Jon Kyl

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, again, this is an amendment to eliminate some of the funding for research on an antisatellite program in the event the United States should ever need that. It is a contingency program. We are not talking about deploying anything. But the primary argument of the Senator from Iowa was that if this was ever utilized, obviously, these satellites might be blown apart and that would create space junk. I suppose that might be true, but I find that not to be a very persuasive argument that we should be denied a weapon that we would need in time of war. It is a little like lamenting the rubble that may exist after the necessary bombing of downtown Baghdad. It may be too bad that there is some rubble there, but the fact of matter is, that is a consequence of war. If we needed an antisatellite weapon, obviously that would be the last of our concerns. [[Page S 12185]] As the Armed Services Committee stated in its report, the United States military has spent billions of dollars on the spectrum of multi- service and joint war-fighting space requirements. We spent billions, too, on a broad mix of space and ground-based capabilities that will serve us both in time of peace and war. In the event of a conflict, the United States would be faced by a wide array of capabilities by our potential adversaries in space and with the access to space-derived data that comes from that. As a member of the Intelligence Committee, I am very concerned about the ability of the United States to counter these technological gains by potential adversaries as a result of the massive decontrol of the technologies of satellite weaponry and satellite reconnaissance and sensing. These products are being sold now commercially and are being purchased around the world. The sensing and reconnaissance space-based technologies will have proliferated by the time we may be faced by an adversary, which will require that we have some capability to counter it. If we do not continue to do the research on this kind of a program, we will be denied that capability when the time comes. China, France, Italy, Spain, and Israel have satellite reconnaissance capability, in addition, of course, to Russia and China. India, Japan, North Korea, and other countries are moving toward developing such a capability. As the reconnaissance and space-based technology spreads with the sale or lease to Third World countries of satellites over time, the satellites will obviously spread as well. The funds recommended by the committee for the tactical antisatellite program would provide the United States with a contingency capability. That is all we are talking about. That would enable the United States, if necessary, to influence the use of these technologies in a conflict and to prevent the misuse or denial of space systems and access to space by the United States. During the Persian Gulf war, the U.S. and its coalition allies had almost total domination of space and used unprecedented space-dependent military capabilities to achieve victory. Preventing the misuse or denial of space systems and access to space is vital to United States national security. The history of the space advantage enjoyed by the United States and its coalition allies I hope will not be forgotten. Future adversaries such as a rogue nation with access to a nuclear weapon or, for that matter, a ballistic missile with a conventional payload could use space to generate a theater atmospheric disturbance, electromagnetic pulse, disrupt signal propagation and, frankly, destroy much of our military communications system. We have to have a hedge against potential adversaries from misusing space and causing great harm to our satellites and our critical intelligence sensors. This $30 million in the defense bill for the tactical antisatellite contingency capability is that hedge. So it is critical that we support the Armed Services Committee and the committee's position on this by tabling the Harkin amendment.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, this is an important program. According to the GAO, the space-based laser program has met every technical milestone. No one has criticized it on technical grounds. [[Page S 12187]] The Senator from Iowa has asserted it is a violation of the ABM Treaty. That is not accurate. The ABM Treaty does not prohibit research. That is what this is. This is a research program, nowhere near deployment. In fact, it may never be deployed. It is important for our country to have a very highly leveraged, highly technical program such as this. This is the last of the directed energy programs, and it is the kind of program that we need to continue to do the research as a hedge against the kind of future threat that we may have to face. It is not a threat anywhere near deployment--only research money. I hope the motion to table is agreed to.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, this amendment would add $313,000 to the budget of the Indian Arts and Crafts Board at the Department of the Interior, bringing the total for the Board to $962,000 for the upcoming fiscal year. The funding would be offset by an equal reduction in the departmental management account. My amendment will ensure that a small, but important arts agency, the Indian Arts and Crafts Board, can continue its operations. I want to make it clear to my colleagues, however, that even if the amendment is adopted, the Arts and Crafts Board will take a 10-percent cut from the current year level--a 20-percent cut from the President's budget request. The work of the Indian Arts and Crafts Board is about creating opportunities for native American artisans, particularly young people who must decide whether to continue the historical and cultural traditions that are entailed in Indian art and craftmaking. The Board helps to foster such opportunities for native American artisans, providing business advice and technical assistance to Indian individuals and organizations; helping to identify new markets for Indian craft businesses; and promoting Indian art in Board museums as well as outside exhibitions. The most important function of the Board relates to implementation of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, which directs the Board to assist native American artisans, tribes, or marketing organizations in obtaining trademarks for their products. Such marks of genuineness-- trademarks--help develop markets for Indian products, as well as assure consumers that the products they buy are indeed genuine Indian. The act also establishes stiff penalties for misrepresentation of works as Indian produced when they are not. The 1990 act represents a free market approach to promoting economic development in Indian country. In a nutshell, the 1990 act gives the Board authority to obtain trademarks for Indian artisans and thus help them distinguish their works in the marketplace. This also helps consumers determine genuineness. It strengthens criminal penalties for violations-- counterfeiting of trademarks--and establishes new civil remedies against those who misrepresent works as Indian produced when they are not. In short, it cracks down on the fraud which is siphoning off a significant share of the market for native American artisans. Prior to passage of the 1990 act, the Commerce Department had estimated that imported imitation Indian handcrafts were siphoning off 10 to 20 percent from genuine Indian artisans' markets. Commerce also found that much of the counterfeit market was made up of jewelry that undersold the genuine articles made by craftsmen such as the Navajo, Hopi, and Zuni, by as much as 50 percent. That is significant because, if Indian artisans cannot make enough money due to competition from cheap fakes, they will abandon the arts, and rich native American traditions will die out as a result. Or, if they have to increase productivity at the expense of time-honored manufacturing techniques in order to compete with imitation products, an important part of their heritage will be compromised and lost. Mr. President, for many Native Americans, their art is their sole source of income. These are not wealthy people. I met with one Navajo couple, for example, whose ability to produce more Navajo rugs was limited by their inability to raise more sheep. These people are struggling from day to day to make ends meet. I am not asking in our amendment that Indian artisans get special treatment. We're proposing a funding level that represents a 10-percent cut from the fiscal year 1995 level. What I am asking is that the Indian Arts and Crafts Board be allowed to continue its work promulgating the regulations to implement and enforce the 1990 act; to continue its work on behalf of native American artisans. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. amendment no. 2315 (Purpose: To provide that any new fossil energy research and development project start shall be cost-shared with a private entity) On page 77, line 12, before the period, insert the following: ``: Provided further, That any new project start funded under this heading shall be substantially cost-shared with a private entity to the extent determined appropriate by the Secretary of Energy''.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, when the Senate returns from recess, it will begin the process of fundamentally changing our Nation's welfare system. While this is one of the most important things we should do this year, I believe we must acknowledge, as Bill Bennett has said, that most of our problems are cultural, and ``cultural problems demand cultural solutions.'' In other words, the problems that we seek to influence at the margins with governmental programs can only be permanently and effectively dealt with by changing our culture. After trillions of dollars spent on welfare, it is obvious that Federal dollars alone will not solve the problems. All over this country, people need to be involved on a personal level to make the kinds of changes that will reverse the devastating social trends that have taken hold of so much of our land. We desperately need to overhaul our Nation's welfare system, yes. But, change in Federal policy alone will not resolve the underlying causes of this crisis. It cannot be solved without individual commitment and personal responsibility. Everyone has to be willing to answer to his or her own behavior and decisions. The challenge is to help those people with no hope to a new life of responsibility, productivity and happiness. The Ineffective, Costly Federal Welfare Bureaucracy Must End As we work toward effective welfare reform, I believe it would benefit the Senate to first recognize publicly the failure of the current system. We cannot expect different results if we continue to do the same things. [[Page S 11889]] It has become painfully clear that we cannot solve our welfare problems by expanding the bloated and detached Federal bureaucracy or by increasing Federal dollars with entitlement status. Since President Johnson declared his ``War on Poverty,'' the Federal Government, under federally designed programs, has spent more than $5 trillion on welfare programs. But, during this time, the poverty rate has increased from 14.7 to 15.3 percent. The average monthly number of children receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits has increased from 3 million in 1965 to over 9 million in 1992. That increase occurred as the total number of children in the United States decreased by 5.5 percent. This means, at a minimum, the Great Society system has not worked; and, at worst, it has actually contributed to the problem by discouraging work, penalizing marriage, and destroying personal responsibility and, oftentimes, self-worth. Limited success in reforming welfare has occurred when States and localities have been given the opportunity ``to go their own way.'' Under a State work-based initiative in Wisconsin, for example, individuals have been diverted from ever getting on welfare, and under a local initiative in Riverside, CA, individuals on welfare are staying in jobs permanently. In both Wisconsin and Riverside, welfare rolls have been reduced. Additionally, in Wisconsin, unemployed, non- custodial parents not meeting their child support obligations are required to actively look for work or work in a public or private sector job, or they are faced with jail time. Since States are designing programs that work and since the Federal Government has clearly failed, the administration and design of most welfare related programs should fall under State and local control. Arizona's efforts at reform are a good example of why reform is needed. Arizona applied in July of last year to implement a new State welfare program, EMPOWER. It is based on work, responsibility, and accountability. It took the Department of Health and Human Services bureaucracy a full year to approve the waiver. What State wants to waste its time and resources preparing a waiver request knowing full well that the Federal Government might put up roadblocks or simply not act on it for years? That is why block grants to States make sense. By allowing States to design their own programs, decisions will be more localized, and the costs of the Federal bureaucracy will be avoided. I support proposals to block grant AFDC, child care, and job training programs, and perhaps, to block grant additional programs, such as food stamps. This having been said about block grants, there are two fundamental driving forces behind welfare dependency that require some Federal commitment: nonwork and nonmarriage. While I am totally skeptical about Government's ability to legislate cultural solutions, I do believe that certain fundamental principles are worth reinforcing. In other words, as long as Federal tax funds are being used, they should be spent in a positive, not a negative way. For example, it is wrong for Federal policy to penalize work and marriage. Instead, work and marriage should be rewarded because they are integral to the fabric of our society. Nonwork and illegitimacy are key underlying causes of our welfare crisis and, even with the effective elimination of the Federal welfare bureaucracy, they will remain as its legacy if we choose not to address them. Responsibility is integral to a successful life--so Federal tax funds should be given only to those willing to work and willing to raise children responsibly. People will never get out of the dependency cycle if Federal funds reinforce destructive behavior. Work Everybody knows that incentives to work are one integral component of any successful welfare solution. Let us deal with the facts: To escape poverty and get off welfare, able-bodied individuals must enter and stay in the workforce. As Teddy Roosevelt said, ``The first requisite of a good citizen in this Republic of ours is that he shall be able and willing to pull his own weight.'' Let us look at another cold, hard fact: The JOBS program that passed as a part of the Family Support Act of 1988 is not moving welfare recipients into work. Less than 10 percent of welfare recipients now participate in the JOBS Program. In fact, the JOBS Program does not require work, but simply participation in a job readiness program. Once again: the Federal solution has been a failure. States can probably do better. States should be given the flexibility to determine how they will increase the number of welfare recipients engaged in work--and I mean real work. A number of studies, including a study recently released by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC), indicate that getting a welfare recipient into work is more likely than any other factor--more than training or education for example--to result in the recipient leaving welfare for good. And so, in my view, requiring States to adhere to tough definitions of work and to meet realistic, but tough, work participation rates will help States move toward what should be their primary goal: self- sufficiency among all their citizens. S. 1120 provides a beginning toward these goals. Under S. 1120, welfare recipients must enter work no later than 2 years after receiving their first welfare payment. By the year 2000, 50 percent of a State's welfare caseload, with no exemptions, will be required to work. I am pleased that an agreement has been reached to add to S. 1120 a requirement that States must lower welfare benefits on a pro rata basis for individuals who fail to show up for required work. I will continue to work for a bill that will bring more individuals into the workforce. Illegitimacy Our Nation's illegitimacy rate has increased from 10.7 percent in 1970 to nearly 30 percent in 1991. Eighty-nine percent of children receiving AFDC benefits now live in homes in which no father is present. As the senior Senator from New York, who has worked on these issues for 30 years, said this week, if we do not do something to reverse this trend we may simply not make it as a society. And, as the senior Senator from Texas and others have said as well, to do anything less than radically change the system that has created this trend would be suicidal for our country. Clearly, the issue of illegitimacy is not a partisan issue, and it is one that demands immediate attention. We must appreciate the role that the breakdown of the family, that fatherless families, have played in our societal and cultural decline. This is not really even a debatable point. The facts support the devastating reality. According to a 1995 U.S. Census Bureau report, the one-parent family is six times more likely to live in poverty than the two-parent family. And, according to a study conducted in 1990 by June O'Neill--now director of the Congressional Budget Office, a young male is twice as likely to engage in criminal behavior if he is raised without a father. Robert Lerman of the Urban Institute stated it well in an op-ed in the Washington Post on Monday. He says that even the best set of employment and training programs will still leave children in one- parent families living ``near the edge.'' Mr. Lerman goes on to explain that growing up in a family with only one parent ``increases the child's risk of dropping out of school, becoming an unmarried parent and having trouble getting and holding a job.'' As the op-ed clearly states, the engagement of fathers in parenting is the most important factor in helping people leave the welfare rolls and escape poverty. I will, therefore, support measures to combat illegitimacy, including an amendment to provide incentives to States for reducing illegitimacy rates. I will also support initiatives to limit increases in cash assistance for mothers having additional children while on welfare. If the rules of welfare are stated clearly to a mom from the beginning, and if allowances are made for noncash essentials like diapers and other items, then I do not believe such a welfare rule is unfair. In the end, if such a rule reduces out-of-wedlock births, it may turn out to be more fair than most other aspects of welfare. Private Sector Solutions Although most State solutions to welfare are more effective than Federal [[Page S 11890]] solutions, no Government program can replace private sector charities and civic contributions. States can do it better than the Federal bureaucracy, but communities and individuals will ultimately have to solve this crisis. For instance, if given $10,000 to spend on a welfare programs of their choice, most Americans would choose to contribute to the local homeless shelter or Salvation Army over some Government welfare program because they know the private sector will be more effective. During this welfare debate, it is my hope that we can discuss ways to end what John Goodman of the National Center for Policy Analysis has called, the ``Federal Government's monopoly on welfare tax dollars.'' I support the provision of S. 1120 that allows States to contract with private charitable organizations--including religious organizations--to meet the needs of recipients within their State. I also believe that allowing taxpayers to claim a credit on their Federal tax returns for dollars or hours donated to a qualified charity will give taxpayers the opportunity to decide how their welfare tax dollars are spent and will promote private sector involvement. I will support efforts to establish such a tax credit; I will also support efforts to change sections of the Tax Code that provide disincentives to marriage. Mr. President, I would ask my friends on both sides of the aisle to recognize the urgency of our task. I respect the intentions of those who disagree with our proposals for more fundamental reform. But the bureaucratic responses to the problem have failed. It is time for something else. The status quo of the past 30 years will no longer suffice. As candidate for President Clinton said, ``we must end welfare as we know it.'' The most compassionate thing we can do for those on welfare is to get them off of welfare. The measure of our success will not be by how many people we cover, but how few we need to cover. Our current system has the effect of enslaving human beings to lives of dependency. Mr. President, let us end the bureaucratic welfare state; let us create an opportunity society.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, as a cosponsor of this amendment, which was offered by the Senator from New Mexico, Pete Domenici, I rise in strong support of the effort to restore funding to critical tribal government accounts. Mr. President, I want to refer for a moment to the Budget Committee's report on the budget resolution because I believe it goes directly to the heart of the issue at hand: The Committee recognizes the unique trust relationship between the U.S. government and the nation's Indian tribes and pueblos. That trust relationship is based upon a government-to-government principle embodied in treaties and subsequent actions by both the Executive and Legislative Branches of Government, and the courts. The Committee acknowledges this trust relationship, and assumes that programs serving Native Americans through the Bureau of Indian Affairs will be given priority consideration for ongoing federal support. I want to emphasize a few points made by our Budget Committee, because we are not talking just about shifting priorities within an appropriations bill--although the Appropriations Committee has every right to do that. We are talking about something more fundamental: A trust relationship which finds its roots in treaties, and in actions taken by the President, the Congress, and the courts. It is a trust relationship that the Senate acknowledged when it passed the budget resolution back in May, and that did not go unnoticed among Indian people. Indian people looked to the budget resolution as an indication of Congress' commitment to their needs and concerns. We ought to affirm what we said just 3 months ago in the budget resolution and pass the Domenici amendment today. Mr. President, the reductions the committee has proposed affect one of the most vulnerable populations in the country. The committee bill would cut funding for basic governmental and social service programs on Indian reservations, including child abuse prevention and tribal court enhancement programs. These are programs that should be funded first, not cut first. The poverty rate on the Pascua Yaqui Reservation in Arizona is in excess of 62 percent. More than 33 percent are unemployed. The poverty rate on the Gila River Indian community is more than 64 percent. More than 30 percent are unemployed. On the Navajo Reservation, unemployment is more than 30 percent and 56 percent live in poverty. The figures are staggering and they go on and on. These are communities that need more help, not less. At the very least, funding for essential services should not be reduced. This amendment changes priorities; it does not add to the deficit or impede progress toward a balanced budget. The additional spending on Indian programs would be fully offset by cuts in our Interior Department accounts. All we are saying here is that Indian programs are of higher priority. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the Domenici amendment.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. I would like to thank the Senator from Tennessee for yielding this time. I think it is fortunate that in the Senate now we have a distinguished surgeon, someone very familiar with the delivery of health care, who can help us in the crafting of legislation to deal with this important problem that faces us today, the reform of our Medicare system to preserve and to protect and to strengthen Medicare. That is the challenge that faces us today. And I appreciate the time to talk on that. Before I begin that discussion, however, I would like to ask unanimous consent that, after my remarks, there be printed in the Record a copy of an editorial that was carried this morning in the Wall Street Journal dealing with the subject we debated much last week and which, hopefully, will be concluded this week. The editorial is entitled ``GOP Stakes Missile Defense.'' It is about our missile defense program and the work that the Senate has done to foster that program.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, my colleague, John McCain, and I have been conducting a series of townhall meetings in the State of Arizona for the last several months to talk about this question of how we preserve and protect and strengthen Medicare. We have listened to our constituents. And I think the first thing we ought to do here, when we begin to craft solutions, is to find out what they think is important to retain and what needs to be fixed and how to do that. So I am hoping that our colleagues will utilize what little time might remain of the August recess to hold such meetings with constituents, come back with new ideas about how to address the problem when we really begin work on this in September. People might wonder why we are talking about this particular subject this morning. Of course, the reason we are doing it is because, hopefully, at the end of this week we will be leaving Washington for 3 weeks or so for the so-called recess. And it does offer us that opportunity to begin to talk to people about it. We want to begin that conversation right now. There has been much conversation already about the Medicare trustees' report. I do not think that anyone now who is familiar with the problem will deny that there is a problem, that we have to do something right away to fix that problem, to take quick action. If we do not, as has been noted before, Medicare will be bankrupt beginning in the year 2002. Let me quote one small portion from the Medicare trustees' report. We strongly recommend that the crisis presented by the financial condition of the Medicare Trust Funds * * * be urgently addressed on a comprehensive basis, including a review of the program's financing methods, benefits provisions, and delivery mechanisms. Mr. President, that is something that I like to begin meetings with when I talk to my constituents in Arizona, because the Medicare trustees say we need to look at all three of these aspects. First, a review of the program's financing aspects. This means talking about taxes and premiums primarily, as my colleague from Wyoming just pointed out. The Medicare part A payroll tax paid by workers would have to be increased by up to 600 percent if we are going to solve the financial condition of Medicare by a payroll tax increase. If we are going to deal with it by increasing the premiums, the part B premiums, they would have to be increased by up to 700 percent. I ask seniors in Arizona, ``Is anybody here in favor of raising taxes or premiums?'' It might not be surprising that no hands go up, at least very few hands go up on that. All right. Let us turn then to the second thing that the trustees say we have to review, a review of the program's benefits provisions. Likewise, it might not surprise anyone here that when you ask whether or not anyone would like to see benefits reduced, you see very few hands go up in the audience. And, indeed, limiting benefits would merely exacerbate the Medicare coverage limitations that force seniors to spend millions per year on MediGap supplemental insurance. If we are talking, on the other hand, about restricting Medicare reimbursements to providers, that has been tried in the past. That is how we have tried to deal with this problem so far. And it has not worked. It only increases the incentives for rationing. We have seen the results of that because Medicare pays only between 60 and 70 percent of the cost of care. More and more providers have decided not to provide that kind of care. So that limits the choice for seniors. Well, the third thing that can be done in dealing with Medicare reform, according to the trustees, is review of the delivery mechanisms. And that is where the real savings are to be found. That is where the real incentives for providing better care at an ultimately reduced cost is going to be found, I think. I think review of delivery mechanisms divides itself into two convenient ways of discussing the problem. The first are specific things that we can do in the delivery of this care, that we know will save money and will not at all adversely affect the care that seniors receive. When we hold these townhall meetings, we like to ask the people in attendance, ``Has anybody here ever reviewed a bill for something that they received and had Medicare pay for and found a mistake in the bill?'' Well, almost every hand goes up. And as a matter of fact, during the question and answer period, again, it is not surprising that you have tens of seniors coming up telling their personal stories about the surgery that they had to have or their spouse had to [[Page S 11720]] have and the bill, and they cannot believe what they charged. They asked about it, and it was, ``Yes, it is an overcharge, but we do not have the mechanism for trying to deal with that. Somebody else is paying for it. Do not worry about it.'' That frustrates seniors very greatly because they saved all their lives, paid taxes and they see the waste and abuse and, yes, sometimes fraud. And it makes them mad. It ought to make all of us mad. They want that dealt with. Before there is any talk about increasing any contribution that they may want to make or having to deal with the delivery of health care differently, they want to know that we have squeezed every dime of savings that can be squeezed out of this program in eliminating the waste and the fraud and even the abuse. One of the ideas we talked about to deal with this is some kind of reward whereby those who find the mistakes receive, let us say just hypothetically, 10 percent of all of the mistakes that have been certified to have existed or the fraud that has resulted in overpayments. So that is one way to deal with the problem. There is also a need, obviously, for tort reform, because there is too much excess spending in the program that results from the necessity of physicians and hospitals having to practice what we call defensive medicine, having to protect themselves from liability lawsuits and, therefore, ordering extra, unnecessary, and costly tests and procedures. So we need to have tort reform as a part of this overall reform. There are other things like computerized billings and some other things that we know will save a lot of money and does not affect the delivery of care at all. But we also know the second part of this discussion has to involve actual changes in the way that the various health care options are presented to seniors so that they can then have a wider array of choices and, with that wider array of choices being presented, the competition by the providers will naturally result in driving costs down. We also know that if they have the option of making choices themselves, where they may be able to keep some of the savings that result, there will necessarily be savings because it is no longer a third party paying it without consequence, it is rather the seniors being able to exercise a choice and save some of the money that is saved in the system. So we think these are additional ways by which we can save money. Now, we do not have a secret plan out there as to how to do this. That is why we want to talk to our constituents to find out what they think is the best way to do this. But there have been some pretty good ideas out there. And they basically enhance choice. They say, if you like the current kind of system, you can keep that. If you think it would be beneficial to you to go to an HMO, you can do that, although there should not be any disincentives for those who do not want to go to an HMO. Some people like the idea of going to PPO's and some like the idea of the medisave account. Frankly, I think this presents a great opportunity for us because, as I said a moment ago, with a medisave account you basically provide seniors with an amount of money they can spend so long as they can buy a major medical policy that can take care of their major medical expenses. They then have enough money left over to pay the out-of-pocket expenses that they have to pay until they reach the limit that would then kick into a major medical or a catastrophic policy. But if they do not spend that money, they get to keep what is left over and that provides a powerful incentive not to be spending as much on health care. That is the bottom line. We have to decrease the rate of growth from about 10 percent down to about 7 percent, which is still twice the rate of increase in the private sector and twice the rate of inflation increase. So as we go out to visit with our constituents this August, Mr. President, I suggest we visit with them about some of these options, ask them what is on their minds, how they would see the solution to the problem being developed. And when we come back in September, hopefully we will have developed some kind of consensus so we can present the plans, debate them, have a good, thorough debate around the country, but eventually this fall come up with legislation that can preserve, protect, and strengthen Medicare for the seniors who are currently beneficiaries and all of us in the future. Again, I thank the Senator from Tennessee for conducting this important discussion this morning. [From the Wall Street Journal, Aug. 7, 1995] Exhibit 1 GOP Stakes Missile Defense Missile defense is back. In an important 51-48 vote last week, largely upon party lines, the Senate approved construction of a system to defend the nation against attack by ballistic missile. The House approved a similar bill this spring. Beyond taking a crucial step to ensure the country's future security, the Republican Senate has thrown down a huge political marker for the coming presidential campaign. The part of the bill that has gotten the most attention is the plan to build a network of land-based missile-defense sites over the next eight years. Even more important is its increased funding for an upgrade of the Navy's Aegis air- defense system, which could provide a rough defensive capability for the continental U.S. by the year 2000. It also ups the spending for Brilliant Eyes, a space-based sensor capable of detecting missile launches and tracking missiles in flight. In the long run, space-based defenses--Star Wars-- are the most efficient and effective way to defend against missile attack. It's hard to overstate the significance of the Senate vote. It is a long-delayed recognition of the need to prepare now for a future threat. This is not a bad lesson to remember in the month that we are commemorating the 50th anniversary of the end of a terrible war that we were unprepared to fight. It's a lesson, however, that the Administration rejects; it's threatening to veto the Senate bill, so the campaign issue is clearly drawn. Nations with ballistic missiles Afghanistan Argentina Brazil Britian Belarus China Egypt France India Iran Iraq Israel Kazakhstan Libya North Korea Pakistan Russia Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Syria Taiwan Ukraine

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Because the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Department in May of this year had suggested to the administration the desirability of these kinds of tests. When the issue went to the National Security Council and the highest counsels, including the President, the Defense Department recommendations were shelved, they were overruled. As a result, we are not going to go forward with these tests, although the most recent Defense Department document in July of this year, which I can quote to you, does refer to the continuing open issue as to whether we should go forward. But in any event, I find it interesting that this is the same Secretary of Defense who was so relied upon yesterday in the debate on missile defense and find it ironic that some people on the floor were suggesting that the reason we did not need missile defenses is because we could rely upon our triad, our nuclear triad. You cannot have it both ways. If you are not going to test reliability and safety of the triad, then you should be supporting missile defense. If you are not going to support missile defense, then you ought to be supporting the effectiveness of our nuclear triad. Mr. President, I want to conclude at this point. The whole phrase, the whole concept of stockpile stewardship implies a responsibility. That is what stewardship means. And these are the most complex weapons in our inventory. As I said, we test guns and planes and ships regularly. It is called readiness. I cannot believe that we are arguing here about a 1-to-4 pound test that does not reach criticality, where, by definition, the conventional yield is greater than the nuclear yield, and it seems to me, therefore----

Mr. KYL. The Senate ought to support the committee position and reject the position of the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. KYL. I thank the chairman for yielding. I will take 30 seconds of that time. Let me say this. We all wish the nuclear genie had not been let out of the bottle, but it was. I noted with interest, Senator Hatfield, Senator Exon, and others commented about their experience in World War II and glad that President Truman made the decision he did, which probably brought that horrible war to a conclusion much faster than it would have been, and thank God the weapon he chose to use worked. All we are saying is, in the future, 30 years from now we better know that the weapons we rely on in our stockpile will work. To do that, we need to be prepared to conduct the very limited tests, and that is going to require the limited money included in the bill for this purpose. That is why we need to reject the Exon amendment.

Mr. KYL. Will the Senator tell me who he meant when he referred to the wishy-washy advisers to the President?

Mr. KYL. I thank the chairman for yielding me the time. Mr. President, I rise in very strong opposition to the Exon amendment and in support of the committee's position. Let us begin with a redefinition here of what we are talking about. What is a hydronuclear test? All that the committee has done is to provide $50 million to enable us to have the capability to conduct such tests, should the administration decide to go forward with that decision. A hydronuclear experiment is one in which the conventional high explosive yield is greater than the nuclear yield. So we are, by definition, talking about something that does not have a high nuclear yield. As a matter of fact, the kind of tests that have been contemplated in the past are tests with approximately 4 pounds--4 pounds--of material, between 1 and 4 pounds. All these experiments provide is an experimental calculation of the safety of the stockpile. That is what we are talking about here. Now, what about the CTB, the comprehensive test ban? Would conducting such tests run afoul of the test ban? Well, we can quote no better authority than one of our colleagues here in the U.S. Senate who was here during the debate on the Hatfield amendment. And I refer to the Senator from Massachusetts, Senator Kennedy, who suggested that such low-yield tests would be perfectly acceptable within the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. On September 18, 1992, Senator Kennedy said: The first of these concerns--accidental detonation--can be resolved with safety tests with an explosive power equivalent to a few pounds or less of TNT. Such test need not be limited under a comprehensive test ban. That is on page S13965 of the Congressional Record. Now, the reason, of course, why, such tests should be allowed under the CTB is because they are not verifiable. As the Senator from Ohio pointed out, the CTB only works at levels where you can verify that the nations that are adhering to the treaty are, in fact, adhering to the treaty. These low yields are not verifiable. They are so small you cannot detect them. That is why they could not be included under a CTB. That is why this has nothing to do with the CTB. So let us get that off the table right now. The next point is: Why test? Lawrence Livermore Laboratory estimates that: One-third of all of the weapon designs placed in the U.S. stockpile between 1958 and 1987 required and received post- deployment nuclear tests to resolve problems. In other words, after we had put the warheads on top of the missiles, or put them in the bombs in the planes, one-third of all of those weapons required and received postdeployment tests to resolve problems that they had developed. ``In three-quarters of these cases the problems were identified as a result of nuclear testing.'' In each case the weapon was thought to be reliable and adequately tested when it entered the stockpile. In other words, Mr. President, we test in order to find out whether they are still going to work, whether they will be reliable, and whether they will remain safe. These are the most complex weapons in our entire inventory, and yet they receive the least testing once they have been deployed. We shoot the guns. We fly the airplanes. We sail the ships. This is called readiness. But some of our friends on the other side do not want to know whether the most complex weapons in our inventory are reliable, whether they will work, and whether they are safe. And how can they possibly constitute an effective deterrent if those against whom they might be used understand that they have not been tested maybe for 30 years? We are talking about weapons, warheads that will be in our inventory for 30 years or more, never having been tested. Lawrence Livermore notes that in three-fourths of the cases where testing was done, problems were identified as a result of that testing. These weapons were thought to be reliable. Let me be very specific. Of the 16 Lawrence Livermore developed warhead designs that entered the stockpile between 1958 and 1987, several were found to have problems. For six of these, the WXX, the W84, the W79, the W68, the W47, and the W45, the resolution of these problems involved nuclear tests. Further, of the 25 Los Alamos weapon designs that were deployed between 1958 and 1987, one-third have required postdeployment nuclear testing. That is what we are talking about here. Let us go to the element of safety, because, obviously, we want our weapons to be safe, and technology has improved, has enhanced our capability of making these weapons safe. The 1990 Drell panel, which was constituted to consider this issue, concluded that ``there is still room for substantive improvement in nuclear weapons safety.'' One manner to improve the safety of the warheads is to replace warheads--the ones that have high explosives--to ones with insensitive high explosives, the so-called IHE. High explosives can be detonated in abnormal thermal pressure or shock environments. That can be a danger in a crash situation or a fire situation. As the Drell panel noted, ``In certain violent accidents, such as airplane fires or crashes, HE has a high probability of detonating, in contrast to IHE.'' The Drell panel concluded that: . . . replacing warheads with HE with new systems with IHE is a very effective way--perhaps the most important step--for improving safety of the weapons stockpile from scattering plutonium. IHE was first introduced in 1979 in the stockpile. As of early 1990, only 25 percent of the stockpile was equipped with IHE. Incorporating IHE in the stockpile could require design changes and, thus, the requirement to retest the weapon to ensure its ability to accomplish its military requirement. So, Mr. President, both for reliability reasons and for safety reasons, some limited testing is necessary. There has been a lot of quotation here of the so-called--I should not say ``so-called''--of the experts on the subject, because experts will differ in their opinions and the JASONs are all experts and so are the directors of the laboratories. I quoted the statistics from the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and the Los Alamos Laboratory. One of my colleagues said the lab directors are against this. The lab directors are for it. Ask Sig Hecker, who is the director today of the Los Alamos Laboratory. Some of the quotations were for previous directors. This is the current director of Los Alamos, and he says we ought to have testing. You can find whatever you want to in the JASON report, but what my colleague from Nevada is quoting from is the most recent report. It is the draft July 1995 report. That is the most recent report. Of course, they point out the fact that there are some advantages and some disadvantages, but one of their conclusions is that experiments involving--actually let me read the first sentence, because it will support the position of the Senator from Nebraska. I do not want to quote selectively, I am going to quote the whole thing: Underground testing of nuclear weapons at any yield level below that required to initiate boosting is of limited value to the United States. They are talking about these very low yield kind of tests. But they go on: However, experiments involving high explosives and fissionable material that do not reach critical-- The ones we are talking about-- are useful in improving our understanding of the behavior of weapons materials under relevant physical conditions. They should be included among treaty consistent activities. That is the most recent JASON report. Obviously, they discussed all of the pros and cons, and there are pros and cons of this kind of testing. Let me just conclude with two points, Mr. President. The Senator from Nebraska, in his opening remarks, talked about the wishy-washy advisers of the President. I think who he had in mind--he can correct me if I am wrong--is the Secretary of Defense William Perry, perhaps among others. If the Senator would like to correct me right now.

Mr. KYL. Yes, I am going to say that.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Will the majority leader yield so I may make an announcement on behalf of Senator Thurmond? This is a very important announcement for all Members of the Senate. Senator Thurmond and Senator Domenici propose to offer a substitute amendment to title 31 of Senate bill 1026. This amendment contains numerous changes. In order to allow all Senators an opportunity to review it, copies of the amendment will be available in the Senate Armed Services Committee. I thank the majority leader for yielding.

Mr. KYL. I thank the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee for yielding time to discuss this amendment. Going back to basics, the amendment is to cut $300 million from the committee's request for funding for the Defense Department. The committee has a $300 million increase from what the administration had requested for this particular part of the budget. The House had increased it $400 million. The Senate increase is less than the House increase by $100 million. The Dorgan amendment is to cut $300 million from the committee's request. The primary arguments against the committee's mark are categorized into two areas: First, the threat is not that great or that soon; second, the money could be spent on other things. First, talking about the threat, there is a suggestion here that the threat is not imminent. The threat we are talking about is a threat to relatively soon be able to attack the continental United States, because this is the national missile defense part of the program we are talking about. Now, we all understand that eventually we will have to have a defense against missiles that would either be accidentally or intentionally launched against U.S. territory. The question is, how soon do we need to begin preparing for that? The Senator from North Dakota says we do not need to worry about it yet because it will be maybe 10 years before the threat emerges. There are two primary responses to it. First, it is wrong; and, second, we are not taking into account the fact that it takes a long time to develop the programs to respond to the offensive threat. We have been working at this program for a long time. It has been 5 years yesterday, since the taking over of Kuwait by Iraq. Yet we are not very far down the road in terms of improving our ability to defend even against a missile like the Scud B that the Iraqis had. We are talking here about much longer range missiles than the Scud B. We are talking about missiles that could reach U.S. territory. Now, at first we are talking about the State of Alaska or the Territory of Guam. I know it is of interest to the Senator from North Dakota. In fact, we all would be very, very concerned about a threat to any U.S. citizen, whether it be in Guam or whether it be in Alaska. It does not have to be to the heartland of America. What is the fact with regard to this threat? The person who last headed the CIA just prior to the new Director, John Deutch, the then Acting Director [[Page S 11233]] of the Central Intelligence Agency, Admiral William Studeman, made this point just a few months ago. He said, Our understanding of North Korea's earlier Scud development leads us to believe that it is unlikely Pyongyang could deploy Taepo-Dong I or Taepo-Dong II missiles before 3 to 5 years. However, if Pyongyang has foreshortened its development program, we could see these missiles earlier. What the acting CIA Director was saying is that they probably will not have this missile that could reach the United States for 3 to 5 years. Well, we cannot develop this system within 3 to 5 years. The bill calls for some kind of a deployment, hopefully, by 1999. That is within the timeframe that the CIA Director acknowledges the Taepo-Dong II missile could be developed. Now, what about the current CIA director? John Deutch said last year, ``If the North Koreans field that Taepo-Dong II missile, Guam, Alaska, and parts of Hawaii would potentially be at risk.'' The point here is that North Korea, a belligerent state over whom we have virtually no negotiating control, no diplomatic control, is developing a weapon which the CIA says could potentially reach United States territory in 3 to 5 years. If the 3 years is correct, we cannot possibly have anything deployed in time to meet that threat. Even if it is just used to blackmail us, it is a tremendous threat. For those who say that there is no threat here, the facts do not bear them out. The intelligence estimates do not bear them out. The other side of this argument is, well, there are other threats. There could be a suitcase bomb. There is a cruise missile threat, and of course the answer is yes, that is true. We are doing everything we can to meet those threats as well. It is a fallacy of logic to suggest that because there is some other threat that, therefore, this is not a threat. That is the logic of the Senator from North Dakota. Well, somebody might bring a suitcase bomb over. Well, we are working that problem very hard. The last three CIA Directors have said that their primary concern is the proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that can deliver them. As a matter of fact, there has not been a suitcase nuclear bomb explode, but there have been missiles launched against U.S. forces. As a matter of fact, as I said yesterday, fully 20 percent of our casualties in the Persian Gulf were as a result of a Scud missile. We did not have an adequate protection against the Scud missile. We at least had the Patriot over there. We have nothing to protect the people in the United States. I think the CIA Directors are a pretty good source for the proposition that there is a potential threat out there, and we will be lucky to be able to deploy a system in time to meet that threat, if their statistics are correct. Now, just one quick final point on the threat. The Senator from North Dakota suggests that the triad is actually adequate here, but the same Secretary of Defense that he is so fond of relying on has made it clear that mutual assured destruction, the threat that we retaliate with nuclear weapons against Iraq or some other country, is just not credible. As Secretary Perry said on March 8 of this year, The bad news is that in this era, deterrence may not provide even the cold comfort it did during the cold war. We may be facing terrorists or rogue regimes with ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons at the same time in the future, and they may not buy into our deterrence theory. Indeed, they may be madder than MAD. And the M-A-D that he is referring to is the mutual assured destruction doctrine, which the Secretary is saying is madness today. That doctrine no longer works. We need a defense, not just the threat of massive retaliation to prevent countries from launching missiles against the United States. Finally, let us talk about the amount here. First of all, as the Senator from Mississippi pointed out earlier, the amount that is in the Senate bill this year is less than the Clinton administration requested last year in their 5-year budget. So in the 5-year plan the administration sent up here last year, they were asking for more money for this program than the committee has asked for this year. It is a matter of timing, of when you spend the money. As I think I have pointed out, even with this amount of money we will be lucky to be able to field something that is effective by the time the threat is upon us. Second, there is a suggestion here that the Secretary does not want this because he has not asked for it. Obviously, we are all aware of the politics within the Pentagon and the administration and not asking for it is not the same as not wanting it. You will note in the letter from the Secretary, nowhere does he say: Do not send us this $300 million, I do not want it and I will not spend it if you send it to me. As a matter of fact, his spokesman on this issue, Gen. Malcolm O'Neill, before the House committee just a few weeks ago, was asked if he could spend this money, and here is what he said: I have reviewed the BMD program, the impact of last year's budget reductions and the schedule of several key programs in order to recommend where additional resources could be best applied. Remember, the House is talking about $400 million in additional resources. And he says: These funds could be effectively used in several key BMD programs to accelerate development efforts, preserve early development options for a national missile defense system, and to protect current theater missile defense system acquisition schedules. In other words, the expert in this area, the head of the program, Gen. Mal O'Neill, made it clear to the House of Representatives if he had this extra money he could effectively use it. I understand the administration position is against this. We all understand that. But it is not common sense when you recognize the speed with which this threat could be upon us and the ability we have to develop a system that could defend us. When I say it is not common sense, I do not mean to denigrate the Secretary of Defense. He is a fine public servant and is very concerned about the future of our country. But reasonable people can differ about the speed with which we ought to get on with this effort and the priority of spending this money. I submit the weight of evidence from the Central Intelligence Agency and from the other people who have spoken on the issue is, we better get about this task right away. The final point with regard to the money is that while we could be spending this money on summer youth programs or Low Income Home Energy Assistance--of course we could. But what is more important, defending American lives or summer youth programs? We have to set priorities around here. I submit, if a missile were launched against the State of Hawaii or the State of Alaska, every one of us on this floor would be denouncing the act and would be asking why that was allowed to happen? Who sat by while this threat emerged? Who allowed this threat to evolve to the point we could not defend our own citizens from a missile attack? Those would be the questions asked on this floor. Today that question can be answered because those people who seek to cut these funds out of the committee bill will be the people responsible for us not having a system at the time that the CIA believes we are going to need to have it. That is the question before the body. Do we go along with the leadership? Do we go along with the committee, which is the body of expertise on this? Do we go along with the Central Intelligence estimates, and do we go along to fund this program to at least get us on a path to develop and deploy a system in the time we need it? Or do we take the risk and roll the dice, spend the money on summer youth programs or Low Income Home Energy Assistance or the like? I submit the decision today is that we should go along with the committee's request here, support the committee and vote down the Dorgan amendment which would cut the $300 million.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, under this time agreement I would like to yield myself 20 minutes, and I ask to be notified when that 20 minutes has expired.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, since the Senator from Ohio just spoke in favor of the amendment, I thought I would take some of our time to speak in opposition to the amendment. It seems to me that the arguments in favor of the amendment boil down to three: First of all, variations of the theme of the ABM Treaty is relatively sacrosanct; second, we have to do everything possible to avoid riling the Russians, doing something they may not like; and, third, that we should not limit the power of the President. Let me discuss each of those arguments in turn. First of all, regarding the 1972 ABM Treaty, I think it is important to recognize that the ABM Treaty has, since its inception in 1972, been under the process of negotiation. There have been discussions going on between our two countries almost throughout that period of time. So the fact that we may be talking about making changes in it is nothing new, and it has never been interpreted as a breach or an anticipatory breach of treaty for the United States to be stating that we want to change a particular part of the agreement. As a matter of fact, the original ABM Treaty called for two national ballistic missile sites, not one. That was amended to one site. And one of the things that is being called for in the underlying legislation here is multiple sites. I think almost all of us would agree that it does not make sense for us to deploy an ABM system in this country if we cannot have multiple sites. It just will not be effective. So that is our stated policy in the legislation. That is nothing new. It is nothing that the Russians should get excited about. As a matter of fact, I am not even sure what their position would be. I would not be surprised at all if they would agree that multiple sites are appropriate. So I do not think that is a big problem with the policy stated in the bill for multiple sites. The second point under this first argument is that demarcation, as called for in legislation here, does not violate the ABM Treaty. As a matter of fact, the administration has already been demarking what is appropriate testing for a theater ballistic missile system, and has already been discussing that with the Russians. Bob Bell, former staff member of the committee, a prominent specialist at the National Security Council, told the National Defense University that, ``We have already reached an agreement with the Russians that you can shoot at a target that goes 5 kilometers per second and not have it captured as an ABM.'' The problem here is, of course, that the negotiations that the administration has been engaging in went further than that, and accepted, at least temporarily, Russian demands that the proposed demarcation also include a speed limit on the United States' interceptor of 3 kilometers per second, which would in effect dumb down our system to the point where it would not be as robust as we would want it to be. The point here is that you cannot argue demarcation per se is a violation of the ABM Treaty. The administration has done it. That has been policy. The question before us is whether or not we will in legislation demark that limit at which we can test our theater ballistic missile system since it has never been a part of the ABM Treaty. I think that is an important point for us to make. Again, the ABM Treaty only limits strategic systems. It does not limit theater systems. All the demarcation in the Warner language does is to define the level of testing that can be engaged in for theater systems. There should not be anything wrong with that. The administration has already engaged in demarcation. As a matter of fact, in a speech before the National Defense University, again referring to Bob Bell, he ably explained that this question of identifying the demarcation between ABM and TMD has been an issue for as long as the treaty has been around, and, as a matter of fact, it has changed. One of the things he said is, what is a TMD and what is not a TMD goes back to the ratification hearings and the negotiations themselves. During the Senate hearings on the ABM Treaty in 1972, then-Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Johnny Foster, was asked by Senator Proxmire, ``Where is the line? Where is the distinction between the two?'' He said, ``If you shoot a missile interceptor at a target that goes faster than 2 kilometers per second, that is an ABM.'' Of course we all know that demarcation is unacceptable today. That is the point. Technology changes. It has been 23 years since the ABM Treaty was adopted. What we are trying to do in this legislation is to keep up with the times. As a matter of fact, our own Defense Department has made the point that the treaty has not kept up with the times, and the gentleman who is now the CIA Director, John Deutch, has made the point that the treaty, the ABM Treaty, constrains us in ways that technology should not anymore. And, as a result, it seems to the committee--and it seems to me--that it is important for the United States to draw this demarcation so that we can test the systems that we could ultimately deploy against theater threats. Why is it important to have the language in the bill? Because the administration in effect proposes to dumb down our TMD. And that is the problem. In both the Patriot system and the THAAD system earlier, we dumbed them down. The reason the Patriot could not be any more successful in the gulf war was because of decisions made right after the ABM Treaty that in effect preclude the use of certain sensors to enable it to be more robust. We have done the same thing with the THAAD system in taking out certain software and making certain hardware changes that precluded it from being as robust as it otherwise would be in meeting these threats. We cannot do this anymore. And we should not dumb down our TMD system. Our demarcation language in the bill merely proscribes tests against strategic missiles, as I said, and that enables us then to continue to test the theater system in a way that would make it effective against future threats. Let me quote, as a matter of fact, from General Shalikashvili. He has been quoted before. Let me first of all quote a January 3 memo to Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch. Here is what he said General Shalikashvili said: The United States should make no further concessions and even start thinking about rolling back the U.S. negotiating position. The reason that General Shalikashvili, I believe, made that statement is because he understood that the position that Bob Bell had negotiated with the Russians that I referred to earlier was as far as this country should go; that if we went any further, we would arbitrarily be putting limits on our theater systems in ways that we should not do. That would make them less capable of meeting future threats. That is why he said at that time that we should make no further concessions and even start thinking about rolling back the U.S. negotiating position. That is the real position of General Shalikashvili. That is the position which is embodied in this legislation, to make no further concessions with regard to this demarcation. Finally, with respect to this argument that the ABM Treaty is sort of sacrosanct, I want to make this point. There is no anticipatory breach in the bill at all because, of course, there are two specific conditions. No. 1, there can be amendments to the ABM Treaty. That is all we are suggesting should eventually occur here. But it is suggested that maybe the Russians will not agree with the policies stated in the bill, and they will not agree to those negotiations or to our position. The United States can always withdraw from the ABM Treaty after having given 6 months' notice if that is [[Page S 11257]] deemed to be in the interest of the United States. So should we deem it to be in the interest of the United States to act in ways that the Russians would deem inimical to continuation with the ABM Treaty, they can either negotiate or the United States can step out of the treaty. The bill itself does not violate the treaty. I want to make that point crystal clear. There is some notion that has been seeping into this debate that somehow there is still a cold war going on here. The cold war is over. The Soviet Union, with whom we negotiated the ABM Treaty, is no longer even in existence. The threats that the theater ballistic missiles are designed to thwart are not necessarily threats emanating from the Soviet Union or now Russia but, rather, are threats coming from countries like North Korea and Iraq and Iran, and countries of that sort. Therefore, we cannot be proscribed from acting against those threats because of an ABM Treaty with the Russians. We need to proceed to develop theater missiles that can protect the United States, protect our forces deployed abroad, and protect our allies against these theater threats, whether they come from Iran, Iraq, North Korea, or whatever. So the ABM Treaty really ought not to stop us from doing it. The second point is that it would cause the Russians to react negatively. It would not be a reason for the United States to forego actions which are clearly in our national interest. The argument that is being made here is the same argument that was used against the Reagan initiatives that in fact today are credited with ending the cold war. Maybe the Russians will react badly to this. Well, as it turned out, by taking bold action, we were able to win peace through strength. The cold war is over because of the initiatives we took and because we did not listen to those who said the Russians might react badly to this if we do it. So I do not necessarily think that is a good argument. I again refer to the now CIA Director, John Deutch, on the ABM Treaty. In some respects, the technology has exceeded the limits of the ABM Treaty, and we have to go forward with the technology to protect ourselves not just from Russian threats but from threats around the rest of the world. And the problem of waiting for the Russians to agree is that this is no longer a bipolar world and we have these other threats to be concerned about. It is also, I think, an important point to make that the Russian Duma is not likely to ratify the START II Treaty in any event, and this is clear from a variety of things that come out of Russia. So to suggest that the action we take here is going to prevent Russia from ratifying the START II Treaty is not relevant. Chairman of the Duma's Foreign Relations Committee, Vladimir Lukin said: We need big money to carry out these reductions [in START II], and we don't have it. We do not want to ratify this treaty and then not be able to comply with its terms. We will have to wait until we see how to pay for our promises. That is the reason--or at least that is one of the reasons--nothing to do with what we are talking about today. Others suggest that ratification should be tied to other international issues. The Speaker of the Federation Council, their upper chamber, Vladimir Shumeyko, said: We closely link [START II] ratification with the overall situation existing between Russia and NATO. . . We consider the perseverance of NATO as a stumbling block to our cooperation in the era of disarmament and advancement on the road to peace. And still others see START II as inimical to Russian interests. Viktor Ilyukhin, chairman of the State Duma Security Committee, said: If this treaty [START II] is fully implemented, the United States will almost double its superiority, while the damage to Russia's national security will be unrecoverable. There are many more quotations that I could cite. The point is there are a lot of reasons why a lot of Russians do not want to ratify the START II Treaty. It is not because of what we are doing in this legislation here today. Finally, let me just refer to this notion of anticipatory breach. If we are going to use that legal doctrine here, we also ought to refer to the equitable doctrine of clean hands. I will not take the time here to recite the numerous instances of Soviet and Russian violations of treaties that we have negotiated, but they are numerous. And in some respects we have chosen to ignore those violations because we believe that it is important to continue the dialog and to keep the process moving. But the fact is it would be anomalous for the Russians to consider that a policy we state today that in no way involves a violation of the treaty is some kind of a big deal when they are in violation of a variety of treaties, and should my colleagues desire we can put that information in the Record. The final argument that is given as a reason to support the amendment of the Senator from Michigan is that the language of the bill ties the President's hands. What we do here is two things. We call for a study to determine what the administration should negotiate relative to the ABM Treaty. We are not saying what the administration has to negotiate. We are saying let us have a study and pick those areas where we want to make a change. One of them I think is going to be clear. We should not go forward in this country to deploy a national defense missile system at one site. That would not make sense. So one of the items clearly is going to be let us ask the Russians to negotiate this multiple site. That is the only way we should deploy a national system. And I do not see what the problem with that is. In the meantime, we are saying let us not use defense funds to continue, the administration should not use the 050 account to continue to make concessions to the Russians on matters that ought to be either the subject of further negotiation or at least the administration ought to come to the Senate to discuss them with us. That is the final point I wish to make here. We have been trying for months to get the administration to work with us. That is what advice and consent is all about. And it is true that there are prerogatives of the administration that are important to be protected, and I do not want to step on those. But it is also true that the Senate has prerogatives. We have the right of advice and consent, and thus far the administration has generally ignored the position that at least those of us on this side have taken. What we are asking in this legislation is that you not go any further--in fact, we are demanding that the administration go no further in the direction of making further concessions to the Russians in ways that would limit our ability to develop our theater systems which can be used not just against Russians but against other potential threats; that they do not do that; that they not use defense funds for that purpose. That is why we are saying it is important for us to be talking to the administration. If the administration wants to get together with us and talk about what they can do, if they want to submit the changes to the Senate, then well and good. So far that has not been the administration's position. So with regard to the argument that we are stepping on the administration's prerogative, I would just note that the administration has been ignoring the Senate and its advice and consent prerogatives, and it is time for us to be giving a little advice and asking for the ability to consent to what the administration is doing. Mr. President, the bottom line here is that the Armed Services Committee came up with a very good bill, and I wish to commend the chairman of the committee, Senator Thurmond, who is here; Senator Lott is a member of the committee; Senator Warner made an excellent statement here this morning in opposition to the amendment of the Senator from Michigan, and I believe that it would be in the best interests of the United States for this body to agree with the Armed Services Committee to vote down the amendment of the Senator from Michigan. Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.

Mr. KYL. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. KYL. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. KYL. Briefly, can the Senator point anywhere in that letter where he is referring to this $300 million? He is referring generally to this bill, not to this $300 million.

Mr. KYL. Will the Senator yield to me for 1 minute?

Mr. KYL. I want to add to the comments of the Senator from Virginia that at least some of us on this side have sent no fewer than five letters to the President on this subject asking to be consulted and advised, suggesting that the administration, frankly, was going too far in these discussions with the Russians and asked him not to do so. As the Senator from Virginia just noted, one of the reasons for finally putting the language in the bill is that our entreaties have gone unheeded, the administration has gone forward. This is apparently the only way we can get their attention. We had 50 Senators, all Republicans, urging the administration not to go forward, and they did so anyway. That is the reason for finally acting in a legislative way. I thank the Senator.

Mr. KYL. That is correct. Unanimous-Consent Agreement

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise to propose an amendment to S. 1026, the Defense Authorization Act. I am pleased to introduce this amendment which will require the President to analyze all issues in developing a progressive, cohesive national policy toward protecting our ability to communicate, our defense structure, and our information. There is currently no defense against attacks on our Nation's information systems, which include our defense, telephone, public utility, and banking systems. Military officials have no ability to protect our country from cyberspace attacks, and no legal or political authority to protect our information systems against another country's offensive. Current CIA Director John Deutch said, at his Senate confirmation hearing, ``this is a very important subject * * * which we really don't have a crisp answer to.'' We need to start looking for that answer now, since the problem is looming. A June 14 Wall Street Journal article reported that security experts were used to ``hack'' into 12,000 Defense Department computer systems connected to the Internet. The experts ``hacked'' their way into 88 percent of the systems, and 96 percent of the attacks were undetected. According to a June 1995 Federal Computer Week article, computer hackers are breaking into Defense systems by using highly automated tools. The article reported that the DOD's Center for Information Systems Security is receiving two computer attacks a day-- twice the rate of last year's intrusions. In 1994, the DOD recorded 255 successful attacks. The threat is imminent. According to a 1994 report prepared by the National Communications System [NCS], no fewer than 30 countries are working on information warfare techniques. The administration must develop a comprehensive national policy that coordinates national security defense for both U.S. Government and private sector users of our National Information Infrastructure [NII]. My amendment seeks to analyze all critical issues involved in protecting our Nation's information infrastructure. These answers will provide a framework, I believe, toward developing our Nation's policy for defending against strategic attacks against the NII. As technology changes, we cannot allow ourselves to become vulnerable to attack on the nerve centers of our society and defense structure. We need to modernize our laws to protect against this very real threat. Vice Adm. Arthur Cebrowski, director of C4 systems at the Pentagon, states that, ``a critical policy implication of the revolution in security affairs is the need to treat information and access to information as a vital national interest,'' and ``information warfare must become an important instrument of national security policy.'' [[Page S 11320]] Now is the time for Congress to be active. This amendment is intended to place an emphasis on an issue that must be addressed before our country's communications system is attacked. We must begin now to elevate our efforts to protect the national security interest of this country. I urge my colleagues to support my amendment.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Will the Senator yield for a question?