Dennis Kucinich

Mr. KUCINICH

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in honor and remembrance of Mr. Carl Hirsch, a leading figure in the music industry in Cleveland and throughout the country. Born in Shaker Heights, Ohio, Mr. Hirsch demonstrated a love for radio broadcasting from an early age. He graduated from Kent State University and began working in the music industry, swiftly becoming a big name in the business. Mr. Hirsch was known for his ability to drive radio station ratings through the roof. He was the man behind such popular stations as WMMS-- The Buzzard and WMJI--Magic in the Cleveland area and WHTZ-Z100 in New Jersey. He was also instrumental in bringing the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum to Cleveland. In recognition of his vast achievements, he was inducted into the Cleveland Association of Broadcasters Hall of Fame, and received an honorary doctorate from Kent State University. Mr. Speaker and colleagues, please rise with me in honor and remembrance of a dedicated and widely respected individual. Mr. Carl Hirsch was a legend in the radio industry, and his exuberance, generosity, and promotion of his hometown will not be forgotten. I extend my sincerest condolences to his fiancee, Cappy; his children, Lori and Scott; and to all of his friends and relatives.

Mr. KUCINICH

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to rule IX, I rise to a point of personal privilege.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, the critical issue before this Nation today is not Libyan democracy; it is American democracy. In the next hour, I will describe the dangers facing our own democracy. The principles of democracy across the globe are embodied in the U.N. Charter, conceived to end the scourge of war for all time. The hope that nations could turn their swords into plowshares reflects the timeless impulse of humanity for enduring peace and, with it, an enhanced opportunity to pursue happiness. We are not naive about the existence of forces in the world which work against peace and against human security. But it is our fervent wish that we should never become like those whom we condemn as lawless and without scruples, for it is our duty as members of a democratic society to provide leadership by example, to not only articulate the highest standards but to walk down the path to peace and justice with those standards as our constant companions. Our moral leadership in the world depends chiefly upon the might and light of truth and not shock and awe and the ghastly glow of our 2,000-pound bombs. Mr. Speaker, our dear Nation stands at a crossroads. The direction we take will determine not what kind of nation we are but what kind of nation will we become. Will we become a nation which plots in secret to wage war? Will we become a nation which observes our Constitution only in matters of convenience? Will we become a nation which destroys the unity of the world community, which has been painstakingly pieced together from the ruins of World War II, a war which itself followed a war to end all wars? Now, once again, we stand poised at a precipice, forced to the edge by an administration which has thrown caution to the winds and our Constitution to the ground. It is abundantly clear from a careful reading of our Declaration of Independence that our Nation was born from nothing less than the rebellion of the human spirit against the arrogance of power. More than 200 years ago, it was the awareness of the unchecked arrogance of George III that led our Founders to carefully and deliberately balance our Constitution, articulating the rights of Congress in article I as the primary check by our citizens against the dangers they foresaw for our Republic. Our Constitution was derived from the human and political experience of our Founders, who were aware of what happens when one person took it upon himself to assume rights and privileges which placed him above everyone else. ``But where,'' asked Tom Paine in his famous tract ``Common Sense,'' ``is the king of America?'' ``I'll tell you, friend. He reigns above, and doth not make havoc of mankind like the royal of Britain. So far as we approve of monarchy, that in America the law is king; for as in absolute governance the king is law, so in free countries the law ought to be king, and there ought to be no other,'' said Thomas Paine in ``Common Sense.'' The power to declare war is firmly and explicitly vested in the Congress of the United States, under article I, section 8 of the Constitution. That is the law. The law is king. Let us make no mistake about it. Dropping 2,000-pound bombs and unleashing the massive firepower of our Air Force on the capital of a sovereign state is in fact an act of war, and no amount of legal acrobatics can make it otherwise. It is the arrogance of power which former Senator from Arkansas J. William Fulbright saw shrouded in the deceit which carried us into the abyss of another war in Vietnam. My generation was determined that we would never see another Vietnam. It was the awareness of the unchecked power and arrogance of the executive which led Congress to pass the War Powers Act. Congress, through the War Powers Act, provided the executive with an exception to unilaterally respond only when the Nation was in actual or imminent danger to repel sudden attacks. Mr. Speaker, today, we are in a constitutional crisis because we have an administration that has assumed for itself powers to wage war which are neither expressly defined nor implicit in the Constitution nor permitted under the War Powers Act. This is a challenge not just to the administration but to this Congress, itself. A President has no right to wrest that fundamental power from the Congress, and we have no right to cede it to him. We, Members of Congress, can no more absolve a President of his responsibility to obey this profound constitutional mandate than we can absolve ourselves of our failure to rise to the instant challenge to our Constitution that is before us today. We violate our sacred trust to the citizens of the United States and our oath to uphold the Constitution if we surrender this great responsibility and through our inaction acquiesce in another terrible war. We must courageously defend the oath we took to defend the Constitution of the United States or we forfeit our right to participate in representative government. How can we pretend to hold other sovereigns to fundamental legal principles if we do not hold our own Presidents to fundamental legal principles here at home? We are staring not only into the maelstrom of war in Libya; the code of behavior we are establishing sets a precedent for the potential of evermore violent conflicts in Syria, Iran, and the specter of the horrifying chaos of generalized war throughout the Middle East. Our continued occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan makes us more vulnerable, not less vulnerable, to being engulfed in this generalized war. In 2 years, we have moved from President Bush's doctrine of preventive war to President Obama's assertion of the right to go to war without even a pretext of a threat to the Nation. This administration is now asserting the right to go to war because a nation may threaten force against those who have internally taken up arms against it. Keep in mind, our bombs began dropping even before the United Nations International Commission of Inquiry could verify allegations of murder of noncombatant civilians by the Qadhafi regime. The administration deliberately avoided coming to Congress and, furthermore, rejects the principle that Congress has any role in this matter. Yesterday, we learned that the administration would forge ahead with military action even if Congress passed a resolution constraining the mission. This is a clear and arrogant violation of our Constitution. Even a war launched ostensibly for humanitarian reasons is still a war, and only Congress can declare war. Mr. Speaker, we saw in the President's address to the Nation on March 28 how mismatched elements are being hastily stitched together into a new war doctrine. Let's review them: number 1, an executive privilege to wage war; number 2, war based on verbal threats; number 3, humanitarian war; number 4, preemptive war; number 5, unilateral war; number 6, war for regime change; number 7, war against a nation whose government this administration determines to be illegitimate; number 8, war authorized through the U.N. Security Council; number 9, war authorized through NATO and the Arab League; and, finally, war authorized by a rebel group against its despised government. But not a word about coming to the representatives of the people in this, the United States Congress, to make this decision. Mr. Speaker, at this very moment, thousands of sailors and marines are headed to a position off the coast of Libya. The sons and daughters of our constituents willingly put their lives on the line for this country. We owe it to them to challenge a misguided and illegal doctrine which could put their lives in great danger, for we have an obligation to protect our men and women in uniform as they pledge to defend our Nation. This administration's new war doctrine will not lead to peace but to more war, and it will stretch even thinner our military. In 2007, the Center for American Progress released a report on the effects of war in Iraq and Afghanistan and the multiple, multiple deployments of our Armed Forces. The report cited a lack of military readiness. It cited high levels of posttraumatic stress and suicide. The report was released just before President Bush's surge in Iraq, just 1 year after the surge in Afghanistan. And after 8 years of war in Iraq, the President commits an all-volunteer Army to another war of choice. If the criteria for military intervention in another country is government-sponsored violence and instability, overcommitment of our military will be virtually inevitable and, as a result, our national security will be undermined. It is clear that the administration planned a war against Libya at least a month in advance, but why? The President cannot say that Libya is an imminent or actual threat to our Nation. He cannot say that war against Libya is in our vital interests. He cannot say that Libya had the intention or capability of attacking the United States of America. He has not claimed that Libya has weapons of mass destruction to be used against us. We're told that our Nation's role is limited; yet, at the same time, it is being expanded. We've been told that the administration does not favor military regime change, but then they tell us the war cannot end until Qadhafi is no longer the leader. Further, 2 weeks earlier, the President signed a secret order for the CIA to assist the rebels who are trying to oust Qadhafi. We're told that the burdens of war in Libya would be shared by a coalition, but the United States is providing the bulk of the money, the armaments, and the organizational leadership. We know that the war has already cost our Nation upwards of $600 million and we're told that the long-term expenses could go much, much further. We're looking at spending additional billions of dollars in Libya at a time when we can't even take care of our people here at home. We're told that the President has legal authority for this war under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, but this resolution specifically does not authorize any ground elements. Furthermore, the administration exceeded the mandate of the resolution by providing the rebels with air cover. Thus, the war against Libya violated our Constitution and has even violated the very authority which the administration claimed was sufficient to take our country to war. We're told that the Qadhafi regime has been illegitimate for four decades, but we're not told that in 2003 the U.S. dropped sanctions against Libya. We're not told that Qadhafi, in an effort to ingratiate himself with the West in general and with America specifically, accepted a market-based economic program led by the very harsh structural adjustment remedies of the IMF and the World Bank. This led to the wholesale privatization of estate enterprises, contributing to unemployment in Libya rising to over 20 percent. CNN reported on December 19, 2003, that Libya acknowledged having a nuclear program, pledged to destroy weapons of mass destruction, and pledged to allow international inspections. This was a decision which President George W. Bush has praised, saying Qadhafi's actions ``made our country and our world safer.'' We're told that Qadhafi is in breach of the U.N. Security Council resolutions, but now our own Secretary of State is reportedly considering arming the rebels, an act which would be a breach of the United Nations Security Council resolution which established an arms embargo. We are told that we went to war at the request of and with the support of the Arab League. But the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, began asking questions immediately after the imposition of the no-fly zone, stating that what was happening in Libya, ``differs from the aim of imposing a no-fly zone. What we want is the protection of civilians and not the shelling of civilians.'' Ban Ki-moon, the U.N. Secretary-General, has also expressed concern over the protection of civilians, even as allied bombing continued during the international conference on Libya in England this week, stating, ``The U.N. continues to receive deeply disturbing reports about the lack of protection of civilians, including various abuses of human rights by the parties to the conflict.'' He was alluding to possible human rights abuses by Libyan rebel forces. Even the Secretary-General of NATO, an organization which the United States founded and generally controls, expressed concern, saying, ``We are not in Libya to arm people but to protect people.'' So I ask, is this truly a humanitarian intervention? What is humanitarian about providing to one side of the conflict the ability to wage war against the other side of a conflict, which will inevitably trigger a civil war, making all of Libya a graveyard? The administration has told us, incredibly, they don't really know who the rebels are, but they are considering arming them, nonetheless. The fact that they are even thinking about arming these rebels makes one think the administration knows exactly who the rebels are. While a variety of individuals and institutions may comprise the so-called opposition in Libya, in fact, one of the most significant organizations is the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, along with its military arm, the Libyan National Army. It was the National Front's call for opposition to the Qadhafi regime in February which was the catalyst of the conflict which precipitated the humanitarian crisis which is now used to justify our intervention. But I ask, Mr. Speaker, how spontaneous was this rebellion? The Congressional Research Service in 1987 analyzed the Libyan opposition. Here's what the Congressional Research Service wrote: ``Over 20 opposition groups exist outside Libya. The most important in 1987 was the Libyan National Salvation Front, formed in October 1981.'' This National Front ``claimed responsibility for the daring attack on Qadhafi's headquarters at Bab al Aziziyah on May 8, 1984. Although the coup attempt failed and Qadhafi escaped unscathed, dissident groups claimed that some 80 Libyans, Cubans, and East Germans perished.'' Significantly, the CRS cited various sources as early as 1984 which claim, ``The United States Central Intelligence Agency trained and supported the National Front before and after the May 8 operation.'' By October 31, 1996, according to a BBC translation of Al-Hayat, an Arabic journal in London, a Colonel Khalifa Haftar, who is leader of this Libyan National Army, the armed wing of the National Front, was quoted as saying, ``Force is the only effective method for dealing with Qadhafi.'' Now follow me to March 26, 2011. The McClatchy Newspapers reported, ``The new leader of Libya's opposition military left for Libya 2 weeks ago,'' apparently around the same time the President signed the covert operations order. And I am making that observation. The new leader spent the past two decades of his life in Libya? No. In suburban Virginia, where he had no visible means of support. His name, Colonel Khalifa Haftar. One wonders when he planned his trip and who is his travel agency? Congress needs to determine whether the United States, through previous covert support of the armed insurrection, driven by the American-created National Front, potentially helped create the humanitarian crisis that was used to justify military intervention. We need to ask the question. If we really want to understand how our constitutional prerogative for determining war and peace has been preempted by this administration, it is important that Congress fully consider relevant events which may relate directly to the attack on Libya. Consider this, Mr. Speaker: On November 2, 2011, France and Great Britain signed a mutual defense treaty which included joint participation in Southern Mistral, a series of war games outlined in the bilateral agreement and surprisingly documented on a joint military Web site established by France and Great Britain. Southern Mistral involved a long range conventional air attack called Southern Storm against a dictatorship in a fictitious southern country called Southland in response to a pretend attack. The joint military air strike was authorized by a pretend United Nations Security Council resolution. The composite air operations were planned, and this is the war games, for the period of March 21 through 25, 2011. On March 20, 2011, the United States joined France and Great Britain in an air attack against Libya, pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973. So the questions arise, Mr. Speaker, have the scheduled war games simply been postponed, or are they actually under way after months and months of planning under the named of Operation Odyssey Dawn? Were operation forces in Libya informed by the U.S., the U.K. or France about the existence of these war games, which may have encouraged them to actions leading to greater repression and a humanitarian crisis? In short, was this war against Qadhafi's Libya planned, or was it a spontaneous response to the great suffering which Qadhafi was visiting upon his opposition? Congress hasn't even considered this possibility. NATO, which has now taken over enforcement of the no-fly zone, has morphed from an organization which pledged mutual support to defend North Atlantic states from aggression. They've moved from that to military operations reaching from Libya to the Chinese border in Afghanistan. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We need to know, and we need to ask what role French Air Force General Abrial and current supreme allied commander of NATO for transformation may have played in the development of operation Southern Storm and in discussions with the U.S. and the expansion of the U.N. mandate into NATO operations. What has been the role of the U.S. African Command and Central Command in discussions leading up to this conflict? What did the administration know, and when did they know it? The United Nations Security Council process is at risk when its members are not fully informed of all the facts when they authorize a military operation. It is at risk from NATO, which is usurping its mandate, the U.N. mandate, without the specific authorization of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973. Now, the United States pays 25 percent of the military expense of NATO, and NATO may be participating in the expansion in exceeding the U.N. mandate. The United Nations relies not only on moral authority, but on the moral cooperation of its member nations. If America exceeds its legal authority and determines to redefine international law, we journey away from an international moral order and into the amorality of power politics where the rule of force trumps the rule of law. What are the fundamental principles at stake in America today? First and foremost is our system of checks and balances built into the Constitution to ensure that important decisions of state are developed through mutual respect and shared responsibility in order to ensure that collective knowledge, indeed, the collective wisdom of the people is brought to bear. Two former Secretaries of State, James Baker and Warren Christopher, have spoken jointly to the ``importance of meaningful consultation between the President and Congress before the Nation is committed to war.'' Our Nation has an inherent right to defend itself and a solemn obligation to defend the Constitution. From the Gulf of Tonkin in Vietnam to the allegations of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, we've learned from bitter experience that the determination to go to war must be based on verifiable facts carefully considered. Finally, civilian deaths are always to be regretted, but we must understand from our own Civil War more than 150 years ago that nations must resolve their own conflicts and shape their own destiny internally. However horrible these internal conflicts may be, these local conflicts can become even more dreadful if armed intervention in a civil war results in the internationalization of that conflict. The belief that war is inevitable makes of war a self-fulfilling prophecy. The United States, in this new and complex world racked with great movements of masses to transform their own government, must, itself, be open to transformation away from intervention, away from trying to determine the leadership of other nations, away from covert operations to manipulate events, and towards a rendezvous with those great principles of self-determination which gave birth to our Nation. In a world which is interconnected and interdependent, in a world which cries out for human unity, we must call upon the wisdom of our namesake, our Founder, George Washington, to guide us in the days ahead. He said: ``The Constitution vests the power of declaring war in Congress. Therefore, no offensive expedition of importance can be undertaken until after they shall have deliberated upon the subject and authorized such measure.'' Washington, whose portrait faces us every day as we deliberate, also had a wish for the future America. He said: ``My wish is to see this plague of mankind, war, banished from the Earth.'' I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. KUCINICH

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chair, I rise in strong support of the amendment offered by Representatives LaTourette and Costello, which would strike section 903 of the underlying bill. This amendment removes language from the legislation which is unnecessary and destructive, and if it is not removed, would represent a continuation of the sustained attack on employee unions--and by extension, the Middle and Working class--that has been taking place in America. If the language of section 903 passes into law as currently written, it would mean that any railroad or airline worker who does NOT vote in a union representation election would automatically be counted as having voted AGAINST the union. This is an absurd and capricious notion. Last year the National Mediation Board adopted a rule which corrected a flawed implementation of the Railway Labor Act that would have allowed this absurd voting practice. The National Mediation Board rule change ensured that airline and railworker union elections would be subject to the very same democratic principles used in other American elections, by requiring that only the ballots of those who vote be counted. But section 903 of the FAA reauthorization bill repeals the National Mediation Board rule, and for that reason it must be struck. I strongly urge my colleagues to join me in supporting the LaTourette-Costello amendment and reject the backward language of section 903.

Mr. KUCINICH. I thank the gentleman very much. As a Congressman from the Cleveland area, I want to thank the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Graves) for pointing out the importance of making this change so that we can continue to have the air show at the same time that we have these major sporting events going on. What most people may not understand, in Cleveland we have a lake- front airport that is a relatively short distance from our football stadium, and it's also not that far away from our baseball stadium. So it's important for this great event, which is the air show, to be able to get the cooperation from all Federal authorities so that we can proceed with it. This is one of the major events of the end of summer in Cleveland. And we're very proud of the airshow. It's a Cleveland tradition that goes back many, many years. And I would hope to have the support of Members of both sides of the aisle. And I want to thank my good friend for helping to take the initiative on this because I think this is something that, hopefully, we'll all be able to agree on.

Mr. KUCINICH

Mr. KUCINICH. Madam Speaker, we are in the midst of a foreign policy and constitutional crisis. The administration has committed our Nation to a war against Libya in violation of the Constitution of the United States. The administration has said they do not have full information about the rebels they are assisting. But it is clear that for the last 30 years, U.S. intelligence has had a relationship with prominent elements within the Libyan opposition. Further, The New York Times today reports that elements of the opposition may be linked to al Qaeda, and that we are considering arming them. When it comes to the war in Libya, the administration has subverted Congress and the United States Constitution. Tomorrow, I will present to Congress a definitive 1-hour response to the administration's Libyan war in the form of facts and questions. Congress must challenge violations of our constitutional principles relating to war and peace. The critical issue today is not the defense of Libyan democracy but the defense of American democracy.

Mr. KUCINICH

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to recognize the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) Ohio Chapter on the occasion of their Ninth Annual Civil Rights Banquet entitled ``Carrying the Legacy: Advancing with Confidence.'' CAIR is a nationwide, nonprofit organization whose mission is to ``enhance the understanding of Islam, encourage dialogue, protect civil liberties, empower American Muslims and build coalitions that promote justice and mutual understanding.'' For the past nine years, CAIR Ohio has played an instrumental role in helping to bridge the divides between Greater Cleveland's diverse communities. CAIR Ohio's Ninth Annual Banquet will provide a platform for vibrant discourse led by this year's distinguished speakers: Chip Pitts Esq., of Stanford Law School, Oxford University and the Bill of Rights Defense Committee and Kareem Irfan, Esq. President of the Council of Religious Leaders of Metropolitan Chicago. I commend these speakers for their efforts to promote civil liberties and social justice. Mr. Speaker and colleagues, please join me in recognizing the Council on American-Islamic Relations Ohio Chapter for their eight years of outstanding achievement. May their efforts to promote dialogue and create a more inclusive world continue to endure.

Mr. KUCINICH

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to honor the Hotz Cafe, which after 92 years of service is closing their doors. The patrons and loyal customers of this fine establishment will remember the service and memories that the Hotz Cafe offered. Hotz Cafe was founded on the corner of Starkweather Avenue and West 10th Street in 1919 by John Hotz Sr. John, a Russian immigrant, wished to open the cafe to serve as a place of comfort, relaxation and comradery for fellow immigrants and industrial workers. This establishment quickly became a favorite of all the area's workers and was also seen as a home away from home. When the Prohibition Era commenced, the Hotz Cafe continued as a speakeasy and became well known for its famous patrons, such as Ty Cobb, Babe Ruth, Elliot Ness and Franklin Delano Roosevelt. When the Great Depression struck, John Hotz saw an opportunity to assist those who were less fortunate and consistently gave out bread to those families who were downtrodden. The dawn of the 50s ushered in a new era for the Hotz Cafe. John Sr.'s sons, Andrew and Mike took control of their father's business. Andrew strived to ensure that his father's legacy lived on. During this era, the cafe remained a favored place of leisure among the working class. In addition to their devotion to the cafe, the sons' family began to expand. Andrew's wife Betty opened up a beauty salon in 1967 adjacent to the cafe and in 2003 Andrew's son John opened up a pizza parlor in the location that formerly held his mother's beauty salon. Mr. Speaker and colleagues, please join me in honoring the legacy of Hotz Cafe. For over 90 years, this establishment provided the Tremont community with a welcoming and hospitable environment for the community's enjoyment.

Mr. KUCINICH

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in remembrance of Ralph Warren Goehring, a loving husband, father, grandfather and friend. Mr. Goehring's strong passion for education and dedication to hard-work benefited many in the community. Mr. Goehring was raised in Pittsburgh, and graduated from Indiana University of Pennsylvania and Penn State University. He served as a Marine during World War II in the Pacific and was subsequently awarded several medals for his brave service. Mr. Goehring moved to Lorain in 1952 and became a social studies teacher. He taught for 31 years at Lorain High School and Hawthorne Jr. High School in Lorain. He was best known for teaching a special course called ``Problems of Democracy.'' Throughout his career, he also served as a leader for the Lorain Education Association. As an educator and a strong proponent of labor rights, Mr. Goehring led the fight for collective bargaining rights before Ohio passed laws protecting those rights. When the school district fired all the strikers, Goehring reassured his colleagues that the district could not replace 900 workers. Sure enough, with Ralph Goering's strong leadership and perseverance for justice, the workers won their jobs back. As one friend recounted, Ralph ``felt that collective bargaining made things better in Lorain for the students, teachers and district.'' After retiring, Ralph worked with the Internal Revenue Service in Cleveland and he used the skills he learned there to help seniors with their taxes in Lorain. He also served as a retiree executive member of the North Eastern Ohio Education Association, where he worked as an editor for their newsletters. Mr. Goehring is survived by his wife, three children, two grandsons, two step-granddaughters and five step-great-grandchildren. Mr. Speaker and colleagues, please join me in remembering Ralph Warren Goehring, whose legacy of professionalism, service to the community and determination for justice will forever stand as an example of what it means to be a community leader.

Mr. KUCINICH

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in honor and recognition of Parma Park Reformed Church, also known as the ``Church in the Woods,'' which will be closing its doors following fifty years of ministry. The congregation of Parma Park Reformed Church began in 1960. They met in a local grade school until the Church in the Woods was constructed in 1962. Since then, the congregation has been deeply involved in the community. The church offered Bible studies, Alcoholics Anonymous groups, and grief support groups. Community outreach projects included a meal program called ``Pay it Forward'' and a program in which the congregation's children sent gifts and correspondence to military units in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Church in the Woods has also been a popular location for private, intimate wedding ceremonies. At the end of March, Parma Park Reform Church will host its final service. The congregation intends to continue its services through other nearby churches. Mr. Speaker and colleagues, please join me in honoring Parma Park Reform Church. Its presence will be sorely missed; however, I have no doubt that its mission will live on. We need only look to the words written on every Sunday worship bulletin: ``Our Service has ended; our Worship continues.''

Mr. KUCINICH

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in recognition of James J. Gnew, a praiseworthy individual who has devoted his life to upholding the law and defending the lives and wellbeing of the citizens of Cleveland. James' service to others began early in his life. In 1966, James joined the Army to serve his country in Vietnam. After leaving the Army, he joined the Cleveland Police Department, extending his service to the community at large. He was noted for his superb talents as an officer of the law and in 1978 he was chosen to be a part of a high risk tactical division which would eventually become the Cleveland SWAT team. His tenure as a valued member of the SWAT team is filled with numerous achievements. Throughout his career he conducted over 400 high risk operations. One such incident occurred on January 4th, 1984. James led his team in successfully defusing a hostage scenario at Cleveland's Hopkins International Airport. James handled the situation exceptionally well. In recognition of his acts of heroism, he received numerous awards including a Silver Star, 3 Medals of Heroism, a Medal of Valor and the Ohio Tactical Officers Association Lifetime Achievement award. James is also a caring husband and father. He loves his wife Cheryl dearly, and his three children are always in James' thoughts. Mr. Speaker and colleagues, please join me in honoring James J. Gnew, whose life and legacy will always be cherished by the Cleveland community. James has been a diligent and vital asset to the Cleveland community and he will always be honored and remembered by those he serves.

Mr. KUCINICH

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 2 minutes. In the next 2 hours, we are going to demonstrate that the American people oppose this war by a margin of two to one. I will enter into the Record this Washington Post poll that was published on March 15 which says that nearly two-thirds of Americans say the war isn't worth fighting. In the next 2 hours, we are going to demonstrate that we are spending $100 billion per year on this war. There are those who are saying the war could last at least another 10 years. Are we willing to spend another $1 trillion on a war that doesn't have any exit plan, for which there is no timeframe to get out, no endgame, where we haven't defined our mission? The question is not whether we can afford to leave. The question is, can we afford to stay? And I submit we cannot afford to stay. In the next 2 hours, we are going to demonstrate that the counterintelligence strategy of General Petraeus is an abysmal failure, and it needs to be called as such. So I want to conclude this part of my presentation with an article by Thomas Friedman in The New York Times, which says, ``What are we doing spending $110 billion this year supporting corrupt and unpopular regimes in Afghanistan and Pakistan that are almost identical to the governments we are applauding the Arab people for overthrowing?'' [From The Washington Post, Mar. 15, 2011] Poll: Nearly Two-Thirds of Americans Say Afghan War Isn't Worth Fighting (By Scott Wilson and Jon Cohen) Nearly two-thirds of Americans now say the war in Afghanistan is no longer worth fighting, the highest proportion yet opposed to the conflict, according to a new Washington Post-ABC News poll. The finding signals a growing challenge for President Obama as he decides how quickly to pull U.S. forces from the country beginning this summer. After nearly a decade of conflict, political opposition to the battle breaks sharply along partisan lines, with only 19 percent of Democratic respondents and half of Republicans surveyed saying the war continues to be worth fighting. Nearly three-quarters of Americans say Obama should withdraw a ``substantial number'' of combat troops from Afghanistan this summer, the deadline he set to begin pulling out some forces. Only 39 percent of respondents, however, say they expect him to withdraw large numbers. The Post-ABC News poll results come as Gen. David H. Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, prepares to testify before Congress on Tuesday about the course of the war. He is expected to face tough questioning about a conflict that is increasingly unpopular among a broad cross section of Americans. Petraeus will tell Congress that ``things are progressing very well,'' Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said Monday. But because of battlefield gains made by U.S. and coalition forces since last year, Morrell told MSNBC, ``it's going to be heavy and intensive in terms of fighting'' once the winter cold passes. The poll began asking only in 2007 whether the Afghan war is worth fighting, but support has almost certainly never been as low as it is in the most recent survey. The growing opposition presents Obama with a difficult political challenge ahead of his 2012 reelection effort, especially in his pursuit of independent voters. Since Democrats took a beating in last year's midterm elections, Obama has appealed to independents with a middle- of-the-road approach to George W. Bush-era tax cuts and budget negotiations with Republican leaders on Capitol Hil1. He called a news conference last week to express concern about rising gasoline prices, an economically pressing issue for many independent voters. But his approach to the Afghan war has not won over the independents or liberal Democrats who propelled his campaign two years ago, and the most recent Post-ABC News poll reinforces the importance of Republicans as the chief constituency supporting his strategy. The results suggest that the war will be an awkward issue for the president as he looks for ways to end it. Nearly 1,500 U.S. troops have died since the fighting began in 2001. During his 2008 campaign, Obama promised to withdraw American forces from the Iraq war, which he opposed, and devote more resources to the flagging effort in Afghanistan, which he has called an essential front in combating Islamist terrorism targeting the United States. After a months-long strategy review in the fall of 2009, he announced the deployment of an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan--taking the total to more than 100,000--and a July 2011 deadline for the start of their withdrawal. The number of respondents to the Post-ABC News poll who say the war is not worth fighting has risen from 44 percent in late 2009 to 64 percent in the survey conducted last week. Two-thirds of independents hold that position, according to the poll, and nearly 80 percent said Obama should withdraw a ``substantial number'' of troops from Afghanistan this summer. Barely more than a quarter of independents say the war is worth its costs, and for the first time a majority feel ``strongly'' that it is not. Obama, who met with Petraeus on Monday at the White House, has said he will determine the pace of the withdrawal by assessing conditions on the ground. At the same time, U.S. and NATO forces have come under sharp criticism from the Afghan government. Over the weekend, after a NATO bombing killed nine children, Afghan President Hamid Karzai demanded that international troops ``stop their operations in our land,'' a more pointed call than previous ones he has made following such deadly NATO mistakes. The telephone poll was conducted March 10 to 13 among a random national sample of 1,005 adults. Results from the full poll have a margin of sampling error of plus or minus 3.5 percentage points. The survey also asked respondents to assess Obama's performance in managing the political changes sweeping across the Middle East and North Africa. Overall, 45 percent of respondents approve of his handling of the situation, and 44 percent disapprove. In Libya, where Moammar Gaddafi is battling a rebel force seeking to end his 41-year rule, Obama is under increasing pressure to implement a no-fly zone over the country to prevent the Libyan leader from taking back lost territory and to protect civilians from government reprisals. Nearly six in 10 Americans say they would support U.S. participation in a no-fly zone over Libya, the poll found, despite recent warnings from Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates that doing so would be a ``major operation.'' But the survey found that American support dips under 50 percent when it comes to unilateral U.S. action, as Democrats and independents peel away. When told that such a mission would entail U.S. warplanes bombing Libyan antiaircraft positions and ``continuous patrols,'' about a quarter of those initially advocating U.S. participation turn into opponents. After a meeting Monday with Danish Prime Minister Lars Loekke Rasmussen, Obama said, ``We will be continuing to coordinate closely both through NATO as well as the United Nations and other international fora to look at every single option that's available to us in bringing about a better outcome for the Libyan people.'' In general, Americans do not think that the changes in the Middle East and North Africa will prove beneficial to U.S. economic and security interests. More than seven in 10 respondents said demonstrators are interested in building new governments, although not necessarily democratic ones. Almost half of those surveyed view the turmoil as undermining the United States' ability to fight terrorist groups in the region.

Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to insert into the Record a report from the United Nations that says that 2010 was the worst year for civilian casualties in Afghanistan with nearly 3,000 civilians killed. Afghanistan--Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2010 Kabul, Afghanistan, March 2011 Executive Summary The human cost of the armed conflict in Afghanistan grew in 2010. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and UNAMA Human Rights recorded 2,777 civilian deaths in 2010, an increase of 15 per cent compared to 2009. Over the past four years, 8,832 civilians have been killed in the conflict, with civilian deaths increasing each year. The worsening human impact of the conflict reinforces the urgent need for parties to the conflict to do more to protect Afghan civilians, who, in 2010, were killed and injured in their homes and communities in even greater numbers. UNAMA Human Rights and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission urge the Anti-Government Elements and Pro-Government Forces to strengthen civilian protection and fully comply legal obligations to minimize civilian casualties. civilian deaths Of the total number of 2,777 civilians killed in 2010, 2,080 deaths (75 per cent of total civilian deaths) were attributed to Anti-Government Elements, up 28 per cent from 2009. Suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) caused the most civilian deaths, totaling 1,141 deaths (55 per cent of civilian deaths attributed to Anti-Government Elements). The most alarming trend in 2010 was the huge number of civilians assassinated by Anti-Government Elements. Four hundred and sixty two civilians were assassinated representing an increase of more than 105 per cent compared to 2009. Half of all civilian assassinations occurred in southern Afghanistan. Helmand province saw a 588 per cent increase in the number of civilians assassinated by Anti- Government Elements and Kandahar province experienced a 248 per cent increase compared to 2009. Afghan national security and international military forces (Pro-Government Forces) were linked to 440 deaths or 16 per cent of total civilian deaths, a reduction of 26 per cent from 2009. Aerial attacks claimed the largest percentage of civilian deaths caused by Pro-Government Forces in 2010, causing 171 deaths (39 per cent of the total number of civilian deaths attributed to Pro-Government Forces). Notably, there was a 52 per cent decline in civilian deaths from air attacks compared to 2009. Nine per cent of civilian deaths in 2010 could not be attributed to any party to the conflict. I would like to put into the Record a report from the Afghanistan Rights Monitor relating to the number of civilians killed and wounded and displaced. ARM Annual Report Civilian Casualties of War January--December 2010 Kabul, Afghanistan, February 2011 Executive Summary Over nine years after the internationally-celebrated demise of the repressive Taliban regime in Afghanistan, civilian Afghans increasingly suffer from the armed violence and rights violations committed by various internal and external armed actors. More ordinary Afghans were killed and injured in 2010 than a year before. And while US officials dubbed Afghanistan as their longest foreign war, Afghans suffered it for 32 years relentlessly. Almost everything related to the war surged in 2010: the combined numbers of Afghan and foreign forces surpassed 350,000; security incidents mounted to over 100 per week; more fighters from all warring side were killed; and the number of civilian people killed, wounded and displaced hit record levels. Collecting information about every security incident and verifying the often conflicting reports about their impacts on civilian people were extremely difficult and risky. The war was as heatedly fought through propaganda and misinformation as it was in the battlefields thus making independent and impartial war reporting tricky and complex. Despite all the challenges, we spared no efforts in gathering genuine information, facts and figures about the impacts of war on civilian communities. Our resources were limited and we lacked the luxury of strategic/political support from one or another side of the conflict because we stood by our professional integrity. We, however, managed to use our indigenous knowledge and delved into a wealth of local information available in the conflict-affected villages in order to seek more reliable facts about the war. From 1 January to 31 December 2010, at least 2,421 civilian Afghans were killed and over 3,270 were injured in conflict- related security incidents across Afghanistan. This means everyday 6-7 noncombatants were killed and 8-9 were wounded in the war. ARM does not claim that these numbers--although collected and verified to the best of our efforts--are comprehensive and perfect. Actual numbers of the civilian victims of war in 2010 could be higher than what we gathered and present in this report. Unsurprisingly, about 63 percent of the reported civilian deaths and 70 percent of the injuries were attributed to the Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs) (Taliban, Hezb-e-Islami and the Haqqani Group); 21 percent of deaths (512 individuals) and 22 percent of injuries (655) were attributed to US/NATO forces; and 12 percent of deaths (278 individuals) and 7 percent (239) injuries were caused by pro-government Afghan troops and their allied local militia forces. In addition to civilian casualties, hundreds of thousands of people were affected in various ways by the intensified armed violence in Afghanistan in 2010. Tens of thousands of people were forced out of their homes or deprived of healthcare and education services and livelihood opportunities due to the continuation of war in their home areas. In November 2010, ARM was the first organization to voice concerns about the destruction of hundreds of houses, pomegranate trees and orchards in several districts in Kandahar Province by US-led forces as part of their counterinsurgency operations. In January 2011, an Afghan Government delegation reported the damage costs at over US$100 million. In compensation, US/NATO forces have doled out less than $2 million. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are widely considered as the most lethal tools which killed over 690 civilians in 2010. However, as you will read in this report, there is virtually no information about the use of cluster munitions by US/NATO forces. Despite Afghanistan's accession to the international Anti-Cluster Bomb Treaty in 2008, the US military has allegedly maintained stockpiles of cluster munitions in Afghanistan. A second key issue highlighted in this report is the emergence of the irregular armed groups in parts of Afghanistan which are backed by the Afghan Government and its foreign allies. These groups have been deplored as criminal and predatory by many Afghans and have already been accused of severe human rights violations such as child recruitment and sexual abuse. I would like to put into the Record a report from the Congressional Research Service that the war in Afghanistan has cost over $454 billion to date. Introduction: War Funding to Date Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has initiated three military operations: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) covering primarily Afghanistan and other small Global War on Terror (GWOT) operations ranging from the Philippines to Djibouti that began immediately after the 9/11 attacks and continues; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) providing enhanced security for U.S. military bases and other homeland security that was launched in response to the attacks and continues at a modest level; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) that began in the fall of 2002 with the buildup of troops for the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, continued with counter-insurgency and stability operations, and is slated to be renamed Operation New Dawn as U.S. troops focus on an advisory and assistance role. In the ninth year of operations since the 9/11 attacks while troops are being withdrawn in Iraq and increased in Afghanistan, the cost of war continues to be a major issue including the total amount appropriated, the amount for each operation, average monthly spending rates, and the scope and duration of future costs. Information on costs is useful to Congress to assess the FY2010 Supplemental for war costs for the Department of Defense (DOD) and State/USAID, FY2011 war requests, conduct oversight of past war costs, and consider the longer-term costs implications of the buildup of troops in Afghanistan and potential problems in the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. This report analyzes war funding for the Defense Department and tracks funding for USAID and VA Medical funding. Total War Funding by Operation Based on DOD estimates and budget submissions, the cumulative total for funds appropriated from the 9/11 attacks through the FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Acts for DOD, State/USAID and VA for medical costs for the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and enhanced security is $1,121 billion including: $751 billion for Iraq; $336 billion for Afghanistan; $29 billion for enhanced security; and $6 billion unallocated. Of this total, 67% is for Iraq, 30% for Afghanistan, 3% for enhanced security and 1/2% unallocated. Almost all of the funding for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is for Afghanistan. This total includes funding provided in H.R. 4899/P.L. 111- 212, the FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act enacted July 29, 2010. Some 94% of this funding goes to the Department of Defense (DOD) to cover primarily incremental war-related costs, that is, costs that are in addition to DOD's normal peacetime activities. These costs include: military personnel funds to provide special pay for deployed personnel such as hostile fire or separation pay and to cover the additional cost of activating reservists, as well pay for expanding the Army and Marine Corps to reduce stress on troops; Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funds to transport troops and their equipment to Iraq and Afghanistan, conduct military operations, provide in-country support at bases, and repairing war-worn equipment; Procurement funding to cover buying new weapons systems to replace war losses, and upgrade equipment, pay modernization costs associated with expanding and changing the structure of the size of the Army and Marine Corps; Research, Development, Test & Evaluation costs to develop more effective ways to combat war threats such as roadside bombs; Working Capital Funds to cover expanding the size of inventories of spare parts and fuel to provide wartime support; and Military construction primarily to construct facilities in bases in Iraq or Afghanistan or neighboring countries. In addition, the Administration initiated several programs specifically targeted at problems that developed in the Afghan and Iraq wars: Coalition support to cover the logistical costs of allies, primarily Pakistan, conducting counter-terror operations in support of U.S. efforts; Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) providing funds to individual commanders for small reconstruction projects and to pay local militias in Iraq and Afghanistan to counter insurgent or Taliban groups; Afghan Security Forces Fund and the Iraq Security Forces Fund to pay the cost of training, equipping and expanding the size of the Afghan and Iraqi armies and police forces; and Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs) Defeat Fund to develop, buy, and deploy new devices to improve force protection for soldiers against roadside bombs or IEDs. I would like to put into the Record an article by Nobel prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes in the Washington Post that says there is no question the Iraq war added substantially to the Federal debt. [From the Times, Feb. 23, 2008] The Three Trillion Dollar War--The Cost of the Iraq and Afghanistan Conflicts Have Grown to Staggering Proportions (By Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes) The Bush Administration was wrong about the benefits of the war and it was wrong about the costs of the war. The president and his advisers expected a quick, inexpensive conflict. Instead, we have a war that is costing more than anyone could have imagined. The cost of direct US military operations--not even including long-term costs such as taking care of wounded veterans--already exceeds the cost of the 12-year war in Vietnam and is more than double the cost of the Korean War. And, even in the best case scenario, these costs are projected to be almost ten times the cost of the first Gulf War, almost a third more than the cost of the Vietnam War, and twice that of the First World War. The only war in our history which cost more was the Second World War, when 16.3 million U.S. troops fought in a campaign lasting four years, at a total cost (in 2007 dollars, after adjusting for inflation) of about $5 trillion (that's $5 million million, or K2.5 million million). With virtually the entire armed forces committed to fighting the Germans and Japanese, the cost per troop (in today's dollars) was less than $100,000 in 2007 dollars. By contrast, the Iraq war is costing upward of $400,000 per troop. Most Americans have yet to feel these costs. The price in blood has been paid by our voluntary military and by hired contractors. The price in treasure has, in a sense, been financed entirely by borrowing. Taxes have not been raised to pay for it--in fact, taxes on the rich have actually fallen. Deficit spending gives the illusion that the laws of economics can be repealed, that we can have both guns and butter. But of course the laws are not repealed. The costs of the war are real even if they have been deferred, possibly to another generation. Background American voters must choose: more benefits or more defence; $3 trillion budget leaves little for Bush to bank on; MoD forced to cut budget by K1.5bn; they're running our tanks on empty. On the eve of war, there were discussions of the likely costs. Larry Lindsey, President Bush's economic adviser and head of the National Economic Council, suggested that they might reach $200 billion. But this estimate was dismissed as ``baloney'' by the Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld. His deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, suggested that postwar reconstruction could pay for itself through increased oil revenues. Mitch Daniels, the Office of Management and Budget director, and Secretary Rumsfeld estimated the costs in the range of $50 to $60 billion, a portion of which they believed would be financed by other countries. (Adjusting for inflation, in 2007 dollars, they were projecting costs of between $57 and $69 billion.) The tone of the entire administration was cavalier, as if the sums involved were minimal. Even Lindsey, after noting that the war could cost $200 billion, went on to say: ``The successful prosecution of the war would be good for the economy.'' In retrospect, Lindsey grossly underestimated both the costs of the war itself and the costs to the economy. Assuming that Congress approves the rest of the $200 billion war supplemental requested for fiscal year 2008, as this book goes to press Congress will have appropriated a total of over $845 billion for military operations, reconstruction, embassy costs, enhanced security at US bases, and foreign aid programmes in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the fifth year of the war draws to a close, operating costs (spending on the war itself, what you might call ``running expenses'') for 2008 are projected to exceed $12.5 billion a month for Iraq alone, up from $4.4 billion in 2003, and with Afghanistan the total is $16 billion a month. Sixteen billion dollars is equal to the annual budget of the United Nations, or of all but 13 of the US states. Even so, it does not include the $500 billion we already spend per year on the regular expenses of the Defence Department. Nor does it include other hidden expenditures, such as intelligence gathering, or funds mixed in with the budgets of other departments. Because there are so many costs that the Administration does not count, the total cost of the war is higher than the official number. For example, government officials frequently talk about the lives of our soldiers as priceless. But from a cost perspective, these ``priceless'' lives show up on the Pentagon ledger simply as $500,000--the amount paid out to survivors in death benefits and life insurance. After the war began, these were increased from $12,240 to $100,000 (death benefit) and from $250,000 to $400,000 (life insurance). Even these increased amounts are a fraction of what the survivors might have received had these individuals lost their lives in a senseless automobile accident. In areas such as health and safety regulation, the US Government values a life of a young man at the peak of his future earnings capacity in excess of $7 million--far greater than the amount that the military pays in death benefits. Using this figure, the cost of the nearly 4,000 American troops killed in Iraq adds up to some $28 billion. The costs to society are obviously far larger than the numbers that show up on the government's budget. Another example of hidden costs is the understating of U.S. military casualties. The Defense Department's casualty statistics focus on casualties that result from hostile (combat) action--as determined by the military. Yet if a soldier is injured or dies in a night-time vehicle accident, this is officially dubbed ``noncombat related''--even though it may be too unsafe for soldiers to travel during daytime. In fact, the Pentagon keeps two sets of books. The first is the official casualty list posted on the DOD Web site. The second, hard-to-find, set of data is available only on a different website and can be obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. This data shows that the total number of soldiers who have been wounded, injured, or suffered from disease is double the number wounded in combat. Some will argue that a percentage of these noncombat injuries might have happened even if the soldiers were not in Iraq. Our new research shows that the majority of these injuries and illnesses can be tied directly to service in the war. From the unhealthy brew of emergency funding, multiple sets of books, and chronic underestimates of the resources required to prosecute the war, we have attempted to identify how much we have been spending--and how much we will, in the end, likely have to spend. The figure we arrive at is more than $3 trillion. Our calculations are based on conservative assumptions. They are conceptually simple, even if occasionally technically complicated. A $3 trillion figure for the total cost strikes us as judicious, and probably errs on the low side. Needless to say, this number represents the cost only to the United States. It does not reflect the enormous cost to the rest of the world, or to Iraq. From the beginning, the United Kingdom has played a pivotal role--strategic, military, and political--in the Iraq conflict. Militarily, the UK contributed 46,000 troops, 10 per cent of the total. Unsurprisingly, then, the British experience in Iraq has paralleled that of America: rising casualties, increasing operating costs, poor transparency over where the money is going, overstretched military resources, and scandals over the squalid conditions and inadequate medical care for some severely wounded veterans. Before the war, Gordon Brown set aside 1 billion for war spending. As of late 2007, the UK had spent an estimated 7 billion in direct operating expenditures in Iraq and Afghanistan (76 per cent of it in Iraq). This includes money from a supplemental ``special reserve'', plus additional spending from the Ministry of Defense. The special reserve comes on top of the UK's regular defense budget. The British system is particularly opaque: funds from the special reserve are ``drawn down'' by the Ministry of Defense when required, without specific approval by Parliament. As a result, British citizens have little clarity about how much is actually being spent. In addition, the social costs in the UK are similar to those in the U.S.--families who leave jobs to care for wounded soldiers, and diminished quality of life for those thousands left with disabilities. By the same token, there are macroeconomic costs to the UK as there have been to America, though the long-term costs may be less, for two reasons. First, Britain did not have the same policy of fiscal profligacy; and second, until 2005, the United Kingdom was a net oil exporter. We have assumed that British forces in Iraq are reduced to 2,500 this year and remain at that level until 2010. We expect that British forces in Afghanistan will increase slightly, from 7,000 to 8,000 in 2008, and remain stable for three years. The House of Commons Defense Committee has recently found that despite the cut in troop levels, Iraq war costs will increase by 2 per cent this year and personnel costs will decrease by only 5 per cent. Meanwhile, the cost of military operations in Afghanistan is due to rise by 39 per cent. The estimates in our model may be significantly too low if these patterns continue. Based on assumptions set out in our book, the budgetary cost to the UK of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan through 2010 will total more than 18 billion. If we include the social costs, the total impact on the UK will exceed 20 billion. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Barney Frank.

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 10 more seconds. Overall government spending has increased 9 percent from 2008 through 2011, but Afghanistan war spending has increased 25 percent. If you want to save $100 billion, then vote for this resolution. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Filner). (Mr. FILNER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to include in the Record an article on AlterNet by Tom Engelhardt which discusses the open-ended nature of the Afghanistan war. How To Schedule a War: The Incredible Shrinking Withdrawal Date (By Tom Engelhardt) Going, going, gone! You can almost hear the announcer's voice throbbing with excitement, only we're not talking about home runs here, but about the disappearing date on which, for the United States and its military, the Afghan War will officially end. Practically speaking, the answer to when it will be over is: just this side of never. If you take the word of our Afghan War commander, the secretary of defense, and top officials of the Obama administration and NATO, we're not leaving any time soon. As with any clever time traveler, every date that's set always contains a verbal escape hatch into the future. In my 1950s childhood, there was a cheesy (if thrilling) sci-fi flick, The Incredible Shrinking Man, about a fellow who passed through a radioactive cloud in the Pacific Ocean and soon noticed that his suits were too big for him. Next thing you knew, he was living in a doll house, holding off his pet cat, and fighting an ordinary spider transformed into a monster. Finally, he disappeared entirely leaving behind only a sonorous voice to tell us that he had entered a universe where ``the unbelievably small and the unbelievably vast eventually meet, like the closing of a gigantic circle.'' In recent weeks, without a radioactive cloud in sight, the date for serious drawdowns of American troops in Afghanistan has followed a similar path toward the vanishing point and is now threatening to disappear ``over the horizon'' (a place where, we are regularly told, American troops will lurk once they have finally handed their duties over to the Afghan forces they are training). If you remember, back in December 2009 President Obama spoke of July 2011 as a firm date to ``begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan,'' the moment assumedly when the beginning of the end of the war would come into sight. In July of this year, Afghan President Hamid Karzai spoke of 2014 as the date when Afghan security forces ``will be responsible for all military and law enforcement operations throughout our country.'' Administration officials, anxious about the effect that 2011 date was having on an American public grown weary of an unpopular war and on an enemy waiting for us to depart, grabbed Karzai's date and ran with it (leaving many of his caveats about the war the Americans were fighting, particularly his desire to reduce the American presence, in the dust). Now, 2014 is hyped as the new 2011. It has, in fact, been widely reported that Obama officials have been working in concert to ``play down'' the president's 2011 date, while refocusing attention on 2014. In recent weeks, top administration officials have been little short of voluble on the subject. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (``We're not getting out. We're talking about probably a years-long process.''), Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen, attending a security conference in Australia, all ``cited 2014 . . . as the key date for handing over the defense of Afghanistan to the Afghans themselves.'' The New York Times headlined its report on the suddenly prominent change in timing this way: ``U.S. Tweaks Message on Troops in Afghanistan.'' Quite a tweak. Added Times reporter Elisabeth Bumiller: ``The message shift is effectively a victory for the military, which has long said the July 2011 deadline undermined its mission by making Afghans reluctant to work with troops perceived to be leaving shortly.'' Inflection Points and Aspirational Goals Barely had 2014 risen into the headlines, however, before that date, too, began to be chipped away. As a start, it turned out that American planners weren't talking about just any old day in 2014, but its last one. As Lieutenant General William Caldwell, head of the NATO training program for Afghan security forces, put it while holding a Q&A with a group of bloggers, ``They're talking about December 31st, 2014. It's the end of December in 2014 . . . that [Afghan] President Karzai has said they want Afghan security forces in the lead.'' Nor, officials rushed to say, was anyone talking about 2014 as a date for all American troops to head for the exits, just ``combat troops''--and maybe not even all of them. Possibly tens of thousands of trainers and other so-called non-combat forces would stay on to help with the ``transition process.'' This follows the Iraq pattern where 50,000 American troops remain after the departure of U.S. ``combat'' forces to great media fanfare. Richard Holbrooke, Obama's Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, was typical in calling for ``the substantial combat forces [to] be phased out at the end of 2014, four years from now.'' (Note the usual verbal escape hatch, in this case ``substantial,'' lurking in his statement.) Last Saturday, behind ``closed doors'' at a NATO summit in Lisbon, Portugal, Afghan War commander General David Petraeus presented European leaders with a ``phased four-year plan'' to ``wind down American and allied fighting in Afghanistan.'' Not surprisingly, it had the end of 2014 in its sights and the president quickly confirmed that ``transition'' date, even while opening plenty of post-2014 wiggle room. By then, as he described it, ``our footprint'' would only be ``significantly reduced.'' (He also claimed that, post-2014, the U.S. would be maintaining a ``counterterrorism capability'' in Afghanistan--and Iraq--for which ``platforms to . . . execute . . . counterterrorism operations,'' assumedly bases, would be needed.) Meanwhile, unnamed ``senior U.S. officials'' in Lisbon were clearly buttonholing reporters to ``cast doubt on whether the United States, the dominant power in the 28-nation alliance, would end its own combat mission before 2015.'' As always, the usual qualifying phrases were profusely in evidence. Throughout these weeks, the ``tweaking''--that is, the further chipping away at 2014 as a hard and fast date for anything--only continued. Mark Sedwill, NATO's civilian counterpart to U.S. commander General David Petraeus, insisted that 2014 was nothing more than ``an inflection point'' in an ever more drawn-out drawdown process. That process, he insisted, would likely extend to ``2015 and beyond,'' which, of course, put 2016 officially into play. And keep in mind that this is only for combat troops, not those assigned to ``train and support'' or keep ``a strategic over watch'' on Afghan forces. On the eve of NATO's Lisbon meeting, Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell, waxing near poetic, declared 2014 nothing more than an ``aspirational goal,'' rather than an actual deadline. As the conference began, NATO's Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen insisted that the alliance would be committed in Afghanistan ``as long as it takes.'' And new British Chief of the Defense Staff General Sir David Richards suggested that, given the difficulty of ever defeating the Taliban (or al-Qaeda) militarily, NATO should be preparing plans to maintain a role for its troops for the next 30 to 40 years. war extender Here, then, is a brief history of American time in Afghanistan. After all, this isn't our first Afghan War, but our second. The first, the CIA's anti-Soviet jihad (in which the Agency funded a number of the fundamentalist extremists we're now fighting in the second), lasted a decade, from 1980 until 1989 when the Soviets withdrew in defeat. In October 2001, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration launched America's second Afghan War, taking Kabul that November as the Taliban dissolved. The power of the American military to achieve quick and total victory seemed undeniable, even after Osama bin Laden slipped out of Tora Bora that December and escaped into Pakistan's tribal borderlands. However, it evidently never crossed the minds of President Bush's top officials to simply declare victory and get out. Instead, as the U.S. would do in Iraq after the invasion of 2003, the Pentagon started building a new infrastructure of military bases (in this case, on the ruins of the old Soviet base infrastructure). At the same time, the former Cold Warriors in Washington let their dreams about pushing the former commies of the former Soviet Union out of the former soviet socialist republics of Central Asia, places where, everyone knew, you could just about swim in black gold and run geopolitically wild. Then, when the invasion of Iraq was launched in March 2003, Afghanistan, still a ``war'' (if barely) was forgotten, while the Taliban returned to the field, built up their strength, and launched an insurgency that has only gained momentum to this moment. In 2008, before leaving office, George W. Bush bumped his favorite general, Iraq surge commander Petraeus, upstairs to become the head of the Central Command which oversees America's war zones in the Greater Middle East, including Afghanistan. Already the guru of counterinsurgency (known familiarly as COIN), Petraeus had, in 2006, overseen the production of the military's new war-fighting bible, a how-to manual dusted off from the Vietnam era's failed version of COIN and made new and magical again. In June 2010, eight and a half years into our Second Afghan War, at President Obama's request, Petraeus took over as Afghan War commander. It was clear then that time was short--with an administration review of Afghan war strategy coming up at year's end and results needed quickly. The American war was also in terrible shape. In the new COIN-ish U.S. Army, however, it is a dogma of almost biblical faith that counterinsurgencies don't produce quick results; that, to be successful, they must be pursued for years on end. As Petraeus put it back in 2007 when talking about Iraq, ``[T]ypically, I think historically, counterinsurgency operations have gone at least nine or 10 years.'' Recently, in an interview with Martha Raddatz of ABC News, he made a nod toward exactly the same timeframe for Afghanistan, one accepted as bedrock knowledge in the world of the COINistas. What this meant was that, whether as CENTCOM commander or Afghan War commander, Petraeus was looking for two potentially contradictory results at the same time. Somehow, he needed to wrest those nine to 10 years of war-fighting from a president looking for a tighter schedule and, in a war going terribly sour, he needed almost instant evidence of ``progress'' that would fit the president's coming December ``review'' of the war and might pacify unhappy publics in the U.S. and Europe. Now let's do the math. At the moment, depending on how you care to count, we are in the 10th year of our second Afghan War or the 20th year of war interruptus. Since June 2009, Petraeus and various helpers have stretched the schedule to 2014 for (most) American combat troops and at least 2015 or 2016 for the rest. If you were to start counting from the president's December surge address, that's potentially seven more years. In other words, we're now talking about either a 15-year war or an on-and-off again quarter-century one. All evidence shows that the Pentagon's war planners would like to extend those already vague dates even further into the future. On Ticking Clocks in Washington and Kabul Up to now, only one of General Petraeus's two campaigns has been under discussion here: the other one, fought out these last years not in Afghanistan, but in Washington and NATO capitals, over how to schedule a war. Think of it as the war for a free hand in determining how long the Afghan War is to be fought. It has been run from General Petraeus's headquarters in Kabul, the giant five-sided military headquarters on the Potomac presided over by Secretary of Defense Gates, and various think-tanks filled with America's militarized intelligentsia scattered around Washington--and it has proven a classically successful ``clear, hold, build'' counterinsurgency operation. Pacification in Washington and a number of European capitals has occurred with remarkably few casualties. (Former Afghan war commander General Stanley McChrystal, axed by the president for insubordination, has been the exception, not the rule.) Slowly but decisively, Petraeus and company constricted President Obama's war-planning choices to two options: more and yet more. In late 2009, the president agreed to that second surge of troops (the first had been announced that March), not to speak of CIA agents, drones, private contractors, and State Department and other civilian government employees. In his December ``surge'' address at West Point (for the nation but visibly to the military), Obama had the temerity as commander-in-chief to name a specific, soon-to-arrive date--July 2011--for beginning a serious troop drawdown. It was then that the COIN campaign in Washington ramped up into high gear with the goal of driving the prospective end of the war back by years. It took bare hours after the president's address for administration officials to begin leaking to media sources that his drawdown would be ``conditions based''--a phrase guaranteed to suck the meaning out of any deadline. (The president had indeed acknowledged in his address that his administration would take into account ``conditions on the ground.'') Soon, the Secretary of Defense and others took to the airwaves in a months-long campaign emphasizing that drawdown in Afghanistan didn't really mean drawdown, that leaving by no means meant leaving, and that the future was endlessly open to interpretation. With the ratification in Lisbon of that 2014 date ``and beyond,'' the political clocks--an image General Petraeus loves--in Washington, European capitals, and American Kabul are now ticking more or less in unison. Two other ``clocks'' are, however, ticking more like bombs. If counterinsurgency is a hearts and minds campaign, then the other target of General Petraeus's first COIN campaign has been the restive hearts and minds of the American and European publics. Last year a Dutch government fell over popular opposition to Afghanistan and, even as NATO met last weekend, thousands of antiwar protestors marched in London and Lisbon. Europeans generally want out and their governments know it, but (as has been true since 1945) the continent's leaders have no idea how to say ``no'' to Washington. In the U.S., too, the Afghan war grows ever more unpopular, and while it was forgotten during the election season, no politician should count on that phenomenon lasting forever. And then, of course, there's the literal ticking bomb, the actual war in Afghanistan. In that campaign, despite a drumbeat of American/NATO publicity about ``progress,'' the news has been grim indeed. American and NATO casualties have been higher this year than at any other moment in the war; the Taliban seems if anything more entrenched in more parts of the country; the Afghan public, ever more puzzled and less happy with foreign troops and contractors traipsing across the land; and Hamid Karzai, the president of the country, sensing a situation gone truly sour, has been regularly challenging the way General Petraeus is fighting the war in his country. (The nerve!) No less unsettling, General Petraeus himself has seemed unnerved. He was declared ``irked'' by Karzai's comments and was said to have warned Afghan officials that their president's criticism might be making his ``own position `untenable,' '' which was taken as a resignation threat. Meanwhile, the COIN-meister was in the process of imposing a new battle plan on Afghanistan that leaves counterinsurgency (at least as usually described) in a roadside ditch. No more is the byword ``protect the people,'' or ``clear, hold, build''; now, it's smash, kill, destroy. The war commander has loosed American firepower in a major way in the Taliban strongholds of southern Afghanistan. Early this year, then-commander McChrystal had significantly cut back on U.S. air strikes as a COIN-ish measure meant to lessen civilian casualties. No longer. In a striking reversal, air power has been called in--and in a big way. In October, U.S. planes launched missiles or bombs on 1,000 separate Afghan missions, numbers seldom seen since the 2001 invasion. The Army has similarly loosed its massively powerful High Mobility Artillery Rocket System in the area around the southern city of Kandahar. Civilian deaths are rising rapidly.

Mr. KUCINICH. Further parliamentary inquiry. Does the Chair have the ability to direct individual Members that they are to give their closing statements?

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you, Mr. Speaker. We've stated over and over in this debate the cost of this war in this budget alone will be over $113 billion--$113 billion. There are Members who have come to this floor trying to whack a billion dollars in spending here and there. This is $113 billion. You want to cut out waste, let's get out of Afghanistan. Keep in mind that when you go to the Pentagon, and some of our Members have, and have gone to Afghanistan, there's an open-ended war going on here. There's no end in sight. I've submitted for the Record articles with respect to that. Hear this: We're going to be there through at least 2020. And that's going to cost us an extra, at least an extra trillion dollars. Where are we going to get that money? Are we going to cut Social Security for that? Are we going to cut health care and cut funds for education? Are we going to cut more funds for home heating aid? Where are we going to get this money? Are we ready to give up our entire domestic agenda so that we can continue on the path of a war to prop up a corrupt regime whose friends are building villas in Dubai, presumably with money that comes through the United States that's shipped out in planes out of the Kabul airport? We have to start standing up for America here. I appreciate and respect every Member of this Congress who served in the military. We honor them, just as I honor the members of my own family; my father, Frank, who was a World War II veteran; my brother Frank, who was a Vietnam veteran; my brother Gary, a Vietnam-era veteran; my sister Beth Ann, an Army veteran. I come from a family that appreciates service to our country. But how are we serving our troops by letting them in a situation that is absolutely impossible, whether it's greater numbers of them returning home with injuries from IEDs. How are we serving our troops by telling them we're going to keep extending the period of the war? Who's speaking up truly for our troops here? Is it General Petraeus, who says, Well, we'll just keep the war going and maybe--maybe--we'll send 2,000 troops out of Afghanistan or redirect them by 2014. He doesn't get to make the choice. That choice must be made by the Congress of the United States. It's time that we started to stand up for the Constitution of the United States, which, last I checked, in Article I, section 8 provides that Congress has to make the decision whether or not to send our troops into war. We have not the right to give that over to a President, over to a general, or anybody else. It's our prerogative inside this Congress. In 2001, Mr. Speaker, I joined with Members of this House in voting for the authorization of military force following the terrorist attacks on 9/11. I don't take a backseat to anyone in standing up to defend this country. But as the United States continues in what is now the longest war in our history, it has become clear that the authorization for military force is being used as a carte blanche for circumventing Congress' role as a coequal branch of government. I want you to hear this. We're a coequal branch of government. We're not lap dogs for the President. We're not servants of generals. We are a coequal branch of government expressing the sovereign will of the American people. It has become clear this administration, just as the last administration, is willing to commit us to an endless war and an endless stream of money, just a year after a commitment of an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan and continued assurances of ``progress.'' They have been walking that dog down the road for the last 7 years. Progress. My legislation invokes the War Powers Resolution of 1973, and if enacted, would require this President to withdraw U.S. Armed Forces out of Afghanistan by December 31, 2011. Regardless of your support or opposition to the war in Afghanistan, this debate has been a critical opportunity to evaluate the human and the economic cost as this Congress works to address our country's dire financial straits. Those of us that supported the withdrawal may not agree on a timeline, but an increasing number of us agree it's time to think and rethink our current national security strategy. And we have to know the costs are great. We can't get away from the costs of this war. Nobel Prize-winning economist Joe Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes, his associate, wrote a book about the Iraq war. They projected then a minimum of $3 trillion in costs. I would like to include in the Record, Mr. Speaker, a statement that I made over 8 years ago at the beginning of the Iraq war, where I pointed out there was nothing--no reason why we should be going to war in Iraq because there was no proof that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. I mention that in terms of this debate because we're at the confluence of the events--the anniversary of the Iraq war; the confluence of the funding of the war in Afghanistan. We've got to get out of Afghanistan. We've got to get out of Iraq. We've got to start taking care of things here at home. Analysis of Joint Resolution on Iraq by Dennis J. Kucinich Washington, Oct 2, 2002.--Whereas in 1990 in response to Iraq's war of aggression against and illegal occupation of Kuwait, the United States forged a coalition of nations to liberate Kuwait and its people in order to defend the national security of the United States and enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq; KEY ISSUE: In the Persian Gulf war there was an international coalition. World support was for protecting Kuwait. There is no world support for invading Iraq. Whereas after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Iraq entered into a United Nations sponsored cease-fire agreement pursuant to which Iraq unequivocally agreed, among other things, to eliminate its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs and the means to deliver and develop them, and to end its support for international terrorism; Whereas the efforts of international weapons inspectors, United States intelligence agencies, and Iraqi defectors led to the discovery that Iraq had large stockpiles of chemical weapons and a large scale biological weapons program, and that Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program that was much closer to producing a nuclear weapon than intelligence reporting had previously indicated; KEY ISSUE: UN inspection teams identified and destroyed nearly all such weapons. A lead inspector, Scott Ritter, said that he believes that nearly all other weapons not found were destroyed in the Gulf War. Furthermore, according to a published report in the Washington Post, the Central Intelligence Agency has no up to date accurate report on Iraq's WMD capabilities. Whereas Iraq, in direct and flagrant violation of the cease-fire, attempted to thwart the efforts of weapons inspectors to identify and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and development capabilities, which finally resulted in the withdrawal of inspectors from Iraq on October 31, 1998; KEY ISSUES: Iraqi deceptions always failed. The inspectors always figured out what Iraq was doing. It was the United States that withdrew from the inspections in 1998. And the United States then launched a cruise missile attack against Iraq 48 hours after the inspectors left. In advanced of a military strike, the US continues to thward (the Administration's word) weapons inspections. Whereas in 1998 Congress concluded that Iraq's continuing weapons of mass destruction programs threatened vital United States interests and international peace and security, declared Iraq to be in ``material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations'' and urged the President ``to take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations'' (Public Law 105-235); Whereas Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security of the United States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region and remains in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, among other things, continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations; KEY ISSUES: There is no proof that Iraq represents an imminent or immediate threat to the United States. A ``continuing'' threat does not constitute a sufficient cause for war. The Administration has refused to provide the Congress with credible intelligence that proves that Iraq is a serious threat to the United States and is continuing to possess and develop chemical and biological and nuclear weapons. Furthermore there is no credible intelligence connecting Iraq to Al Qaida and 9/11. Whereas Iraq persists in violating resolutions of the United Nations Security Council by continuing to engage in brutal repression of its civilian population thereby threatening international peace and security in the region, by refusing to release, repatriate, or account for non-Iraqi citizens wrongfully detained by Iraq, including an American serviceman, and by failing to return property wrongfully seized by Iraq from Kuwait; KEY ISSUE: This language is so broad that it would allow the President to order an attack against Iraq even when there is no material threat to the United States. Since this resolution authorizes the use of force for all Iraq related violations of the UN Security Council directives, and since the resolution cites Iraq's imprisonment of non-Iraqi prisoners, this resolution would authorize the President to attack Iraq in order to liberate Kuwaiti citizens who may or may not be in Iraqi prisons, even if Iraq met compliance with all requests to destroy any weapons of mass destruction. Though in 2002 at the Arab Summit, Iraq and Kuwait agreed to bilateral negotiations to work out all claims relating to stolen property and prisoners of war. This use-of-force resolution enables the President to commit U.S.046 troops to recover Kuwaiti property. Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against other nations and its own people; Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its continuing hostility toward, and willingness to attack, the United States, including by attempting in 1993 to assassinate former President Bush and by firing on many thousands of occasions on United States and Coalition Armed Forces engaged in enforcing the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council; KEY ISSUE: The Iraqi regime has never attacked nor does it have the capability to attack the United States. The ``no fly'' zone was not the result of a UN Security Council directive. It was illegally imposed by the United States, Great Britain and France and is not specifically sanctioned by any Security Council resolution. Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq; KEY ISSUE: There is no credible intelligence that connects Iraq to the events of 9/11 or to participation in those events by assisting Al Qaida. Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of American citizens; KEY ISSUE: Any connection between Iraq support of terrorist groups in Middle East, is an argument for focusing great resources on resolving the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. It is not sufficient reason for the U.S. to launch a unilateral preemptive strike against Iraq. Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 underscored the gravity of the threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by international terrorist organizations; KEY ISSUE: There is no connection between Iraq and the events of 9/11. Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction, the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine to justify action by the United States to defend itself; KEY ISSUE: There is no credible evidence that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction. If Iraq has successfully concealed the production of such weapons since 1998, there is no credible evidence that Iraq has the capability to reach the United States with such weapons. In the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq had a demonstrated capability of biological and chemical weapons, but did not have the willingness to use them against the United States Armed Forces. Congress has not been provided with any credible information, which proves that Iraq has provided international terrorists with weapons of mass destruction. Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 authorizes the use of all necessary means to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 and subsequent relevant resolutions and to compel Iraq to cease certain activities that threaten international peace and security, including the development of weapons of mass destruction and refusal or obstruction of United Nations weapons inspections in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, repression of its civilian population in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, and threatening its neighbors or United Nations operations in Iraq in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 949; KEY ISSUE: The UN Charter forbids all member nations, including the United States, from unilaterally enforcing UN resolutions. Whereas Congress in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) has authorized the President ``to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677''; KEY ISSUE: The UN Charter forbids all member nations, including the United States, from unilaterally enforcing UN resolutions with military force. Whereas in December 1991, Congress expressed its sense that it ``supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization of Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1),'' that Iraq's repression of its civilian population violates United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 and ``constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region,'' and that Congress, ``supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688''; KEY ISSUE: This clause demonstrates the proper chronology of the international process, and contrasts the current march to war. In 1991, the UN Security Council passed a resolution asking for enforcement of its resolution. Member countries authorized their troops to participate in a UN-led coalition to enforce the UN resolutions. Now the President is asking Congress to authorize a unilateral first strike before the UN Security Council had asked its member states to enforce UN resolutions. Whereas the Iraq Liberation Act (Public Law 105-338) expressed the sense of Congress that it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove from power the current Iraqi regime and promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime; KEY ISSUE: This ``Sense of Congress'' resolution was not binding. Furthermore, while Congress supported democratic means of removing Saddam Hussein it clearly did not endorse the use of force contemplated in this resolution, nor did it endorse assassination as a policy. Whereas on September 12, 2002, President Bush committed the United States to ``work with the United Nations Security Council to meet our common challenge'' posed by Iraq and to ``work for the necessary resolutions,'' while also making clear that ``the Security Council resolutions will be enforced, and the just demands of peace and security will be met, or action will be unavoidable''; Whereas the United States is determined to prosecute the war on terrorism and Iraq's ongoing support for international terrorist groups combined with its development of weapons of mass destruction in direct violation of its obligations under the 1991 cease-fire and other United Nations Security Council resolutions make clear that it is in the national security interests of the United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions be enforced, including through the use of force if necessary; KEY ISSUE: Unilateral action against Iraq will cost the United States the support of the world community, adversely affecting the war on terrorism. No credible intelligence exists which connects Iraq to the events of 9/11 or to those terrorists who perpetrated 9/11. Under international law, the United States does not have the authority to unilaterally order military action to enforce UN Security Council resolutions. Whereas Congress has taken steps to pursue vigorously the war on terrorism through the provision of authorities and funding requested by the President to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations or persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 or harbored such persons or organizations; KEY ISSUE: The Administration has not provided Congress with any proof that Iraq is in any way connected to the events of 9/11. Whereas the President and Congress are determined to continue to take all appropriate actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations or persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations; KEY ISSUE: The Administration has not provided Congress with any proof that Iraq is in any way connected to the events of 9/11. Furthermore, there is no credible evidence that Iraq has harbored those who were responsible for planning, authorizing or committing the attacks of 9/11. Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to take action in order to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States, as Congress recognized in the joint resolution on Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40); and KEY ISSUE: This resolution was specific to 9/11. It was limited to a response to 9/11. Whereas it is in the national security of the United States to restore international peace and security to the Persian Gulf region; KEY ISSUE: If by the ``national security interests'' of the United States, the Administration means oil, it ought to communicate such to the Congress. A unilateral attack on Iraq by the United States will cause instability and chaos in the region and sow the seeds of future conflicts all over the world.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Jones) be allowed to control half of my time.

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Woolsey).

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record a report from the Afghanistan Study Group that says that the current U.S. military effort is helping to fuel the very insurgency we are attempting to defeat.

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.

Mr. KUCINICH. May I ask, Mr. Speaker, how much time each group has remaining.

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 1 minute. Mr. Speaker, Members of this House are talking about cutting $100 billion from the budget. Well, we can trim the Federal budget of more than $100 billion in out-of-control spending. Members have been very concerned about out-of-control spending. They are calling for a reduction in the Federal budget. Cutting spending on the war in Afghanistan would solve their concerns. Spending on the war is greater than the minimum amount of Federal spending certain Members believe must be cut from the budget for fiscal responsibility. In the fiscal year 2012 budget request, the President has requested $113.4 billion to continue the war. In fact, congressional appropriations of over $100 billion for the Afghanistan war has been the rule in recent years; and as we've seen, there is talk of extending this war for another 10 years. $1 trillion, perhaps? Spending on the Afghanistan war has increased much faster than overall government spending in recent years. Consider a comparison of the average annual rates of growth of government spending versus the Afghanistan war spending from 2008 through 2011.

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Lewis).

Mr. KUCINICH

Mr. KUCINICH. We need to go back to basic principles here. In 1934, when the Federal Communications Act was passed, people were given broadcast licenses to serve in the public interest, convenience, and necessity. The public owns the airwaves. In a country that wasn't run by corporations, we wouldn't be having this debate because the public has the inherent right to ownership of the airwaves. Theoretically, it should all be public radio, but it's not. There's just a small segment now of the airwaves we're talking about here. And this bill would stop that from being funded. It is absolutely unimaginable that Members of Congress are not aware of the history of how broadcast radio and TV came into being. This isn't about private ownership of the airwaves. This is about a basic public right; and if you take that right away, what you've done is totally capitulate to corporations in America. Protect NPR.