Jon Kyl

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I will, at a later time, join in thanking the various staff and other people who have been so useful in ensuring a good debate. I think the Senate has gotten very serious about this matter. As the majority leader said earlier, as a result of the application of various Members of the Senate, a great deal of progress has been made in trying to bring the sides closer together in getting a treaty that, if it is entered into, will be more in the interest of the United States than as originally submitted. There are a couple of conditions, however, in the resolution of ratification which we believe ought to be a part of this treaty before the President submits those articles for ratification, signifying the U.S. entry into the treaty. One of the most important is the one before us at this moment. There is a motion to strike this condition from the resolution of ratification. We believe that this condition should remain. As the majority leader earlier said, he believes this condition should remain. Here is what it provides: Prior to depositing the U.S. instrument of ratification, the President must certify four things: First, that Russia is making reasonable progress on implementing the 1990 bilateral destruction agreement entered into between the United States and Russia. Second, that outstanding compliance related to the 1989 Wyoming memorandum of understanding have been resolved to U.S. satisfaction. Third, that Russia has deposited its articles of ratification of the conventional weapons agreement. Fourth, that it is committed to foregoing any weapons development. Those are four important conditions, if our partner, Russia, and the United States are to effectively utilize the Chemical Weapons Convention. The reason is, first of all, because Russia is the world's largest possessor of chemical weapons. It has anywhere from 60 to 70 percent of the world's chemical stocks. For the Chemical Weapons Convention to be global, in the sense that it covers the weapons, and to be effective, it should involve the country with the largest inventory of chemical weapons. Now, Russia has signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, but has indicated that it will not ratify, at least at this time and, as a matter of fact, in a communication to the Vice President of the United States, one of the Russian leaders, Chernomyrdin, said, in effect, that Russia would prefer that the two parties, if they are going to come into the treaty, come in at the same time rather than one preceding the other, and, therefore, said that it would be integral to Russian entry that the United States entered first, which is what we are about to do. I think these four commitments by Russia are integral to the success of the Chemical Weapons Convention if we are to have a truly global ban. That is why this condition 29 should remain a part of the resolution of ratification. Quickly, to the four points: First, reasonable progress in implementing the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement. Reasonable progress simply means that we are continuing to work on complying with it. That is what the Russians agreed to do when they entered into this agreement in June 1990. This is an agreement between President Bush and President Gorbachev. By the way, when proponents of this treaty speak of it as a Reagan- Bush-Clinton treaty, I point out the fact that the treaty was different in the Reagan and early Bush years than it is now. One of the underpinnings of the treaty was that this bilateral destruction agreement between Russia and the United States would be in place and would be enforced and would be complied with by the two parties. This agreement was designed specifically to ban the production of chemical weapons, their agents, the destruction of chemical weapons agents, to provide for onsite inspections of CW facilities, and require data declarations. The Bilateral Destruction Agreement is central to the CWC before us today. Without it the Chemical Weapons Convention is a much weaker treaty than it would otherwise be. The CWC was negotiated with the assumption that the United States and Russia would both destroy and verify destruction of their stockpiles under the Bilateral Destruction Agreement. But Russia has not implemented the Bilateral Destruction Agreement, and it appears that it has no intention of doing so. Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, in this letter to Vice President Gore that I mentioned before, essentially stated that the Bilateral Destruction Agreement and the 1989 Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding have outlived their usefulness insofar as Russia is concerned. The Chemical Weapons Convention before us today is no substitute for the Bilateral Destruction Agreement. Under the Bilateral Destruction Agreement, the inspectors of Russian facilities would not be international inspectors. They would be U.S. professional inspectors, and there would be more frequent inspections. The United States would have guaranteed access to data declarations, none of which would be the case under the CWC. So it is important that Russia at least indicate to us that it is making reasonable progress to implement the BDA before we enter into force CWC. Second, the resolution says there should be compliance with the 1989 Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding. Without getting into a lot of detail, I will simply note that this memorandum of understanding was essentially an agreement between the two states that we would exchange data on how much chemical weapons we had and to provide the information on the status for binary weapons programs. To comply with this declaration, the United States has given information to the Russians. Russia declared a 40,000 metric ton agent stockpile. However, present reports and other information allege that the Defense Intelligence Agency estimates that the former Soviet--now Russian--stockpile could be as large as 75,000 tons. Russia has refused to provide information on the status of its binary weapons program. And, according to the former Director of Central Intelligence Jim Woolsey, ``The data we have received from Russia makes no reference to binary chemical weapons or agents. That is contrary to our understanding of the program that was initiated in the former Soviet Union.'' There are additional indications of activity on the part of the Russians, all of which suggest that they are not in compliance with this 1989 memorandum of understanding. Our second point in this condition is getting compliance with that. Third, we want the Russians to ratify this treaty at the same time that we do. That is what they want to do. We believe that will be a preferable course of action to the United States entering into the treaty causing the Russians to be concerned that we would set up the rules of the treaty, in effect, in a way that would be amicable to their interests, thus perhaps causing them never to enter into the treaty. A CWC without Russia, furthermore, means that over 50 percent of the world's known chemical weapons stockpile will be outside of the treaty regime. Should the United States ratify the CWC absent Russian participation or the involvement of other states that have weapons, the treaty's intrusive verification schemes would, for all intents and purposes, be focused solely on the United States, the only nation likely to declare integral weapons inventory. In effect, we would be paying 25 percent of the cost of the treaty to verify our own compliance. Finally, Russian commitment to forego a chemical weapons capability. This is central to the meaning of the CWC. If Russia is not willing to do this, obviously their intentions are not to comply with CWC. We have evidence of the so-called Novichok class of nerve agents that is more lethal than any other known chemical agent in the world. According to Jane's Land-Based Air Defense 1997-98, Russia is developing three new nerve agents, two of which are eight times as deadly as the VX nerve agent stockpiled by Iraq. Mr. President, Russia's new chemical agents do not depend on stockpiles that are on the CWC list of scheduled chemicals, according to sources. Thus, inspectors will neither be prepared nor allowed to look for them, nor will Russia be precluded from importing these components. A declassified portion of a May 1995 national intelligence estimate states ``Production of new binary agents would be difficult to detect and confirm as a CWC-prohibited activity.'' In conclusion, in light of these ongoing activities and related United States intelligence estimates, it is reasonable to condition United States ratification of the CWC to the President certifying that Russia is committed to foregoing chemical weapons capability or other activity contrary to the purpose of the convention weapons treaty. For those reasons, Mr. President, I join the distinguished majority leader and the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in urging that we not strike this condition from the resolution of ratification. Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, we are now going to commence additional debate on the Chemical Weapons Convention. I would like to begin with some general observations about treaties in general and about this treaty in particular. Mr. President, I want to begin by making what should be an obvious point. But in view of some of the rhetoric, I think it is important to reiterate it; that is, that the opponents of the Chemical Weapons Convention abhor chemical weapons just as much as proponents do. If this treaty performs as it is advertised to perform, I think everyone in this body would be supportive of it. Certainly those who oppose the convention support eliminating our chemical weapons, which will happen with or without the Chemical Weapons Convention. As has been noted by previous speakers, the United States is committed to eliminating all of our chemical weapons, and I suspect that everyone in this Chamber supports that position. So opposition is not based on the notion that we would retain our chemical weapons. Mr. President, I also ask that the Record reflect that the Senator from Iowa, Senator Grassley, was present and voted ``aye'' on the last two votes. Mr. President, let me move forward to this proposition. Last week the Senate approved Senate Resolution 495, which demonstrates our commitment to do more. Whether one supports the Chemical Weapons Convention or not, this was an important bill to demonstrate our commitment, both here at home and abroad, to do more to try to stop the spread of chemical weapons, and not doing it alone, as my friend from Delaware has said, because Senate Resolution 495 contains several provisions that call for additional multilateral action on the part of the United States. It requires the President, for example, to use his best efforts to keep the Australia Group intact and to work against any weakening of the Australia Group restrictions on trade in chemicals; to work with Russia to ensure that it conforms to its obligations under the bilateral destruction agreement; for the President to impose sanctions on countries that violate international law with respect to chemical weapons. So Senate Resolution 495 was not a go-it-alone resolution. Quite to the contrary. Though it did close some loopholes in American law, it also reached out in various specific ways to enable us to deal with the problem of the spread of chemical weapons in more practical and specific ways than the Chemical Weapons Convention itself does. We have just had a vote on the resolution of ratification as presented by Senator Helms, the resolution that is currently before us. Many of us voted for that resolution, to make the point that we favor the Chemical Weapons Convention so long as it has certain protections built into it. I think it should also be clear that the opposition to the Chemical Weapons convention is not based on politics. As one of my colleagues said, there will be criticism of President Clinton. I don't think you will hear criticism of President Clinton. The opposition to this treaty is not based on politics. Indeed, it is not an easy treaty to oppose. I think those who oppose it must be recognized as doing so because of a firm principle and commitment rather than anything political. Another general point I would like to make is this. The Senate has a constitutional obligation to independently scrutinize treaties. It has been said that treaties are forever. Most of the treaties that have been ratified by the U.S. Senate are still in force--treaties that are many, many, many years old, some undoubtedly far beyond this time. It is like amending the Constitution. It requires a two-thirds vote. It requires a great deal of thought, therefore, on the part of the Senate. Mr. President, we are not a rubber stamp. No one should feel that they have to support this treaty just because it has been proposed. Treaties are no substitute for sensible action. They are in many respects inherently limited in their value, especially when the nations with whom they are entered into are not committed to the principles of the treaty. There are examples in past history that demonstrate this. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which outlawed war, was obviously something that everyone felt good about supporting. But the actions didn't follow the words, and we know what happened. Also, this morning one of my colleagues quoted Will Rogers, who said, ``We have never lost a war or won a treaty.'' While that has a certain ring of truth to it, I don't think anyone would suggest that, therefore, all treaties are bad. As a matter of fact, we have supported very specific treaties that we think have done some good--arms control treaties like the INF Treaty, the START I Treaty, and the START II Treaty. As a matter of fact, I was asked to support the START II Treaty on the grounds that Russia would not ratify the START II Treaty until the United States did. So we did. We support the START II Treaty. It was ratified here. And 2 years later, the Russians still have not ratified the START II Treaty. So I agree with my colleagues who say that some treaties can be useful. I also make the point that one should not rely strictly on treaties. I also am troubled by the proposition that we somehow feel that we could do internationally that which we could never do domestically. I don't think any of us would contend, for example, that we think we can solve the problem of crime by going to the criminals in our neighborhoods and making a treaty with them to stop committing crime. Instead, we have police forces, we have laws, we have specific punishments, we have a court system, and we put people in prison when they violate those laws. In other words, we take specific action to deal with the problem. We don't rely upon the written word of someone who may be unreliable. Yet, in the international forum that seems to be very much in vogue. I don't think there is any reason that we can believe that a treaty with Iran, for example, is going to change its behavior, or Iraq, or Libya, or North Korea, or many of the other rogue states throughout the world. I think it is countries like Iran that want the benefits of the CWC and the lifting of the trade restrictions that we currently have with Iran, secure in the knowledge that it can avoid detection and/or any punishment that might follow that. Treaties generally do not modify the behavior of states. The law-abiding will abide, and those that intend to cheat will either cheat or not join at all. That is why these multilateral treaties, unlike some of the bilateral treaties that we entered into earlier, are more difficult to make work. Frequently what they do is complicate diplomacy and encourage dishonesty. We know that there are numerous examples of violations of existing treaties and previous treaties. But it was uncomfortable for us to bring those violations to light because, frankly, we thought that we had bigger fish to fry. We had more important matters with those states than the violation of a particular treaty. As a result, paradoxically it was more difficult to enforce these conditions once the treaty went into effect than it was before, because once the treaty went into effect, in order to upset the applecart, we have to find violations. We take it to the body that is going to find a violation and sanction, and we decide that would be diplomatically difficult because we want to accomplish some greater purpose with the state that is in violation. So we just forget the whole thing. What that does is literally put into law the violations that are occurring currently. So they can complicate diplomacy and encourage dishonesty. The bottom line about this general discussion is this: Sometimes treaties can be very useful and sometimes not. We have an obligation to make that distinction--not just to take the word that, if a treaty has been proposed, we have an obligation to support it. That is not the job of the U.S. Senate. Treaties are not an excuse to do that which is difficult. It is like making a New Year's resolution rather than beginning to diet. Sometimes we have to have the courage to begin the diet rather than just relying on a New Year's resolution. Mr. President, a second set of general comments: Reasonable people can differ over the Chemical Weapons Convention. We have a series of former governmental officials on both sides of this issue. We have former Secretaries of Defense, ambassadors, generals, columnists--all of whom have come out very publicly against the treaty. There is undoubtedly an equal number who have come out for the chemical weapons treaty. I hope we can begin this debate with the proposition that reasonable people can differ on this very important matter. Frankly, when former Secretaries of State--like Dick Cheney, Casper Weinberger, Don Rumsfeld, James Schlesinger; former Defense officials, such as Jeane Kirkpatrick and Richard Perle, Gen. P.X. Kelley, and Freddie Clay--when people like this say that they are opposed to the treaty, it ought to be clear that there are reasonable arguments on both sides and that neither side should claim that all right and truth and justice are on their side. Important columnists have also weighed in to this and find themselves on both sides of the issue. That is why I am troubled by the slogan of some people in the administration--and, in particular, I will cite the Secretary of State, who has said on national television that one of the reasons to vote for this treaty is that it has ``Made in America'' written all over it. Mr. President, that is not a substitute for reasoned argument. It is a slogan. It misrepresents the Reagan administration's position on the chemical weapons treaty, which, by the way, was very much different than the treaty that is before the Senate today. I can point out the fact that there have been other treaties proposed to the U.S. Senate that also had ``Made in America'' written all over them--like the League of Nations, which this Senate in its judgment decided not to rubberstamp but to reject. There were cries at the time similar to the cries you hear today that it would isolate America; that it would hurt our business; that we would be the laughingstock of the world; that, after all, President Wilson was the one who created this treaty and how could we vote against it. Moreover, we would be the pariah in the world if we voted against the League of Nations. But in 1919, this body exercised its judgment, its constitutional prerogative and it declined to allow the United States to participate. And I do not think today there are very many people who believe this country made a mistake by waiting and creating instead the United Nations. We, I think, should be able to go forward. I think it takes more courage sometimes to go forward with a position that acknowledges a mistake than it does to simply blindly go forward and perhaps have in the back of your mind the idea that you have made a mistake but it would not look good if you backed out at this time. That is another one of the arguments being made by the opponents; we would be embarrassed internationally if we backed out of the treaty at this point or caused part of it to be renegotiated. I submit that knowing we have made a mistake at least with regard to articles X and XI in this treaty, we should have the courage to fix articles X and XI before our resolution of ratification is deposited at The Hague. Now another general comment, Mr. President. No one has a monopoly on morality. Ours is a disagreement about means, not about ends. I want to make this point very clear because some people, perhaps a little overzealous to push this treaty, have inferred that those who vote against it somehow support the use of chemical weapons. I watched my grandfather die, Mr. President, from emphysema acquired as a result of his being gassed in World War I in Europe. Therefore, I take a back seat to no one in expressing my abhorrence for these despicable weapons and why I fully support the United States eliminating our chemical weapons and leading the world in that regard. We are the only country in the world with chemical weapons that has declared we will eliminate all of our stocks of those weapons. So I hope no one tries to lecture me about the evils of poison gas and how the only way to deal with that is through this Chemical Weapons Convention. We have been the moral leader of the world by imposing trade restrictions on countries like Iran, for example, restrictions that will probably have to be lifted as a result of this treaty because of articles X and XI. So I believe that insisting on renegotiation of articles X and XI would confirm our moral position. Our negotiators tried but failed to win key concessions on those provisions. In the future, they will be strengthened by the knowledge that the Senate will not go along with such halfway measures with a defective treaty. So, Mr. President, my point here is this. It matters how we make a moral statement, and simply ballyhooing a treaty that everyone knows is flawed does not enhance our moral stature. Now to some specific comments. Those of us who have reservations about the treaty have said that it fails in its key objectives, that if it met these objectives we would support it, that our opposition is based on two simple points. It fails to meet the objectives and it does more harm than good. In what way does it fail to meet its objectives. It was proposed as a global and verifiable and enforceable treaty. Unfortunately, it is none of those. First, it is not global. It does not cover the key countries and the key chemicals that are currently suspected of being the problems. Nine of the 14 countries suspected of possessing chemical weapons have not even signed this treaty. These countries include Libya, Iraq, Syria, North Korea, Egypt, Sudan, Serbia, South Korea, and Taiwan. So many of the countries in the world that possess the chemicals are not signatories. They are not going to bind themselves to it. And there is nothing we can do in terms of verification or inspection or anything else that is going to deal with it. The best way to deal with those countries is to do what we are currently doing, which is to maintain and enforce the restrictions of the Australia Group. Now, I spoke of that before. What is it? It is a group of 29 countries, including the United States, that have agreed among themselves not to trade these chemicals to countries that they think might want to develop chemical weapons with them. And we have these restrictions in place now. That is the best way to prevent the spread of these chemicals. Unfortunately, as an incentive to get countries to join the chemical weapons treaty, articles X and XI call into question the existence of those conditions and in fact in our view require that the states remove those restrictions and trade with the countries that are parties to the treaty. Second, the treaty is not verifiable. Now, proponents have said, well, nothing is 100-percent verifiable. That is a false standard, Mr. President. Nobody is claiming that it should be 100-percent verifiable. The question is whether it is effectively verifiable. And on that there is virtually unanimous agreement that, no, it is not effectively verifiable. I read to you a recently unclassified national intelligence estimate conclusion published originally in August of 1993 which stated: The capability of the intelligence community to monitor compliance with the CWC is severely limited and likely to remain so for the rest of the decade. The key provision of the monitoring regime, challenge inspections at undeclared sites, can be thwarted by a nation determined to preserve a small secret program using the delays and managed access rules allowed by the convention. And there are a variety of other statements I could read, including statements of the former Director of the CIA, all of which confirm the fact that this is not a verifiable treaty. Nor is the treaty enforceable. Even if you were to find a violation and you brought it to the bodies that are supposed to run this treaty, you would have to have a three-quarter vote, and there is no sanction in place. Once they found a violation, they would go to the country and say, would you please stop violating. If the country continued to ignore them, although the likelihood is the country would say, well, sure, we would be happy to, and eventually hide the material in such a way that you could not find a violation in the future, but assuming the violation continued and you continue to prove that, what is the sanction? There is none. Where do you go? The United Nations, the General Assembly. Mr. President, that is not a place where at least the United States has been treated very kindly in the past. And if you have to go all the way to the Security Council, Russia, China, other states have a veto. So it is unlikely that significant punishment would be meted out. As a matter of fact, the evidence of that probably most clearly is the case of Iraq which admittedly--I should not say admittedly. They denied it, but after inspection it was confirmed that chemical weapons were used against both Iran and against the Kurdish population of Iraq itself and yet the United Nations, the peace-loving nations of the world were incapable of mustering the courage to even name Iraq in a meaningless resolution about the use of these weapons. So it does not seem likely to me that the United Nations would muster the courage to impose any kind of particular sanction. Now, another one of the selling points of this treaty, according to its proponents, is, well, it is better than nothing. In other words, granted, it does not cover a lot of the countries we wished it covered and it is not very verifiable and there are not any particular sanctions in the treaty, but at least it is better than nothing. Our response to that is essentially twofold. First of all, it is very costly both in terms of money and potential constitutional restrictions and, second, there are some other very significant reasons why it is not better than nothing. In terms of cost, we know that the cost to the Government is going to be $150 million to $200 million annually. Businesses are going to have to pay between $200,000 and $500,000 for inspections. Just to fill out the forms, and there are thousands of businesses in this country that will have to fill out the forms, it is going to be a $50,000 to $70,000 proposition, and, of course, untold amounts lost in confidential business information which can result as a result of the industrial espionage that most people believe will result from the inspections under this treaty. Second, we mentioned the constitutional issues. There has been an attempt to fix about half of the constitutional issues. One deals with the fourth amendment, and there has been an amendment to say a search warrant would be required. The problem with that is that it would probably be found to be in violation of the treaty if a constitutional requirement were imposed to prevent the treaty from operating as it was written. So if we actually go ahead with a protection from fourth amendment searches and seizures, we may very well be found in violation of the treaty. On the other hand, those responsible for making such a decision may decide that we can have such a constitutional protection in which case I think we can count on all of the other nations that want to avoid detection doing the same thing and, of course, as a nation that lives under the rule of law we will abide by it in a proper way. And I think we can count on countries like Iran or China or Cuba, for example, to use that as an excuse not to allow the kind of inspections that would result in detection. The other part of the Constitution, the fifth amendment, presents a special problem that nobody has figured out how to fix. The fifth amendment provides that if there is a taking by the Government of property one is entitled to be paid. The problem is that when the U.S. Government imposes this regime on American businesses and individuals, it has not yet made the commitment to pay them. My own guess is that I would have a right to sue and the U.S. Government would have to pay but there is no provision for that. You cannot sue under the Federal Tort Claim Act, and so we would have to somehow construct an ability to sue the U.S. Government and provide for the unlimited liability that would result from such an undertaking. So that has not been dealt with either. The bottom line is the constitutional issues remain very much up in the air. Now, those are some of the costs. I think, however, the biggest costs are the following two. The mere fact that this treaty has been proposed has caused many to decide that we do not have to worry as much about defending our troops. I know the President has made a big matter out of saying that this treaty would help to protect our troops. Well, I think he is very wrong and his own administration officials verify this because for the last 2 years his representatives have come to the Congress and based on the fact that the United States signed this treaty and they presumed we would ratify it, this administration has called for reductions in spending on defensive measures for our troops. How can a President who tries to sell the treaty on the basis that it will be good for our troops, that it will protect them, come before the Congress not once but twice and call for a reduction in funding to provide defenses for our troops? Two years ago, $850 million. Fortunately, we restored it. What was the reason? The reason expressly was because this treaty is going to enter into force and we will be a part of it, as if the treaty were going to make the threat go away. And this year General Shalikashvili let us cut another $1.5 billion over 5 years out of this part of the defense budget, this despite the fact that the General Accounting Office in a very critical report following the Persian Gulf war, updated just last year, has found that our defenses are in a very serious state of disrepair; that we are not adequately prepared; that we have not provided our soldiers, our marines, our fighting people who are going to be confronting chemical or biological warfare the kind of training, the kind of equipment, the kind of antidotes, the kind of protection they deserve. So you have GAO in a very current finding that we are not doing enough for our troops, the administration trying to cut the funding to do more, and the President saying that the chemical weapons treaty will solve the problem. That is what I had reference to when I said that treaties can make you feel good, like you have solved a problem, but when it comes to the lives of American soldiers, we will not have done enough to protect them. And that is why we should not be lulled into a sense of false security by signing a piece of paper that I do not think people would loan money on if they wanted to get it back, frankly. So, this treaty does damage. It is worse than nothing. What is another example? You have heard me talk about articles X and XI. You are going to hear a lot about that, because articles X and XI turn out not to be such a good idea. I am going to discuss that in more detail later. They were put into the treaty at a time when it seemed like a good idea. Now it does not seem like such a good idea. The administration and everybody else acknowledges we have a problem here. The problem is, everybody is embarrassed to go back and change it. The administration says, ``Well, we negotiated the best deal we could.'' We say, ``Because it is flawed, let us go back and take those two sections out.'' But the administration does not want to do that. Not taking them out is going to result in a proliferation of chemical weapons and technology, not a restriction of it. Again, I will get into that in more detail later. The point I want to make here is that as long as this treaty has articles X and XI in it, it is going to be worse than nothing because it is going to result in the proliferation of chemicals rather than a restriction. I will just quote one sentence that a letter that former Defense Secretary, Dick Cheney wrote in this regard. He said, ``In my judgment, the treaty's article X and XI amount to a formula for greatly accelerating the proliferation of chemical warfare capabilities around the globe.'' So, in this second significant respect, the treaty makes the situation worse than it was before. Finally, as I made a point to mention before, it is going to significantly reduce our diplomatic options. Claiming violations will take back seat to more pressing diplomatic considerations. We have seen this in a variety of situations. When the Russians were in violation of the ABM Treaty and had a radar at a place called Krasnoyarsk, we were in delicate negotiations with them in a variety of other things and therefore it was ``see no evil,'' basically. ``We are really not all that sure they violated the treaty,'' when in fact our intelligence community knew full well they had. And after the Soviet Union broke up, its leaders said, ``Sure we were in violation.'' The question is, why didn't we do anything about it? Well, because we did not want to upset the diplomatic applecart. Think about China with MFN. Are we going to upset the diplomatic applecart? You see, today we do not have to because there is no treaty. Once a treaty is in place we have an obligation. If we know there are violations--perhaps, for example, with China--we would have an obligation to send inspectors over there and ask them to see what they could find. One of two things will happen. Either they are going to confirm there are violations--unlikely, in which case we are then going to have to do something about it. More likely, they will come back and say, ``Well, we couldn't prove it.'' As a result, China or whoever is doing the violating will have the Good Housekeeping stamp of approval. We set up this regime. You try to find people guilty. But the burden is so difficult you are not going to find people guilty. They are going to, in effect, be acquitted. And when they are acquitted we have then diminished our opportunity to negotiate with them, to tell them to stop selling chemicals, for example, to Iran or other countries we do not want to have them. In that respect, again, the treaty reduces our diplomatic options. It puts us into a box. It makes it more difficult to deal with these kinds of violations and in that respect again it is not better than nothing, it is worse than doing nothing. What are some of the administration's claims? First of all, they have made the astonishing claim that failure to ratify the treaty would mean that we are aligned with the pariah states of Iraq and Libya because Iraq and Libya are not going to sign or ratify this treaty. I hope the Secretary of State and the President of the United States could discriminate a little better than that. I could make the same argument to them. If we sign the treaty, we are going to be in with a bunch of other pariah states. Do they think it is any better to be with Iran or Cuba? These are states that have signed the treaty and presumably will ratify it. Obviously, that is not an argument that gets you anywhere. But it is the kind of simplistic, superficial argument that this administration is using to sell the treaty. It is an affront to the intelligence of the Senate. As I said, I hope the President and Secretary of State can make better distinctions than that. I also note it is a bit meaningless at this point to join the treaty, though 67 other nations have joined it, because they do not have chemical weapons. The countries that have chemical weapons have not joined it, and many of them are not going to. About 99 percent of the world's chemical weapons, according to open source material, are held by three countries, none of whom have joined the treaty: The United States, Russia, and China. We have a bilateral destruction agreement with Russia, in which we are trying to get them to destroy their chemical weapons--and they decided they are not going to follow through with that, apparently. So, what makes us think that we are going to do any good by joining the treaty, when about 80 percent-plus of the chemicals in China and Russia would be outside the purview of the treaty? The next comment made is, ``No treaty is 100 percent verifiable.'' I think I dealt with that before. Nobody is claiming it needs to be 100- percent verifiable, but when we say this treaty is not adequately verifiable or effectively verifiable, their comeback is, ``Well, no treaty is 100 percent.'' That is not the issue. The issue is whether it is effectively verifiable, and unfortunately no one claims that this treaty is effectively verifiable. No one, for example, has said that they have high confidence that this treaty will timely detect significant violations. As a matter of fact, one of the strong supporters of the treaty, a friend and someone who has served this country well, and we have a difference of opinion about the treaty, Ron Adelman, said in an op-ed piece he wrote on February 20, ``Granted, the treaty is virtually unverifiable and granted it doesn't seem right for the Senate to ratify an unverifiable treaty. . .'' he went on to say: ``however, I think we are still better off by going ahead.'' My point is that even treaty proponents acknowledge it is not verifiable, so let us not get into a debate as to whether it has to be 100-percent verifiable or not. It is not effectively verifiable. That is the point. I discussed a bit ago the argument that the CWC will protect American troops and prevent a terrorist attack. No one who has spoken to this from an intelligence point of view can credibly make the claim that this treaty will, in any way, shape or form, reduce the threat of terrorism. Let me repeat that. Our intelligence community is unwilling to say that this treaty would stop terrorist attacks. And even one of the much vaunted agreements that was entered into between our friends on the other side of the aisle and Senator Helms recognizes the fact that the CWC is not effective to deal with the problem of terrorism. Let me quote one of the recently unclassified assessments of our intelligence agency, the Central Intelligence Agency: In the case of Aum Shinrikyo [this is the cult in Japan that gassed Japanese citizens] the Chemical Weapons Convention would not have hindered the cult from procuring the needed chemical compounds needed in the production of sarin. Further, the Aum would have escaped the requirement for an end-use certification because it purchased the chemicals within Japan. The point is, here, that chemicals are so easily secreted, chemical weapons are so easily made in small, confined spaces, that it is essentially impossible to find all of them. And a terrorist group, in a room the size of a large closet, in Japan, was able to make the sarin gas that they used. This Chemical Weapons Convention has no capability to deal with that. I will say it this way: It is a fraud on the American people to suggest that we have to adopt this treaty in order to do away with terrorist use of chemical weapons. It will not be effective for that purpose. It may have some other beneficial effects, but no one should contend that it is going to help with regard to terrorism. The same thing, as I said, is true with regard to the defense of our troops. If this administration were actually pursuing a strong defensive capability for our troops, that would be one thing, but it is not. As a result, I think it is not an appropriate argument for this administration to base the ratification of the treaty on. Another argument of the administration is that this is important to protect the jobs in the chemical industry and that there would be some losses to our chemical companies if the treaty were not adopted by the United States. First, I would say that this is no reason for the United States to enter into a treaty, simply to enhance the financial balance sheets of American companies. We are all for doing that, we are all for helping American businesses do well, but one does not enter into a treaty for that purpose. I think there should be a question about whether our chemical companies ought to be selling these kinds of chemicals to countries like Iran and Cuba and China in any event, because that is the new market that will open up. These are countries that have signed the treaty, not yet ratified. Presumably they will ratify it at some point so there will be an added market for us to sell our chemicals. The other added market is that if the Australia Group restrictions come off, then our companies would not be restricted by the Australia Group limitations. In both cases they would be able to sell more chemicals. I would argue that that is not necessarily a good thing, even though it might enhance their balance sheets. And to the argument that somehow there will be a downside to them, that they will actually lose money, it is an argument that does not persuade me. Because folks should know that the only limitation that can be imposed on companies in countries that do not sign the treaty is with respect to so-called schedule 1 and schedule 2 chemicals. These are the chemicals of chemical warfare, of chemical weapons and their precursors, by definition, made in noncommercial quantities. So the only limitation that could ever be imposed upon American companies, if it ever were, would be on such a small amount of chemicals that, even by their own definition it would constitute only a fraction of 1 percent of the chemicals that are traded. We should pass the treaty for that? I do not think so. Another argument is that at least we will get more intelligence if we are a party to the treaty. This is the argument that says granted it may not solve all the problems but it is better to be inside than outside. I think this particular argument deserves a little bit of attention. I serve on the Senate Intelligence Committee. I know how this works. I think I should explain a little bit about it. The claim is not true. Our intelligence agencies, of course, always are looking for new opportunities to get information, but it is not correct to say that the chemical weapons treaty provides us that mechanism. The chemical weapons treaty says that if you want to inspect another country for a suspected violation, you bring the matter to the council in charge of the treaty, and if it decides to go forward, it will appoint three inspectors--but it cannot be somebody from your country. So, it would be somebody from three other countries that go do the inspection. They come back and they deposit their findings with this body, this executive council. And by the treaty terms they cannot share that information with anybody else. It is secret. So the United States, not being a party to the inspection, does not have the information, and cannot have it, under the terms of the treaty. So there is only one way that we would gain more information under the terms of the treaty and that is by cheating, by violating the treaty, by somehow trying to steal the information, by somehow trying to turn one of those inspectors to be an agent for us in violation of the treaty terms. That is how we would get more information--not legally, under the treaty. What would we do if we found somebody cheating? Let us assume that we find that Russia or China has chemical weapons, is not destroying them--in other words, does possess in violation of this treaty. Would we insist on sanctions? How about today? Take the case of China. Would we insist on sanctions? We shake in our boots when the President of Taiwan comes over, attends his 25th class reunion at Cornell, and the Chinese Government threatens to lob missiles into Los Angeles and steams in the Straits of Taiwan and sends missiles over Taiwan. Are we going to impose sanctions on China because of a finding that they have maintained a chemical weapons stock? Are we going to have to prove to this international body, this executive council, that they are in violation? And at what cost to our relations? The problem is, with the treaty you can no longer ignore violations. You either object or it ends up in a whitewash. Either way it creates significant problems. There is a final argument that has been made recently and it mystifies me because it doesn't go anywhere but they have been making it, so I will try to respond. Proponents say we are getting rid of our weapons, and therefore the chemical weapon convention will force others to do so, too. It is absolutely true the United States is getting rid of our weapons. We are committed to doing that. We do not need the Chemical Weapons Convention to prove to the world that we are the moral leader of the world. We have said we are getting rid of ours. Nobody else has, but we have. So you don't need the Chemical Weapons Convention. I challenge my friends who propose the treaty, in what way will the chemical weapons treaty make the other countries get rid of theirs? That is the purpose, that is the goal, but there is no effective mechanism to make it happen, and there is no intelligence estimate or assessment to that effect, Mr. President. We are going to have an opportunity tomorrow to go into classified session and hear just what our intelligence community has to say about the chemical weapons programs of other nations and about what we think they are going to be doing in the future, and I urge my colleagues to attend that session. (Ms. COLLINS assumed the chair.)

Mr. KYL. I will conclude on articles X and XI because we are going to hear a lot more about them. I think it is important to read into the Record the provisions we are talking about and discuss in a little bit of detail specifically what our concerns are. Here is what article X says. I might preface this comment, Madam President, with the statement that these were inducements put into the treaty originally to induce countries to join the treaty. They were put there based upon inducements that were included in a previous treaty, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, under the so-called atoms for peace plan. Many people know or will remember that the atoms for peace plan was the idea that if countries would eschew the development of nuclear weapons, we would provide them peaceful nuclear technology. And countries like Iraq, and other countries that could be mentioned, took advantage of that program, and said, ``Fine. We won't develop nuclear weapons. Now send us the peaceful nuclear technology.'' We eventually learned that what they did with that peaceful technology was to use it in their nuclear weapons program. So after it was put in the treaty, and we got these people signed up, we learned that several countries were using this provision of the treaty to actually enhance their nuclear weapons capability. It worked to the detriment of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Well, before that was ever learned this chemical weapons treaty was negotiated. So at the time it seemed like a good idea to put the same kind of provision in the chemical weapons treaty. At the time it seemed like it would be a smart thing to provide an inducement for countries to join the treaty, saying: If you'll join up, then we will not have any restrictions on trade in chemicals with you. You can buy all the chemicals you want. And, in addition to that, you can ask us for, and we will provide to you, all of the defensive gear, chemicals, antidotes, equipment, and so on, that will enable you to defend against chemical weapons. That is a pretty good incentive for a country to join up. Look at it from the standpoint of a country that has in mind conducting chemical warfare capability. The first thing they want to do is be able to protect their own troops from the use of the weapons. So they want our latest technology in defensive gear, in defensive equipment, in antidotes and the like. So it is a pretty good incentive to sign up for the treaty because they have a right to ask us, and the treaty says we will undertake to provide to them that material. Moreover they want to buy chemicals. Right now the Australia group I talked about before has limitations on what chemicals can be sold. As a matter of fact, there are 54 specific chemicals under the Australia group that cannot be sold to the countries we believe want to develop the chemical weapons capability. These countries then have an incentive for joining the convention because under the convention you cannot limit the trade in chemicals. What does the treaty say? Article X: Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning means of protection against chemical weapons. It could not be more clear, Madam President. Article X says that the parties to the treaty have the right to participate in and each party undertakes to facilitate. In other words, we have an obligation to facilitate their acquisition of this defensive equipment. Article XI carries this further and adds another element. And I read in part: The . . . States Parties . . . .shall . . . undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest . . . exchange of chemicals, equipment and scientific and technical information relating to the development and application of chemistry for purposes not prohibited under this Convention . . . for peaceful purposes . . . In other words. The ``atoms for peace'' equivalent in the Chemical Weapons Convention. So here is a big incentive for countries who want to develop a defense against chemical weapons to join the Chemical Weapons Convention. The second part of article XI, section (c) says that: [The] States Parties. . . shall. . .[n]ot maintain among themselves any restrictions, including those in any international agreements . . . shall. . . [n]ot maintain among themselves any restrictions, including those in any international agreements, incompatible with the obligations undertaken under this Convention, which would restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of [again] scientific and technological knowledge in the field of chemistry for industrial, agriculture, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes. shall . . . [n]ot maintain among themselves any restrictions, [either unilateral or international restrictions.] So what this says is that States Parties will have the right to say, once they become parties, ``You can't have an embargo on selling chemicals to us. You have to lift your restrictions.'' For a country like Iran, for example, which has signed the treaty, this would be a pretty good deal because currently none of the Australia Group countries will sell it these chemicals. What is going to happen? Well, today, China may be selling chemicals to Iran or maybe another country is selling chemicals to Iran not covered by the treaty. Once the treaty goes into effect, those countries could continue to sell chemicals to Iran. But what is going to happen is that the other countries, countries that sign onto the convention are going to say, ``Wait a minute. China, for example, is selling chemicals to Iran. Our chemical companies want in on the action. It says right here in the treaty we're not supposed to maintain any restrictions. So we are out of here. We are going to allow our countries to sell chemicals to a country like Iran.'' We will have a very poor argument against that. What has been the administration's response to this? Belatedly the administration seems to find there is a little problem here. But originally it did not think so. As a matter of fact--and I think this is a critical point of this debate, Madam President,--right after the chemical weapons treaty was signed into force, the Australia Group members were all asked to begin the process of lifting their restrictions pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the plain wording of articles X and XI. Let me read to you, according to the administration--this is in testimony before the Congress: Australia Group members in August 1992 committed to review their export control measures with a view of removing them for CWC States Parties in full compliance with their own obligations under the convention. In other words, after the CWC was signed, the Australia Group countries began to review their export control measures which currently prohibit them from selling chemicals to certain countries, so that they could bring themselves into compliance with their obligations under articles X and XI of the convention. And the Australia Group itself issued a formal statement--and I am quoting now-- Undertaking to review, in light of the implementation of the Convention, the measures that they take to prevent the spread of chemical substances and equipment for purposes contrary to the objectives of the convention with the aim of removing such measures for the benefit of States Parties to the Convention acting in full compliance with the obligations under the Convention. In other words, again, if you have limitations on the sale of chemicals to countries, you are going to have to lift them or you will be in violation of articles X and XI of the convention. What has the administration's response to this been? At first it was denial. Then, one comment made to me was, ``Well, we tried our best to negotiate our way out of this, but the best we could do is get language like `undertake to facilitate' rather than `obligated to.' We just couldn't negotiate anything better.'' So this was a bone to those countries, an incentive for them to come in. And to our argument, this makes the situation worse, not better, and will actually proliferate these weapons, the same as Secretary Cheney just said in the quotation I just read, that articles X and XI will result in the proliferation of chemical weapons because there cannot be any restrictions. The administration then began to take a different tack. First they said, well, we will decide not to lift our restrictions, so the United States will still not sell to countries that we think might develop chemical weapons. And we will get you a letter to that effect. I have not seen anything in writing, but that is the administration's latest statement. We said, that does not do any good because it only takes one country to break an embargo. Any one of the countries could do it. And the horse would be out of the barn. So they said, well, we will try to get the other Australia Group states to agree to the same thing. Bear in mind what they are saying. First, they were all going to lift these restrictions to be in compliance with the treaty. Now we are going to try to convince them they should keep them in place in clear violation to the treaty. This is the way to make a moral statement, Madam President, by violating the treaty right up front and announcing to the world we are violating the treaty, by keeping in place restrictions that are required to be lifted under articles X and XI? It is not a very propitious way to make a moral statement or to begin the operation of an international treaty to announce in effect not only are you going to violate it but you are going to try to get all your friends in the Australia Group to violate it because not to do so would be to lift the restrictions we currently believe are helpful in preventing the spread of chemical weapons. Even if all these countries do decide to ignore articles X and XI, countries that are not States Parties can continue to sell these chemicals. I said, it will not be long until everyone else will want in the action. The same argument that has been made by some of our chemical companies, in the event if somebody is selling we should have the right to sell too otherwise we are just losing good business. So I will conclude, Madam President, by trying to make this rather simple, but I think important point. To those who say, granted, it is not going to be a very effective treaty, but at least it does no harm, I say, you are wrong. It is going to do a lot of harm--to business, to the taxpayers, to our ability to conduct diplomacy and, importantly, to our ability to constrain the spread of chemical weapons. As Secretary Cheney said, unless articles X and XI are removed from this treaty, it is going to make matters worse, not better. So the fourth condition that is a part of the Helms resolution of ratification says that we will ratify the treaty, but before we deposit the articles of ratification there has to be a certification by the President that those two sections have been removed from the treaty. Yes, of course, that will require a renegotiation. The States Parties will have to agree to take those provisions out. That should not be a problem if the administration's most current assurances are to be believed. I suspect, however, there are specific States Parties who do not agree with those assurances who fully intend to continue these sales. As a matter of fact, if you will read the language of the Chinese ratification, it explicitly preserves their understanding of articles X and XI which is the obvious understanding of anyone reading them, that it would be improper to have trade restrictions or to deny the defensive equipment in the case of other States Parties. So, Madam President, we are stuck with articles X and XI. And it is the belief of many of us that perhaps we could support this treaty if those articles were removed. But until they are removed, it makes matters worse and therefore we cannot in good conscience support the treaty in that form. I thank the distinguished chairman of the committee for yielding me this time. Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.

Mr. KYL. Madam President, I return that thanks. I see the distinguished ranking member of the committee. I compliment both of them for their work to achieve what I have described as ``limited success'' in the provisions agreed to, but nonetheless important. I appreciate the negotiations that they conducted and the spirit in which this debate has been conducted as well.

Mr. KYL. Finally, Madam President, there has been much made of the fact that in the negotiations over this treaty, numerous improvements were made and, therefore, we should remove our objections and go along with the treaty. First of all, I want to set the stage. Last fall when the treaty came before the Senate, the statement was that we couldn't touch it, that we couldn't negotiate anything, we had to use the resolution that came out of the committee and there were no changes that were possible; ``You can't change the treaty; we're not interested in negotiating any terms.'' It turned out there was not sufficient support for the treaty and, therefore, the administration had it pulled. Interestingly enough, last night I saw a news program, the Jim Lehrer News Hour, in which it was misstated that Senator Dole, the previous majority leader, asked the treaty to be withdrawn. He did not ask the treaty to be withdrawn. He was not even in the Senate at the time. He wrote a letter in opposition to the treaty, but he did not ask it be withdrawn. He just said he wouldn't vote for it if it were still in the Senate. It was withdrawn by the administration, by the Clinton administration, not by anyone here in the Senate. Notwithstanding the fact that the administration took the position that nothing could change, once the treaty was found not to have adequate support, the administration began to change its tune, and little by little, they began to sit down and talk to those who had objections. Over many months, various concessions were made which marginally improved the situation. Now, they are not concessions with respect to the treaty itself because it can't be changed, but there are some things which at least help to clarify how the United States is going to proceed, and had it not been for the considerable efforts of the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, these changes would not have been made. So while they were critical of the chairman for his opposition to the treaty, it turns out that now they are bragging about the changes that he sought to have made, and I think that is a very important point, Madam President. Let me just repeat it. While initially deriding the concerns of the chairman of the committee, they are now bragging about the changes that he forced them to make, claiming that this makes it a better treaty, now we should all support it. It does make it a better treaty, but at the margins, not at the core. What has been negotiated? First of all, there are nine specific conditions that merely restate existing constitutional protections. Those could not have been taken away in any event, but it was helpful to get the administration to acknowledge that they existed. They were even reluctant to acknowledge some of these constitutional protections. We could do without them, because they are in the Constitution anyway, but at least it was handy to get the administration to acknowledge that they existed. Second, there are two conditions that merely allow the Congress to enact appropriations or approve reprogramming. As every Senator knows, we have that right. We are the body, along with the House, that enacts appropriations or approves reprogramming. So that was essentially meaningless, though handy to have the administration acknowledge. There are four conditions that call for reports. Whenever you see a call for a report, Madam President, you know that that means we tried to reach agreement on something, we couldn't, so we said, ``By golly, we'll have a study on it, we'll have a report.'' And that is what this calls for. There are seven conditions that call for Presidential certifications, all of which he can make today. These were not concessions by the administration. They were able to agree to these because these are certifications they can currently make. So one should not brag about those. Four additional conditions are a restatement of current U.S. policy. Again, we thought these were good to have on paper in connection with the treaty so there would be no mistake about what U.S. policy was. It isn't new, it isn't new policy, it isn't a compromise, it isn't a negotiated settlement; this is just a restatement in the resolution of ratification about existing U.S. policy. One of the conditions doesn't take effect until 1998. I conclude, then, with the two that have some meaning. One deals with search and seizures under the fourth amendment, and I discussed that briefly a moment ago. The other deals with the subject of riot control agents. We do not know what the courts will do with either of these two. I spoke to the issue of the fourth amendment. The resolution includes a statement that we will require search warrants, either administrative warrants or criminal warrants in the appropriate case. That may or may not be effective under the treaty. It may be declared in violation of the treaty. If not, other countries are going to be able to do the same thing. While the United States will assiduously adhere to the law and to the Constitution, my guess is if other States are able to do the same thing, we will suddenly find interesting provisions in the Iranian Constitution or Chinese Constitution that are going to constitute loopholes big enough to drive a truck through. The other matter is important, but in the overall scheme of things, I think perhaps more has been made of it than was generally warranted, and it is still not certain that it is resolved, but at least the allegation is that it is. This has to do with riot control agents, tear gas to most people. This was one of the areas in which the Bush and Reagan administrations had been very clear, and the Clinton administration changed policy, another example of a situation where this is not the same treaty that the Bush and Reagan administrations had in mind. They always thought you could use tear gas in certain situations; for example, to rescue a downed pilot, to deal with a situation where you had civilians surrounding an American hostage, for example. Rather than having to shoot those people, we say it makes sense to use tear gas to disperse the crowd and rescue the American. This administration said, no, we don't interpret the treaty as allowing that. Even people who support the treaty, like Gen. Brent Scowcroft, said, that's crazy, that has to be changed. It took a long time to get the administration to finally agree in concept to a change. I am still not persuaded the language does it, but let's assume in good faith they have really agreed to a change in this policy. What that will mean is that, at least in that limited kind of situation, we will be able to use tear gas. That is a positive development, but in light of the final points that I want to make here, it is not reason to change from supporting a treaty that is not global, not verifiable, not effective, does more harm than good. That change is helpful but not dispositive. What are the five unresolved issues? The way this treaty comes before the Senate, it is the Helms resolution of ratification. In other words, it is a resolution wrapped around the treaty. It has 28 agreed-upon items, and then, in addition, there are 5 that are not agreed upon. Those are the items that constitute the Helms resolution of ratification. To approve the treaty, we will vote on the resolution of ratification. The proponents of the treaty have the right under the rule here to seriatim move to strike each of these five remaining conditions. If they are all stricken, then we will end up voting for the Helms resolution of ratification sans these five protections. If four of them are stricken, we will have one, and so forth. What are these five unresolved issues? These are the core of the dispute. This is really what it is all about. And this is what I will spend the rest of my time on. The first issue says the country that has the most chemical weapons in the world, Russia, is not a party to the treaty. It has not complied with various agreements that we have concerning destruction of its chemical weapons stocks and its biological weapons, incidentally, and it has not agreed to abide by a memorandum of understanding with this country under which it would list its stocks of chemicals. These were key agreements that were part of the basis for the Reagan and Bush administrations' sponsorship of this treaty. Russia had agreed to these things. One is called the bilateral destruction agreement. The other is called the Wyoming memorandum of understanding. The Reagan and Bush administrations believed that if the Russians complied with these provisions, that the chemical weapons treaty might be a good thing. But they are not complying with them. Again, we will hear some details in the session tomorrow. But the fact of the matter is, we ought to require that Russia at least demonstrates some good faith to proceed down the path toward declaring what they have and getting rid of those things. If there is no indication by the Russians that they intend to do this, then it seems a little odd to be entering into a treaty where 60 percent of the world's chemical weapons are not even being dealt with and we are basically conceding to the Russians that they don't have to agree with these other agreements with us. What we are saying is, to try to apply a little leverage to our friends in Russia, look, we know it is expensive to dismantle this, but that cannot be the only problem you have when you will not even declare all of the chemical weapons you have, when you won't even begin the process of dismantling them, when you have signaled that you are no longer going to be complying with the bilateral destruction agreement, you consider it now inoperative, no longer useful. We want some signs from you that you are serious about dealing with chemical weapons before we enter into the Chemical Weapons Convention. And there is a final reason for this, Madam President. One of the leaders of Russia has written to one of the top leaders of the United States and made it clear that if Russia is to join the Chemical Weapons Convention, it wants to do so at the same time the United States does. As a result, it would be highly unfortunate if the United States went ahead and ratified this treaty before the Russian Duma did. The Russian Duma is clearly not ready to do so. This first condition, therefore, in the Helms resolution of ratification says, ``Hold on, we will ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, but we will not deposit our instrument of ratification at The Hague until Russia has done the same, thus enabling us to come in at the same time.'' That is all that condition says. It would require certification by the President that Russia is making progress, that it intends to comply, it is making progress toward complying. They don't have to demonstrate that they have complied. We think that is a reasonable condition. I guess I will state it the other way around as to this first condition, should we be supporting a treaty that we know is being breached by the country that has the largest number of chemical weapons in the world and is going to continue to be breached by that country, or should we insist on a condition that they are making progress toward complying before we buy into it? The second condition has to do with other states, the so-called rogue states. I will spend only a moment on this because I know my colleague from Oklahoma, Senator Inhofe, wants to speak at greater length about this. We know that there are a variety of rogue states that have no intention of signing on to this treaty and others that may want to sign on but know they can violate it with impunity. These chemical weapons in these countries' hands constitute a real threat to American troops. We think that if one is going to make the claim that this Chemical Weapons Convention is going to reduce the chemical weapons stocks of these rogue nations that pose a threat to the United States, the least that ought to happen is that they submit themselves to the treaty. Can't do any good if they are not members. We need to certify that some of these nations are going to be states parties before we subject ourselves to it. The third condition is one that I can't imagine anybody is going to object to, and that is that certain inspectors would be barred from inspecting American sites. We have the right to do this under the treaty. The President has the right to say, I don't want any inspectors from China, I don't want any inspectors from Iran coming in here because we think they are going to--and I use these as hypotheticals-- the President says, we think they may be bent on industrial espionage and therefore we are going to ask that they not be inspectors. The argument against that is, well, tit for tat. They will say, fine, we don't want any Americans on the inspection team that comes into our country. We are willing to say, fine. We think for certain countries, like China and Iran, we should put right up front they are not going to be inspectors of United States facilities. And that would be a third condition to ratification. A fourth condition to--actually No. 5 on the list has to do with the standard for verification. This has to do with the question of whether or not we have an adequate sense that we can actually find cheating under the treaty. And we are not asking for an impossible standard. We are not asking for 100-percent verification. We are simply asking that the President certify to the Congress before we submit the articles of ratification that the CIA has certified to the President to a level of verification that will work. And what we have basically done is take the definition of previous administrations, the so-called Baker-Nitze definition, along with a specific aspect that General Shalikashvili identified as a way of identifying our standard here for verification under the treaty. It would be effectively verifiable. We could find violations with a high degree of confidence in a timely fashion, within a year of their occurrence. And they would be militarily significant. Now, militarily significant was defined in a hearing before the U.S. Congress by General Shalikashvili as 1 ton of chemical weapons. And, therefore, that is what we have built into this definition. So what we have said, Madam President, is that we would join the treaty at such time as we had the certification from the President that the CIA certified that we could achieve this level of verification. I do not think that is asking too much. Finally, the final condition has to do with articles X and XI. This is what I had spoken to before. I would ask my distinguished chairman if I could go on for just a few minutes here.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, may I further ask that the Record reflect that the Senator from Florida, Senator Mack, was present and voting ``aye''; and that Senator Kempthorne, Senator Abraham, Senator Roberts, and Senator Hutchinson also voted ``aye.''

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask that the Record reflect my ``aye'' vote on the two resolutions just voted, and that the Record also reflect that Senator Smith of New Hampshire voted ``aye.'' Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent Jeanine Esperne, John Rood, and David Stephens be granted the privilege of the floor for the duration of the day.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, tomorrow, at 10 a.m., the Senate will resume consideration of the Chemical Weapons Convention treaty. I remind all Senators that from 10:30 to 12:30 the Senate will conduct its business in a closed session of the Senate in the Old Senate Chamber to hear debate on sensitive intelligence issues. With that in mind, I ask all Senators to arrive promptly at the Old Senate Chamber at 10:30 tomorrow morning. Under the agreement, tomorrow there will be five motions to strike in order to the resolution of ratification with 1 hour of debate equally divided between the chairman and ranking member, or their designees. Therefore, Senators should anticipate rollcall votes throughout Thursday's session of the Senate and possibly into the evening, if necessary, to complete action on this treaty.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I now ask that the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today it stand in adjournment until the hour of 10 a.m. on Thursday, April 24. I further ask unanimous consent that on Thursday, immediately following the prayer, the routine requests through the morning hour be granted and the Senate immediately resume consideration of the Chemical Weapons Convention treaty.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, to explain to the colleagues what is going to happen next, we are going to conclude debate this evening on the Chemical Weapons Convention and then reinitiate it tomorrow. We will begin tomorrow with the closed session which will be a 2-hour closed session in the Old Senate Chamber, and thereafter resume debate, including the motions to strike.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there now be a period for the transaction of morning business with Senators permitted to speak for up to 5 minutes each.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. He is willing to go ahead if you would like.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I have a unanimous-consent request that has been cleared on both sides. I ask unanimous consent that 1 hour of the 2 hours devoted to the closed session not be counted against the 10- hour debate time as provided in the consent agreement.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I have time remaining, and I am perfectly happy to yield back almost all of that time in an effort to get this matter to a vote. I urge my colleagues on the other side, if they have opposition, to please make their arguments in opposition so we can bring this to a vote and our colleagues can try to catch their airplanes, which I know they are trying to do. Until someone is here to speak, I will reiterate the basic point of the legislation. I do urge my colleagues who may be in opposition to please come to the floor to make their arguments to try to accommodate our colleagues. This legislation, again, Mr. President, is simply designed to complement the provisions of existing law and is also complementary to the Chemical Weapons Convention. It does not create a great deal that is new, but rather plugs loopholes in existing law. We noted, for example, that while it is illegal for one to manufacture and possess and use biological weapons in the United States, we have overlooked passing a law that makes it illegal to manufacture or possess chemical weapons. If we are going to be serious about the chemical weapons business and trying to prevent proliferation, obviously we need to make that conduct illegal as well. We do that in this legislation. It is not anything Members should have concern about. In fact, they should want that. Who would be against providing the President a little more flexibility and imposing sanctions on countries that violate international law by using chemical or biological weapons? Who could be against asking the President of the United States to do his best to keep the Australia group together, working as a group of countries in the world that do not sell chemicals, precursor chemicals, to nations that might make chemical weapons of them? It is the policy of the United States, and a sense of the Senate, that the President should ensure that the Australia group restrictions are not weakened in any way. That is consistent totally with the Chemical Weapons Convention. Again, I cannot imagine anyone objecting to that. We continue the conditions that were imposed in the 1996 defense authorization bill on aid to Russia, which is designed to help them dismantle their chemical weapons. We say they have to demonstrate reasonable progress toward that dismantlement. We pick the same language that was the subject of the Nunn-Lugar compromise in the 1996 defense authorization bill. What we have done is simply to continue that same requirement of Presidential certification of compliance by Russia, or, if all else fails, the President can certify that he cannot certify, and we still send the money to them. So it is not a condition I can imagine anyone would object to. If anything, we would want to make it stronger. Our legislation calls for an annual report on the state of proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, something that the Congress needs in order to work with the President in doing everything we can to stop the proliferation of these weapons. We ask the President to convene a group of nations to try to put some teeth into the Geneva protocol, which is the treaty that currently bans the use of chemical weapons. Like the Chemical Weapons Convention, it does not have strong teeth in it. So we are urging the President to try to get a group of nations together to try to do that. Again, I cannot imagine any opposition to that. We provide our military be better protected against chemical warfare. The GAO issued a report last year that found grave deficiencies in the way that our troops were being equipped and trained to deal with chemical warfare and biological warfare. That needs to be remedied, and we have three specific things in here that we think will help the Defense Department in ensuring that our troops are adequately protected. One of the things that we recommend, for example, is that the U.S. Army Chemical School remain under the oversight of a general officer, just to make our point that we think this is an important matter, and certainly at least a one-star general ought to be in charge of that facility and that operation. We provide for a fixed riot-control agent problem, Mr. President. This is the problem that has arisen because this administration has signaled an intention to change the understanding that has been in existence since President Ford's days when the opportunity to use riot- control agents, or tear gas, was said to be permitted in certain instances where it would help to save lives. For example, where we have a downed pilot that is being held by a group of hostile civilians, we can rescue that downed pilot, not by shooting civilians but by the use of tear gas. Where you have a group of civilians protecting someone that you want to get out, or you want to control a group of hostile prisoners of war, that kind of thing, you do not want to shoot anybody, you can do it with riot-control agents, tear gas. We want to assure that is possible under the law. These are the things that are the key elements of S. 495, Mr. President, and there should not be anything controversial here. It should be provisions that all of us can support. We simply identified each of these items in the course of all of the hearings and all of the debate about the Chemical Weapons Convention and found there were a lot of practical things we could do in legislation. Bear in mind, this legislation has to go over to the House, it has to pass the House, it has to go to the President. Therefore, there are plenty of scrubs on it, even though the Senate has not had a great deal of opportunity to debate it. I hope that our colleagues, if there is anyone else in opposition, will say so and we can get on with a vote on this matter pursuant to the unanimous-consent agreement. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that if there are any more quorum calls, that the time be subtracted equally from both sides.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. KYL. I just want to respond to a couple of things my distinguished colleague has raised. He is certainly correct to point out the fact that in my view there has been inadequate attention paid to this entire subject. I wish we could spend a lot more time debating the Chemical Weapons Convention, as a matter of fact, but in an effort to meet the deadline imposed or that the administration has indicated it needs to meet, we have had to accordion a great deal of debate and consideration of items into a very small period of time. I desperately wanted to spend more time on the Chemical Weapons Convention, but in order to agree to get that done on time, we have all made some compromise agreements of how much time to take on things. That is why there is not much time taken on this legislation. The one thing I did want to assure my colleague of, and that is the portions where he sees sections having been repealed, those sections were picked up in a new title under title I, section 101, chapter 11(B) and the following. Essentially what was done, I assure my colleague, is the chemical and biological provisions of the code were combined and the same activities that are illegal as to one are now illegal as to both with the same penalties. So nothing was dropped from the law; it was merely consolidated in a different place. The definition of chemicals, incidentally, is the same definition that is contemplated by the Chemical Weapons Convention. I might also note, the subject matter here has been debated and was the subject of hearings really for the last 3 years in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, by and large, and the exact language of this legislation has been aided by the FBI and others in the administration as well. My colleague is correct, it would be better to have more time to spend not only on this bill but on the Chemical Weapons Convention itself. In an effort to try to get all of this done under the timeframe the administration is working under, we have all made compromises. I would like a lot more time to brag about what is in this bill, but I agreed to keep my remarks to a couple minutes. I will not take more time at this point. I appreciate the spirit in which the comments of the Senator from Vermont were made.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me say for the benefit of my colleagues, to whom we had indicated that we would try to ensure that we would have a vote on this matter at about 3:45, that even though, under the unanimous consent agreement, we have a half-hour to discuss this legislation in order to try to accommodate my colleagues, to set an example for those on the other side who may wish not to take their full compliment of time, that at this time I am going to express a willingness to discuss this bill no further but just take a couple of minutes to close and to relinquish the floor to those who may be in opposition, again with the plea to them that since we had earlier advised colleagues that a vote would occur on this matter at about 3:45 that anyone who can possibly do so truncate their remarks in order to accommodate our colleagues.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Abraham be added as cosponsor to S. 495.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. In the interest of time, since we would like to get on with the vote, I respond by saying that is a misreading of the bill. The exemptions are the same as the implementing legislation submitted by the administration. The same for protective purposes. And he misreads the exemption he spoke to about seizing the weapon. That is related only to the pending destruction of the weapon authorized by law.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, we are still in the process of trying to work out the details of a unanimous-consent agreement. Part of the question is whether we can get to a vote on this matter by 3:45, or thereabouts, this afternoon. We are trying to leap to that conclusion, and in order to allow people to continue to talk about that and perhaps reach that point, I am going to begin discussing this bill now as if it were before us, so I will not have to speak later and, therefore, we will not have to use more time, hoping to be helpful in that regard. What we are talking about doing here this afternoon is having a couple hours of debate on a bill called the Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act. The bill is S. 495. This legislation is before us because in the process of leading up to the debate on the Chemical Weapons Convention itself--which, if there is a unanimous- consent agreement, will be taken up next week--we discovered there were several things actually we could do right now, very practical, realistic steps we could take to help ameliorate the threat. Senator Hutchison from Texas has already spoken to it. Let me detail what those things are. It, basically, involves closing some loopholes in existing law and ensuring that the administration and the Congress work together in those ways that we can, right here at home, irrespective of whether the Chemical Weapons Convention passes or does not pass, to actually reduce this threat. One example of the kind of thing we are talking about is the fact that existing U.S. law does not make it a crime to manufacture or possess chemical weapons in the United States. If we are going to have this big debate about the chemical weapons treaty, the first thing you want to do is make sure that kind of activity is outlawed here at home. It is a provision of the law we add as a result of S. 495. There are several things like that in this bill, and I will go through them briefly. I want to assure my colleagues, whether you are for the Chemical Weapons Convention or opposed to the Chemical Weapons Convention, this legislation is legislation you can support. If you are against the convention, you can see this as an alternative. If you are for it, you can see it as a supplement. I am not trying to sell it as either one. I am saying these are good, practical steps we can take right now, and we should do it. Let me quickly go through the specifics of the provisions of the legislation. I think my colleagues will see it is exactly as we have said that it is. For the first time in history, we would be criminalizing the entire range of chemical weapons activities. The current law only prohibits the use or attempt or conspiracy to use chemical weapons. It does outlaw, with respect to biological weapons, the possession or manufacture. We combine the two and say that it is against the law to manufacture, to possess, to use or to conspire to use either chemical or biological weapons. So, for the first time, we contain all of those things in our criminal code, and that is against the law in the United States. That is the first thing this bill would do. The second thing it would do is to revoke certain export privileges of companies that violate the law. That is a commonsense proposition, and it has the additional benefit, by the way, of helping us to prevent American companies from assisting countries who we believe should not have chemicals, the precursors to making their biological or chemical weapons. The third section deals with sanctions against the use of chemical or biological weapons. Mr. President, today under existing law, the President of the United States is obligated to impose sanctions against countries that use chemical or biological weapons, and he is given a list of 10 sanctions that he is to impose. They are in two different tiers--five in one tier and five in another tier. He also has a waiver authority. What we do in this legislation is to grant him more flexibility, to keep the same sanctions, but not to have the one tier and two tier. So he can actually decide, based upon the circumstances at the time, exactly how he wants to proceed. The price for that flexibility is that we reduce somewhat his flexibility on the waiver, but he still has the ability, under the supreme-national-interest-waiver clause to waive the imposition of those sanctions should he deem it appropriate. Obviously, that waiver would not likely be used by a President if a country actually used chemical or biological weapons. He would, under the law today, under the law as we have it written today, want to impose sanctions. As I said, we provide more flexibility in those sanctions. In addition, in this section, we call on the President to block transactions of any property that is owned by a country found to have used chemical or biological weapons. In other words, just to use a hypothetical, country A uses biological or chemical weapons, and they have assets in banks in the United States. The President could block any transaction of that property, basically freeze those assets as a way of preparing to indemnify victims of the use of that chemical weapon. This is a way we can provide real, meaningful relief. This is new in law. This does not exist today. We would have a way, therefore, at least of providing a fund should we be able to indemnify victims of such a horrible, horrible crime. Another thing we do is have a section on continuation and enhancement of multilateral control regimes, which is really a fancy way of saying that we are expressing the sense of the Senate and establishing United States policy that the President continue to maintain our role in the Australia group, that group of countries that has agreed among itself not to trade chemicals to countries we believe might want to use them to create a biological or chemical weapon with them. We establish the policy that the President will attempt to block any attempt to substantially weaken the controls established by the Australia group. I believe that as a general proposition--this is the administration's policy anyway--I do not think that this is particularly new, but it puts into statute our policy expressing this strong position. It should, therefore, assist the President in the advocacy of that position in the Australia group meetings. There is another section dealing with assistance to Russia. A year ago, in the 1996 Defense Authorization Act, the Congress actually fenced, meaning it set aside the expenditure of funds under the so- called Nunn-Lugar provision for chemical- and biological-related activities. We did this because we felt there was some question about whether Russia was actually proceeding in good faith to dismantle their chemical and biological capability. As a result of the compromise that was struck by Senators Nunn and Lugar, there was actually a provision for four conditions in that legislation that had to be certified by the President prior to the release of part of these funds. What we have done in this legislation is to reinstate--essentially the same language that was in that 1996 defense authorization bill--and to reestablish those four conditions for certification by the President. Those conditions, as I said, are essentially the same conditions that existed before and would be certified by the President or, as was done in that defense authorization bill, the President could also release the funds if he formally certifies that he is unable to make the certification. So the President has total flexibility here, but at least it focuses attention on the degree of cooperation by the Russians with respect to the dismantlement of their CW and BW programs. The next section calls for reports on the state of chemical and biological weapons proliferation. It asks the administration to provide us an annual classified report that will enable us to better understand the threat that is out there. The next section would strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol. It is a sense of the Senate, but what it does do is urge and direct the Secretary of State to work to convene an international negotiating forum for the purpose of putting some teeth into this 1925 Geneva Protocol, which is the agreement that actually prevents or prohibits the use of chemical weapons, not just the manufacture or possession of them. We provide $5 million for the State Department to begin this process. We think this would be useful because countries of greatest concern to us, like Iran and Iraq, North Korea, Russia, China, Syria, and Libya, are all signatories to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. If we could make an international agreement that puts some teeth into that, it would be clearly useful. As I say, it is a sense of the Senate, but we believe it is useful nonetheless. Next it says, until the United States has developed its resolution of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention--if it does--we would not be providing funding for that organization. The next section is that it is the sense of the Senate that we actually do some things to beef up our military defenses against the use of chemical or biological weapons. The General Accounting Office, in 1996, issued a report that was very distressing in that it reported that U.S. forces are inadequately equipped, organized, trained and exercised for operations in battlefields in which chemical and biological weapons are being used. So this bill recommends three specific corrective steps to deal with that and, as a result, we think, will help to actually improve and enhance our defensive capability should our forces ever be confronted with the use of these weapons. The last two sections, Mr. President. The first is relating to negative security assurances. It is a sense of the Senate that calls on the President to reevaluate the current policy of the United States on negative assurances and its impact on deterrent strategy. In effect, what this is all about is the following. In return for a nation's decision to join the nuclear nonproliferation treaty as a nonnuclear weapons state, the United States pledges never to threaten or use nuclear weapons against that state unless it was allied with a nuclear weapons state in aggression against the United States. So today, when chemical and biological threats seem like the larger concern, this negative security assurance could undermine our effective deterrence against such an attack. Would Saddam Hussein, for example, feel free to use chemical weapons if he did not think we would possibly retaliate with nuclear weapons? As a result, that is in here. Finally, we have the riot control agent provision which has been much spoken of. We think it is important for the rescue of downed pilots or in a situation where civilians are present that riot control agents be used. And our act provides for that. These are all, I would say, very helpful, very specific, very realistic provisions that constructively deal with the proliferation of this threat. As a result, we think this legislation is important. Again, as I say, whether you are pro or con on the treaty, this legislation enhances the security of the United States. I certainly request my colleagues to consider it and to support the vote, assuming we have the vote here before long. Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, today the Senate will vote on the Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act which will, for the first time in U.S. history, provide criminal and civil penalties against those who produce, stockpile, or transfer chemical weapons in the United States. It will also legislate other practical and realistic reforms to reduce the spread of both chemical and biological weapons and improve the American military's defenses against them. The impetus for this legislation was the realization that the Chemical Weapons Convention being promoted by the administration, though noble in aim, would have little practical effect, especially in the United States; and that there were important steps we could take to fill gaps in existing law regardless of what happens with the CWC. That is why Senate Republicans have introduced the Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act, setting forth a comprehensive package of domestic and international steps to address chemical and biological threats. Importantly, the legislation reiterates our firm commitment to destroying the entire U.S. chemical weapons stockpile whether or not the CWC is ratified--a pledge no other chemical weapons state has matched. Some may be skeptical of this bill because they see it is as an alternative to the CWC. To the contrary, S. 495 provides a sensible and effective action plan that CWC critics and proponents alike should support. By enacting the Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act, the United States will lead by example, and will underscore its commitment to bringing together like-minded friends and allies to make unthinkable the resort to chemical or biological weapons. This is not going it alone, this is leadership. Mr. COVERDELL addressed the Chair.