Jim Leach

Mr. LEACH

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Sanford].

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on International Relations, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman]. (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Chabot].

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Rohrabacher].

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Foley]. (Mr. FOLEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Funderburk].

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton], chairman of the Latin American Subcommittee of the Committee on International Relations.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Fox].

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. King], who has probably contributed as much to this resolution as anybody, along with the gentlewoman from Ohio [Ms. Kaptur].

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Stearns]. (Mr. STEARNS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Bartlett]. (Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. Kolbe] who as always has exerted enormous leadership on every issue that affects the state of Mexico.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Barr].

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from New Jersey [Mrs. Roukema]. (Mrs. ROUKEMA asked and was given permission to revise and extend here remarks.)

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, in conclusion let me state that an original cosponsor of this resolution, the gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter] had hoped to be here today, but he is, unfortunately, in San Diego tending to an illness of his wife. Mr. Speaker, let me just conclude by saying this resolution represents a desire for greater accountability related to one of the first crises of the new economic order. In the background of this debate is macroeconomic decisionmaking as it relates to the intertwining of global economies. In the background also is the refusal of this Congress in a timely fashion to respond to the administration request to act on a bipartisan basis to this particular crisis.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. de la Garza]. (Mr. de la GARZA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) [Mr. de la GARZA addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

Mr. LEACH. I would fully concur with the gentleman's assessment. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentlewoman from Idaho [Mrs. Chenoweth]. (Mrs. CHENOWETH asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. LEACH. I would respond, yes, that is the clear intent of paragraph 20.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman, and I yield 30 seconds to the distinguished gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Coble].

Mr. LEACH. I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss]. (Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LEACH

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton].

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me. Mr. Chairman, let me just stress I think the big question is not whether there is a modification--it is probably too harsh to call it a retreat--from a quasi-party platform, the contract. The big question is whether there is going to be a retreat from international leadership, from the traditions of at least half a century of American involvement in world affairs. I would only ask, as we look at this particular amendment that has been offered by the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Berman], two questions: Is it cheaper and more effective to advance the interests of the United States through international burden sharing, or is it cheaper and more effective to go it alone? The second question is, How can we, in times of trauma, ask others to serve with us if we refuse to serve with them? It is in this context that I think this particular amendment would add modestly to the bill and make it something that would be more acceptable to more Members of this body. But I would stress to everyone, this has become a flawed bill in the final measure. With great regret, I am going to have to vote against it.

Mr. LEACH

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. This is a self-explanatory amendment. It is designed to protect the constitutional authority and responsibility of the President as Commander in Chief from unprecedented and improper congressional tampering with the separation of powers doctrine. The Commander in Chief clause of the Constitution supports two key policy precepts. First, it gives the President broad authority to command the military forces of the United States, thereby securing civilian command over the military. Second, and most relevant to this debate, the framers also sought to ensure that one commander had sole authority to direct the Nation's fighting forces. The colonists had learned the difficulties of prosecuting war via committee during the American Revolution. Naming the President Commander in Chief was intended to assure consistent orders, plans, and decisions. The President was not given the authority to make the political decision to declare war, but he was granted the authority to command the troops in day-to-day operations. In its present form, this bill, with unbridled gall, undercuts the separation of powers doctrine by limiting the well-established constitutional authority of the President to decide upon the command arrangements for U.S. military personnel. Title IV, for instance, attempts to prevent the expenditure of funds for any element--even an individual soldier--of U.S. Armed Forces under the command or operational control of a foreign national acting on behalf of the United Nations unless certain commitments are made to Congress. As a matter of constitutional law, I believe that the Constitution does not permit the President to derogate his power as Commander in Chief to another body. Period. Certification requirements are inappropriate; indeed, they are constitutionally unseemly. U.S. command, which no President can give up, and operational control, which both constitutionally and as a matter of established military practice, the President may delegate to others. Yet this bill brazenly attempts to strip the President of his constitutional authority and responsibility for deciding upon the command arrangements for U.S. military personnel lawfully participating in U.N. operations. Indeed, this bill would deny the President the authority to place U.S. troops under the operational control of another country even a NATO ally for U.N. operations. In this regard, a fair reading of the Constitution and any understanding of history suggests that the Commander-in-Chief should properly retain the flexibility to place troops temporarily under the operational control of officers of another nation when it serves U.S. interests, as we have done in a number of military conflicts since the American Revolution. Accordingly, my amendment strikes the existing interpretation section found on page 28 of title IV to the bill and inserts instead a new clause recognizing that subject to the power of the Congress under article I of the Constitution to declare war, nothing in this section of the bill shall be construed to derogate or limit the President's article II powers as Commander-in-Chief. Title IV, as currently crafted, is poor constitutional law; it is also doubtful policy. The principle of collective security has been a linchpin of U.S. national security policy of every administration since Franklin Roosevelt. The effect of title IV, unless amended, is to diminish U.S. leadership in the U.N. and elsewhere and force Presidents in emergency settings to either do nothing or rely exclusively on unilateral actions. At issue is whether we want to be the policeman for the world or the leading member of an international highway patrol. The second option, in more than a few instances, is more realistic and, I might add, cheaper. So that there is no misunderstanding, this title is more constraining than the War Powers Resolution. The War Powers Resolution, passed over President Nixon's veto, deals with Congressional assertions of power to declare war. Because of modern practices of prosecuting but not declaring war, the war powers resolution was offered to check the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief to direct U.S. Armed Forces in the event of imminent hostilities which might lead to war. But this bill goes beyond the reach of the war powers resolution by attempting to trench upon and limit the command authority of the President before hostilities are threatened and in instances of actions designed to deter conflict rather than lead to war. On this point, let me quote from a recent Wall Street Journal editorial: Yes we should check the exorbitant costs of U.N. peacekeeping by rectifying the accounting and limiting the U.S. share of the burden. But diminishing the legitimate powers of the presidency, even in this particular way, is poor precedent. In the background of this debate is Somalia. In this Members' view it is a widely misunderstood circumstance. In earlier debate on this bill the minority pointed out that the problem was not command and control of U.S. Armed Forces, in that U.S. military personnel at all points were under U.S. command. This is true, but it begs the larger policy questions. What happened in Somalia, and it was by no means a totally failed operation, was that President Bush called upon the U.S. military to take part in one of the most idealistic foreign policy interventions in the history of the world. The U.S. military because of its extraordinary organization and logistic capabilities was sent to a foreign country to feed a people whose social infrastructure had broken down. In a high-risk environment, a succeeding U.S. administration chose out of frustration to take sides in a civil war. This decision, made without intellectual rigor, profoundly changed American policy because it caused United States forces in the field to become diverted from the professionalism of their original mission and enmeshed in the history and sociology of internal Somalian politics. Responsibility for the change of mission rests in the White House. This Congress has every reason in retrospect to be critical, but care should be taken to hold decision-makers, not the system, accountable. What is warranted is consideration of the need for new leadership, not a change in the constitutional framework of decision-making. The character of modern international affairs is that decision need to be made quickly. What, for instance, would happen if when Congress was out of session a peace agreement were signed between Israel and Syria which included United States participation in peacekeeping in the Golan? Would a President be hamstrung by legal niceties in authorizing the movement of several hundred U.S. troops? More consequentially, the character of modern Congressional politics is an unwillingness to share accountability with the executive branch. I don't know which is more remarkable: the fact Congress barely authorized the gulf war, giving President Bush much less of a mandate than he received from assorted rivals in the Security Council, or the fact that Congress almost didn't vote at all. The obvious conclusion that has been reached in modern Congresses is that there are no liabilities in standing by and many for taking sides in controversial questions of foreign affairs. Congress simply can't be relied on to share executive authority. Our Founding Fathers had it right then and now. Finally, a personal note. When I signed the Contract With America last fall, I publicly made clear that I differed with several parts, particularly that which applied to a prospective bill on this subject. The Republican commitment was to raise the issues of the contract in a measured way. But the oath we all take is to uphold the Constitution. Just because we have little confidence in this President, just because we now control the Congress is insufficient rationale to turn the Constitution upside down. A strong Presidency is in the national interest whether or not we have divided government. Let's be measured and reasonable. I urge adoption of this amendment which conforms this title to constitutional stricture, historical experience, and the requirements of future national security. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.