Jim Leach

Mr. LEACH

Mr. LEACH. Madam Speaker, we have no further requests for time, and I yield myself such time as I may consume. In conclusion, I would simply like to express my personal appreciation for the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Wilson) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Royce) for their leadership on so many Indian affairs, and particularly for this bipartisan expression of admiration for India and its achievements, and for the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel), two leaders of this House on Indian affairs. Yes, it has been noted that India is the world's largest democracy, but it also should be made clear it is one of the oldest and greatest civilizations on this planet with evidence of civil society dating back many millennium before Christ. In the years since its modern day independence in 1947, it has produced some of the greatest leaders in modern times: Mr. Gandhi and his doctrine of nonviolence, civil disobedience. The doctrine of Sarjat Hagahoth is a great symbol and inspiration for many citizens of the globe. Mr. Nehru stood for a great international leadership of independence and neutrality, and then in the new era of Mr. Vajpayee we have an India dedicated to economic development and market forces, all of which betokens in terms of history, in terms of longevity of civilization, a modern day society that is one of the greatest on this planet, and we in this body are deeply impressed. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LEACH. Madam Speaker, we yield back the balance of our time.

Mr. LEACH

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on S. 811, the Senate bill just passed and include extraneous material thereon.

Mr. LEACH

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, 26 months after 9/11 and 7 months after the conclusion of major combat operations in Iraq, America is in a strategic pickle and Americans are in a judgmental quandary. The issue of our engagement in Iraq demands that we, as a society, probe the question of the limits of the superpower's power and the possible anomaly that there are severe liabilities to power, particularly for a superpower. Does, for instance, overwhelming military might protect us from terrorism or, if used unwisely, increase our vulnerability to terrorism? Likewise, does overwhelming economic power ensure loyalty or buy friendship from the countries most indebted to the United States? In other words, can military and economic might ever become a substitute for sensible and sensitive foreign policy? And given the dilemma of Iraq, could it, indeed, be that the most important ``multibillion'' problem America faces is not deficits measured in dollars, fiscal, or trade, but the antagonism of billions of people around the world who object to our current foreign policy? Here let me say that I strongly believe the need for clarification of thought as it applies to policy, and anyone who wishes to review the reasoning I have applied to the Iraq issue, ranging from a floor explanation of a ``no'' vote on the congressional resolution authorizing war last year to calls for internationalizing the civil governance in Iraq several months ago, to a vote in favor of generosity in reconstruction efforts several weeks ago, can find explanatory statements on my congressional Web site. What I would like to do today is summarize the dilemma we face and make the following points about where we might go from here. Point number 1: there are no certitudes. Anyone who was not conflicted on the original decision to intervene or who does not see a downside to all courses of action today is not approaching the problem with an open mind. In an era of anger, of divisions in the world based on economics, on color of skin, on ethnicity, on religious belief, on happenstance of family and place of birth; in a world made smaller by technological revolutions in communications and transportation, those who have causes, good or bad, have possibilities of being heard and felt around the globe that never existed before. Great leaders like Gandhi and Martin Luther King appealed to the higher angels of our nature and achieved revolutionary change with nonviolence. Mendacious leaders like Hitler, Saddam Hussein, and Osama bin Laden have sought to impose their wills on others through appeals to hate and reliance on increasingly wanton instruments of oppression. As the world's only superpower, the U.S. has no choice but to display firmness of purpose and resolve in deterring inhumane breaches of order. Yet, firmness and resolve must be matched by compassionate understanding of the reasons people of the world lash out. We have the world's greatest Armed Forces. But these forces cannot successfully be deployed to counter international misconduct if we do not also seek to undercut the causes of such conduct. Reviewing the causes of World War I, historians quickly concluded that there was not enough flexibility in the European alliance system, and that this rigidity allowed a rather minor event, the assassination of an Austrian archduke, to precipitate a cataclysmic war. With this example in mind, political leaders in the 1930s erred on the side of irresolution, which led them to Munich and the partition of Czechoslovakia. Too much inflexibility caused one war; too little spine led to an even greater one. The problem today is not whether we should meet problems with firmness or compassion. We often need both. The problem is determining whether and how to respond with firmness and when and how to express compassion. As in all human conduct, the challenge is wisdom. Point number 2: we must listen as well as assert. Four decades ago, the British author Lawrence Durrell wrote a series of novels called the ``Alexandria Quartet'' in which he describes a set of events in Alexandria, Egypt preceding World War II. An experiment in the relativity of human perception, each of the four books views the same events through the eyes of a different character. While the events described are the same in each book, the stories as seen through the lens of each of the participants are surprisingly different. The reader comes to the realization that a broad understanding about events as they transpire can only be grasped by synthesizing the different perceptions of various protagonists. To understand the Middle East today, we need to listen to everyone's story. Point number 3: to shape or to deter opponents' actions, we need to understand how they think. American policymakers, at their best, reason in a pragmatic, future- oriented manner. In much of the rest of the world, on the other hand, people reason by historical analogy. Events dating centuries back, especially umbrages, dominate thinking about today. People in the Middle East, as in the Balkans, are oriented to the past and are driven by values and ideas of honor of a very different shape and emphasis than those we derive from American culture. When we assume the Iraqi populace should accept a prolonged American presence because of our goodwill and desire to establish a Western-style democracy, Muslims see our presence as compounding grievances originating in the Crusades and, in some ways, even earlier Biblical times. Point number 4: no country can go it alone for long and expect to be respected as an international leader. Doctrines of American exceptionalism, the precept that we should not be bound by legal or procedural norms that bind others, which are now fashionable in certain Washington ideological circles, have led to intervention in Iraq without full U.N. sanction. Ironically, prior to 9/11, these same notions led to rejection of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and of upgraded verification provisions for the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, agreements that would have stood in the way of weapons of mass destruction production in Iraq and provided a legal basis for possible armed intervention if violations occurred. The world is crying out for leadership in restraining weapons development. We are not providing it because Washington policymakers prefer that restraint on others not apply to ourselves. Point number 5: be cautious of articulating policy doctrines. Given the events of 9/11, consideration of preemption must continuously be on the table in Washington, but there is a distinction between needing to consider an action and setting forth a definitive doctrine. Here Teddy Roosevelt may have had the right adage: ``speak softly and carry a big stick.'' Any American President, Democratic or Republican, socialist, liberal, conservative, or libertarian, would not think more than a millisecond before ordering the Marines to intervention if he or she were presented information that on some island, somewhere, a terrorist group had gotten control of a weapon of mass destruction which it was prepared to explode or infilter in an American city. The problem is that raising a commonsense concern to the order of a doctrine legitimizes such a doctrine for others: China, India, Russia, North Korea, for example, and undercuts the premises of much of post-World War II international law. Complicating the issue is the psychological assumption that once the leader articulates a doctrine, especially one that bears his name, it is difficult to advance a policy in a given circumstance which is not consistent with the doctrine. Not to do so would provide critics a chance to suggest that a doctrine like preemption is ethereal, lacking meatiness ness, unless it is made real. Any leader who outlines such a doctrine but chooses not to intervene would be open to charges of lightness or worse. Hence, the simple articulation of a doctrine can have the effect of biasing decision- making in complicated circumstances. The exception might be a doctrine of quietude; statesmanship often should be measured by what is not, rather than what is, said. Point number six. When Washington policymakers speak on foreign policy, they must understand that their audience is more than one party's political base. While Saddam Hussein is widely perceived to be the worst sort of tyrant, many people around the world view us as bullies for attacking a sovereign country without prior armed provocation. That is why it is so critical that a case for intervention should be based in concern for the well-being of others as well as the United States' national interest. For foreign policy to be effective, it must be clearly articulated and convincing in those parts of the world most affected by it. Point number seven. We must rededicate ourselves to building up an intelligence capacity that better understands the Middle East and Islamic world and is less susceptible to being politicized. Our inability to understand Islamic culture resulted in the greatest intelligence failure of our era. It is, however, not the sole intelligence failure. In one of the greatest judgmental errors of our time, we appear to have attempted to combat the ideological posturing of others by slanting our own intelligence. Based on what is known today, policymakers not only erred in assessing Saddam Hussein's WMD capacities but put too much faith in a narrow cadre of ideologues who suggested that the U.S. would be welcomed as a liberating, rather than conquering or worse yet, colonizing, force in Iraq. Estimates of the cost of war, the ramifications of involvement, of the expected reaction of the population, and of the likelihood of foreign support were dead wrong. Point number eight. It is the responsibility of public officials to ensure that no American soldier is deployed as a defenseless magnet for terrorist attack or in such a way as to incite foreign radicals to commit terrorist acts in America itself. American soldiers have been trained to withstand the heat of battle in defense of America and American values. For 2\1/4\ centuries, no country has been more effectively or more courageously served by a citizen soldiery than the United States. In Iraq, our Armed Forces could not have performed more professionally or valiantly than in the initial engagement. But the difference between service in combat and service in occupation of a foreign land, especially in Islamic society, is profound. In Iraq, which is fast becoming for us much like Algeria was for the French in 1950s, our men and women in uniform are increasingly facing hit-and-run terrorist assaults, which are much more difficult to defend against than traditional military confrontations. The challenge of policymakers has recognized that there is a distinction between three endeavors: warfare, reconstruction, and occupation. Our Armed Forces are trained to prevail in the first, they can be helped on the second, but in the Islamic world no outside power is ever going to be well received as an occupying force. Hence, strategies that emphasize the first two endeavors and do not lead to a long-term reliance on the third should be the goal of the U.S. policymakers today. Point number nine. Responses to terrorism often lead to escalating action-reaction cycles. When our armed services become subject to terrorist assault, and the perpetrators disappear into their neighborhoods, we, like Israel, will inevitably be tempted to retaliate in ways that may intensify, rather than restrain, future violence. Calls will be made not only to use air power in urban areas but to double or triple troop deployments perhaps without adequate assessments of what such troops would be assigned to do. In conventional warfare, the case for overwhelming superiority, sometimes referred to as the Powell Doctrine, is compelling. In a terrorist setting, as in modernist design, less can often be more. There may be cases where deploying a large force to combat terrorism is appropriate, there may also be cases, and I believe Iraq is one, where additional soldiers simply become additional targets; and a different mix of strategies is both preferable and more effective. Point number ten. To defend against terrorism, especially when it is fueled by an explosive mix of religious and national sentiment requires frank acknowledgment of the nature and depth of the problem. For months, the administration has suggested that the problem in Iraq is limited to 5,000 dissidents. This is a five-digit miscalculation. At least half the Muslim world, over 500 million people, is outraged by the U.S. Government's attitudes and action. Long-simmering resentment of American policies in Muslim countries like Indonesia as in recent months metastasized into hatred. And in Europe, including what the Defense Department refers to as the ``new Europe'' as well as in south and east Asia, respect for American policy is in steep decline. In the Vietnam War, we gave a great deal of attention to the notion of winning the hearts and minds of the people. We did not succeed in convincing the Vietnamese or world opinion of our good intentions despite the horrendous tactics of the Viet Cong in the communist north. Today, Americans must understand that in the battle for the minds of men, particularly in the Muslim world, we are doing less well than even the most difficult days of the Vietnam War. In this context, we would be well advised to remember America's original revolutionary commitment to decent respect for the monies of mankind. Point number eleven. While for the time being security in Iraq must remain the responsibility of U.S. military commanders in the field, we would be wise to put an international face on civil governance in the country and ask Secretary General Kofi Annan to immediately appoint a top civilian administrator to whom Ambassador Bremer and his staff would report. Transfer of interim civil authority to the U.N. would provide greater legitimacy to the formation of a new Iraqi government and encourage other countries to help with economic reconstruction and security requirements. We should also work to transfer as soon as practicable responsibility for internal security to troops of other nations of the Iraqis themselves. Transferring the police function to others is a way to build up Iraq's own postwar internal security infrastructure and make evident that the U.S. does not desire long-term control. Point number twelve. We should also move forthwith to transfer more political control to the Iraqi Governing Council and press for immediate elections and constitution-writing. Some argue that stability is more likely to be achieved with a long-term U.S. occupation. I believe the reverse is true. The longer we are in Iraq, the greater the instability there and the greater the likelihood that terrorism will spread to other countries, including the United States. Point number thirteen. America cannot cut and run politically, economically, or militarily; but we would be wise to announce a timetable for troop withdrawal by the end of next year at the latest. Some experts in and out of government believe that American troops should stay in and control Iraq at least as long as we did in Japan and Germany after World War II. Such a timetable, a minimum of 5 years, is out of sync with the times and the mood of the Islamic world. The world is more impatient today and Muslims in particular are more history-sensitive than ever before. While we assume the Iraqi populace accepts the American presence because of our goodwill, the Muslim world sees our force as the compounding of grievances dating back to the Crusades and more recently to the American support of Israel. The imagery Al Jazeera projects of Baghdad is that of another West Bank. In this context American commitments to ``slog on'' interminably play into the hands of extremists. All extremists have to do is continue blowing up a vehicle or two every day, thereby eliciting a military action that we might view as reasonable but the Islamic world is likely to see as heavy handed, angering the populace and emboldening further dissent. The longer we stay, the greater the opportunity for al Qaeda and radical Baath Party supporters to claim that the war is continuing and that they are prevailing. To prevent this, and to keep control of events, we would be wise to announce a withdrawal timetable that we, not they, control. Setting such a timetable has the effect of asserting that the war itself is over and we prevailed and that Iraqis cannot dither in establishing a legitimate elected government. A drawn out occupation plays into the hands of radicals. It gives them a rallying cry to keep up resistance in Iraq and expand terrorist assaults around the world. It gives them the chance to suggest that America is bent on continuing the crusades and, when we eventually withdraw, the prospect of claiming that they won the war. On the other hand, if we set a firm schedule for drawing down our troops, we define the war as being over in its 3rd week, not its 6th year. An announced timetable can later be modified to allow, for instance, a small force to remain briefly in northern Iraq to maintain sovereign cohesion. Timetables can also be abbreviated. But the point is that they underscore our reluctance to become an imperial power and, perhaps more importantly, our determination to control our own destiny. Point number fourteen. Beware of partisan critiques. Some partisans are implying today ill motives in Presidential leadership and have suggested that American actions are constitutionally frail. Such criticisms miss the mark. This President is sincerely committed to his national security responsibilities, and his policies have received constitutional endorsement from the Congress. Other partisans are taking what some might perceive as an oxymoronic, liberal, neohawk perspective. They suggest the problem is the administration has not committed sufficient troops and sufficient time to do what we want to do in Iraq, whatever that might be. The assumption is that Iraq will be a much better place if we aggressively occupy the country for prolonged periods of time. This assumption deserves review from two perspectives: the situation within and the political environment outside Iraq. From the first, the question has to be raised whether an occupying force has the effect of an over-stayed house guest: understandable for a short period, increasingly irritable with each passing day. In a domestic setting, house guests can at some point be pointed to the door. In Iraq, many have concluded that the only effective way of getting the uninvited to leave is to submit young soldiers to terrorist strikes and their local supporters to anarchist attacks. A response to this dilemma cannot be developed in the simple linguistic context of resolving to stay the course, particularly when no clear course has been laid out. The language of intervention was couched in terms of concern for weapons of mass destruction and the need to retaliate against the forces that precipitated the events of 9/ 11. Postmortem analysis of these rationalizations put our actions in a questionable light. On the other hand, we must proceed from where we are not, where we thought we would have been. Wisdom might indicate that the emphasis be placed on, A, the humanitarian advantage to Iraqis in the region of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein; B, U.S. assistance and rebuilding Iraq's social infrastructure and help in bringing the country back into the mainstream of international politics and country; and, C, the laying of the groundwork for new political institutions. None of these three emphases necessitates 5 to 10 years of occupation. Indeed, the longer we are there, the more likely a Saddam- type demagogue, albeit probably less secular, will emerge. It is true that the development of new civil institutions will take time, but it is also the case that the U.S. role in shepherding their development can be quickened. The judgment call we must make is whether U.S. leadership for change should be swift or slow paced. My sense is that swift actions are more likely to lead to Iraq-centric responsibility- taking. The U.S. will inevitably be dissatisfied with postwar circumstances in Iraq; but the longer the conflict continues, the more unstable the aftermath. Iraq will become more splintered and the U.S. more vulnerable to hateful reaction to others. Another approach might be to indicate that we would expect to take most of our troops from Iraq within 6 months of Saddam Hussein's capture or death. Such a pronouncement would underscore that our problem is with his dictatorial regime, not with the Iraqi people or their religious faith. It might also provide incentive for the populace to help in apprehending their former head of state. Point number fifteen. It is critical to the security of our troops as well as Iraqi security that we create an Iraqi police force as soon as possible. Responsibility for domestic security is an internal, not external, matter. We cannot be their policemen; and if we persist in trying, we will make it harder for stability to be established and maintained. Students of international politics have for the past generation questioned the capacity and moral authority of any country to be policemen for the world. But little academic attention has been devoted to the challenge of being policemen within a country after the conclusion of conflict. We have little experience with such responsibility. In Japan, MacArthur relied on indigenous Japanese police. In post-Hitler Germany, we quickly reconstituted a German constabulary at most levels. Common sense would indicate that trying to police a country the size of France with soldiers unfamiliar with the language and culture of the society, untrained in the art of policing and unwelcome and resented in critical cities and towns must be a nearly impossible task. Hence, the need to expedite the training of an indigenous Iraqi police force. Point number sixteen. We should announce that we have no intention of establishing permanent military bases in Iraq. Some Washington policymakers want such bases but they would be a political burden for any new government in Baghdad and a constant struggle for the U.S. to defend. Defense of American bases in Iraq from terrorism in the 21st Century is likely to be far more difficult than the challenge we first saw of maintaining United State sovereignty over the Panama Canal in the 20th Century. The reason the Department of Defense concluded in the Carter Administration that it was wise to transfer control over the Panama Canal to the Panamanians was the estimation that the canal could be defended against traditional aggression but not sabotage or acts of terrorism. It seemed wiser to respect nationalist sentiment and provide for gradual transfer of the canal to local control than to insist in quasi-colonial assertions of power. There are many reasons which Europeans are so smugly opposed to our policy in Iraq. One is historic experience to colonialism. The French were chased out of Algeria, the Russians, and earlier the British, out of Afghanistan. U.S. intervention in Iraq is seen in Europe is not too dissimilar to the British and French effort to reestablish control over the Suez Canal in 1956. It is noteworthy that the Islamic world deeply appreciated President Eisenhower's refusal to back the British and French intervention in Egypt at that time. Europeans now think the shoe is on the other foot. We appear insensitive to history. In particular, those who call for multiyear occupation based on the World War II model seem not to comprehend that the Japanese understood that they attacked us and the Germans understood that our intervention was precipitated by their aggression. Iraqis, on the other hand, look at us as the aggressors, as imposers of alien values. They feel our presence is only justified at their behest. Of all forms of government, successful occupation depends on consent of the governed. If it is lacking, problems are inevitable, particularly when and if foreign presence is of a military nature. Point number seventeen. Credit will remain the dominant economic issue until Iraq's foreign debt is reduced or cancelled. Neither significant private nor large-scale public credit will be made available to Iraqis until the burden of old debt is lifted. Accordingly, we should press vigorously for Saddam-era debt, which went largely to build palaces for Saddam's family and to buy weapons of aggression to be written off. We should also press to establish community-centered banks and credit unions where micro-credit can be offered. Oil wealth has its advantages only if revenues are used for the benefit of society rather than political insiders. Increasing petroleum production is not enough. Oil is not a labor-intensive industry. Jobs matter and Iraq needs bankers and small business entrepreneurs far more than oil barrens. We have no choice except to help rebuild Iraq's oil infrastructure, but we must make clear that we have no intention of controlling the country's oil reserves. The natural resource of Iraq must be treated as the patrimony of the Iraqi people. Point number 18: Economic assistance to Iraq should be front-loaded and generous. War has been a constant of history, but the concept of reconstruction is relatively new. The 20th century gave us two vastly different models. At the end of World War I, the victors imposed retributive terms on Germany, which so angered German society that it turned to fascism. World War II was the result. The allies took a different approach at the end of World War II. Generosity was the watchword. The Marshall Plan was adopted to rebuild Europe and General MacArthur directed the reform and modernization of Japan. Model democracies emerged. The world was made more secure. The economic plan for Iraq should be two-prong, debt forgiveness coupled with institution building. A better world is more likely to emerge if the American agenda places its emphasis on construction rather than destruction. Here a note about the other reconstruction model in American history is relevant. With his call for malice toward none in his second inaugural address, Lincoln set the most conciliatory tone in the history of war. His successor once removed, U.S. Grant, proved to be a more proficient soldier than President and countenanced carpetbagging conflicts of interest. Our government today would be well-advised to recognize that neither history, nor the American public, approves of war or postwar profiteering. Great care has to be taken to ensure transparency and integrity in government contracts. And common sense would indicate that the more Iraqis are involved in rebuilding their own society, the more lasting such efforts are likely would be to be. Point number 19: Terrorism effects world economics as well as politics. Markets depend on confidence and nothing undercuts confidence more than anarchist acts. Policies designed to deter terrorism can be counterproductive. International disapproval of our actions may jeopardize our economy and diminish the credibility of our political leadership in the world. Increased terrorism could well have the dual effect of precipitating new U.S. military engagements and, ironically, strengthening isolationist sentiment which in turn could degenerate into a disastrous spiral of protectionism. Point number 20: The measure of success in reconstruction is not the sum of accomplishments. During the Viet Nam War, the Pentagon gave progress reports mainly in terms of body counts. One of the most liberal critics of that war, I.F. Stone, once commented that he accepted the validity of the body counts, but thought that they did not reveal the big picture. Suppose, Stone suggested, he was walking down a street and he bumped into a man running out of a bank, waving a gun and carrying a satchel full of money and were to ask the man, ``What are you doing?'' If the man responded, ``I am waiting for a car,'' he would be telling the truth but not revealing the big picture. Good things are being accomplished in Iraq, particularly in the north where an American General has won a measure of popularity through progressive stabilization initiatives. Yet, terrorism cannot credibly be contained in the arms-infested Iraqi environment. American civilians, as well as Armed Services personnel who have been posted to Iraq, deserve to be commended for their commitment and sacrifices, but prudence suggests that brevity of service is preferable to a long- standing presence. Otherwise, in a world where terrorism is a growth industry, even extraordinary sacrifice and significant accomplishments could be for naught. Point number 21: We must respect Iraqi culture and work to ensure that the art and artifacts of this cradle of civilization are preserved for the Iraqi people. There are few umbrages more long-lasting than cultural theft. Cultural looting must be stopped, and the market for stolen antiquities squelched. For our part, we should ensure that Iraqi cultural sites are protected and that our laws are upgraded. Any stolen antiquities brought to America must be returned. Point number 22: The war in Iraq should not cause us to forget Afghanistan. While the center of our military attention may at the moment be Bagdad, we must remember that no Iraqi was involved in hijacking the planes that struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11. Few countries are more distant physically or culturally from the United States than Afghanistan; yet, it is there the plotting for the terrorist acts began. The Taliban have been removed and a new, more tolerant government has been established; but the world community has not fulfilled its commitments to raise the country out of poverty and warlordism. The U.S. cannot continue to be complacent about economic and social development in that country, where foreigners have never been welcome. Failure of the Karzai government and a return of the Taliban would be a major setback in the battle with terrorism. Point number 23: Lastly and most importantly, U.S. policymakers should never lose sight of the fact that events in Israel and Iraq are intertwined and that no challenge is more important for regional and global security than resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dilemma. Extraordinarily, from a priority perspective, administration after administration in Washington seems to pay only intermittent attention to the Palestinian issue. There should be no higher priority in our foreign policy than a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Attention in Washington should be riveted at all times on this singular problem. The current status quo is good neither for Israel nor for the Palestinians. Now, for the first time lack of progress in establishing a mutually acceptable modus vivendi between the parties may be even more damaging to countries not directly involved in the conflict. The need for U.S. leadership in pressing for peace has never been more urgent. It would be a tragedy if, focused as we are upon making war in one part of the Middle East, we neglected to give sufficient prority to promoting peace in another. In conclusion, the world is noting that we are saying and what we are doing. Many are not convinced by our words; many are appalled by our actions. Yet nothing would be worse for the world than for us to fail. We must not. The key at this point is to recognize the limits as well as magnitude of our power and emphasize the most uplifting aspects of our heritage: democracy, opportunity, freedom of thought and worship. Motives matter; so do techniques to advance our values. The lesson of the past year is clear: America does better as a mediator and multi- party peace maker than as a unilateral interventionist.

Mr. LEACH

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, it is with sadness I would like to formally report to the House the passing of one of our most distinguished Members of the 20th century, Barber Conable of New York. Barber retired from the House over a decade ago, so many current Members are not familiar with Barber except by his reputation. Let me just stress that Barber Conable was the quintessential public servant. In Congress he was an expert on all matters of taxation. He led the Republican Party on the Committee on Ways and Means, rising to be the ranking member. He was identified with particular issues such as reductions in capital gains, also for the development of revenue sharing. Prior to serving in the Congress, he was in the United States Military, having served in both World War II and the Korean conflict, and he rose to the rank of Colonel. After leaving the Congress of the United States, where he, by the way, had been a close friend of the former President of the United States, George Bush, he was appointed to head the World Bank. He came to be known as a leader of the bank as interested for the world environment as well as for world economic growth. All of us in life have been privileged to have mentors. I would just simply say in this body this Member never considered anyone more a model legislator and mentor than Barber Conable. He was simply the most decent, the most thoughtful, the most intelligent, and the least political individual I have served with. To his wife, Charlotte, and family, I know I speak for many Members who are friends and staff on this Hill in extending our shared grief and best wishes.

Mr. LEACH

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's table the Senate bill (S. 811) to support certain housing proposals in the fiscal year 2003 budget for the Federal Government, including the downpayment assistance initiative under the HOME Investment Partnership Act, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

Mr. LEACH

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, the issue of our engagement in Iraq demands that we as a society probe the question of the limits of a superpower's power and the possible anomaly that there are severe liabilities to power, particularly for a superpower. Does, for instance, overwhelming military might protect us from terrorism or, if used unwisely, increase our vulnerability to terrorism? Likewise, does overwhelming economic power ensure loyalty or buy friendship even from the countries most indebted to the U.S.? In other words, can military and economic might ever become a substitute for sensible and sensitive foreign policy? And given the dilemma of Iraq, could it indeed be that the most important ``multibillion'' problem America faces is not deficits measured in dollars, fiscal or trade, but the antagonism of billions of people around the world who object to our current foreign policy? Here, let me say that I strongly believe in the need for clarification of thought as it applies to policy, and anyone who wishes to review the reasoning I have applied to the Iraq issue, ranging from a floor explanation of a ``no'' vote on the Congressional resolution authorizing war last year to calls for internationalizing the civil governance in Iraq last month, to a vote in favor of generosity in reconstruction efforts last week, can find the explanatory statements on my Congressional web site: www.house.gov/leach. What I would like to do today is summarize the dilemma we face and make the following points about where we might go from here: (1) There are no certitudes. Anyone who was not conflicted on the original decision to approve intervention or who does not see a downside to all courses of action today is not approaching the problem with an open mind. America and the world are in a strategic pickle. In an era of anger, of divisions in the world based on economics, on color of skin, on ethnicity, on religious belief, on happenstance of family and place of birth; in a world made smaller by technological revolutions in communications and transportation, those who have causes--good or bad--have possibilities of being heard and felt around the globe that never existed before. Great leaders like Gandhi and Martin Luther King appealed to the higher angels of our nature and achieved revolutionary change with non-violence. Mendacious leaders like Hitler, Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden have sought to impose their wills on others through appeals to hate and reliance on increasingly wanton instruments of oppression. As the world's only superpower, the U.S. has no choice but to display firmness of purpose and resolve in deterring inhumane breaches of order. Yet, firmness and resolve must be matched by compassionate understanding of the reasons people of the world lash out. We have the world's greatest armed forces. But these forces cannot successfully be deployed to counter international misconduct if we don't also seek to undercut the causes of such conduct. Reviewing the causes of World War I, historians quickly concluded that there was not enough flexibility in the European alliance system and that this allowed a rather minor event, the assassination of an Austrian archduke, to precipitate a cataclysmic war. With this example in mind, political leaders in the 1930s erred on the side of irresolution, which led them to Munich and the partition of Czechoslovakia. Too much inflexibility caused one war; too little spine a greater one. The problem today is not whether we should meet problems with firmness or compassion. We need both. The problem is determining when and how to respond with firmness, when and how to express compassion. As in all human conduct, the challenge is wisdom. (2) We must listen as well as assert. Four decades ago the British author Lawrence Durrell wrote a series of novels called the Alexandria Quartet, in which he describes a set of events in Alexandria, Egypt, preceding World War II. An experiment in the relativity of human perception, each of the four books views the same events through the eyes of a different participant. While the events described are the same in each book, the stories as told by each of the participants are surprisingly different. The reader comes to the realization that a broad understanding about events that transpire can only be developed by synthesizing the singularly different perceptions of various protagonists. To understand the Middle East today, we need to listen to everyone's story. (3) To shape or deter an opponents' actions, we need to understand how they think. American policy makers, at their best, reason in a pragmatic, future-oriented manner. In much of the rest of the world, on the other hand, people reason by historical analogy. Events dating centuries back, especially umbrages, dominate thinking about today. People in the Middle East, like the Balkans, are oriented to the past and are driven by ideas of honor of a different shape and emphasis than those we derive from American culture. (4) No country can go it alone for long and expect to be respected as an international leader. Doctrines of American exceptionalism--the precept that we should not be bound by legal or procedural norms that bind others--which are now fashionable in certain Washington ideological circles have led to intervention in Iraq without full UN sanction. Ironically, prior to 9/11 these same notions led to rejection of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and of upgraded verification provisions for the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention--agreements that would have stood in the way of WMD production in Iraq and provided a legal basis for possible armed intervention if violations occurred. The world is crying out for leadership in restraining weapons development. We are not providing it because Washington policy makers prefer that restraint on others not apply to ourselves. (5) When Washington policy makers speak on foreign policy they must understand that their audience is more than one party's political base. While Saddam Hussein is widely perceived to be the worst sort of tyrant, many people around the world view us as bullies for attacking a sovereign country without prior armed provocation. That is why it is so critical that a case for intervention should be based on concern for the well-being of others as well as the U.S. national interest. For foreign policy to be effective, it must be clearly articulated and convincing in those parts of the world most affected by it. (6) We must rededicate ourselves to building up an intelligence capacity that better understands the Middle East and the Islamic world and is less susceptible to being politicized. Our inability to understand Islamic culture resulted in the greatest intelligence failure of our era. It is, however, not the sole intelligence failure. In one of the greatest judgmental errors of our time we appear to have attempted to combat the ideological posturing of others by slanting our own intelligence. Based on what is known today, policy makers not only erred in assessing Saddam Hussein's WMD capacities, but put too much faith in a narrow cadre of ideologues who suggested the U.S. would be welcomed as a liberating rather than conquering or, worse yet, colonizing force in Iraq. Estimates of the costs of war, of the ramifications of involvement, of the expected reaction of the population and of the likelihood of foreign support were dead wrong. (7) It is the responsibility of public officials to ensure that no American soldier is deployed as a defenseless magnet for terrorist attack--or in such a way as to incite foreign radicals to commit terrorist acts in America itself. American soldiers have been trained to withstand the heat of battle in defense of America and American values. For two and a quarter centuries no country has been more effectively or more courageously served by a citizen soldiery than the United States. In Iraq, our armed forces could not have performed more professionally or valiantly than in the initial engagement. But the difference between service in combat and service in occupation of a foreign land, especially an Islamic society, is profound. In Iraq, which is fast becoming for us much like Algeria was for the French in the 1950s, our men and women in uniform are increasingly facing hit-and-run terrorist assaults, which are much more difficult to defend against than traditional military confrontations. The challenge of policy makers is to recognize that there is a distinction between three endeavors: warfare, reconstruction and occupation. Our armed forces are trained to prevail in the first; they can be helpful in the second; but in the Islamic world no outside power is ever going to be well received as an occupying force. Hence, strategies that emphasize the first two endeavors and don't lead to long-term reliance on the third should be the goal of U.S. policy makers. (8) Responses to terrorism often lead to escalating action/reaction cycles. When our forces become subject to terrorist assaults and the perpetrators disappear into their neighborhoods, we, like Israel, will inevitably be tempted to retaliate in ways that may intensify rather than restrain future violence. Calls will be made not only to use air power in urban areas but to double or triple troop deployments, perhaps without adequate assessment of what such troops will be assigned to do. In conventional warfare, the case for overwhelming superiority (sometimes referred to as the Powell Doctrine) is compelling. In a terrorist setting, as in modernist design, less can often be more. There may be cases where deploying a large force to combat terrorism is appropriate. There may also be cases--and I believe Iraq is one--where additional soldiers simply become additional targets, and a different mix of strategies is both preferable and more effective. (9) To defend against terrorism, especially when it is fueled by an explosive mixture of religious and nationalist sentiments, requires frank acknowledgment of the nature and depth of the problem. For months, the administration has suggested the problem in Iraq is limited to 5,000 dissidents. This is a 5-digit miscalculation. At least half the Muslim world--over 500,000,000 people--are outraged by the U. S. government's attitudes and action. Long simmering resentment of American policies in Muslim countries like Indonesia has in recent months metastasized into hatred. And in Europe, including what the defense secretary called the ``new Europe,'' as well as in South and East Asia, respect for American policy is in steep decline. In the Vietnam War we gave a great deal of attention to the notion of ``winning the hearts and minds'' of the people. We didn't succeed in convincing the Vietnamese or world opinion of our good intentions despite the horrendous tactics of the Vietcong and the Communist North. Today, Americans must understand that in the battle for the minds of men, particularly in the Moslem world, we are doing less well than even in the most difficult days of the Vietnam War. In this context, we would be well-advised to remember America's original revolutionary commitment to a decent respect for the opinions of mankind. (10) While, for the time being, security in Iraq must remain the responsibility of U.S. military commanders in the field, we would be wise to put an international face on civil governance in the country and ask Secretary General Kofi Annan to immediately appoint a top civilian administrator to whom Ambassador Bremer and his staff would report. Transfer of interim civil authority to the UN would provide greater legitimacy to the formation of a new Iraqi government and encourage other countries to help with economic reconstruction and security requirements. We should also work to transfer, as soon as practicable, responsibility for internal security to troops of other nations or the Iraqis themselves. Transferring the police function to others is a way to build up Iraqi's own postwar internal security infrastructure and make evident that the U.S. does not desire long term control. (11) We should also move forthwith to transfer more political control to the Iraqi Governing Council and press for immediate elections and constitution writing. Some argue that stability is more likely to be achieved with a long U.S. occupation. I believe the reverse is true. The longer we are in Iraq, the greater the instability there and the greater the likelihood that terrorism will spread to other countries, including the United States. (12) America cannot cut and run politically, economically or militarily, but we would be wise to announce a timetable for troop withdrawal, by the end of next year at the latest. Some experts in and out of government believe that American troops should stay in and control Iraq at least as long as we did in Japan and Germany after World War II. Such a time table (a minimum of 5 years) is out of sync with the times and the mood in the Islamic world. The world is more impatient today and Muslims in particular are more history sensitive than ever before. While we assume the Iraqi populace should accept the American presence because of our good will, the Muslim world sees our forces as a compounding of grievances dating back to the crusades and, more recently, to American support of Israel. The imagery AlJazeera projects of Baghdad is that of another West Bank. In this context, American commitments to ``slog on'' interminably play into the hands of extremists. All extremists have to do is continue blowing up a vehicle or two every day, thereby eliciting a military reaction that we might view as reasonable but that the Islamic world is likely to see as heavy-handed, angering the populace and emboldening further dissent. The longer we stay, the greater the opportunity for al Qaeda and radical Baath party supporters to claim that the war is continuing and that they are prevailing. To prevent this and to keep control of events we would be wise to announce a withdrawal timetable that we, not they, control. Setting such a timetable has the effect of asserting that the war itself is over and we prevailed, and that Iraqis cannot dither in establishing a legitimate, elected government. A drawn out occupation plays into the hand of radicals. It gives them a rallying cry to keep up resistance in Iraq and expand terrorist assaults around the world. It gives them the chance to suggest that America is bent on continuing the crusades and, when we eventually withdraw, the prospect of claiming that they won the war. On the other hand, if we set a firm schedule for drawing down our troops, we define the war as being over in its 3rd week, not in its 6th year. An announced time table can later be modified to allow, for instance, a small force to remain briefly in northern Iraq to maintain sovereign cohesion. Timetables can also be abbreviated. But the point is that they underscore our reluctance to become an imperial power and, perhaps more importantly, our determination to control our own destiny. (13) It is critical to the security of our troops, as well as Iraqi security, that we create an Iraqi police force as soon as possible. Responsibility for domestic security is an internal not external matter. We can't be their policemen and if we persist in trying, we will make it harder for stability to be established and maintained. Students of international politics have for the past generation questioned the capacity and moral authority of any country to be policeman for the world. But little academic attention was devoted to the challenge of being policeman within a country after the conclusion of a conflict. We have little experience with such a responsibility. In Japan, MacArthur relied on indigenous Japanese police; in Germany, we quickly reconstituted a German constabulary at most local levels. Common sense would indicate that trying to police a country the size of France with soldiers unfamiliar with the language and culture of the society, untrained in the art of policing, and unwelcome and resented in critical cities and towns must be a nearly impossible task. Hence the need to expedite the training of an indigenous Iraqi police force. (14) We should announce that we have no intention of establishing permanent military bases in Iraq. Some Washington policy makers want such bases but they would be a political burden for any new government in Baghdad and a constant struggle for the U.S. to defend. Defense of American bases in Iraq from terrorism in the 21st century is likely to be far more difficult than the challenge we foresaw of maintaining U.S. sovereignty over the Panama Canal in the 20th century. The reason the Department of Defense concluded in the Carter administration that it was wise to transfer control over the Panama Canal to Panamanians was the estimation that the Canal could be defended against traditional aggression but not sabotage or acts of terrorism. It seemed wiser to respect nationalist sentiment and provide for a gradual transfer of the canal to local control than to insist on quasi-colonial assertions of power. There are many reasons why Europeans are so smugly opposed to our policy in Iraq. One is historical experience with colonialism. The French were chased out of Algeria, the Russians, and earlier the British, out of Afghanistan. U.S. intervention in Iraq is seen in Europe as not too dissimilar to the British and French effort to re- establish control over the Suez Canal in 1956. It is noteworthy that the Islamic world deeply appreciated President Eisenhower's refusal to back the British and French intervention in Egypt. Europeans now think that the shoe is on the other foot. We appear insensitive to history. (15) Credit will remain the dominant economic issue until Iraq's foreign debt is reduced or canceled. Neither significant private nor large scale public credit will be made available to Iraqis until the burden of old debt is lifted. Accordingly, we should press vigorously for Saddam-era debt--which went largely to build palaces for Saddam's family and to buy weapons of aggression--to be written off. We should also press to establish community-centered banks and credit unions where micro credit can be offered. Oil wealth has its advantages only if revenues are used for the benefit of society rather than political insiders. Increasing petroleum production is not enough. Oil is not a labor intensive industry. Jobs matter, and Iraq needs bankers and small business entrepreneurs far more than oil barons. We have no choice except to help rebuild Iraq's oil infrastructure, but we must make clear that we have no intention of controlling Iraq's oil reserves. The natural resources of Iraq must be treated as the patrimony of the Iraqi people. (16) Economic assistance to Iraq should be front-loaded and generous. War has been a constant of history, but the concept of reconstruction is relatively new. The 20th century gave us two vastly different models. At the end of World War 1, the victors imposed retributive terms on Germany, which so angered German society that it turned to fascism. World War II was the result. The allies took a different approach at the end of World War II. Generosity was the watchword. The Marshall Plan was adopted to rebuild Europe and Gen. MacArthur directed the reform and modernization of Japan. Model democracies emerged. The world was made more secure. The economic plan for Iraq should be two-pronged: debt forgiveness coupled with institution building. A better world is more likely to emerge if the American agenda places its emphasis on construction rather than destruction. Here a note about the other reconstruction model in American history is relevant. With his call for malice toward none, Lincoln's second inaugural address set the most conciliatory tone in the history of war. His successor once removed, U.S. Grant, proved to be a more proficient soldier than President and countenanced carpet bagging conflicts of interest. Our government today would be well advised to recognize that neither history nor the American public approves of war or post-war profiteering. Great care has to be taken to ensure transparency and integrity in government contracts and common sense would indicate that the more Iraqis are involved in rebuilding their own society, the more lasting such efforts are likely to be. (17) Terrorism affects world economics as well as politics. Markets depend on confidence and nothing undercuts confidence more than anarchist acts. Policies designed to deter terrorism can be counter- productive. International disapproval of our actions may jeopardize our economy and diminish the credibility of our political leadership in the world. Increased terrorism could well have the dual effect of precipitating new U.S. military engagements and, ironically, strengthening isolationist sentiment--which, in turn could degenerate into a disastrous spiral of protectionism. (18) The measure of success in reconstruction is not the sum of accomplishments. In the Vietnam War the Pentagon gave progress reports that came to be symbolized by its body counts. One of the most liberal critics of that war, I.F. Stone, once commented that he accepted the validity of the body counts but thought that they did not reveal the big picture. It would be as if, Stone suggested, he were to be walking down the street and bump into a man running out of a bank waving a gun and carrying a satchel full of money, and were to ask the man, ``What are you doing?'' If the man responded, ``I'm waiting for a car,'' the man would be telling the truth but not revealing the big picture. Good things are being accomplished in Iraq, particularly in the North where an American general has won a measure of popularity through progressive stabilization initiatives. Yet terrorism cannot credibly be contained in the arms-infested Iraqi environment. American civilians as well as armed services personnel who have been posted to Iraq deserve to be commended for their commitment and sacrifices, but prudence suggests that brevity of service is preferable to a long standing presence. Otherwise, in a world where terrorism is a growth industry even extraordinary sacrifice and significant accomplishments could be for naught. (19) We must respect Iraqi culture and work to ensure that the art and artifacts of this cradle of civilization are preserved for the Iraqi people. There are few umbrages more long lasting than cultural theft. Cultural looting must be stopped and the market for stolen antiquities squelched. For our part we should ensure that Iraqi cultural sites are protected and that our laws are upgraded. Any stolen antiquities brought to America must be returned. (20) The war in Iraq should not cause us to forget Afghanistan. While the center of our military attention may at the moment be Baghdad, we must remember that no Iraqi was involved in hijacking the planes that struck the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 9/11. Few countries are more distant physically or culturally from the United States than Afghanistan, yet it is there where the plotting for that terrorist act began. The Taliban have been removed and a new, more tolerant government has been established, but the world community has not fulfilled its commitments to raise that country out of poverty and warlordism. The U.S. cannot continue to be complacent about economic and social development in that country, where foreigners have never been welcome. Failure of the Karzai government and a return of the Taliban would be a major setback in the battle with terrorism. (21) Lastly, and most importantly, U.S. policy makers should never lose sight of the fact that events in Israel and Iraq are intertwined and that no challenge is more important for regional and global security than resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dilemma. Extraordinarily, administration after administration in Washington seems to pay only intermittent attention to this issue. There should be no higher priority in our foreign policy than a resolution of the Arab- Israeli conflict. Attention in Washington should be riveted at all times on this singular issue. The current status quo is good neither for Israel nor for the Palestinians. Now, for the first time lack of progress in establishing a mutually acceptable modus vivendi between the parties may be even more damaging to countries not directly involved in the conflict. The need for U.S. leadership in pressing for peace has never been more urgent. It would be a tragedy if, focussed on making war in one part of the Middle East, we neglected to promote peace in another. In conclusion, the world is noting what we are saying and what we are doing. Many are not convinced by our words; many are appalled by our actions. Yet nothing would be worse for the world than for us to fail. We must not. The key at this point is to recognize the limits as well as magnitude of our power and emphasize the most uplifting aspects of our heritage: democracy, opportunity, freedom of thought and worship. Differences we must respect; intolerance we must reject. But America does better as a mediator and multi-party peace maker than as a unilateral interventionist. This is the great lesson of the past year.

Mr. LEACH

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of House Joint Resolution 63, legislation that reauthorizes the Compact of Free Association of the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Mr. Speaker, the text of H.J. Res. 63 which is before us is substantially identical to the extensive bill passed by this body 3 weeks ago. The few changes it incorporates were the result of the bipartisan, bicameral consultations prior to passage in the other body, and in my judgment represent further improvements to this legislative product. Specifically, these include an amendment to the education section which ensures retention within the islands of eligibility for participation in U.S. special education programs; a modification of the disaster assistance provisions based primarily on a recent proposal from the administration which envisions continuing roles for both the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance; and the inclusion of $5.3 million for the final U.S. contribution to the trust fund established to assist in the resettlement of Rongelap Island, the locale for the U.S. thermonuclear tests in the 1940s and 1950s. It would be my hope that we could finalize this noncontroversial package today and send it to the President for signature before the end of the session. As my colleagues may be aware, the economic assistance provisions of the current Compact with Micronesia and the Marshall Islands expired in 2001, but were extended for 2 years while the United States renegotiated the expiring provisions with the island countries. These negotiations were only completed this spring, leaving Congress relatively little time to act on a host of difficult substantive and jurisdictional issues before those authorities expired on September 30, 2003. Because Congress was not able to reauthorize the compacts prior to the end of the fiscal year, the basic authorities for U.S. assistance to the islands have been extended temporarily by continuing resolution. In closing, I would like to thank again the chairmen and ranking members of the Committees on Resources, Education and the Work Force, Budget, Ways and Means, and the Committee on International Relations, particularly the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), for their assistance and cooperation in developing and supporting this important legislation which further advances relations with our stalwart friends in the freely associated states and protects key U.S. interests in the Western Pacific. I urge support for the resolution. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendments to the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 63) to approve the ``Compact of Free Association, as amended between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federated States of Micronesia'', and the ``Compact of Free Association, as amended between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands,'' and otherwise to amend Public Law 99-239, and to appropriate for the purposes of amended Public Law 99-239 for fiscal years ending on or before September 30, 2023, and for other purposes.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on the joint resolution under consideration.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. In conclusion, let me thank each of the contributors to today's discussion. Obviously, the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) has played a seminal role in this process; so have the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Watson), the gentleman from American Samoa (Mr. Faleomavaega), the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. Abercrombie), and I would like to note with regard to the gentlewoman from Guam (Ms. Bordallo), how appreciative we are of her help in this endeavor, and how appreciative I am that she has referenced all the people from the outside that have contributed to the development of this particular agreement. I might say that Congress has put a slightly modified stamp on what was negotiated by the executive branch. This modified stamp is tilted towards generosity. This is particularly appropriate because this is the people's body, and we are in the fortunate position of having nothing but feelings of enormous goodwill towards the people of the freely associated states. This is a tangible agreement, but it is what is intangible that is so much more important. So as we in this House pass this agreement, I would just like to say that I am confident I speak for this entire body when I suggest that we are proud of our friends in the Pacific and we hope to maintain warm relationships for decades and decades to come.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. LEACH

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I rise in support of H. Res. 427 regarding the United Buddhist Church of Vietnam. This resolution congratulates the newly appointed leadership of this Buddhist Church and notes the persecutions faced by the church during the past 3 decades and urges the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to comply with its own constitutional and international pledges to protect rights of religious belief and practice. According to the State Department, the Vietnamese government ``continues to maintain broad legal and policy restrictions on religious freedom and to ban and actively discourage participation in what it regards as illegal religious groups, including the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam.'' The most recent Country Reports on Human Rights Practices notes that religious and organizational activities by Buddhist monks associated with this church are illegal and that all of this Buddhist church's activities outside of private temple worship have been proscribed by the government. The plight of the Unified Buddhist Church is perhaps most poignantly symbolized by the enforced isolation endured by some of its senior clerics over the past 2\1/2\ decades, notwithstanding their advanced age and sometimes frail health. Inspired by their examples of nonviolence and courage, we reaffirm our belief in the rights of all people to worship and to organize their religious communities according to the dictates of conscience, free from state coercion. At the same time, it is important to note that H. Res. 427 is not merely critical of past transgressions. It is also aspirational. In addition to citing the Constitution of Vietnam, which formally protects religious freedom of belief, it notes certain extremely modest but welcome developments earlier this year. This past spring the Vietnamese government allowed the Fourth Supreme Patriarch of the Buddhist Church to travel to Hanoi to seek urgent medical care and also ended the long-standing detention ordered against the Venerable Thich Quang Do. During that period the Vietnamese Prime Minister reportedly met with the Supreme Patriarch and made statements that some hoped would presage an era of increased governmental openness towards the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam. Unfortunately, those statements have not yet borne practical dividends, and just last month there were indications of a renewed crackdown in the Buddhist leadership, including the return of numerous senior clerics to effective detention. At a time when Vietnam is admittedly undergoing many transformations that are progressive, we urge the government of that nation to trust its citizens with the basic freedoms that they deserve. I would like to thank the personnel of the United States Department of State and the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom who worked with our committee staff and with the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Loretta Sanchez), the sponsor, to update and refine the language of the original resolution. The text before us is a thoughtful, accurate product that deserves the support of this body. Mr. Speaker I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the resolution under consideration.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the resolution (H. Res. 427) expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the courageous leadership of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam and the urgent need for religious freedom and related human rights in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, as amended.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, first I would like to thank the gentlewoman from California for her wonderful leadership on this initiative and also that of her colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos). Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Tom Davis).

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to our distinguished colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. Royce).

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith).

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his profound statement and for his leadership on so many human rights issues as well as the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos). Mr. Speaker, I would only conclude with the observation that there are very important abstract principles at issue here but they are made concrete by references to individuals which the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith) has just done. Individuals matter because it is with the individual that the picture at large can be revealed. So we care about the individuals in this particular instance as well as the principle of the freedom of religion.

Mr. LEACH

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the resolution under consideration.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I would conclude by thanking the gentleman from Maine (Mr. Allen) who has so thoughtfully brought this resolution before us. Congress is in the gentleman's debt.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 288) honoring Seeds of Peace for its promotion of understanding, reconciliation, acceptance, coexistence, and peace among youth from the Middle East and other regions of conflict.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen), distinguished chair of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia.