Edward Kaufman

Mr. KAUFMAN

Mr. KAUFMAN. I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to support the comprehensive review of our Afghanistan policy being conducted by the Obama administration. This is the right time for such a review because conditions have changed since the President's strategy was announced on March 27. I have traveled to the region twice since then--first in April and again last month--and can confirm the recent observations of General McChrystal that the Taliban has made inroads in Afghanistan and the situation is deteriorating and serious. At the same time, political dynamics have changed in the region. There have been flawed elections in Afghanistan, and an emboldened Pakistani military has taken actions against elements in the Taliban in Pakistan. In light of these developments, we must give the President the time he needs to review the strategy and reevaluate the mission. Today marks 8 years since the U.S. military entered Afghanistan, but if there is one message I hope to convey to the American people today, it is that we have not been there in earnest since 2003. After launching a successful NATO campaign against al-Qaida and the Taliban- led government that sheltered it, resources were diverted to Iraq in 2003 before the job was finished. We essentially left Afghanistan to invade Iraq, and the result in Afghanistan was a resurgent Taliban and failure to capture Osama bin Laden. This was not the first time we left Afghanistan. After resourcing the Afghans throughout the 1980s in their efforts to beat the Soviets, we abruptly ended our support in 1989 after Soviet troops withdrew. We were then absent for 12 years until 9/11. Historically, and especially since 2003, our commitment to Afghanistan has been wavering and halfhearted. This has created a deficit of trust in the minds of the Afghans, especially among those who have allied with us and faced the prospect of life or death in our absence. I wish to repeat that. This has created a deficit of trust in the minds of Afghans, especially among those who have allied with us and faced the prospect of life or death in our absence. As we enter the ninth year of the war, it is critical to reassess our strategy so we can get it right. This is why the President's review must be complete and must be comprehensive. It is not just about combat troops or the McChrystal report. Troops are just one part of the puzzle and the report submitted by General McChrystal is just one input. The President must consider multiple perspectives on the political and regional situation from U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson, and the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke. He must also weigh broader concerns from the Department of Defense, including overall force structure and other global military requirements. The review will take time. There are many complex issues to deal with in Afghanistan which closely relate to our policy in Pakistan. The President will present his plan to the American people when he has made his decision. At that time, Congress will be an important part of the process and will hold hearings on the President's plan, as it did with the President's plans in Iraq. Then each Member of Congress will cast the most important vote for any Member of this body: whether to send additional troops abroad and how to protect them. That debate should not be about politics. I believe we must look at this challenge as a sum of the parts, and I wish to raise two primary questions. The first is about our mission and our objectives, which have been complicated by changes on the ground since March. The second is about waging an effective counterinsurgency strategy and what it would take to meet those requirements in Afghanistan. After we review our mission strategy in Afghanistan, we must also review how it correlates to our strategy in Pakistan. I will take each one of these questions in turn, both to give an indication of the complexity of the decisionmaking process and to share my observations on each subsidiary question. First, the President must ask: What are our missions and objectives? In March, he presented his mission statement: To dismantle, disrupt, and defeat al-Qaida and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent the return to Pakistan or Afghanistan. He also laid out key objectives: promoting a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan, developing increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can take the lead in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, and assisting efforts to enhance civilian control and stable government in Pakistan. As I have said, since March there have been at least three specific changes to the situation. First, there were flawed Presidential elections in August which have further eroded confidence between the Afghan people and the government. When I was in Afghanistan in April, there was hope--real hope--that these elections would lead to real change and progress. Unfortunately, the outcome has been a worst-case scenario, validating the fears of those who view the Afghan Government as plagued by corruption. As each day passes, the steady stream of election fraud revealed in the media further undermines trust in the Karzai government. This is especially harmful to our overall counterinsurgency strategy because the goal is to build support among the Afghan people for their government. Remember, this is not--not--between us and the Taliban, it is between the Afghans and the Taliban, and the perception of government corruption only strengthens the Taliban. Second, we must review the challenges of training the Afghan national security forces. While the Afghan National Army has demonstrated an ability to fight, there are serious questions about its size and effectiveness, and problems are even worse among the Afghan National Police. Recruitment has been slow, attrition has been high, there are no noncommissioned officers, and many among the ranks are illiterate. To build the ANA and ANP, we need to overcome limiting factors in the dearth of leadership development, qualified recruits, infrastructure, trainers, and equipment. During my trip to Helmand Province last month, I was struck by the side-by-side image of the Afghan Army troops in Toyota pickup trucks and U.S. troops in Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles, or MRAPS. There is widespread recognition that there is a long way to go before the Afghan security forces can be self-sufficient and that the training plan requires adjustments. We are now embedding American trainers with Afghan battalions to enhance leadership development, but we continue to do this better, which is why I strongly support Senator Levin's plan to prioritize and focus on training the Afghan Army and police. Specifically, I agree that we must expedite the training, equipping, and support for the army and police so they can double in size to 240,000 for the army and 160,000 for the police, not by 2013 but by 2012, and hopefully by the end of 2011. Based on my September trip to Afghanistan with Senators Levin and Reed, I believe this training can be expedited with the necessary focus and resources. This must--I say, must--be a top priority because our overall goal is not nation building in Afghanistan; it is self-sufficiency for the Afghans so they can provide for their own security, much like what has happened in Iraq. The third changed condition we must consider is recent developments in Pakistan. When I traveled there in April, the situation was grave. The tension between the Pakistani Government and the Taliban was mounting. The deal that was cut with the Taliban to relinquish control over Swat Valley was unraveling, the Frontier Corps did not have the capacity to ``clear and hold'' in the tribal areas and border region, and I walked away very concerned about the overall political situation. Immediately after the trip, the Pakistani military took decisive action against the Taliban in Swat Valley and has since regained control of the area. With our help, the Frontier Corps is building its capacity, and we just passed the Kerry-Lugar legislation, which would triple economic aid to Pakistan. On my most recent trip in September, it was clear the political security environment had improved, but I still remain concerned about al-Qaida and its allies continuing to use Pakistan as a safe haven. As we review our mission--taking into account these three developments and changing conditions--we must also consider the strategy used to meet our objectives. In March, the President announced ``an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency strategy'' for Afghanistan. Partnering with the population and training local security forces has proven to be the best way to defeat insurgencies over time. Let me repeat: Partnering with the population and training local security forces has proven to be the best way to defeat insurgencies over time. Therefore, the second principal question we must ask is, Do we have the requirements necessary for waging an effective counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan? Before I address these questions, let me say that I am struck--truly struck--by how quickly the military has adapted to counterinsurgency and how, from the bottom up, it has been adopted. Since General Petraeus wrote the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual in 2006, counterinsurgency has become fundamental to our military doctrine. As long as we maintain the strength of our conventional forces, it is increasingly unlikely anyone will take on the U.S. military through conventional means. Let me repeat that. As long as we maintain the strength of our conventional forces, it is increasingly unlikely anyone will take on the U.S. military through conventional means. We must, therefore, prepare to fight future wars against insurgencies, nonstate actors, and asymmetrical forces. As such, the military, under the leadership of Secretary Gates, is rebalancing its budget and making other fundamental changes. This is remarkable to me because any large organization, especially one as large as the U.S. military, is like a supertanker: it just does not turn easily. Through an incredible organizational effort, however, this supertanker has changed course, and I am truly impressed by the extent to which DOD and the U.S. military have accomplished this and have embraced counterinsurgency, from the privates to the four-star generals. Counterinsurgency is a four-step process: First, shape a strategy; second, clear the area of insurgents; third, hold the area; and fourth, build through governance, essential services, and economic ability. It is important to note that troops are just one part of a counterinsurgency strategy. Equally important is training the indigenous security forces, providing essential services, promoting economic development, and strengthening systems of governance. General McChrystal has recommended a full counterinsurgency approach in Afghanistan. As he mentions in his report, we should not resource the mission without reconsidering the strategy, and focusing on troop levels or resources alone ``misses the point entirely.'' Therefore, I ask again, do we have the requirements for an effective counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan? In order to explore this question, we must look at three key areas--governance, training, and the civilian role--and ask the following questions: First, can the Afghan Government offer a winning alternative to the Taliban? Second, can we train enough Afghan troops and police to meet the required number of counterinsurgents? Third, do we have enough civilians? Finally, we must also consider how to develop an effective strategy for reintegrating low-level insurgents. Counterinsurgency is about trust building between the local population, the security forces, and the government. Without trust, we cannot expect sustainable progress, and that is why I am particularly concerned about allegations of fraud in the Afghan elections. If this were a political campaign, there would be no need to run negative ads against the Taliban. According to the polls, the Taliban has only 6 percent support among the Afghan population. This is the good news. The bad news is that in the absence of jobs, credible governance, and essential services, this does not translate into support for the Afghan Government by the Afghan people. This is why we cannot just target the Taliban or insurgents. We must help the government develop a capacity to provide for its people so it can be viewed as credible and effective. This is why the outcome of the recent election must be resolved in a clear manner so that whatever trust remains between the Afghan people and the government is not further diminished. We must ask--can we succeed in a counterinsurgency with a Karzai government tainted by allegations of fraud and corruption? How do we recalibrate our strategy in light of the recent flawed elections? The second question I would like to raise is about the amount of counterinsurgents we need to succeed. Counterinsurgency doctrine tells us that troop size is not determined by the size of the enemy, but rather, by the size of the population. As such, we need a ratio of one counterinsurgent for every 50 citizens. The latest CIA World Factbook estimates the population of Afghanistan at 28 million, which means that we need roughly 560,000 ``boots on the ground'' which includes Afghans, NATO troops, and Americans. During our visit, we learned that there have been 94,000 Afghan National Army and 82,000 Afghan National Police trained as of August. This brings the total number of trained Afghans to slightly less than 200,000. Combine this with 68,000 U.S. troops by the end of the year, and 38,000 NATO forces, and we have reached nearly 300,000. This is slightly more than half of the requisite number of troops, and is overly-generous in assuming that all trained Afghan security forces are combat ready and effective. Just by comparison, in Iraq, a country of two-thirds the size, there are already more than 600,000 trained security forces. No one is suggesting we fill this enormous vacuum with American troops, which is why we must focus on expediting training for the Afghans. And this is what Senators Levin, Reed, and I heard was wanted and needed by the Afghans themselves during our recent visit. In the Garmsir District of Helmand Province, we met with more than one hundred local Afghans and tribal elders who insisted they want to independently secure their own population. They realize the need for U.S. troops to help to train and equip the Afghan National Security Forces, and recognized that American assistance is needed to accomplish this mission. But once the Afghans are able to provide security for themselves, they will be ready for us to end our military presence. In the words of the elders--once the Afghan security forces are trained, we will be welcome simply as ``guests.'' In the meantime, we have to find a way to prioritize training, so Afghans can eventually fill the security vacuums with minimal American assistance. The third question regarding an effective counterinsurgency strategy is: do we have enough civilians to implement counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, and how can we expedite the deployment and training of civilians? According to counterinsurgency strategy, once the troops have cleared and held an area with the support of Afghan Security Forces, civilians must partner with Afghans to build. And we need hundreds of additional civilians on the ground to fulfill a wide range of non-military requirements including improvements in agriculture, economic development, essential services, and governance. We have heard lots of talk in Washington about the need for a ``civilian surge'' to complement the additional troops President Obama has pledged for Afghanistan this year. Many of those civilians have been hired, and the State Department expects to have nearly 1,000 civilians on the ground in Afghanistan by the end of this year. I support these efforts, but still believe that more must be done to build a stronger civilian capacity in Afghanistan. During a visit to Camp Atterbury in Indiana last week, I met with 38 civilians deploying to Afghanistan. At Atterbury, civilians train with the military to cultivate an integrated approach and greater unity of mission. Like our soldiers, these civilians volunteer to leave their families behind and put themselves in harm's way to better the future of Afghanistan. We owe them and their families a debt of gratitude for their service, and we must ensure they have the tools, support, and training they need to succeed. Civilians serving in Afghanistan from across the interagency are sharing trir expertise in everything from agriculture to governance, counternarcotics, accounting, energy, development, and education. The role of the military and civilians are complementary--one cannot succeed without the other. This is why military officials including Secretary Gates and General McChrystal are some of the strongest advocates for a deepened civilian commitment to Afghanistan. To succeed in counterinsurgency, we must do everything we can to expedite and increase the recruitment and deployment of qualified civilians. Finally, when formulating an effective counterinsurgency strategy, we must ask if we have developed a plan for reintegrating low- and mid- level Taliban. I am not suggesting we speak with Mullah Omar or other members of the Taliban leadership, but we must recognize there are many Afghans working with the Taliban for purely economic reasons. One of the striking observations on my two trips was the fact that a primary concern of Afghans is jobs, just like Americans. And if we can offer economic incentives and alternative sources of livelihood--especially with regard to the drug trade--I am hopeful that we can reintegrate some insurgents ready to disavow violence. This will not be quick or easy, but the good news is that reintegration is possible, based largely on the model we successfully used for the Sons of Iraq. You can see the complexities of determining our mission and objectives are great, and multiple questions remain in developing an effective counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan. But these considerations are only half the story. Once we have reviewed the strategy and mission, we must also consider how our policy in Afghanistan impacts Pakistan. As the President announced on March 27, ``the ability of extremists in Pakistan to undermine Afghanistan is proven, while insurgency in Afghanistan feeds instability in Pakistan.'' The relationship is clear and U.S. interests are inextricably linked, which is why the President adopted the regional approach coined ``Af-Pak.'' In my view, there are four primary challenges in Pakistan that we must consider when formulating our strategy in Afghanistan. First, Pakistan is a vital security interest because it has become a safe haven for al-Qaida, which has continued to train there and plan for future attacks on Americans. We know this based on the arrest less than three weeks ago of Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan planning a large- scale attack in New York, who is believed to have trained with al-Qaida in Pakistan. Second, Pakistan has nuclear weapons and the delivery vehicles to use them. Therefore, political instability in Pakistan is not only a regional threat, but a larger global security interest. If Pakistan was destabilized or if control over its nuclear arsenal was compromised, it would pose severe security repercussions. It would be a nightmare scenario to have Pakistan ruled by fundamentalist religious fanatics with ``loose nukes'' in the hands of al-Qaida or other extremists. Third, Pakistan's ongoing tension with India has limited its ability to respond fully to internal threats, such as the Taliban. The Pakistani military continues to see India as its number one threat, and has therefore hesitated to shift its focus from its eastern border to the west. This has improved in recent months since the Pakistani military went into Swat, but any U.S. policy must take into account Pakistani concerns about India. Fourth, elements of the Pakistani intelligence service, or ISI, have at times allied with the Afghan Taliban. On the one hand, they want to hedge against a total U.S. total withdrawal from Afghanistan, as we did in 1989, or a limited withdrawal as we did in 2003. On the other hand, many in Pakistan worry that an increase of U.S. forces in Afghanistan may push extremists further into Pakistan. This view was expressed today by the Pakistani Foreign Minister in the Washington Post. Quoted in an editorial, Foreign Minister Qureshi stated, ``If the likes of Mullah Omar take over in Afghanistan, it will have serious repercussions for Pakistan . . .'' He went on to say that the Taliban's actions in Afghanistan ``. . . will have implications on Pakistan and it will have implications on the region.'' All of these considerations indicate the need for a sustained U.S. commitment to Pakistan, which is why Congress just passed the Kerry- Lugar bill and economic assistance package. This is a $7.5 billion vote of confidence in the Pakistani people, meant to demonstrate that our commitment to Pakistan is strong and enduring. It is also meant to demonstrate that our interests are not just limited to the border with Afghanistan. In conclusion, as one can see in the detail and number of questions that I have raised, this reassessment of our Af-Pak strategy is about much more than sending additional U.S. combat troops into Afghanistan. As Senator Levin has pointed out, talking about troop levels in Afghanistan is similar to talking about the public option in health care reform. Just as the public option is only one element of the health care debate, U.S. troop levels are just one element of a much broader set of issues in Afghanistan. The White House is now engaged in the necessary process of evaluating realities on the ground and questioning underlying assumptions. I fully support this process. The questions I raise today are intended to contribute to this ongoing review, so that we may find the right solution. The stakes are too high for us to carry on business as usual or to ignore the changing dynamics in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is why the President should weigh all perspectives about conditions on the ground and the region, our counterinsurgency strategy, and the way forward in our mission. I fully support the President's comprehensive approach, and I agree it is needed because we have to get this right. We owe it to ourselves, we owe it to the American people, and we owe it to the brave men and women who continue to serve with great courage, honor and sacrifice in Afghanistan. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I thank Chairman Mikulski and Ranking Member Shelby for their work on this bill. I rise today to speak about the importance of strengthening the Federal Government's ability to investigate and prosecute the kinds of financial crimes that have contributed to our financial crisis. I am pleased this appropriations bill adds significant resources for fraud enforcement, thanks to Chairwoman Mikulski and her committee and their attention to this critical issue. In May, Congress passed the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act or FERA. In the aftermath of September 11, Federal law enforcement resources were shifted dramatically, and understandably, to counterterrorism. One of the central features of FERA was to authorize the appropriation of substantial resources to rebuild our capacity to attack mortgage fraud and other white-collar crime. FERA was passed with overwhelming bipartisan support. The vote was 92 to 4 in the Senate, demonstrating our shared commitment to this effort. Today's economic crisis has many causes, from serious regulatory failures to recklessness and greed. While we still have much to learn about what happened, one thing is absolutely certain: We need law enforcement investigators and prosecutors with ample resources and training to drill down now. Only a targeted and thorough investigation can find out the extent to which financial fraud contributed to the crisis and identify the individuals involved who should be held responsible. We need to look at the mortgage brokers who engaged in systemic fraud. But we must also examine the financial institutions that pooled subprime mortgages and sold them with knowledge that they were toxic, the credit rating agencies that failed due to conflicts of interest to grade the assets properly, and the investment banks that failed to disclose the fair value of the toxic assets on their books. In order to restore the public's faith in our financial markets and in the rule of law, we must identify, prosecute, and send to prison those individuals who broke the law. If we do less than that, we will fail to serve the American public and we will risk history repeating itself. But these cases are extremely complex. In this area, the bad guys have substantial resources at their disposal to fend off investigations. We need to remain vigilant in ensuring that our investigators and prosecutors are not overmatched. That is why I am pleased to see the substantial resources devoted to fraud enforcement in this bill. The bill appropriates over $500 million for fraud enforcement, a 10-percent increase over last year. At the FBI, it adds funding for 50 new agents, 61 new forensic accountants, and 32 professional support staff, all devoted to investigating financial fraud. As a result of this increase and other resource allocation decisions by the FBI, we now will have investigative resources approaching those devoted to the savings and loan crisis. The bill also adds funding for 155 new lawyers and 49 support staff in the Department of Justice and U.S. Attorneys offices, all dedicated to financial fraud enforcement. I was proud to join with Chairman Leahy and Senator Grassley in sponsoring the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act. I look forward to working with them and our colleagues on the Judiciary Committee to make sure these significant new resources are used wisely and effectively. In closing, I thank Chairman Inouye as well as, again, Chairwoman Mikulski and Ranking Member Shelby for making funding for financial fraud enforcement a high priority of this bill. I look forward to working together going forward to make sure that as the economy recovers, we do not lose sight of the importance of fully funding enforcement efforts, not only to uncover and prosecute financial crimes that have already been committed but also to defer future crimes. Prosecuting bad people won't put an end to bad behavior, but it will have an impact on those people in the mortgage industry, on the trading desks, and in the boardrooms who might be tempted to put greed ahead of the law. Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor and note the absence of a quorum.

Mr. KAUFMAN

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the concurrent resolution be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table, with no intervening action or debate, and that any statements relating to the concurrent resolution be printed in the Record.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of S. Con. Res. 45, which was submitted earlier today.

Mr. KAUFMAN

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, rollcall votes are expected to occur throughout the day in relation to amendments to the CJS appropriations bill and on any available conference reports, if we are able to reach an agreement on any conference reports.

Mr. KAUFMAN

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that it stand adjourned under the previous order.

Mr. KAUFMAN

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of S. Res. 306, submitted earlier today.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table, with no intervening action or debate, and that any statements relating to the resolution be printed in the Record.

Mr. KAUFMAN

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table, with no intervening action or debate, and that any statements relating to the resolution be printed in the Record.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of S. Res. 304, submitted earlier today.

Mr. KAUFMAN

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to welcome home the Delaware Army National Guard's 261st Tactical Signal Brigade from Iraq. Just over 1 year ago, on October 2, 2008, 110 brave citizen soldiers left behind their families in the great State of Delaware to serve their country with honor in Iraq. Nearly 1 year later, on September 30, 2009, all 110 members of the 261st returned to Dover Air Force Base to be reunited with their families. I am extremely grateful that each member of the 261st has returned safely to Delaware, and I offer them my deep gratitude, respect, and admiration for their service. I know I speak for all Delawareans when I say just how proud I am of their contributions in Iraq. Under the leadership of the Delaware National Guard Adjutant General, MAJ Frank Vavala, the 261st trained for 1 year to prepare for their deployment. Under the command of BG Scott Chambers they served with distinction at Camp Victory in Baghdad. I had the privilege of visiting the 261st in April and then again in September during my two visits to Iraq. I was enormously proud to see the tremendous work they were doing, and I was honored to spend time with these inspiring men and women from Delaware during my trip. While in Iraq, the 261st played a critical role as the first National Guard unit to maintain and administer the communications network. They also ran the Baghdad Signal University which trained Iraqi nationals in communication skills. During each visit, I was impressed by the professionalism and the commitment of the members of the 261st. There is no question that their unique skill set and unwavering commitment greatly contributed to the U.S. mission in Iraq. As we see progress in infrastructure and security in Iraq, it is due in no small part to the efforts of the Delaware National Guard. The 261st worked tirelessly to share their expertise and knowledge with their Iraqi counterparts, expanding the Iraqi capacity to manage their own communications networks and systems. The families of the Guard can rest assured knowing that despite their great sacrifice over the past year and the difficulties they faced in being separated from their loved ones, the 261st left Iraq a better place because of their service. The volunteers of the 261st are part of a proud and historic Delaware tradition. For decades, the 261st has served its country with great honor and distinction. Since 1924, it has deployed in times of need, first, as a part of the Delaware National Guard 261st Coast Artillery Battalion. The 261st was activated again on January 27, 1941, to participate in coastal defense operations during World War II. Since then, the mission of the 261st has evolved from defending the homeland to a broader global mission, such as that in Iraq, where it played a vital role in building communication networks and engaging in information operations. We are truly fortunate as a nation to have so many dedicated volunteers willing to serve on the front lines defending our interests at home and abroad, and I am especially grateful to the 261st for their courageous service. As we welcome this unit home from Delaware, we also send our prayers for the safe return of all of those serving our Nation in Afghanistan and Iraq. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. KAUFMAN

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand adjourned until 9:30 a.m. tomorrow, Wednesday, October 7; that following the prayer and the pledge, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, the morning hour be deemed expired, the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day, and the Senate proceed to a period of morning business for up to 1 hour with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes each, with the time equally divided and controlled between the two leaders or their designees, with the majority controlling the first half and the Republicans controlling the final half; that following morning business, the Senate resume consideration of H.R. 2847, Commerce-Justice-Science appropriations.

Mr. KAUFMAN

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table, with no intervening action or debate, and that any statements relating to this measure be printed in the Record.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of S. Res. 305, which was introduced earlier today.

Mr. KAUFMAN

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I would like to thank Senator Levin for submitting this important resolution to commemorate the significance of the War of 1812. ``America's Second War of Independence''--as it is sometimes called--was a critical turning point in forming the Nation we know today. Battles took place throughout the country to define our borders and secure our independence. One of those engagements took place in Lewes, DE. Lewes sits at the mouth of the Delaware River--a critical gateway to Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Trenton. In March of 1813, under the command of Commodore John Beresford, the British Royal Navy established a blockade of the Delaware Bay and River. Beresford demanded that Lewes provide his squadron with meat, vegetables, and other supplies. He warned that, ``If you refuse to comply with this request, I shall be under the necessity of destroying your town.'' The residents of Lewes stood their ground. America was at war, and Lewes officials refused to help the British--even though the blockade was significantly impairing trade in the region and driving up the cost of goods. Lewes prepared for attack. The Delawareans knew they did not have the ammunition to match the British ships, but they readied for battle as best as they could. Led by the intrepid Colonel Samuel Davis, local militias were called in to build a basic fort and small watchtower to protect the town. They blew out the lamps in the Cape Henlopen lighthouse and moved the buoys that marked the shoals in the bay, hoping to disorient enemy vessels during an assault. On April 6, the British launched their attack. They fired hundreds of cannon balls at Lewes, yet they were unable to do heavy damage to the town. This was partially because the creative tactics of the Delawarean militia disoriented the British, and none of their larger ships were able to get close to shore. The people of Lewes also retrieved many of the cannons that landed in soft soil and fired them back at the British. The engagement at Lewes also holds historical significance for the first-ever use of the Congreve rocket. The red glare of these rockets, when used during a similar attack on Fort McHenry in Baltimore, would inspire Francis Scott Key to write the ``Star Spangled Banner.'' After 22 hours of bombarding Lewes, Beresford's ships retreated on April 7. Although short of supplies and trained soldiers, the people of Lewes were able to repel and cause damage to the British vessels. There was no loss of life in Lewes and a local poet summarized the attack with the simple phrase: ``The commodore and his men, wounded a pig and killed a hen.'' The defenders of Lewes were brave and resourceful, and while this small battle in Lewes may not have changed the course of the war, it demonstrated to the British--and to the world--that Americans were united and strong in defense of their country. The War of 1812 was a significant turning point in our natural development. It solidified our independence and marked the emergence of our Nation as a great power. I am pleased to cosponsor Senator Levin's resolution to issue a stamp commemorating the War of 1812.

Mr. KAUFMAN

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I ask for a voice vote.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that amendment No. 2578 be modified with the changes at the desk.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I am grateful to the Senator from the State of Hawaii and the Senator from the State of Mississippi for their work on this very important bill. I also thank Senator Jack Reed from Rhode Island, Senator Lugar, and Senator Bayh for their support of this amendment, which instructs the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Department of State and USAID, to continue to support the integrated civilian-military training for all civilians deploying to Afghanistan, occurring once a month in Indiana at Camp Atterbury. The civilian role in Afghanistan is absolutely critical to achieving the broader goals of counterinsurgency. As we discuss the way forward in Afghanistan, it is essential to remember that troop levels are only one part of that strategy. In order to cultivate support among the population and implement an effective counterinsurgency, civilians from across government agencies must continue to partner and work in tandem with the military. In May, I offered an amendment to the supplemental which aimed to ensure that civilians deploying to Afghanistan receive training that cultivates greater civilian-military unity of mission and which emphasized the importance of counterinsurgency and stability operations. Prior to passage of this amendment, joint civil-military training was only occurring once every 9 months to coincide with scheduled military deployments. Since then, officials throughout the government--and especially the State Department--realized this was insufficient to meet the increased needs presented by the civilian surge in Afghanistan. As such, the joint training schedule was increased to once a month, and Ambassadors Eikenberry and Holbrooke recently mandated that all civilians working in the field in Afghanistan must receive this training prior to deployment. On Monday, I visited Camp Atterbury to observe and express my support for the training, to thank these brave men and women for their service, and to emphasize the key role of our civilians in Afghanistan. Civilians from across the interagency process--including the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of Agriculture--have come together in Camp Atterbury for a 1-week intensive course with the military, where they simulate real life experiences in Afghanistan. This includes participating in vignettes with role players and the military to brainstorm ways to help their Afghan partners deliver essential services, security, and economic opportunity. This essential skill set and level of familiarity with the military would take weeks to achieve once in theater. But the integrated training at Camp Atterbury allows our civilians heading to Afghanistan to hit the ground running. Given the increased demand for this training, I am offering an amendment to ensure that training at Camp Atterbury continues to receive the support it needs in terms of military and civilian personnel, trainers, and other resources. With a new mandate from Ambassadors Holbrooke and Eikenberry, the class size for this training has obviously increased. As we continue with the civilian surge, I hope the training at Camp Atterbury will receive a commensurate level of increased funding and support which it needs. We owe it to our brave men and women in Afghanistan to get this right. It is critical to remember that our strategy in Afghanistan is not just about the troops; it is also about the civilians. Just as we seek to ensure our troops headed to the field have the proper preparation and equipment, it is critical our civilians have the same level of training to ensure their effectiveness and security. As the number of civilians in Afghanistan continues to grow--up to nearly 1,000 by the end of the year--our support for this mandatory training must also increase. Integrated civilian-military training is a great example of steps being taken to improve our counterinsurgency strategy. In order to succeed in Afghanistan, civilians must successfully partner with the Afghans to help provide essential services, to promote economic development, and to improve systems of governance. I am especially grateful to the Indiana National Guard. General Umbarger, adjutant general of the Indiana National Guard, and General Touley are so involved in this and doing such a wonderful job. They are to be commended. I also am grateful to the staff at Camp Atterbury and the broader training support team from the Departments of State, Defense, and USAID. Most important, I am extremely grateful to the thousands of our brave men and women--civilian and military--who are serving in Afghanistan. I believe this amendment is noncontroversial, and with support of the bill managers, I will be more than happy to adopt it by voice vote at the appropriate time. I yield the floor.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside, and I call up amendment No. 2578.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I cannot think of two better people to be involved in a discussion about what we should be doing in Afghanistan than Senator McCain and Senator Levin. Where I come down on this issue is with Senator Levin because I believe it is very important we give the President time to discuss this issue in detail. There are a lot of different pieces to this puzzle. It is not just General McChrystal's report. It is a report by Ambassador Eikenberry. It is a report by Ambassador Holbrooke. I think he would have a report from Ambassador Patterson from Pakistan. I think we need a report from the DOD in terms of force structure and what additional troops we would have beyond that. There are a number of issues that have to be dealt with here. I think as in the past with President Bush, where there was a 3-month process before the surge--during that time, people were able to talk to the President, and to work their way up the chain of command in the military, and the civilians to work their way up in the Department of Defense, to talk to the President so the President could have their counsel before the President made his decision. I think that is what we need here. I think one of the most important things President Obama said in his speech the other night to the joint session was: I am going to be here for a long time, so I want to get it right. We have to get it right in Afghanistan. I think this is the obvious time to proceed. Clearly, the present election and the flaws in the election, in addition to General McChrystal's report which points out the rise of the Taliban, demonstrates it is time for us to sit down and take a hard look at what our strategy in Afghanistan is. I think the President is going to do that. He is going to go through a process. Many people have to be involved. Many different issues have to be done. And then the President will come with his plan for Afghanistan. At that time, after that happens, I think then--Chairman Levin is correct--we should have hearings, we should have people come and testify, and that will be the time to do it. In the meantime, I think we owe it to the military chain of command that everyone involved in that chain of command be allowed to come and talk to the President so he can make the best decision he can possibly make before the Senate gets an opportunity to deal with everyone who is going to be involved with the President. So, again, I support Senator Levin's amendment. I think it is essential we have a process that allows it to go forward.