Jon Kyl

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. The Senator has mischaracterized what I said. I pointed out a couple of instances in which these items got into the wrong hands in the past. But under the previous law, we had the ability to pull them back. I did cite some examples. We would not have that authority under the legislation as the Senator has written it. Moreover, I am perfectly aware that many of these items would not necessarily be mass marketed. Yet every one of them would be subject to the definition of availability, foreign availability, or U.S. availability. That is precisely why I picked these items because under any reasonable definition, you would have to say, yes, those are available someplace. Now, if the Senator is telling me some of those look serious and I don't think we would want to consider them available, then I say we have to be more careful about how we draft this legislation. On that point I agree with the Senator, but as to the first point, the Senator raised the suggestion--I heard it made several times: The President has the authority to waive this. No, the President does not have the authority to waive this. The authority is very constricted. The President, and only the President--as if he did not have anything else to do--can three times for 6 months only, for a total of 18 months, waive the applicability of that section.

Mr. KYL. Does my colleague want an answer to his question?

Mr. KYL. First of all----

Mr. KYL. I answer the Senator that I am aware that the items are not automatically decontrolled. But by virtue of what I talked about before--and I think the Senator was here--because of availability for commercial purposes, the items will also be available under the dual technology regime that is contemplated by the legislation.

Mr. KYL. But it is not.

Mr. KYL. Yes. Is China defined as a rogue state in the legislation?

Mr. KYL. Yes.

Mr. KYL. I appreciate the question being reasked by the Senator from South Dakota, and my answer is as I indicated and as I will continue to demonstrate in my remarks. I think it would be a mistake for us to take the position on either side that this is an all-or-nothing proposition. It is not. I respect, for example, the work of Senator Enzi from Wyoming, a member of the Banking Committee, who has worked very hard on this issue, and in good faith, and his chairman, Senator Gramm. There is no one in this body for whom I have greater respect than Senator Gramm, the chairman of the committee. Because they are putting this legislation forward at this time, and some other Senators disagree on national security grounds as to whether it is exactly the right bill to be passing at this time, I would think it absolutely appalling that anyone would question in any way their commitment to national security because that would simply be wrong. By the same token, it would be wrong for anyone to question the sincerity or the knowledge of those who may oppose every jot and tittle of this legislation on the grounds that they are somehow either not in synchronization with the administration, not in favor of free trade, or somehow caught in cold war legislation, or something of that sort. Anytime you get that kind of personal suggestion in a debate, it lowers the tone of the debate and is not productive to a rational and constructive solution to the problem. What is the problem? We need to reauthorize the law in a way that properly melds both the trade and national security ramifications. There are those in this body with a great deal of expertise in national security matters who have come to the conclusion that the bill that came out of the Banking Committee would in some respects be inimical to national security and have asked for an opportunity, a greater opportunity, to try to work out some of the differences they have with the sponsors of the bill. These are not people without expertise. We are talking about committee chairmen of every committee in this body that has jurisdiction over national security matters; specifically, Senator John Warner, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, who I believe is going to be here within the hour to speak to the issue; Senator Shelby, who is chairman of the Intelligence Committee on which I sit; Senator Thompson, who chairs the Governmental Affairs Committee, the committee that had the jurisdiction to look into Chinese espionage and other matters; Senator McCain, chairman of the Commerce Committee and also a member of the Armed Services Committee; and Senator Helms, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. All of these Senators have extensive experience in matters relating to our national security. I have not added up the combined years of wisdom represented by them, but it is not inconsiderable. They have all raised a red flag. None of them has said they are opposed to reauthorization of an Export Administration Act. All of them assume we are going to do this. But all would like to do so in a way that accommodates both interests. These Senators simply are not of the view that we have had the opportunity to do that yet. I spoke to the issue of timing a moment ago. There is another reason I think it is unfortunate that the legislation is brought up right now. Not only is it not critical that it be done this week or even this month, I am fearful that having this kind of debate at this time could very well send the wrong signal to China. China is very much in the news today. It holds our reconnaissance aircraft. It improperly held American crewmen for 11 days. Its pilot wrongly and accidentally endangered the lives of our crew members, in the process of which he lost his own life. China has been making extraordinarily belligerent comments in recent months. It has continued to hold and has arrested people, some of whom are U.S. citizens or relatives of U.S. citizens, without much explanation, and it has acted very negatively to the U.S. response to these actions. This is all in the context of a buildup of military might across from Taiwan, accompanied by threats that if Taiwan does not negotiate its return as a province to mainland China, there is a possibility that China would use force against Taiwan to achieve that reunification. This is all quite troubling, and it is a circumstance that requires great care on the part of the United States. We want to live in peace with China. We expect we are going to be able to do that for decades and decades. We would like very much to have good trading relationships with China. But we also understand that there are some tensions in our relationship. Part of the reason for these tensions is, I suspect, misunderstanding between the leaders of our two countries--misunderstandings, frankly, between the peoples of our two countries. It is frequently said we just do not understand the Chinese well enough and we do not deal with them very well as a result. I suspect the converse is true as well. So there is a great deal of talk about sending messages. I think it is important for us not to send the wrong messages. I think in this regard the President was masterful in his handling of what was a serious crisis. A country was improperly holding U.S. citizens. The President, in a very understated but very firm way, was able to effect the return of our people and I hope not send any negative messages and in fact send some pretty positive messages, at least designed to elicit cooperation from China. He was very sensitive, in other words, to the notion of what kind of messages were being sent. He sent another message when he decided to sell defensive arms to Taiwan--arms necessary for Taiwan's defense in the face of an attack by the PRC. That has grated on the PRC. And they reacted publicly to it. But he was very candid and clear about obligations of the United States in this regard. Again, he sent the right message: We mean you no harm. Obviously, we want to avoid conflict. The best way to do that is to ensure that Taiwan can defend itself because, obviously, we wouldn't want the PRC to be tempted to engage in any kind of belligerent activity toward Taiwan. Messages that are sent are very important. My fear is that by acting on this legislation at this time, whatever we end up doing, we are going to end up sending the wrong message. To the extent that this debate boils down to a question of whether or not those who are in favor of enhancing trade prevail over those who are involved in trying to preserve our national security--a very false dichotomy--but to the extent that is the way it is played--and it will be played that way by the media--we send a very bad message to our friends in China. It is a message that trade trumps national security. That is wrong. It would be an incorrect interpretation. But that is a message that I guarantee you will be in the headlines and in the papers to the extent that people pay attention to this debate. I am trying to bend over backwards not to characterize it that way. The people who are sponsoring this bill are very interested in national security, and they believe they have crafted a bill that meets national security requirements, as does the administration. There are others who very much believe in free trade and expanding our trade with China but who believe there are additional changes that need to be effected in this legislation and that it can best be done before the bill is brought to the floor for the amendment process. It will be a wrong message, but it will be, nonetheless, a message that will be delivered, and I guarantee you that the longer this debate goes on the more of us are going to be called by the talk shows. They are going to call, for example, the Senator from Wyoming and myself. They are going to say: Will the two of you debate trade versus national security? Both of us are going to say that we really do not want to debate this issue in those terms because that is a false dichotomy. But that is the way it is going to be interpreted. It would be the wrong message at this crucial time in our sensitive relations with China. China represents only something like 1 percent of our trade and much less than that relates to dual technology. In some sense, this whole question about what kind of export controls to put on dual technology items is much overblown. It is not nearly as important as a lot of people would have us believe. We are not talking about an amount of trade that is going to affect the U.S. economy, or even any specific segment of our economy. We are talking about a very small number of items. I happen to agree with the authors of the bill that there are many items that can be decontrolled. That is the word we use. It is now possible because of the evolution in technology to take items that were at one time deemed to be sophisticated off the list because they are simply no longer state of the art, and they are no longer all that useful if applied to military weaponry. That is one of the features of the bill that I think is good. I think we all agree with that. But I also think it would be a big mistake to assume that just because the cold war is over there is no longer any concern or shouldn't be any concern on our part and any justification on national security grounds for controlling the exports of technologies which have dual uses; that is to say, both civilian uses and military uses. It would be just as wrong to characterize the proponents of this legislation as believing in that. There is a middle ground. I think one of the problems with the legislation that has not been adequately addressed is the fact that a new regime has been introduced. The regime is that if these items are readily available, either domestically or on the foreign market, then they are no longer subject to the same kinds of stringent controls that they were before. That something has a dual application to both civilian use and military use, by definition virtually everything that we are concerned about will, therefore, have applicability because it will be available either in the United States or on the foreign market for civilian uses, and, therefore, for military uses as well. That is the definition of dual-use technology, and that is the concern we have. The mere fact that something is available to be purchased in the United States or abroad for civilian purposes doesn't necessarily mean we should forget about any kind of restrictions with respect to its export, irrespective of whether its export might result in its use in military equipment that could be used against the United States. It doesn't mean that at all. Yet because of provisions of this bill, it is going to be very difficult to regulate the export of items which one can argue are available either in the United States or abroad. Why is that argument so important? When it comes to U.S. military equipment, we have always had superior technology, and while it is possible that a particular item might be available in another country--I am just speaking hypothetically. But let's say the French manufacture it, the Israelis manufacture it, and maybe the Germans manufacture it as well as the United States. It doesn't necessarily stand true that all of those items are equal and that purchasers of those items are indiscriminate with respect to from whom they buy it. If that were the case, it wouldn't much matter unless the U.S. products were a whole lot cheaper. These other countries are going to be able to export their products, in any event. The truth is that in most cases, even when U.S. products are more expensive--in some cases much more expensive--they are the items that are sought because other countries understand that for various reasons the U.S. product is superior. Some of these products have intelligence components associated with them. They know that in certain cases other countries have certain capabilities with respect to that equipment that makes their use suspect. Not so with the United States. They know they can buy these products from the United States and have no worry about being compromised through their use. They cannot be so sure with respect to the very same item that they might buy from someone else. Just because an item is available someplace else doesn't necessarily mean that it is comparable, or that the United States should allow our product to be exported even when we know that its use will be embedded in military equipment and it could be used against the United States in the future. That is part of the problem. While the legislation itself grants to the President, and only the President, the ability to waive certain of these requirements, even the President is limited. He can only do it three times. He can only do it for 6 months at a time, and after 18 months even he can't control the item or require an export license for it. There are some significant concerns that I think we have to be aware of before we just necessarily assume that because we are all for free trade--and most of us are for free trade--therefore, we ought to adopt this legislation. The very fact that the President just this week announced the arms sales to Taiwan because of the threat that China poses to Taiwan should give us some pause. China is the same country which bought fiberoptic- cable technology items from American companies and then was found to have helped the Iraqis imbed those fiberoptic cables in Iraqi air defenses causing the United States enough concern that in February the President ordered U.S. jets--and British jets accompanied ours--to carry out airstrikes against those very same Iraqi air defense systems. It was because of the upgrade through the installation of the fiberoptic cable provided and installed by China. Fiberoptic cable is a dual-use item, and it is of considerable strategic importance. Its export to China is permissible under Senate bill S. 149. Let there be no mistake, fiberoptic cable not only increases the amount of data that can be transmitted, virtually exponentially, but it is also extraordinarily difficult to intercept signals in fiberoptic cable as opposed to, for example, through microwave transmissions or through regular copper wire. This is an item that is in clear use all over the United States. You can buy it on the market. But when it is applied to certain kinds of military uses, such as military equipment, it can become very dangerous to the United States. We have actually taken action against it for that very reason. Why should we liberalize its export to countries? If Iraq could have gotten that equipment and China could have gotten that equipment from anywhere else in the world, why didn't they? They buy it from the United States because we have the best products. If we deny that for military use to countries in the world that we do not want to have it, then they are going to have to accept an inferior product, one which presumably, at least, hopefully, we would be able to deal with much better than our own particular product. Let me try to also put in perspective what all the bill relates to. There are literally thousands of items on the list of dual-technology materials or services that could be, in effect, decontrolled through this legislation. I certainly do not have time to go through all of them. Let me give you some ideas of what some of these are. I have a very lengthy report which, given the time, I will be happy to go through in some detail because I think it is most illustrative in relation to those who believe there is not much of a problem. One of my colleagues said that you can buy it all from Radio Shack. The truth is, you cannot buy all this from Radio Shack. Yet it has enough availability to escape the requirements of an export license. We talked about the Chinese company that helped Iraq outfit its air defenses with fiberoptic equipment. This results in high-speed switching and routing. That equipment is all provided by U.S. companies which, by the way, would like to sell some additional items, various communications technology, to the very same Chinese firm that provided this technology to Iraq. Is that what we want to be doing? I am not so sure. I think we want to think about this very carefully. We ought to have the ability to deny an export license for this kind of dual-use technology to a company such as the Chinese company that bought it in this case. Yet under this bill these technologies would be determined to have foreign availability because of their marketing abroad, and they would meet the mass market criteria in the bill. Therefore, unless the President himself exercised the authority that I talked about, they would be eligible for export. That is a very recent example. Let's go back to look at some other examples. There were news stories at the time of ball-bearing grinders purchased from the United States. Since then, there have been quite a few public reports, although much of it is classified. But the fact is, in the 1970s the Soviet Union purchased ball-bearing grinders from the United States ostensibly for its use in civil industry. It used them, in fact, to produce pin-sized bearings for use in the SS-18 guidance system. The SS-18 is the most fearsome weapon on the Earth today--a nuclear- tipped intercontinental ballistic missile. These ball bearings are crucial to produce the guidance system capable of ensuring the very high degree of accuracy which this missile possesses. Those are the missiles that could incinerate every American living today. The guidance systems are perfected because of the ball bearings produced by equipment that the United States sent. These precision machine tools and ball bearings are controlled by the Commerce Department under the authorities granted by the Export Administration Act. But under the legislation pending here, these items would be available to foreign sources. The bill prohibits export controls on them unless the President is able to set aside the determination. And he can only do that for 6 months at a time. Submarines have to be quiet in order to be effective. The advantage of United States submarines is that they are the quietest submarines in the world. The other side cannot detect them, and we can pretty much go where we want to at will. The dual-use technology control list contains numerous technologies that can be used to make submarines quieter. This technology is, to some extent, available from foreign suppliers. Its export should be regulated to prevent nations such as China from freely purchasing it from American companies. While foreign submarine manufacturers such as Russia and Sweden have made great strides in submarine technology, we think U.S. technology is superior, and it is unique to U.S. submarines, and, if nothing else, its export could compromise the vital capability of U.S. submarines. There are those in Government who also like to talk about something a lot more mundane. I am choosing examples almost at random, but this caught my eye: a variety of devices that can be used to torture prisoners. We are now talking human rights, folks. These devices that can be used to torture prisoners--some of which are as mundane as electric prods and shock batons and shackles, and so on--are controlled for export due to human rights considerations. You can get these on the open market. If you are a bad guy, and you go shopping for them, you can find them somewhere in the world. Should the United States be selling them to countries that we know engage in human rights abuses? That is the kind of consideration that distinguishes America from many of the rest of the nations of the world. We just do not sell equipment and items to other countries that we know will be used to hurt people improperly, even though that equipment can be obtained from other places. It is perhaps a small point, but I think it makes a big difference. Even if people can buy something from someplace else, it is not necessarily a good idea for the United States to be selling it, again, partially because of the signals that we send. I may, if I have a little time later, also discuss in greater detail about technology that relates to the production of nuclear weapons, nuclear reactors, tritium plants, fissile material, liquid and solid propellant rocket engines, chemical and biological processing equipment, encryption software, flow-forming machines for a variety of production applications. All of these are items that are on the dual- use control list. I am going to talk a bit about maraging steel and gas centrifuges in just a moment. But suffice it to say, on this list there is page after page after page of items that have dual uses; that is to say, perfectly permissible civilian uses and also very sophisticated and, in some cases, very dangerous military uses. The question is, just because you can buy them for civilian purposes, should the United States be allowing the export of these items, without some control, to nations of the world that we believe would or could use them against us? In some cases, we use the export control regime for the purpose of not prohibiting the export but providing some conditions on it or limiting it in some way. Part of the ability to calibrate what we allow to be exported is lost as a result of the specifics of this legislation. I am sure my colleagues would agree with me--those who are supporting this legislation--that in some cases we may want to ultimately grant the export license but to have certain conditions on them. One of the conditions we have had in the past, for example, has to do with who the end user is. There are some fairly well-known cases of situations in which we thought that the end user was a civilian entity, and it turned out not to be the case. I have in mind two cases. One of the cases is where McDonnell Douglas--a very prominent company; a company that was formerly in my State, as a matter of fact--thought it was selling machine tools for the manufacture of civilian aircraft, and it turned out it went to China for the production of military aircraft. We also had some very sophisticated computers that we did not want to go to a military end user in China. It went, I think, to a research institute. But it ended up in the wrong hands. My recollection is, in that case, because of some limitations we had put on the export license, we were able to pull it back. There are cases where if you have some ability to regulate the specifics of how the license is granted, you can actually prevent items from falling into the wrong hands. I haven't talked about computers yet. We know that high-performance computers are one of the main areas of contention here because the evolution of the technology is so rapid now that something that was really leading edge a year or 18 months ago is relatively passe today, overtaken by much more high speed and capable computers. U.S. computer technology exceeds that of all foreign competitors, yet our manufacturers argue for more and more liberal ability to export, to the point that the Clinton administration, for all practical purposes, eliminated controls on high-performance computers without any compelling evidence that reasonably comparable foreign systems were seriously sought by foreign customers. That brings up another question. There isn't any real definition in this bill of what we mean by ``availability.'' It is a very subjective term. One wonders why or how it is that we are going to judge something to be available. If the market that they really want to buy from is the U.S. market, then maybe the availability of a so-called comparable foreign product isn't as great as we might think it to be. That is an element that needs a further look. There is a very interesting example that was pointed out by Gary Milhollin of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. He noted that high-precision electronic switches needed to detonate nuclear weapons would be decontrolled under the act because of their civil application in medical instruments. I believe this device is used in the lithotripters, the equipment now that can actually blast apart gall stones so you don't have to painfully extract them from an individual. They are blasted apart and taken out like little bits of sand. The electronics of that are the very same electronics that are used in the nuclear detonation components of weapons. Similarly, he points out that glass and carbon fibers are used in ballistic and cruise missile construction as well as in the enrichment of uranium for nuclear weapons and that they could be decontrolled because of their use in the manufacture of skis and tennis rackets and boats and golf clubs. We have heard recent reports in the news about the possibility that different countries--Iraq comes to mind--might be buying some of these items off the shelf in fairly huge quantities. Everyone asks: Why would they be buying so many of those? The speculation is, of course, that it just might be because they want to apply them to one of their military uses. I mentioned maraging steel before. This is a very special kind of steel that is used in the manufacture of solid rocket motor cases, propellant tanks, and interstages for missiles as well as in the enrichment of uranium. It would be decontrolled because its application in commercial rocketry and also the fact that in many forums it is available in other countries. There are many other items. I will summarize a couple: Corrosion resistant valves used in the enrichment of uranium for nuclear weapons; they are also used in the commercial paper, energy, and cryogenic industries. This is a list of pretty deadly serious military applications of items that nonetheless would be decontrolled under this legislation because of their applicability to civilian uses as well. I talked in the beginning about a concern I had that this legislation is being debated at the wrong time. I hope I am not, by articulating this list of items--and again, we can talk about a lot more--leaving the impression that there is no role for the approach of this legislation to get rid of a lot of items on the list that have both civilian and military applications. The legislation moves in the right direction because there are a lot of items that don't need to have this kind of regulation. There are some that do. The question is, have we discriminated properly in drawing the dividing line between those that do and those that do not? There is another provision of this bill that has to do with another way we can judge whether or not something would be automatically exempt from the export control regime. It has to do with how much value an embedded component has. On the surface, you would say, what difference should that make? If you have a very highly classified component and it represents only, let's say, 10 percent of the cost of an item, simply because it is only 10 percent of the cost of the overall item, should that mean that the entire item is decontrolled and another country has the ability, then, to reverse engineer the entire component so that it can take out the part that is highly classified? That is what this legislation allows. It says that if only a certain percentage of the value is in this very highly controlled component, you can go ahead and sell it. There is sort of a presumption that it can't be all that big a deal if it is only a small percentage of value--10 or 25 percent. A case that I don't think is included in this legislation, because of action that the Congress took last year to take it out of the Commerce Department and put it back with the State Department, but which obviously we had to act on or it would have been, is the case of rocket motors. I shouldn't say rocket motors, rather, the so-called kick motors that are in many cases embedded in satellites. These are very highly classified items. We take a satellite that we want to launch, and when it is kicked into its final orbit by this little motor, it can actually perform the way we want it to perform. In the case of China, for example, the Chinese have made it a condition for some companies doing business in China that those companies allow China to launch a certain percentage of the satellites that they want to launch. So those companies, in order to do business in China, have to agree to that, and they have. These satellites are supposed to be under the control of Americans at all times because they are very sophisticated. We don't want them to fall into the wrong hands and to be reverse engineered. We don't want our technology to be stolen from them. That certainly applies to an item such as the kick motor embedded in the satellite. We recall that a couple years ago there was a great deal of evidence of the fact that certain American companies had allowed satellite launches in China without adequate security, the result of which was that we believe there was some compromise of American technology by the Chinese. It is not only the kick motors. There are other components, too. Had Congress not acted last year to retrieve those satellite items from the Commerce Department and put them back on what was called the munitions list, where the State Department would have the authority to require license, we wouldn't have had the same degree of control over them that we do today. This is the kind of thing that can happen. Again, the timing is wrong here because we are forced to talk about situations involving China over and over and over again. I don't particularly care to do that. This is a time when it would be nice if we could kind of lower the rhetoric and try to develop a relationship with China which very clearly states our goals and tries to deal with China in a way that doesn't result in more belligerency on their part. By the authors of the legislation being insistent on bringing it up now, some of us have no choice but to use examples that are, unfortunately, very real examples of where we believe that sensitive technology has been either sold to or acquired by China in ways that this legislation would not prevent. I wish we didn't need to talk about that at this time, but since they are very real examples, we will talk about them. Again, I hope the message isn't misunderstood. This is not about either having trade or national security. The authors of this legislation agree with me and I with them that we can do both. We have to do both. We will do both. But this will be portrayed as trade trumping national security. That would be a mistake. With the indulgence of my colleagues, I will continue now to discuss some of this other technology that I mentioned would be impacted by this legislation. I talked before about maraging steel. Here are some of the countries where this product is of particular interest. This, again, is the high-alloy steel that has very high yield strength. Pakistan has used it for uranium enrichment centrifuges; India for its polar satellite launch vehicle; Russia and Iran, special alloys for missiles. I talked before about the bearings and gas centrifuge. There are military applications for high uranium production, and there is some evidence that China has sold this technology to Pakistan for the production of nuclear weapons in Pakistan. The centrifugal isotope separation plant, equipment and components, the military applications: Russia's uranium isotope separation plant has played a significant role in warhead production. The plant is primarily a centrifuge enrichment facility, and it has produced about 40 percent of the Soviet Union's enrichment uranium. I talked about explosive detonators earlier. Aluminum alloys is another very interesting case. This is obviously very useful in rocket technology and missile technology for casings. China has developed a welded aluminum alloy used in the design of the torpedo hull. It manufactures aluminum alloy casings. India is manufacturing heavy-duty aluminum alloy extruded composition and has conducted studies on this that are very significant relating to its satellite launch vehicle. All of these are items that would be impacted by this legislation. The ceramic composite materials are a new and increasingly important kind of material because they don't conduct electricity. Therefore, they have some very unique military applications. They have been used in ballistic missiles and reentry vehicle antenna windows, for example. They are produced, by the way, by companies in France, Germany, India, Japan, Russia, as well as the United States. Laminates: Again, missile parts are often made from these other kinds of materials. Composite structures and laminates are materials used in rocket systems, including ballistic missiles and space vehicles, and they are produced in a whole variety of countries, including the United States. There are military applications to something called crucibles. These are used to melt and reduce and cast uranium and plutonium for nuclear explosive devices. I realize when I read these, people may say: Wait a minute; we are not talking about just putting these things on the open market. What I am saying, folks, is they would be items that are no longer controlled under the dual technology control regime under the old Export Administration Act, which everybody would like to see reauthorized, with some changes. Because of the liberalization under this act, these items, in effect, become decontrolled. In the early 1990s, for example, the U.S. was licensed to sell a significant volume of this equipment for making crucibles for high- performance furnace systems. It found its way to Iraq and to Iraq's nuclear missile and chemical weapons program, and for its nuclear weapons design and research center. This particular item at that time, because of a law that existed, was stopped by Presidential order. That would not be possible today if this legislation were to pass. Guidance sets for missiles--you might think this is pretty technical stuff that we should not be selling on the open market. But there are items here that have dual uses. So ballistic missile guidance sets are often built to fit into a particular missile to be used in a hostile environment, and it would perform with a high degree of accuracy. It could have both civilian and military uses. They are produced in a whole variety of countries, in addition to the U.S. There are services as well as products--and I will not go into all of these. We are not just talking about the military applications of specific pieces of equipment. We are also talking about certain kinds of services showing people how to do certain kinds of things. We talked about propulsion systems and components. Here are some of the military applications of that. On one occasion, they were disguised as automotive spare parts on the airwaves of a certain country and were destined for Libya. This was very recently, by the way. Some of the paperwork indicated that the seized shipments had already reached Libya, I might add. The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, which was sanctioned by the U.S. in August of 1993 for missile proliferation activities, designed and researched propulsion systems, among other things. Russia aided Iran with the design of guidance and propulsion systems, some of which found their way into the Shahab 3 and Shahab 4 ballistic missiles for Iran. There are a variety of examples that I can give you. Reentry vehicles--we are familiar with those--for both commercial and military applications. These, too, would be subject to the provisions of this legislation. And I hate to talk about China again, and I wish we didn't have this debate right now. Chinese engineers were arrested for trying to steal some blueprints from a plant in the Ukraine. Yet these very items would be subject to sale because they are produced by a variety of countries and have dual applications. Without getting into a lot of detail, I will indicate the nature of some of these other activities or products. Propellant additives, propellant control systems, propellant production equipment, radar software--you can easily understand why that could be a dual item-- radiation-hardened computers. The applications here for military use are obvious. Ramjet engines: The military applications there, I think, are fairly obvious; rocket motor mounts and sounding rockets as well. These all have to do with space, and also aircraft, such as airborne radar, navigational systems, depleted uranium, fly-by-wire flight control. Obviously, that is the way our commercial aircraft is now designed. It is also a very important military design. We have various kinds of noise reduction and acoustic mounts and valves and other kinds of things that are used in quieting for the Navy, primarily. Precision tracking systems: We are all familiar with how we are able both in civilian and military applications to precisely track using the global system. Yet many of those items would also be covered by this legislation and no longer require license: side-looking airborne radar, sonar signal processing equipment, underwater breathing apparatus, wind tunnel applications.

Mr. KYL. I will be happy to yield for a moment.

Mr. KYL. I would like to continue making a point. The Senator has had quite a bit of time. I will note, however, I have heard the questions of my colleague. The question is the same: Essentially, as a good Republican, why wouldn't you support the Republican administration with all its expertise on this? I guess part of my answer is if the Senator from South Dakota is willing to abide by the expertise and recommendations of this administration on all matters from here on, I would almost be persuaded to sit down and to pocket his votes on the tax cuts, education bill, all the defense matters that come before us, and everything else. The fact is, reasonable people can differ. The Senator from South Dakota can agree with the administration on some things and disagree with them on others, just as people on this side of the aisle can do. So it is no great argument to say if you belong to the party of the President, you have to walk in lockstep with the President or somehow there is a suggestion that your position is tainted. But let me go on with my point.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, first, I express regret the Senate is being asked to take up this legislation at this time. As pointed out earlier, the Export Administration Act, which this bill reauthorizes, with changes, has not been reauthorized for over a decade. It is not as if there is an emergency to do it this week. We have lived without a reauthorized bill for over 10 years. What we have done is reauthorized it on a year-to-year basis from time to time--most recently, last year. I believe it is in October that reauthorization runs out, so we have to take some action before that time. I believe we should. I believe the Senate should act on this legislation before that time. I suspect there will be some amendments offered. I suspect there will be a healthy debate. But at the end of the day, in one form or another, the bill will pass and the Export Administration Act will be reauthorized as significantly modified. President Bush, when campaigning, campaigned on that promise, and he has made good on that promise by supporting this legislation. I appreciate that effort on his behalf. But I think it would be wrong to suggest that it was the administration that requested the bill be considered at this time. The administration was asked by a group of Senators who have expertise in national security matters to evaluate the bill that is before us. In less than a 2-week period that evaluation was complete, and it was done largely by people about whom Senator Thompson was talking this morning, who are not new additions to this administration. Meeting this morning with Secretary Rumsfeld, we found that there are only two confirmed positions in the Defense Department--Secretary Rumsfeld and the No. 2 person in the Defense Department, Secretary Wolfowitz: That is it. So it is not as if a new Bush team has evaluated this legislation, has had the time to give it the kind of critical look I had hoped it would be able to do.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise to take a few moments to explain why I will oppose S. 27 on final passage. At the outset, however, I want to congratulate my colleague John McCain for bringing this matter to a successful conclusion in the Senate. He has fought long and hard to get to this point. If this bill becomes law, we know that the Supreme Court will have the final say as to its constitutionality. Few doubt that the bill at least raises issues about the fundamental liberties guaranteed in the First Amendment. Having taken an oath to uphold the Constitution, I cannot vote for a bill I believe the courts are almost certain to strike down. Both the restrictions on issue advocacy contained in Title II of this bill, and the bill's total ban on soft money contributions to parties are, in my opinion, likely to be declared unconstitutional. Like the proponents of the bill before us, I believe that it is too difficult to mount a viable challenge to an incumbent Member of Congress; that Members of Congress spend too much of their time raising funds for their campaigns; that voter turnout is lower than it ought to be; and that advertisements by outside groups often drown out the voices of candidates. Worst of all, there is the lingering concern that fundraising considerations can affect Members' decisions. But, whereas the proponents of the bill before us contend that their reforms will promote participation, competition, and disinterested deliberation within our politics, I am concerned that passing this bill, if anything, will have the opposite effect. I am especially concerned about the bill's adverse effect on our two great political parties, which are the primary targets of S. 27. It is political parties that help challengers to overcome the significant advantages incumbents enjoy, and help candidates, incumbent and non-incumbent alike to fight back against attacks from outside groups. It is political parties that do much of the voter registration and get-out-the-vote organizing that bring new voters to the polls. And because a party will provide support to any credible candidate who will run on its line, it provides a counterweight to single-issue committees which can spend large sums of money defining the candidate. As has been widely reported, the bill before us targets political parties by prohibiting them from receiving so-called ``soft money'' donations. It imposes particularly severe restrictions on party organizations in the 50 states, preventing them from using funds, other than federally-regulated ``hard dollars'', even under state law for party-building activities and constitutionally protected issue advocacy during any time-frame that coincides with a federal election. To realize that most state and local contests are conducted concurrently with federal campaigns is to realize how stifling such restrictions are going to be. To the extent that there is credible evidence of corruption of officeholders by unlimited soft money contributions, it might be constitutional to limit the amount of such contributions, as opposed to banning them altogether. For that reason, I supported Senator Hagel's proposal to cap soft money contributions to parties at $60,000. Imposing such a cap would achieve the objective of preventing a donor from potentially corrupting those to whom he donates while heeding the Supreme Court's warning that any such limitation be tailored as narrowly as possible to meet that objective. Senator Hagel's alternative, which I supported and the Senate rejected, would arguably also have weakened political parties, but it would not have marginalized them, the way S. 27 is likely to do. The Hagel bill, by combining its restrictions on parties with a hard-money limit increase, offered a reasonable bargain: moderate the influence of parties, while increasing the ability of candidates to get their own message out. The bill before us imposes much more stringent limits on parties, while providing much more modest relief to candidates in the form of a hard-money limit increase. By causing a contraction of the supply of money available to parties and candidates, this arrangement will lead to either an attenuation of political debate or the movement of funds into the coffers of outside single-issue groups. They and the media will take the place of the parties and the candidates in carrying the messages of the campaign. Again, this is assuming that the Supreme Court upholds a soft money ban. There are several legal precedents that make this assumption difficult to sustain. In 1976, in the landmark case of Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court held that restrictions on political donations and expenditures impinge on the rights of speech and association protected by the First Amendment, and, therefore, are subject to the most stringent level of constitutional scrutiny. In a 1996 case, Colorado Republican Party v. FEC, the Court made it clear that these guarantees extend to political parties, as well as to independent citizens and groups, noting that, as Justice Thomas wrote in a concurring opinion, ``political associations allow citizens to pool their resources and make their advocacy more effective, and such efforts are fully protected by the First Amendment.'' It is true that a common manifestation of that protected advocacy is the type of communication that has, not altogether inaccurately, been described as the ``sham issue ad.'' But the Buckley court anticipated that ``the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of the election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application,'' yet insisted that ``discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution.'' ``The First Amendment,'' said the Court, ``affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.'' In light of these holdings, it is difficult to imagine that the courts could find a prohibition aimed at preventing the parties from engaging in this type of advocacy to be anything but an infringement on the free speech rights of those organizations. If, as I believe they will, courts strike down these provisions of the bill, and unions, corporations, and other entities are allowed to use unregulated funds for issue advocacy, S. 27's soft money ban on contributions to parties could give rise to a very plausible equal protection claim. Of course, activity by independent entities does not fall outside the scope of the bill before us. The proponents of the bill suggest that we who worry about its impact on parties and non-incumbents should be consoled by the restrictions it places on the ability of such citizen groups to advance their views and coordinate their activities with political parties. These provisions provide me with no consolation. As I noted, these restrictions will not likely survive judicial scrutiny. That outcome is one that we should welcome, because these restrictions are misguided. I have great respect for my colleagues who confronted the issue of constitutionality and tried to craft a way to permit ``genuine'' issue ads while cracking down on ``phony'' ones. They attempt to identify a permissible subcategory of issue advertisements that constitute ``electioneering'' without expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate. But I believe that using the threat of mandatory disclosure of donor information or outright bans on advocacy as a lever to regulate the quantity, timing, and content of issue advocacy communications is fundamentally at odds with the First Amendment's injunction to Congress to ``make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or of the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.'' Congress cannot be in the business of outlawing criticism of itself. Of course, I do not appreciate the unfair attacks that are all too frequently presented in single-issue advertisements. But I think that we would do well to resist the urge to silence those who would criticize us, even those who criticize us when we are most sensitive to criticism--at election time. Unfortunately, passage of this bill leaves us with three unappetizing possibilities: that our work may be struck down in toto; that it might be refashioned by the courts into something altogether different than what was intended; or that it might be left as it is, which would leave us with a democracy less vital than the admittedly imperfect one it is our privilege to be a part of. It is my hope that this bill will be modified in the House of Representatives to avoid those three results.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Madam President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess under the previous order, following the remarks of Senators Conrad, Kennedy, and Nickles.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Madam President, again, on behalf of the leader, for the information of all Senators, the Senate will reconvene on Monday and resume the campaign reform bill for 30 minutes for closing remarks. Under the previous order, the Senate will conduct a rollcall vote on passage of S. 27, as amended, at 5:30 p.m. Following that vote, Senators should expect additional votes to occur immediately. Therefore, a late session can be expected with votes. Also, Members should expect votes to be limited to 20 minutes only; therefore, Members will have to be prompt for these votes and all votes during the week of the budget resolution.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. I further ask unanimous consent that at 5 p.m. there be 30 minutes for closing remarks on S. 27, to be equally divided between the chairman and the ranking member of the Rules Committee.

Mr. KYL. Madam President, again, on behalf of the leader, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in recess until 5 p.m. on Monday, April 2, 2001.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Madam President, on behalf of the leader, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate immediately proceed to executive session to consider the following nominations: Nos. 24 through 30, 32 through 35, and all nominations on the Secretary's desk. I further ask unanimous consent that the nominations be confirmed, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, any statements relating to the nominations be printed in the Record, the President be immediately notified of the Senate's action, and the Senate then return to legislative session.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Madam President, I rise today to express concern about the direction of Chinese military policy vis-a-vis the United States. America's relationship with China is one of the key foreign policy challenges facing our nation in the 21st Century. It is hard to understate the importance of our relationship with China. It is the world's most populous nation, has the world's largest armed forces, and is a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Its economic and military strength has grown a great deal in recent years, and is projected to continue to grow significantly in the coming decades. And most significantly, it is intent on gaining control over Taiwan, even by military force if necessary. For some time now, I have been concerned that, out of a desire to avoid short-term controversies in our relationship with China that could prove disruptive to trade, we have overlooked serious potential national security problems. As Bill Gertz noted in his book, The China Threat, the former administration believed that China could be reformed solely by the civilizing influence of the West. Unfortunately, this theory hasn't proven out--the embrace of western capitalism has not been accompanied by respect for human rights, the rule of law, the embrace of democracy, or a less belligerent attitude toward its neighbors. Indeed, serious problems with China have grown worse. And continuing to gloss over these problems for fear of disrupting the fragile U.S.-China relationship, primarily for trade reasons, only exacerbates the problems. We must be more realistic in our dealings with China and more cognizant of potential threats. As Secretary of State Colin Powell said in his confirmation hearing: A strategic partner China is not, but neither is it our inevitable and implacable foe. China is a competitor, a potential rival, but also a trading partner willing to cooperate in areas where our strategic interests overlap . . . Our challenge with China is to do what we can do that is constructive, that is helpful, and that is in our interest. I believe it is in our best interest to seriously evaluate China's military strategy, plans for modernization of its People's Liberation Army, including the expansion of its ICBM capability, and buildup of forces opposite Taiwan. Let us not risk underestimating either China's intentions or capabilities, possibly finding ourselves in the midst of a conflict we could have prevented. I would like to begin by answering a seemingly obvious question: Why isn't China a strategic partner? Among other things, China is being led by a communist regime with a deplorable human rights record and a history of irresponsible technology sales to rogue states. Furthermore, Beijing's threatening rhetoric aimed at the United States and Taiwan, as well as its military modernization and buildup of forces opposite Taiwan, should lead us to the conclusion that China potentially poses a growing threat to our national security. While it is true that China is one of the United States' largest trading partners, we must not let this blind us to strategic concerns. Strategically, we must consider China a competitor--not an enemy, but certainly a cause for concern that should prompt us to take appropriate steps to safeguard our security. Chinese government officials and state-run media have repeatedly threatened to use force against Taiwan to reunite it with the mainland; and further, have warned the United States against involvement in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. For example, in February 2000, the People's Liberation Army Daily, a state-owned newspaper, carried an article which stated, ``On the Taiwan issue, it is very likely that the United States will walk to the point where it injures others while ruining itself.'' The article went on to issue a veiled threat to attack the U.S. with long-range missiles, stating, ``China is neither Iraq or Yugoslavia . . . it is a country that has certain abilities of launching a strategic counterattack and the capacity of launching a long-distance strike. Probably it is not a wise move to be at war with a country such as China, a point which U.S. policymakers know fairly well also.'' This treat, and countless others like it, have been backed by China's rapid movement to modernize its army. The immediate focus of the modernization is to build a military force capable of subduing Taiwan, and capable of defeating it swiftly enough to prevent American intervention. According to the Department of Defense's Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, released in last June, ``A cross-strait conflict between China and Taiwan involving the United States has emerged as the dominant scenario guiding [the Chinese Army's] force planning, military, training, and war preparation.'' We should also be concerned with China's desire to project power in other parts of the Far East. According to a recent Washington Post article, China announced that it will increase its defense spending this year by 17.7 percent--its biggest increase in the last 20 years. China's publicly-acknowledged defense budget of over $17 billion for next year is higher than the defense budgets of neighboring countries like India, Taiwan, and South Korea. Most analysts estimate China's real spending on defense is at least three times as great as the publicly disclosed figure. For example, according to the Secretary of Defense's January 2001 report, Proliferation: Threat and Response, China's military funding levels are expected to average between $44 and $70 billion annually between 2000 and 2004. Chinese Finance Minister Xiang Huaicheng, in a speech to China's National People's Congress, stated that the increase would go, in part ``. . . to meet the drastic changes in the military situation around the world and prepare for defense and combat given the conditions of modern technology, especially high technology.'' This is consistent with the Department of Defense's assessment in the Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, that ``China's military planners are working to incorporate the concepts of modern warfare . . . and have placed a priority on developing the technologies and tactics necessary to conduct rapid tempo, high technology warfare . . .'' Defense Department assessment, an invasion of the island would likely be preceded by ``a naval blockade, air assaults and missile attacks on Taiwan.'' Furthermore, it states: Airborne, airmobile, and special operations forces likely would conduct simultaneous attacks to the rear of Taiwan's coastal defenses to seize a port, preferably in close proximity to an airfield. Seizing a beachhead would likely constitute a support attack. An airborne envelopment would facilitate amphibious operations by cutting off Taiwan's coastal defenders from supply lines and forcing them to fight to two directions. China would likely seek to suppress Taiwan's air defenses and establish air superiority over an invasion corridor in the Taiwan Strait . . . To solidify is ability to launch such an attack. China is expected to continue to increase its force of short-range ballistic missiles. According to an article in the Far Eastern Economic Review, Taiwan estimates that the Chinese Army currently has 400 short-range missiles deployed opposite that island. More recently, the Washington Times reported that a U.S. satellite detected a new shipment of short-range missiles to Yongan, in Fujian province, opposite Taiwan. The Washington Times had previously reported ``that China had deployed nearly 100 short-range ballistic missiles and mobile launchers'' at this particular base. Bill Gertz's book, the China Threat, cites a 1999 internal Pentagon report that indicates China plans to increase its force of short-range M-9 and M-11 missiles to 650 by 2005. In addition, China has also deployed medium-range CSS-5 missiles, with a range of 1,800 kilometers, which cannot be stopped by Taiwan's Patriot missile defense batteries. China's continued development of its ICBM force, which directly threatens U.S. cities, is also troubling. The Defense Department's report, Proliferation: Threat and Response, states: China currently has over 100 nuclear warheads . . . While the ultimate extent of China's strategic modernization is unknown, it is clear that the number, reliability, survivability, and accuracy of Chinese strategic missiles capable of hitting the United States will increase during the next two decades. China currently has about 20 CSS-4 ICBMs with a range of over 13,000 kilometers, which can reach the United States. Some of its ongoing missile modernization programs likely will increase the number of Chinese warheads aimed at the United States. For example, Beijing is developing two new road-mobile solid-propellant ICBMs. China has conducted successful flight tests of the DF-31 ICBM in 1999 and 2000; this missile is estimated to have a range of about 8,000 kilometers. Another longer-range mobile ICBM also is under development and likely will be tested within the next several years. It will be targeted primarily against the United States. Another study completed by the National Intelligence Council, presenting the consensus views of all U.S. intelligence agencies, echoed these concerns stating, Beijing ``will have deployed tens to several tens of missiles with nuclear warheads targeted against the United States'' in the not too distant future. The intent of this deployment is obvious--to preclude the United States from intervening in any Chinese military actions against Taiwan. China's advances in its air and naval forces are also weighing upon the growing imbalance in the Taiwan Strait. Russian transfers of military equipment and technology are accelerating China's efforts in these areas. According to a February article in Jane's Intelligence Review, Between 1991 and 1996 Russia sold China an estimated $1 billion worth of military weapons and related technologies each year. That figure doubled by 1997. In 1999 the two governments increased the military assistance package for a second time. There is now a five-year program (until 2004) planning $20 billion worth of technology transfers. China's Air Force is continuing its acquisition of Russian fighters and fighter bombers. For example, China now has at least 50 Russian Su- 27 fighters, and has started co-producing up to 200 more. Furthermore, according to a 1999 Defense News article, Russia and China signed a preliminary agreement in 1999 calling for the transfer to China of approximately 40 Su-30MKK fighter-bombers, which are comparable to the U.S. F-15E Strike Eagle. According to a 1999 article in the Russian publication Air Fleet (Moscow), these aircraft will be equipped with precision-guided bombs and missiles, as well as an anti-radar missile. Delivery has not yet occurred, but is expected within the next three years. The June 2000 Defense Department report predicted that by 2020, the ``. . . readiness rates, the distances over which China can project air power, and the variety of missions which China's air forces can perform also can be expected to improve.'' Furthermore, it states that after 2005, ``. . . if projected trends continue, the balance of air power across the Taiwan Strait could begin to shift in China's favor.'' This shift will undoubtedly be accelerated by Russia's assistance. Additionally, the report estimates that, by 2005, China will have developed the capability for aerial refueling and airborne early warning. Also, the development of a new Chinese active-radar air-to-air missile similar to the U.S. AMRAAM for China's fourth-generation fighters is likely to be complete. In an effort to increase its ability to place a naval blockade around Taiwan, the Chinese Navy is in the process of acquiring new submarines, anti-ship missiles, and mines. According to the Defense Department's June 2000 report, ``China's submarine fleet could constitute a substantial force capable of controlling sea lanes and mining approaches around Taiwan, as well as a growing threat to submarines in the East and South China Seas.'' Furthermore, a January 2001 Jane's Defense Weekly article states that the core of China's future naval plans calls for the acquisition of an aircraft carrier capability and the incorporation of nuclear-powered attack submarines into its fleet. According to this article, the Chinese Navy recently acquired two Russian Sovremenny-class destroyers armed with Sunburn anti-ship missiles that were developed by Russia to attack U.S. carrier battle groups. It is also continuing to buy Kilo- class submarines from Russia, and has discussed purchasing an aircraft carrier from Russia. Faced with China's moves to increase its ability to blockade Taiwan or to disrupt sea lanes near the island, its steps to develop the ability to establish air superiority over the Taiwan Strait, and its moves to increase its missile force facing the United States and Taiwan, we must contend with the question of how to deter an attack on Taiwan, and how to defend our forces which would be deployed in the area. The obvious answer is to supply Taiwan with the defensive weaponry it has sought to buy from the United States and to be able to defend the United States against missile attack threatened by China. Taiwan has submitted its official defense request list to the United States, and next month, the Administration will make its final decision as to which items will be sold. According to the Washington Times, Taiwan has requested approximately 30 different weapons systems from the United States this year. Though the official list is classified, a recently released Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report discussed Taiwan's current defense needs, mentioning some of the items that it is interested in acquiring. I would like to highlight just a few of these items. According to this Senate report, Taiwan has, once again, expressed its need for four Aegis destroyers--a request that was repeatedly denied by the Clinton Administration. These destroyers would, according to the Foreign Relations Committee report, provide Taiwan ``with an adequate sea-based air defense and C4I system to deal with rapidly developing [Chinese] air and naval threats.'' Because final delivery will take 8 to 10 years, however, Taiwan will need an interim solution to deal with these threats. Thus, it may be necessary to sell Taiwan four used Kidd-class destroyers, which do not have a radar system as capable as Aegis, but are more advanced than what Taiwan currently possesses. Additionally, the report indicates that Taiwan has stated its need for submarines. It currently has only four, while China has sixty-five. They could prove particularly important should Taiwan need to defend itself against a Chinese blockade of the island. Taiwan also needs our help to deal with the growing imbalance of air power across the Taiwan Strait. According to the report, Taiwan's Air Force has indicated its need to be able to counter China's long-range surface-to-air missiles, and to counterattack its aircraft and naval vessels from long distances. In order to counter China's surface-to-air missile sites that can threaten aircraft over the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan has expressed interest in obtaining High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM). Taiwan reportedly would also like to purchase Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), and longer-range, infra-red guided missiles capable of attacking land targets. The United States should approve all of Taiwan's requests, provided they are necessary for Taiwan to defend itself, and provided they do not violate technology transfer restrictions. Section 3(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act states, ``The President and Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan . . .'' (Emphasis added) Taiwan clearly needs to upgrade its capabilities in several key areas and should act to address these shortfalls. We must also deal with a broader question. Since the approach adopted by the Clinton Administration clearly did not move China in the right direction, how can we positively influence China to act responsibly and eschew military action against Taiwan? One way is to be unambiguous in our dealings with China. During the cold war, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher took a principled stand against the Soviet Union, which contributed to one of the greatest accomplishments in history: the West's victory without war over the Soviet empire. The time has come for the United States to take a similarly principled, firm approach to our dealings with China. We should hold China to the same standards of proper behavior we have defined for other nations, and we should work for political change in Beijing, unapologetically standing up for freedom and democracy. We should begin by assuring that the United States is not susceptible to blackmail by China--to freeze the United States into inaction by threat of missile attack against the United States. In this regard, we need to work toward the development and deployment of a national missile defense system. The United States currently has no defense against a ballistic missile attack from China, or any of the countries that it has assisted in developing a long-range missile capability. Missile defense will allow us to abandon the cold war policy of mutually assured destruction. China has threatened that NMD deployment will lead to destabilization and to an arms race with that country. I disagree. As former Secretary of Defense William Cohen testified to the Senate in July of last year, ``I think it's fair to say that China, irrespective of what we do on NMD, will in fact, modernize and increase its ICBM capability.'' And this is why president George W. Bush is correct to remain firm in his decision to deploy an NMD system as soon as possible. Secondly, we need to maintain strong U.S. military capabilities in Asia and improve ties to our allies in the region. As Secretary of State Colin Powell recently said about these relationships, particularly with Japan, ``Weaken those relationships and we weaken ourselves. All else in the Pacific and East Asia flows from those strong relationships.'' The United States can promote democracy, free-markets, and the rule of law by standing by our democratic allies in Asia, like Japan and Taiwan. The preparedness of Taiwan's defense forces is questionable. Increasing this preparedness will decrease the chances that the United States will need to become involved in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, or that such a conflict will occur in the first place. As I mentioned earlier, not only do we need to sell Taiwan the necessary military equipment for defense against China, our defense officials and military personnel need to be able to work with their Taiwanese counterparts to ensure that they know how to use the equipment. Without this training, the equipment we provide will be far less useful. As stated in the Defense Department's report: The change in the dynamic equilibrium of forces over the long term will depend largely on whether Taiwan is able to meet or exceed developments on the mainland with programs of its own. Its success in deterring potential Chinese aggression will be dependent on its continued acquisition of modern arms, technology and equipment, and its ability to integrate and operate these systems effectively . . . President Bush recently stated that China, our ``strategic competitor'' needs to be ``faced without ill will and without illusions.'' Our long-term goal is to live in peace and prosperity with the Chinese people, as well as to promote democratic transition in that country. China's far-reaching ambitions in Asia, coupled with efforts to modernize and strengthen its military force, however, require the United States to exercise leadership. There is no doubt that China will and should play a larger role on the world stage in the coming years. The challenge before us is to deal with this emerging power in a way that enhances our security by dealing candidly and strongly with some of the troubling facts and trends. It is time to take a more clear-eyed approach to dealing with China.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. What we have, of course, is the estimate of those portions of the President's tax plan that have been put forward by Members of the House and Senate, and that is ordinarily what is reviewed and what we get estimates of. That is plenty enough for us to move forward on it at this point. I know the Senator from North Dakota appreciates that we in the Senate operate on that basis as a routine matter. I appreciate the opportunity to have this exchange. I think it may illustrate some of the tough sledding that we have to do as we move forward with the consideration of the President's budget, with the Senate budget resolution, with our tax relief legislation, and the other business that we have.

Mr. KYL. I think, as the Senator from West Virginia has said, I have been more than liberal in yielding to my colleagues. I really would like to get on to what I came here to talk about.

Mr. KYL. I would like to get on with what I started a half hour ago, if I may.

Mr. KYL. That is a question. Let me answer by saying apparently the Joint Tax Committee believes it has enough information, because it has given us an estimate of the cost, both to the House and the Senate. In fact, it gave a very uncomplimentary estimate of the part of the tax relief which I am putting forward. I might argue with what they have come up with, but apparently they believed they had enough information to do it. We do have an estimate this year, whether it is right or wrong. We had an estimate back in 1993. We have an estimate this year. We are going to have to live with it one way or the other. But I don't think that should be a basis for suggesting it is improper at this point to take up the budget resolution. I think what we have established is that just as with the change of President in 1993, when you have a President in the year 2001, it is unrealistic to expect there would be the same degree of detail in the budget they send up in their very first year as there is for the remainder of their term. But the fact has not stopped Congress from acting on a budget resolution at the time of year when it should do so, that we will be doing that, and that hopefully we will have an entire week next week for a continuation of this debate for proposals of amendments. I suspect we will be going very late at night next week as we consider all the different ideas different Senators have before we finally act on the budget. I hope, to conclude the remarks here, this could be done in a bipartisan fashion and it will not be a purely partisan vote. One would hope that. We will see how it develops.

Mr. KYL. I think that will be sufficient to give the other remarks I have, unless the Senator from North Dakota wishes to engage me in a lengthy colloquy, in which case I would want to ask for a little bit more time.

Mr. KYL. Then, Madam President, perhaps what I should do is ask how much time we have remaining so I can give the remarks I was originally prepared to give and then yield to those others.

Mr. KYL. If I might, since the Senator from Oklahoma was here earlier and had sought recognition, I would like to yield to him first.