Jim Leach

Mr. LEACH

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, very briefly, I would simply like to express a lot of personal appreciation to Chairman Mike Oxley of the Banking Committee, Spencer Bachus and all those who have preceded us on this side, to Chairman Sensenbrenner and, extraordinarily, to Bob Goodlatte who has led this movement for quite a long time. I also want to express a great deal of respect for points in the opposition, Ron Paul, our distinguished Libertarian leader in the House, and Barney Frank, who from a liberal perspective has taken a Libertarian view, have thoughts that deserve great respect; and I have always admired the work of the ranking member, John Conyers, on this committee. But I want to just conclude with this observation. This is not a partisan bill. It is not an ideological bill. As Ms. Hooley very thoughtfully reflected, from a Democratic perspective, this is a family bill, and this bill, I am hopeful, will get a lot of support from both sides, and it will get a little opposition from both sides. This is for the good of the American people, and in the development of legislation like this, outside groups do play a role. Sometimes they are nefarious; that happens around here. Sometimes they are high-minded. When I think of Marty Gold of the NFL, when I think of Cynthia Abrams from United Methodist Church, I think of really fine Americans who have indicated that we should act in this area, and I am honored to work with them. I urge support for this legislation.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Pitts).

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Aderholt).

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3\1/4\ minutes. Mr. Speaker, for nearly a decade, many in the Congress have sought to deter Internet gambling. But time and again the issue has been stymied, often in ways that reflect imperfectly on this institution. But it cannot be stressed enough that from a macroeconomic perspective, there are no social benefits for Internet gambling, and from a microfamily perspective, enormous harm is frequently inflicted. John Kindt, a professor of business at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign calls the Internet ``crack cocaine for gamblers. There are no needle marks,'' he says. ``There is no alcohol on the breath. You just click the mouse and lose your house.'' These comments could not be more apropos than for Greg Hogan, Jr., a 19-year old Lehigh University class president and chaplain's assistant from Barberton, Ohio. This pastor's son gambled away $7,500 playing online Texas Hold-'Em, then confessed to robbing a bank to try to recover his losses. His life is ruined. Never before has it been so easy to lose so much money, so quickly, at such a young age. Internet casinos are proliferating. Soon they will be ubiquitous. In the next 5 years, if Congress does not act to clarify and enforce the laws banning Internet gambling, and if Internet casinos' business plans come to pass, gamblers will be able to place bets not just from their home computers but also from their cell phones, while they drive from work, or from their BlackBerrys as they wait in line at the movies. Mr. Speaker, the time has come for Congress to finally deal with the subject matter. The measure before us, H.R. 4411, is supported by the NCAA, all the major professional sports organizations, from the NFL and Major League Baseball to the NBA and NHL, as well as the financial services industry, family groups, religious organizations and 48 of the 50 State attorneys general. The reason the sports groups support the legislation, as our colleague, Tom Osborne, so thoughtfully noted, is that they are concerned with the integrity of the games. The reason the religious community has come together is that they are concerned for the unity of the American family. Internet gambling is not a subject touched upon in the Old or New Testament or the Koran or the Bhagavad Gita. But the pastoral function is one of dealing with families in difficulty. And religious leaders of all denominations and faiths are seeing gambling difficulties erode family values. It will be suggested in this debate that there is no call to rein in activities of individual choice. But it should be clear that in the history of the Western world, whenever gambling has been legalized it has been subject to careful regulation. This is simply not the case with the Internet. Nor is it the case that an individual's misjudgment does not affect society as a whole. There is nothing in Internet gambling that adds to the GDP or makes America more competitive in the world. Indeed, if an individual cannot repay his or her debt, neighbors will be subject to higher interest rates. Everyone loses if this industry continues its remarkable growth. While Congress has failed to act, the illegal Internet gambling industry has boomed. This year, Americans are projected to send more than $6 billion to unregulated, offshore, online casinos, half of the $12 billion that will be bet worldwide on Internet gambling, FBI and Justice Department experts have warned that Internet gambling sites are vulnerable to be used for money laundering, drug trafficking and even terrorist financing. Further, these sites evade rigorous U.S.-based regulations that control gambling by minors and problem gamblers, and ensure the integrity of the games. Internet gambling's characteristics are unique: online players can gamble 24 hours a day from home; children may play without sufficient age verification; and betting with a credit card can undercut a player's perception of the value of cash, leading to addiction, bankruptcy and crime. Unlike in brick-and-mortar casinos in the United States where legal protections for bettors exist and where there is some compensatory social benefit in jobs and tax revenues, Internet gambling sites principally yield only liabilities to America and to Americans. H.R. 4411 was introduced to provide federal and state governments strong tools to enforce existing gambling prohibitions. It would crack down on illegal gambling by clarifying that the Wire Act covers all forms of interstate gambling and would account for new technologies. Designed to cut the money flow from gamblers to Internet gambling sites, the bill would enhance criminal penalties for gambling businesses settling Internet wagers with financial instruments such as credit cards, checks, or fund transfers. It would also require payment systems to establish procedures for blocking these transactions. Internet gambling has become as much a part of the college experience as late-night study sessions and rooting for the football team. Researchers have called gambling online addictive. Players attest to becoming obsessed with it. The activity is illegal, but the law is not being forced. According to a study by the Annenberg Public Policy Center, nearly 10 percent of college students gambled online last year. They play in their dorm rooms, in library lounges, in class. The number of college males who reported gambling online once a week or more quadrupled in the last year alone. Finally, a note about horseracing. In 1978, Congress passed the Interstate Horseracing Act (IHA) to set forth the rights and responsibilities applicable to interstate wagering on horseracing, to affirm that States have primary responsibility for regulating gambling within their borders, and to prevent States from interfering with the gambling policies of other States. In 2000, Congress amended the IHA to clarify that the statute applied to the transmission of interstate off- track wagers via telephone or other electronic media. The Executive Branch has taken the position that the 1961 Wire Act overrides the IHA, even though the IHA is a more recent statute, because neither statute expressly exempts IHA transactions from the Wire Act. The horseracing industry vigorously disagrees. H.R. 4411 has been very carefully drafted to maintain the status quo regarding horseracing, preserving the ability of the Executive Branch and the horseracing industry to litigate the proper interpretation of these two statutes. The text of the bill is clear: ``this Act does not change which activates related to horseracing may or may not be allowed under Federal law.'' To the degree this act provides new definitional standards, it bolsters rather than diminishes the Justice Department's latitude. Bills of this nature are always controversial and subject to intense lobbying by powerful interests. I believe the approach on the table represents the only credible initiative likely to be considered in the foreseeable future. I urge support for this important legislation. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Shadegg).

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Wolf), who has been a phenomenal advocate of this issue.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Dent), who represents Lehigh University.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to a great leader of this particular effort, Mr. Bachus from Alabama.

Mr. LEACH

Mr. LEACH. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. LEACH. Let me respond directly to that. The horse racing provisions in this bill reflect the Interstate Horse Racing Act. To the degree that there is any change, it is a slight upgrading restriction in horse racing, because the new definitional structures put in this bill apply to the Wire Act. This bill does not touch the dispute between the Justice Department and the horse racing community. But it increases the strength of the Justice Department's position in the sense that these new definitional structures that will apply to the Wire Act will also apply to horse racing itself.

Mr. LEACH. Actually, let me respond to that.

Mr. LEACH. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I hadn't intended to speak during the rule. I would comment to begin with on Mr. McGovern's point. I think he has a really quite excellent one on the minimum wage. But I must frankly differ quite profoundly with the comments of my good friend, the distinguished ranking member of the Judiciary Committee from Michigan. The public record is very clear, John, and there is no equivocation, no conceivable other interpretation. A bill was brought to the floor in the year 2000, which was brought by Bob Goodlatte, and a great deal of lobbying went into it to defeat it by Mr. Abramoff. It did not get the requisite two-thirds vote. Subsequently, in addition, the record is quite clear, on three separate occasions, the House banking committee brought a bill out that was not allowed to come to the floor. And there is every indication that it was a group led by Mr. Abramoff and others that blocked the leadership from allowing the bill to come to the floor. And so I do not want anyone to think and be sidetracked into any other interpretation. This is an interpretation, by the way, fully shared by all of the outside groups looking at the issue. I know of no group that has a different interpretation than this. Now, I recognize the gentleman has a long-held view about the appropriateness, and it is a credible approach of legalizing gambling. It is not an approach that I share, but it is credible. And this bill goes in the other direction. As we go down this path, it is important that we all reflect the issues that we believe in from one perspective or another, but I don't think we should misinterpret history. And I know Mr. Goodlatte from your committee has personal scars on what happened from influence peddlers from the outside world that have come and blocked approaches that he has advocated for long periods of time, and I have advocated also for a fair length of time.

Mr. LEACH

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's table the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 409) commemorating the 60th anniversary of the ascension to the throne of His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej of Thailand, with a Senate amendment thereto, and concur in the Senate amendment.

Mr. LEACH

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, last week the House entertained 10 hours of debate on the Iraq war. The unamendable resolution which formed the basis of the debate was a partisan measure crafted to be a simple endorsement of our troops, a subject upon which all Americans are united. But the resolution also scoffed at the notion of establishing time lines for withdrawal and thus implicitly sanctioned a prolonged engagement, implying that it might be considered a 21st century version of Lyndon Johnson's Gulf of Tonkin resolution. During the debate, several of us suggested that the longer we stay in Iraq, the greater the prospect that forces of anarchy will multiply and spread, perhaps across oceans. I would like to amplify on this concern. From an American perspective, the two central issues in our Iraq policy are how best to advance our long-term national interests and how best to protect our troops. At issue is whether a prolonged engagement makes better sense than a time-lined withdrawal policy. The case for a prolonged engagement involves a neocon objective of establishing semipermanent bases in Iraq and neighboring emirates from which American military power, or the threat thereof, can be readily projected against Syria or Iran, or potentially Saudi Arabia if it were to become radicalized. It also allows greater flexibility in support of the new Iraqi Government. On the other hand, there is a thin line between being a liberating and an occupying power that many in the Muslim world either do not accept or think has been crossed. Sometimes it is as hard to determine when to end a war as when to start one. It may have been a mistake to intervene in Iraq in the first place, but clearly a precipitous departure after our initial engagement would have been an error. By the same token, prolonging our involvement runs the risk of causing American forces supporting the Shi'a majority government to be seen by Sunnis as favoring one side in an intrareligious conflict. Worse yet, the longer we stay, the more we will be seen as an occupying force, embarrassing to the Muslim world, causing the prospect of a long-lasting conflict between the Judeo- Christian and Muslim civilizations to increase in likelihood. It is important to give momentum to and solidify Iraqi democracy, but there are tipping points in all struggles. We are at a point where action/reaction engagements could all too easily and rapidly intensify in asymmetric and multigeographic ways if the struggle to build a new Iraq comes to be perceived as an imperial American imposition on Iraqi sovereignty instead of an effort by Iraqis working to shape their own future. This is why it is so important that we reframe the discourse away from WMD and 9/11 concerns and define instead the establishment of democracy as our principal reason for intervention, and thus the logical basis for disengagement. Now that a Constitution has been written, elections held, and a government formed, we should forthrightly announce that we are prepared to draw down our troops in a measured, orderly way. A hasty departure would be imprudent, but the sooner the disengagement process begins, the better. Our goal may be to fight anarchistic forces over there rather than here, but we must understand that prolonging our involvement over there could precipitate a gathering storm of resentment which could make violence here more rather than less likely. With regard to protecting our troops, it is impressive that in polling data reported by the Brookings Institute, 47 percent of Iraqis favor attacking American forces, and 87 percent favor time lines for withdrawal. Occupation is neither the American way, nor is it tolerable for Muslims. While precipitous withdrawal after our intervention might have led to civil war and a breakup of the Iraqi state, the logic of these polling statistics would seem to indicate that Iraqis have become weary of and humiliated by a foreign occupying presence. The rationale for attacks against American forces would be undercut if Muslims had confidence that we were committed to an orderly and timely withdrawal policy. If we do not begin to leave Iraq now that democratic institutions have been put in place, anarchistic acts will continue, and the other side may be in a position to say when we eventually draw down our forces that they have somehow forced us out. Little would be worse for the American national interest or more demoralizing for all those who have served so valiantly in combat there than such a preposterous claim. This is why the implications of slogans like the need to stay the course can be so misleading. There is nothing more disadvantageous for our national security or more dangerous for our troops in the field than overstaying our presence. The longer this war goes on, the greater the likelihood that anger will intensify in the Muslim world as well as among Muslims in the West, including the United States. The recent arrest of 17 young Muslims in Canada is a case in point. From news accounts it would appear that an accumulation of U.S. actions with which Canada was considered complicit triggered perfectly normal youngsters to consider violent and profoundly anti-democratic actions, including a plot to kidnap Canadian legislators and slit the throat of the Prime Minister. As long as the conflict in Iraq continues and the Israeli-Palestinian issue remains unresolved it is only a question of time before other 9/ 11 type events or series of violent acts will occur in various parts of the world. Bringing the occupation to an end and resolving other Middle Eastern issues will not ensure against future violence but it could dampen the anger of millions of Muslims and reduce the prospect of a clash of civilizations. The challenge for the administration is to determine when the new Iraqi Government is strong enough to stand on its own. Our presence is dual edged. We have helped train a new army, perhaps erring along the way in disbanding the Iraqi armed forces after the capture of Baghdad. But we also are the subject of anger and humiliation for many Muslims in and out of Iraq. The opposition continues for an assortment of reasons. Some relate to the centuries-old antagonism between Sunnis and Shi'a, complicated by the nationalist ambitions of the Kurds. Some relate to the millennia-old implication of the Crusades, memories of which hang over the Middle East the way the Civil War did for a century in the American South. And some relate to current events--the Palestinian-Israeli confrontation, the occupation of Iraq and, to a far lesser extent, the more understandable U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, as well as problems attendant to the unforeseen-- Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, Haditha. We are in unprecedented times. But there are parallels from recent history that might provide glimmers of guidance for policy makers today. One from the Reagan era that I have always assumed stemmed as much from the President's wife, Nancy, the closet moderate within that administration, as any geo-strategic planner relates to an attitudinal shift away from confrontation to diplomacy. In Reagan's first term he postured firmly in the anti-multilateralist, anti-arms control camp, objecting to negotiations with the evil empire. At the U.N., he ordered a U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO, one of the more financially bloated but least dangerous international organizations ever created. In reaction to a perceived anti-progressivism in his first term, two movements of educated citizens mushroomed in size. One, the environmental movement, was concerned with the confrontational policies of the Secretary of the Interior, Jim Watt; the other, which paralleled it in foreign policy, was the arms control movement. Thousands of fledgling advocates came to support the concept of a nuclear freeze in the context of SALT-- strategic arms limitation talks. This movement gained so much currency that a poll of delegates to the 1984 Republican National Convention which renominated Reagan found that the majority favored a nuclear freeze rather than the intransigent negotiating policy then in vogue. But the President, in a remarkable policy shift early in his second term upstaged his opposition by out-radicalizing it. Instead of pushing for a ``status quo'' SALT approach which would halt the arms race, he threw his support behind a more imaginative START initiative--a strategic arms reduction treaty--which would reverse it. The implication was a strategic oxymoron: America had to build up military might in order to reduce it. An inconsistent geo-strategic policy was adroitly presented as consistency. In part because of the wisdom of the policy reversal, in part because of Reagan's unique personal capacity to persuade, in part because the persuader spoke from the bully pulpit of the Presidency, America began to lead the world as a force both of resolve and restraint. A progressive might presumptuously hope today that on issues as diverse as North Korea, Iraq and potentially the Israeli-Palestinian challenge the Reagan policy-shift model beckons this President. Since John Kennedy, all American Presidents have been obsessed with what their place in history may be. In most circumstances I cannot envision a more worthwhile or uplifting motivation. I am concerned, however, that an unnecessarily sticky situation may be developing with this presidency. My sense is that advisors are telling the President that his administration will be judged on the steadfastness of his commitment to a policy of continued military engagement in Iraq and, quite possibly, following through with a military confrontation with Iran. But might not the Reagan ``consistent inconsistency'' model be fortuitously adapted? Instead of following one military action with another, what if the President were to commence drawing down forces as democratic institutions take hold in Iraq? And having proven that he is willing to use force--as Reagan proved his willingness to escalate defense spending--the President could then plausibly point out that he is now prepared to negotiate from a position of strength with Iran and North Korea. But for such a change in emphasis--use of diplomacy instead of force--to take place, the administration cannot continue to fritter away time and opportunity. If it continues to refuse to offer the respectful attention that direct negotiations imply with countries like Iran and North Korea, our adversaries could wait us out, or tempt the administration into a highly dangerous confrontation. The other historical model that gets little attention, except to serve as an apparent warning not to get too involved in African civil wars, is Somalia. Under this President's father, U.S. Armed Forces were deployed in a unique humanitarian intervention. The logistical capacities of the U.S. military were used to bring food and medical help to a war-torn society. This might have been a model of success rather than failure had events in the field not gotten out of hand. But over time, as one administration folded into the next, American forces in their efforts to provide assistance to starving people found it necessary to try to stabilize internal relations and thus do battle with anarchistic elements of Somali society. For many in Somalia this came to be perceived as siding with one side in an internal conflict. The disastrous consequence of becoming militarily engaged instead of simply humanitarianly involved may have relevance in a very different setting today--Iraq. Good intentions and heroic deeds can backfire. In this context, one of the most constitutionally awkward pronouncements of the civilian side of this administration deserves review. The President and Secretary of Defense have repeatedly suggested that troop-level determinations in Iraq will be made by the commander in the field. This articulation, which at first blush seems indisputedly prudent, is perhaps related to the hammering the administration has taken, especially from supporters in the press and on Capitol Hill of the intervention, who hold that there would be far fewer problems in Iraq today if more troops had been committed at the outset. According to this reasoning, the mistake for any failure of policy rests not with the judgment call on going to war, but with the implementation of the decision. It may be, as Colin Powell has implied, that once the decision to intervene had been made, it would have been wiser to follow the overwhelming force doctrine that is derived from military history but in recent times has come to bear the former Secretary's name. In any regard, whether or not the commitment of more troops would have made a significant difference in sealing Iraqi borders or bringing greater stability to Baghdad, both the military and civilian side of government have to think through the issue of who responds to whom on troop-level questions. There are distinctions between tactical decision-making and strategic judgments. The former should be disproportionately military; the latter require greater and, at some point, total civilian involvement. In a historical sense it is worth remembering, for instance, that Harry Truman stood down the most popular military officer of the 20th century when GEN Douglas MacArthur attempted to widen the war in Korea. Decisions to end as well as begin wars are constitutionally proscribed. The constitutional dimension of modern war making is not as clear-cut as the Founders might have surmised. This is the case because modem warfare, for a variety of reasons, is conducted without a formal declaration of war from Congress and because the law of the land, despite being unlikely to pass constitutional muster if tested in the courts, is the War Powers Act. Whether one approves or disapproves of the decision to intervene in Iraq, there is no question that because of a congressional vote to authorize the use of force, this war is legal. A strike without a precise Congressional authorization on Iran is more conjectural, but the War Powers Act which gives the President 60 days discretion on use of force as well as other war against terror resolutions, the NPT and possible future Security Council resolutions would presumably be used by the administration to justify executive discretion. Others might suggest that lacking an imminent threat rationale, the Constitution would seem to envision the need for congressional concurrence. As one who is doubtful of the wisdom of intervention against Iran, I was disappointed that an effort to amend the DOD appropriations bill this week to require prior congressional consent for a strike against Iran was defeated. In any regard, the executive branch, possibly with congressional advice, has two profound judgment calls to make in the near future: whether and how to end the Iraq war and whether and how to engage Iran. And here--based on public commentary within the civilian side of our government and the private observations of former generals--my sense is that it is quite conceivable that a rift could develop between the military and civilian elements of our government which would be the reverse image of the MacArthur/Truman confrontation. The professional military seems far more skeptical than the White House of the judgment of the neo-cons who drove the decision to intervene in Iraq and far more dubious than many on Capitol Hill about the wisdom of a preemptive strike against Iran. With regard to Iran, I am impressed how congressional leadership of both parties, at least on the House side, remains confrontational. This is one reason I feel that it is important to emphasize the appropriateness of bipartisan criticism as well as bipartisan support for executive branch foreign policies. Partisanship should stop at the water's edge; but judgmental capitulation must never occur. Closed- mindedness is the enemy. Members are obligated to review decisions made and oversee actions taken by the Executive. It is the question of motivation that must be above partisan reproach. The only motivation consistent with our pledge to uphold and defend the Constitution is to concern ourselves exclusively with the national interest. Neither concerns for political party advantage nor individual ambition should play a role in foreign policy judgments. Over the years I have become impressed by how within Republican administrations there is a tendency of political appointees, particularly in the White House, to advocate confrontation over diplomacy. My sense is that there is a lot of frustration within high levels of the military with what might be described as an immature, ideological machismo among key political appointees. It would not be surprising to me if in the next couple of years it falls to the professional military and career CIA and foreign service officers to raise cautionary flags about various policy options. In conclusion, as a representative of a State which has disproportionately provided Reserve and National Guard forces for the Iraqi conflict, I am struck by an extraordinarily impressive aspect of America's involvement in Iraq. In one of the most psychologically and militarily difficult settings ever to confront U.S. Armed Forces, the morale of our troops and their families at home has never ebbed and the patriotism of volunteer soldiers has never been challenged. This reflects well on their character as well as on their dedication to duty. There may be question whether intervention should have occurred, but once our troops were committed there is no question that it is in the national interest that they succeed. What remains at issue is whether longevity of commitment contributes to or undermines the success of the mission; whether IED attacks and skirmishes at the field level escalate or diminish; and whether diplomacy or lack thereof leads to a more peaceful or violent world.

Mr. LEACH

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, there are few certitudes in these complicated times. Anyone who was not conflicted in the original decision to invade Iraq or who does not see a downside to all courses of action today is not thinking. But I am hard pressed to believe anything except that the case for a steady, measured drawdown of troops in Iraq is compelling. The neocon desire to establish a semi-permanent presence in a divided Muslim country is foolhardy. It is true that there are circumstances where it is better to fight over there than here at home. Afghanistan is a case in point. But we should not be so naive as to fail to recognize that there are also circumstances where fighting over there can increase the likelihood that conflict will spread to our shores. A decision to prolong unnecessarily our intervention in Iraq could be a case in point, as could a military confrontation with Iran. There are tipping points in all struggles. The signs are evident that we are close today to a calamity if we do not recalibrate our policies. The irony is that our troops have lost no battles and shown great heroism, but Western occupation is intolerable for Muslims. It is also not the American way. The longer we stay, the greater the prospect that anarchistic acts will multiply and spread, perhaps to our shores. The issue is no longer, as is so frequently asserted, the need to stay the course. It is to avoid overstaying our presence. Sometimes it is harder to know how to end a war than to start one. Just as important to think through the ``why and how''' of committing troops to conflict, we must also think through the ``why and how'' of ending an engagement. Timing is a key element of both considerations. For many Americans, including me, the war in Iraq has been difficult to justify. But all Americans, except perhaps a few who may be partisanly vindictive, should want as positive a result as possible, given the circumstances we now face. The decision to go to war may have been misguided and strategies involved in conducting it mistake-ridden; nonetheless there should be clarity of purpose in ending the conflict, with the goal neither to ``cut and run,'' nor simply to cut losses. At this junction of involvement we should define cogently our purposes and by so doing create a basis both for a viable future for Iraq and for a U.S. disengagement that respects the sacrifices of those who have served so valiantly in our armed forces and those of our coalition allies. Americans understand that three rationales were given at successive stages for the war. The first involved Iraq's complicity in 9/11; the second was the imminent threat of Iraqi WMD; and the third was the desire to replace the despotic regime of Saddam Hussein with a free, democratic government. The first two arguments have proven frail. The third has some legitimacy, but to many of us it never seemed compelling, particularly in relation to the costs of the conflict. In any regard, whether or not democracy provided a compelling rationale for starting the war, it offers the most appropriate rationale for ending it. If we do not prepare to leave Iraq on our terms, stating clearly that now that a Constitution has been adopted, elections held, and a government formed, we are prepared to proceed with a comprehensive and orderly draw-down of our troops, we will be viewed as an occupying power lacking credible motivations. When we eventually leave, the other side will claim they forced us out. That is why it is as critical to define the rationale for our disengagement as the reason for going to war. And democracy is the only rationale I know that can be used as a basis for ending our involvement in this conflict with any hope of suggesting a partial measure of success. The key is that we must control and be seen as controlling our own fate. All Americans should be respectful of the sacrifices of our men and women in uniform. They have been placed in an untenable situation. If they had not been so heroic and in many cases so helpful in rebuilding neighborhoods and schools, the U.S. would face a far more difficult dilemma today. But we have no choice except to assess whether Osama Bin Laden and his movement have not been given added momentum by our intervention in Iraq, and whether the ideologically advocated policy of establishing long-term bases or one of returning our troops home is likely to be the more effective strategy in prevailing in the world-wide war on terror. Here, it should not be hard to understand that prolonged occupation of a country which encompasses an area of land where one of the world's oldest civilizations prospered is humiliating to a proud people and those elsewhere who share its great religion. It should also not be hard to understand that the neo-con strategy of establishing a long- term military presence in Iraq with semi-permanent bases raises the risk of retaliatory terrorist attacks at home and abroad. Indeed, according to the University of Chicago scholar, Robert Pape, in his definitive book on suicide bombers, Dying to Win, the principal reason anarchists choose to wrap themselves in explosives and kill innocent civilians is to register martyred objection to the occupation of countries or territories by the armed forces of Western or other Democratic governments. Suicide bombing, by implication, will exist as long as occupations continue. In this regard, a note about al Qaeda is in order. Just as neither Iraq with its secular leanings nor any Iraqis were responsible for 9/11, so Saddam Hussein apparently considered Osama Bin Laden as much a rival as a soul brother. It is Western military intervention that has precipitated al Qaeda's rapid growth in Iraq and elsewhere, creating a ``cause celebre'' for its singularly malevolent actions. If American withdrawal policy comes to turn on the question of anarchy--i.e., troops can't be drawn down as long as IEA attacks continue--we place ourselves in a catch-22 and, in effect, hand over decision-making discretion to those who wantonly kill. We allow the radical few to use our presence as the reason for their actions and at the same time cause our involvement to be held hostage to their villainy. On the other hand, if we proceed with a turn-over of responsibilities to the new, freely elected Iraqi government, Sunni dissidents will confront a critical choice: to pursue the insurgency or join the political process. Pursuing the insurgency would be a risky gamble; if it fails, Sunnis may fall under Shiite domination for years to come, and the demise of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi makes prospects of expanding influence through terrorist tactics less likely. Joining the political process, on the other hand, would guarantee Sunnis a role in governing the country. Though the prudential and civilized choice may seem obvious to us, a continued American military presence in Iraq gives Sunni radicals a popular cause--ridding the country of the occupier--for rallying popular sentiment in Iraq and elsewhere and justifying continued violence. Announcing the commencement of an orderly drawdown of our troops, and trumpeting it widely, would rob radicals of this powerful cause, allowing moderate Sunnis to join the government and pursue sectarian interests through the constitutional process. In the realm of policy timing can often be as important as substance. Just as Senator Dirksen once noted that a billion dollars here and a billion dollars there and pretty soon you're talking about real money, in foreign affairs a week here and a week there can soon add up to a policy dilemma. It is possible, of course that civil strife will ensue when we withdraw, but this is just as likely to be the case in 2026 as 2006. In any regard, civil union is for the Iraqi people to manage. It's not for American troops to sustain. The authorization this Congress gave to the Executive to use force contemplated the clear prospect of military intervention in Iraq. It did not, however, contemplate prolonged occupation. If this is not understood by the Executive branch, the current overwhelming Iraqi polling sentiment favoring American troop withdrawal will be more than matched by shared American sentiment. And in a democracy no one can be a leader without followers. The older I get, the more central I consider the human factor to be in international relations. Logic is never totally dominant. No one knows the exact origins of the seven deadly sins, but to the degree human nature is the least changed aspect of the human condition, it is relevant to today's debate to contrast two human foibles: avarice and pride. Let me suggest that avarice, the weakness of business classes, is fundamentally more pragmatic than pride, the weakness of politicians, and pride is fundamentally more dangerous than avarice. For example, if a bookstore owner were to read two books and strongly prefer one to the other, he might inventory half a dozen of the one he prefers and one of the other. But if his customers buy the one he likes least, he will not reorder the one he likes. He will put it on the discount shelf and re-order the public's choice. His pride isn't hurt. In politics, on the other hand, the tendency is to avoid embarrassment, never acknowledge error. Mistakes are often repeated to avoid political inconsistency. An anecdote comes to mind. In one of my early terms in Congress I was invited to the Library of Congress to a seminar Henry Kissinger was asked to give on the 1973 Paris Peace Accords. Before going, I perused one of his autobiographical tomes and was struck by a singular paragraph. In December 1968, Kissinger as the National Security Council Advisor-designate met with Richard Nixon, then the President-elect. They agreed, he wrote, that their policy would be to disengage from Vietnam. After Kissinger had delivered his lecture, I asked him about his pre-Presidency strategy talk with Nixon. Why, I inquired, didn't the Nixon administration immediately do what he said they had decided in December 1968, to do? Kissinger looked at me and responded: ``We meant with honor.'' I asked him if honor required escalation. ``Absolutely,'' he replied. ``Honor'' and ``pride'' do not have the same meaning. But in some circumstances they are clearly first cousins. I mention this incident as a reflection of human nature and the psychology of decision-making. LBJ was too much of a Texan to reverse gear on his own policies; Nixon was too much a product of the Cold War to risk being perceived as less tough than his Democratic predecessor. All wars evoke analogies to prior conflicts; Vietnam is on everyone's mind. My sense is that references to our Southeast Asian experience are somewhat oblique, but important to ponder. Of particular relevance is the advice of a former Vermont Senator, George Aiken, who suggested we just declare victory and get out of Vietnam. Aiken's advice was rooted in frustration, but wise as it was, represented more spin than reality. Given the strategies then in play, victory wasn't close at hand. Today, on the other hand, despite the escalation of world-wide violence and the precipitation of widespread mistrust of the United States, particularly in Muslim societies, the Administration can point to positive political change in Iraq. An Aiken approach might not be historically compelling, but it would have more currency now than when originally suggested. In governance, judgment to be good must be timely. If we maintain a heavy presence much longer our president could find himself in a dilemma of the kind Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon came to know too well. Despite the overwhelming nature of our military capacities and the courageous commitment and sacrifice of our armed forces, well- intentioned policies can fail if they are inadequately justified, poorly executed, or pursued too long. The timing and explication of disengagement can be as consequential as the decision to intervene. This is why clarity of purpose and flexibility of response are so crucial. Hasty withdrawal is problemsome; orderly, philosophically cogent decisions to wind down the military dimension of our presence in Iraq should, however, be our highest national interest priority. It would be a mistake of historical proportions if respectful relations not only between America and the Moslem world but between America and its traditional allies were to rupture. We are obligated to see that they don't. In a broader historical and philosophical context, the American intervention in Iraq underscores the need to probe the question of the limits of power of a superpower and the possible anomaly that there are liabilities of power, particularly for a superpower. Does, for instance, overwhelming military might alone protect us from terrorism, or if wielded unwisely, does it escalate our vulnerability to terrorism? Likewise, does overwhelming economic power ensure loyalty and buy friendship even from countries most indebted to the United States, or does it inspire resentment? With each lED explosion and suicide bomb attack it becomes clearer that America and the world community are in a strategic pickle. In an era of anger, of divisions in the world based on economics, on color of skin, on ethnicity, on religious upbringing, on happenstance of family and place of birth, those who have causes--good and bad--have new globalized techniques of being heard and felt. Great leaders like Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King appealed to the higher angels of our nature and achieved revolutionary change with non-violence. More mendacious leaders like Adolf Hitler, Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden have sought to impose their wills on others through appeals of hate and reliance on increasingly wanton instruments of oppression. The policy question Americans must think through is whether great powers may be more effective with policies of restraint rather than intervention. Just as Gandhi and King led non-violent revolutions which have proved more lasting than the barbarism of Stalin and Pol Pot, maintenance and embellishment of the American model of governance may itself be more intrusively revolutionary in oppressed societies than interventionist policies. Caution and restraint are better models for 21st Century statecraft than naive adventurism. With this admonition in mind, it is critical that Members of the Executive Branch must understand that how and what they say to justify various policies determines how others respond. Anyone who ever studied physics may recall that Sir Isaac Newton set forth three fundamental laws, the second of which was that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. A decade ago when the Congress was led by an extraordinary upstart whose first name was Newt, I suggested, at first as a pun, the existence of a fourth ``Newt- onian'' law, this one of social physics: reaction is greater than action. My thoughts at the time related to the partisan bickering within Congress. But with the passage of time I have come to the conclusion that international slights have graver consequences than domestic. When, for instance, we use words like ``evil,'' reference events like the Crusades, and employ tactics designed expressly to ``shock and awe,'' should we not expect others to think and respond in like or escalated terms, although the methods employed might in the current vogue be described as asymmetric? This brings me to several broad precepts, one of which is seemingly trite, and others of which are intended to form a theoretical and practical framework for a recalibrated foreign policy. First, the trite. Every society has a sage who cautions that wise leaders should put themselves in the shoes of their adversaries before reaching self-centered judgments. The profoundest illustration of this comes from literature rather than Clausewitz or Tsun Tsu. When speaking to constituents of the rationale for and against the Iraq War, I have over the past couple of years referenced a set of books that provides more geo-political wisdom than balance of power strategists: the Alexandria Quartet by Lawrence Durrell. Set in inter-war Egypt, each of Durrell's four books chronicles the same series of events through the eyes of a different participant. While the events repeat, the stories are profoundly different. The implicit moral is that one set of eyes, one set of interactions, is insufficient to gain a full grasp of what is happening around us. Likewise, in world politics one country's perspective is not enough. The views of others matter. If we are to manage prudently the affairs of state, we have to use more than just our own eyes, rely on more than just our own experience, and reference more than our own historical circumstance. The Muslim experience, for instance, gives substantially less weight than the Western experience to the two cataclysmic wars of the 20th century. Despite Lawrence's involvement in Arabia and the battles between Allied forces and Rommel's tanks, the engagements in the Middle East and North Africa were skirmishes compared with the struggles in Europe and the Far East. Not only do Muslims see the 20th century differently from Westerners, but Europeans and Americans have drawn different strategic parallels in the application of common experience to current challenges in the Middle East. In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, historians and political strategists in Europe rightly concluded that the European alliance system had been too rigid and the assassination of a relatively minor figure, an archduke, should not have precipitated a war of such devastating consequences. Hence European leaders in the 1930's falsely concluded that historical wisdom necessitated initial accommodation with Hitler's adventurism. Too little flexibility caused one war; too little spine led to Munich. In the current context, President Bush sees himself as Churchill rather than Chamberlain, but Europeans see 9/11 as more analogous to the shots fired at Archduke Ferdinand than as a cause for a doctrine of preemption or war with Iraq, a war that could too easily spring into a clash of civilizations. If we're ever going to have a chance to shape or deter the actions of others, we must understand their reasoning. Failing to understand or respect Muslim culture, for instance, resulted in the greatest intelligence failure of our era. It is, however, not the sole intelligence failure. In one of the greatest judgmental errors of our time, we appear to have attempted to combat the ideological posturing of others by ideologizing our own intelligence. Based on what is known today, policymakers wrongly implied Iraq played a role in the 9/11 attack and not only erred in assessing Saddam Hussein's WMD capacities but put too much faith in a narrow cadre of policymakers who suggested the United States would be welcomed as a liberating rather than conquering or, worse yet, colonizing force in Iraq. Estimates of the costs of war, of the ramifications of our involvement, of the expected reaction of the population and of the likelihood of foreign respect and support were dead wrong. Now, given the anarchy that has mushroomed in the country, Washington is swept by occupation analogies of World War II. Japan and Germany, it is noted, were occupied for more than five years after hostilities ceased. Hence, many are suggesting, we must be prepared to stay at least this long in Iraq. I have seldom been more apprehensive about an historical analogy. Japan and Germany were the instigators of war; their citizens understood this. The Muslim population throughout the world does not see it this way. They see the U.S. as the aggressor. Images from Al- Jazeera portray a country under siege. In the Moslem world Iraq looks more like a police-cordoned West Bank than a great and ancient society on the move to a better life. Outsiders are viewed as unwanted intruders acting out of great power self-interest, disrespectful of the culture and values of the country being occupied. Yet if we take the most difficult geo-strategic issues of the day, it is impressive how we seem to misunderstand the fundamentals of human nature. Publics in many parts of the world are crying out for two aspirations: respect and hope. But our policy response is an entirely parochial one, rooted in the so-called doctrine of American Exceptionalism, which neo-cons do not define as refining a shining City on a Hill but as the right of a superpower to place itself above the legal and institutional restraints applied to others. In the Neo-con world, values are synonymous with power. The implicit assumption is that American security can be bought and managed alone, without allies, without consideration of contrasting international views or the effect of our policies on others. Treaties like a Comprehensive Test Ban, which every President since Eisenhower has propounded, have been rejected, as have negotiations to strengthen the verification provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention. Legitimacy is critical for all countries. There may be times and circumstances in which the U.S. national interest requires action without the support of our allies or without United Nations sanction. But the U.N., in particular, is ignored at great risk, especially when the international community is largely at odds with American policies. In this context, recent rhetorical attacks by ideologues in and out of government on the U.N. and other multilateral institutions would appear to particularly ill-serve the American national interest. The diplomatic issue our government has to come to grips with today is the problem of sequencing. Which comes first--the chicken or the egg--is the most cheerful and abstract philosophical discussion Americans engage in. But which precedes the other--talk or war--is neither cheerful nor abstract. Experience would seem to indicate that while war may not be averted by negotiations, it is less likely to break out if direct dialogue occurs beforehand. In adversarial situations pacific results can seldom be achieved without human interaction. That is why our founders clearly contemplated that the new American Republic would have diplomatic relations with undemocratic states. It is why Prime Minister Rabin, when faulted for talking to Arafat, noted that you don't make peace with friends. There are few examples in history where empty chair diplomacy has proved effective. Indeed, it is next to impossible to reach mutual accommodation if there is not mutual understanding and a modicum of trust and respect which only personal relationships can provide. The sequencing dilemma is particularly evident with regard to Iran. Not only should we not fear to negotiate, we must understand that as the stronger party, we can afford to put on the table steps, particularly related to process, that weaker parties are less able to initiate without seeming to capitulate. Unfortunately, we have over a number of Administrations chosen to isolate rather than engage Iran. The question is whether isolationist policies drive a proud people to greater extremes. A stigmatic refusal to interact has characterized our policy toward Iran for a generation and, just as haplessly, Cuba for two. Some of us have fretted for a long time that a more forthcoming U.S. diplomatic approach might have produced a more stable Persian Gulf. Five years ago Senator Specter and I invited to Capitol Hill the Iranian Ambassador to the U.N. In a long meeting over dinner in a small room on the Senate side of the Capitol, I indicated that while many of us would like to see more direct contact between the U.S. and Iran, normalization of relations was inconceivable unless Iran ceased supporting Hamas and Hezbollah. The ambassador responded with frankness. He chillingly acknowledged Iranian support of Hezbollah but then asserted that such support would cease the moment a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians was reached in a framework acceptable to the Palestinians. The slight hope implicit in this position may or may not have reflected Tehran's real position at the time, but it is apparent that Ahmedinajad is far more radical today than Khatami was yesterday. While neither has nor had the power of the Ayatollahs, the hardening of Iranian public attitudes toward us and Israel makes questions about the effectiveness of our strategic and psychological isolation of Iran important to ponder. Last week the administration suggested a possible policy shift. We indicated a willingness to join the Europeans in talks with Iran if Iran first agrees to freeze uranium enrichment activities. This approach might presage a nuanced new American flexibility. But much depends on the Iranian response. Our position appears to be that we will proceed with sanctions and contemplate sterner actions if Iran does not capitulate on the uranium issue, but we will not talk to the government unless it first acquiesces. In other words, the goal of negotiations must be achieved before we will negotiate. Conditional approaches like this are needlessly ``high wire''; nevertheless, in contrast with prior diplomatic intransigence they may represent the best hope yet of yielding a conflict-averting break-through on the NPT issue. Yet policymakers in Washington appear to underestimate a series of strategic phenomena. Hezbollah is far larger, more sophisticated and experienced in terrorist undertakings than Al Qaeda. A preemptive strike on Iranian nuclear facilities would unleash a level of anarchy in world affairs that would be unprecedented. It would slow but not stop its ability to develop nuclear weapons. It would have little effect on Iran's ability to obtain such weapons elsewhere. The ``loose nuke'' phenomenon is real. A rich country has as good a chance to purchase or steal weapons of mass destruction as it does to develop them on its own. And if that country is attacked as part of an effort to block nuclear development, it has to be assumed it will have new incentives to seek and use such weapons. This prospect could presumably be heightened if bunker busting bombs tipped with small nuclear warheads are employed. The U.S. thus faces a double catch-22: embargoing Iran hurts our economy more than theirs and attacking militarily the Iranian infrastructure ensures immediate asymmetric violent responses as well as the greater likelihood that weapons of mass destruction once obtained will be used against us and our allies at a later point. This brings us to the last underestimation by Washington. We may be considering a conflict of a few weeks duration--one to three weeks of intensive bombing. The Iranians may be thinking of a multi-decade or multi-century response. Western history has known a 30-year war. Eastern peoples carry in their hearts the burden of centuries of crusades, and many Islamic radicals today would like the 21st century to be a continuation of what they consider to be a struggle against Judeo-Christian intervention. Sequencing is a historical as well as diplomatic term of concern. The Iranians, too, are in a quandary. They recognize that no American President can take the force option completely off the table. They suspect DOD has made extensive contingency plans and they see a President who has little hesitancy to take difficult, unpopular decisions. They know he is in his last term and does not want to pass on strategic problems to his successor. They may reason that a U.S. decision to attack is irrational because it would solidify a radical reaction in Iran, in other Muslim countries, and perhaps even within the U.S., but the government of Iran cannot be certain that the President will conclude that he would be passing on a bigger mess if he attacked rather than engaged. The Iranian challenge is stickier than many Americans assume. The President may see himself in a position analogous to that of John Kennedy in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy was dealing with Khrushchev and a Soviet system that had many despotic dimensions. But while communism was manipulated in such a manner as to become a quasi- state religion, it is fundamentally about political and economic rather than spiritual relationships. Iran, on the other hand, is a theocracy in a region where religion and, too frequently, its perversion are dominant themes. Just as the Iranian government must understand the strong will of the President, Washington has to come to grips with the pride and principles of an adversary which is the inheritor of one of the oldest civilizations on earth. Each side may understand the consequences of individual actions, but that does not mean that decisions in one or the other country will not unfold domino-like in a manner that could be catastrophic for all. That is why human interrelationship--diplomacy--is so key. Let me suggest a corollary to Lord Acton's maxim that power corrupts and absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely. The Leach corollary is that military power tempts and excessive power tends to tempt excessively. America's enormous military strength is critical at this stage in history. But while we are obligated to recognize that its maintenance is imperative, we must also realize that its utilization may not fit, and may indeed be counter-productive, in certain strategic settings. Analogies between all wars exist, but comparisons between Iraq and Vietnam are frail. What must be understood is not that Iraq could be as bad as Vietnam; rather, that it is becoming far worse. Vietnam, after all, involved no WMD issues; and while the North was predominantly Buddhist and the South Catholic, there were no implications of a world- wide religious struggle; nor of a conflict that might last many decades, if not centuries. The issue at the time was Communism and fears that if Vietnam fell, neighboring governments would topple like dominoes. In retrospect, the real domino lesson of Vietnam was about political decision-making. Once the patriotic flag was raised, stands taken, words uttered, one doubtful decision precipitated another, and the pride of politicians did not allow a change of course until the people demanded common-sense reconsideration. Interestingly, in the 19th century, two obscure Italian political theorists, Vito and Pareto, noted that for all the differences in political systems, one person alone at the top had the power to make critical decisions for a nation. While these decisions might be of a social magnitude, they are personal in the making. Our Founders were moral as well as political thinkers. They feared kingly powers and wanted shared decision-making, especially when it came to war. But as we all have come to understand, modern times have produced wars without formal declarations approved by Congress. In response to Vietnam, Congress fashioned the War Powers Act to establish new constraints on the Executive. While most Constitutional scholars are convinced the Act would be declared unconstitutional if it were ever tested, it stands today as the law of the land. What is often overlooked, however, is that the Act also empowers the Executive wide- ranging options to commit American forces for a period of several months. Hence, there is little doubt that the administration assumes it has no need to come to Congress if it decides to launch an air assault on Iran, as long as it is only of multi-week duration. Let me conclude with an observation about priorities, contrasts, and principles. First, priorities. The Iraqi war has had the unfortunate effect of decreasing American attention on both Afghanistan and the Israeli- Palestinian dilemma, both of which have extraordinary consequences for U.S. national security. In addition, while I have assumed for most of my adult life that war and peace is the biggest issue in the world, the bigger challenge to life itself may be disease control. We have lost nearly 2,500 American troops in Iraq and 20 to 40 times as many Iraqis have been killed. But over the past two decades more than 20 million people have died of AIDS, and this number will double or triple in the next decade or two. Likewise, a new flu epidemic might match or exceed these numbers. Yet we are spending less on these problems than the cost of one month's fighting in Iraq. Second, contrasts. Educated Americans are well aware of the ideas that Samuel Huntington and Joe Nye of Harvard have propounded about the dangers of a clash of civilizations and of the importance of soft as contrasted with hard power in diplomacy. These are important frameworks of thought for the American public to dwell upon. But I would add to those considerations the elements of individual judgment and the contrasting model of realism vs. pseudo-realism in policymaking. Realists look to effect, not to appearance. But Washington today has come under the sway of the grim neo-con notion that diplomacy, particularly multi-lateral diplomacy, is soft-headed. Is this not pseudo-realism? What is more realistic and more consistent with the American heritage than attempting to advance the rule of law? An earlier excess of pseudo-realism caused the Senate to reject Wilsonian idealism and ignore the League of Nations. Nevertheless, it approved U.S. participation in the World Court. Americans want law and order. Americans also prefer to work in alliances. It is neo-con nonsense, realism inverted, to press a foreign policy rooted in snubbing the concerns of others. One of the myths of our time is that realism is principally about might. Actually, realism is about the human condition. A great power must maintain a strong military capacity, but it is the human condition that must be improved if national security is truly to be secured. Impoverished nations are breeding grounds for radicalism. Where there is no hope, there is nothing to lose. When life, as Hobbs described, becomes nasty, brutish, and short in a jungle of hopelessness, and humiliation, it becomes easily expendable, sometimes by martyred self- choice. Finally, a note about principle. Never has it been more important to return to the basics. Whether it be tax policy or foreign policy, the concern must be for justice and the common good, what the 19th century British utilitarians described as concern for the greatest good of the greatest number. The public wants its leaders to unify and uplift. Elections are about whether political leadership is up to the task. Democracies provide continual verdicts. This fall will be one measure.

Mr. LEACH

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, at issue in this case are Colombia priorities, but in a different sense than is usually assumed. The priority debate today is not about whether stemming the drug trade is appropriate, but the methodology of going about it. Quasi-military approaches fit war scenarios. Civil war is more problematic; criminal activities even more so. My concern is that when America becomes intertwined in internal conflicts, we change the nature of the ongoing struggle, as well as the motivation of various combatants. We become implicitly accountable for a panoply of policies of any side we back and, accordingly, answerable to the people for that side's allegiance or lack thereof to social fairness and sometimes the rule of law itself. In this context, wouldn't it be better to limit our military involvement in this struggling, divided country and focus efforts on replenishing the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance program? This assistance program allows the President to respond quickly to urgent, often unexpected, crises throughout the world. For instance, it is this program that the President tapped last year to provide assistance to the victims of the Pakistani earthquake. Mr. Chairman, I support this amendment and I respect very much the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. McGovern) for enlightened leadership on a whole host of issues. But I don't support the amendment out of a conviction it is an answer to a real dilemma between both the Colombian and American people, but out of a belief that a military emphasis of this kind carries many counterproductive consequences. There is no track record that this program has been particularly helpful, and some indications that the results have been disadvantageous to the United States. So I would argue that there are better uses for these very scarce resources. And I would suggest again that when we think about realism in world affairs, the test is effectiveness. Here the effectiveness that the United States has exhibited in compassion for refugees is far more apparent than the tests that might be applied to this particular program based on any past record.

Mr. LEACH

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment. Mr. Chairman, the amendment which Mr. Blumenauer and I are offering is a transfer amendment. $250 million would be taken from the unearmarked section of the Military Assistance Account which exceeds the Development Assistance Account by approximately a three to one margin. These resources would then be applied to clean water and other poverty alleviation programs. In our interactions with the world, the U.S. basically only has two options. We can emphasize our capacities to project military might and be a global policeman, or we can emphasize our humanitarian concerns and be a global doctor or engineer. There are times that the policeman's role may be compelling, but I am hard pressed to think anything except that in the long run, American leadership in the 21st century will be judged on whether the United States chooses to be a superhumanitarian power rather than principally a military interventionist. One of the myths of our time is that realism is about might. Actually, realism is about the human condition. It is the human condition that must be improved if national security is to be strengthened. Impoverished nations are breeding grounds for radicalism. Where there is no hope, there is nothing to lose. There is no restraint on violence. Thus, the approach contained in this amendment is to address the daily concerns of the 3.7 billion people in the world who lack access to clean drinking water and adequate sanitation. These people are exposed to sicknesses like giardia, guinea worm, shistosomaisis, and diarrhea on a regular basis. Hundreds of millions of people, including one in every five children in the poorest countries of the world, die simply because there is no clean water. Mr. Chairman, our priorities must be recalibrated. It may be true that the militaries of several poor countries will not be as advantaged, but the family of man will clearly benefit.

Mr. LEACH

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 409) commemorating the 60th anniversary of the ascension to the throne of His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej of Thailand, as amended.

Mr. LEACH

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. Faleomavaega for his wondrous comity on this and so many issues, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Pitts) who is the author of this resolution.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H. Res. 828, commending the people of Mongolia on their 800th anniversary of Mongolian statehood which they are preparing to celebrate during the next month. Mongolia's storied history stretches back to the 13th century, when, beginning under the leadership of Genghis Khan, the Mongol Empire grew to become the largest contiguous land empire in world history. However, the most important portions of this resolution are not those that recall the past, but those that point toward the future. In the eight recent centuries of Mongolian statehood, the past 16 years have perhaps been the most dramatic. In that short time, Mongolia has cemented its transition from a Soviet-era Communist state to a successful, multiparty, Asian democracy committed to economic reform. It has conducted five free and fair parliamentary elections and four presidential elections. I was fortunate to have had the opportunity to visit Ulan Bator last fall as an election observer and to see firsthand the remarkable democratic and social progress that the Mongolian people have achieved. Mongolia represents a transitional model that merits study by other Asian nations, such as North Korea, who have not yet internalized the lessons of the 20th century. In contrast to its history of constant military concerns, Mongolia today is a country committed to peace and international stability, whose foreign policy is informed by an admirable humanitarian impulse. It has repeatedly deployed troops in support of Coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and it has supported NATO peacekeeping operations in Kosovo. As befits two nations committed to democracy and freedom, the United States and Mongolia have enjoyed a deepening friendship, both on a government-to-government and a people-to-people basis. Our growing relationship encompasses not only security matters and development assistance, but also trade, with the U.S. and Mongolia having signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement in 2004. Although that great landlocked state is physically bordered only by China and Russia, the United States is proud to consider itself Mongolia's third neighbor on the basis of our shared values and common interests. This resolution is a welcome opportunity for the Congress to reaffirm our desire to strengthen the strategic, political, economic, educational, and cultural ties between our countries. In closing, I would like to thank the gentleman from American Samoa (Mr. Faleomavaega), and also the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Pitts) for his initiative in sponsoring this timely resolution, as well as the men and women of the Department of State for their judgment and guidance in assembling the final text. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 days within which to revise and extend their remarks on H. Res. 828.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the resolution (H. Res. 828) commending the people of Mongolia, on the 800th anniversary of Mongolian statehood, for building strong, democratic institutions, and expressing the support of the House of Representatives for efforts by the United States to continue to strengthen its partnership with that country.