Jon Kyl

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. I appreciate the point the Senator makes. My only point is, any action by the Congress to disapprove the decision by the President to test in our amendment is more than the existing law, which is zero after September 30. Mr. President, I say to my friend from Michigan, we are trying to do what we can to allay concerns that a rogue President would simply decide to do something very foolish and Congress would not have any ability to deal with it. Let me go to some of the arguments that have been made. The first is the one that questions our timing here. I must say that I am baffled by this because, as I said, I made the offer to have the vote on this amendment after June 28. But let us look at that date June 28 again. According to the Washington Post and other news sources--I quote from the June 21 editorial entitled ``Treaty in Trouble.'' I am not sure if this treaty is going to be approved on this Friday in any event, regardless of what we do. The editorial begins by saying: The bleak possibility arises that negotiations on a test ban treaty may fall into a deepening deadline or--an even more bitter prospect--produce a treaty that will languish and not be put into effect. They point out this is because of a deadlock of the several nations of the world that do not have or may not have nuclear capability and are putting demands on the countries that do. They say, ``We will not sign up unless you disarm yourself totally.'' This is the country of India. Pakistan says, ``If India does not sign up, we do not sign up.'' So there is a significant question as to whether or not this treaty is going to be approved on Friday in any event. But let us assume that, in any event, it is voted on by Friday and is approved. I have already indicated that I am perfectly happy to have the vote on our amendment subsequent to that time. Third, and most important, this amendment has nothing whatsoever to do with the CTBT. Again, referencing the chart will make that point clear, we say that at such point in time as the CTBT enters into force, that is what controls. But we fill this hiatus after September 30, when the President cannot test for safety and reliability, by continuing the authority for the President to do that, again, unless Congress disapproves. For the life of me, I cannot understand why someone would want to tie our hands in this regard particularly where safety is concerned. We test everything else for safety, from the pistol that is issued to the troops to the airplanes that fly, to the ships and everything else. We test all of our other weapons all the time for safety and reliability. But we are saying we want to cover our eyes and not know whether the most complex and devastating weapons in the world are safe? Mr. President, what if we were talking about chemical weapons here, and there was a suggestion that a chemical or biological warhead was beginning to leak. Would we have a statute here that says, no, we do not want to worry about that because we want to do away with all chemical weapons? That is the same argument being made here. We want to do away with nuclear weapons, so we're not even going to test them, even if we conclude they might not be safe. It does not make sense. This amendment does not do anything to the CTBT. It simply continues the existing law until there is a CTBT. There is a letter from one of the administration officials that says, well, this could signal a possible intent to conduct tests. How? The administration has already said it is not going to conduct tests. No funding has been requested. It disclaims any interest in conducting tests. That ought to answer that. But in any event, if we had a dangerous weapon, would somebody in Britain--why should they be opposed to our testing to make sure that we could ensure the safety of our weapons, so that our personnel would not be irradiated, for example? What is so wrong with ensuring that we have that element of safety? Finally, I find a bit of an irony here with people who are commending the Chinese for joining the family of nations that want to do away with testing. The Chinese have already said that they are going to conduct another test. They are going to conduct another test. Let us say it is after September 30, 1996. The fact is, they can conduct a test until the CTBT goes into effect. There is nothing to prohibit the British from conducting a test or the French or the Russians. We would be the only nation of the declared nuclear powers that is saying, we alone will not test after September 30, no matter how long it takes to get to the CTBT. What if we do not have a CTBT for 10 years or 15 years? We and we alone would be prohibited from testing for safety purposes. How does that make any sense? More importantly, how could that cause people in Geneva to worry? They have the right to conduct tests. If we simply consider an amendment that would extend the President's authority beyond September 30, that is going to somehow give people concern that they should not sign the treaty because maybe the United States is going to begin conducting tests again, when they have that very right? It does not seem to me that is a very sound argument, Mr. President. Finally, there was the suggestion that we have our stockpile stewardship program, it can handle the situation, we do not need to test, and that is what we are relying on. The problem is, this administration, while they say they do not need to test, that we can rely upon this stockpile stewardship program--which is essentially trying to, through computer analysis, determine if there are any problems with the stockpile, examine them from time to time, and otherwise try to take care of them in a way that they will not deteriorate, although they do deteriorate--but notwithstanding that being our policy, the administration is not funding it adequately. As a result, one wonders whether or not these weapons really are going to continue to be safe and reliable. If you are going to use the stockpile stewardship argument in opposition to the possibility of ever testing, then you darn well better have a good stockpile stewardship program. But this administration is not doing that. Hazel O'Leary, the Secretary of Energy, is responsible for the program. In testimony to the Strategic Forces Subcommittee on April 16, the Secretary had this to say about the outyear funding for the stockpile stewardship: I think we all have reason to be concerned about the outyears. It is in that area where I have no quarrel with their concern. [The laboratory directors had expressed concern for years.] I think we need to work together to address that. The point had been made earlier that the funding that had been requested as the minimum level necessary, according to C. Bruce Tarter, of University of California's Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, was $4 billion a year. Yet the President's request for this year is $3.7 billion. So it would be nice to rely upon the stockpile stewardship; it would be even nicer if the administration, which allegedly opposes our amendment here, would properly fund the stockpile stewardship. I do not have a lot of confidence in that in that event. I am going to conclude at this point, Mr. President, by saying our amendment has no hidden agenda behind it. We are not seeking to engage in testing. It should not have any impact on the discussions that are occurring. As I said, I am willing to have the vote after that anyway. The only thing we are trying to do is preserve the ability of the President in that kind of emergency where he may need it to engage in some kind of low-level, underground testing to preserve the safety and reliability of our stockpile up until such time as the CTBT should go into force. I urge, Mr. President, that our colleagues who are watching and listening here support the chairman of the Armed Services Committee in his request that we vote no on the motion to table. Mr. KEMPTHORNE addressed the Chair.

Mr. KYL. My guess is, if a majority of Congress voted that way, it would send a message to the President. This, in any event, is a restriction that does not exist under current law. Today, the President can simply say, ``I am going to test because France tested.'' I just ask my friend from Michigan, is it not better to have some way for Congress to express itself in opposition, and if we adopt the resolution of disapproval, it does not happen, as opposed to the existing situation of which we have no ability to say to the President, ``No, you can't do it''?

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I believe the answer to the question is that a veto would lie in the event that a majority of the Congress voted to disapprove the President's action.

Mr. KYL. That is correct.

Mr. KYL. Quickly; yes, I will yield.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I am delighted to take some time. As I informed the Senator from Nebraska earlier, we had only two speakers remaining on our side. I knew the Senator from Nebraska had several speakers. I, therefore, wanted to give those speakers an opportunity to present the arguments against our amendment, which I had already explained in great detail when we first laid it down a week ago. I have been on the floor twice explaining it. I will do it again. I am happy to do it, because we are asking for something that is very modest, yet very important. I hope all the Senators who are watching will appreciate the fact it is important to defeat the motion to table that will be laid down. I think the easiest way to describe what this amendment does is to use this chart. If you go to the line above Kyl-Reid amendment, you see where we are today: the status quo, what the law provides with respect to nuclear testing. And that is what we are talking about today: the President's authority to conduct an underground nuclear test in the event that he should deem it necessary to do so. That authority expires, Mr. President, on September 30 of this year. When some say, ``Well, we may not have that big of a problem with the amendment, but we're concerned about the timing because we're engaged in these delicate negotiations''--I will come back to that in a minute--but the reason we raised the amendment now is because the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee said if you have amendments to the bill, lay them down now. Mine was the second amendment laid down, just following the instructions of the chairman. Secondly, we have to do this before September 30. As you know, we are not going to have that much in the way of legislative time. But third, I have already offered to the Senator from Nebraska, who I see now leaves the Chamber, but I made this offer before and I make it again. I am delighted to delay this vote until the evening of the 28th--long after the day in Geneva has expired--because I have no intention of having this amendment have any effect whatsoever on the negotiations. It does not, it cannot, there is no relationship whatsoever, but for those who thought it might, I was perfectly willing to delay the vote, and I am still willing to do that. I will make that offer here again right now. Assuming we defeat the motion to table, I will be happy to have this amendment be the very last one considered before final action on the defense authorization bill, which I assume will be on Friday. Now let us go back to the explanation of the law. On September 30, there is only one basis for the President to conduct a nuclear test, and that is if another nation tests. Over the last 12 months or so, we have seen France test, Russia may have tested--the intelligence is not clear on that--and China has conducted a test, and China has said it is going to conduct at least one more test. So those tests would give the President of the United States the authority to conduct nuclear tests until such time as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [CTBT] goes into force. That is what we have showing here. We do not know when that will be, if ever, but we presume it will occur, and so we just entered it on this line here. At that point, as the Senator from Nebraska said, there will not be any nuclear test, except in the extraordinary event of what is called the supreme national interest, which is an event very unlikely, if at all likely, to occur. So, in effect, the only thing that can cause the President to test after September 30 is if another nation tests. Now, is that a logical basis upon which the United States would conduct nuclear testing? The answer, of course, is no. Because France tested, does that therefore provide a reason for the United States to test? No. Even China's tests do not provide a reason for the United States to test. We have developed our nuclear arsenal. We have really only three reasons to test, Mr. President. The first is for the safety of our stockpile, to ensure that as weapons become 20 or 30 years old and begin to deteriorate--and they do deteriorate--that the safety of the weapons is not compromised, that the safety requirements of the people who handle the weapons is not compromised. I will return to that issue of safety in a moment. The second reason is reliability. Will they still work, or, as a result of this deterioration, does there come a point in time when we cannot assure the reliability of the stockpile? At that point, we do not have an adequate return, obviously. The third reason to test is to deal with a recent phenomenon: the problem of terrorism. We have just seen a terrible event occur in Saudi Arabia involving a bomb, and many people have suggested that perhaps the terrorist state's worst weapon is a nuclear bomb delivered by a truck. Today, we do not have a good way of dismantling that bomb, and the experts at our national laboratories believe that there may come a point in time when we have to understand how to dismantle such a weapon. We have to know how to do it, obviously, in advance, because we may have very little warning when the time comes. Do you shoot a laser at it? Do you overpower it with electrical voltage? What can you do to disarm that bomb? We may have to conduct some kind of low-level test to find that out. None of this, Mr. President, advances nuclear weapons in the world. As a matter of fact, it is all designed to reduce their use: the dismantling or disarming of a terrorist device, providing for total safety so no device would ever go off. These are defensive measures, if you will. We are not developing new nuclear weapons, and nobody is proposing to do that. But, effectively, after September 30, our ability to test, unless another country tests, will have been eliminated, terminated by the law, and that is what we are trying to prevent. What we are saying in our amendment is really very simple, and if you go below the line that says ``Kyl-Reid amendment,'' you will see what our amendment will do. We simply extend this September 30 deadline until such time as a CTBT goes into effect. At that point, you have an entirely different set of rules, but until that time, we continue to have the option of testing for stockpile safety and reliability purposes. We would not have to wait for another nation to test to have the ability to test. But importantly, we also added some other safeguards in our amendment. We provide in our amendment that the President will continue to report to the Congress on the stockpile and will provide a report on the necessity for any testing. Now, those reports are not required after September 30. And we provide that the President's authority to test after September 30 is subject to a veto by the Congress. If a majority of the Congress says ``no'' to a testing message by the President, then the President would not be allowed to test. So we tighten up the law after September 30, and I think that is a good thing for us to have done.

Mr. KYL. I yield time to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me see if I can answer the question posed by the Senator from Nebraska who said I misstated the law. I have the law right here. I will quote it directly. This is Public Law 102-377: ``No underground test of nuclear weapons may be conducted by the United States after September 30, 1996 unless a foreign State conducts a nuclear test after this date, at which time the prohibition on United States nuclear testing is lifted.'' That is precisely what I said. After September 30, the only basis upon which we could conduct a test is unless another nation tests--exactly as it is stated up here. I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me take a moment.

Mr. KYL. I thank the Chair. I thank the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee for that strong statement in support of our amendment. The chairman spoke in support of our amendment when we first laid it down a week ago, and his arguments, I thought, were very persuasive at that time. I very much appreciate his support, and I join him in hoping that our colleagues will defeat this motion to table.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I advise my friend from Nebraska we only have two speakers on our side. We prefer to see what arguments are posited against the amendment and then respond to them at that time.

Mr. KYL. I am happy to respond.

Mr. KYL. That is correct.

Mr. KYL. This is an illustration of why this amendment would be useful. Without the Kyl amendment, first of all, the President would be able to conduct an unlimited number of underground nuclear tests just because China conducted a test. Second, the President has no obligation to inform the Congress, certainly not to get our consent. The Congress does not have any authority to disapprove of any such tests, and we would no longer after September 30, receive the reports on the safety and reliability of the stockpile that the President has always been required to send to the Congress. Conversely, if our amendment is adopted, first of all, the President is required by law to submit an annual report to the Congress that outlines the need for any underground nuclear test. We would have 90 days to disapprove of that request, and we would indefinitely be entitled to receive reports on the safety and reliability of the stockpile. At a minimum, it seems to me, Mr. President, that Congress, if it is going to rely upon the stockpile stewardship program, should want to continue to receive reports from the President on the viability of the stockpile. Under existing law, that would cease to exist. Under our amendment, the President would be required to submit the reports.

Mr. KYL. Yes, clearly it is, because without the Kyl-Reid amendment, if China tests, the President can test, period, end of story.

Mr. KYL. While we are waiting for the Senator from Oregon to arrive, Mr. President, I will conclude by saying that in an entire week of debate here, there has not been a new argument raised. The two primary arguments are that it would be good to put this vote over until the 28th, which I would be happy to do; and, second, that the administration has not asked for this authority. But as I just quoted from the President of the United States, Bill Clinton, he explicitly said that he would have to have the authority to test if his advisers came to him and said that it was in the supreme national interest that he do so, as a result of which there will be a clause in the CTBT which allows the President to test under that circumstance. I have simply said that it would be ironic for us to have the ability to do that today, to have that ability under the CTBT but not to have that authority during the interim period of time, when the other declared nuclear nations do have that ability--mentioning one, for example, the nation of China, which has already indicated its intent to conduct just such a test. So it seems to me that nations that might be concerned about what the United States is doing ought to focus their energies more on a country like China. It is still developing its arsenal. We would only test, as the President himself has said, for the purpose of ensuring the safety and reliability of our stockpile. So this amendment does nothing more than extend the authority of the President up until the time there is a CTBT. It has no other effect than that. I urge my colleagues not to support the motion to table and to vote ``no'' on the motion to table that I assume is about to be entered. Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise to sponsor, with Senator Santorum, an amendment to S. 1745, the 1997 Defense Authorization Act, introduced by Senator Nunn. I thank Senator Nunn for his sponsorship of this provision, and his leadership in protecting the Nation's information systems. I believe that his hearings on computer security have awakened many to the need for a national defense strategy against strategic attacks on the national information infrastructure. I am pleased to be a sponsor of this amendment, which will ensure the continued operation of the computer emergency response team [CERT] at the Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute [SEI] in Pennsylvania for 1997. The amendment would make $2 million available to CERT for fiscal year 1997. For the last few years, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency [DARPA] has allocated between $2.5 million and $3.0 million per year to CERT. CERT requested $2.75 million for 1997. DARPA will fund only one-fourth of that request in 1997 and $0 in 1998. DARPA's administration does not want to fund CERT because it believes that CERT does not properly belong to it. The amendment would correct the problem and move the funding out of DARPA. Why is this amendment necessary? CERT is arguably the most reliable source of computer security statistics and support in the country. Absent a comprehensive overhaul of national security policy for information systems--which I initiated in last year's bill, with an amendment that requires the President to develop a national architecture to protect against strategic attacks on the NII--there is not another entity better prepared to respond to potential threats. It continues to be DOD's best means of warding off unauthorized entry into the Pentagon's and the Nation's complex computer infrastructure. The Senate Subcommittee on Investigations, in its staff report on hearings it held on computer security, recommended the creation of a National Information Infrastructure Threat Center that ``should have real time 24 hour operational capabilities as well as serve as a clearinghouse for intrusion reports.'' CERT, for many years, has performed many of the functions cited in the staff report. It should continue to serve DOD until the committee's recommendations are executed. In 1988, DARPA requested that the SEI set up a computer response team. It was funded through a competitive procurement process, initiated by DARPA with the approval of Congress. DARPA mandated that CERT set up a 24-hour point of contact center to respond to security emergencies on networks and to help prevent future network incidents. This remains its current function. Since the inception of its response team, CERT has responded to over 7,600 security incidents affecting tens of thousands of network- connected sites. It is clear that CERT has played a key role in the DOD's national defense against attacks on our information systems. The amendment authorizes funding for only 1 year. Congress can reevaluate the importance of CERT again next year. I urge my colleagues to adopt the amendment.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me simply respond to the argument of the Senator from Nebraska with three quick points. I hope the Senator from Nebraska does not misunderstand what the amendment would do. He said there is no justifiable reason to test now. There is nothing in this amendment that calls for testing now. Nothing whatsoever. It merely continues the existing authority of the President to ask for a test. I have no reason to believe that the President would do so. It has nothing to do with engaging in any tests now. Second. the Senator from Nebraska said, ``Why bring it up now?'' The answer is very simple: Because the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee said if you have any amendments to the defense authorization bill bring them to the floor now. I am following the request of the distinguished chairman. And on the assumption that the bill is going to be dealt with within the next few days, we need to bring the amendment up now, not later. But I offer to my colleague from Nebraska this good-faith offer: If the Senator from Nebraska would agree with me that we could vote on this amendment on June 29, the day after the 28th, which is the big date in the Senator's mind, I would be happy to enter into such a UC agreement. We have no reason to have a vote necessarily before or after the 28th. We are simply proposing the amendment at the time it is supposed to be proposed. So if the Senator will agree to a unanimous-consent request to vote on the 29th, I would be delighted to enter into such an agreement with him. The third point is that nowhere in the Senator's speech about how the timing could not be worse because it comes only 9 days before the 28th of June, which is the self-imposed deadline for the parties negotiating the CTBT to reach an agreement, nowhere in his discussion was any suggestion as to why this would somehow disrupt the agreement, why anybody would consider this relevant in the least, why they would object to it. I understand that they have this self-imposed deadline to reach an agreement by the 28th. What we are doing here is absolutely irrelevant to that; it has no bearing on it. I cannot imagine somebody standing up and saying, ``Well, U.S. Negotiator, we can agree with you on the CTBT, but the U.S. Senate just considered this amendment that allows the President to continue to test up to the time we have a CTBT.'' Every other country in the world has that right. I suspect the United States would be the only country in the world that as of September 30 will not have that right by law, because that is when the President's authority expires. Other countries that we are negotiating with can test right up to the time there is a CTBT. Why is that not disruptive? There is no logic to the Senator's argument: ``We're going to have 9 more days to negotiate, so your amendment shouldn't be voted on.'' What is the connection? Why should anybody object to our amendment being voted on in these negotiations? Our amendment has absolutely nothing to do with this CTBT. It, by definition, only deals with the period of time up to the CTBT. If we put the chart back up again, I will try to make it crystal clear. Graphic: The law allowing the President to test expires September 30. Up until the time that there is a CTBT, he would not be able to test for stockpile safety and reliability. We simply extend his ability to do so. That is all. How can anybody in the CTBT negotiations object to that? All of the other states will already have that right. So, Mr. President, I heard the Senator from Nebraska, but I do not understand the logic of the argument. Two final quick points. We are going to have to change the law at some time, because when we enter into a CTBT, if we do, we are going to have to legislatively give the President the authority to test in the supreme national interest, as the President said he would need the authority to do, and I quoted the President's safeguard section (f) in that regard. So if this law expires on September 30, that is not the end of it. We are going to have to legislate. Second, I note that the administration itself has said that until three different countries--I think two of them were Pakistan and India--agreed to sign up that we are not going to be entering into a CTBT. I am just not at all sure this magic date of the 28th is all of that magic. It may well be we are not able to reach an agreement by that self-imposed deadline. But it does not matter, because all my amendment does is to allow the President the authority he has today, subject to Congress saying, ``No, you can't test,'' allow him to call for a test up until the time the CTBT goes into effect. It has no effect whatsoever on the CTBT. It does not affect it in the least. Granted, the 28th date is out there, but I do not know what relevance that is as to what we are doing here today. I did want to clear those up since the Senator had raised the question of our motives in bringing it up at this time. I know Senator Reid and I both want to make it crystal clear--that was the point in my seeking recognition a moment ago--to assure the Senator from my home State of Nebraska that our motive was to simply comply with the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee to get any amendment we had to this bill presented before the bill was taken from the floor. That is why we brought it up today. We could have easily brought it up tomorrow or the next day. I think we are happy to agree to any unanimous consent request that the Senator would be agreeable to enter into to have a vote after the date of the 28th, if there is a concern doing it before then would be disruptive in Geneva. Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.

Mr. KYL. We do have hearings that are planned for the Government Affairs Committee. The amendment has been cleared with Senator Stevens and also the chairman of the D.C. Subcommittee, Senator Cohen. Both have assured me that this amendment complements their efforts regarding the reopening of Pennsylvania Avenue, and they plan to hold hearings regarding this. But I would also remind the Senator from Nevada that there were no hearings, there were no consultations with anybody, when Pennsylvania Avenue was closed because it was an imposed closure, only temporary, and then that has evolved into a permanent closure. Now the only option being offered is to keep it closed. We do not think that is correct either. So we have asked this. Again, I remind the Senator from Nevada, this is only a sense of the Senate to move ahead with this.

Mr. KYL. Will the Senator withhold? I would like to discuss the pending amendment.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, the pending amendment is the Kyl amendment, cosponsored by Senator Reid from Nevada. The distinguished chairman of the committee spoke in support of this amendment last night when I offered it. Since then, there has been virtually no discussion of it. Several people have asked me questions, and I thought I would come to the floor and try to answer those questions because, for the life of me, I cannot understand why this would be a controversial amendment. I am advised that at least one Senator is awaiting instructions from the White House. I suggest that this body can take the action that it deems appropriate. Certainly the White House will have its say in anything that we do on the Defense authorization bill. But this ought not to be that controversial. So let me attempt to explain again what I am trying to do with this amendment. Again, I thank the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee for his support of the amendment. Probably the best way I can do this, Mr. President, is to do it graphically. Above this line we have the status quo, the current law with respect to nuclear testing. Just to set the stage, we have not conducted nuclear tests for a long time. The tests that have been conducted in the last decade have been primarily to ensure safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile. I might add that about a third of the problems that have been discovered with the stockpile were found as a result of safety testing. I also make the point, in general, with respect to testing, that it has always seemed odd to me that while we hear speeches that we should fly before we buy, we should be sure that we test the equipment that we are going to buy for our military uses, we should make sure that we continue to maintain our equipment, understand how it works, and whether it might not work, and we want to make sure that all of the things that we are going to have to rely upon will in fact work, that the one thing that we do not want to test to see if it will continue to work is the most sophisticated weapon we have in our inventory, namely, our nuclear weapon. On that we are going to close our eyes and say, ``Well, we tested these a long time ago. We maybe built these systems 20 years ago, but we're just going to hope that they continue to work if we ever have to use them.'' I submit that that is not an intelligent way for us to maintain our nuclear stockpile. But that is essentially where we are right now. The administration does not want to test, is not testing. We currently have the authority to test, if the President decides to do so. That is what is indicated here. We have a test moratorium in our country, but we could test for safety reasons or to determine the reliability of a system. So that if, for example, the Department of Energy came to the President and said, ``Mr. President, we think we may have a problem with one of these systems. It seems to be acting funny. We obviously don't want to send it up in an airplane or put it on top of a missile if something might happen. Therefore, we need to conduct a test to determine exactly what's wrong here or how to fix it,'' the President could do that today. But that authority will expire on September 30 of this year under existing law. The President will no longer have that capability. That was done in order to anticipate the fact that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the so-called CTBT, would be entering into force. The problem is, it has not been ratified by this country. It is obviously not going to go into force for some time. Therefore, we are left with a hiatus, a period between September 30 of this year and whenever the CTBT comes into effect, if it comes into effect. After the CTBT comes into effect, there are no tests except in a very extreme situation called supreme national interest which, in effect, would only exist if there was some grave emergency that existed where the country was threatened and there was some need to do so. So what we are talking about is simply extending this September 30 date until the CTBT goes into effect. It is not anti-test-ban treaty. Anyone who favors a test-ban treaty should not be concerned about this. In fact, I would think they would be supportive because it would maintain the status quo until the CTBT goes into effect. What actually changes? Two things. No. 1, we continue to require the administration to report to the Congress on the status of the stockpile. There is nothing wrong with that. I assume there is no objection to that. So the test moratorium would continue and the reporting requirements would continue. But the President could still test for stockpile safety and reliability purposes beyond the September 30 date until some date in the future if and when the CTBT goes into force or when the U.S. Senate ratifies it. The other difference is that under the test moratorium that will exist if we do not change the law, there is one circumstance under which the President can test. But it does not make any sense. The President could test if another country tests. We do not need to test just because China conducts a test or just because France conducts a test or Russia conducts a test. That is no reason for the United States to conduct a test. We are not testing in retaliation for what another nation does. There is no rational reason to base our testing on whether another nation tests. Whether another nation tests will depend upon whether that nation believes it to be in that nation's interest to test. Likewise, whether the United States tests prior to the implementation of the CTBT, ought to be based upon whether it is in our national interest to do so. Just because France tests should not mean that the President should call for the United States to do so. But by the same token, if the Department of Energy or the Department of Defense should discover a problem with one of our weapons, it is the height of irrationality for us to close our eyes and say, ``But we can't fix that weapon.'' Until this Nation has effective missile defenses and defenses against any other way in which a nuclear warhead would be delivered to the United States, we are relying upon our strategic retaliatory nuclear capability. That is a fact. Therefore, it has to work and it has to be safe. It makes no sense to say that we should not have the capability of ensuring that safety. I doubt very seriously whether President Clinton would ever order a test, but why tell him that he cannot do so? For those who believe, well, maybe it will not be President Clinton next year, maybe it will be President Dole, and he is going to be irresponsible in this regard, my amendment also requires that the Congress not disapprove the decision. So Congress has a check on the President's actions. The President cannot unilaterally call a test. I do not know what could be more reasonable, Mr. President. All we are saying is that the deadline that is going to expire on September 30 be continued--not the deadline--but that the ability to test be continued, the power of the President to call for a test. We are not saying he has to do anything. This has no relationship to the CTBT. We are simply saying, until the CTBT comes into effect, the President would have the ability to call for a test, but Congress would have to not disapprove it. Let me read some statements, perhaps, that will give people a little sense of security in supporting this if they think there is some hidden meaning to it. There is not. The administration's testing policies, as articulated by the President himself, are totally consistent with what we are doing. On August 11, 1995, the President gave his statement regarding the CTBT. He acknowledged that the possibility of future underground tests might be needed. In fact, there is a specific safeguard in his policy enumerated ``Safeguard F'' which reads as follows: If the President of the United States is informed by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Energy (DOE)-- advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Director of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command--that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type which the two Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, the President, in consultation with Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under the standard ``supreme national interests'' clause in order to conduct whatever testing might be required. That is the end of Safeguard F. Mr. President, what we are proposing here is something far short of that. The President has made the point here that he needs a mechanism for conducting an underground test if it is in the supreme national interest to do so. We are simply saying until there is a CTBT, he should have that same authority. A fortiori, once the CTBT goes into effect, the President is saying he should still have that authority in the supreme national interest. I agree. It does not make any sense for that authority to exist at that time after this CTBT has already gone into effect, and not to have the authority before it goes into effect. Following the President's own understanding of the potential need for an underground test to ensure safety and reliability of our weapons, we simply gave him that authority beyond the deadline that it would otherwise expire, and base it on what the President has said he would need to base it on; namely, safety and reliability, rather than on whether another nation tests. I cannot imagine anything more reasonable and more rational. I will read a quotation from one of the President's top advisers in this entire area, former staff member for the distinguished ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, Bob Bell, in a speech at the National Missile Defense University Foundation. On May 8 of this year, Bob Bell, who is a member of the National Security Council, suggested that a key element of the administration strategy to defend America is deterrence, both conventional and nuclear deterrence. He said, The second line of defense against weapons of mass destruction is deterrence, both at the conventional and nuclear level. Any rogue nation foolish enough to contemplate using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons against the United States, its Armed Forces or our allies must not be confused about how we would respond. As Secretary Perry stated, it would be ``devastating'' and ``absolutely overwhelming.'' Now, Mr. President, you cannot rely upon a nuclear deterrent that is not safe or does not work. You have to know that it is safe and it will work. That is why we have always maintained the ability, the right, to test these weapons, to make sure they will work and that they are safe. That is what the law provides today. That authority terminates on September 30. For the life of me, I do not understand why anyone would object to simply continuing the President's right to do what he said he needed to have the ability to do. Not that he would ever do it. I am sure everyone would acknowledge this President's inclinations would not be to do it, but as he himself said, if he were advised by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Nuclear Weapons Council, and the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command that they did not have a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a weapon type that was deemed critical for nuclear deterrent, then he would need that authority. If we are going to give him that authority after a CTBT goes into effect, why should he not have that authority before it goes into effect? Mr. President, all I can do is continue to repeat the point that I wish somebody would challenge it, would argue it, would debate it. This amendment has been pending since last night. I said I am happy to explain it, to debate it, but can we not have a discussion on it, and then vote? I cannot imagine why anyone would oppose it. Now, there have been two reasons suggested to me. One is that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations are in a delicate stage now and we do not want to do anything that might upset them. How would this upset them? It has nothing to do with the CTBT. Surely, people who want us to enter into the CTBT want us to do so with weapons that are safe and reliable. Surely, they do not want us to deny ourselves the ability to enter into the treaty, knowing we have safe and reliable weapons. Why would they want us to have a period of time where our weapons could deteriorate or become unsafe and we could not do anything about it, and then enter into a comprehensive test ban limitation? That would not make any sense. We want to enter into the comprehensive test ban knowing that our weapons are in good shape. I guarantee you, Mr. President, other countries will make very sure that their weapons are in good shape before they enter into it. Look at the evidence. What did France do? France thumbed its nose at the international arms limitation community by saying, ``We are going to test until we are confident that our weapons are reliable and safe and they will do the job.'' They conducted their tests, notwithstanding opposition from practically, it seemed like, everybody in the world. When they finally had concluded they had done enough testing and they were confident of their weapons, they said, ``Fine. Now we will join up.'' China, likewise, has been conducting tests. They just concluded one. They have said they are going to do another one. They have said, ``We think we have to do one more to make sure that our system is reliable, safe, and workable. After that, we will join up, or at least consider joining up.'' It may be that Russia has conducted tests. There have been reports of activity at their test site that may suggest that some kind of activity has occurred there. I submit that other nations will do the same thing if they believe their weapons are deteriorating or they need to do something to improve the safety or reliability. They will test to make sure that can be done. All we are saying is the President of the United States ought to have the authority to do that, with Congress not overruling, to ensure that our nuclear deterrent, as Bob Bell said, is a meaningful deterrent. That is to say that countries of the world will know that it is workable, and that we, in fact, will employ it. The argument that CTBT negotiations are underway does not suggest any reason why we should not proceed with this. Are those negotiations so touchy that if anybody talks about nuclear testing or continues authority that currently exists in law, that they somehow are going to full apart? I cannot imagine that. If that is the case, there is something drastically wrong. Are those negotiations dependent upon an elimination of our authority to test after September 30? That would not be good policy for the United States, and I cannot imagine that other countries of the world have made that a precondition. I have not heard any evidence to that effect. Just because the CTBT negotiations are going on does not mean that we cannot extend the President's authority beyond September 30. We are not telling him he has to test, he should test or anything of that sort. We are saying if he thinks it is necessary to test, as he himself pointed out, he should have the authority to do that, subject to Congress not saying no. Now, I do not know of any other reason, except one reason expressed to me by someone who said, ``Well, I have always been so much in favor of absolutely eliminating all nuclear weapons from the world that I would not want to do anything even to extend the ability of the United States to test until there is a CTBT. If we can stop it on September 30, boy, that is great.'' Mr. President, if all of the other nations in the world were as idealistic as this particular individual, I would not have a problem with that. As we have already seen, since the United States has stopped testing, since our moratorium, other nations, both friendly and unfriendly, have decided it is in their best interests to go ahead. We are not going to stop them from doing what they think is necessary and in their national interests, and particularly where it relates to safety, it seems to me, we ought to retain the ability to test. That should have very little to do with the argument of whether or not all the nations of the world will eventually agree to a comprehensive limitation. One final point I make, Mr. President. When I served in the House of Representatives, I was the ranking member of the Department of Energy's nuclear facilities panel, along with Representative Spratt from South Carolina. We had the jurisdiction, basically to deal with the Department of Energy programs, including the nuclear stockpile. During that time, it came to light that a very new and sophisticated and technical way of utilizing very new and powerful computers could actually help us understand the dynamics of nuclear weapons much better than we ever had before. This computer analysis seemed to suggest that there might be some vulnerability to certain of our weapons that we should look into. Just to talk hypothetically, what we are talking about, if a nuclear weapon were to be dropped, for example, could that possibly trigger some kind of emission of radioactive material? In the past we had done a lot of telephoning and we said, ``No, we think it is very safe.'' This new computer technology suggested that maybe there would be a bit of a problem. So we caused a commission to be created called the Drell Commission. The members of the commission were very prominent nuclear scientists who studied for over a year whether there were safety or reliability problems with our weapons--primarily safety problems. They made recommendations to the Congress, which we have largely carried out, and which the military has largely carried out, that caused us to make some changes in the way that we handle our nuclear weapons. Some weapons were removed from active alert status on strategic bombers. Certain changes were made in the way that weapons were handled in their loading and unloading. Without getting into too much technicality, or classified material, those recommendations demonstrated that we have to be constantly vigilant of the potential for accidents, because the last thing in the world that we want is an accident with a nuclear weapon. We know that there have been some, and we do not want that to ever happen and cause harm to anyone in the world. So safety has been a primary consideration--at least in recent years--with respect to our nuclear stockpile. For the life of me, Mr. President, I cannot imagine that people who are interested in consumer safety, who are interested in the health, safety, and welfare of our citizens, who frequently support measures to protect us from all sorts of things that might cause damage to us, who are interested in reducing smoking by teenagers and adolescents, and I cannot imagine why people who are interested in protecting the American citizenry would say, however, when it comes to one of the most potentially devastating threats of all--not a threat that is likely to occur, but if it ever did occur, it would be very devastating--a release of radioactive material as a result of an accident with a nuclear weapon, and we are not going to do anything about that. We are just going to trust that weapons that are 20 or 30 years old, and that have not been tested for years, are going to continue to work all right, behave all right, and not pose any safety threat. We are going to close our eyes to the possibility that there could ever be a problem there, and we are going to legally prohibit the President from testing those weapons to see that they are safe--not to develop a new weapon; we are not talking about testing for new weapons. We are going to bind the President and say that, after September 30, he cannot test to determine the safety of a nuclear weapon anymore. I just, for the life of me, cannot understand how people would make that argument. Now, Mr. President, there are Senators on the floor now who would like to enlighten me as to why this perfectly innocent amendment is not appropriate. I will conclude by simply reminding you of what it does. It simply says the power that the President has to test, which will expire on September 30, will continue until there is a CTBT. If the Congress does not approve a test, the President cannot do it. I hope people who want to debate the issue will do that so I know what we are trying to respond to here because, right now, I cannot think of any arguments against this amendment. I hope we can quickly get a time agreement so that, as the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee said, we can get on with this bill. This is a minor amendment in the overall scheme of things with this very important defense authorization bill. The chairman is right that we have to get on with it. I do not intend to take any time with this. If we can reach a time agreement for 10 minutes, that is fine with me. I thank the chairman of the committee for supporting my amendment.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Bob Perret, a congressional fellow in Senator Reid's office, be provided privilege of the floor.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, might I ask the Senator to yield for one moment so I may ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment which is pending?

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.