Jon Kyl

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, today the Senate will begin debate on the motion to proceed to S.J. Res. 3, proposing an amendment to the Constitution to protect the rights of crime victims, until 12:30 p.m. Following that debate, the Senate will stand in recess until the hour of 2:15 p.m. in order for the weekly party caucuses to meet. At 2:15, the Senate will proceed to a vote on the motion to invoke cloture on the motion to proceed to S.J. Res. 3. If cloture is not invoked on the motion, then a second vote will occur on cloture on the substitute amendment to the marriage tax penalty bill. I thank my colleagues for their attention.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. I think the two distinguished law professors make a very important point. They point out the example of paralleling a defendant's constitutionally protected right to a speedy trial. Our amendment confers on victims the right to consideration of their interest in a trial, free from unreasonable delay. By definition, the professors note, these rights could not collide since they are both designed to bring matters to a close within a reasonable time. If any conflict were to emerge, courts retain ultimate responsibility for harmonizing the rights at stake. We have also gone one other step. That is, whereas the defendant had an absolute right to a speedy trial--and frequently, also, courts determine he has a right to delay things--we have provided for victims merely that the judge must ``consider'' their desire to bring the trial to a speedy conclusion. In this case, we have created a right of victims which, indeed, is subservient to the right of the defendants. Theirs is absolute. The victims have a right to have their views considered. We have been very careful to ensure we don't trample on defendants' rights. I make one more point because the Senator reminded me of something that is very important. In the statement by Professor Mosteller, he makes a relative point that relates to this. ``In theory, victims' rights could be safeguarded without a constitutional amendment. It would only be necessary for actors within the criminal justice system-- judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and others--to suddenly begin fully respecting victims' rights. The real world question, however, is how to actually trigger such a shift in the Zeitgeist. For nearly two decades, victims have obtained a variety of measures to protect their rights. Yet, the prevailing view from those who work in the field is that these efforts have `all too often been ineffective.' Rules to assist victims `frequently fail to provide meaningful protection whenever they come into conflict with'''--and here I break the quotation--not the defendant's rights. They are not conflicting with defendant's rights. That is not why they are denied, but rather ``whenever they come into conflict with bureaucratic habit, traditional indifference, or sheer inertia.'' That is what is preventing these rights from being fully affected-- not that they conflict with the defendant's rights. Here is the conclusion: The view that State victims provisions have been and will continue to often be disregarded is widely shared, as some of the strongest opponents of the amendment seem to concede the point. For example, Ellen Greenlee, president of the National Legal Aid and Defenders Association, bluntly and revealingly told Congress that the State victims amendments, ``so far have been treated as mere statements of principle that victims ought to be included and consulted more by prosecutors and courts. A State constitution is far . . . easier to ignore than the Federal one.'' That is the bottom line point. State constitutions, even Federal statutes, as we found in the Oklahoma City bombing case, are far easier to ignore than the U.S. Constitution. That is something no judge and no prosecutor can ignore. That is why we want to elevate these rights--not because they conflict with the defendant's rights, not because they take anything away from any accused in the courtroom, but rather because these elemental rights of fairness are not currently being enforced by the judges and prosecutors because they just don't have the stature of the U.S. Constitution.

Mr. KYL. If I could put an exclamation point on that. The point Senator Feinstein makes is this: During the pendency of the proceedings, the victim has the right to assert these rights. For example, if you have a week-long trial and the victim finds out about the trial after the second day, the victim can't go back and say you have to start the trial all over again. All the victim can do is say, hey, I have a right to be there for the rest of the trial. That is unlike the defendant's rights. Here is the exact language we included: ``Nothing in this article shall provide grounds to stay or continue any trial, reopen any proceeding, or invalidate any ruling''-- and there are only two exceptions--``except with respect to conditional release or restitution or to provide rights guaranteed by this article in future proceedings without staying or continuing a trial. Nothing in this article shall give rise to or authorize the creation of a claim for damages . . .'' There are only two exceptions. One is prospective, so long as it does not continue or delay the proceedings. In other words, you have the right to say: Judge, this trial is starting, and I have a right to be there. And the other one is with respect to a conditional release. I close with this point: You need the right to enforce it with respect to a conditional release. Here is a true story. Here is how it would work. Patricia Pollard of Flagstaff, AZ, was picked up one night by a man and his wife, ironically, and the man brutally raped her, sliced her up with an open beer can, and left her to die. She lived. He was eventually prosecuted. After the Arizona legislature passed the provision which enabled victims to be notified, the parole board held a hearing on his conditional release. They decided to conditionally release her assailant from the Arizona State Penitentiary, but they did not give her notice. The Governor's office found out about this, located Patricia Pollard in California, brought her back, and arranged for another meeting of the parole board after they had already made their decision. They agreed to hear her. She spoke about what he had done to her and what she feared he would do to others. The parole board reversed its decision. I asked Patricia Pollard whether she did that because she feared for her life, that he would come after her again. She said: Well, he might have tried to track me down. But in truth, his crime against me was a random kind of crime. I was available for him to victimize. I simply could not have lived with myself if I had not gone there and told these people what he could do to someone else because I know that had he gotten out, he would have done it to somebody else. That is why we provide this limited exception, the only situation, really, where something can be done retroactively--where a person was not given notice to attend the parole or conditional release proceedings and the individual has not yet been released, you can go back in and tell your story and just maybe it will make a difference. That is what this amendment is all about, protecting the rights not only of the victims of crime but of the rest of society as well.

Mr. KYL. I have completed my opening statement. I don't think there is a specific agreement. The time is divided equally.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, this is a historic time because we are about to commence a debate on an amendment that has passed through the Senate Judiciary Committee but has not yet come to the floor of the Senate; that is, an amendment to the U.S. Constitution to protect the rights of victims of violent crime. I am very pleased this morning, along with Senator Dianne Feinstein of California, to be making the primary case in support of this amendment. I would like to make some opening remarks and then turn our opening time over to Senator Feinstein for a discussion of the history of this amendment and much of the articulation of the need for it. But let me make a few preliminary comments. First of all, we have heard a little bit about passion on a related matter. I can tell you there is nothing about which I am more passionate these days than supporting the rights of victims of violent crime. According to the Department of Justice, there are over 8 million victims of violent crime in our society every year. Not enough is being done to protect the rights of these victims. They have no constitutional rights, unlike the defendants. Those accused of crime have more than a dozen rights which have been largely secured by amendments to the U.S. Constitution. They, of course, trump any rights that States, either by statute or State constitutional provision, grant to the victims of crime. It is time to level the playing field, to balance the scales of justice, and provide some rights for victims of crime. These are very basic and simple rights, as Senator Feinstein will articulate in just a moment. To secure basic rights to be informed and to be present and to be heard at critical stages throughout the judicial process is the least that our society owes people it has failed to protect. Thirty-two State constitutional amendments have been passed by an average popular vote of nearly 80 percent. Clearly, the American people have developed a consensus that the rights of crime victims deserve protection. Unfortunately, these State provisions have not been applied with sufficient seriousness to ensure the protection of these victims of crime. Let me note some quotations, first from the Attorney General of the United States, and then from attorneys general--these are the law enforcement officials of our country--and the Governors, who, of course, are the chief executives of the various States. Attorney General Reno explained, in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee: Efforts to secure victims' rights through means other than a constitutional amendment have proved less than fully adequate. Victims' rights advocates have sought reforms at the State level for the past 20 years. However, these efforts have failed to fully safeguard victims' rights. These significant State efforts simply are not sufficiently consistent, comprehensive, or authoritative to safeguard victims' rights. Legal commentators have reached the same conclusion. For example, Harvard law professor Laurence Tribe has explained that the existing statutes and State amendments ``are likely, as experience to date sadly shows, to provide too little real protection whenever they come into conflict with bureaucratic habit, traditional indifference, sheer inertia, or any mention of an accused's rights regardless of whether those rights are genuinely threatened.'' According to a December 1998 report from the National Institute of Justice, the victims are denied their rights. The report concluded that: Enactment of state laws and state constitutional amendments alone appear to be insufficient to guarantee the full provision of victims' rights in practice. The report went on to note numerous examples of how victims were not given rights they were already supposed to be given under State provisions. For example, even in several States identified as giving strong protection to victims' rights, fewer than 60 percent of the victims were notified of the sentencing hearing, and fewer than 40 percent were notified of the pretrial release of the defendant. That can be a serious matter to a victim of crime. A followup analysis of the same data found that racial minorities are less likely to be afforded their rights under the patchwork of existing statutes. According to a letter, dated April 21 of this year, signed by 39 of the State attorneys general: We are convinced that statutory protections are not enough; only a federal constitutional amendment will be sufficient to change the culture of our legal system. A 400-page report by the Department of Justice on victims' rights and services concluded that: [t]he U.S. Constitution should be amended to guarantee fundamental rights for victims of crime. The report continued: A victims' rights constitutional amendment is the only legal measure strong enough to rectify the current inconsistencies in victims' rights laws that vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction on the state and federal levels. For those who are concerned that somehow a Federal constitutional amendment would impinge upon States rights other than noticing, of course, that 75 percent of the States would have to approve such a constitutional amendment for it to go into effect, let me refer to a resolution of the National Governors' Association, which passed by a vote of 49-1, strongly supporting a constitutional amendment. It stated: Despite . . . widespread state initiatives, the rights of victims do not receive the same consideration or protection as the rights of the accused. These rights exist on different judicial levels. Victims are relegated to a position of secondary importance in the judicial process. The resolution also stated: The rights of victims have always received secondary consideration within the U.S. Judicial process, even though states and the American people by a wide plurality consider victims' rights to be fundamental. Protection of these basic rights is essential and can only come from a fundamental change in our basic law: the U.S. Constitution. That is it. Despite the well-meaning intention of judges, prosecutors, and others who fundamentally agree that victims need these rights of basic fairness in our criminal justice system, as the evidence has overwhelmingly demonstrated, they are just not getting that kind of fair treatment, despite the best efforts of all these people. That is why, after 18 years, the conclusion has been reached by so many that the only way to guarantee these rights is by placing them in the U.S. Constitution where defendants' rights have also been amended into existence. We all know it shouldn't be easy to amend the Constitution, but we have been very careful to communicate with prosecutors and others who are familiar with the issues. After 63 drafts, we think we have it right. We think we have a very tightly drawn amendment, which Senator Feinstein will explain in just a moment, that protects these rights without denigrating whatsoever the rights of the defendants or those accused of crime. Our amendment has 42 cosponsors in this body, a bipartisan group of Democrats and Republicans. We have 39 State attorneys general who have signed a strong letter in support. Our Presidential candidates, both current and past, have strongly supported a crime victims' rights amendment, as have groups such as Parents of Murdered Children, Mothers Against Drunk Driving, the National Organization for Victim Assistance, and others. I thought it would be appropriate to recognize the President of the United States, who said in a very strong statement before a number of crime victims' rights groups: I strongly believe that victims should be central participants in the criminal justice system, and that it will take a constitutional amendment to give the rights of victims the same status as the rights of the accused. He also said the following, which I think represents the views of all of us in this body: I do not support amending the Constitution lightly; it is sacred. It should be changed only with great caution and after much consideration. But I reject the idea that it should never be changed. Change it lightly and you risk its distinction. But never change it and you risk its vitality. But this is different. This is not an attempt to put legislative responsibilities in the Constitution or to guarantee a right that is already guaranteed. Amending the Constitution here is simply the only way to guarantee the victims' rights are weighed equally with defendants' rights in every courtroom in America. Mr. President, that is all we ask. I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record three pages of groups that strongly support our amendment.

Mr. KYL. I agree it is perplexing how one could conclude a defendant's rights would be trampled on in any way by our proposal. It does not do that. The article in the Los Angeles Times, quoting Professors Tribe and Cassell, makes the point that ``a victims' rights amendment must, of course, be drafted so the rights of victims will not furnish excuses for roughshod treatment of the accused. The Senate Resolution is such a carefully crafted measure, adding victims' rights that can exist side by side with defendants'.'' Precisely the point. There is only one conceivable circumstance I know of in which there could actually be an assertion of two constitutional rights, one by the defendant and one by the victim, which could theoretically come in conflict, and that is the right to be present at the trial. Courts deal with that today. They would balance the interests tomorrow. We have the same thing existing with respect to the press. We have the right of free press. Say victims want to attend the trial. Sometimes, as we know, judges don't permit that, but it is in the Constitution. That is right. But the defendant has a right to a fair trial as well. The courts will balance those two interests and generally come to an accommodation that enforces both rights.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I appreciate the members of the minority allowing me to speak for a moment on this important piece of legislation. It is legislation I cosponsored when Congress convened earlier last year. It was Kay Bailey Hutchison's bill to repeal the marriage tax penalty. Since that time, the legislation has been adopted to provide for an essential repeal for most Americans. That is the pending business before us. I have supported similar measures ever since I came to the Senate in 1995, and I am very pleased the majority leader has attempted to schedule a vote on this prior to tax day. As we have just seen, it may not be possible for the Senate to actually vote on repealing the marriage tax penalty prior to tax day, but it would certainly be our hope that that could be accomplished immediately thereafter, if not before. This will be the third time in 5 years we have acted to mitigate the marriage tax penalty. In 1995, Congress passed legislation that would have provided a tax credit to married couples to partially offset this penalty. President Clinton vetoed that bill. In 1999, Congress again approved a measure to provide married couples with some relief. Last year's bill would have set the standard deduction for couples at twice the deduction allowed for singles. It also would have set the lowest income tax bracket for married couples at twice that allowed for single taxpayers. Again, President Clinton vetoed that last September. According to the nonpartisan Tax Foundation, the total tax burden borne by American taxpayers dipped slightly in 1998. That is the good news. The bad news is Americans still spent more on Federal taxes than on any of the other major items in their household budget. For the median-income two-earner family, for example, Federal taxes still amounted to 39 percent of the family budget, more than what they spent on food, housing, and medical care combined. One of the reasons why they paid so much is the continuation of the marriage tax penalty that exists in the Nation's Tax Code. According to the Congressional Budget Office, nearly half of all married taxpayers--about 21 million couples--filing a joint return paid a higher tax than they would have if each spouse had been allowed to file as a single taxpayer. The marriage tax penalty hits the working poor particularly hard. Two-earner families making less than $20,000 often must devote a full 8 percent of their income to pay the marriage tax penalty. Eight percent is an extraordinary amount for couples who count on every dollar to make ends meet. I will give an example of the marriage tax penalty at work. In this example, the penalty comes about because workers filing as single taxpayers get a higher standard deduction and because income tax bracket thresholds for married couples are lower than the thresholds for singles. Consider a married couple with each spouse earning about $30,000 a year. They would have paid $7,655 in Federal income taxes last year. By comparison, two individuals earning the same amount but filing a joint return would have paid $6,892 between the two of them. That is a marriage tax penalty of $763, about a 10-percent penalty simply for being married. The average penalty paid by couples is even higher than that--about $1,400 a year, according to the Congressional Budget Office. Think what families could do with an extra $1,400. They could pay for 3 or 4 months of day care if they chose to send a child outside the home, or make it easier for one parent to stay at home and take care of the children if that is what they decide is best for them. They could make four or five payments on a car or minivan. They could pay their utility bill for 9 months. The bill reported by the Finance Committee is the most comprehensive effort yet to eliminate the marriage penalty. It will increase the standard for couples filing jointly to twice the deduction allowed for single taxpayers. It will widen the 15-percent and 28-percent tax brackets. It will allow more low-income married couples to qualify for the earned-income credit and preserve the family tax credits that are currently phased out by the alternative minimum tax. Unlike President Clinton's so-called relief bill, the plan Chairman Roth brings to us today does not neglect married couples who choose to have one parent stay at home to raise their children. It gives them relief and, in so doing, it let's them know we value the choice they have made to stay home and raise a family. Unlike the Clinton plan, which would preserve the penalty for many couples, our plan would eliminate the marriage tax penalty in its entirety. Sure, that means revenue loss associated with this legislation is greater than the President proposed, but the smaller cost of providing relief under the Clinton plan is also indicative of just how little it would do to solve the problem. We should not be stingy when attempting to ensure fairness in the Tax Code. Passage of this legislation will continue the good progress we have made this year in making the Tax Code fairer. First, we passed the measure to repeal the Social Security earnings limitation, a tax that has unfairly penalized seniors for more than 60 years simply because they wanted to earn extra income to supplement their monthly retirement checks. The measure is now law. Hopefully, the marriage tax penalty repeal bill will pass with a strong bipartisan majority, and President Clinton will rethink his opposition and sign it when it reaches his desk. Another thing we can do to make the Tax Code fairer is eliminate the death tax. Although most Americans will probably never pay the death tax, overwhelming majorities still sense there is something terribly wrong with a system that allows Washington to seize more than half of whatever is left after someone dies--a system that prevents hard- working Americans from passing the bulk of their nest eggs to their children or grandchildren. We can debate the merits of any number of changes in the Tax Code-- whether a flat tax is preferable to a sales tax; whether tax rates should be reduced across the board; or whether we should make the Tax Code more conducive to savings and investment. There are legitimate points to be made on all sides. But when it comes to fairness, we need to do what is right. The marriage tax penalty, as the earnings limit and the death tax, is wrong; it is unfair; and it is time to put it to rest. I thank Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison from Texas for her hard work. I thank Chairman Roth for bringing it forward. I appreciate the work of the majority leader in getting this matter before the Senate for a vote so we can finally end the marriage tax penalty. I again thank Senator Hutchison for deferring to me for my remarks.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise today to speak in support of S. 2285, the Federal Fuels Tax Holiday Act of 2000. Our country is in dire need of a comprehensive energy policy, including a strategy to reduce fuel prices. Immediately suspending the 4.3 cent per gallon Clinton/Gore gas tax is one thing we can do in the short-term to provide some relief from the high fuel prices we have been experiencing. S. 2285 would further suspend all but 0.1 percent of federal excise taxes on fuels if the national average price of a gallon of regular unleaded gasoline rises to $2. While I fully support this concept, we should consider doing more. I have cosponsored legislation in the past that would permanently repeal all but two cents per gallon of the federal gas tax, allowing states to make up the difference if they choose to fund their own highway-construction needs. Mr. President, we Arizonans have been sending more gas tax revenues to Washington than we receive back in federal highway funds. For Arizona, and other so-called donor states, repeal of the federal tax would either mean significant tax relief or, if the state does increase its own tax, more dollars actually spent on highway improvements in- state. It is time to divest the federal government of this authority, and give it back to the states where it rightfully belongs. To ensure our energy security in the long-term, we also need a strategy for reducing our dependence on imported oil. Today we are extremely dependent on other countries for our oil--56 percent comes from foreign sources. While our imports are rising, domestic production is decreasing. In just the last decade, U.S. production has declined 17 percent. At the same time, our consumption has increased 14 percent. Unfortunately, we are moving in the direction of greater dependence on foreign oil, not less. To reverse this trend we need to stop the decline in domestic production, which can only be done by increasing access to lands with high potential for oil and gas resources. Of course this can, and must, be done in an environmentally sensitive manner. While extraction should be part of a larger energy strategy, including the development of alternative fuels, and conservation efforts, it is a critical component. Increasing domestic production will help reverse our rising reliance on imported oil, and will boost supply, thereby lowering prices.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise in support of S.J. Res. 14, the flag protection constitutional amendment, and to explain, quite briefly, my opposition to Senator McConnell's statutory substitute. The McConnell amendment (No. 2889) would amend the U.S. Code to establish jail terms and fines for (1) damaging a flag ``with the primary purpose and intent to incite or produce imminent violence or a breach of the peace,'' (2) damaging a flag that belongs to the United States, or (3) damaging a flag that belongs to a third party if the damage occurs within the ``exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of the United States.'' See Section 3, proposed 18 U.S.C. 700. I oppose the McConnell amendment for three reasons. First, the narrow strictures of the amendment would provide little protection for the flag. For example, the McConnell amendment would not apply to the very case (Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)) in which the Supreme Court struck down flag protection statutes. In that case, Gregory Johnson burned a flag that had been stolen from a bank. He did not burn the flag on Federal property; be burned it in front of city hall as a political protest. Thus, the second and third restrictions of the McConnell amendment (a ban on destroying flags stolen from the United States, and a ban on destroying stolen flags on Federal property) would not have applied. As for the first restriction (a ban on burning a flag when such action could cause imminent violence or a breach of the peace), it is important to note that the Court in Texas v. Johnson found that unless there was evidence that a riot ensued or threatened to ensue one could not protect the flag under the breach of the peace doctrine. Second, it seems unlikely that the amendment would survive scrutiny by the U.S. Supreme Court. In response to Texas v. Johnson, Congress quickly enacted a facially content-neutral, flag-protection statute that it hoped would pass constitutional muster. See Public Law 101-131. On June 11, 1990, in United States v. Eichman (496 U.S. 310 (1990)), the Supreme Court struck down that law. The Court found the following: ``Although the Flag Protection Act contains no explicit content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct, it is nevertheless clear that the government's asserted interest is `related to the suppression of free expression,' and concerned with the content of such expression. The Government's interest in protecting the `physical integrity' of a privately owned flag rests upon a perceived need to preserve the flag's status as a symbol of our Nation and certain national ideas.'' Id. at 315-16. If precedent is an accurate guide, it is likely that the Court would reach a similar conclusion if it considered the McConnell amendment. Finally, as one of the 58 Senate sponsors of S.J. Res. 14, I want to see that resolution receive an up-or-down vote. The sponsors of the amendment and the numerous veterans, patriotic, civic, and religious groups have worked hard to bring the constitutional amendment to a vote. In closing, I would like to reaffirm my support for S.J. Res. 14. I cannot believe that our Founding Fathers intended ``freedom of expression'' to encompass the willful destruction of our national symbol--the symbol of America that so many of our sons and daughters have given their lives to defend.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me express my appreciation to Senators Roth and Moynihan, and especially to Senators Bob Kerrey and Judd Gregg for their efforts. This is clearly an idea where the time has come. My colleagues are correct to emphasize that saving Social Security for the future will require us to put aside the prospect of partisan gain for the good of the country and of our senior citizens. I respect the point they have made. I hope the step we are taking today, which could not be taken without a bipartisan consensus, bodes well for future reform of Social Security. I am quite pleased to see that the Senate is on the verge of taking this momentous action of eliminating the earnings test for those between the ages of 65 and 69. It is a step that is long overdue. Many of us have been calling for the repeal of this test for many years. In fact, the occupant of the Chair and I were part of the 100th class of Republicans in the House of Representatives who made repealing this earnings test one of our projects. We have been at this for a long time. When I came to the Senate, I joined Senator John McCain, who has been a champion for this cause, in introducing the Senior Citizens' Freedom to Work Act in the opening days of the 106th Congress. When we did that, I wondered whether it would fare any better than when we had offered it in the past. Now, at long last, we have forged a bipartisan consensus for taking action which even includes the President, and relief is finally in sight for working seniors. I have always believed it just wasn't right to impose steep taxes on people who tried to work after reaching retirement age. It isn't right that under current law seniors between the ages of 65 and 69 lose a dollar for every $3 they earn above the threshold of $17,000. In fact, last year, 800,000 seniors lost a portion of their benefit because of this unfair tax. It isn't right that, combined with regular income taxes, and the taxation of Social Security benefits, the earnings test subjects some working seniors to an effective marginal tax rate of more than 100 percent. That is not right. We all know this earnings test was created during the Depression era when policymakers felt an urgent need to give opportunities to young workers by encouraging seniors to leave the workforce. Today, America faces an extraordinarily tight labor market and seniors are living longer, more productive lives. In that context, a policy that penalizes our most experienced citizens for their hard work is not just unfair, it is counterproductive. America needs the skills and knowledge senior citizens have acquired, especially in today's competitive global marketplace. I believe repealing the earnings test also affirms our commitment to the values of self-help and personal responsibility. After working to accomplish this repeal throughout my entire time in the Congress, I am very pleased to note that we are so close to completing the job today. Again, my compliments to all those people who have worked so hard to make this a reality.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise to discuss the nominations of Richard Paez and Marsha Berzon to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. I intend to vote against Judge Paez and for Marsha Berzon. Because these nominations have received a great deal of attention, I would like to briefly explain the reasons for my votes. I want to begin by briefly discussing the ninth circuit. As a Senator from Arizona (the state which generates more appeals than any other ninth circuit state except California), as a member of the Judiciary Committee, and as someone who practiced law in the ninth circuit for nearly 20 years, I have a keen interest in matters affecting the ninth circuit. Richard Paez and Marsha Berzon are, of course, nominees to the ninth circuit. I agree with many of my colleagues that nominees to the ninth circuit should be given special scrutiny because of the problems with the circuit. The ninth circuit has received a great deal of criticism--so much, in fact, that Congress passed bipartisan legislation to require a blue- ribbon commission to study the circuit. See Public Law No. 105-119, section 305(a)(1)(B) and (a)(6). Before both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, I have testified in detail as to my concerns with the circuit, so I will not go into detail here. I would like to just mention one statistic that speaks volumes: In the past 6 years, the Supreme Court has reversed (often unanimously) the ninth circuit in 86 percent (85 of 99) of the cases it has reviewed. The average reversal rate for courts other than the ninth circuit is about 57 percent. As Justice Scalia commented in a September 9, 1998, letter to Justice White, the chair of the Commission on Structural Alternatives, the Ninth Circuit's ``reversal rate has appreciably--sometimes drastically--exceeded the national average.'' This is but one small piece in a mountain of evidence that indicates that the ninth circuit is out of the mainstream of American jurisprudence. See, for example, letters to the Commission on Structural Alternatives by Justice Scalia (August 21, 1998), Justice Kennedy (August 17, 1998), and Justice O'Connor (June 23, 1998); Commission on Structural Alternatives, Final Report, December 18, 1998; Review of the Report by the Commission on Structural Alternatives regarding the Ninth Circuit and S. 253, the Ninth Circuit Reorganization Act, hearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Congress, 1st Session (July 16, 1999) (statements of ninth circuit Judges Pamela Ann Rymer (member of commission) and Diarmund F. O'Scannlain). It seems clear that the ninth circuit has problems. Even those who oppose dividing or splitting the circuit concede this point. Thus, in my opinion, nominees to this circuit-- which is effectively the court of last resort for more than 52 million people--should be given special scrutiny. The Constitution imposes an important role upon the Senate. In exercising its advice and consent power, the Senate must be vigilant in ensuring that, at a minimum, nominees are of top legal caliber, possess good judgment, have the proper judicial temperament, are of unquestioned integrity and impartiality, and would not abuse the great power of their office--an office they will hold for life. In this regard, I would like to reiterate the comments that I made before this body 3 years ago, on March 12, 1997. Some have attributed the Ninth Circuit reversal rate to the unwieldy size of the bench. Others point to a history of judicial activism, sometimes in pursuit of political results. I suspect there is more than one reason for the problem. Whatever the case, the Senate will need to be especially sensitive to this problem when it provides its advice and consent on nominations to fill court vacancies. The nominees will need to demonstrate exceptional ability and objectivity. The Senate will obviously have an easier time evaluating candidates who have a record on a lower court bench. Such records are often good indications of whether a judge is--or is likely to be--a judicial activist, and whether he or she is frequently reversed. Nominees who do not have a judicial background or who have a more political background may be more difficult to evaluate. . . . [T]he Senate has as much responsibility as the President for those who end up being confirmed. We need to take that responsibility seriously-- among other things, to begin the process of reducing the reversal rate of our largest circuit. I remain quite concerned about the ninth circuit. In the October 1999 term, the U.S. Supreme Court has so far reviewed seven ninth circuit cases and in all seven cases the ninth circuit has been reversed--four times unanimously, twice by a 7-2 margin, and once by a 5-4 vote. If the ninth circuit continues to remain out of step, it will be very hard to continue to give ninth circuit nominees the benefit of the doubt. The risk is too great. The ninth circuit covers nine states and two territories. To have so many subject to a circuit that so often errs should concern us all. Within this context, the general rule that a President should be given deference in making nominations to the federal judiciary is less relevant to today's nominations. While Judge Paez is academically qualified, I have reservations about him for a variety of reasons. First, he made what many consider to be inappropriate comments while he was a federal district court judge. In an April 6, 1995 speech at Boalt Hall School of Law in Berkeley, California, Judge Paez said the following: The Latino community has, for some time now, faced heightened discrimination and hostility, which came to a head with the passage of proposition 187. The proposed anti-civil rights initiative [Proposition 209] will inflame the issues all over again, without contributing to any serious discussion of our differences and similarities or ways to ensure equal opportunity for all. Judge Paez was, as I noted above, a sitting federal district court judge when he made this remark, and litigation was pending in Judge Paez' own court, the Central District of California, regarding the constitutionality of Proposition 187. The court had granted a temporary restraining order and had before it a request for a preliminary injunction, which the district court did not rule on until November 1995, 7 months after Judge Paez' speech. As Senator Spence Abraham pointed out in a detailed statement before the Senate, Judge Paez' remark seems inconsistent with Canon 4(A)(1) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct which governs judges' extra-judicial activities. Under that canon, ``a judge shall conduct all of the judge's extra-judicial activities so that they do not cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge.'' In discussing Judge Paez' comments in an October 29, 1999, editorial, the Washington Post stated that ``[f]or a sitting judge to disparage ballot initiatives that were likely subjects to litigation was inappropriate.'' And, indeed, the judge appears to have, at least privately, acknowledged this error. Judge Paez made another troubling comment. On March 26, 1982, in the Los Angeles Daily Journal, he is quoted as making the following statement. I appreciate * * * the need of the courts to act when they must, when the issue has been generated as a result of the failure of the political process to resolve a certain political question * * * There's no choice but for the courts to resolve the question that perhaps ideally and preferably should be resolved through the legislative process. At the time of this statement, Paez was a municipal court judge. In the same article, he commented that ``you could characterize my background as liberal.'' Judge Paez' supporters have made comments that raise concerns. For example, in an August 13, 1993 Los Angeles Times article, Romana Ripstein, the executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, made the following statement in discussing Paez's nomination to the federal district court: ``It's been a while since we've had these kinds of appointments to the federal court. I think it's a welcome change after all the pro-law enforcement people we've seen appointed to the state and federal courts.'' If this is an accurate portrayal of his predilections, Ms. Ripstein's characterization is troubling. Similarly, in a November 17, 1995, Los Angeles Daily Journal article, trial attorney Steven Yagman commented that ``Judge Paez embodies the ideal of the '60's. The Judge is an intelligent, moral person who got power and uses it to do good.'' Judges are not supposed to use power to do good (especially since that is a subjective term). Judges are supposed to apply the law. That's why we say we are a nation of laws. Judge Paez also has been criticized for giving--without explaining how he arrived at the sentence--what many consider to be a light sentence to former Representative Jay Kim following Kim's guilty plea for having accepted more than $250,000 in illegal campaign contributions, the largest acknowledge receipt of illegal contributions in congressional history. In the March 10, 1998, Los Angeles Times, Assistant U.S. Attorney Stephen Mansfield said, ``The sentence . . . must not be a `slap on the wrist.' It must not approximate a penalty for `jaywalking'.'' The Los Angeles Times also reported that ``[o]utside the federal courthouse, prosecutors made it clear that they were disappointed but not stunned by Paez' sentence.'' On March 12, 1998, Roll Call wrote, ``All the evidence--and the fact that Kim received a lighter sentence than his former campaign treasurer--makes Judge Paez' sentence a mere slap on the wrist and makes us think that the Senate Judiciary Committee ought to question whether Paez isn't too soft on criminals to be an appellate judge.'' None of these factors would by itself necessarily disqualify a nominee, but taken as a whole they are troubling and lead me to conclude that, on balance, Judge Paez is apt to be an activist rather than a neutral arbiter. As a result, I reluctantly conclude that I cannot support his nomination. I have concerns about Marsha Berzon. Almost her entire legal experience has been in one narrow field--labor law. According to her Senate Judiciary questionnaire, ``more than 95 percent'' of her work has been civil. Additionally, she stated that ``I have not personally examined or cross-examined a witness in any trial'' and that ``I have not tried any cases myself, jury or non-jury.'' Concerns have been expressed by the National Right to Work Committee and the Chamber of Commerce because of her narrow labor-oriented background. While I share these concerns, I am unaware of credible evidence suggesting that she fails to possess the requisite capability or temperament to serve on the bench. As a result, although I have serious concerns about her nomination, I will support it.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise today to recognize and say farewell to an outstanding Naval Officer and fellow Arizonian, Lieutenant Michael Sullivan, who has served with distinction for the past year and a half years in the Navy's Senate Liaison Office on Capitol Hill. It is a privilege for me to recognize his many outstanding achievements and to commend him for the superb service he has provided this legislative body, the Navy, and our great Nation. Lieutenant Sullivan comes from a patriotic family. His grandfather was a submariner during World War II and his father is a Navy veteran of the Riverine Force in Vietnam. The Sullivan Family lived in the Bronx, New York before moving to the great state of Arizona. Lieutenant Sullivan attended elementary and middle public schools in Scottsdale and ultimately graduated from Saguaro High School. He was attending the University of Arizona, and I was still a Member of the House of Representatives, when he applied for the most privileged of responsibilities I have as a Member of Congress--making a nomination for appointments to the U.S. Service Academies. It was with great pride that I had submitted his name to attend the United States Naval Academy where he graduated and earned his commission in 1993. Lieutenant Sullivan joined the Navy's Senate Liaison team in July 1998, following successful sea tours on board the U.S.S. Fife (DD-991) and the U.S.S. Antietam (CG-54). During his service as a Navy Liaison Officer he provided members of the Senate and our personal staffs with timely support and accurate information on Navy plans, programs, and constituent casework. He has helped us maintain the best trained, best equipped, and best prepared Navy in the world. Mr. President, Lieutenant Sullivan has served proudly with a dedication and enthusiasm that only comes from our Nation's best and brightest. Lieutenant Sullivan is a great credit to both our Navy and our country. As he now departs for Department Head School and his next sea tour, I call upon my colleagues from both sides of the aisle to wish him the best for a continued brilliant Navy career.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I compliment Senator Hatch for the great way in which he explained this amendment which Senators Coverdell, Collins, Hatch, and myself have cosponsored. He points out that we have goals for excellence in teaching, and this is a way to help foster those goals. We ask our teachers to do a great deal. This is one small step we can take to help those who are most willing to help their students. I thank Senator Hatch for an excellent statement. I also thank Senator Collins for the kind remarks she made last evening. It has been a pleasure to work with her. She is a real leader in education. To be able to join my amendment with her amendment as one approach which provides some relief to the teachers who are willing to take that extra step to help their students is certainly an honor for me. To recapitulate for our colleagues because I think we are going to be voting soon, I leave it to Senator Collins to close the debate unless there is anyone else who would like to speak to it. The old saying of taking an apple to the teacher at school has caused us to stop and think a little bit. It is fine to take an apple to the teacher, but there is a way we can be a little bit more helpful to those teachers who go the extra mile. There may not be a direct relationship between excellence in teaching and providing some assistance to those teachers who will go out of their way to take extra supplies to their students, but I suspect there, in fact, is a connection because these are the most dedicated of all--those teachers who realize their local schools have not been able to provide quite enough in instructional materials for their kids, and out of their own family budget they are willing to make a contribution for their students' education. As I pointed out last night, the NEA estimates, according to a study, that each teacher annually spends $408 out of his or her pocket to help kids in school by taking these instructional materials to them. These two amendments, in a small way but an important way, recognize that dedication and that contribution. In the case of my half of the amendment, it provides dollar for dollar in relief and $100 in the case of Senator Collins' amendment. It relieves 2 percent of the burden for itemizing it, which Senator Hatch just spoke about. Is this going to solve all of our woes in education? No. But is it an important recognition of the job teachers do, particularly those teachers who are willing to go the extra mile? We think it is. To the degree they are willing to supplement what their schools provide for students, and it comes out of their own pockets, we think we should at least cause them no harm in that process. That is why we provide these two elements of tax relief basically to encourage them to continue to work with their students in this way. I conclude again by thanking Senator Coverdell for his leadership, Senator Collins, and Senator Hatch. I hope my colleagues will give this amendment their overwhelming support.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise to bring to the attention of the Senate a serious problem facing many thousands of Medicare beneficiaries in Arizona. On November 16, 1999, Premier Health Care of Arizona went into receivership. The health care of more than 20,000 Medicare beneficiaries who were enrolled in Premier has been affected by this solvency. Since Premier Medicare HMO was placed in receivership, I have been advised that some non-contract providers--providers outside of the HMO network--have asserted that Medicare beneficiaries are personally liable for unpaid claims and have referred the outstanding claims to collection agencies. These unpaid claims--some of which may date back more than six months and amount to significant sums of money--have made it difficult for many contract and non-contract providers to continue to provide care to Medicare beneficiaries. Because Premier operated in a largely rural area where few alternative providers were accessible, this has created a dire health-care delivery situation for Medicare beneficiaries. Mr. President, today I introduce legislation that addresses the Arizona situation, as well as future Medicare+Choice insolvencies, wherever they may occur. This legislation mandates that, after a Medicare+Choice goes into receivership, the receiver--in this case, the state insurance commissioner--may apply to the Secretary of HHS for payment of all valid, unpaid provider claims for items or services furnished to Medicare enrollees before the date the receiver was appointed. Contract providers will be paid at their contract rate, while non- contract providers will be paid for the ``reasonable cost'' of the covered item or service. Amounts needed to make these payments will be paid out of the Part A or Part B trust fund, as is appropriate based on which fund would have paid the claim on a fee-for-services basis. To recover these amounts paid to providers, the bill establishes that HCFA will become a creditor of the receivership estate and assumes the priority position of the respective providers it has paid. The bill also mandates that Medicare+Choice enrollees may not be held liable to contract or non-contract providers for any claims that are unpaid by the Medicare+Choice organization. While the regulation of state-licensed Medicare+Choice organizations is primarily a state responsibility, the Medicare law makes clear that the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the administrator of HCFA have an ongoing ``responsibility to ensure that it (HCFA) contracts only with fiscally-sound Medicare+Choice organizations.'' To this end, Section 1857(d) gives the Secretary the right to audit and inspect any books and records that pertain either to the ability of the Medicare HMO to bear the risk of potential financial loss, or to the quality and timeliness of services provided for Medicare beneficiaries. See 42 CFR 422.502, 516 and 552. My bill strengthens current law and regulation by requiring that, once HCFA determines that a Medicare+Choice organization may not be able to bear the risk of financial losses, the Secretary must promptly notify the appropriate state officials and provide those officials with the information on which that determination is based. The bill also strengthens current law by requiring that, when Medicare+Choice organizations fail to provide prompt payments to providers, the Secretary must pay providers directly. Under my bill, if the Medicare+Choice plan fails to provide prompt payment of 10 percent of claims submitted for services and supplies furnished to enrollees within 60 days of the date on which the claim was submitted, the Secretary must pay contract and non-contract providers directly--there is no discretion as there is in current law. To avoid a repeat of this problem with other carriers in the future, the bill requires that Medicare+Choice organizations post a surety bond of no less than $500,000, as well as meet any additional requirements related to bonding or escrow accounts that the Secretary deems necessary. The bond requirement may be waived if a comparable surety bond is required under state law. Mr. President, this legislation will enable the government to fulfill its promise to those seniors who have chosen to receive their Medicare coverage through a Medicare+Choice organization. It will prevent seniors from being billed for covered services and providers from losing large sums in unpaid bills. If providers aren't paid, many may be unwilling--or unable--to continue providing care. If quality care is not available through experienced providers, or if seniors are the subject of legal action for the bills of insolvent Medicare+Choice organizations, beneficiaries will lose confidence in the Medicare+Choice programs, and ultimately, in Medicare fee-for-service as well. We simply can't let that happen. The Congress must ensure that providers are paid and Medicare beneficiaries are protected. This is a commitment we have made to seniors--it is a commitment we must fulfill.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Nevada. I appreciate his willingness to allow me to move forward. Also, what Senator Lott told us is extremely important. His point is this is an act that is not going to be opposed by very many Senators once we can get it to the floor for a vote. It is the procedural maneuvering that is going on right now by some who want to gain an advantage in this debate to propose some of their own extracurricular ideas that have nothing to do with the bill that is holding us up from considering the bill. I hope, along with the majority leader, we can get quickly to the consideration of this important legislation because, as he correctly noted, once we begin debate on this bill and have an opportunity to vote on it, it is going to receive overwhelming support from Members on both sides of the aisle in the Senate. I want to speak for a moment on an amendment which I intend to offer, but before I do that, I commend the Senator from Georgia, Mr. Coverdell, for his work on S. 1134. He has made a valiant effort, over a long period of time, to bring reform to our educational system. He particularly wants to give all parents more choice in deciding where to send their children and to give them more of their own money with which to do so, or perhaps I should say to allow them to keep more of their own money in order to have those choices. The number of Americans and, as I said, Senators of both parties who agree with Senator Coverdell is growing every day. His education IRA legislation, which was vetoed in 1998, is now a vital component of S. 1134. As noted by the majority leader, it will allow parents, grandparents, labor unions, churches, synagogues, employers, or others to contribute to tax-free savings accounts to provide for a child's education from kindergarten through high school. According to a 1998 report from Congress' Joint Committee on Taxation, 14 million families--a majority of them low and middle income--are currently denied these benefits because of the Clinton veto of this bill in 1998. These are the families who will benefit from this legislation. As one cosponsor of the vetoed bill, Democratic Senator Torricelli, lamented in an op-ed in the New York Times: With one stroke of a pen. . .an effort to begin a vast reform of American education has ended. The Coverdell education IRA would extend a provision which I supported in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 which allowed parents to save $500 per year tax free for their children's college education. However, all levels of education, not just college, need the incentives to improve that market-oriented reforms such as parental school choice supply. The real crisis in education, as former Education Secretary Bill Bennett has observed, ``is at the primary and secondary levels.'' As the majority leader said a moment ago, all of the help we provide for college students goes for nought if our students are not prepared by the time they get to the college level. So we need to be focusing now on the primary and secondary levels. This resurrected Coverdell-Torricelli education IRA will allow families to save up to $2,000 a year in a special education savings account for each of their children. The contributions will be in after-tax dollars, but the interest generated will be tax free, as long as any deductions from the account are used to pay for school expenses. The President may resist it, but we have to develop a unified student assistance funding system that guarantees choice to struggling parents of all income levels with children in all grade levels, from kindergarten through college. Again, as Senator Torricelli said, For real reform to take place, both Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, must look beyond their narrow agendas and partisan political interests and seek out new proposals. Our schoolchildren deserve nothing less. I could not say it better. With that background, let me discuss the amendment which I will be offering to S. 1134. As the whole theory of this is to put resources where they will help the most, I have prepared an amendment which in a very narrow but important way will do precisely that. We call our amendment the Apples for Three Million Teachers Tax Credit Relief Act of 2000, first introduced on January 24 of this year, with Senator Bunning and Senator Fred Thompson as cosponsors. In the House, Representative Matt Salmon introduced companion legislation, H.R. 1710, which currently has 38 cosponsors, including the majority leader, Dick Armey. What will this amendment do? It will provide an annual tax credit of up to $100 for public and private teachers' unreimbursed classroom expenditures that are qualified under the Internal Revenue Code. What does that mean? We know that teachers routinely every year pay for a lot of their supplies for their classrooms to help instruct their children, things they know will be useful in their instruction but which are not provided by their local school districts. There is currently a tax deduction allowed--which I will talk more about in the future--but it does not work as well for these particular taxpayers. Our amendment provides a $100 tax credit right off the top for these school supplies which these teachers are taking to their classrooms. Thomas Jefferson once said ``an educated citizenry is essential for the preservation of democracy.'' As the son and brother of teachers devoted to their students, I know firsthand of the public spiritedness and commitment of these professionals to their students. It falls to our teachers to inculcate the academic values and analytic skills that make good citizenship possible, of which Thomas Jefferson spoke. In talking with teachers, both public and private, I have come to learn that a lot of them use their own money to cover the cost of classroom materials that are not supplied by their schools. Some have used money from the family budget to purchase these needed classroom supplies, and they would do it again. It seems to me we should not expect them to pay for these things out of their own pockets, or at least to give some Federal financial assistance when they do, particularly those who are on a teacher's rather modest income. To put this in perspective, in 1996, according to a study by the National Education Association, the average K-12 teacher spent $408 annually on those classroom materials which they thought they needed for their classroom instruction but which were not supplied by the schools. They spend $408 on average per year. That includes everything from books, workbooks, erasers, pens, pencils, paper, and other equipment. Under current law, a tax deduction is allowed for such expenses but only if the teacher itemizes and only if expenses exceed 2 percent of the teacher's adjusted gross income. I commend Senator Susan Collins for her successful amendment to the Taxpayer Relief Act which eliminates this 2-percent threshold. I look forward to working with her to give our teachers needed relief from their out-of-pocket cost for classroom expenditures. A deduction reduces taxable income. A credit will give teachers relief dollar for dollar spent, in the case of my amendment, up to the $100 annual limit. This isn't the solution, but it is a small first step which I think would be very much appreciated by our hard-working and sacrificing teachers. There is no absolute linkage between these personal contributions to school supplies and the quality of the teaching. However, there likely is some correlation, given the degree of commitment evidenced by these teachers who are spending their own money on their students. We will be helping the best teachers. I believe this will promote high-quality instruction. A similar provision enacted by the Arizona legislature in 1997 has been very well received by our teachers. Incidentally, it was recently upheld in terms of its constitutionality by the Arizona Supreme Court. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this bill and in supporting the amendment I will be offering. I think it is important that our teachers at least be partially reimbursed for some of the financial sacrifices they made to educate our Nation's children. If we are serious about getting dollars to the classrooms that need it, this is really an excellent way to do it. Again, I commend my colleague, Senator Coverdell, for all his efforts in this regard and look forward to working with him in the future as we get this legislation up for debate and, importantly, for a vote in the Senate. Mr. COVERDELL addressed the Chair.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise to bring to the attention of the Senate a serious problem facing many thousands of Medicare beneficiaries in Arizona. On November 16, 1999, Premier Health Care of Arizona went into receivership. The health care of more than 20,000 Medicare beneficiaries who were enrolled in Premier has been affected by this solvency. Since Premier Medicare HMO was placed in receivership, I have been advised that some non-contract providers--providers outside of the HMO network--have asserted that Medicare beneficiaries are personally liable for unpaid claims and have referred the outstanding claims to collection agencies. These unpaid claims--some of which may date back more than six months and amount to significant sums of money--have made it difficult for many contract and non-contract providers to continue to provide care to Medicare beneficiaries. Because Premier operated in a largely rural area where few alternative providers were accessible, this has created a dire health-care delivery situation for Medicare beneficiaries. Mr. President, today I introduce legislation that addresses the Arizona situation, as well as future Medicare+Choice insolvencies, wherever they may occur. This legislation mandates that, after a Medicare+Choice goes into receivership, the receiver--in this case, the state insurance commissioner--may apply to the Secretary of HHS for payment of all valid, unpaid provider claims for items or services furnished to Medicare enrollees before the date the receiver was appointed. Contract providers will be paid at their contract rate, while non- contract providers will be paid for the ``reasonable cost'' of the covered item or service. Amounts needed to make these payments will be paid out of the Part A or Part B trust fund, as is appropriate based on which fund would have paid the claim on a fee-for-services basis. To recover these amounts paid to providers, the bill establishes that HCFA will become a creditor of the receivership estate and assumes the priority position of the respective providers it has paid. The bill also mandates that Medicare+Choice enrollees may not be held liable to contract or non-contract providers for any claims that are unpaid by the Medicare+Choice organization. While the regulation of state-licensed Medicare+Choice organizations is primarily a state responsibility, the Medicare law makes clear that the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the administrator of HCFA have an ongoing ``responsibility to ensure that it (HCFA) contracts only with fiscally-sound Medicare+Choice organizations.'' To this end, Section 1857(d) gives the Secretary the right to audit and inspect any books and records that pertain either to the ability of the Medicare HMO to bear the risk of potential financial loss, or to the quality and timeliness of services provided for Medicare beneficiaries. See 42 CFR 422.502, 516 and 552. My bill strengthens current law and regulation by requiring that, once HCFA determines that a Medicare+Choice organization may not be able to bear the risk of financial losses, the Secretary must promptly notify the appropriate state officials and provide those officials with the information on which that determination is based. The bill also strengthens current law by requiring that, when Medicare+Choice organizations fail to provide prompt payments to providers, the Secretary must pay providers directly. Under my bill, if the Medicare+Choice plan fails to provide prompt payment of 10 percent of claims submitted for services and supplies furnished to enrollees within 60 days of the date on which the claim was submitted, the Secretary must pay contract and non-contract providers directly--there is no discretion as there is in current law. To avoid a repeat of this problem with other carriers in the future, the bill requires that Medicare+Choice organizations post a surety bond of no less than $500,000, as well as meet any additional requirements related to bonding or escrow accounts that the Secretary deems necessary. The bond requirement may be waived if a comparable surety bond is required under state law. Mr. President, this legislation will enable the government to fulfill its promise to those seniors who have chosen to receive their Medicare coverage through a Medicare+Choice organization. It will prevent seniors from being billed for covered services and providers from losing large sums in unpaid bills. If providers aren't paid, many may be unwilling--or unable--to continue providing care. If quality care is not available through experienced providers, or if seniors are the subject of legal action for the bills of insolvent Medicare+Choice organizations, beneficiaries will lose confidence in the Medicare+Choice programs, and ultimately, in Medicare fee-for-service as well. We simply can't let that happen. The Congress must ensure that providers are paid and Medicare beneficiaries are protected. This is a commitment we have made to seniors--it is a commitment we must fulfill.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the Iran Nonproliferation Act. For the past few years, I have been concerned about Iran's efforts to acquire the technology for ballistic missiles and nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons from Russia and China. When reports began to surface in 1997 about Russian missile assistance to Iran, I met twice with Russia's Ambassador to the U.S. and the administration's special envoy on this issue to express my concern about this dangerous trade and to urge the Russian government and the Clinton Administration to take steps to stop it. I also gathered together a group of 99 Members of the House and Senate, who wrote to the President to urge him to invoke sanctions to halt this trade. The President refused. Along with a bipartisan group of House and Senate Members, I went to the White House to meet with Vice President Gore to urge the administration to take concrete actions to end Russian transfers to Iran. Again the administration refused, citing the need to let diplomacy work. That summer, I successfully offered an amendment that was adopted by unanimous consent to the fiscal year 1998 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill barring U.S. aid to Russia if missile assistance to Iran continued. In conference, the amendment was changed to give the President the ability to waive this prohibition on aid to Russia, which he subsequently did. In November 1997, the Senate unanimously passed a concurrent resolution that I sponsored, expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should sanction the Russian organizations involved in selling missile technology to Iran. The House also passed this resolution overwhelmingly by a vote of 414 to 8. Again the President refused to impose sanctions. The Congress tried again to spur the administration to action 6 months later when we passed the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act mandating sanctions on any organization involved in assisting Iran's missile or weapons of mass destruction programs. This bill passed the Senate by a vote of 90 to 4. Yet, when it reached the President's desk, he vetoed it. Instead of voting to override this veto, the Congress acceded to the President's request for more time to let diplomacy work. The verdict is in on that decision. Transfers of nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile technology to Iran persist demonstrating the Congress erred in deciding not to override the veto. While the administration has imposed so-called administrative sanctions against a handful of Russian entities, it cooperated with the Russian government to identify the target organizations such that the sanctions would have no meaningful effect, completely undermining the value of the action. While I will not go into the same detail here, let me simply say the administration has a similar record on Chinese proliferation to Iran, where it has failed to enforce U.S. laws calling for sanctions, again noting the need to let diplomacy work. Since the administration would not take steps to halt proliferation to Iran, I offered an amendment to a supplemental appropriations bill that the President signed into law in May 1998. The amendment appropriated $179 million to accelerate the development of U.S. theater missile defenses, including $45 million for Israel to begin purchasing equipment for a third battery of its Arrow missile defense system in order to counter the increased Iranian missile threat. As these examples show, the Clinton Administration is simply not willing to take the tough actions necessary to prevent proliferation. As a result, intelligence assessments indicate the problem is growing worse all the time. In an unclassified report to Congress last month, CIA Director George Tenet stated; Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional weapons technology from abroad. . . . For the first half of 1999, entities in Russia and China continued to supply a considerable amount and a wide variety of ballistic missile- related goods and technology to Iran. . . . Iran already is producing Scud short-range ballistic missiles and has built and publicly displayed prototypes for the [1,300 kilometer- range] Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile, which had its initial flight test in July 1998 and probably achieved ``emergency operational capability''--i.e., Tehran could deploy a limited number of the Shahab-3 prototype missiles in an operational mode during a perceived crisis situation. In addition, Iran's Defense Minister last year publicly acknowledged the development of the [2,000 kilometer range] Shahab-4 . . . [and] publicly mentioned plans for a ``Shahab- 5.'' In the report, Director Tenet went on to note that Iran continues to seek biological warfare technology from Russia and Europe and despite being a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention has ``already has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons . . . and the bombs and artillery shells for delivering them.'' He also said that ``Tehran continues to seek production technology, expertise, and chemicals that could be used as precursor agents in its chemical warfare program from entities in Russia and China.'' Finally, the report indicated that despite promising never to acquire nuclear weapons, when it ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran has a nuclear weapons program, stating: Iran is attempting to establish a complete nuclear fuel cycle for its civilian energy program. In that guise, it seeks to obtain whole facilities . . . that in fact could be used in any number of ways in support of efforts to produce fissile material needed for a nuclear weapon. Despite international efforts to curtail the flow of critical technologies and equipment, Tehran continues to seek fissile material and technology for weapons development and has set up an elaborate system of military and civilian organization to support its effort. In fact, according to the Washington Post, the CIA recently concluded that it could no longer rule out the possibility that Iran is already capable of producing a nuclear weapon. This is terribly troubling in light of the progress Iran has made in its missile program. Earlier this month, Director Tenet testified to the Intelligence Committee that: Most [intelligence] analysts believe that Iran, following the North Korean pattern, could test an ICBM capable of delivering a light payload to the United States in the next few years. . . . As alarming as the long-range missile threat is, it should not overshadow the immediacy and seriousness of the threat that U.S. forces, interests, and allies already face overseas from short and medium range missiles. The proliferation of medium-range ballistic missiles [to nations like Iran] is significantly altering strategic balances in the Middle East and Asia. Finally, Director Tenet outlined a new type of proliferation threat from Iran in his testimony, warning that: . . . long-standing recipients--such as Iran--might become suppliers in their own right as they develop domestic production capabilities. . . . Iran in the next few years may be able to supply not only complete Scuds, but also Shahab-3s and related technology, and perhaps more advanced technologies if Tehran continues to receive assistance from Russia, China, and North Korea. It is clear that meaningful measures, and not simply another round of feckless diplomacy or a flawed international treaty such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CTBT, is needed to combat this growing threat. Last Fall, the Administration accused the Congress of undermining U.S. nonproliferation efforts in rejecting the CTBT. But that treaty was unverifiable, would have undermined America's nuclear deterrent, and would have done nothing meaningful to combat proliferation. As I mentioned earlier, Iran along with 191 other nations has ratified the NPT, and thereby promised never to acquire nuclear weapons. It is violating this treaty. It is also violating the Chemical Weapons Convention and is acquiring missile technology. All of these actions should trigger U.S. sanctions, but the Clinton Administration has refused to take action. If arms control treaties like the NPT and other nonproliferation efforts are to be useful, they must be enforced. I urge the administration to finally get serious about this matter and for my colleagues to vote for the Iran Nonproliferation Act. Iran's possession of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and the missiles used to deliver them poses a clear and present danger to the United States and our forces and friends in the region. It is long past time that we address this threat.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise to introduce the Teacher Tax Credit Relief Act of 2000. The act would provide an annual tax credit of up to $100 for teachers' un-reimbursed classroom expenditures that are qualified under the Internal Revenue Code. Thomas Jefferson once said that ``an educated citizenry is essential for the preservation of democracy.'' It falls to our teachers--through their hard work and lifetime of commitment to young people--to inculcate the academic values and analytical skills that make good citizenship possible. In my discussions with teachers--public and private--I have been amazed to learn that many use their own money to cover the cost of classroom materials that are not supplied by their schools or school districts. These expenditures enhance our childrens' education but are paid for out-of-pocket. In fact, in 1996, according to a study by the National Education Association, the average K-12 teacher spent $408 annually on classroom materials needed for education but not supplied by the schools. These materials include everything from books, workbooks, erasers, paper, pens, equipment related to classroom instruction, and professional enrichment programs. Under current law, a tax deduction is allowed for such expenses, but only if the teacher itemizes, and only if the expenses exceed two percent of the teacher's AGI. Of course, a deduction just reduces taxable income. A credit would give teachers relief dollar-for-dollar spent, up to the $100 annual limit. On a modest income, teachers provide an incalculable service to our country. Surely, we should not expect them to pay for school supplies out of their salary, when they have already committed their lives to the education of our young. A similar provision enacted by the Arizona legislature in 1995 has been extremely well-received by teachers. The provision was recently upheld as constitutional by the Arizona Supreme Court. Please join me in supporting this bill. Our teachers deserve to be at least partially reimbursed for financial sacrifices they make to educate our nation's children.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise to introduce the Teacher Tax Credit Relief Act of 2000. The act would provide an annual tax credit of up to $100 for teachers' un-reimbursed classroom expenditures that are qualified under the Internal Revenue Code. Thomas Jefferson once said that ``an educated citizenry is essential for the preservation of democracy.'' It falls to our teachers--through their hard work and lifetime of commitment to young people--to inculcate the academic values and analytical skills that make good citizenship possible. In my discussions with teachers--public and private--I have been amazed to learn that many use their own money to cover the cost of classroom materials that are not supplied by their schools or school districts. These expenditures enhance our childrens' education but are paid for out-of-pocket. In fact, in 1996, according to a study by the National Education Association, the average K-12 teacher spent $408 annually on classroom materials needed for education but not supplied by the schools. These materials include everything from books, workbooks, erasers, paper, pens, equipment related to classroom instruction, and professional enrichment programs. Under current law, a tax deduction is allowed for such expenses, but only if the teacher itemizes, and only if the expenses exceed two percent of the teacher's AGI. Of course, a deduction just reduces taxable income. A credit would give teachers relief dollar-for-dollar spent, up to the $100 annual limit. On a modest income, teachers provide an incalculable service to our country. Surely, we should not expect them to pay for school supplies out of their salary, when they have already committed their lives to the education of our young. A similar provision enacted by the Arizona legislature in 1995 has been extremely well-received by teachers. The provision was recently upheld as constitutional by the Arizona Supreme Court. Please join me in supporting this bill. Our teachers deserve to be at least partially reimbursed for financial sacrifices they make to educate our nation's children.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, today we are considering the District of Columbia appropriations bill, which includes not only funding for the nation's capital, but also regular appropriations for seven cabinet- level departments--the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, State, Justice, Commerce, and Interior. The package also includes four major authorization bills covering Medicare, foreign operations, satellite television, dairy programs, and scrap-metal recycling. Mr. President, under ordinary circumstances, legislation should not be packaged this way. If I were to base my vote merely upon the process that led us to combine these measures into one huge bill, I would vote no, as I have on the other omnibus bills that have come before the Senate during the last few years. However, I think there are some important distinctions between the package before us this year and what we have seen in the past. Unlike last year, for example, when free-for-all negotiations resulted in an orgy of new spending and wholesale concessions to the White House, this year the individual parts of the bill were negotiated separately, in a largely orderly process. Unlike last year, any additional spending won by the White House was required to be offset so that net spending would not increase. With the exception of the dairy provisions, which I oppose, I have concluded that I would vote for each of the measures included here if we had the opportunity to vote on them separately. For this reason and, because on balance, I believe the good in the rest of the package outweighs the bad, I will vote aye. Mr. President, when we look back on this legislation five or 10 years from now, I think we will see one aspect of it as truly historic. The legislation, despite its shortcomings, establishes a historic new precedent against ever again raiding the Social Security trust fund for other purposes--a precedent that future Presidents and Congresses will deviate from only at their own peril. The package has been designed to avoid intentionally spending a dime of the Social Security surplus. And if our estimates turn out to be right, it will be the first time since 1960--the first time in nearly 40 years--that Congress did not tap the Social Security surplus to pay for other programs. It also means that we will be able to pay down publicly held debt by another $130 billion or so this year. Mr. President, I think everyone needs to recognize that estimates of spending and revenues can be affected by even the slightest changes in the economy, and so we will need to be prepared to adjust spending levels early next year if it appears that that is necessary to take further action to safeguard the Social Security surplus. We should even consider putting an automatic mechanism in place, as proposed in legislation I cosponsored with Senator Rod Grams, to make sure Social Security is never again tapped. In any event, it is important to recognize just how far we have come since 1995. That was the year Bill Clinton sent Congress a budget that would have spent every penny of the Social Security surplus every year for the foreseeable future, and still run $200 billion annual deficits on top of that. The President's FY96 budget submission would have resulted in actual deficits rising from about $259 billion in 1995 to roughly $289 billion this year. We did not follow the President's recommendations. We charted an entirely different course. The result: We now have a budget that sets aside the entire Social Security surplus and even runs an estimated $1 billion surplus in the government's operating budget. That is progress. Because we do not raid Social Security, we had to do a better job of setting priorities so that we could take care of those things the American people care most about, and to a large degree, I think we succeeded. This bill provides a substantial increase in funds for medical research at the National Institutes of Health. We provide even more resources for education than the President asked for, and we take a modest first step in the direction of public school choice and providing local school districts with increased flexibility in how they will use federal funds to meet the particular needs of their students. We restore funding for hospitals and nursing homes that care for Medicare patients. We also include additional resources for law enforcement, including funding for 1,000 new Border Patrol agents, and funds to combat the scourge of methamphetamine in our communities. We are able to provide more money than the President sought for the Violence Against Women Act. And we provide money to make sure federal agencies can be better stewards of our national parks, forests, and wildlife refuges. We require that international family-planning money be used for just that--family planning, not abortion or lobbying to liberalize the abortion laws of other countries. Although the compromise provisions would allow the President to waive the limitations and provide about $15 million to groups that engage in such activity, about 96 percent of the dollars would still remain subject to the restrictions. Of course, funding these various priorities means we had to limit spending in other areas in order to keep our promise not to raid Social Security. For example, the National Endowment for the Arts does not get the increase it sought. There will not be as much foreign aid as President Clinton wanted. We cut the President's Advanced Technology Program. To make doubly sure we keep our pledge to stay out of Social Security, we include a small across-the-board spending cut to force agencies to ferret out waste and abuse. It is hard for me to conceal my disappointment in several regards. First, I regret that Congress did not protect the projected surplus in the non-Social Security part of the budget. This bill, combined with the other appropriations bills that have already been signed into law, will spend the entire $14 billion surplus that was projected in the government's operating budget --excluding Social Security--and it will bust the spending caps Congress and the President agreed to only two years ago. Second, there is still far too much wasteful spending in the budget. And third, there is so much advance funding in the bill for FY2001 that it will be difficult for us to stay within our spending targets for next year. On balance, though, it strikes me that the short-term cost of exceeding the caps and spending the relatively small non-Social Security surplus for this year is more than outweighed by the long-term discipline that will be imposed by the precedent we have set with regard to protecting Social Security. Mr. President, with that in mind, I intend to vote for this bill.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise in support of H.R. 1887, a bill by Representative Gallegly which would prohibit, and set penalties for, knowingly creating, selling, or possessing a depiction of animal cruelty with the intention of placing that depiction in interstate or foreign commerce for commercial gain. I would first like to thank the advocacy groups and individuals who testified at the House Subcommittee on Crime hearing and helped publicize the need for legislation to combat this form of animal cruelty. I would also like to thank Senator Hatch, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, for his help in the passage of H.R. 1887. I recently was informed by Representative Gallegly of a growing problem in California involving ``crush'' videos. Much of the material graphically features women stepping on and killing a variety of small animals. The animals are bound to the floor or other materials and are slowly tortured and crushed. When this deplorable practice came to light, Representative Gallegly introduced H.R. 1887, which targets the market for these disturbing videos. While the acts of animal cruelty featured in these videos may violate many state animal cruelty laws, they can be difficult to prosecute. For example, prosecutors often cannot prove the date when the acts were performed or the identity of the individual committing the act of cruelty because the person's face is concealed or not filmed. The purpose of H.R. 1887 is to prohibit individuals from profiting from videos depicting animal cruelty if the act depicted is illegal under federal or state law. This bill provides federal law-enforcement officials with a tool to prosecute the individuals making profits from these videos, which can be sold via the Internet and through catalogs for $30 to $100 a piece. Eliminating the videos' commercial incentive will hopefully stem the creation of ``crush'' videos. This bill is important because many studies have shown that abusing animals is often a prosecutor for committing violence against other people. H.R. 1887 may not solve that problem, but it will at least eliminate the market for a truly reprehensible product.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of S. 692, the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999. As we move toward passage of this landmark legislation, I want to thank especially Senator Bryan, the original cosponsor of S. 692, Senator Feinstein, the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, and Senator Hatch, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee. I also want to acknowledge the role of Senator Campbell in helping ensure that the legislation addressed issues of concern to Indian tribes, and Senator Leahy, the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, who helped advance S. 692 notwithstanding his differences with some of its features. Finally, I want to thank all of my colleagues who joined the legislation as cosponsors following its introduction. S. 692 enjoys extraordinarily broad public support. Those supporting it--ranging from Federal and State law-enforcement authorities to religious, consumer, and family groups, from the professional and amateur sports leagues to the thoroughbred racing industry--are fully identified in the Judiciary Committee report accompanying the bill. I want to acknowledge, in particular, the support of the National Association of Attorneys General, the National Football League, and the National Collegiate Athletic Association, and the constructive role played by the American Horse Council, the Major League Baseball Players Association, and America Online, which spearheaded a coalition of Internet service providers and others interested in this legislation. I would particularly like to thank David Remes, Gerry Waldron, Marty Gold, Daniel Nestel, and Stephen Higgins, whose hard work and diplomatic skills played an important role in securing the passage of the bill by unanimous consent. The bill we are voting on today, which the Judiciary Committee approved in June by a recorded vote of 16-1, is the culmination of efforts begun in the last Congress, when Senator Bryan and I first introduced legislation to prohibit Internet gambling. That legislation, S. 474, was approved by the Judiciary Committee in August 1997 and passed by a 90-10 vote as an amendment to the Commerce-Justice-State appropriations bill in July 1998. The Subcommittee on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee held hearings on an Internet gambling bill in that the last Congress (H.R. 2380) and approved a revised version of the bill (H.R. 4427), but the House did not complete action on the legislation due to the lateness of the session, and the Senate language was not included in the final version of the appropriations measure. New legislation, similar to S. 692, has been introduced in the House in this Congress, and I am quite hopeful that Internet gambling legislation will be enacted into law early next year. Mr. President, as documented in the Judiciary Committee's report, both the number of Internet gambling sites, and Internet gambling revenues, have grown rapidly since Internet gambling first appeared in the summer of 1995. Two studies cited by the National Gambling Impact Study Commission in its ``Final Report'' to Congress this summer indicate that Internet gambling revenues have doubled every year for the past three years. One study reported growth from $300 million in 1998 to $651 million in 1999, and projected revenues of $2.3 billion by 2001. Another study reported growth from $445.4 million in 1997 to $919.1 million in 1998. The Commission noted estimates by the Financial Times and Smith Barney that Internet gambling will reach annual revenues of $10 billion early in the new millennium. A third study cited by the Commission found that the number of online gamblers had increased from 6.9 million to 14.5 million between 1997 and 1998. According to the Commission, ``virtually all observers assume the rapid growth of Internet gambling will continue.'' It is no exaggeration to say that the Internet has brought gambling into every home that has purchased a computer and chosen to go online. According to the Department of Commerce, 26.2 percent of U.S. households had Internet access at the end of 1998, representing 27 million households. That percentage will undoubtedly continue to grow (millions of other U.S. households have computers but simply have not yet chosen to go online) until, not long from now, online home computers will be as commonplace as the humble telephone--which, like the telegraph before it, seemed as revolutionary and wondrous, in its day, as the Internet seems today. As a new technology, the Internet presents new problems that current law must be updated to address. These problems, which S. 692 is designed to remedy, are extensively documented in the Judiciary Committee's report. They include, among others, serious harms to our young people, who are the most adept users of Internet; harms from gambling on professional and amateur sports events and athletic performances; and harms relating to pathological gambling and criminal activity. It is vital that we legislate to prevent the Internet from being used as an instrument of gambling and establish an effective mechanism--specifically tailored to this new medium--for enforcing that prohibition. In establishing such a mechanism, however, it is also important to avoid impeding or disrupting the use of the Internet as an instrument of lawful activity. I am confident that S. 602 meets these objectives. Moreover, the fact that the legislation is strongly supported by the chief law enforcement officers of the States is compelling evidence that it strikes the right balance between Federal and State authority in this area. S. 692 creates a new section 1085 of title 18. It prohibits any person engaged in a gambling business from using the Internet to place, receive, or otherwise make a bet or wager, or to send, receive, or invite information assisting in the placing of a bet or wager, and it establishes mechanisms tailored to the Internet to enforce this prohibition. The new section provides criminal penalties for violations, authorizes civil enforcement proceedings by Federal and State authorities, and establishes mechanisms for requiring Internet service providers to terminate or block access to material or activity that violates the prohibition. Because section 1085, as reported by the Judiciary Committee, is comprehensively analyzed in the Judiciary Committee's report, I will only describe its structure here. Section 1085(a) contains definitions. Section 1085(b) contains the prohibitions and criminal penalties. Section 1085(c) provides for civil actions by the United States and the States to prevent and restrain violations, applicable to persons other than Internet service providers. Section 1085(d) establishes responsibilities for Internet service providers, enforceable through civil injunction actions by Federal and State authorities, and grants providers specified immunities from liability. Section 1085(e) specifies that the availability of relief under subsections (c) and (d), which is civil in nature, is independent of any criminal action under subsection (b) or any other Federal or State law. Section 1085(f) specifies categories of activities that, if otherwise lawful, are not subject to the prohibition of subsection (b). This subsection addresses State lotteries, pari-mutuel animal wagering, Indian gaming, and fantasy sports league games and contests. Section 1085(f) specifically preserves the regulatory authority of the States with respect to gambling and gambling-related activities not subject to the prohibition of subsection (b), but nothing in section 1085 authorizes discriminatory or other action by a State that would otherwise violate the Commerce Clause. Section 1085(g) specifies that section 1085 does not create immunity from any criminal prosecution under any provision of Federal or State law, except as provided in subsection (d), and does not affect any prohibition or remedy applicable to a person engaged in a gambling business under any other provision of Federal or State law. Mr. President, the bill we are voting on today has been modified in several respects from the version reported by the Judiciary Committee. All but one of those modifications affect section 1085. The other affects section 3 of the bill, which calls for a report to Congress by the Department of Justice two years after enactment. Proceedings by Sports Organizations. The bill has been amended by adding a new subparagraph (C) to section 1085(c)(2) to authorize a professional or amateur sports organization whose games, or the performances of whose athletes in such games, are alleged to be the basis of a violation of section 1085 to institute civil proceedings in an appropriate district court of the United States to prevent or restrain the violation. The right of action provided by this subparagraph is similar to the right of action for sports organizations provided in the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. 3701 et seq., which Congress passed in 1992 to halt the spread of legalized sports betting and S. 692 is intended to reinforce. The new subparagraph limits proceedings, by sports organizations against interactive computer service providers. Advertising and promotion of Non-Internet Gambling. The bill has been amended by adding a new paragraph (4) to section 1085(d) to address the responsibilities and immunities of an Internet service provider relating to the use of its facilities by another person to advertise or promote non-online gambling. Paragraph (4) generally mirrors the approach of paragraph (1), which addresses the responsibilities and immunities of an Internet service provider relating to the use of its facilities by another person to engage in online gambling activity. Paragraph (4) provides that, if specified conditions are met, a provider shall not be liable, under any provision of Federal or State law prohibiting or regulating gambling or gambling-related activities, or under any State law prohibiting or regulating advertising and promotional activities, either (1) for content, provided by another person, that advertises or promotes non-Internet gambling activity that is unlawful under such Federal or State law, arising out of any of the activities described in section 1085(d)(1)(A)(i) or (ii); or (2) for content, provided by another person, that advertises or promotes non- Internet gambling activity that is lawful under both Federal law and the law of the State where the gambling activity is being conducted. To be eligible for immunity under paragraph (4), a provider must, among other things, offer residential customers at reasonable cost computer software, or another filtering or blocking system, that includes the capability of filtering or blocking access by minors to Internet gambling sites that violate section 1085. Paragraph (4) provides for injunctive relief under specified circumstances. Horse Racing. The bill has been amended by adding language to subsection (f)(1)(B)(v)(I) to recognize, expressly, the authority of the State in which the bet or wager originates to prohibit or regulate the activity relating to live horse races described in subparagraph (B). this authority was implicit; the amendment makes it explicit. Indian Gaming. The bill has been amended to address Indian gaming by adding a new paragraph (4) to section 1085(f). The new paragraph specifies that the prohibitions of section 1085 regarding the use of the Internet or other interactive computer service do not apply to any otherwise lawful bet or wager that is placed, received, or otherwise made on any game that constitutes class II gaming or class III gaming (as those terms are defined in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act), or the sending, receiving, or inviting of information assisting in the placing of any such bet or wager, as applicable, if four conditions are met. First, the game must be one that is permitted under and conducted in accordance with the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Second, each person placing, receiving, or otherwise making such bet or wager, or transmitting (i.e., sending, receiving, or inviting) such information, must be physically located in a gaming facility on Indian lands when such person places, receives, or otherwise makes the bet or wager, or transmits such information. Third, the game must be conducted on a closed-loop subscriber-based system or a private network. Fourth, in the case of a game that constitutes class III gaming, the game must be authorized under, and be conducted in accordance with, the respective Tribal-State compacts that govern gaming activity on the Indian lands on which each person placing, receiving, or otherwise making such bet or wager, or transmitting such information, is physically located when such person places, receives, or otherwise makes the bet or wager, or transmits such information. In addition, each such Tribal-State compact must expressly provide that the game may be conducted using the Internet or other interactive computer service only on a closed-loop subscriber-based system or a private network. To illustrate one application of the fourth condition, suppose that Person A, a player who is physically located on Indian lands in Florida, by using the Internet or other interactive computer service, places or makes a bet or wager with Person B, a person operating or employed by a casino who is physically located on Indian lands in Idaho. To be lawful under section 1085 in this illustration, the game, among other things, must be one that is expressly authorized (1) by the compact that governs gaming activity on the Indian lands in Florida on which Person A is physically located when he places or makes the bet or wager, and (2) by the compact that governs gaming activity on the Indian lands in Idaho on which Person B is physically located when the bet is placed, received, or otherwise made. In addition, both compacts must expressly provide such gaming activity may be conducted using the Internet or other interactive computer service only on a closed-loop subscriber-based system or a private network. Paragraph (4) further provides that the requirement of compact language expressly allowing the game to be conducted using the Internet or other interactive computer service, if a closed-loop subscriber- based system or a private network is used, as set forth in paragraph (4)(A)(iv)(II), shall not apply in the case of gaming activity, otherwise subject to section 1085, that was being conducted on Indian lands using the Internet or other interactive computer service on September 1, 1999, with the approval of the State gaming commission or like regulatory authority of the State in which such Indian lands are located, but without the compact language required by paragraph (4)(A)(iv)(II). The exemption applies only until the date on which the compact governing gaming activity on such Indian lands expires (exclusive of any automatic or discretionary renewal or extension of such compact), and only to the extent that the gaming activity is conducted using the Interned or other interactive computer service on a closed-loop subscriber-based system or a private network. This exemption avoids the need to renegotiate compacts currently in effect if the specified conditions are satisfied. The exemption waives only the requirement of subparagraph (A)(iv)(II). It does not in any manner waive the compact authorization requirement of subparagraph (A)(iv)(I), the physical location requirement of subparagraph (A)(ii), the closed- loop or private network requirement of subparagraph (A)(iii), or any other requirement of subparagraph (A). To use the previous illustration, if the compact that currently governs gaming on the Indian lands in Florida on which Person A is physically located when Person A places or makes the bet or wager does not expressly specify that the game may be conducted using the Internet or other interactive computer service (if a closed-loop subscriber- based system or a private network is used), the game may nevertheless be conducted on those Indian lands using the Internet or other interactive computer service (if a closed-loop subscriber-based system or a private network is used), notwithstanding section 1085, until that compact expires, if the game was one that was conducted on those Indian lands in Florida using the Internet or other interactive computer service on September 1, 1999, with the approval of the gaming commission or like regulatory authority of Florida. After the compact expires, however, any gaming on those Indian lands using the Internet or other interactive computer service is subject to the requirement of express approval (limited to use of a closed-loop subscriber-based system or a private network) in subsequent compacts governing gaming activity on those Indian lands. Rule of Construction. The bill has been amended by adding a new paragraph to section 1085(g) to make even more explicit that, except as provided in subsection (d), section 1085 does not create immunity from any criminal prosecution under any provision of Federal or State law. This amendment responds to a concern expressed by Senator Leahy. Report on Enforcement. Section 3 of S. 692 has been amended to require the Justice Department to include in the required report to Congress further information specified by the Gambling Impact Study Commission in its ``Final Report''. Mr. President, S. 692 is urgently needed to address a serious social problem. It reflects the very best thinking on how to update existing law to meet the challenges of a new technology. I respectfully urge its passage.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, on November 17, 1776 a small American warship, the Andrew Doria, sailed into the harbor of the island of Saint Eustatius in the West Indies. Only 4 months before, the United States had declared its independence from Great Britain. The American crew was delighted when the Governor of the island, Johannes de Graaf, ordered that his fort's cannons be fired in a friendly salute. The first ever given by a foreign power to the flag of the United States, it was a risky and courageous act. The British seized the island a few years later. De Graff's welcoming salute was a sign of respect, and today it continues to symbolize the deep ties of friendship that exist between the United States and the Netherlands. After more than 200 years, the bonds between the United States and the Netherlands remain strong. Our diplomatic ties, in fact, constitute one of the longest unbroken diplomatic relationships with any foreign country. Fifty years ago, during the second world war, American and Dutch men and women fought side by side to defend the cause of freedom and democracy. As NATO allies, we have continued to stand together to keep the transatlantic partnership strong and to maintain the peace and security of Europe. In the Persian Gulf we joined as coalition partners to repel aggression and to uphold the rule of law. While the ties between the United States and the Netherlands have been tested by time and by the crucible of armed conflict, Dutch American Heritage is even older than our official relationship. It dates back to the early seventeenth century, when the Dutch West India Company founded New Netherland and its main settlements, New Amsterdam and Fort Orange--today known as New York City and Albany. From the earliest days of our Republic, men and women of Dutch ancestry have made important contributions to American history and culture. The influence of our Dutch ancestors can still be seen not only in New York's Hudson River Valley but also in communities like Holland, Michigan and Pella, Iowa where many people trace their roots to settlers from the Netherlands. Generations of Dutch immigrants have enriched the United States with the unique customs and traditions of their ancestral homeland--a country that has given the world great artists and celebrated philosophers. On this occasion, we also remember many celebrated American leaders of Dutch descent. Three presidents, Martin Van Buren, Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin D. Roosevelt, came from Dutch stock. Our Dutch heritage is seen not only in our people but also in our experience as a Nation. Our traditions of religious freedom and tolerance, for example, have spiritual and legal roots among such early settlers as the English Pilgrims and the French Huguenots, who first found refuge from persecution in Holland. The Dutch Republic was among those systems of government that inspired our Nation's Founders as they shaped our Constitution. In celebration of the long-standing friendship that exists between the United States and the Netherlands, and in recognition of the many contributions that Dutch Americans have made to our country, we observe Dutch American Heritage Day on November 16. I salute the over eight million Dutch Americans and the sixteen million people of the Netherlands in the celebration of this joyous occasion.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President. I rise in support of the Republican crime amendment (#2771) to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999. This amendment takes a multi-faceted approach to combating the problem of drugs. However, I am particularly pleased with the methamphetamine component of the amendment, which will help my own state of Arizona combat a veritable meth epidemic. Arizona law enforcement continues to seize a record number of meth labs. Meth lab seizures are up to 30 percent over last year, with over 400 labs projected to be dismantled by the end of this fiscal year. An average of 26 labs per month are seized--that's almost one lab per day. Meth usage is up, I am sad to report. Phoenix has the second highest rate for meth emergency-room admissions in the United States, according to the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN). Phoenix also has the second highest percent of arrestees testing positive for meth in the U.S. according to the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring program (ADAM). Meth prosecutions are up, as well. The number of meth cases prosecuted by the Maricopa County Attorney's office in the first five months of this year was equal to all of the cases prosecuted during 1990. This amendment provides a well-balanced approach to tackling meth by not only increasing penalties for certain meth-related crimes but also providing money to law enforcement (DEA and HIDTAs) for training, personnel, and meth lab cleanups, and providing money for prevention. The amendment also pays special attention to the anti-meth needs of rural communities by providing funding so the DEA can assist rural law enforcement in meth investigations. Many rural counties in my state cannot afford the latest and safest equipment, so they use old and unsafe equipment. Limited personnel and expansive terrain hinder meth- lab seizures. For example, Mohave County law enforcement seized about one lab per week last year and could have seized double that if they had the resources. Because of Arizona's meth problem, I have fought for additional funding for Arizona law enforcement. Last year, I secured $1 million for Arizona law enforcement to use for equipment, personnel, and training in order to combat meth. This was in direct response to a field hearing I held in Phoenix highlighting the problem of meth and meth labs. During the hearing I heard from urban and rural law enforcement on the dangers posed by meth labs as well as their drain on resources. I support this amendment because it will give law enforcement the resources needed to combat the problem of meth in my state.