Jon Kyl

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise in support of an amendment to be offered by my good friend, the Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Lieberman. The purpose of this amendment is straightforward: it seeks to make sure that the missile defense system deployed in Europe is as cost- effective and as capable of protecting the United States as the installation of ground-based midcourse defense missile defense interceptors and early warning radars proposed by the last administration; that proposal was endorsed by the NATO alliance and embraced by the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic. This system is important not just because it provides the U.S. with a much needed defense against the long-range ballistic missile threat of Iran, but also because of what it says about the alliance between the United States and these two countries. It is significant that Poland and the Czech Republic, which spent the better part of the 20th century as oppressed satellites of the Soviet Union have so earnestly sought to align themselves with the United States to confront the threats of the 21st century. This deployment is clearly in U.S. interests. The Congressional Budget Office, CBO, recently concluded a study of the options--current and future--to protect the U.S. and its allies from the Iranian threat. The results of that study were clear: only the Polish and Czech deployments can protect the United States and Europe; any other option costs more and defends the U.S. less, if at all.''\1\ Let me quote from this CBO study, ``Options for Deploying Missile Defenses in Europe'': Of the modeled options, MDA's proposed European system would provide the most extensive defense of the United States, covering the entire continental United States against liquid-fuel ICBMs and covering all of the threatened portion of the continental United States plus part of Alaska against solid-fuel ICBMs.\2\ The reason for this deployment is plain: the STRATCOM and EUCOM Commanders said to Congress in a July 24, 2008 letter: We are in complete agreement that Europe requires a layered defense enabled by a robust network of sensors in and a credible interceptor capability. Iran's actions last week illustrate the imperative for credible global missile defenses. We cannot wait to counter a long-range, WMD- capable, Iranian missile threat. Deploying missile defenses in Europe would demonstrate our resolve to deter this threat and protect our nation and allies by providing a critical capability to the warfighter. As Combatant Commanders responsible for both United States military operations in the European theater (EUCOM) and global missile defense plans, operations, and capability (STRATCOM), our best military advice leads us to strongly endorse the President's funding request for European missile defense sites. These capabilities remain critical to defending America and our allies in Europe and for deterring our adversaries today and in the future.\3\ That is why I am a cosponsor and supporter of the Lieberman amendment. endnotes \1\ CBO study, ``Options for Deploying Missile Defenses in Europe.'' Pg. xv. (February 2009). (Quoting CBO: ``Overall, CBO estimates, Option 1 would cost between $9 billion and $13 billion; Option 2, between $18 billion and $22 billion; Option 3, between $9 billion and $13 billion; and Option 4, between $10 billion and $14 billion. (Those and other cost estimates in this report are in 2009 dollars.)'') \2\ CBO, pg. 37. (Quoting the CBO study: ``Option 4, with its Kinetic Energy Interceptors, would also provide substantial added coverage of the United States, particularly against solid-fuel ICBMs. The systems using SM-3 Block IIA interceptors (Options 2 and 3) offer the least additional defense of the United States: almost none against solid-fuel ICBMs and coverage of only parts of the northeastern (and, in the case of Option 2, central) United States against liquid fuel ICBMs.'') \3\ General Kevin P. Chilton and General Bantz J. Craddock. Letter to Senator Robert C. Byrd. 14 July 2008.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the following documents: (1) an open letter to the Obama administration from leading Europeans, including Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel, who warn in strong terms that the so-called U.S.-Russia reset must not come at the expense of mutual interests between the U.S. and the nations of central and eastern Europe; (2) a recent New York Times article, ``Eastern Europe Is Uneasy Over U.S. Ties with Russia''; and (3) an op-ed from yesterday's Washington Post, ``A Letter From Europe: U.S. leadership in the post-Soviet age is needed to face new challenges.''

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I will make some brief remarks here, and at the conclusion we will determine whether there is an agreement on the other side so I can go ahead and lay down an amendment. But first I want to discuss what that amendment will be. It is amendment No. 1628, and in a moment I will seek to offer it and get it pending. It is an amendment I introduced with Senator Lieberman, Senator Bayh, and Senator McCain. Like other Members of this body, we have watched recent events unfold in Iran with great concern. This year began with talk of warming ties and potentially reestablishing contact with Iran; that we would no longer be afraid to talk to Iran and perhaps to even reach some kinds of agreements. In recent months, however, the Iranian regime has continued its support of terrorism, its illegal nuclear weapons program in defiance of its NPT obligations, and its engagement in violent and deadly repression of its own citizens. While the administration has made clear its intention to continue to pursue high-level talks with Iran, an overture which the regime has not seen fit to even respond, the President has indicated that the window for Iran to negotiate and demonstrate progress toward complying with its international obligations is not open indefinitely. I think President Obama was correct when he said: Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon would not only be a threat to Israel and a threat to the United States, but would be profoundly destabilizing in the international community as a whole and could set off a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that would be extraordinarily dangerous for all concerned, including for Iran. In May, the President indicated that Iran would have until December to show meaningful improvement. More recently, French President Nicolas Sarkozy said on behalf of the G8 nations that they will give Iran until September 2009 to agree to negotiations with respect to its nuclear activities or face tougher sanctions. If negotiations do not prove fruitful, the United States must be ready to act quickly to increase pressure on Iran to end its support for terrorist groups and its illegal nuclear program. The Kyl-Lieberman amendment expresses the sense of the Senate that the President should sanction the Iranian Central Bank if, by December, Iran has not verifiably halted its uranium enrichment activities, as well as come into full compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Additional Protocol. By sanctioning the Central Bank of Iran--Bank Markazi--our Nation would send the message that we will use all methods at our disposal to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and oppose sponsors of terror. The case against the Iranian Central Bank is strong. It is knee-deep in the regime's illicit activities. Last year, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Robert Kimmit revealed that between 2001 and 2006 the bank had moved $50 million from banks in London to Hezbollah front organizations in Beirut. Hezbollah, of course, is a terrorist organization. It also processes transactions for Iranian banks that already face U.S. sanctions. The Central Bank of Iran is instrumental in helping Iranian banks--the very ones this body voted overwhelmingly to sanction in 2007--to avoid sanctions. In March 2008, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the Department of the Treasury warned financial institutions about the illicit behavior of the Central Bank of Iran. Here is what the advisory said: The Central Bank of Iran and Iranian commercial banks have requested that their names be removed from global transactions in order to make it more difficult for intermediary financial institutions to determine the true parties in the transaction. They have also continued to provide financial services to Iranian entities designated by the U.N. Security Council in its Resolutions 1737 and 1747. The U.S. Department of Treasury is particularly concerned that the Central Bank of Iran may be facilitating transactions for sanctioned Iranian banks. Under U.S. law, institutions that aid entities covered by financial sanctions are liable to penalties. The Central Bank's activities clearly warrant such action, and sanctioning the bank would increase the effectiveness of existing measures. I urge my colleagues to support our amendment at such time as we are able to get a vote on it.

Mr. KYL. The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Idaho (Mr. Crapo).

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, today marks President Obama's sixth month in office. The President began his term with an enormous amount of goodwill, high approval ratings and pledges to work in a bipartisan way. In the earliest days he reached out in a bipartisan way to secure passage of administration priorities and Republicans reciprocated. For example, I joined the President in supporting the release of the second tranche of financial stabilization money. But the administration has become increasingly partisan in the months since then. The effectiveness of the President's policies is increasingly questioned by the American people as spending and deficits have skyrocketed. Unemployment has gotten much worse since he took office, and America's interests abroad have been challenged with little response. Let me first speak to the issue of domestic policy, spending and debt. On domestic policy, President Obama's first 6 months in office have been characterized by unprecedented spending and debt accumulation. In 6 months, President Obama has put the country on a course to spend more and accrue more debt than any President in history; in fact, to take on more debt than all of the other Presidents in the history of the United States combined. The President has at the same time exercised the power of government in unprecedented ways. The President knows this is greatly concerning to the American people. So on June 16, President Obama told an interviewer: I actually would like to see a relatively light touch when it comes to government. But when it comes to the size and scope of the government, nothing President Obama has done in his first 6 months resembles a light touch. Time after time, he has pushed government intervention and takeovers and huge spending increases as the preferred solutions to various problems, whether it is to stimulate the economy, reform health care, or bail out bankrupt car companies. The President cites the economic downturn as a reason to clear the way for more and more new spending, but we still don't have any evidence that this record-breaking spending has actually helped the economy. Take the $1.2 trillion so-called stimulus bill. In pitching the stimulus to the Nation, the President pledged that ``a new wave of innovation, activity, and construction would be unleashed all across America.'' The administration also said it would help keep unemployment from topping 8 percent and ``save or create 3.5 million new jobs.'' He insisted Congress rush the bill through despite concerns about the cost and the Government's ability to disburse funds in a timely way. As we now know, since President Obama signed the legislation, far from stopping unemployment from exceeding 8 percent, unemployment has now reached over 9.5 percent and is headed to at least 10 percent. The economy has lost over 2 million jobs, including 433,000 last month. According to the White House Web site, which tracks stimulus spending, only 7.68 percent of the stimulus money has been funneled into the economy. In an article for the Washington Post, Michael Gerson explains why the stimulus is having such a negligible effect: Pouring money into the economy through a thirst sponge of federal programs . . . is slow and inefficient. Just as Senate Republicans argued when we opposed this plan. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office projects less than a quarter of the funds earmarked for this bill will be spent by the end of this year, with the lion's share being distributed over the next 3 years, by which time, hopefully, the recession will be over. If that is the case, the administration will no longer have a justification for this stimulus spending. But taxpayers will still be on the hook for the hundreds of billions of dollars the government will have to borrow to pay for it. Thanks to a new report by Senator Coburn, we know more about some of these wasteful projects that have been funded by the so-called stimulus or are awaiting funds, including a $23.5 million turtle tunnel in Florida, a $550,000 skateboard park in Rhode Island, and even $40,000 to give someone a job in North Carolina to lobby for more stimulus funds. That is just a handful of the projects approved so far. So what has happened to the President's plan to spend wisely? That brings us to the budget. The President's $3.4 trillion 10-year budget also defies the idea of a light touch. In an editorial about the budget, the Wall Street Journal wrote: With [his] fiscal 2010 budget proposal, President Obama is attempting not merely to expand the role of the federal government, but to put it in such a dominant position that its power can never be rolled back. So the spending is the means to an end, a bigger government that can never be tamed. To understand the magnitude of the budget the President proposed, consider: Federal spending will skyrocket to 27.7 percent of the gross domestic product in 2009. That is up from 21 percent of GDP in 2008. According to the CBO's monthly budget review, for the first 9 months of the 2009 fiscal year, outlays are 21 percent higher than they were in the first three quarters of 2008, though revenues have fallen by 18 percent. Federal spending will make up a greater share of the economy in 2009 than in any year since 1945, when the country was still fighting World War II. It is also a greater share of the economy than during the Vietnam war or during the recessions of 1974-1975 or 1981- 1982. The debt created by his budget will be greater than the combined debt created by the budgets of each of the previous 43 Presidents, all the way back to President Washington. By the end of this fiscal year, our publicly held debt will amount to roughly 57 percent of the gross domestic product and deficits of $1 trillion every year are predicted for the next decade. This will drive the debt to 82 percent of the gross domestic product by the year 2019. Interest payments on this debt will soon make up the single largest item in the debt. In fact, as for the interest cost, beginning in 2012 and every year thereafter, the government will spend more than $1 billion a day on finance charges to holders of U.S. debt. That means Federal spending on finance charges for the government's debt will be a whopping $5,700 per household in 2019. Americans are weary of this kind of debt, to say the least, and many don't think it is fair for Washington to overspend and then simply pass the bill on to our children and grandchildren. These levels of spending and debt would be reckless in the best of economic times, and they are not consistent with President Obama's pledge for a new era of fiscal responsibility. Let's turn to health care. The American people--and those of us in Congress--want health care reform. That is not in question. But President Obama is proposing a trillion-dollar health care program that would, according to the Congressional Budget Office, cause millions of Americans to lose their current care by providing an incentive to employers to drop their health care coverage. How is this consistent with the President's assurances that if Americans like their current insurance, they can keep it? Remember, 85 percent of Americans have insurance and the vast majority of them like their coverage and they do not want to lose it. President Obama frames this huge new entitlement as a cost-saving, deficit-reducing measure. At a July 1 townhall meeting in Virginia, the President told participants: If we want to control our deficits, the only way for us to do it is to control healthcare costs. But does anyone believe that creating a new trillion-dollar, Washington-run health care bureaucracy will reduce costs? When in history has a new government program ever reduced costs? Our two current government-run health care programs--Medicare and Medicaid--are both on financially unsustainable paths. Medicare alone has a $38 trillion unfunded liability over the next 75 years and is in urgent need of reform. Some of the projected revenue for the President's plan comes from cuts in Medicare. How is it fair to cut seniors' care to pay for a new government-dominated system for nonseniors, especially since Medicare is already in financial trouble? This would ultimately lead to shortages, rationing, and the elimination of private plan choices-- something our seniors rightly fear. It does not make much sense to strip funds from those already participating in government health care and to then use the savings for the creation of a massive new government health care system that few people want. Americans rightly worry the President's proposals will lead to the kind of denial and delay that happens in Canada and Great Britain. The President has even said: What I think the government can do is be an honest broker in assessing and evaluating treatments. That can only mean one thing: denial and delay of care. In that kind of system, Federal boards would dictate what is best for you and me, if our health care is worth the money, and drive a wedge between doctors and patients. President Obama said recently: When you hear the naysayers claim that I am trying to bring about government-run healthcare . . . know this, they are not telling the truth. Well, maybe the President does not like the term ``government-run health care'' because it is not popular with Americans. But a plan administered by the government, with prices and policies and treatments evaluated and dictated by Washington bureaucrats, is government-run health care, plain and simple. On another issue, cap and trade: One of the President's oft-repeated campaign pledges was he would not raise taxes on middle-income Americans. But the cap-and-trade legislation he and congressional Democrats are backing would do just that. On June 26, the House of Representatives passed cap-and-trade legislation described by Harvard University economist Martin Feldstein as ``a stealth strategy for a massive long-term tax increase.'' The bill would implement a cap-and-trade program with the goal of reducing carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere. Cap-and-trade programs set strict mandatory limits on carbon emissions from various sources, such as electric utilities. Those sources would then either reduce carbon emissions or buy or trade emission allowances to achieve the required overall emissions reductions. The energy bill would not directly raise taxes on Americans; that is, they will not necessarily see a larger income tax bill at tax time in April. Rather, cap and trade increases the cost of living for everyone by raising energy costs and consumer prices for virtually everything. The effect would be the same as if the IRS sent them a tax bill. When the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office analyzed the cost of a reduction of carbon emissions by 15 percent below 2005 levels, it estimated a family's cost of living would increase by $1,600. To put that $1,600 carbon tax in perspective-- Martin Feldstein wrote-- a typical family of four with earnings of $50,000 now pays an income tax of about $3,000. The tax imposed by the cap-and- trade system is, therefore, equivalent to raising the family's income tax by about 50 percent That is $1,600 that families will not be able to spend or save for the future. In addition to the tax increase, cap and trade would retard economic growth. The Heritage Foundation analyzed the proposal and concluded it would slow long-term growth by almost $10 trillion over the next 26 years. Jobs would be lost. The Heritage Foundation's analysis, in fact, found that my State of Arizona would lose thousands of jobs. Proponents of the cap-and-trade proposal argue that job losses will be offset by the creation of new green jobs. But it is not at all certain those jobs will materialize, let alone make up for the jobs that are lost. In Spain, where government has invested heavily in green jobs, two jobs are lost for every green job created, according to Spanish economist Gabriel Calzada. Especially at a time when the economy is shaky and unemployment has reached a 25-year high, I am disappointed the President is promoting this legislation that not only would violate his campaign promise but would cost taxpayers billions of dollars and harm jobs. Let me now address some issues that are not directly domestic: free trade issues and problems with Iran and North Korea. First, on free trade: I am very disappointed that the administration has not made free trade a top priority. It has failed in its first 6 months to take any action on bilateral trade pacts with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea--all of which were signed under President Bush. These trade deals would provide a boost to the U.S. economy and would also strengthen U.S. partnerships in two important regions. Not only has the administration failed to move swiftly on these trade agreements, it has also supported a number of damaging protectionist measures, such as a ``Buy American'' provision in the stimulus package. These policies have angered U.S. trading partners and hurt America's credibility as a promoter of free trade liberalization. They have already triggered retaliation. For example, after the administration canceled a trucking program with Mexico--a program opposed by the Teamsters Union--the Mexican Government responded by slapping tariffs on a range of American imports, including wheat, beans, beef, and rice. A global recession is no time in which to start a trade fight. With Iran: There are few regions of the world as volatile as the Middle East. Yet the administration's approach to Iran has been regrettable, to say the least. When prodemocracy demonstrations were being suppressed in Tehran, the President offered barely a word of support for the people putting their lives on the line for their freedom. Iranian people were met with violence after they took to the streets to peacefully protest the validity of Iran's Presidential election in June to declare their support for free elections and oppose Iran's oppressive police state. The President likes to say: Words matter. Very true. But his initial statement referring to ``deep concerns about the election'' failed to condemn the Iranian theocracy and lacked moral fortitude. And even as pressure rose on the President to take a stronger stand, he declined to provide the leadership the world expects from America, the standard bearer for freedom and democracy. As the Weekly Standard recently editorialized: Since June 12, [President Obama has] done nothing to help those Iranians who have been seeking, in the words of Thomas Jefferson, `` . . . to assume the blessings and security of self-government.'' Explaining his reticence, the President said: It's not productive, given the history of U.S.-Iranian relations to be seen as meddling--the U.S. president meddling in Iranian elections. The United States should be lending full-throated voice to the democratic aspirations of the Iranian people, while seeking to impose sanctions on their oppressors. It is not meddling for the world's oldest and greatest democracy to stand with them. The administration's Iranian policy was flawed from the beginning. It came into office with the idea that it could negotiate a ``grand bargain'' with the mullahs on Iran's nuclear program and would meet with its rogue leader without preconditions. With the mullah's repression of dissent following Iran's flawed elections, that has all gone by the boards. Of course, it was always destined to fail. Was it ever realistic to believe this is a government with which we can successfully negotiate--a government that sponsors terrorism and murders peaceful student protesters and does not even have the mandate of its own people? What do we think we can give this government more than it wants a nuclear weapon? What is more, what message do we send to the Iranian people, many of whom have been arrested, tortured, and had family members killed, by negotiating with this regime while it robs its own people of their fundamental rights? I do not believe the United States can deal in good faith with a regime that so violently suppresses its own citizens. I hope the President will come to agree. With regard to North Korea, the administration's reaction to North Korea's recent activity is also of concern. As Pyongyang prepares for the transition of power from Kim Jong Il to his son Kim Jong Un, the regime's behavior has become increasingly belligerent and unpredictable. North Korea has pulled out of the six-party negotiations, restarted its nuclear program, test launched several ballistic missiles, and conducted a suspected underground nuclear test. The regime even declared that it has now abandoned the armistice that brought a cease- fire to the Korean war. What has the Obama administration done in response to this threat to the security of other nations in the region and indeed to the very security of the United States? The answer is disappointing. It has cut missile defense. The President's budget cut the Missile Defense Agency's budget for fiscal year 2010 by $1.2 billion and decreased the planned number of Ground-Based Interceptor missiles in Alaska from 44 to 30. These proposals amount to almost a 15-percent cut in the Missile Defense Agency's budget and a major reduction in our missile defense portfolio--at the very moment we should be increasing our capability to defend ourselves and our allies from the North Korean threat. Finally, a word about the prison at Guantanamo Bay. I think this is important in evaluating the first 6 months of this administration because one of the very first acts of the President, after he was inaugurated 6 months ago, was his self-imposed deadline to close the facility at Guantanamo within 1 year. A majority of Americans strongly oppose the closure of Guantanamo. Congress has refused to support President Obama's arbitrary deadline to close the facility without a plan, for example, showing where he will relocate the terrorists. The administration has convinced Palau and Bermuda to take a few detainees, but this is not much of a solution if the President is determined to close the facility in just another 6 months. Where will the rest of the detainees still housed at Guantanamo Bay go? We still do not know. Ultimately, the debate over Guantanamo has become a debate over geography. Both the new Attorney General and the new Solicitor General have endorsed the government's right to detain suspected terrorists indefinitely. Whether we can detain them at Guantanamo or at prisons on U.S. soil does not change the fundamental reality that this administration, similar to its predecessor, will be holding certain individuals without trial. We have been told that Guantanamo must be closed for symbolic reasons. But America should never make national security decisions based on symbolisms--or on false moral arguments. In conclusion, on the campaign trail and after his election, President Obama repeatedly promised ``change we can believe in'' and the end of partisan politics in Washington. He pledged to bring Republicans and Democrats together. On election night, he said: Let us resist the temptation to fall back on . . . partisanship. But partisan politics looms larger than ever. Congress is urged to rush costly legislation through, despite frequent Republican concerns about the pricetag and the efficacy of the legislation. Indeed, the President's budget and stimulus both passed mainly on party lines. As Michael Barone recently wrote, the President: Brings [to Washington] the assumption that there will always be a bounteous private sector that can be plundered on behalf of political favorites. Hence, the takeover of Chrysler and GM to bail out the United Auto Workers union. Six months later, President Obama continues to take unnecessary jabs at his predecessor. On his promise for change, more government debt, government bailouts, and large transfers of the economy from the private to the public sector are not what Americans are looking for. Americans want the President and Congress to support the private sector to help the economy get back on track, without tidal waves of spending, debt, and new taxes. They want real health care reform without a government takeover, and they want the President to lead us in this dangerous world, acknowledging the harsh reality that not every rogue regime will respond to smooth talk. In the next 6 months, and beyond, I hope the President will take a more sensible and, indeed, more bipartisan course so we can all accomplish what the American people seek.

Mr. KYL. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Utah (Mr. Bennett), the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Florida (Mr. Martinez), and the Senator from Alaska (Ms. Murkowski).

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Madam President, the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, which my colleague from Vermont has offered as an amendment to the Defense authorization bill, should not be attached to such an important piece of legislation. The Defense authorization bill authorizes nearly $680 billion for national defense programs, most notably the ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the war on terror. It authorizes funding for such crucial programs as missile defense and foreign military aid for Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as a 3.4-percent across-the-board pay raise for the men and women in the military. With such important issues at stake, we should not attach a controversial piece of unrelated legislation that puts passage of the entire bill at risk. Last month, members of the Judiciary Committee received a letter from the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights strongly urging us to vote against the proposed Hate Crimes Prevention Act. The Commission states this bill ``will do little good and a great deal of harm.'' Those are very strong words from the Federal body charged with investigating, reporting on, and making recommendations related to civil rights issues. The Commission's letter details a number of specific concerns, including that the bill would permit Federal authorities to prosecute defendants who have been previously acquitted by State juries--a result that it describes as contrary to the spirit of the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution. Like the Commission, I believe that hate crimes legislation poses significant constitutional problems and risks undermining important principles of federalism. No less than 45 States and the District of Columbia already have hate crimes laws. I am not aware of evidence that any State has been reluctant to aggressively prosecute hate crimes. Furthermore, Federal sentencing guidelines already provide for enhancements for hate crimes based on race, color, religion, natural origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation. In fact, in the case of Matthew Shepard, for whom this bill is named, his killers are appropriately serving life sentences in prison for felony murder. The trend to try at the Federal level crimes that traditionally have been handled in State courts not only is taxing the judiciary's resources and affecting its budget needs but also threatens to change the nature of our Federal system. The pressure in Congress to appear responsive to every highly publicized societal ill or sensational crime needs to be balanced with an inquiry into whether States are doing an adequate job in these particular areas and, ultimately, whether we want most of our legal relationships decided at the national rather than local level. Federal courts were not created to adjudicate local crimes, no matter how heinous they may be. State courts handle such problems. While there certainly are areas in criminal law in which the Federal Government must act, the vast majority of local criminal cases should be decided in the State courts which are equipped for such matters. Matters that can be handled adequately by the States should be left to them; matters that cannot be so handled should be undertaken by the Federal Government. Neither Senator Leahy nor other supporters of this bill have demonstrated that there is an epidemic of hate-based violence that State and local authorities can't or won't prosecute, therefore justifying the need for a hate crimes bill. For these reasons, I strongly urge my colleagues to vote against the Hate Crimes Prevention Act amendment.

Mr. KYL. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Alexander), the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Corker), the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg), the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Bunning), the Senator from Florida (Mr. Martinez), and the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Graham). Further, if present and voting, the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Alexander) would have voted ``yea,'' the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Corker) would have voted ``yea,'' and the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Bunning) would have voted ``yea.''

Mr. KYL. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Bunning), the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Alexander), the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Corker), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg), the Senator from Florida (Mr. Martinez), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Graham), and the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond). Further, if present and voting, the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Bunning) would have voted ``yea,'' the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Alexander) would have voted ``yea,'' and the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Corker) would have voted ``yea.''

Mr. KYL. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Alexander), the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Bunning), the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Corker), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Graham), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg), and the Senator from Florida (Mr. Martinez). Further, if present and voting, the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Alexander) would have voted ``nay,'' the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Bunning) would have voted ``nay,'' the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Graham) would have voted ``nay,'' and the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Corker) would have voted ``nay.''

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Utah (Mr. Bennett), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. DeMint), the Senator from Texas (Mrs. Hutchison), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. Lugar), and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. Voinovich).

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I wanted to deliver these remarks on the same subject of health care earlier in the week. I had been back home in Arizona during the July recess and had spoken to many of my constituents about the subject. I didn't have the opportunity to address this subject until today. I note that health care is very much on their minds. They have been asking a lot of questions. My constituents have been following the health care debate, and the majority I have spoken with are very much in favor of reform. I think all of us in this body realize there are things we have to do to lower the cost of health care and ensure everybody has an opportunity to be covered. I can also tell you they are very concerned about the reforms that have been proposed by the President. They wonder whether they, in fact, will work to their best interests. Cost is an issue that has come up repeatedly when I have spoken with my constituents. They want to know why we have to spend so much money in order to--allegedly--save money and how much it will cost. I tell them it is projected to cost at least a trillion dollars. This is not a fanciful figure; this is what the two bills pending before the Senate are being scored at, meaning that the Congressional Budget Office has said that is about how much they are going to cost. The ultimate price tag could be even higher because in the case of one of the bills, not everything that is going to be in it has already been scored by the CBO, and as to the Finance Committee bill, it is still very much a work in progress. The usual reaction people have to a trillion dollar-plus health care bill is that they cannot believe we would want to spend that much money or that we can't afford to spend that much. They know already that there are only two ways the Federal Government can pay for such a massive program: one, either borrow more money or, two, impose new taxes or some combination of the two. Naturally, they don't like either alternative. Most Arizonans think Washington has already borrowed more money than taxpayers can handle, after the President's $1.2 trillion stimulus bill, the $400 billion Omnibus appropriations bill, and the $3.4 trillion, 10-year budget. Now we hear talk about adding an additional trillion dollars on top of that. The folks in Arizona think that is just too much. In fact, by the end of the fiscal year, our publicly held debt will be about 57 percent of our gross domestic product, and deficits of a trillion dollars a year are projected for the next decade. We just got the statistics for the deficit this year. It is already at $1.1 trillion. By the end of the year, it could easily be another half-trillion dollars above that. This will drive the debt to at least 82 percent of the gross domestic product by 2019. To give you an idea of what that means, the GDP is how much money we make as a country. It would be the same as saying that for a family that has an income of $100,000, its credit card debt is $89,000. Try paying off an $89,000 credit card debt on a $100,000 income. The interest payments on the debt will soon make up the single-largest item in our budget. So, obviously, when we talk about spending another trillion dollars we don't have, my constituents are very wary of this. They are wary about the debt, and, to say the least, they don't think it is fair for Washington to pass another trillion-dollar bill, with the costs being transferred to our children and grandchildren--especially after what happened with the stimulus, which has, frankly, included a great deal of waste and obviously has failed to contain unemployment. A lot of folks have expressed skepticism that spending another trillion dollars is the right way to reduce health care costs. Frankly, I agree with them. Somebody has to pay the trillion dollars. They are also concerned about the new taxes that have been proposed to pay for this because, in fact, part of this trillion dollars is proposed to be paid for through new taxes. There have been all kinds of ideas proposed, such as a tax on beer, soda, juice, and snack food. Those are really small items, but they hit people right where it counts when they go to the grocery store. There is also a new value-added tax idea. This hits the small business men and women, who are especially concerned because of the new taxes that some are suggesting they should pay--as much as a 10 percentage point increase in the amount of taxes they would have to pay. This is important because, in our economic downturn today, we know it is small businesses that are going to create the jobs that will bring us out of the recession. This would not be just a job killer but an economic growth and recovery killer with that kind of tax imposed on these folks. My constituents want to know--and, frankly, I want to know--if the President will fulfill his campaign pledge not to raise taxes one single dime on the middle class and whether he will veto any legislation that includes the kinds of taxes of which I am speaking that would fall directly on families. They believe and I believe there ought to be a different way to achieve the health care we want--in other words, without this new round of spending and taxes. They have heard the President argue in his pitches for Washington to change our health care system that if we spend all this money on health care now, we will somehow save money later. Americans have some commonsense questions about this claim: How will the government actually do this? Will their health care be rationed? If they are privately insured, will they be able to keep the health care they already have? Eighty-five percent of persons are already insured and are happy with what they have. Yet proposals in the pending legislation would cause many of them to lose that insurance and go onto government programs. That, of course, then raises questions like rationing, as I have discussed many times before. A Washington-run health care system would likely try to suppress costs by denying or delaying care. Administration officials are already talking about using comparative effectiveness research for this purpose. This is not a fanciful or hypothetical notion. As we know, this is exactly what has happened in countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom, two countries with government-run health care systems. In a ``20/20'' health care segment, they reported that Norwood, Ontario, holds a lottery each week to give one winner a trip to a family doctor. The show filmed the town clerk pulling a name from a box and calling the name of an elated winner. Is that what we want in the United States? The average emergency room wait in Canada is 23 hours-- if you are even considered sick enough to be admitted. In Britain, in 2007, the government set a goal to reduce the average wait time to see a physician to fewer than 18 weeks. That is 4\1/2\ months waiting to see a doctor. Do Americans want that? That is how government-run health care works: You make something free and demand soars. To reduce costs, bureaucrats deny or delay treatment or tests or procedures they deem too expensive. The way it works is simple: You set a budget of how much you are going to spend on health care every year. It doesn't matter how sick your folks get; it has to fit within that budget. Think about that for your family. Say you set a budget and you are going to spend no more than $5,000 on health care this year. A good friend of mine in Arizona had an automobile accident; it was very serious. He had to have his spleen removed. He is still in recovery, and it is obviously going to cost a lot of money--more than $5,000. Well, if he set a budget and said that is all he is going to spend, what is he to do? Does he not get the treatment he needs as a result of that accident? You cannot reform health care or reduce costs by rationing care to patients. One of the things Republicans will insist on is that the way we do the reform doesn't hurt what we already have, which is a system that allows you to get to the emergency room and allows you to see a doctor. You can choose your own doctor. If you have insurance, you get to keep it. We don't want to take care of the few who are unable to get insurance today in a way that requires us to change what everybody else has, if it is already working for them. It is true that you won't find the words ``ration'' or ``denial'' of care or ``withholding coverage'' in these bills. Obviously, they don't state it that way. But the results are precisely what are required by the policies in the bill. The results are easily masked by all kinds of terminology, but the rules, the forms, the legal obligations, and the provider reimbursement schemes all result in the ability of the government to tell you whether something is going to be covered, whether you and your doctor think it is necessary for your care or not. I have heard some respond by saying that at least in the Canadian system they may ration care, but everybody has access to a doctor. Not true. The Fraser Institute, a Canadian think tank, released a study this year that found that 1.7 million people--out of a country of 33 million--were unable to see a physician in 2007. That number does not include those who have a doctor but are on a waiting list. As I said earlier, many of my constituents also worry about losing their current coverage if a new Washington-run health care system is implemented. True, they have heard the President say repeatedly that if you have health insurance, you get to keep it. But they have also heard the other side of the story, and I have read at least one of the bills--in fact, there are two specific provisions--that render this statement untrue--that if you have health insurance, you get to keep it. Not true. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that just part of one of the proposed plans shows that millions of people would lose their existing coverage and be told to enroll in government health care. The Lewin study specifically mentioned 119 million people who would be shifted from their current employer-provided coverage onto the government plan. Many of my constituents also want to know if the President would veto legislation that has the potential to cause Americans to lose the private insurance they currently enjoy. There is a final concern, and this concerns me. It goes to America's seniors. We have made some very strong commitments to our seniors through the Medicare Program. Our seniors obviously are more susceptible to needing health care. They have a greater number of health concerns than younger Americans. And we have said to them: We will, through Medicare, ensure that your health concerns will be taken care of. They are obviously very concerned about rationing if Medicare were somehow to be cut in order to raise money to solve the problem for others in our society. That is precisely what at least one of these bills proposes to do--cut Medicare and take that money and apply it to the new costs that we are going to be incurring as a result of this so- called health care reform. Seniors are worried these cuts in Medicare will adversely affect their ability to get care. They also fret that adding the 47 million uninsured Americans--which would be just for starters--to health insurance rolls, including government insurance rolls, would impact the care they now receive by crowding the system. In other words, leading to wait times, rationing for them or even potentially denial of care. We must not implement a new health care system that would suddenly erode the quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries. My constituents want high-quality, patient-centered health care. Most already have good health insurance for themselves. They are concerned about its cost. They are also concerned that there are some who need to be insured who are not. But what they want to hear are fresh new ideas about how to achieve this result without, in effect, throwing the baby out with the bathwater; without adversely affecting the system that currently takes care of them, whether it is seniors being cared for in Medicare or it is the vast majority of Americans who are already insured and like the insurance they have. They do not want us to rush a costly new plan through the Congress. I think the President was correct when he said: If we don't do this quickly, we might not do it at all. Well, what did he mean by that? In effect, what he was saying is that if the American people have a long enough time to study and debate exactly what is being proposed, they may not like what they see. I think that is exactly what is happening here. There is a bill that is going to be marked up next week in the House of Representatives, and I don't think the American people are going to like what they see in that bill. We have a bill that has been marked up in the HELP Committee in the Senate, and much of my criticisms go to that particular bill. There is one section in that bill, for example, that spends $400 billion over 7 years to subsidize health care for families making between $66,000 a year and 80,000-some dollars a year. Is that what we want to cut Medicare to pay for? As I said, the more Americans understand the details of these bills, the more questions I think they are going to ask. We owe it to our constituents to allow them the time to understand it and to ask us those questions. I want to be able to go back to Arizona and say: All right, here are the three bills--or two bills or however many there are--and here is what they do. Do you like it or not? If not, how would you change it? We need the time and the ability to get the reaction from our constituents if we are going to be true to our position as representatives of the people. So when the President says: If we don't do this quickly, we might not do it at all, he is probably right. But it is better to get it right; to take our time to do it right and not make mistakes, than to rush something through that is going to add $1 trillion in new spending; that is going to potentially impact the coverage we already have, potentially impact Medicare for our seniors and perhaps not achieve the results we want. This is one of the most important things this Congress--the American Congress--will have done in years. It is complicated, it is hard, and we have to get it right. One of the first things a physician learns in medical school, when confronting a patient to see what is wrong with that patient and to begin the treatment, is to, first, do no harm. It is possible to do harm to a patient. So the physician, first of all, is admonished: The body is a wonderful thing, it recovers pretty well; don't do anything to harm. The same thing is true with our economy and with the policies with respect to health care. There are a lot of good things being done in health care--physicians are working very hard to take good care of us, most people have good insurance, seniors rely on Medicare. Let's not do harm to what we have in order to take a small segment of our population and make sure they can get insurance. That is the primary position we are taking when we say: Let's don't rush this. Let's do it right. At the end of the day, we can all be proud of the fact that we have reformed our health care system to reduce, not increase, some of the expenses and to ensure that those who don't have insurance can, in fact, be covered. I said I wished to give these remarks earlier in the week, having talked with a lot of my constituents in Arizona. I also wished, toward the end of this week, to comment on the President's trip to Russia. He is going to be returning home soon, and his trip to Russia produced some very important announcements, which I wished to discuss today. President Obama's Visit to Russia I am going to switch subjects now and discuss the President's trip to Moscow and his summit with the President of Russia. The most significant object of that summit, as we know, was the discussion of further strategic arms reductions. I personally believe it is important that the verification and confidence-building measures of the 1991 START agreement not expire without some measure to continue them, possibly including a legally binding replacement treaty. I know that is one of the purposes of the President's visit. But I am also cognizant of the fact that a follow-on to the 1991 START agreement does not address the most current threats to the United States and the West; namely, those posed by nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. The two subjects are barely related. For example, the threat from Iran and the history of Russian support for the Iranian nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program is well known. It is probably even going on today. This should have been at the top of the President's agenda with Russia, if, in fact, he is going to address the threats that are most currently before us, rather than a decades-old arms control agreement with Russia. Additionally, there is the ongoing nuclear weapon ambitions of North Korea. Some press reports suggest it may be sharing its technology with countries such as Syria and Burma. Given the well-known willingness of these rogue states--and I speak of North Korea and Iran--to support terrorism, their unchecked nuclear ambitions will surely hasten the day when terrorists are able to acquire nuclear weapons. I believe nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism are the greatest threats to our Nation today, and we should be focused much more on those threats, as I said, than going back and negotiating an arms control agreement with Russia, which obviously is not a current threat to the United States. The main focus of the President's trip when he was in Moscow appears to have been on the subject of a strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia. That being the case, the Senate has a great responsibility--if the administration seeks our advice and consent by submitting the treaty to us for ratification--to understand what the proposal is and to provide our advice to the President before it is negotiated and, if appropriate, our consent to ratify. Obviously, the Constitution requires this process of advise and consent when it comes to treaty making. Here are some of the questions I think we need to answer. First of all, what does the United States get from such a new treaty when it appears that the Russians are on their way to reaching the levels of weaponry announced without a treaty? They are going to do it anyway. Second, why has the United States bent to Russian demands to take tactical nuclear weapons off the table when the Russians have a 10-to-1 advantage in tactical nuclear weapons over the United States and have openly talked in their military doctrine about using tactical nuclear weapons in conflict? How will the administration provide for the modernization of U.S. nuclear forces, including the warheads and the complex of infrastructure that sustains them and the nuclear weapons delivery systems, the bombers and the missiles and submarines that must accompany any START ratification process? That is perhaps the most critical question of all. A number of these questions and recommended courses of action have recently been articulated by some of this country's leading experts on arms control and nonproliferation policy, including Ambassador James Woolsey, Dr. Fred Ikle, Ambassador John Bolton, and many others. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, at the conclusion of my remarks, a document entitled ``U.S.-Russian START Renewal Negotiations: Guidelines to Protect U.S. Interests.''

Mr. KYL. I thank the Chair. I also urge my colleagues to study materials recently released by the New Deterrent Working Group involved with the Center for Security Policy, a respected think tank here in Washington, that has studied these issues for years; and also a very objective and important guide for how we should approach our thinking on these negotiations from the Hudson Institute. These are outstanding compilations of expert opinions for Senators to familiarize themselves with as we head into a treaty ratification process. They are too lengthy to insert in the Record, but I am happy to provide these papers to any of my colleagues who would like to read them. Another important question concerns missile defense. Just before the summit, it appeared the White House was taking a strong line in refusing to accept Russian demands to link missile defenses with a follow-on treaty. The Russians have said: We are not even going to talk about the START numbers unless we can also talk about U.S. missile defense. The Russians don't like it. They would like to have us put some limitations on that. The administration recognized not only should there be no constraint on the development of missile defenses, but, moreover, any treaty--any treaty--that limits U.S. missile defenses would be dead on arrival in the Senate if we tied the two subjects together. This past week, I joined Senators Wicker, Johanns, McCain, Hatch, Lieberman, Ben Nelson, and Begich in sending a letter to the President in which we confirmed that ``linking missile defense plans to offensive force negotiations runs contrary to American strategic interests and would undermine our security.'' Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the letter to which I just referred.

Mr. KYL. Notwithstanding what I have said, buried in the joint understanding--which has now been made public--reached by President Obama and Medvedev is inclusion of the following language suggesting an accession to the Russian demand to include missile defense in the follow-on treaty: A provision on the interrelationships of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Joint Understanding be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mr. KYL. This last statement is a dangerous connection to make and one the administration must not negotiate. U.S. missile defenses exist to protect against ballistic missile threats by rogue regimes and the threat of accidental or unauthorized launches. They are not about Russia. Consequently, we should not allow Russia to attempt to limit our defenses, and that is what I fear these words from the Joint Understanding may allow to occur. Such a linkage in the START agreement will be rejected by Members of the Senate. I would also like to call attention to a curious statement by the President which was quoted in this past Sunday's New York Times: It's naive for us to think that we can grow our nuclear stockpiles, the Russians continue to grow their nuclear stockpiles, and our allies grow their nuclear stockpiles, and that in that environment we're going to be able to pressure countries like Iran and North Korea not to pursue nuclear weapons themselves. The fact is, the United States has not been growing or even modernizing its nuclear stockpile. Why did the President make such a false statement? Yes, the Russians are growing theirs, at least modernizing it. Britain and France are modernizing their stockpiles, though not growing them, as far as I have seen in the press. India, Pakistan, and North Korea are all growing their stockpiles; and, of course, we are all familiar with Iran's actions. All of this has occurred in the absence of the United States growing its stockpile. What the President said is not true. In fact, it has all occurred while the United States has undertaken substantial nuclear force reductions. We haven't modernized our nuclear weapons, and we haven't conducted an underground nuclear test for 17 years. One would think this history would put to rest the naive assumption that the U.S. movement toward disarmament will be reciprocated by other nations, including those that threaten our national security. I would also like to submit for the Record a Wall Street Journal op- ed written by Steve Rademaker, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation in the last administration. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks that letter.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Rademaker correctly observes: The critics are not impressed that by 2012 the U.S. will have reduced its deployed strategic warheads by 80 percent. They will not be satisfied if the U.S. reduces by 99 percent. So long as there is one nuclear weapon remaining in the U.S. inventory, he says, they will point to this as the root cause of nuclear proliferation. As I indicated a few moments ago, there are real concerns facing the Senate at this time as we consider the START follow-on treaty. It is imperative that the President understand the true situation as he negotiates with his Russian counterparts. This is all the more important as we begin to understand the highly significant reductions the administration apparently wants to negotiate in a follow-on agreement. According to the Joint Understanding from which I quoted before, the President plans to reach an agreement that represents a significant departure from current force levels. I note that the 1,700 to 2,200 deployed strategic nuclear force level--actually on the high end of that range--was considered the minimum force level required for deterrence and assurance just last year when the Departments of Energy and Defense issued an unclassified white paper, ``National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century.'' Given yesterday's announcement, I am curious to understand how estimates of necessary force levels could have changed so dramatically in the 10 months since that paper was issued. I am also very concerned about the implications for our triad and for our conventional arms modernization, if we lock in a launcher limit at anything close to 500. The triad is the combination of our strategic bomber force, our intercontinental ballistic missiles based on land in silos, and ICBMs in submarines. Those are the three parts of our strategic triad. If we were to reduce the numbers as dramatically low as this paper would indicate, it is very clear the triad would be jeopardized; that is to say, not all elements of it would have the weaponry to be part of our strategic deterrent. Moreover, these numbers would suggest that parts of this triad can be used for conventional purposes. Bombers can drop high explosive bombs. They don't just drop nuclear weapons. A missile--we have a lot of cruise missiles that send high-explosive warheads to their destination. It doesn't have to be a nuclear warhead. If we reduce the number of delivery systems down below a certain level, we not only impact our strategic nuclear deterrent but also our conventional deterrent and conventional capability. This may be very advantageous for Russia. In fact, Russia is headed to a low level anyway because of their economy. But I believe it is a grave risk for the United States and our allies. I think these are issues that will warrant the highest level of scrutiny by the Senate. We can't be rushed in our work. These are very important existential questions. I note that the Senate had over 425 days between the signature on the START I agreement and the eventual ratification of that treaty. There were 1,119 days between the signing and ratification of START II. And the Chemical Weapons Convention allowed the Senate 1,563 days of review, deliberation, and debate. The last successful arms control treaty with the Russians, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, or SORT, permitted the Senate 287 days to review. I say again, there is no need for a rush. As the Wall Street Journal reported yesterday, July 8: The White House Coordinator for Weapons of Mass Destruction, Security and Arms Control, Gary Samore, said on Sunday that the Administration may have to enact certain provisions of a treaty by executive order and on a `provisional basis' to meet the December deadline. Clearly, there are options available to ensure that the Senate has all the time it needs to thoughtfully consider a treaty and to make sure a nuclear weapons modernization program is in place and funded before the Senate proceeds to ratification of the START follow-on. Mr. President, according to press reports, Russian President Medvedev has indicated that his nation would like to reduce the number of strategic launchers several times below the number currently permitted under START. This is reflected in the launcher limits outlined in the Joint Understanding. This sounds good, but it is unclear that Russia is actually giving anything up. In recent testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Dr. Keith Payne, a former official of the Defense Department and a member of the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture, cautioned ``We should be very careful about moving toward lower launcher numbers because it would provide significant advantages for the Russian Federation, but significant disadvantages for U.S. strategy.'' As Dr. Payne noted in his testimony, Russia's strategic ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers will drop dramatically with or without a new arms control agreement. Specifically, Dr. Payne stated: ``within 8 or 9 years, the number of Russian strategic launchers will have dropped from approximately 680 launchers (some of which already are not operational) to approximately 270 launchers simply as a result of aging of their systems and the pace of their modernization program. In contrast, the service life of existing U.S. systems extends several decades.'' Dr. Payne continues: ``Despite spending up to 25% of the Russian military budget on the strategic forces, Russia's strategic nuclear forces will decline steeply with or without arms control.'' Consequently, Russia isn't giving up anything by agreeing to these reductions. At the same time, reductions in delivery vehicles could have consequences for the U.S., in terms of prompt global strike capabilities nd conventional strike modernization. Dr. Payne also wrote about these facts in a recent Wall Street Journal piece, and I ask unanimous consent to print it in the Record as well.

Mr. KYL. Additionally, in order to get a follow-on START agreement with Russia--one that appears to be much more to Russia's advantage than ours--we have also decided we will not seek to get the Russians to give up a very real advantage they possess: their tactical nuclear weapons, also known as nonstrategic nuclear weapons. While the United States and Russia have a rough equivalence in their strategic nuclear weapons, there is a significant imbalance in tactical nuclear weapons that favors Russia. This imbalance is exacerbated by the fact that Russia maintains an active nuclear weapons production complex, while the United States does not. According to the recently concluded report of the bipartisan Perry- Schlesinger Commission, there is a growing asymmetry between United States and Russian nuclear weapons capabilities thanks to a longstanding problem whereby the Russian Federation has maintained far greater numbers of tactical nuclear weapons than the United States. According to the commission, the Russians have approximately 3,800 of these weapons, while the United States has only a few hundred. And according to a recent CRS report, the Russians may have as many as 8,000. Despite this asymmetry, we are told that the forthcoming START follow-on will not deal with Russian tactical nuclear weapons, at Russian demand. Yet, it is clear that our allies who rely on our extended deterrent are increasingly concerned. For example, the Perry-Schlesinger report stated: ``The combination of new warhead designs, the estimated production capability for new nuclear warheads, and precision delivery systems such as the Iskander short-range tactical ballistic missile (known as the SS-26 in the West), open up new possibilities for Russian efforts to threaten to use nuclear weapons to influence regional conflicts.'' And according to that report, ``The United States should not cede to Russia a posture of superiority in the name of deemphasizing nuclear weapons in U.S. military strategy. There seems no near-term prospect of such a result in the balance of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons. But that balance does not exist in nonstrategic nuclear forces, where Russia enjoys a sizeable numerical advantage. As noted above, it stores thousands of these weapons in apparent support of possible military operations west of the Urals. The United States deploys a small fraction of that number in support of nuclear sharing agreements in NATO. Precise numbers for the U.S. deployments are classified but their total is only about five percent of the total at the height of the Cold War. Strict U.S.-Russian equivalence in NSNF numbers is unnecessary. But the current imbalance is stark and worrisome to some U.S. allies in Central Europe. If and as reductions continue in the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons, this imbalance will become more apparent and allies less assured.'' It is therefore inexplicable to me that we will not be negotiating with the Russians about reductions in those nuclear forces. Moreover, I am concerned by suggestions that discussions of these forces will have to wait for the ``next treaty'' which may not ever arrive. In the meantime, this follow-on agreement may lock in a significant disadvantage for the United States and our allies. In recent months, it has become clear that the state of our nuclear deterrent is in need of serious attention. As high an authority as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned: ``At a certain point, it will become impossible to keep extending the life of our arsenal, especially in light of our testing moratorium. It also makes it harder to reduce existing stockpiles, because eventually we won't have as much confidence in the efficacy of the weapons we do have.'' Secretary Gates continued this argument when he said: ``To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program.'' This is a statement of significant import. Secretary Gates has warned that without a modernization program, such as the Reliable Replacement Warhead RRW, which Congress rejected during the last administration, we will be unable to reduce the number of weapons we maintain. In fact, we are not even certain we can modernize without testing, but we would be a lot closer to knowing the answer to that question if Congress had approved the RRW studies. As the Perry-Schlesinger Commission noted, our nuclear weapons and their delivery platforms are long overdue for a needed modernization program and will continue to experience safety, reliability and credibility problems until that modernization is in place. In fact, even in its Interim Report, the commission stated: ``High confidence in stockpile reliability not only is important for maintaining deterrence, it is also vital for making substantial reductions in the size of our stockpile.'' Thus, it should not be surprising that the commission made the following findings and recommendations that are of such importance that I want to read them into the Record in their entirety: i. For the indefinite future, the United States must maintain a viable nuclear deterrent. The other NPT- recognized nuclear-weapon states have put in place comprehensive programs to modernize their forces to meet new international circumstances. ii. The Stockpile Stewardship Program has had some remarkable achievements. But in recent years, the level of funding provided to support these safeguards has been inadequate. iii. The Life Extension Program has to date been effective in dealing with the problem of modernizing the arsenal. But it is becoming increasingly difficult to continue within the constraints of a rigid adherence to original materials and design as the stockpile continues to age. iv. As the reductions have proceeded over the period since the end of the Cold War, the potential to deal with technical surprise has been reduced, as the diversity of types of weapons in the stockpile has shrunk. v. The infrastructure that supports two thirds of the strategic deterrent triad--the SLBMs and ICBMs is not being sustained. Mr. President, it is clear that not only is a modernization program for our nuclear weapons, the complex that supports it, and the delivery systems associated with it long overdue, it is also inextricably linked to safely reducing our nuclear arsenal further and must be considered by the Senate simultaneously to, if not before, the START follow-on is submitted. Such a modernization program should take into account issues raised by the Nuclear Weapons Council in its December 24, 2008, letter to the NNSA administrator. I ask unanimous consent to print the letter in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mr. KYL. It should also take into account the commission's recommendations, which noted that as long as modernization takes place within current policies regarding testing and military characteristics, there should be no political controversy. The administration should request a modernization program that in its first year includes: increases to stockpile surveillance; LEP studies for W76 and B61 that add safety, reliability and credibility; increases to directed stockpile work; certification and safety at the Nevada Test Site; accelerated funding of the Los Alamos CMRR facility and the Y-12 UPF; and, increases to advanced computing platform and code work. Mr. President, lastly, I wish to discuss an important but so far overlooked component of the pending arms control discussions, namely Russia's history of violating its obligations. The unclassified version of the 2005 State Department Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments makes clear, and not for the first time, that Russia has not lived up to all of its agreements under the 1991 START agreement. Dr. Payne noted this in his recent testimony, and I quote, ``in my opinion, the most important of these violations has been discussed openly in Russian publications. It is the Russian testing of the SS-27 ICBM with MIRVs in direct violation of START. The SS-27 is listed as a single-warhead ICBM and can only be tested and deployed with a single warhead under START. Russian Sources place the number of MIRVs on this forthcoming missile at 4 or more.'' These are not the only such issues regarding the Russians compliance with START. I ask unanimous consent that the START section of the unclassified Compliance Report be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mr. KYL. Additionally, the Commission on the Strategic Posture noted that the Russians are in violation of their commitments concerning tactical nuclear weapons under the 1990-91 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. I remind my colleagues these are the same tactical nuclear weapons that Russia refuses to discuss in the follow-on treaty, a demand the administration seems to have accepted. Clearly, if the United States is going to negotiate a successor to the 1991 START agreement with the Russians, we must have a way to reconcile past compliance failures and ensure that future violations, if any, are resolved in a timely manner. As I have articulated, there are significant issues that the Senate will have to follow closely and scrutinize as a part of the process of advice and consent. This is a two-way process of consultation between the administration and the Senate. I remind my colleagues and the administration, it is more important that this be done right than quickly. Arrangements can be made to ensure that the provisions of START that enjoy almost universal support in this body do not expire, as administration officials have freely admitted. I urge the administration to continue consulting regularly with the Senate, including the National Security Working Group that I cochair with my colleague from West Virginia, Senator Byrd. I yield the floor. Exhibit 1 U.S.-Russian START Renewal Negotiations--Guidelines To Protect U.S. Interests Recognize that the U.S. nuclear deterrent force is a key element in the defense of the United States and of our allies and friends. U.S. nuclear umbrella is crucial non-proliferation tool. The U.S. nuclear umbrella is perhaps the most important nonproliferation tool we possess, as many of our allies and friends rely on our deterrent force. Absent a U.S. nuclear deterrent seen to be credible, effective and safe, those nations would have to consider developing their own nuclear weapons. Analyze first, then negotiate. The U.S. Defense Department should complete a proper Nuclear Posture Review, as mandated by Congress, before the U.S. concludes a new treaty with Russia on further nuclear weapons reductions. Limit Russian advantage in ``tactical'' nuclear weapons--A new U.S.-Russian agreement should aim to reduce the current Russian superiority over the U.S. in numbers of ``tactical'' nuclear weapons. Russia has approximately ten times the number of such weapons in the U.S. arsenal. Address before U.S. leverage shrinks--The U.S. will have less leverage to address this issue once a START renewal agreement has been concluded. Recognize the significance of Russia's large advantage in ``tactical'' nuclear weapons. The distinction between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is an artifact of the Cold War that facilitated arms control agreements on very high levels of nuclear forces. Today, the size of nuclear arsenals is much smaller and the importance of large numbers of smaller-yield weapons is much greater. To U.S. allies and friends, all nuclear weapons are strategic. An agreement that preserves the large imbalance in total numbers of deployed nuclear weapons in Russia's favor will, over time, affect the views of U.S. allies and friends on the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. U.S. policy for decades--in administrations of both parties--has been to maintain a nuclear capability second to none. That policy would be undermined by an agreement that further reduces strategic weapons while leaving so-called non-strategic weapons unlimited. Recognize existence of risks in strategic reductions below current levels--There is no compelling reason for the U.S. and Russia to reduce deployed strategic nuclear warheads below the current range of 1700-2200, as set in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). This level of offensive strategic nuclear arms, the lowest in decades, was based on analysis that took into account the dangers and uncertainties of the security environment. Quickly reducing to an arbitrary number like 1500, does not take into account these risks. Don't pay for what's free--According to credible Russian sources, Russia's strategic nuclear weapons will be reduced by approximately 60% over the next decade in any event--with or without a START renewal treaty--due to the aging or planned modernization of systems. The United States should not make concessions for the purpose of inducing Russia to make reductions that will occur anyway. Certain reductions may be harmful--Whether a reduction below the 1700-2200 range is prudent depends on a number of considerations, especially preserving deterrence and taking account of all potential adversaries. Preserve deterrence and extended deterrence--Any reductions should allow the U.S. to preserve not only deterrence of threats directly against the U.S. but also extended deterrence--for allies and partners who depend on the U.S. to deter potential nuclear aggressors. Effect on triad--In particular, any reductions should allow the U.S. to maintain a robust nuclear triad of land-based, sea-based and bomber-delivered weapons. Importance of triad--It is important to maintain the triad, lest the survivability and flexibility of the U.S. strategic posture be undermined. Consider all potential adversaries--In assessing the sufficiency of the U.S. deterrent, the potential nuclear capabilities of all possible adversaries of the U.S. and of allies and partners who depend on that deterrent should be considered, not just the capabilities of Russia. Don't incentivize proliferation--The U.S. nuclear posture should not be constrained to the point that other current or potential nuclear powers come to believe they can create a nuclear arsenal that would give them significant strategic leverage against the U.S. In any case, exercise caution in limiting delivery systems--In the interest of stability and flexibility, the U.S. should not agree to reduce the number of delivery systems in a way that would increase the vulnerability of our deterrent (including our extended deterrent that protects U.S. allies and partners). Don't incentivize MIRVs--For the same reasons, a new agreement should not restrain or penalize ``de-MIRVing''-- that is, converting multiple-warhead missiles into single- warhead missiles. Severe limits on the number of delivery systems create pressure for the parties to arm missiles with multiple warheads. Preserve U.S. ability to modernize for safety and reliability--Any agreement should preserve the right of the U.S. to develop new warheads to be able to react to unforeseen circumstances. A crucial requirement: A comprehensive modernization plan-- The Senate should not consent to any treaty until the Administration has proposed to Congress a satisfactory, comprehensive modernization plan that fulfills the modernization recommendations of the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, especially the maintenance of a safe, reliable and credible U.S. nuclear deterrent, including an extended deterrent for the protection of U.S. allies and partners. Don't constrain missile defense--A new U.S.-Russian arms control agreement should not constrain the U.S. ability to develop and deploy missile defenses. Don't constrain advanced conventional weapons--A new U.S.- Russian agreement should not constrain or penalize (1) U.S. development of advanced conventional--that is, non-nuclear weapons, including those capable of strategic strike, or (2) U.S. deployment of such weapons to replace nuclear weapons. Take account of unpredictability of technology developments--We cannot now predict what conventional weapons developments may be possible. Consider effects on programs of the future--Thus, the effect of a given treaty limitation cannot be measured only by how it would impact programs already on the books. Address Russian compliance problems--Devise a mechanism that ensures treaty violations are investigated and parties to an agreement adhere to their obligations. From the outset, the Russians have failed to comply fully with their obligations. For example, according to an August 2005 U.S. State Department report, Russia has prevented U.S. inspectors from verifying warhead limits on certain ICBMs. Update START verification--A key U.S. objective in an agreement with Russia should be to update START verification provisions to take account of new circumstances and fix problems. Verification regime extendable--Obama administration officials have a sense of urgency because the START Treaty expires in December 2009 and they want to ensure that the treaty's verification regime does not lapse. But the US and Russia can agree to extend the verification regime without having to rush to reach agreement on further weapons reductions. Endorsed by: John Bolton, Ambassador to United Nations, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security (G.W. Bush); Seth Cropsey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (G.H.W. Bush); Jack David, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Negotiations Policy (G.W. Bush); Paula DeSutter, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance and Implementation (G.W. Bush); Michael M. Dunn, Lieutenant General, U.S.A.F. (ret.); President, National Defense University; Eric Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (G.W. Bush) Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (G.W. Bush); Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Reagan); Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Ford); Robert Joseph, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security (G.W. Bush); Stephen Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation (G.W. Bush); Abram N. Shulsky, Director, Strategic Arms Control Policy, Office of Secretary of Defense; Secretary of Defense Representative to Defense and Space Talks (Reagan); James Woolsey, Director, Central Intelligence Agency (Clinton). Exhibit 2 Joint Understanding The President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation have decided on further reductions and limitations of their nations' strategic offensive arms and on concluding at an early date a new legally binding agreement to replace the current START Treaty, and directed that the new treaty contain, inter alia, the following elements: 1. A provision to the effect that each Party will reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms so that seven years after entry into force of the treaty and thereafter, the limits will be in the range of 500-1100 for strategic delivery vehicles, and in the range of 1500-1675 for their associated warheads. The specific numbers to be recorded in the treaty for these limits will be agreed through further negotiations. 2. Provisions for calculating these limits. 3. Provisions on definitions, data exchanges, notifications, eliminations, inspections and verification procedures, as well as confidence building and transparency measures, as adapted, simplified, and made less costly, as appropriate, in comparison to the START Treaty. 4. A provision to the effect that each Party will determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms. 5. A provision on the interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms. 6. A provision on the impact of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles in a non- nuclear configuration on strategic stability. 7. A provision on basing strategic offensive arms exclusively on the national territory of each Party. 8. Establishment of an implementation body to resolve questions related to treaty implementation. 9. A provision to the effect that the treaty will not apply to existing patterns of cooperation in the area of strategic offensive arms between a Party and a third state. 10. A duration of the treaty of ten years, unless it is superseded before that time by a subsequent treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms. The Presidents direct their negotiators to finish their work on the treaty at an early date so that they may sign and submit it for ratification in their respective countries. Signed at Moscow, this sixth day of July, 2009, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Madam President, I join my Republican colleagues in thanking Senator Norm Coleman for his service in the Senate. As a valued member of my whip team, Senator Coleman was devoted to solving problems in a practical and nonpartisan way. I could always expect from him a serious and interesting view of an issue and could count on him for good advice. His thoughtful and unique perspective, as well as his talent and high energy, will be missed. Senator Coleman ran a fine campaign and was a consummate gentleman throughout the long process of determining the winner of his seat. I join my colleagues in wishing him all the best in his future endeavors, and know that he will remain an important voice in our party.

Mr. KYL

Mr. KYL. Madam President, I believe there is now 5 minutes per side to debate the amendment I have offered, which is cosponsored by Senator McCain. I would appreciate it if the Chair will advise me when I have consumed 2 minutes. Senator McCain will talk for about 2 minutes, and I wish to reserve the last minute following Senator Tester. The amendment is very simple. It strikes $900,000 for an earmark for the city of Whitefish Emergency Operations Center in Montana. The administration terminated funding for these types of projects in its 2010 budget submission. This operations center has not been subject to a congressional hearing nor has it been authorized by Congress. It is a pure earmark. Not only did the administration not request funding for the project, it specifically zeroed out funding. Senator Feingold had an amendment that would have subsumed this project along with several others. That amendment failed. But he noted in regard to his amendment that while we may not all agree on the appropriateness of earmarks in general, I certainly hope we can agree certain things ought not be earmarked, including FEMA grant programs such as those protecting Americans from terrorist attacks. I quote Senator Feingold, because this is precisely the view of the 9/11 Commission. From page 396 of that report it included this recommendation: Homeland security assistance should be based strictly on an assessment of risks and vulnerabilities . . . Congress should not use this money as a pork barrel. The report goes on to state: In a free-for-all over money, it is understandable that representatives will work to protect the interests of their home states or districts, but this issue is too important for politics as usual to prevail. Resources must be allocated according to vulnerabilities. That is why in its budget submission the administration said this: The administration is proposing to eliminate the Emergency Operations Center Grant Program in the 2010 budget because the program's award allocations are not based on a risk assessment. Also, other Department of Homeland Security grant programs can provide funding for the same purposes more effectively. So you have the 9/11 Commission saying these programs should be eliminated; you have the administration saying, in its budget submission, they should be eliminated from the budget submission, that they should not be subject to earmarks. That is why our amendment is being offered.

Mr. KYL. Madam President, it is appropriate for the sponsor of the amendment to have the final word. I wish to reserve my final minute to have the last response.

Mr. KYL. Madam President, I certainly accept the argument of my friend from Montana that this could be put to good purpose in Whitefish, MT. It could be put to good use in Yuma or Nogales or anywhere else in the country. That is why the 9/11 Commission said, and I quote again: Homeland Security assistance should be based strictly on an assessment of risks and vulnerabilities . . . The Congress should not use this money as a pork barrel. All we ask is, as the administration did, that the money be allocated based on the risk assessment from the Department of Homeland Security, not on the ability of a particular Congressman or Senator to get the money earmarked in a bill. I ask unanimous consent that page 396 of the 9/11 Commission report be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks, and again urge my colleagues to support this amendment, as at least one small step we can take to demonstrate that we agree with the 9/11 Commission and we agree with the administration that these grants should be based on risk, rather than earmarks.

Mr. KYL. I believe we need to ask for the yeas and nays, and I do at this time.