Jon Kyl

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. If I can add, I understand Senator Shaheen is in order to speak next, and then Senator Risch is available to begin; am I not correct?

Mr. KYL. OK. His numbers are 4878 and 4879, so we can begin with one of those, if it is agreeable.

Mr. KYL. So, Mr. President, it would be in order to call up for consideration--I believe the first is amendment No. 4878, Risch amendment No. 4878. Well, Mr. President, I said there shouldn't be any quorum call, but we are going to be a couple of minutes here. So I suggest the absence of a quorum until we are ready to go.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, in response to the last argument that the Russians don't have any incentive to and we don't believe they are going to build the rail mobile system again, I ask, then: What is the big deal about ensuring in the treaty that if they do, they would be counted under the 700? What is the problem? The problem appears to be that the Russians don't have the same view of this as do my colleagues or the United States Government. My colleague from Nevada quoted earlier from the Interfax report of October 29, 2010, where the chairman of the Russian Duma--parliament-- committee responsible for treaties, Konstantin Kosachyov, stated--in response to the argument we have just made, that the Senator from Nevada just made, that the treaty should include rail-mobile as part of the 700 limit--he stated, in response to that claim, and in response to the resolution of ratification of the Foreign Relations Committee, that U.S. claim compelled the Duma to stop action on the treaty. He said-- and I am quoting: The Americans are trying to apply the New START Treaty to rail-mobile ICBMs in case they are built. That, obviously, means if he is saying: We would have to stop the Duma action on this if that is what the U.S. Government is going to claim, they are pushing back on this pretty hard. The question is, why? I do not know whether they intend to build the rail-mobile system. I do not much care whether they build it. All we care about is, if they do, it has to be included within the 700 limit. Now, the report language of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirms the fact that they are not included. Here is what the report language says--and this is in direct contradiction to what was said just a moment ago--this is from page 17 of the report-- Nevertheless, while a new rail-mobile system would clearly be captured under the Article II limits despite the exclusion of rail-mobile launchers from the definition of mobile launchers of ICBMs, those provisions that actually use the defined term ``mobile launcher of ICBMs'' would not cover rail-mobile systems if Russia were to reintroduce them. ``Would not cover.'' It goes on to say: ``Appropriate detailed arrangements for incorporating rail- mobile ICBM launchers and their ICBMs into the treaty's verification and monitoring regime would be worked out in the Bilateral Consultative Commission.'' Under Article XV . . . the Parties may make changes to the Protocol or Annexes. . . . We have discussed this in the past. If there is a dispute about what the treaty means, then you go to this dispute resolution group of Russians and Americans, and they try to talk it out and work it out. But there is nothing to say they will, and if the Russian chairman of the committee is already saying we are trying to insert something into the agreement that isn't there, I wonder how successful we would be in working it out. The report concludes: If Russia were again to produce rail-mobile ICBM launchers, the Parties would work within the BCC to find a way to ensure that the treaty's notification, inspection, and monitoring regime would adequately cover them. So it is clear that it does not. It is clear from the report that the language would not cover rail-mobile systems if Russia were to reintroduce them. It is clear we would have to rely upon the Russians' good offices, good intentions, to reach some kind of an agreement with us in the Bilateral Consultative Commission. There are no assurances that will be done. Why are we willing to proceed with an agreement that has such built in ambiguity? Why say: Well, we will let that be worked out by the BCC when we could work it out right now? It is the same answer we get with respect to every one of these proposals: Well, the Russians would then demand to renegotiate the treaty. I ask again: Is the Senate just to be a rubber stamp? We cannot do anything to change the treaty or the protocol, or just the resolution of ratification, which is what we are trying to do because the Russians would say no, and, therefore, we cannot do it? I thought we were the Senate. We are one-half of the U.S. Government that deals with it. The other is the Executive. The Executive negotiated the treaty. Now, why didn't they include this language? We do not know because we do not have the record of the negotiations. What I am told is that it is because the Russians said they would not include it because the rail-mobile system would be unique to Russia, and we do not have such a thing. Therefore, there would be a lack of parity. You could not have such a unilateral provision. So if that is the case, either the Russians do intend to develop these systems, and they do not want them counted, or there should be no problem with the Ensign amendment, which would ensure that they would be counted. So you cannot read the report language and agree with what has been said--that the treaty covers these weapons--you cannot read it and believe they would clearly be covered by the inspection and notification and monitoring regime. In fact, it clearly shows that is not the case. What you have to believe is that this built-in dispute in the treaty may well arise if the Russians decide to proceed to develop such a system, and we would then--or would arise if they decide to do that, and we would be required to go to the BCC to try to work it out with them. That, obviously, builds in a conflict that is not good. As I said before, when you have a contract between two parties, the first thing the lawyers try to do is ensure there are no ambiguities that could cause one side or the other to later come forward and say: I did not mean that. Then you have a legal dispute. But it is one thing to have a legal dispute about buying a car or a house. It is quite another to have a dispute like this between two sovereign nations. I would note when the United States had a system we might develop, such as the rail-mobile--but we have not made a decision to do it; we certainly do not have it--the Russians knew we wanted to at least study the possibility of developing a conventional Prompt Global Strike capability--that is to say, an ICBM that could carry a conventional warhead rather than a nuclear warhead--and they specifically insisted that we include that in the treaty. Now, you might say: Well, wait a minute. The Russians apparently argued that they did not want to include anything on rail-mobile because the United States did not have anything on rail-mobile, and that would be a lack of parity--it would be a unilateral restriction-- but the same thing is true with conventional Prompt Global Strike. The Russians have no intension of doing that, apparently. We might, just like for the rail-mobile, the Russians might. Yet they insisted a limitation be put on our conventional Prompt Global Strike--by what?-- by counting them against the 700 launcher limit--exactly the same thing that should be done with regard to rail-mobile. So, apparently, if we might do something in the future the Russians do not like, we have to count it. But if the Russians might do something in the future we do not like, we cannot count it. Our only relief then is to go to this BCC and hope the Russians would agree to something in the future that they have not been willing to agree to today. So all the Ensign amendment does is to clear up an ambiguity and avoid a future dispute between the parties. It is clear from the report that it is not covered now. Again, the language, ``those provisions that actually use the defined term `mobile launchers of ICBMs' would not cover rail-mobile systems if Russia were to re-introduce them.'' The report acknowledges that, therefore, in order to apply the inspection and notification and monitoring regimes, you would have to get the Russians to agree in the BCC. Why not solve that problem right now? Again, we meet with the same argument we are always met with: Well, we do not dare change anything in here because the Russians would disagree. I just ask my colleagues, again, is there any purpose for us being here? If every argument is, well, we do not dare change it because the Russians would disagree, so we would have to renegotiate it, maybe that suggests that there was not such a hot job of negotiating this treaty in the first place. If the Senate cannot find errors or mistakes or shortcomings and try to correct them without violating some superprinciple that is above the U.S. Constitution, which says that the Senate has that right, then, again, I do not know what we are doing here. So I urge my colleagues to support the Ensign amendment, as with some other things we have raised, to try to avoid a conflict. Resolve the situation now while we still have time to do it rather than after the treaty is ratified when it is too late.

Mr. KYL. Madam President, I am not arguing that this issue has been resolved within Russia as to whether to go forward. I am not arguing whether it is a good thing or a bad thing. I simply submit it in response to the argument that the Russians would be crazy to think about doing this. Either they are crazy or--well, in any event, I would never attribute that motivation to anybody, even somebody from another country. The fact is, they have begun design work on exactly such a project.

Mr. KYL. What was the unanimous consent request?

Mr. KYL. Madam President, that understanding is fine. There are two Members who I think will be ready to go forward with their amendments immediately following the two votes at 6 o'clock. Again, for benefit of the Members, it is my hope that we can continue to work through as many amendments as possible this evening, maybe have debate a couple at a time and vote, whatever the body desires. But perhaps we could continue at least to work through a few more amendments yet this evening.

Mr. KYL. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), and the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg).

Mr. KYL. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg), and the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. Coburn).

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, a point of inquiry before I begin. Is there a reason I should speak to either amendment No. 4860 or amendment No. 4893 first?

Mr. KYL. Thank you, Mr. President. Amendment No. 4860 Then, Mr. President, with that, I would like to offer amendment No. 4860, SLCM side agreement, which I believe is pending at the desk. I would ask for its consideration.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, this is actually a very straightforward amendment. It simply seeks to repeat in this New START treaty the same thing the then-Soviet Union and United States did in the previous START I treaty with respect to a particular kind of weapon--a Russian weapon called the SLCM or sea-launched cruise missile. As part of START I, we reached a binding side agreement--a side agreement--because the Senate had said we needed to include these weapons in the treaty. So a side agreement was reached that they would limit a deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles or the SLCMs due to their impact on strategic stability, the point being that whether these sea-launched cruise missiles are deemed tactical or strategic, they actually have a strategic component, especially if they are sitting right off your coast and they are launched and they can hit your country. So that agreement was put into a side agreement between the then-Soviet Union and the United States. But when this New START treaty was negotiated, there was no similar side agreement. So there were no restrictions on SLCM deployments. The side agreement in the START treaty limited both nations to fewer than 800 SLCMs with a range greater than 600 kilometers. In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the administration committed to unilaterally eliminating our SLCM capability. The United States will retire the nuclear-equipped sea- launched cruise missile (TLAM-N). Under Secretary Miller said: The timeline for its retirement will be over the next two or three years. Now Russia is developing a new version of its SLCM, with a range of up to, approximately, 5,000 kilometers, which is a longer range than some of the ballistic missiles that are covered by the New START treaty. So that is why we believe there should be a side agreement, just like there was in START I, that deals with these SLCMs. We are not going to have them, Russia is. Yet there is nothing in the treaty that would count their SLCMs against the total limit of warheads or delivery vehicles that are allowed under the treaty or in any other way deal with them. The administration assures us we should not be concerned about a lack of a formal agreement. Secretary Clinton noted that the START I treaty did have a limitation on sea-launched cruise missiles and said that both parties ``voluntarily agreed to cease deploying any nuclear SLCMs on surface ships or multipurpose submarines.'' But today it is obvious, with the information about Russian plans, that there is going to be a great disparity between the United States and Russia. As I said, it is not obvious that saying one is tactical, as opposed to the strategic weapons that are otherwise limited by this treaty, is a very important distinction. I think it is really a distinction without a difference. Steve Hadley, the former head of the NSC, said: And if you're living in eastern or central Europe, a so- called tactical nuclear weapon, if you're within range, looks pretty strategic to you. So what are we going to do about those? As I said, he was the National Security Adviser. Ambassador Bob Joseph, in testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, said: Every time I hear the term ``nonstrategic nuclear weapons,'' I recall that no nuclear weapon is nonstrategic. If you stop and think about it, that is certainly true. So these weapons, which are very powerful, and can have a range of up to 5,000 kilometers, clearly need to be dealt with. Now, we did not want to insist that they go back and renegotiate the treaty because we heard that argument before, so what we are suggesting by this amendment is simply to do the same thing we did in START I-- just have it be a side agreement where the two parties would agree to limit the number. Our administration would limit the Russians so they would not have a significant number of these particular weapons. Just a point, by the way: In the event there are folks who do not believe the Russians intend to rely on their weapons such as the SLCMs, Under Secretary of Defense Flournoy said: The Russians are ``actually increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons and the role of nuclear weapons in their strategy.'' Secretary Gates has made the same point. He said: Ironically, that is the case with Russia today, which has neither the money nor the population to sustain its Cold War conventional force levels. Instead, we have seen an increased reliance on its nuclear force with new ICBM and sea-based missiles, as well as a fully functional infrastructure that can manufacture a significant number of warheads each year. And the Strategic Posture Commission noted: This imbalance in non-strategic nuclear weapons, which greatly favors Russia, is of rising concern and an illustration of the new challenges of strategic stability as reductions in strategic weapons proceed. The point has been made by many others as well. So I think this is fairly straightforward. It would require the United States to negotiate a side agreement with Russia, very similar to the side agreement we had under START I, to deal with a weapon that we are no longer going to have, but the Russians are apparently developing a new version of, that has a pretty substantial range--5,000 kilometers. Clearly, it is very difficult to distinguish the difference between a weapon like that and the strategic offensive weapons that are otherwise dealt with in the treaty. I hope my colleagues will recognize this is not a treaty killer, and it is something that needs t be addressed. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. KYL. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg), and the Senator from Alabama (Mr. Shelby).

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, reserving the right to object.

Mr. KYL. I ask the Senator, will you go ahead and handle the unanimous consent agreement on the two amendments. I do not have to be here for that.

Mr. KYL. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Missouri, (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg), and the Senator from Alabama (Mr. Shelby).

Mr. KYL. Madam President, if I could just close, and I actually had, I think, yielded the floor. So I appreciate the chance to make this final point. All the Ensign amendment tries to do is clear up the ambiguity. My colleague says it is absolutely clear to him that they are included. I know the committee says they think it is clear. I do not think the Russians think it is clear, and I think there is a basis for an argument that it is not clear. Why not clear it up?

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I wish to make a comment. For the benefit of Members, what we are trying to do is to identify those matters we need to try to deal with in the 30 hours postcloture on the START treaty. If Members have amendments they need to deal with, I would appreciate it if they would either communicate with me or with Senator Lugar's staff or Senator Kerry's staff so that we can determine whether to get them on the list and where to plug them in. I would also suggest to Members that there isn't a lot of time left, and if they have comments they would like to make, now is the time to come to the Senate floor. There shouldn't be a minute of quorum call time here. There is a lot to do and not a lot of time to do it. So if Members have something, bring it to us. If they want to speak, they should come to the floor now or as soon as they can get here. My goal is to get as many of the amendments as possible dealt with, if not with a vote then worked out by unanimous consent. What I have tried to do is to take a universe of about 70 amendments and to consolidate them into a much smaller group. So there are some specific subject areas that are not specifically dealt with. In some cases, the consolidations may not be technically related. For example, Senator LeMieux would like to add to one of the amendments his language dealing with tactical weapons taken from his treaty amendment but to conform it to a resolution of ratification amendment. So we may be even combining some subjects that don't necessarily relate. The object here is to cover as much ground as possible within a limited period of time, and in order to do that we will need everybody's cooperation. Senator Kerry and I will then--and Senator Lugar, of course--primarily try to make sure everybody gets heard who wants to be heard.

Mr. KYL. Madam President, might I pose a question to my colleague because I understand exactly the point he makes. He makes it accurately. I quoted the language that says that it would clearly be captured under article II limits. That is the committee's understanding, which is the point my colleague is making. But I go on to note that the exclusion of rail-mobile launchers from the definition means that it would not cover rail-mobile systems if Russia were to reintroduce them and, therefore, there would have to be work by the BCC to figure out how to deal with those under the inspection, monitoring, and notification regimes. I understand that our committee says they believe they are captured. I see that in the report. What I am saying is, there is a dispute because the Russians do not appear to agree with that. I would just ask my colleague, how do you square, then, the Russian response? The chairman of their committee--you have dueling committees--in the Duma said: The Americans are trying to apply the New START Treaty to rail-mobile ICBMs in case they are built. It appears to me what he is saying is, but they should not be doing that. In fact, his recommendation, I believe, was the Duma not take action on the treaty if that was our intent.

Mr. KYL. Yes, of course.

Mr. KYL. Before my colleague from Nevada closes, I know this whole argument is based on the proposition that the Russians wouldn't be crazy enough to think about doing a rail system again so we don't need to worry about it. What is all the fuss, is what my colleague said. Well, here is a December 10--how many days ago is that now? I have forgotten. We are about to Christmas, but I have forgotten the date of today. It is from Moscow ITAR-TASS, English version. Headline: ``Russia Completes Design Work For Use Of RS-24 Missiles On Rail-based Systems.'' I want my colleague from Massachusetts to hear this. The Russians aren't crazy enough to think they could do a rail system. Here is the headline, December 10: ``Russia Completes Design Work For Use of RS-24 Missiles On Rail-based Systems.'' Just to quote a couple lines from the story: Russia has completed design work for the use of RS-24 missiles railway-based combat systems, but implementation of the project has been considered inexpedient, Moscow Heat Engineering Institute Director Yuri Solomonov said. His institute is the main designer of these missiles. Asked whether the RS-24 missiles could be used in railway-based systems, he said, ``This is possible. The relevant design work was done . . . '' and so on. I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the Record.

Mr. KYL. Madam President, obviously one of the purposes of these two amendments is to respond to one of the arguments that has been raised in support of this treaty. We have this wonderful new reset relationship with Russia, and were we to not ratify the treaty, that relationship would be frayed, and who knows how much Russia might react to it? It would be harder to get their cooperation on things. Those are all arguments that have been made. I think one of the points of these two amendments is to show that the reset relationship between Russia and the United States has not produced all that much good behavior or cooperation on the part of the Russians. I earlier detailed all of the ways--at least a few--in which Russia had been very unhelpful to the United States with regard to Iran. I noted I think 2 days ago or maybe yesterday that in the U.N., they were trying to water down a resolution dealing with North Korea that we are working hard to try to obtain. They have been very difficult to deal with with regard to North Korea and Iran. At the end of the day, I think they only do what is in their best interest, in any event--not basing their decisions of what is in their best interests on some concept of a new friendliness with the United States. I think part of the reason my colleague from Idaho offered these two amendments is to simply demonstrate that this new relationship isn't all that its cracked up to be if they won't even give us some equipment they confiscated when they invaded Georgia. That is not a major point in international diplomacy, and it certainly isn't a major point with respect to U.S. military capability. It is illustrative of something. The point of the amendment is to say that you have quite a bit of time before this treaty enters into force. A lot has to happen. It is sent to Russia, the Duma has to deal with it, and so on. Just return the stuff. Maybe that little gesture of good will would help to reestablish this so-called reset relationship in ways they have not been able to accomplish by getting Russian support with the U.N. resolutions and other actions with regard to sanctions on Iran and diplomacy with North Korea. One can say it is not a big deal, this military equipment, but on the other hand, they say it will destroy the treaty if we have this particular amendment. The reality is that we are simply trying to make a point that the Russians have not acted well in a variety of situations. I cannot think of a better example than the invasion of Georgia, the continued violation of the cease-fire agreement they signed there, and the violation of the U.N. resolution. I would reiterate, at the summit declaration--this is where the NATO members, meeting in Lisbon last month, joined together to call for a resolution to the problem, saying, ``We reiterate our continued support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders.'' And then they urge all to play a constructive role and to work with the U.N. to pursue a peaceful resolution of the internationally recognized territory of Georgia. And then the final sentence: We continue to call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia as independent States. That is the kind of cooperation we are getting from the Russian Federation these days. I appreciate the amendments brought forth by my colleague to highlight that fact.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback) and the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg).

Mr. KYL. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg), and the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond).