Jon Kyl

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. In response, I hope the Senator from Georgia is not suggesting that the National Missile Defense Act is being held hostage to bringing up the chemical weapons treaty because the two are not linked, and there are a lot of us who believe that whether or not we could pass the chemical weapons treaty this year--and there is still more work to be done to that in the Judiciary Committee on which I sit which has not held hearings yet, given the fact we do not have a lot of legislative time in this session, that there is more to be done on that bill--I hope the Senator from Georgia is not suggesting that until we act on that we cannot act on this important matter of national missile defense.

Mr. KYL. Absolutely. I am happy to.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I appreciate the comments by the Senator from Georgia, and will not attempt to discuss them this evening since the hour is late except to note one thing; that is, that while reasonable people can differ about some of the elements of the bill, as I noted in my remarks and the Senator from Georgia noted to the point that maybe some people are more interested in a press release or the issue than actually getting it passed, I just ask our colleagues tomorrow when the cloture vote comes to put us to the test and allow us to at least have a vote on the bill. We would like to get it passed. I would much rather move forward with the bill, get it to the President so he can sign it, or veto it as the case may be, but at least to try to move forward with the issue. If the cloture vote is supported, and if the bill is defeated, then at least the body will have worked its way. But at least I would like to have people take yes for an answer, and yes in this case meaning that we are serious about moving forward and we would like to try to get something passed. So again I urge my colleagues to support the cloture motion tomorrow.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me begin by discussing some of the details of this legislation because I think when our colleagues focus on precisely what it says, it is awfully hard to disagree with any of it. And in fact I cannot imagine that anyone would vote against the Defend America Act of 1996 except for purely political reasons. That would be most unfortunate because there is nothing more important that the Senate and the House and the President have as our responsibility than defending America. That is the first obligation of the U.S. Government. And to continue to allow the situation which currently exists, which is that the United States is totally vulnerable to a missile attack by any enemy in the future, is intolerable. We need to get about the business of ensuring that we can solve this problem, that we can deploy an effective system for defending against ballistic missiles, and the way to do that is to pass the Defend America Act. It is the necessary first step in this effort. Let me begin by noting the provisions of the act itself. And if anyone wants to disagree with any of these provisions, I invite them here to the floor to engage in that debate. I do not think anyone can logically disagree with the provisions of this act. Mr. President, people will disagree with other things. They will make up an argument about what we are really intending to achieve here, and they will argue against that. It is called red herrings. Or they will set up straw men which they will attempt to knock over. They will assert that we are trying to reestablish the Reagan administration's space shield to prevent a nuclear attack by the then Soviet Union. That is not what this is all about. They will argue about star wars. They will argue about $60 billion expenditures. None of that is what we are talking about here. So I am going to focus specifically on what this act says, and I would ask those who come to argue against it to confine their remarks to this act, not some perceived or imaginary piece of legislation that they may wish to defeat but rather that which is before us right now. It is called, as I said, the Defend America Act of 1996. Majority leader Bob Dole is the sponsor. I can think of no more fitting tribute to Bob Dole than for his Senate colleagues to allow us to vote on this important matter. They can then vote their consciences on whether they want to defend America or not but give the majority leader the right to vote on this important proposition. I guarantee you that if we do not have that right, Republican candidate Bob Dole is going to be talking to the American people throughout the length and the breadth of this country to remind them that today the United States has no ability to defend against a ballistic missile attack by another country. Mr. President, that does not have to come to China and Russia, the two countries that today have the capability of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles against the United States. It can come in the form of an accidental launch from one of those countries or another country. It can come in the form of a limited attack either against our troops stationed abroad, against our allies, or against parts of the United States that are within reach today or soon will be within the reach of ballistic missiles of other nations like North Korea, for example. It is interesting just parenthetically that one of the studies which said there was no threat to the United States in the near term, that is, before the end of the century, relied upon the notion that the definition of United States was the lower 48 States. Well, as I recall, Alaska and Hawaii have been States for some time now and the citizens of those States would be a bit surprised to learn that colleagues in the Senate do not think it important to defend that because they are not part of the lower 48. Mr. President, every veteran of World War II knows how the war in the Pacific started. It was an attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, not even then a State but obviously part of the United States in terms of our defense at risk, and we went to war over that. To suggest that because there is not a threat to the lower 48 States today, we should not begin to prepare against the contingency when that threat will exist or to prepare to defend other Americans who do not live in the lower 48 States is irresponsible, and therefore I would urge my colleagues, as I said, to allow us to at least vote on this Defend America Act. Here are the findings in the act. First, that the United States has the technical capability to develop and deploy a national missile defense system. There is no disagreement about this. There is disagreement about exactly which system to deploy. The administration has its favorites. Others have their favorites. But there is no disagreement about the fact that the technology is here. Second, the threat posed to the United States by the proliferation of ballistic missiles is growing. The trend is toward longer-range missiles including those with intercontinental reach. Again, intelligence estimates make this point clear, and the President himself has declared an emergency based upon this threat of proliferation. Third, there are ways for determined countries to acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles by means other than indigenous development. Of course, that is true, and it is an important point to make because it is not the threat that a country beginning today will after a period of years figure out how to build one of these weapons, but it is also the case that countries around the world are trying very hard to buy components and even completed systems from other countries. This is why the sale by either Russia or China of part or whole of a missile system or a weapon of mass destruction is so disconcerting because countries do not have to develop them indigenously; they can buy them or buy the key components from other countries, and that is why the threat will occur sooner rather than later. Fourth, the deployment by the United States of an NMDS, National Missile Defense System, will help to deter countries from seeking long- range missiles. That, too, should be obvious. It is clear that to the extent we have a defense against such weapons, it does not make sense for another country to expend a lot of resources to develop those kinds of systems. It is very much one of the reasons why the Soviet Union collapsed and why the Soviet Union decided at a certain point that it would not be able to defeat the United States militarily, notwithstanding its very strong intercontinental ballistic missile system, because Ronald Reagan was preparing to develop and eventually deploy the Strategic Defense Initiative, a system which would have been able to thwart such attack-- not defeat it completely but to preclude it from succeeding completely and therefore allowing the United States the opportunity to respond with our own offensive deterrent capability. And that potential for development of SDI, as it was then called, was enough to cause the Russians to throw in the towel with respect to that matter. And it was one of the reasons why the Soviet Union eventually collapsed. And that is not just me talking. There are several Russians who were in power at the time who confirmed the fact. The same thing is true of much less powerful and less wealthy nations than the Soviet Union of old, talking about countries like Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, countries that may well desire to develop these weapons today knowing that we have no defense against them but if we had such a defense would perhaps turn their attentions elsewhere. The next point of the bill is that the danger of an accidental missile launch has not disappeared and deployment of an NMD system will reduce concerns about this threat. That should be obvious and require no further explanation. Next. Deployment of an NMD system can enhance stability in the post- cold-war era. The United States and Russia should welcome the opportunity to reduce reliance on threats of nuclear retaliation as the sole basis of stability. This should be obvious, Mr. President, but it is interesting, and even paradoxical, I would say, that there are still some people in the Government and perhaps even here in the Congress who believe we are more stable in an unstable environment than we are in a stable environment. That may sound counterintuitive, but there used to be an argument that if we were very vulnerable to an attack and if our opponent at that time, the Soviet Union, was also very vulnerable to an attack, that neither one of us would dare to attack each other. It was called ``mutual assured destruction.'' If they would attack us, then we would attack them, and we would both destroy each other. Some people believe that was one of the factors that precluded either country from attacking the other during the cold war, and it may have had some impact. But that is no longer the situation we face today, Mr. President. There is no longer a Soviet Union threatening to destroy the United States, and certainly we have no pretensions in that regard. There is a Russia with a lot of nuclear weapons, some of which could, by mistake, be launched against the United States; some of which could, by mistake, find their way to the hands of people who are not very friendly to us. Certainly the Chinese are developing weapons that they do not have a need to develop. But the real threat today is from countries arrayed around the world that would do us harm, that have foreign policy interests inimical to ours, and that would use these weapons as threats. They are weaker countries than ours. We do not have to worry about them attacking us with these missiles in order to defeat us militarily. That is not the point. The concern is they would use these missiles in order to thwart us from achieving our foreign policy goals. For example, we know 5 years ago during the time of the gulf war, the vote in Congress to try to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait was a very close vote in both the House and the Senate. Among the concerns people had was the threat of loss of life to the U.S. military in trying to repel Saddam Hussein. If we had known at that time that Saddam had a nuclear weapon capability and the missiles to deliver those weapons-- not just to the United States but, let us say, to Israel, to London, to Rome, to Paris, to Cairo, wherever--would the United States Congress, knowing that, have then decided to vote to use military force to repel Saddam Hussein? I think it is a very close question, and I am not certain what the answer would have been. Put it another way. Would the European allies who joined what was then called the ``grand coalition of nations'' to defeat Saddam Hussein, knowing he had weapons that could reach their capital cities, would they have been as willing to come to the aid of Kuwait in that instance? I think the answer is obvious. The point is that countries who would use these weapons today would use them, not in an all-out attack on the United States--nobody is suggesting that--but as a means, in effect, of blackmailing the United States. The most recent expression of this was a Chinese leader who said, with respect to the desire of the United States to come to the aid of Taiwan, ``You better think twice about this, because we really do not think that Taiwan is as important to you as the lives of the people in Los Angeles.'' Would the United States be willing to go to war to protect Taiwan if it knew that China would launch a missile against the people of Los Angeles? Well, it causes you to think. Any President of the United States would have to think very, very carefully about asking the Congress for authority to use force in a situation that did not directly involve the United States if the force that we were attempting to take action against, or might take action against, if that country had a nuclear weapon or a chemical or biological weapon that could be delivered to a United States city or to the city of an ally in Europe or some other place in the world. That is the threat that currently exists and that will exist in the near term before those missiles have the capability of hitting the United States. And, yes, Alaska and Hawaii are a part of the United States. The North Korean missile will be able to hit those States before it will be able to hit, I suppose, California or Arizona or Idaho. But that is still part of the United States, and therefore the threat is sooner and closer, not farther away. In any event, I think it is fairly clear that both the United States and Russia should welcome the opportunity to reduce the reliance on threats of nuclear retaliation as the sole basis of stability, because it is not realistic to expect that the United States would obliterate the people of Iraq, for example, with nuclear weapons if Saddam were to engage in some other act of aggression in the Middle East today. It is just not realistic to expect that the United States would do that. Finally, the authors of the ABM Treaty envisioned the need to change the treaty as circumstances changed, and they provide the mechanisms to do so in the treaty. We note that in the findings of the Defend America Act. Then we say the United States and Russia previously considered such changes and should do so again. As we note later on in the act, it may be necessary for us to approach the Russians to discuss questions of amending the ABM Treaty so that both of our nations will be free of the constraints currently imposed by that treaty that do not permit us to defend ourselves against missile attack, or at least adequately defend ourselves. Next we come to the National Missile Defense Policy. There are two specific policy goals stated in the act. The first is the deployment by the end of the year 2003--that is 8 years from now--of an NMD system-- . . . capable of providing a highly-effective defense of the territory of the United States against limited, unauthorized, or accidental ballistic missile attacks; and (2) [which] will be augmented over time to provide a layered defense against larger and more sophisticated ballistic missile threats as they emerge. The second goal or policy is: . . . cooperative transition to a regime that does not feature an offensive-only form of deterrence as the basis for strategic stability. Let me take them in reverse order. The second is one I already discussed, cooperatively transitioning to a situation in which the powers of the world are not engaged in threats against each other as the method by which to deter an attack against them; the idea that if you attack us, we will attack you. There ought to be a more humane and logical way of keeping peace in the world, and that is to have the capability of defending ourselves as the best way of deterring an attack. That is so for an additional reason that should be obvious, but I will simply note it quickly. There are a lot of regimes in the world today that do not have the stability and the interest in peace that the United States and the Soviet Union had during the cold war. As belligerent as we believed the Soviet Union was, we recognized that it was led by rational people who understood the enormous power of nuclear weapons and the devastation and the tragedy that could be loosed on the world if they were ever to pull the trigger of those weapons. That is why they were not used. That same cannot be said for some of the leaders today. There are people in the world today, leaders who have already said that, if they had the ballistic missile capability, they would use it against the United States. Mu'ammar Qadhafi of Libya is one such person who has said precisely that. I think there is no doubt that countries led by the current leaders of Iraq, Iran, and perhaps other nations--North Korea is certainly not a stable nation today either and other countries could evolve in the future--do not have the same degree of stability that the United States and the Soviet Union had in the past. To rely upon the idea of deterrence without defense, given these kinds of regimes loose in the world today, is clearly not in the best interests of the people of the United States. Let me get to the first of the policy goals, because there is some disagreement about this goal. It has really three components to it. First of all, deployment by the end of the year 2003 of an NMD system. Opponents say 2003 is too specific, it is too soon, we really need more time. If we had more time we could develop an even better system. Mr. President, I am guilty of that same kind of logic when it comes to buying computers. There is going to be a better computer 6 months from now and a year from now. If we maintain that point of view, of course, we would never buy a computer. I know the same thing is true about cars. It is true about virtually everything in our technology area today. But when it comes to defending ourselves against ballistic missile attack, when the threat is here and now and certainly will be before us by the year 2003, I do not think it makes sense to say let us wait a little longer because better technology will come along in the future. Sure it will. That is why we say in the act that we should deploy a system by the year 2003 with the capability of adding additional layers and technology as time goes on and as threats evolve. That is precisely why we say let us start now with something that is relatively simple and have the capability of making it more robust as the threats further clarify and emerge and as we have the capability of doing so. What is the capability that people argue about? We say deployment by the end of 2003 of an NMD system capable of providing a highly effective defense of U.S. territory. Any argument about that, providing a highly effective defense of U.S. territory? . . . against limited, unauthorized or accidental ballistic missile attacks; Is there any reason why we should not provide defense against those three things? Are they all three legitimate threats? Yes, any intelligence source will identify ``limited, unauthorized or accidental ballistic missile attacks'' threats in the near term. The third principle is: . . . and will be augmented over time to provide a layered defense as larger and more sophisticated threats emerge. Precisely as I said before: The goal is to employ what we can at the time a limited threat is before us, to be able to meet that threat and then build on that system as our capabilities increase and as threats might later emerge. Those are the two policy goals in the bill. What do we call for in terms of architecture? There has been a lot of criticism of the bill on the ground it is going to cost too much. That is literally untrue, because the bill does not identify a particular system. It is like going to a broker, as Majority Leader Bob Dole has said. I go to a real estate broker and say, ``I would like to buy a house.'' The broker says, ``I can get you one for $40,000 or I can get you one for $4 million. Which do you want?'' Obviously, there is a big range between $40,000 and $4 million in houses, just as there is a big range in the kind of thing we could buy here to defend ourselves, and it certainly depends on the kind of threat we see emerging, the degree of our technology we want to put in place at any given time and a variety of other factors. What we said is the President should decide. So if the President and his supporters claim it is going to cost too much, it is because they choose a system that is going to cost too much, because the bill allows the President to decide which system to buy and which system to deploy. You cannot have it both ways, Mr. President. You cannot say you want the ability to decide which system and then also say that it is going to cost too much. If it costs too much, it is only because you bought one that costs too much. But the reality is, we are all pretty much agreed on what we need, and it is not too expensive. My guess is it will be less than $2 billion a year for the next 10 years out of a defense budget of $265 billion each year. That is not too much to pay to protect the American people from attack. In any event, what we call for here is components which would be developed for deployment and would include the following things: (1) An interceptor system that optimizes defensive coverage of the United States . . . Obviously, you want to optimize coverage. A single ground site would not optimize coverage. That is all that is allowed by the ABM Treaty, and that is why we have to deal with the ABM Treaty later on. We say it can be either ground based, sea based or space based, or any combination of these basing modes. Typically, the criticism of the Missile Defense Act is we are talking about star wars, a massive shield of space-based satellites that would protect the United States from any conceivable attack. That is what was contemplated back during the cold war when the threat from the Soviet Union required us to develop that degree of protection. That is no longer necessary. Nobody is talking about that, and that is why we say either ground based, sea based or space based, or any combination of these. Probably what would be developed first is a sea-based system or a ground-based system, and then later they would be integrated. The only components in space, at least to begin with, is the satellite that detects the launch. We already have that, and everyone agrees that we need to have a satellite in space that can detect a launch, wherever it might occur, and communicate the information about that launch to the system, whichever it is, sea-based or ground-based. Obviously, we need fixed-based ground radars. If we have a sea-based system, we also need radars on our Aegis cruisers. We already have them, so that is a zero-cost investment. We have 40-plus Aegis cruisers and destroyers out there with this radar already on there, and fixed ground-based radars already exist. We need space based, including a space and missile tracking system. This is a satellite that would be able to detect a launch and communicate that information as it tracks the adversary's missile through space. Finally, battle management, command, control, and communications. Everybody understands the need for that. Those are the components. Nothing new there, nothing wild, nothing exorbitant, no space shield, as some people have suggested. Section 5 of the bill talks about implementation of the National Missile Defense System and specifies certain actions that the Secretary of Defense must take in implementing the NMD policy. This is an area where there is some disagreement, because we say specifically the President should initiate actions necessary to meet the deployment goal. That includes conducting by the end of 1998 an integrated systems test. This is one of the milestones, one of the mileposts, along with actually deploying a system that would need to be achieved in order to achieve the deployment by the year 2003. We talk about using streamlined acquisition procedures. I do not know who can disagree with that. That will certainly save money and time. Finally, we talk about developing a follow-on NMD program. Some opponents find this, and say, ``Aha, we finally discovered the problem with your Defend America Act, because you require a follow-on NMD program.'' All that means is we are not going to freeze everything in place and forget about the development of future threats. We are going to provide for the technology to meet those threats as they evolve. That is all that means. Section 6 of the bill requires a report on the plan for NMD development and deployment. It requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress by March 15, 1997, which addresses the following matters: First, the Secretary's plan for implementing the NMD policy, including a description and discussion of the NMD architecture selected. That should not be any problem. Second, the Secretary's estimate of the cost associated with the NMD. Tell us how much the system you choose is going to cost. Third, an analysis of follow-on options. We need that to evaluate properly what we are going to have to spend and develop in the future. Finally, a point at which NMD development would conflict with the ABM Treaty. This is very important, because some people rightly say there is a point beyond which the United States could be in violation of the ABM Treaty if we deploy a system that is capable of defending us. That is true. Unfortunately, the irony is the only kind of system that is permitted under the treaty today probably would not defend the entire United States, at least very effectively, at least against much of a threat. That is why most everyone agrees we need more than a single site, land-based system. To do that, we have to reopen the ABM Treaty, and that gets us into section 7, policy regarding the ABM Treaty. Let me back up. The bill itself notes there is already in the ABM Treaty a policy established for amending and otherwise dealing with changes to the treaty. They include the following: We would urge the President to pursue high-level discussions with Russia to amend the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty allows for its amendment. Second, any amendment must be submitted for advice and consent to the Senate. Everyone knows that. Third, the bill calls for the President and the Congress to withdraw from the treaty if amendments are not produced within 1 year. That, too, is called for in the ABM Treaty. If it is in the interest of the United States to withdraw from the treaty because we have not been able to amend it to our satisfaction, then we have that right under the treaty. What the bill calls for is a longer period of time, 1 year, than the treaty itself calls for, 6 months. So, Mr. President, I do not see how anyone could object to the language in the Defend America Act that says we tried to amend the treaty, if we need to, and if we cannot, then after a year withdraw from it. Frankly, I would be in favor withdrawing earlier than a year, but we provide that much leeway to the President of the United States. I have now described the act, Mr. President. What is there to disagree with here? The only thing, as I said, I think a reasonable person could disagree with is the specifying of the year 2003 for the actual deployment of a system, and on that reasonable people could differ. Should it be 2003? Should it be the year 2000? Should it be the year 2005? Or should it be a flexible date? Reasonable people can differ about that. As to everything else in here, I fail to see how any reasonable person interested in the defense of the United States could find disagreement with the words of this act. I really challenge my colleagues to come down here and point out what they would disagree with except for this date of 2003. Let me address that again just a little bit. As I said before, one of the arguments is if we lock that date in we will be locking in technology. That is true with any system that we ever have purchased on defense. But sometimes threats are upon us and we have to go with what we have. We have been working on missile defense for a long time. In fact, one of the criticisms of the missile defense program is we have been spending $30 billion on this for well over a decade. That is true. And critics say we do not have anything to show for it. That is not true. We have a lot to show for it. We have a lot of technology that is just ready to be developed and deployed if somebody will just let us do it. That is what this act finally says: You have been critical of us for spending the money and not developing or deploying it. All right. Agree with us that we are going to get on with the job. The only way to do that is to specify a date, because if we do not, Mr. President, we will continue to go on and on and on and on without ever deploying, always saying, ``Well, there's something just right around the corner that is even better.'' It is a Catch-22 for those of us who support missile defense. We say, ``OK, we'll wait for something better.'' And our critics say, ``You haven't deployed any, and you've gone at it for 15 years and spent $30 billion.'' Mr. President, my point is, let us set a date, take the technology we have in hand, which is very good, and plenty good to defeat the kind of missile technology that would be used against us in the foreseeable future, and deploy a system that we know we can deploy. We have done this with weapons systems that we have acquired throughout the last several decades. Many of the systems we have acquired have the built-in capability of being upgraded to more robust or sophisticated systems as time goes on. That is precisely what we call for in the Missile Defense Act. Let us start with what we can build by the year 2003, and, as we say, as technology improves and the threat evolves, we will have follow-on systems. Some opponents of the act have objected to the act because it allows us to do that or calls upon the Congress and the President to do that. But it clearly is nothing more than good sense. And it is really the same argument that opponents have used against us saying, well, there will be better technology later on. That is right. So let us make sure the system we deploy has the capability of taking advantage of that technology as we develop it. Mr. President, there is another advantage to actually getting a deadline in the statute. It focuses the planning efforts. It breeds efficiency because it gives the defense planners a specific time line for developing and for doing the research, for doing the testing and then for acquiring, actually bending the metal, as they say, for acquiring the systems and for getting them deployed. If you do not have a specific deadline, you never have this kind of efficiency, you never have the certainty of the schedule that is required for the researchers and the contractors to get along with the job, let alone the procurement officers in the Department of Defense. So you need a deadline. We have this with every other weapons system that we procure. We have specific dates, specific time lines and we achieve our goal by developing those time lines with a certainty at the end. If you do not have a specific date, you are never going to get there, at least not in any efficient way. Finally, I argue that specifying a date for development, and selecting the date of 2003, is probably the best way for us to prevent the development and deployment of ballistic missiles by these rogue nations that we fear, nations that cannot ever defeat us militarily, but certainly nations who can thwart our conduct of foreign policy and can do us great harm and do harm to our allies and forces deployed abroad. If we actually make it clear that we are committed to deploying a system, let us say by the year 2003, then I think that nations that are not very wealthy and that have a hard time acquiring the components or the completed systems will perhaps turn their attention to other methods for trying to throw their weight around. But as long as they know that nobody in the world is committed to deploying a system by any particular time, there is no reason for them not to proceed with their plans to buy the missiles or to develop the missiles and to develop the warheads that go on them, whether they be nuclear, biological, or chemical. And that is why we want to specify this date of 2003. There has been recently an argument about the cost. And it is too bad that this argument had to come at the time that it did because it is a totally bogus argument, yet I know some of our opponents will use it against us. It is the Congressional Budget Office analysis of the cost of such a system. But if you read the analysis carefully, rather than just spouting the rhetoric of those who oppose a ballistic missile defense system, if you read the analysis carefully, you realize that CBO did not say that the system would cost somewhere between $40 and $60 billion or $14 and $40 billion or whatever the figures people like to throw around. What the CBO said was, well, it all depends on what you buy. If you buy everything that has ever been talked about, something that nobody is proposing, you could even spend up to $60 billion. My guess is you could spend more than that if you really wanted to buy everything that anybody had ever talked about. But the cold war is over. We are not talking about that anymore. I read you the Missile Defense Act. We are not suggesting a space shield, so we are not talking about the system that could cost that kind of money. Instead, what the CBO said with respect to what we are really talking about is this. I want to quote from the CBO analysis. We are talking about an initial defense. I will quote. This initial defense would cost $14 billion, about $8.5 billion for the ground-based system and $5 billion for the SMTS space-based sensors. The ground-based system could cost roughly $4 billion less if the Air Force's proposal for a Minuteman-based system was adopted. They should have said ``were adopted.'' Then they go on to discuss other kinds of options. The point is, that it all depends which house you choose to buy, as the majority leader analogized here. Do you want to buy the $40,000 house, the $80,000 house, the $150,000 house? Do you want to buy five houses at $4 million each? What the CBO said was, well, if you bought everybody's idea of a neat house, it would cost a lot of money, might cost $60 billion. We are not talking about that. Let us not have any rhetoric from the opponents of this bill that it could cost up to $60 billion. CBO itself says what we are talking about would cost $14 billion. Mr. President, actually the administration has said that it would be less than that. The Secretary of Defense has said the system that they like would cost $5 billion. I do not know whether it is $5 billion or $14 billion or something in between. In fact, they note it actually could be $4 billion less if the Minuteman-based system was adopted. That would be $10 billion. I do not know which of these figures is correct. But we are talking about deploying a system over the next 8 years or so. If you divide $10 billion into 8 years, that is a little over $1 billion a year. That is hardly something that we cannot afford in the $265 billion defense budget when we are talking about protecting the lives of Americans and conducting our foreign policy without being blackmailed by these tinhorn dictators around the world. So I think with respect to cost we should understand that we are talking about a system that is probably in the neighborhood of $5 to $10 billion, maybe $14 billion, maybe $20 billion at the most to do it the right way, but $14 billion according to the CBO's suggestion of an initial deployment. I also note that CBO, in its estimates, apparently included O&M costs, operations and maintenance costs for a period of 10 years in some of their estimates. That is not ordinarily used to calculate the cost of acquiring any weapon systems. You understand both the acquisition cost and you understand the cost of acquiring it and operating it for 10 years; but ordinarily you do not describe as the acquisition cost the additional costs of O&M for another 10 years, which is what apparently CBO did. So one better be very careful about throwing these numbers of the CBO estimate around, Mr. President. They do not support the argument that this is too expensive. Anybody that wants to make that argument is going to have to answer to the American people the first time that Americans are killed because somebody has launched a missile against them, and answer the question what price their lives were worth. As a matter of fact, let us just stop and think for a moment, Mr. President. It was only 5 years ago that 28 Americans were killed by a ballistic missile launched by Saddam Hussein during the Persian Gulf war. The largest number of Americans killed in a single attack, 28 Americans died because we could not defend against a ballistic missile. That was in a theater that was far away. That was in a war that we were fighting. But let us move it just a little bit further out. We could not protect our own military. We could not protect the people of Israel who took scud hit after scud hit because the Patriots could not knock them down. In the future we are not going to protect the people in Rome or London or Paris or Moscow or Anchorage or Honolulu or in South Korea or Japan or any number of places around the world that we will want to defend and will not have the capability of defending. Now, what price are those lives worth? Let me proceed just a little bit more with respect to the cost item, since I am informed Senator Nunn will be here in about 15 minutes and he will have some comments to make on this act. I will proceed to discuss some of the arguments that have been raised against it that I was going to refer to later. One of the arguments is that the language in the bill that discusses the ABM Treaty is really tantamount to an anticipatory breach of the treaty. This concerns some people greatly because they also believe if we proceed to defend ourselves, people in Russia will begin acting very irresponsibly with respect to START I and START II, and they may not even ratify START II. It has been predicted they will begin violating the START I treaty that both countries are already bound by. Mr. President, I have two basic things to say about this. First, this kind of argument is reminiscent of the cold war. It was the argument between those who wanted appeasement on the one hand and those who believed in peace through strength on the other hand. Appeasement was no stranger at the time of the cold war, but I thought everyone learned the lesson of Munich. Neville Chamberlain, who believed in his heart he had won peace in our time after he came back from Munich, we now know that the concessions that were made by the allies at that time to Adolf Hitler, the appeasement of Hitler was what created the appetite for him to take even more and finally go beyond the point that the allies could endure. That is how World War II began. There were then those in the cold war era who felt if we just gave the Soviets what they wanted, if we appeased them, everything would be right. What we found, every act of appeasement led to another act of aggression, and it was only when we began to confront aggression with strength, with resolve, with courage, with willpower, with defense, that the aggressor said, ``OK, we did not really want that after all.'' Finally, through the development of our defense forces in the early 1980's, the focus on developing a defense against ballistic missiles, the resolve demonstrated through President Reagan's famous peace through strength, our adversary realized it could not defeat us militarily. President Gorbachev, to his credit, knew he could not defeat us economically, that the political system they developed, combined with the economics of that system, were insufficient to sustain the kind of effort that would be needed to bury us, as Khrushchev said. That is why the Soviet Union fell. Appeasement never worked. Strength did. The argument that if we do not do what the Russians want, everything will be bad, goes back to that old idea, that old philosophy of appeasement. It has been said if we even talk about amending the ABM Treaty, the Russians will violate START I, they will not destroy all the missiles they promised to destroy, that the Russian Duma will not ratify START II. We will take each of those things. First of all, the United States has already suggested the possibility of amending the ABM Treaty to the Russians, and we had conversations with them about it. They did not walk away and say, ``This is absolutely nuts. We will never do that.'' This was done during the Bush administration. Second, there are ongoing discussions today about changes to the meaning of the ABM Treaty as circumstances have changed. In fact, there are ongoing discussions in Geneva and elsewhere about the exact definition of strategic missiles that can be defended against under the ABM Treaty. It is not as if this thing was written in stone, never to be changed or even considered for modification. The cold war is over. Circumstances have changed. It is going to have to be changed, if not scrapped altogether, as threats and circumstances change. That is only right. Only those who do not understand the cold war is over would argue the ABM Treaty should never be changed. The next point, that the Russians actually will violate the START I Treaty if we talk about changing the ABM Treaty, Mr. President, the Russians have, in fact, already violated several treaties. They do not need us to talk about amending the ABM Treaty to do that. I think we need to separate the two. There is no direct linkage, and there should not be. The point is, the Russians will do what they think is in their best interest. If the United States makes it clear to the Russians it is in their best interest to continue to comply with START I and to talk to us about making changes in the ABM Treaty, they will do that. As a responsible country, I believe that Russia will be responsible in pursuing that course of action with us. If the Russians decide not to ratify the START II Treaty because they do not think it is in their national interest, there is nothing we can do to stop them from that. I do not think by stopping any discussion of defending ourselves against ballistic missile attack it will make one bit of difference. I could quote numerous Russians who made the statement the reason that the Duma would not proceed to ratify START II does not have anything to do with the START II Treaty but has to do with what they perceive the costs to be and what they perceive their national interests to be. Therefore, I think it is foolish for us to believe we have that much control over what the Russian Duma does, that if we begin talking about changing the ABM Treaty, it will cause them to change their plans. I do not think that is correct. In any event, if it were, what that would argue for is the United States could never do anything in our national interest to protect our citizens because it might cause some irresponsible Russians to act in a way inimical both to their interests and ours. I do not think that is logical. In addition to this, Mr. President, it is not as if we are breaching the ABM Treaty. As I noted, the ABM Treaty allows for amendment. It is like the Constitution. We all say we should be very careful about amending the Constitution. It is a pretty sacred document, true. But we have amended it because it has within it the means of amending it. Our Founding Fathers knew it was not a perfect document for all time, that we might want to make changes to it. Who were the first group to make changes? Our Founding Fathers. They adopted the Bill of Rights. The ABM Treaty, which has existed now for over 20 years, I daresay is not as sacrosanct as the U.S. Constitution. It could be amended, and therefore it provides within its terms for amendment as time goes on. Many would argue that actually the treaty no longer exists because the country with whom it was negotiated no longer exists; namely, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the U.S.S.R., no longer is. Some say Russia acceded to interests. That may or may not be under international law. But it is a change, an amendment, to reflect changed circumstances. You cannot deny that. In addition to that, in addition to allowing for amendment, the treaty allows for withdrawal if it is in the United States' interest. All we have to do under the treaty is give notice that 6 months later we will withdraw, and we can walk away from the treaty. That is what the treaty itself provides for. Why would people be critical of the Defend America Act, which specifically says, in order not to cause a violation of the ABM Treaty, we should begin discussion with the Russians now, telling them of our desire to develop a ballistic missile defense, of the fact that there may be circumstances under which it would run counter to the terms of the ABM Treaty, and therefore suggesting we sit down and talk with the Russians about ways to modify the treaty to accommodate the kind of defenses both of our countries are going to need in the future. What is wrong with that? That is not an anticipatory breach. That is not saying we will violate the law sometime in the future and have a cause of action against us today. That is a real, genuine effort on our part to be totally upfront and say we will have to make some changes sooner or later, probably, so will you not sit down with us and talk about what the changes might be. If, for some reason, the Russians absolutely will not talk to us, the act says that the President still has a year--not 6 months, as the treaty provides, but an entire year--within which to seek these negotiations and withdraw at the end of that year if the Russians have not been willing to talk to us, that withdrawal being based upon the provisions of the treaty itself, allowing withdrawal in the national interests of the United States. The President of the United States, Bill Clinton, has already declared a national emergency based upon the ballistic missile threat. If there is a national emergency, then certainly the conditions exist under which we could withdraw from the treaty if we desire to. No one is suggesting that at this point. My point is, simply, that it is not an anticipatory breach for us to pass this law. Anyone who argues to the contrary, really seriously, Mr. President, has not read the language of the Defend America Act. It does not call for anticipatory breach. I have already dealt with the argument that this is just a straw horse from the Reagan era of the star wars system. That is not what we are talking about. I had to read the language of the act to make the point. I do not doubt there will be some who have not bothered to read it and who will come here and talk of star wars and space shield and the rest. Remember what I said, Mr. President, they are simply setting up a straw man to knock down. It is not what we are talking about here. There has been some question about the threat and when the threat will actually evolve. There is much that could be said about this, some of which I will reserve for a little bit later on. I do not think that anyone would credibly deny that by the year 2003, there is a significant probability that threats will exist beyond the acknowledged threat that exists today from either Russia or China. Now, there is a question about when the North Koreans will actually be able to reach the continental United States and whether ``continental'' means the lower 48, or Alaska, or Hawaii. I really do not think it matters much. Clearly, by about the year 2003, the North Koreans will have a missile that is able to reach South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, possibly, Alaska and Hawaii. That ought to be enough, Mr. President. For those who say, ``Well, let us wait until the threat is there to develop the system,'' I say, at that point it will be a little too late. Until you can develop and deploy a system, you are susceptible to the blackmail that a regime like that could visit upon you. I do not doubt that if the same leaders who control North Korea today are in power at that point, it could create great mischief if we did not have a means of defending ourselves. With respect to that threat, many things can be said. I have to begin by saying that the year 2003 being 7 years down the road is certainly a point at which we ought to be prepared to defend against a threat from countries like North Korea, even if we are not concerned about a threat from Russia or China today--particularly an accidental launch from one of those countries. The national intelligence estimate, which is touted by some, suggesting that the threat will not occur for 10 or 15 years does not support that proposition. It only supports the proposition that if a country started today and began to indigenously develop a weapon, that it might take that long before they could do it. As we know, that is not the way most nations acquire the weapons. They buy them, for instance, from Russia, China, or North Korea. If they cannot buy a complete system, they buy components from whomever, and they put them together. The Iraqi scuds were done like that. So if you calculate the time it takes a country to buy a space-launch capability, which is just as effective as a ballistic missile war fighting capability, or components of a system to put it together, it is clear that numerous nations do not mean us any good in the world, and they could develop the systems before the year 2003. I also make the point that the United States has a history--an unfortunate history--of turning a blind eye to reality and the facts because we are a peace-loving Nation. We do not like to assume others would do us harm, at least in a sneaky fashion. But Pearl Harbor is the best example of where intelligence pointed the way directly and specifically to a threat. If we had been more suspicious or cynical of the Japanese at that time, we would have probably understood that that was a very real threat and would have been better prepared to deal with it. But we were not. It was our own fault, in many respects. That same thing could be said about the situation today. It will be our own fault if some nation decides to be very sneaky about the way it develops a weapon and deploys that weapon against us. Iraq, we know, was much more capable than we ever had any reason to expect 5 years ago. We now know that. We know that other countries are seeking to acquire this technology, such as North Korea, the Iranians, and so on. Yet, somehow we just try to delude ourselves into thinking that maybe everything will be all right, that we really will not have to worry about it, so let us not bother to worry about it until we are sure the threat is there. Well, Mr. President, at that point it is too late; the horse is out of the barn. The unfortunate thing about that analogy is that it does not begin to describe the horrors that could be visited upon people if we wait until it is literally too late. I would rather be a year too early and maybe spend a little bit more money than we had to, and maybe lock in technology a little bit earlier, than I would be to be a year too late because, frankly, at that point, no one knows what the harm would be, whether it would be an actual attack, or whether it would be simply thwarting important foreign policy goals of the Western alliance because we did not have the weapons to stop a ballistic missile attack. As I said, Mr. President, I will defer discussion of this threat because I really do not think that reasonable opponents to the Defend America Act will argue that there is no potential threat there. They may argue that it may not be as serious by the year 2003 as I think it might be, but I do not think anybody could credibly argue that the threat is not there. We can quote the former CIA Directors. Jim Woolsey made the point very clear. I will note, Mr. President, that as recently as May 31, the Washington Times carried two stories that I thought were, frankly, very distressing. The lower story said, ``Woolsey Disputes Clinton Missile Threat Assessment.'' He was President Clinton's first Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. This article from the Associated Press points out in numerous ways the areas in which former CIA Director Jim Woolsey believes that the Clinton administration is underestimating this missile threat in an effort not to go forward with the Ballistic Missile Defense Act. The other headline is, ``White House Misled Joint Chiefs on ABM Treaty Talks.'' I understand there was a letter written around May 1 by one or more of the Joint Chiefs that says, ``We really do not need this Defend America Act.'' Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this newspaper article be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I now ask that the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Reserving the right to object----

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, this amendment is a sense-of-the-Senate resolution that says that when the Congress has adopted fundamental tax reform, we should, thereafter, adopt some kind of supermajority requirement to raise taxes as a constitutional amendment. This is the idea that came from the Kemp Commission, which said if we ever get to a single rate tax, whether a consumption tax or income tax, thereafter, we better make it harder to raise taxes because there is no place to shelter income taxes. So once we have tax reform, we should have a supermajority requirement.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, this is an amendment to save a little bit of money in the LIHEAP Program, the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program. There are 6 years in our budget. The budget of the President and the committee and my amendment are all the same for the first 2 years at $1 billion. The next 2 years, I accept the President's budget numbers, which are $934 million and $819 million respectively. Then, in years 5 and 6, I keep the number, adding $119 million. So for the last 3 of the 6 years, the numbers spent would be $819 million, which is the President's number in year 4. The total savings would be $633 million if we accept this amendment rather than going the route of the Budget Committee. I urge an ``aye'' vote.

Mr. KYL. I will be happy to speak now, and allow the Senator from Minnesota to have the last word. I accepted the numbers from the President, whose budget office gave that program a lower priority by virtue of the fact it was supposed to be temporary. So in years 3 and 4 we have accepted the numbers of the President's budget and then just continued those numbers for years 5 and 6. This is not a drastic reduction, but it is one small step we can take to at least show some sense of fiscal responsibility.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask that the following newspaper article be printed in the Congressional Record. The article follows: Unnatural Conditions Set Stage for Natural Disaster [From the Tribune, May 17, 1996] (By Sherry Boss) Flagstaff--Peter Fule walks through the past and finds comfort there. He is safe in a stand of 400-year-old ponderosas. Wildfire is unlikely to touch this 8 acres of forest north of Flagstaff. Fule and his colleagues have restored it to the way it was in 1876 in hopes of learning a lesson. The wind is gusty here and rain a stranger--perfect conditions for a sweeping blaze like the one that ravaged 61,000 acres at Four Peaks this month. But unlike most of Arizona's forests this one is not a tinderbox at the mercy of a cigarette butt or car engine spark, said Fule, a senior research specialist at Northern Arizona University's School of Forestry. The grass under Fule's feet and the ample distance between trees in peace of mind. One day in 1994, students and employees for NAU, the U.S. Forest Service and the logging industry sawed down more than 7,000 new trees in the Fort Valley Experimental Forest, short eight miles north of Flagstaff. All that remains now are the 480 pines that were standing in pre-settlement days. Workers brought the density down from more than 1,000 trees per acre to 62--closer to the way it was before cattle disturbed the forest's ecosystem. ``It was a neat feeling to see this being done and see the new forest emerging,'' Fule said. If lightning were strike here now, short flames would creep along the forest floor. The fire would consume grass, twigs and pine needle litter. The flames would singe tree trunks, but wouldn't get hot enough to kill the towering pines. Then, when there was no grass left to burn, the flames would go out. That's the way it was for hundreds of years. Fire was friendly to the forest, Fule said. It cleared out scraggly brush and new saplings every few years, allowing the older trees to thrive without competition for water and light. But this is the forest of the past. Today, national forests like Arizona's Coconino, Kaibab and Apache-Sitgreaves are much different places. They're so dense with spindly young pines, forestry experts call the cluster of trees ``dog-hair ticktets.'' Fire in those tickets equals almost certain destruction. The trees of different sizes form stair steps for the fire to climb to the largest pines. That's why, forestry experts say, Arizona is at risk of the worst wildfires this millenium. Never before has there been such accumulation of fire fuel. Add to that some of the driest weather in recorded history and the danger is extreme. Years of ecological disturbance have brought the West's forests to this point, Fule said. The trouble started in Arizona in 1883 when the transcontinental railroad was finished. The state was connected. People arrived. They brought cows. The lush grass and wildflowers on the forest floors were perfect for grazing. Cows ate to the bare ground. With the grass gone, the fires stopped. When pines dropped their seeds, they took root. The trees grew in thick, but not very big. There wasn't enough water for any one tree to thrive. Now, when a spark hits the thickets, the world forest is doomed. ``If a fire came through this year, this tree would almost certainly die,'' Fule said of a ponderosa that has stood for at least 300 years. ``Not only this one, but all its neighbors.'' What took hundreds of years for nature to build could be destroyed in minutes, he said. For most of this century, the U.S. Forest Service's policy was to put out fires. Fule said. That policy interrupted nature's long-term plans, he said. ``People have always wanted to control nature and remake it for human needs and human goals,'' he said. Years of fire suppression policy led to the devastating Lone fire at four Peaks 35 miles east of Phoenix, said Julie Stromberg, associate research professor at Arizona State University's Center for Environmental Studies. Fires have been put out as soon as they start, allowing the vegetation to accumulate. ``If you don't do frequent burns or controlled burns, you're going to have a catastrophic fire,'' Stromberg said. The problem isn't easily solved now. It's too late to let nature take its course, Fule said. There's no choice but to put out forest fires, he said. ``If all the fire crews walked away, by tomorrow, the whole state would be in flames,'' he said. Fule hopes the solution lies in a combination of cutting and burning. Official will start a fire every three years in the cleared-out experimental forest to imitate the natural fire cycle that occurred between 1630 and 1876. A similar cut-and-burn project is under way on a larger scale at Mount Turmbull on 3,700 acres north of the Grand Canyon. But thinning out the forest is controversial. Some people are so accustomed to thick forests, they believe that's the way they should be. Some are partial to the kinds of wildlife the thickets attract, too. But as the Lone fire proved, nature has a vengeance when it's disturbed. ``The natural area (becomes) so unnatural in its density and fuel accumulation, it begins to present a hazard,'' Fule said.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that my amendment No. 3996 be modified, which I send to the desk.

Mr. KYL. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. KYL. Thank you, Madam President. Amendment No. 3996, As Modified

Mr. KYL. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, and I ask unanimous consent that the quorum time be charged to each side equally.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. If there is no one present, I will defer until then.

Mr. KYL. Second, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for the yeas and nays on amendment No. 3996.

Mr. KYL. I ask for the yeas and nays on amendment No. 3995.

Mr. KYL. I ask for the yeas and nays separately.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to ask for the yeas and nays on two amendments which I previously offered and have spoken to. As far as I am concerned, they do not need further debate. Of course, there could be if anyone wanted to respond.

Mr. KYL. I will defer until then.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I do that in order to strongly support the amendment of the Senator from Texas calling for the repeal of the Clinton tax increase on Social Security benefits. He spoke of this about an hour ago. It is a measure that I had offered in the House of Representatives within hours of the time, on August 6, 1993, that the Social Security tax increase cleared the Senate. I had offered the bill there to repeal it. I also supported Senator Lott's bill to repeal the tax, which he called the Senior Citizens Tax Fairness Act. And I am very pleased to stand in support of the amendment of the Senator from Texas to do the same. This is the tax increase that President Clinton pushed through the Congress in 1993 to impose higher taxes on seniors with incomes of only $34,000 a year and couples with annual incomes of $44,000 a year. The Clinton administration talked about taxing the rich, but we did not believe that couples making $44,000, or individuals making $34,000 a year, should be considered rich. As a result of the Clinton tax increase, 85 percent of these people's Social Security benefits are now subject to tax. That represents an effective tax increase of 70 percent over prior law. The CBO estimated that, in 1994, 9.5 million Social Security beneficiaries were hit by the Clinton tax increase. That is a figure, of course, that will rise every year--to roughly 13.5 million in 1998, and much more each year thereafter--because the tax is not indexed for inflation. It was very clever the way the President crafted the proposal, letting inflation do the dirty work of continuing to raise taxes long after the bill was signed into law in 1993. Repealing the Clinton tax on Social Security will put over $55 million back into the pockets of retired Arizonans every year, and nearly $3.7 billion into the pockets of seniors nationwide. If we really care whether seniors have enough resources to pay for adequate health care, to put food on the table, or pay heating and air conditioning bills, we ought to support the amendment of the Senator from Texas. Whether or not this amendment is supported, I think, comes down to a question of who we trust, Mr. President. Who do we trust more to spend the money wisely, the people that worked hard an entire lifetime to try to ensure themselves a secure retirement, or Government bureaucrats in Washington? I put my faith in people to use their own money to provide for themselves and their families. It is important to emphasize that the Clinton tax increase applies to individuals with incomes of only $34,000 a year. I do not think that is a definition of a wealthy person. Yet, that is who pays the bill. I think, by now, most people realize that Clinton's talk of taxing only the ``rich'' is just an excuse to raise taxes on everybody. He raised taxes on seniors making $34,000 a year. He raised the gas tax, which hits the poorest Americans hardest of all. I note, parenthetically, Mr. President, that according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 1987, the poorest 20 percent of Americans devoted 8.8 percent of their expenditures to gasoline and motor oil, while the wealthiest 20 percent devoted only 3.1 percent of their expenditures to such things. So the gas tax, like the Social Security tax, hits those who are not the most wealthy in our country. I predict that we are going to repeal the Clinton gas tax and the tax on Social Security benefits. Neither is defensible. The Gramm amendment that is before us today will put Senators on record about whether they favor the repeal of the tax increase on seniors, and whether we put our trust in older Americans or whether we put our trust in bureaucrats. I commend Senator Gramm from Texas for raising this amendment. I hope we all support it. I thank the other Senator from Texas, Senator Hutchison, for standing aside and letting me take this time. Mr. President, I earlier posited two amendments--3995 and 3996. In that order, I ask for the yeas and nays on those two amendments.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to proceed on the Gramm amendment. I am not asking to lay the current amendment aside but that I may proceed to discuss that amendment.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask the Senator from New Mexico if I might have about 3 minutes of the time.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. I would say to the Senator from West Virginia, probably about 10 minutes, but certainly no longer than 15.