Jon Kyl

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, both the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, who has just spoken, and I have just come from a briefing by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the FBI, and a host of other officials involved in protecting American secrets and engaging in counterterrorism around the world. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency has said that the amendment that is pending before us is woefully inadequate to protect our national security and the information that we need to keep classified in the United States. I wholeheartedly associate myself with the remarks of the chairman of the Intelligence Committee and want to argue in the strongest way that this amendment be defeated. It should be defeated on a 98-2 vote, frankly, because it would be an astonishing precedent-setting action of giving to foreign countries--foreign powers--power over United States classified material, power that not even U.S. citizens possess. It would greatly jeopardize the sources and methods for gathering intelligence that we have to employ in different parts of the world in order to get the information necessary to protect the security of the United States, all in the name of human rights, which all of us are, frankly, extraordinarily committed to protect. As a member of the Intelligence Committee, I can tell you that the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, who has just spoken, and I, and others, have gone to great lengths to ensure that the CIA and other American intelligence organizations are strictly adherent to standards for human rights and that we will help others track down human rights abuses wherever and however it is necessary. But to provide for the wholesale declassification of American secret information for Guatemalan and Honduran organizations under this amendment, as I said, is not only unprecedented, but is astonishing in its lack of concern for American security. I do not suggest, by any means, that the sponsors of the amendment do not deeply care about the security of the United States. But the way this amendment is written, as I said, according to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, is woefully inadequate in protecting intelligence sources and methods, and as a result will chill current and future sources from providing the CIA information, in fact, information that is essential for us to ensure the protection of human rights in the very countries for which this amendment is designed to get information. It ostensibly applies the same standards that are used for the declassification of documents relating to the JFK assassination. And that is the basis upon which it is argued, ``Oh, well, it must be OK.'' But there are a couple of key factors here, Mr. President. First of all, those are for Americans. This is declassification for American citizens. This is not declassification for foreign governments or foreign organizations. But of equal importance, the JFK assassination documents are--what?--40 years old. We are talking, in this amendment here, about information which is much more current. The privacy, law enforcement, and intelligence concerns are much greater in these newer documents. There is no reason, frankly, for the standards to be different than those set out in the President's Executive Order 12958. Otherwise, we risk jeopardizing ongoing prosecutions, we risk losing critical intelligence information, compromising sources and methods, and, frankly, releasing a lot of private information as well. As I said, it is astonishing to me that we would have an amendment that would literally give foreign organizations these extraordinary statutory privileges to expedite and compel declassification of U.S. national security information. And for the other reasons that the chairman pointed out--the unfunded mandate, the substantial costs associated with it, the substantial litigation costs--I am not sure if the chairman pointed that out, but the litigation costs alone could be well over 100 times greater than just the processing cost for the information itself. In fiscal year 1998, Congress funded a very special declassification program to review and declassify many of the documents. Since this amendment changes the standards for withholding information, the intelligence community will have to re-review the documents, and, as I said, the taxpayers have already paid for that review. We ought to table this amendment until we have an opportunity to fully consider its impact, the impact on the intelligence community, the Departments of State, Defense and Justice, as well as on the human rights that, frankly, would be potentially abused and the human rights concerns that we have as a result of not being able to have access to the same information or to the information that we need to protect human rights because of the implication with respect to the sources and methods that could well be degraded as a result of the passage of this amendment. So this is the kind of thing that ought to be considered very, very carefully, first of all, in the Select Committee on Intelligence. It has not been done. It ought to be very carefully vented through the administration. As I said, the DCI is very, very concerned about this particular amendment. It is premature at best and enormously antithetical to our intelligence collection efforts at worst. As a result, at the appropriate time I will urge my colleagues to support a motion to table this amendment. Mr. DODD addressed the Chair.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Thank you. I doubt that we have to take the full amount of time in completing this debate. I want to make one critical point. The Senator from Alaska, the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, has just made the point that the United States cannot retreat from our international obligations or we will be sending a terrible message. I want to make it very clear that the Kyl amendment doesn't retreat at all. In fact, it moves forward. The Kyl amendment simply institutes the language that the chairman of the Appropriations Committee supported when the committee voted 21-1 to ensure that the money lent by the United States would be effectively spent by requiring some conditions that will work. Now, what the bill before us does is erase those conditions and put in some good-sounding language that isn't going to do the trick. As a matter of fact, both the lead editorial in the Wall Street Journal today, and a lead op-ed piece by David Malpass, the chief international economist at Bear Stearns, make the point that this money will not be spent effectively if we continue to follow current practices. As a matter of fact, from the latter op-ed piece, ``To avoid accountability, the U.S. maintains the facade that the IMF is dealing with the crisis and that Japan is to blame for much of it.'' Are we really going to do something about this crisis? I totally agree with my friend from Nebraska, Senator Hagel, on the nature of the problem, and I believe that we essentially agree on the solution. The only difference is how serious we are about implementing the solution. Here is the crux of the debate. Under the bill before us, there are two key phrases about how we are going to implement the funding, how we are going to spend the money and implement the reforms that we all agree to. One, we are going to seek to implement these reforms--the language is on line 2 of page 120: ``and will seek to implement.'' And then down on line 19, ``The United States shall exert its influence with the Fund and its members to encourage'' these reforms. We are going to ``seek'' and we are going to try to ``encourage.'' That is not going to work. It is the same old thing. What the Appropriations Committee voted 26 to 2 to do was to actually include the reforms. The language in my amendment says ``shall include.'' Those are the two operative phrases. That is the difference we are debating about the reforms we all agree to. The question is, Are we going to encourage these other countries that we lend the money to, to effect the reforms, or are we going to require that they shall be included in the agreement that we enter into with these countries? All of us agree about the nature of the problem. We are all just as committed to an international economy. We all agree on the solution-- the bankruptcy reforms, the transparency. There is no disagreement about that. The only disagreement is, are we going to require it--the Kyl amendment that the Appropriations Committee voted 26 to 2 to do--or are we going to seek to encourage people to do these things? I submit that if all we are going to do is seek to encourage, we are going to end up in the same place as we have been, with countries spiraling downward and downward and downward. The President of the United States had it right when he said in Russia yesterday, to get your fair share of investment, you have to play by the rules. If that is his opinion--and I know it is, and I agree with it--``have to play by the rules'' is a requirement. It is not something we are just asking them to do; it is something we are going to require them to do. It is our money we are lending to them for the good of us all. U.S. taxpayers have some right to insist that it is going to be spent wisely. We all agree that it hasn't worked in the past. The President is saying to the Russians: What you have been doing has not worked. You have to play by the rules. The Kyl amendment says that the agreements shall require that the reforms be included. The current bill says we will seek to implement and will exert our influence to encourage. On the one hand, you have a requirement; on the other hand, you have the same loose language that will allow these countries to continue to slide into economic despair because they don't have the courage or the ability to adopt the reforms, and they are not being required to do so by the Fund that is lending them the money. That is why I urge the adoption of the original committee language which will be much stronger and will guarantee that this money will be spent wisely. I reserve the remainder of my time. Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

Mr. KYL. I thank the Chair. I will just conclude with this point. The distinguished Senator from Delaware, for whom I have great admiration, made the point that the President may instruct our delegates to seek these reforms and, indeed, he may but we do not currently have the means to insist on them. My amendment would change that. The distinguished Senator from Kansas made the point that the reforms in the current bill are not patsy reforms, and, indeed, he is correct in that. As I said, we essentially all agree on the reforms. The only difference is whether they are going to be urged upon the nations to which the money is lent or they are going to be imposed as requirements on the lending of the money. That is what this amendment boils down to. Do we ensure that the reforms are included by requiring it, or do we simply seek to include them and merely encourage the borrowers to engage in the reforms that we all support? I think the debate is clear. I urge my colleagues to support the amendment and yield back the remainder of my time, Mr. President. Mr. HAGEL addressed the Chair.

Mr. KYL. Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, the Senate passed the supplemental appropriations bill last March. Included in that bill was a provision to provide $18 billion in additional budget authority for the International Monetary Fund. That funding, as we all know, was eventually stripped out of the supplemental conference report because Members could not come to an agreement on the funding or on reforms for the IMF. Today, of course, we are back debating the foreign operations bill. Obviously, we are trying to develop some kind of consensus in going forward for the funding of the IMF. Unfortunately, in my view, this bill that we are debating right now does not go far enough to move the IMF toward reform, including in the areas of transparency and bankruptcy reform. It includes conditions much less restrictive than those voted out of the Appropriations Committee earlier this year. I support the restrictions that were developed by the Appropriations Committee. As a result, I am offering this amendment today which, while not going as far as I would like, would move the IMF closer to reform than the current provisions of the fiscal year 1999 foreign operations bill will do. As I said, when the Senate debated IMF reform in March, the full Senate Appropriations Committee approved, by a vote of 26-2, a series of reforms affecting IMF funding. They were not as strong as some of us would have liked. But instead of strengthening the provisions on the Senate floor, an amendment was offered to weaken them, and that amendment passed 84-16. Those of us who voted against the weakening amendment in March are here today again to request that the Senate vote for this amendment and require the IMF and its recipients to use the $18 billion in U.S. taxpayer-contributed funds in more open and responsible ways. The Kyl amendment changes only one of the reform sections included in the foreign operations bill. It does not prevent the United States from releasing funding to the IMF. The current IMF language requires the G-7 nations to publicly agree to seek policies that provide for new conditions. But seeking policies is not the same as requiring policies. So my provision simply returns to the Senate Appropriations Committee-passed language and states that: None of the funds appropriated in this Act under the heading ``United States Quota, International Monetary Fund'' may be obligated, transferred or made available to the International Monetary Fund until 30 days after the Secretary of the Treasury certifies that the Board of Executive Directors of the Fund have agreed by resolution that stand-by agreements or other arrangements regarding the use of Fund resources shall include provisions requiring the borrower [to agree to a set of conditions]. Passing an amendment that requires a commitment from the board of directors of the Fund to pass such a resolution makes more sense than just asking for a public commitment to such reforms. The IMF, by its nature, is often the antithesis of free market reform. IMF intervention often rewards negligent bankers or corrupt or incompetent governments and often does not reward individual countries that work through the private sector to get through tough times. So my amendment, which does not cut off funding for the IMF, would nevertheless return to a stricter version of reforms than is currently included in this bill. There is a case that some have made that IMF funding should be eliminated altogether. I will not try to make that case today, although people like Lawrence Lindsay and Allan Metzer of AEI, for example, have made a strong argument that much of the money we have contributed to the IMF has been wasted. It is true that no money has been lost yet, although Lindsay suggests that the IMF is like the FDIC in the late 1970s or early 1980s. At that time, the taxpayers had not lost any money in the FDIC either. If the world is ready to topple into an economic abyss, there probably is not much the IMF could do about it in any event. Its $23 billion in lending in 1997 was about a tenth of the private capital flow into developing countries alone. And in any event, there is evidence that suggests that the IMF has actually been a barrier to economic growth in poorer countries. According to Johns Hopkins University economist Steve Hanke, few nations actually graduate from IMF emergency loans. Many stay on the dole for years on end. One study found of 137 mostly developing countries from 1965 to 1995, less than a third graduated from IMF loan programs. The Heritage Foundation found that of IMF borrowers from 1965 to 1995, no more than half were better off than when they started the loan programs. Almost all were actually poorer. Almost all were deeper in debt. So what we are trying to do with this amendment is to restore some of the conditions that will ensure that the money American taxpayers have worked hard to earn will actually serve a useful and productive purpose if contributed to the IMF. Clearly, the policies promoted by the IMF are important. Whether debt incurred by other nations as a result of IMF intervention is good or bad depends on the uses to which that debt is put. If it increases productive capital, income increases and the debt can be serviced from the increased wealth that is generated. If, however, borrowing is used to hold the exchange rate steady so private lenders can flee, there are no productive assets from which later interest payments can be made. Unfortunately, it is the latter type of policies that are typically promoted by the IMF. The IMF promotes trade barriers in order to cut current account deficits. The IMF promotes tax increases to reduce budget deficits, and currency devaluations to adjust exchange rates. The IMF long ago admitted it was not committed to free markets, explaining that ``programs have accommodated such nonmarket devices as production controls, administered prices, and subsidies.'' These are the kind of policies that often bring economies to a halt. The better policy is to promote fair and reliable bankruptcy laws, transparent and internationally accepted accounting procedures, minimal government interference in the allocation of credit, prudent oversight of banking systems, and competition among foreign and domestic banking organizations. All of these are the kind of reforms that we all agree should be pursued. But that is as far as the foreign operations bill before us goes. Basically, it just says this is what we ought to be doing. It does not require the implementation of these reforms in the countries that are going to receive the IMF loans. As a result, it does nothing to assure that that money will not be wasted. By contrast, my amendment would ensure that reforms are accomplished before taxpayer dollars are allocated. Why is it important to ensure that reform is accomplished first? In some cases, IMF programs have effectively subsidized very inefficient and even corrupt political systems. Former Secretary of State George Shultz suggested in testimony before the Joint Economic Committee earlier this year that creditors must be held accountable for their mistakes. Taxpayers should not assume the risk of bad decisions or those bad decisions will continue to be made. That is the sad record, unfortunately, of many of the countries that have received these IMF loans in the past. Bailouts effectively shield investors and politicians from the consequences of their poor economic decisions by ``socializing'' the risks and reducing the cost to failure associated with investment. Risks are socialized because everyone ends up paying for an individual investors' errors; the costs of failure are reduced because either directly or indirectly the IMF can compensate investors when their investments fail. IMF bailouts, as they are currently constructed, encourage investors to engage in activity they would likely avoid if there were no IMF to shield them from actions. Investors, not people or countries, are being bailed out. We should understand that when we talk about bailing out a country, that is really inaccurate. We are talking about bailing out investors. In the so-called Mexican bailout in 1995, the Mexican people suffered a sharp decline in the standard of living there, and there were large increases in unemployment and an overnight erosion of the savings. Investors, however, escaped with minimal losses. Lawrence Lindsay contends IMF bailouts probably make systematic contagion more likely in the long run and suggests that the best protection we have against bankers overextending themselves to imprudent borrowers is the bankers' fear of losing money. The amendment I am presenting today is an effort to ensure that these poor lending practices are not continuing. Virtually all of us have agreed that the IMF needs reform. In fact, we put that reform in the amendment that was adopted earlier this year to the supplemental appropriations bill. But that amendment rejected the Senate appropriations decision, which was made on a 26-2 vote, to have really meaningful reforms required--not simply pursued. That is the difference--do you try to pursue it or do you guarantee it before you give this taxpayer money. Let me close with the final thought about what is not at issue because of our very real concern about the state of the Russian economy now. All of the experts agree that assistance to Russia will only work if Russia makes fundamental reforms, the kind of things that would be required under my amendment. For example, the President in Moscow yesterday urged the Russians-- quoting from a Washington Times story of today--to follow free market principles. Here is what the President said: Investors move in the direction of openness, fairness and freedom . . . you have to play by the rules. That is precisely what would be required by my amendment. The President said he would not give ``any fresh money unless it moves decisively toward reform.'' The article points out that IMF detractors are not proposing to withdraw money that has already been committed. I want to make that point crystal clear. We are not talking about not loaning money to the Russians, money that has already been committed. We are saying the same thing the President of the United States is telling them: You have to make a commitment to the fundamental reforms, otherwise the money is wasted and we both lose. Mr. President, the same thing could be said of other countries in the world. These countries are not going to be denied loans if they establish the kind of rules of law required for a functioning economy. If they don't, all the money in the world will not help them anyway. That is true for Russia, as well as it is for the other countries that might be receiving IMF loans. In conclusion, my amendment simply restores the original committee language setting forth reasonable conditions for IMF loans. If we are unwilling to do this, then some will suggest that we are simply committing $18 billion in taxpayer funds to feel good about having done something to help countries having economic difficulties. Let's ensure that in approving our contributions to the IMF, that that money will be effectively spent. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. KYL. Thank you. Amendment No. 3522

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I inquire how much time I have?

Mr. KYL. I also ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment, Mr. President.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3522. I inquire of the Chair as to what the time agreement is.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. I advise the Senator from Vermont that this is the original committee language.

Mr. KYL. Will the Senator from Oklahoma yield for a question?

Mr. KYL. I have a copy of what I believe is the amendment that the Senator from Oklahoma has offered. I wonder if this is the amendment, and I am going to read what I have: This subsection shall not apply unless the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified combatant commanders certify in writing to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives that the signing of the Convention is consistent with the combat requirements and safety of the armed forces of the United States. Is that the Senator's amendment?

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, it seems that we would all want the military leaders of our country to agree that any policy that we adopt is commensurate with both combat requirements and the safety of the Armed Forces of the United States. And if they are not willing to certify that, then I certainly wouldn't want to be on record as supporting a policy or a treaty or a law that they felt was inimical to the safety of the Armed Forces of the United States. I guess I am really wondering what the controversy is about. Maybe there isn't much controversy.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, if I can again ask the Senator from Oklahoma to yield, I certainly agree with that assessment. It seems to be a very reasonable proposition. I certainly hope our colleagues will agree with the amendment because of that.

Mr. KYL. I send an amendment to the desk and I ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. KYL. If the managers have no objection, I would like to send an amendment to the desk. Mr. INHOFE addressed the Chair.

Mr. KYL. That is quite all right. I am happy to make that clarification. At this time I would like to yield to the Senator from Indiana for the purpose of laying down an amendment and making his statement on that amendment before I make my statement on my amendment.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, Thank you.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I thought I might take just a moment to speak to the issue of the policy of the United States of America toward Iraq and Saddam Hussein. In the month or so that the Senate has been out of session, there has been a significant series of developments which cause me considerable concern about the direction of the administration's policy--or not policies, as the case may be--and the requirements of the Senate to act in accordance. The President will recall that about 7 years ago the entire country was fixed on the problem of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and strongly supported the action of the President--at that time President Bush--to first engage in what was called Desert Shield and then later Desert Storm; the militarily significant rollback of the Iraqi forces in about 100 hours. I visited Saudi Arabia as that buildup of American forces was occurring. It was unprecedented really since the time of the Vietnam war. The success of the operation was one of the great successes of U.S. military history. I remember the parades all across America when our troops returned home. We were very proud of what we had done. We had turned back a difficult dictator who had engaged in unspeakable horrors against people in Kuwait, against the environment, and really against the rule of international law. We had disengaged from Iraq because the President had succeeded through the efforts of General Norman Schwarzkopf and the Secretary of Defense--at the time Richard Cheney--and Secretary of State Jim Baker to force Saddam Hussein into an agreement that would forever bar him from developing weapons of mass destruction, or the means to deliver them. That was an agreement that Saddam Hussein willingly entered into, although one could say it wasn't too willingly because we had about 500,000 troops in his country at the time. But the deal was we will stop now if you will sign this agreement; otherwise we will have to continue our military operation. Saddam Hussein wisely decided to sign an agreement with the United States. That agreement was to allow U.N. inspectors to ensure that Iraq was not developing weapons of mass destruction, and that it would destroy the stocks that it had developed. We know that for the first few years world attention was focused on Saddam Hussein because of what he had done. The United Nations was focused on supporting and enforcing those inspections, and the United States on a couple of occasions either took or threatened to take military action to force Saddam Hussein to comply with his part of the bargain. America was united in that position. Now, the Bush administration policy at the time was called a policy of containment. The effort was not to get Saddam Hussein out of power per se but, rather, to prevent him from doing any damage to neighbors. But a concomitant to that policy was to ensure that he did not have the capability of causing his neighbors problems by virtue of the U.N. inspections. Slowly, over time, after the Clinton administration took office, that policy evolved. Now, they continued to call it containment, but a critical component of the policy was missing --the policy that denied Saddam Hussein the ability to conduct military operations against his neighbors--because over time the administration became less and less willing to ensure that the inspection regime called for under the agreement was actually carried out. UNSCOM is the name by which we know this, the acronym of the United Nations inspection regime. And the UNSCOM inspections eventually became very big news because Saddam Hussein saw that from time to time he could thwart the inspectors, prevent them from doing their job, and cause the United States to have to build up military forces in the region. And about the time we would spend a lot of money and effort and time to get these military forces in place, then he would agree to strike some kind of a deal. And as soon as we then brought the force level back down again, he would break the deal, and we would have to do the same thing all over again. He was jerking our chain. This administration, however, failed to develop a strategy to deal with that. Many of us in the Senate, through meetings with members of the administration, through correspondence, and through public hearings and statements, have tried to get the administration to focus on a long-term strategy that would have as its ultimate goal not containing Saddam Hussein but eliminating Saddam Hussein. No one believes that this is easy. It is a long-term project, and it takes a real commitment. This administration has not been willing to make that commitment. In February of last year, the administration again built up forces because again Saddam Hussein had refused to allow the inspectors to do their job under the agreement that he had made. Many of us in the Senate were concerned that if the administration simply lobbed a few cruise missiles into certain Iraqi facilities, it would be antithetical to our long-term goal. It would not do anything to ensure that the inspectors could do their job. It would probably kill a lot of innocent people. It would turn world opinion against the United States. And we need the support of our allies, support that we used to have when the Bush administration worked to get that support. But most importantly, military action would not be in furtherance of any particular strategic policy. It would waste money, it would not achieve anything, and in the end we would still have an empty policy. The administration continued to insist that our policy was one of containment. But containment is no policy if, in fact, you are at the same time allowing your opponent--in this case, Iraq--to build up military forces so that when they want to strike, they have the capability of doing so. And because we don't have forces in the area sufficient to stop aggression, again, it would have to be a reaction on the part of the free world in response to aggression by Saddam Hussein rather than preventive action to begin with. And so as time went on, the Iraqis continued to snub their nose at the United Nations inspectors, probably building up the capability to produce weapons of mass destruction and also to develop the missiles, or produce the missiles to deliver those weapons. The inspectors then have reported back to us. Richard Butler, who heads UNSCOM right now, and others have said that if we stop those inspections, it is only a matter of time before Iraq can develop the capability of producing these missiles and either has now or could quickly develop the chemical and biological weapons that would be necessary to threaten or cause harm to their neighbors. So the inspections are a key component of any strategy, including a strategy of containment. And it does no good to have a strategy of containment if you don't enforce the inspection regime called upon by the agreement with Saddam Hussein 7 years ago. Recently, Scott Ritter, a well known inspector on the UNSCOM team, has resigned in protest, and the reason, Mr. President, is because he has said that U.S. officials, including the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, have thwarted the inspections by specifically putting conditions on U.S. involvement with the inspectors and by conditioning the time, the place, and manner of inspections. Now, this is all wrapped up in diplomatic speak. The administration has flatly denied this is true. The administration, frankly, in this respect is not telling the truth, Mr. President. If Scott Ritter is to be believed, restrictions have been placed upon the American involvement in the inspections of these facilities. And it has been done because the administration doesn't want to have to follow up on what the inspections will demonstrate; namely, that action needs to be taken against Saddam Hussein. Or, failing that, if Saddam Hussein says, ``I am not going to allow you to inspect certain facilities,'' the administration will then be forced with the option of either doing nothing or of having to take some kind of action. And since the administration is unwilling, apparently, to take any kind of action, it therefore has to select the option of doing nothing. But it obviously cannot be perceived as doing nothing, so instead it sweeps the problem under the rug, says, ``We don't see any problem with Saddam Hussein.'' And of course you don't see any problem if you have your eyes closed, if you are not engaging in any inspections, or you are not allowing your inspectors to engage in the key inspections. Frankly, Mr. President, the administration's duplicity in this regard is something that the Congress should not permit and the American people need to be aware of. We ought to have the truth from the administration. Have we changed our policy with respect to Iraq? Have we decided not to enforce the agreement anymore? And what are the implications of this policy? Scott Ritter has laid forth his allegations. The administration has responded simply with denials. And yet there are enough sources who confirm Scott Ritter's allegations to cause me to believe that the administration's denials are false, that in fact Secretary of State Albright has, in one way or another, discouraged the American inspectors from inspecting key facilities that the inspectors believe need to be inspected because of what would be revealed. So, Mr. President, here is where we are now. After the agreement that Saddam Hussein entered into, in which he agreed to allow inspections to ensure that he did not develop the capability to pose a threat to his neighbors, part of the containment policy--as a result of that agreement, the United States had enforced for a period of years the inspection regime through UNSCOM--we are now no longer doing that in practice. It is now a charade. The reason it is a charade is because we don't want to face the consequences of either, A, being denied the ability to engage in the inspections or, B, finding something we don't want to find, because in either event we would have to do something, and this administration is frozen into inaction in dealing with Saddam Hussein. If they can lob a few cruise missiles at a problem, as they did against the terrorist Osama bin Laden 10, 12 days ago, then they can say they have taken action. But that is not enough in dealing with Saddam Hussein. He is more clever. He knows that we lack patience. He knows that if he defies us long enough, eventually our allies will desert us because, A, we don't have the capability anymore of keeping the coalition together and, B, the American people will get tired of the issue and no longer be willing to support the kind of military action or long-term action that would be required to oust Saddam Hussein. The result of this is that the United States has, in fact, changed its policy with respect to Iraq without telling either the Congress or the American people. It apparently no longer intends to enforce the agreement that George Bush and his administration insisted Saddam Hussein make. The implications for peace in the world are significant, because when Saddam Hussein has been able to build up his weapons of mass destruction to the level where he can cause significant damage, he will either do so or he will threaten to do so. At that point, his capability will cause a lot of countries in the world, especially those close neighbors who fear that kind of activity on his part, to back off of any opposition to him. His neighbors are relatively unprotected and, not believing the United States is a reliable ally to protect them, they will accede to his demands. Then, rather than having one or two countries in the Middle East that we have to contend with, we will have one or two belligerents and a lot of neutral parties who no longer cooperate with us in restricting his activities and his aggression and his terrorism. We need these countries in the fight against terrorism. I am very concerned that by backing off of the enforcement of the agreement against Saddam Hussein we will have permitted terrorism to further its goals in the Middle East and around the world, especially against Americans; and will have advanced the day when Iraq decides to engage in yet another form of aggression. I think it is a sad day when not only do we see U.S. foreign policy in tatters, in shambles, with respect to a country that we know poses a threat to us, but an administration which is unwilling to come clean on its policy. I know these are harsh words, but the fact of the matter is the administration has not leveled with the American people on this problem. I believe that Scott Ritter is essentially correct in his assessment of the situation, especially the administration's decision to pull the plug on the inspections in any meaningful way. As a result, I think this matter deserves airing in the Senate, in the House, and before the American people. I expect, either as chairman of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Terrorism or as a member of the Intelligence Committee, I will ask the administration to explain its position. I think the Senate will probably have to take some action before we adjourn in October to ensure that this country has a strong policy with respect to one of the rogue nations of the world. In conclusion, when discussing this in my home State of Arizona this last month, one of my friends said, ``Isn't it the obligation of the President to conduct the foreign policy and shouldn't the Congress leave that to the President?'' The answer is, as I said, as a general proposition, yes. But when an administration is frozen into inaction for one reason or another, whether the President is being distracted by other matters or whether it is simply too hard a problem for the administration to want to deal with, then the Senate, in its historic role as a partner in the administration of foreign affairs, needs to insert itself into the equation. To the extent we need to influence the development and execution of foreign policy in this area, the U.S. Senate will have to be involved. I would rather the administration develop a policy and a strategy and execute it with the cooperation of the Senate, but if the administration is unwilling to do that, then the Senate will have to get involved. It is not a happy day to have to talk about this kind of thing in this way. We would much rather cooperate with the administration. I hold myself out to be willing to do that at any time and any place. But the administration has to come clean with the American people on what its strategy really is in dealing with Iraq. Until that statement of strategy has been laid out in an honest way, the Senate is going to have to involve itself in this issue. I hope and pray we will be able to maintain peace in the Middle East and that we will be able to contain Saddam Hussein, but it is going to require commitment and will, not just of the American people, but of the American Government. I am hoping in the next few weeks we can help develop the policy so, between the administration and the Congress and the American people, we will jointly, together, unify and be able to confront this threat to peace in the world. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, the U.S. Forest Service owns a large parcel of land within the boundaries of the town of Pinetop-Lakeside which has historically been used as a park, not only by the town residents, but also by the thousands of tourists who vacation in this bucolic area of Eastern Arizona each year. The town wants to maintain this land as a park. However, the Forest Service has refused to renew the town's special use permit for the largest section of this park, possibly paving the way for the land to be sold to private investors. The bill that Senator McCain and I are introducing, and Representative Hayworth is introducing in the House, prevents the Forest Service from selling the land to any entity other than the town, and requires the Forest Service, in conjunction with the town, to develop a management plan ``designed to ensure that the tract is managed by the Forest Service for recreational purposes.'' Mr. President, the town of Pinetop-Lakeside has been trying to find a way to acquire this parcel from the Forest Service for over 10 years, to no avail. This bill will satisfy the town's goal of preserving this land as a park, while being fair to the American taxpayer. However, the legislation will not solve the problems of communities that seek to acquire Forest Service lands to preserve open space, or to fulfill other essential governmental functions. I intend to continue to seek a long-term solution to those problems.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I want to talk this morning about something called the Rumsfeld Report. There has been a lot of discussion about the Rumsfeld Commission Report in the news media here in Washington. But around the country I have noted there is less coverage of it. I want to talk a little bit about it today, because I think that the Rumsfeld Commission Report issued to the Congress about 2 weeks ago is probably the most important report that this Congress has received and that it is one of the most important events of the last 2 years with respect to the obligations of the Congress and the administration to ensure the national security of the United States. Of course, when all is said and done, our first responsibility is to the defense of the American people. By way of background, in the 1996 defense authorization bill we ensured that there was an amendment that required the establishment of the National Missile System by the year 2003. During the debate on that amendment, however--this was on December 1, 1995--Senators Carl Levin and Dale Bumpers received a letter from Joanne Isham of the CIA's Congressional Relations Office. That letter claimed that the language in the DOD bill relating to the threat posed by ballistic missiles--I am quoting now--``. . . [overstates] what we currently believe to be the future threat'' of missile attack on the United States.'' This is a letter from the CIA directly to Members of the Senate in opposition to an amendment that is pending on the floor. The letter also said, again quoting, it was ``extremely unlikely'' that nations would sell ICBMs and that the United States would be able to detect a home-grown ICBM program ``many years in advance,'' again quoting the letter. The statements in that CIA letter were based entirely on a new National Intelligence Estimate--an NIE. The title is ``NIE 95-19.'' It was entitled ``Emerging Missile Threat to North America During the Next 15 Years.'' It was released in its classified form in November 1995. But the key judgment of that NIE is, quoting: ``. . .[no] country, other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that will threaten the contiguous 48 States or Canada.'' President Clinton vetoed H.R. 1530, the defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1996, on December 28, 1995, in part because the National Missile Defense System called for pursuant to our amendment, in his words, addresses ``. . . [a] long-range threat that our Intelligence Community does not foresee in the coming decade.''--end of quote of the President. In reaction, Mr. President, many Members of the Congress rejected the conclusions of that NIE as incorrect. Some of us on the Intelligence Committee believed that the information that we possessed suggested that the conclusions were inaccurate. Our concerns, frankly, centered on flawed assumptions underlying the key judgment of the NIE. The unclassified assumptions are--there are several. Let me tell you what they are: First, concentrating on indigenous development of ICBMs adequately addresses the foreign missile threat to the United States. What that means is, we can focus just on what these countries are able to build all by themselves and that that is going to be adequate in telling us what the threat posed by these countries will be in the future. Second, foreign assistance will not enable countries to significantly accelerate ICBM development. In other words, we are not going to look at what other countries might sell or give to these powers that we are concerned about, again relying on the notion that whatever they do they are going to do all by themselves without any help from the outside. In other words, third, that no country will sell ICBMs to a country of concern. Fourth, that no countries, other than the declared nuclear powers with the requisite technical ability or economic resources, will develop ICBMs from a space launch vehicle. In other words, they are not going to use the rockets that are used to launch satellites for military purposes to convert those missiles or rockets for military purposes. Another assumption: A flight test program of 5 years is essential to the development of an ICBM. Of course, when the United States and the old Soviet Union did research on a new missile, it would take 5 years for us to test it to make sure it worked properly, because it was always a new concept. So the CIA assumed in this NIE that it would take 5 years to develop a new missile. Seventh, that development of short- and medium-range missiles will not enable countries to significantly accelerate ICBM development. In other words, when they develop a shorter-range missile, that will have nothing whatsoever to do with their capability to develop more robust systems. Finally, the possibility of an unauthorized or accidental launch from existing nuclear arsenals has not changed significantly over the last decade. In my view, and in the view of many, these underlying assumptions ignored plain facts: Foreign assistance is increasingly commonplace and will accelerate indigenous missile programs. Other countries have sold, and almost certainly will continue to sell, weapons of mass destruction with ballistic missile components. The MTCR, which is the regime that is supposed to prevent this proliferation of weapons, has already been violated and is no doubt going to be violated again. And, finally, a flight test program does not have to follow the model of the United States or Soviet flight test program. So the conclusion that flowed from the faulty assumptions of the CIA National Intelligence Estimate had the effect of allowing unwarranted political conclusions to be reached and preached. Let me reiterate that. Because of the CIA's letter to Senators at the time that we were debating the national missile defense amendment, policy was affected. The President vetoed that bill based in part on the conclusions of the CIA's National Intelligence Estimate, which was based upon flawed assumptions, which turned out to be inaccurate. There were several reactions as a result of the President's action. The General Accounting Office and two former CDIs--Directors of Central Intelligence--Jim Woolsey and Bob Gates, each offered opinions about the NIE 95-19. The GAO prepared a report in September of 1996, and it concluded that the level of certainty regarding the 15-year threat which was stated in the NIE was, quoting, ``overstated.'' Former Director of the CIA Jim Woolsey validated this GAO assessment during a September 24, 1996, Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing. In his formal statement, Mr. Woolsey suggested the 1995 NIE asked the wrong question. He said the following: If you are assessing indigenous capabilities with the currently-hostile countries to develop ICBMs of standard design that can hit the lower 48 states, the NIE's answer that we may have 15 years of comfort may well be a plausible answer. But each of these qualifications is an important caveat and severely restricts one's ability to generalize legitimately, or to make national policy, based on such a limited document. Among the things that former DCI Bob Gates said about the NIE was that it was ``politically naive.'' Despite these concerns, the administration and opponents of missile defense were unwilling to hear views contrary to the conclusions of the NIE. Frankly, this is still the case. In May, when the Senate attempted to invoke cloture on the American Missile Protection Act, Senate bill 1873, offered by Senators Cochran and Inouye, the administration based its opposition to the bill on that previous NIE, National Intelligence Estimate 95-19. Here is the quotation from the administration's opposition: The bill seeks to make it U.S. policy ``to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).'' That is true. In her letter stating the administration's position in opposition to Senate bill 1873, the Defense Department's general counsel stated, and I quote: The Intelligence Community has concluded that a long-range ballistic missile threat to the United States from a rogue nation, other than perhaps North Korea, is unlikely to emerge before 2010... Additionally, the Intelligence Community concluded that the only rogue nation missile in development that could strike the United States is the North Korean Taepo Dong 2, which could strike portions of Alaska or the far- western Hawaiian Islands. That is the end of the quotation from the Department of Defense general counsel. So the administration was still basing its opposition to missile defense on this National Intelligence Estimate of 1995. In the wake of the debate over that poorly crafted report, Congress asked for a second opinion. It appointed a bipartisan commission of former senior government officials and members of academia led by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, hence the name ``The Rumsfeld Commission Report.'' This bipartisan Commission was asked to examine the current and potential missile threat to all 50 States and to assess the capability of the U.S. intelligence community to warn policymakers of changes in this threat. The Commission unanimously concluded three things: No. 1, the missile threat to the United States is real and growing; No. 2, the threat is greater than previously assessed; and, No. 3, we may have little or no warning of new threats. Let me go back and review each of those. 1. The missile threat to the United States is real and growing. ``Concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potential hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the United States, its deployed forces, its friends and allies. These newer, developing threats in North Korea, Iran and Iraq are in addition to those still posed by the existing missile arsenals of Russia and China, nations with which we are not now in conflict but which remain in uncertain transitions.'' 2. The threat is greater than previously assessed. ``The threat to the United States posed by these emerging capabilities is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports by the Intelligence Community,'' and a rogue nation could acquire the capability to strike the United States with a ballistic missile in as little as five years. 3. We may have little or no warning of new threats. ``The Intelligence Community's ability to provide timely and accurate assessments of ballistic missile threats to the United States is eroding.'' ``The warning times the United States can expect of new, threatening ballistic missile deployments are being reduced,'' and under some plausible scenarios, ``the United States might well have little or no warning before operational deployment [of a long-range missile.]'' Now, Mr. President, why are the Rumsfeld Commission conclusions so different? First of all, the Commission answered a slightly different question than our intelligence agencies did in the 1995 NIE, by examining the missile threat to all 50 States. The intelligence community has acknowledged that Alaska and Hawaii could be threatened much sooner than 15 years from now, but for some reason did not include that in its 1995 estimate. Second, the Commission has access to the entire amount of information in the intelligence community--frankly, a broader and more highly classified set of information than most of the analysts in the compartmentalized intelligence world. Obviously, much information is compartmentalized to prevent its unauthorized distribution and release, but that also inhibits to some extent the ability of analysts to appreciate all aspects of the potential threat. Third, the Rumsfeld Commission recognized that missile development programs in Third World countries no longer follow the patterns of United States and Soviet programs. They might, for example, succeed in testing a missile one time, conclude that they have got it right because, after all, they are using a weapon that has been sold to them essentially by another country and then deploy it based upon one test, whereas the United States and the Soviet Union, as I said before, might well have had to engage in years of testing to ensure that a new product would work. Fourth, the Commission also understood that foreign assistance and technology transfers are increasingly commonplace. Without getting into the classified information in the Rumsfeld report, it is very clear that countries with which we are concerned have acquired a great deal of technology and in some cases components and perhaps even whole missile systems from other countries eager to earn the cash from the sale of those components or that equipment or technology. And so these nations did not have to do what the intelligence community thought they had to do, and that was to develop it indigenously, from the ground up, with only what the nation could produce. They have been very successful in acquiring technology from other countries which has naturally shortened the lead time for them to develop and deploy their own systems. Finally, and very importantly, the Rumsfeld Commission realized that foreign nations are aggressively pursuing denial and deception programs, thus reducing our insight into the status of their missile programs. In effect, what the Rumsfeld Commission concluded is this: That while the CIA in its estimate provided to us based its conclusions, in effect, on only what it could prove it knew, which, of course, is very little in the intelligence world, the Rumsfeld Commission examined what we knew and then asked questions about what the implications were about what we knew. Would it be possible, even though we have no evidence that a country has done certain things, that it could do so as a result of what we knew? And if our assumptions with respect to its intentions are correct, would it not be plausible to assume that they would try to do that; and if they tried to do it, might they succeed? So questions like that were asked in ways that were not based upon hard evidence in all cases but plausibilities and possibilities, and, as a result of asking those questions, some very troubling conclusions were reached which in many cases were verified by certain confirming evidence. And that is why we now understand that the nations with which we are most concerned have much more robust systems, both with respect to the missiles for delivery of weapons and the weapons on top of the missiles, than we had ever thought before. Second, these programs can be deployed with little or no warning. And third, and probably the key lesson to come out of this, we have to appreciate the fact that we will be surprised by surprises, but we should not be. We should not be surprised by surprises, because most of what these countries are doing we don't know, and we won't know until the weapon is used or it is finally tested and we realize that they have developed it or we find information in some other way that confirms a program that we previously did not know existed. So instead of being surprised at surprises, the Rumsfeld Commission report says we need to get into a new mode of thinking to understand that we should not be surprised by surprises, and that we should base our policy on that understanding. That is my concluding point, Mr. President. The Congress and the President, in setting national policy, in developing our missile defenses, in appropriating the funds to support those programs, should approach this with the understanding that we will have little or no advanced warning, that there is much that we don't know but that we are likely to be facing threats. Therefore, my conclusion is we have got to get on with the development of our missile defenses. That represents my three concluding points. No. 1, we have got to get on with the job of developing and deploying both theater missile defenses and a National Missile Defense System, and we can begin by voting for cloture and for the Cochran-Inouye bill when we return from the recess. Second, we must improve our intelligence capabilities and resources. And third, we must avoid arms control measures and diplomatic actions that impede our ability to defend ourselves and damage our intelligence sources and methods. We have a lot of work to do. Those of us on the Intelligence Committee have committed ourselves, based upon the briefing of the Rumsfeld report, to begin working on the intelligence aspects of this problem, and those who are on the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committees will also have to work toward correction of the problems of the past to assure that our missile defense programs can proceed with the speed that is required to meet these emerging threats. I conclude by thanking the members of this bipartisan Rumsfeld Commission and suggest to all of my colleagues that they become familiar with the contents of its report because it should certainly guide us in our policy deliberations with respect to the security of the United States from a missile threat in future years. Mr. ENZI addressed the Chair.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, as long as the majority leader is still on the floor, let me repeat what I told him a couple days ago. The remarks he made on the occasion of the public ceremony in the Rotunda for the two fallen Capitol Police officers, I thought, were extraordinary, right on the mark, and I very much appreciate his representation of the Senate at that occasion. This Nation has now spent 1 week thinking very carefully about what the meaning of the events of just a week ago are. I think that his remarks and the remarks of other speakers on that occasion certainly help to bring proper perspective to those events for all Americans as well as those of us here in the Congress.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, in that event, let me first ask unanimous consent that two fellows from my office, John Rood and David Stephens, be granted floor privileges for the debate on this matter.

Mr. KYL. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I will describe this amendment briefly. Frankly, this came out of the revelations concerning the alleged transfer of certain technology to the Chinese Government as a part of the process of launching American satellites on Chinese rockets, the so-called Loral-Hughes matter. But it really goes beyond that. It is a question of whether or not the Defense Department has in process an adequate way of reviewing the requests for export licensure and the conditions attached to those licenses to ensure that national security is not jeopardized. That role has in the past been played by an agency of the Defense Department called the Defense Technology Security Agency. It goes by the name of DTSA for the people who understand it. The point of this memorandum is to ensure that DTSA will continue to have a prominent role in the evaluation of export licenses and the kinds of conditions that would be attached to them. In fact, we ensure as a result of this amendment that the role is prominent by restoring the position of the Deputy Under Secretary for Technology Security Policy within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and thereby ensure, as I say, a prominent role for this agency. The Deputy Under Secretary would have access to both the Under Secretary of Policy and the Secretary of Defense himself. This is important, Mr. President, for the following reasons: No. 1, DTSA is the single agency in the Government reviewing the national security implications of an item for export; No. 2, DTSA coordinates input from the services, military branches, the Joint Chiefs and the defense agencies; No. 3, DTSA routinely supports the Department of State in its investigations of these matters; No. 4, creating a Deputy Secretary of Technology Security will ensure that the Department of Defense is represented at a sufficiently high level at the interagency meetings that occur to discuss these export licenses. And, finally, providing the Deputy Under Secretary with the authority to interact directly with the Secretary of Defense will enable the Deputy Secretary to bring items of immediate concern directly to the Secretary to discuss with the Secretary of Commerce and the President. The Department of Defense is the only agency with the expertise, the personnel, and the ability to assess the impact of exports on the national security of the United States, and this ought to be our No. 1 concern. The Persian Gulf war demonstrated the value of the United States maintaining a technical edge on the battlefield. Maintaining that edge in the future is dependent upon keeping sensitive technologies out of the hands of potential adversaries. Questions regarding the appropriate role of the Department of Defense in considering exports of dual-use items have obviously been of concern for a number of years. But, as I said, the alleged transfer technology to the Chinese Government has really elevated this concern to the point that there are those of us in Congress who want to ensure that the Department of Defense continues to have an important role here. Early in the 1990s, Congress examined the problems with export control and how it was possible that American companies, with the knowledge of the Department of Commerce, could have contributed to the Iraqi arms buildup, as we know occurred. We learned, for example, that between 1985 and the imposition of the U.N. embargo on Iraq in August of 1990, the Department of Commerce approved for sale to Iraq 771 export licenses for dual-use goods. Some of these sales involved technologies that very probably helped the Iraqis develop ballistic missile, nuclear, and chemical weapons. In some cases, Commerce approved the sale over strong objections from Defense or without even consulting the Department of Defense at all. In 1994, the Export Administration Act expired and in 1996 dissolved, leaving no overarching legal forum to guide the export control policies of the United States. Export controls were at that point directed by Executive order. And this resulted in relaxed control over national- security-related equipment and technologies. The GAO has documented potential problems with changes that occurred in 1996 and with the Department of Commerce retaining the primary responsibility for oversight of important national security equipment or technology. Let me just give a couple of examples here. On September 14, 1994, the Department of Commerce approved an export of machine tools to China. The tools had been used in a plant in Ohio that produced aircraft and missiles for the U.S. military. Some of the more sophisticated machine tools were diverted to a Chinese facility engaged in military production, possibly cruise missile production. Under current referral practices, the majority of applications for the export of categories related to stealth are not sent to the Department of Defense or the Department of State for review. Without such referrals, it cannot be ensured that export licenses for militarily significant stealth technology are properly reviewed and controlled. A third example: Commercial jet engine hot section technology was transferred to the Department of Commerce in 1996. Defense officials are concerned about the diffusion of technology and the availability of hot section components that could negatively affect the combat advantage of our aircraft and pose a threat to U.S. national security concerns. So the Defense Department must have an active role and a strong position in advising the President about the national security implications of exporting these and other important dual-use technologies. In order to do this, the Secretary of Defense must have the best advice available. This amendment will ensure that Secretary Cohen and all subsequent Secretaries have that advice. Mr. President, at the appropriate time I hope we can engage in further discussion of this to ensure that the national security of the United States is not impaired. At this time, unless there is anyone else who would like to discuss it, I am happy to have the chairman or the ranking member move to other business.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.