian embargo could hardly be worse. Relatively small disruptions could cause spikes in oil prices. A director of the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control, Mr. Adam Szubin, stated that there are real scenarios in which an oil spike might hit. This is from an article: U.S. officials warn that new sanctions could be a boon to Iran. There's another article that cites that, and an article from The New York Times which states that U.S. officials have declared they'd hold Iran accountable for a purported plot, but they've now decided that a proposed move against Iran's central bank would disrupt international oil markets and further damage the reeling American and world economies. I think that's something that we ought to be concerned about; that if, in fact, we are moving forward with sanctions, sanctions which will have an effect on the price of oil, is this the timing to do that kind of thing, and are we prepared in this Congress to accept the responsibility for a sharp increase in the price of oil? Here's a quote from a blog called San Francisco Gate quoting the Undersecretary of State, Wendy Sherman, telling the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ``There's absolutely a risk the price of oil would go up, which would mean that Iran, would, in fact, have more money to fuel its nuclear ambitions, not less.'' Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. KUCINICH. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute. I would respectfully respond to my friend from New York that the price of oil is, in fact, a moral question. I want to raise the question of the constitutionality of this particular proposal. I believe that it's unconstitutional because it is an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech and freedom of association. It is an unconstitutional abridgement of the right of free expression by Federal employees. It is a violation of whistleblower protections which have been granted a constitutional basis; that, in fact, it violates our own speech and debate clause of the Constitution of the United States because we have an obligation to inquire and to ask questions; that it violates the Constitution's separation of powers and challenges the President's power to engage in foreign diplomacy; that it is operationally impossible; that you can have even Admiral Mullen, former Chair of the Joint Chiefs, point out that with the miscommunications that can occur from a lack of diplomacy, we could be putting our own people at risk. In fact, there was an article that was published that deals with a scenario that would happen in the Gulf where there are run-ins between American and Iranian vessels. The no contact provision, if enacted, could outlaw the U.S. Navy's bridge-to-bridge communications with Iranian vessels. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I would like to place in the Record an article by Seymour Hersh which cites the IAE's report suggesting, according to the Arms Control Association, that Iran is working to shorten a time frame to build a bomb once and if it makes the decision. But it remains apparent that a nuclear-armed Iran is still not imminent, nor is it inevitable. [The New Yorker Online Only Daily Comment, November 18, 2011] Iran and The I.A.E.A. (Posted by Seymour M. Hersh) The first question in last Saturday night's Republican debate on foreign policy dealt with Iran, and a newly published report by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The report, which raised renewed concern about the ``possible existence of undeclared nuclear facilities and material in Iran,'' struck a darker tone than previous assessments. But it was carefully hedged. On the debate platform, however, any ambiguity was lost. One of the moderators said that the I.A.E.A. report had provided ``additional credible evidence that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon'' and asked what various candidates, upon winning the Presidency, would do to stop Iran. Herman Cain said he would assist those who are trying to overthrow the government. Newt Gingrich said he would coordinate with the Israeli government and maximize covert operations to block the Iranian weapons program. Mitt Romney called the state of Iran's nuclear program Obama's ``greatest failing, from a foreign-policy standpoint'' and added, ``Look, one thing you can know . . . and that is if we reelect Barack Obama Iran will have a nuclear weapon.'' The Iranian bomb was a sure thing Saturday night. I've been reporting on Iran and the bomb for The New Yorker for the past decade, with a focus on the repeatedly inability of the best and the brightest of the Joint Special Operations Command to find definitive evidence of a nuclear-weapons production program in Iran. The goal of the high-risk American covert operations was to find something physical--a ``smoking calutron,'' as a knowledgeable official once told me--to show the world that Iran was working on warheads at an undisclosed site, to make the evidence public, and then to attack and destroy the site. The Times reported, in its lead story the day after the report came out, that I.A.E.A. investigators ``have amassed a trove of new evidence that, they say, makes a `credible' case'' that Iran may be carrying out nuclear-weapons activities. The newspaper quoted a Western diplomat as declaring that ``the level of detail is unbelievable. . . . The report describes virtually all the steps to make a nuclear warhead and the progress Iran has achieved in each of those steps. It reads like a menu.'' The Times set the tone for much of the coverage. (A second Times story that day on the I.A.E.A. report noted, more cautiously, that ``it is true that the basic allegations in the report are not substantially new, and have been discussed by experts for years.'') But how definitive, or transformative, were the findings? The I.A.E.A. said it had continued in recent years ``to receive, collect and evaluate information relevant to possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program'' and, as a result, it has been able ``to refine its analysis.'' The net effect has been to create ``more concern.'' But Robert Kelley, a retired I.A.E.A. director and nuclear engineer who previously spent more than thirty years with the Department of Energy's nuclear-weapons program, told me that he could find very little new information in the I.A.E.A. report. He noted that hundreds of pages of material appears to come from a single source: a laptop computer, allegedly supplied to the I.A.E.A. by a Western intelligence agency, whose provenance could not be established. Those materials, and others, ``were old news,'' Kelley said, and known to many journalists. ``I wonder why this same stuff is now considered `new information' by the same reporters.'' A nuanced assessment of the I.A.E.A. report was published by the Arms Control Association (A.C.A.), a nonprofit whose mission is to encourage public support for effective arms control. The A.C.A. noted that the I.A.E.A. did ``reinforce what the nonproliferation community has recognized for some times: that Iran engaged in various nuclear weapons development activities until 2003, then stopped many of them, but continued others.'' (The American intelligence community reached the same conclusion in a still classified 2007 estimate.) The I.A.E.A.'s report ``suggests,'' the A.C.A. paper said, that Iran ``is working to shorten the timeframe to build the bomb once and if it makes that decision. But it remains apparent that a nuclear-armed Iran is still not imminent nor is it inevitable.'' Greg Thielmann, a former State Department and Senate Intelligence Committee analyst who was one of the authors of the A.C.A. assessment, told me, ``There is troubling evidence suggesting that studies are still going on, but there is nothing that indicates that Iran is really building a bomb.'' He added, ``Those who want to drum up support for a bombing attack on Iran sort of aggressively misrepresented the report.'' Joseph Cirincione, the president of the Ploughshare Fund, a disarmament group, who serves on Hillary Clinton's International Security Advisory Board, said, ``I was briefed on most of this stuff several years ago at the I.A.E.A. headquarters in Vienna. There's little new in the report. Most of this information is well known to experts who follow the issue.'' Cirincione noted that ``post-2003, the report only cites computer modelling and a few other experiments.'' (A senior I.A.E.A. official similarly told me, ``I was underwhelmed by the information.'') The report did note that its on-site camera inspection process of Iran's civilian nuclear enrichment facilities-- mandated under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which Iran is a signatory--``continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material.'' In other words, all of the low enriched uranium now known to be produced inside Iran is accounted for; if highly enriched uranium is being used for the manufacture of a bomb, it would have to have another, unknown source. The shift in tone at the I.A.E.A. seems linked to a change at the top. The I.A.E.A.'s report had extra weight because the Agency has had a reputation for years as a reliable arbiter on Iran. Mohammed ElBaradei, who retired as the I.A.E.A.'s Director General two years ago, was viewed internationally, although not always in Washington, as an honest broker--a view that lead to the awarding of a Nobel Peace Prize in 2005. ElBaradei's replacement is Yukiya Amano of Japan. Late last year, a classified U.S. Embassy cable from Vienna, the site of the I.A.E.A. headquarters, described Amano as being ``ready for prime time.'' According to the cable, which was obtained by WikiLeaks, in a meeting in September, 2009, with Glyn Davies, the American permanent representative to the I.A.E.A., said, ``Amano reminded Ambassador on several occasions that he would need to make concessions to the G-77 [the group of developing countries], which correctly required him to be fair-minded and independent, but that he was solidly in the U.S. court on every strategic decision, from high-level personnel appointments to the handling of Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program.'' The cable added that Amano's ``willingness to speak candidly with U.S. interlocutors on his strategy . . . bodes well for our future relationship.'' It is possible, of course, that Iran has simply circumvented the reconnaissance efforts of America and the I.A.E.A., perhaps even building Dick Cheney's nightmare: a hidden underground nuclear-weapons fabrication facility. Iran's track record with the I.A.E.A. has been far from good: its leadership began construction of its initial uranium facilities in the nineteen-eighties without informing the Agency, in violation of the nonproliferation treaty. Over the next decade and a half, under prodding from ElBaradei and the West, the Iranians began acknowledging their deceit and opened their enrichment facilities, and their records, to I.A.E.A. inspectors. The new report, therefore, leaves us where we've been since 2002, when George Bush declared Iran to be a member of the Axis of Evil--with lots of belligerent talk but no definitive evidence of a nuclear-weapons program. I would ask how much time is left on all sides.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I would like to place in the Record a letter from 26 organizations that urge Congress to oppose the provision restricting contact with Iranian officials. December 8, 2011. Dear Representative: We urge you to oppose the provision restricting contact with Iranian officials in the Iran sanctions bill H.R. 1905 and to work with your colleagues to remove it from the bill when it comes to the House floor. We are concerned that Section 601c of this legislation would undermine prospects for a diplomatic resolution of Iran's disputed nuclear program, increasing the threat of war. This provision was inserted into the bill during committee markup, after most of the cosponsors had already signed onto H.R. 1905. Section 601c of H.R. 1905 would expressly prohibit contact between U.S. government officials and certain Iranian officials, as noted below: (c) Restriction on contact.--No person employed with the United States Government may contact in an official or unofficial capacity any person that--(1) is an agent, instrumentality, or official of, is affiliated with, or is serving as a representative of the Government of Iran; and (2) presents a threat to the United States or is affiliated with terrorist organizations. (d) Waiver.--The President may waive the requirements of subsection (c) if the President determines and so reports to the appropriate congressional committees 15 days prior to the exercise of waiver authority that failure to exercise such waiver authority would pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the vital national security interests of the United States. If this provision were to be enacted into law, it could have a chilling effect on any diplomatic engagement that this or any future administration might wish to pursue to address Iran's nuclear program, its role in exacerbating or de- escalating regional conflicts, and its failure to respect the human rights of its citizens. It would also place restrictions on members of Congress, likely precluding the potential for inter-parliamentary dialogue with Iranian parliamentarians. As Ambassadors Thomas Pickering and William Luers have pointed out, this provision also raises ``serious constitutional issues over the separation of powers''. For the administration to exercise its waiver authority, the President would have to certify 15 days in advance that the failure to do so would ``pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the vital national security interests of the United States''. At a time of heightened tensions between the U.S. and Iran, sustained and flexible diplomacy is an essential tool to prevent war. Just before he retired from the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen called for an established channel of communications with Iran, noting that: ``We haven't had a connection with Iran since 1979. Even in the darkest days of the Cold War we had links of the Soviet Union . . . If something happens it's virtually assured that we won't get it right, that there will be miscalculations which would be extremely dangerous in that part of world . . . I think any channel would be terrific.'' We urge every member of Congress to oppose Section 601c of H.R. 1905 speak out on the House floor against efforts designed to constrain diplomatic engagement with Iran. Sincerely, Friends Committee on National Legislation; Americans for Peace Now; Arms Control Association; Center for Interfaith Engagement, Eastern Mennonite University; Church of the Brethren; Council for a Livable World; Fellowship of Reconciliation; Just Foreign Policy; Lancaster Interchurch Peace Witness; Mainstream Media Project; Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns; Mennonite Central Committee; Minnesota Peace Project. Middle East Peace Now; National Iranian American Council; New Internationalism Project, Institute for Policy Studies; Peace Action; Peace Action West; Peace Catalyst International; Progressive Democrats for America; Project on Middle East Democracy; Student Peace Alliance; United Church of Christ, Justice and Witness Ministries; United Methodist Church, General Board of Church and Society; Women's Action for New Directions; 3P Human Security: Partners for Peacebuilding Policy. It's interesting that what we're actually suggesting here is taking diplomacy off the table. I was here for the debate in Iraq. I led the effort in this Congress in challenging the then-Bush administration's assertions that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction which they intended to use against the United States. I was here. I don't know how many of you were here. But I saw a case being made for war, and that case was based on exaggerations and unfortunately in some cases distortions and lies. We have to be very careful that we're not setting the stage for still another war. We must be very careful that when we assert a certain level of preparedness on the part of Iran with respect to their nuclear capability that we aren't actually shutting the door that needs to be open in order to try to resolve any difficulty between our nations. We can say, well, we want to get them back to the table, but then don't talk to them. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. KUCINICH. In reclaiming my time, section 603(c) was added in committee. I would inquire of the gentleman, was it stripped from the bill?

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I want to say I have respect for all of my colleagues who are concerned about nuclear proliferation. We all ought to be concerned about nuclear proliferation. We can start with our own country. Right now we've set the stage for continuing to develop nuclear weapons. It's very difficult to be able to have a strong position of standing on this issue if we have one set of rules for ourselves and another set of rules for the rest of the world. I don't want to see a nuclear proliferation in Iran, but I think that if we want to have a standing where people want to take what we say, we have to be consistent. We have to make sure that what we do is consistent with what we say. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. KUCINICH. I would ask how much time is remaining.

Mr. KUCINICH. I would respectfully suggest to my friend from New Jersey that the certainty that Congress had in the debate in October of 2002 with respect to Iraq is very much paralleled with the certainty that some of my friends here have about not only Iran's intention to have a bomb but an intention to use it. That's why we need diplomacy. That's why the provisions of this bill in section 603(c), which say U.S. Government employees can't have any contact with Iranians, is really upside down.

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 1 minute. I am quoting from an article in The Hill, which I cited earlier: Section 601 would prohibit U.S. Government employees in any official or unofficial capacity from contacting anyone who is affiliated with the Iranian Government who presents a threat to the United States or is affiliated with a terrorist organization. Look, if you want to stop war, you have to have communication with people. I mean, if you look back to the Cuban Missile Crisis, which is one of the gravest crises of the 20th century, it was the fact that the United States and Russia were able to engage in a communication. So we have to be very careful that we don't pass any kind of a law that would restrict, not just First Amendment rights and not just freedom of association, but would restrict the basic kind of diplomacy that's used, because everyone here knows that diplomacy is not just leaders talking to leaders. All kinds of backdoor diplomacy goes on, and I think that that needs to be taken into consideration. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. KUCINICH

Mr. KUCINICH. As I am preparing to speak, I'm thinking about a debate we had 3 years ago where banks received $700 billion, about the Fed 1 month ago printing $7.7 trillion for banks in this country and abroad, and here we're telling the American people who happen to be unemployed, you know, we're thinking of cutting benefits 40 weeks. People want work, not welfare. People want work, not unemployment compensation. But when people do not have work, unemployment insurance is essential. It is a lifeline. And this legislation significantly cuts unemployment insurance, that safety net that millions rely on. It reduces the number of weeks unemployed workers are eligible for by as much as 40 weeks. We need more jobs, and yet we have more long-term unemployed. We know the unemployment rate is actually higher because people have stopped looking for work. Nearly 14 million Americans are out of work, and among the long-term unemployed, more than half have been out of work for over a year. The problem is not a lack of effort for those seeking a job, the problem is a lack of jobs. Let's get America back to work, not be cutting unemployment compensation.