Carl Levin

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Select Committee on Intelligence be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on September 20, 2007 at 2:30 p.m. to hold a hearing.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs be authorized to meet on Thursday, September 20, 2007, at 2:30 p.m. for a hearing entitled ``High Risk IT Investments: Is Poor Management Leading to Billions in Waste.''

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Public Lands and Forests of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources be authorized to hold a hearing during the session of the Senate on Thursday, September 20, 2007, at 2:30 p.m. in room SD-366 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. The purpose of the hearing is to receive testimony on S. 1377, to direct the Secretary of the Interior to convey to the city of Henderson, NV, certain Federal land located in the city, and for other purposes; S. 1433, to amend the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act to provide competitive status to certain Federal employees in the State of Alaska; S. 1608 and H.R. 815, to provide for the conveyance of certain land in Clark County, NV, for use by the Nevada National Guard; S. 1740, to amend the act of February 22, 1990, and the act of July 2, 1862, to provide for the management of public land trust funds in the State of North Dakota; S. 1802, to adjust the boundaries of the Frank Church River of No Return Wilderness in the State of Idaho; S. 1939, to provide for the conveyance of certain land in the Santa Fe National Forest, NM; and S. 1940, to reauthorize the Rio Puerco Watershed Management Program, and for other purposes. And to receive testimony on two additional bills added to the hearing: S. 1143, to designate the Jupiter Inlet Lighthouse and the surrounding Federal land in the State of Florida as an Outstanding Natural Area and as a unit of the National Landscape System, and for other purposes; and S. 2034, to amend the Oregon Wilderness Act of 1984 to designate the Copper Salmon Wilderness and to amend the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act to designate segments of the North and South Forks of the Elk River in the State of Oregon as wild or scenic rivers, and for other purposes.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. I wish to join with Senator Boxer in saying that there is no way I know of that one can justify or rationalize the attacks on Senator Cleland or on Senator Kerry. You can't, I believe, do that by saying: Oh, no, they are in a political campaign; therefore, we can impugn their service because they run for office. To say it is different to impugn the honor of veterans such as Senator Cleland and Senator Kerry, it seems to me, is totally unacceptable. It is an effort to justify, differentiate, rationalize attacks which I consider to be abhorrent, just as I do the attack on General Petraeus, and I have said so very publicly. And this amendment, the Boxer amendment, makes it very clear that attacks on men and women who have worn the uniform honorably, attacking their service, their patriotism--this was not an attack on Senator Cleland's politics; this was an attack on his patriotism. Aligning him with Osama bin Laden in an ad is an attack on his patriotism. You can't just single out one attack which you dislike--and we all do, I hope; I hope we all condemn the ad in the New York Times. I have personally, and I feel very personal about it. I thought it was a disgraceful ad. But you can't just then say: But we are not going to talk about other attacks on men and women who have put their lives on the line, given up parts of their body, because they decide to run for public office. No, I am afraid the Cornyn amendment is the effort to justify and rationalize something which cannot be justified or rationalized just because a veteran who has served honorably, put his life on the line, decides to run for public office. They are all disgraceful ads, and we ought to treat them the same way. They impugn the honor, integrity, and patriotism of real heroes.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I agree with much of the Feingold amendment, particularly as it relates to the desire to transition the mission of U.S. forces in Iraq and to commence the reduction of U.S. forces from Iraq. Indeed, I have long sought those actions in an attempt to put the Iraqi security forces in the lead and to bring pressure on the Iraqi Government to make the political compromises necessary for reconciliation among the three main Iraqi groups. My concerns with the Feingold amendment are principally two. First of all, the mission to which U.S. forces would be limited after June 30, 2008, are too narrowly drawn and would not, in my view, allow our forces to carry out the missions that would be required. For example, I don't believe we should limit the duration and scope of targeted operations against al-Qaida as the amendment provides. I also don't believe we should preclude our forces from being embedded with Iraqi forces. I also believe the continuing mission of U.S. forces should include providing logistic support to the Iraqi security forces, which is prohibited by the Feingold amendment. In that regard, I would note that the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq that was led by retired Marine general Jim Jones specifically pointed out the logistic shortfalls of the Iraqi security forces and that they would need to rely on Coalition support for this function. My second chief concern is that restricting appropriations for our military sends the wrong message to our troops who are performing so heroically on the battlefield in Iraq. It would also pose extraordinarily difficult decisions for our field commanders. They could be faced, for instance, with determining whether a member of the Iraqi security forces has ever been involved in sectarian violence or in attacks against U.S. forces, because if they were they could not be trained by our forces under the terms of the amendment. Indeed, an incorrect determination could subject the commander to violations of our antideficiency laws which prohibit the expenditures of appropriated funds except to specified purposes. It is concerns such as these which lead me to vote ``no'' on the Feingold amendment. I yield the floor.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, as I understand it, there is no time agreement on this, other than that we complete debate today on the Levin-Reed amendment, except for the time allocated tomorrow morning?

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Biden amendment identified in a previous consent agreement be subject to a 60-vote threshold, and that if the amendment does not receive 60 votes, it be withdrawn.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, there isn't any dispute about whether a stable and independent Iraq is in our national interest. Some of us disagreed with the way we went to war with Iraq 4\1/2\ years ago. We have disagreed, many of us, with many of the Bush administration's policies in Iraq since then, including ignoring the advice of senior military leaders such as General Shinseki in planning the invasion, failing to properly plan for the occupation and its aftermath, disbanding the Iraqi Army, banning low-level Baath Party members from post-Saddam Government employment, failing to pressure the Iraqi leaders to meet the benchmarks and the timetable they set for themselves and, most recently, increasing the U.S. military presence in Iraq with the so-called surge, when we should be reducing our military presence. But the challenge facing us now, given where we are today, is what is the best way to promote a stable and independent Iraq. Is the course we are on succeeding? So while the opponents of changing course argue that those of us who want to change course don't see the importance of a stable and independent Iraq, they are exactly wrong. We see the importance of it, but we see the current policy is failing to move us in the direction of a stable and independent Iraq. It is the status quo-- staying the course--that jeopardizes the goal of a stable and independent Iraq. So while there is disagreement on whether the current course is leading to a stable and independent Iraq, there is agreement--broad consensus--on the desirability of that goal. There has also been a consensus for some time that there is no military solution to the sectarian violence in Iraq, and that the key to ending the violence lies in bringing about a political settlement among the various factions in Iraq today. Even Prime Minister Maliki recognized that fact a few months ago. This is what he said: The crisis is political, and the ones who can stop the cycle of blood letting of innocents are the Iraqi politicians. That is the Prime Minister of Iraq pointing out that it is the failure of the Iraqi politicians that is resulting in the ongoing violence. President Bush said this last January. He said the purpose of the surge--the explicit purpose, the stated purpose of the surge--was to give Iraqi politicians ``breathing space'' to work out a political settlement. It is also pretty much undisputed that the stated purpose of the surge--that explicitly stated purpose about giving the Iraqi politicians breathing space to work out their political settlement--has not been achieved. There are going to be arguments back and forth about how much military progress there has been on the ground, and there are statistics both ways. I accept General Petraeus's assessment--and I have been there recently--that there has been some military progress on the ground. But the purpose of the surge, the goal of the surge was to provide breathing space to the Iraqi politicians; and the more the surge has succeeded, the less excuse there is for the Iraqi politicians not working out their political misunderstandings. So it works exactly the opposite way from what the opponents of this amendment say. To the extent the surge has succeeded militarily, it makes it less understandable, less excusable, and less acceptable for the Iraqi politicians to continue to dawdle. By the way, the President has kind of shifted ground in terms of the purpose of the surge, anyway. Now the goal of the surge is to provide security and help Iraqi forces to maintain it. So having failed in its purpose, which was to give the Iraqi politicians room to work out their political misunderstandings, now we have a much more open-ended goal: to provide security and help the Iraqi forces to maintain it. Madam President, General Petraeus agreed in his testimony last week that the purpose of the surge--to provide breathing space to work out a political settlement--has not been achieved. He was asked a direct question and he gave that answer. He acknowledged the political settlement has not been achieved and that that was the stated purpose of the surge. There has been a lot of debate on whether the current situation on the ground in Iraq shows significant progress in terms of security--by the way, even though, as I said, this can be argued back and forth, there has been a public opinion poll taken in Iraq. The Iraqi people have been asked that question--not by supporters or opponents of the policy but by ABC News. Here is what the poll results were, and this is the Iraqi citizens being asked whether they feel more or less secure as a result of the surge. Here is the analysis by ABC News: The surge broadly is seen to have done more harm than good, with 65 to 70 percent [of Iraqis] saying it's worsened rather than improved security in surge areas, security in other areas, conditions for political dialog, the ability of the Iraqi government to do its work, the pace of reconstruction, and the pace of economic development. The result of the surge--or more accurately, the lack of political results--underscores the reality that there is going to be no end to the violence until Iraqi national leaders work out their political differences. As the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, under the leadership of retired Marine General Jim Jones, reported last week: Political reconciliation is the key to ending sectarian violence in Iraq. The Iraqi politicians surely haven't done that. They have not kept the commitments they made to achieve political reconciliation by adopting legislation setting the dates for provincial elections, approving a hydrocarbon law, a debaathification law, and submitting constitutional amendments to a referendum. I want to emphasize that the Iraqis' commitments to work out their key differences and the timetable to do so were their commitments and their timetable. So when Prime Minister Maliki complains that outsiders are not going to dictate to the Iraqi Government, what he is trying to do is obscure the fact that his own government set the benchmarks and timetables for themselves. Back in January, when President Bush proposed the surge, this is what he said about the benchmarks and the need for the Iraqis to meet them: America will hold the Iraqi government to the benchmarks it has announced. Last Thursday, we heard the same old song from the President. He said: The [Iraqi] government has not met its own legislative benchmarks, and in my meeting with Iraq leaders, I have made it clear that they must. Eight months after saying we are going to hold the Iraqi Government to the benchmarks, the President's words ring hollow. We are not insisting the Iraqi leaders keep their commitments, and there have been absolutely no consequences for the Iraqi leaders' failure to do so. James Baker, Lee Hamilton, and the rest of the Iraq Study Group recommended the following: If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government. Now, those were the words of the Iraq Study Group. That is exactly what is needed: consequences--clear, direct, and understandable consequences. But the only response to the Iraqi politicians' continued dawdling has been the repeated calls by the President for patience. I make reference to a letter from the Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, dated January 30, 2007. The question had been raised whether the timelines that were set by the Iraqi Government were in fact their timelines or ours. This is what Secretary Rice said about the timelines: . . . Iraq's Policy Committee on National Security agreed upon a set of political, security, and economic benchmarks and an associated timeline in September 2006. These were reaffirmed by the Presidency Council on October 16, 2006, and referenced by the Iraq Study Group; the relevant document (enclosed) was posted at that time on the President of Iraq's website. Madam President, we have been told by the--at least the public has been told by, I believe, the Prime Minister of Iraq that they are not going to accept America's timeline, that we are not going to impose a timeline on Iraq. What Secretary Rice's letter to me confirmed very precisely is that the Presidency Council of Iraq on October 16, 2006, adopted, reaffirmed--in her words, ``Iraq's Policy Committee on National Security agreed upon a set of . . . timelines.'' The dates are here. Here is the timeline. September 2006: To form a review committee and to agree on a political timetable. October 2006: Approve a hydrocarbon law and approve a provincial election law. November 2006: Approve a debaathification law and approve provincial council authorities law. December 2006: Approve amnesty, militias, and other armed formations law. January 2007: Constitutional Review Committee completes its work. February 2007: Form independent commissions in accordance with the constitution. March 2007: Constitutional amendments referendum. I ask unanimous consent that the letter from Secretary Rice to me dated January 30, 2007, be printed in the Record at this point, which makes the very clear statement that, No. 1, the timelines I have referred to attached to her letter are the Iraqi Government's timelines, and they formally adopted those.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I send a series of 24 amendments to the desk which have been cleared on both sides. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate consider those amendments en bloc; that the amendments be agreed to; that the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table; and that any statements relating to any of these individual amendments be printed in the Record.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that another letter that I will read a part of be printed in the Record at this point.

Mr. LEVIN. This is a June 13, 2007, letter to me from Secretary Rice. The setting for this--before I read this paragraph--is that Iraq said they never adopted those timelines, they never adopted those benchmarks. They contested what Secretary Rice said to me in the letter I am making part of the Record, dated January 30. I asked Secretary Rice about that. I said the Iraqis are saying you are wrong, that they didn't adopt the benchmarks. They say you are wrong, Secretary Rice. What do you have to say about that? She wrote me back: Thank you for your letter inquiring about the benchmarks that the Government for Iraq set for itself last fall. I emphasize the words ``set for itself last fall.'' Addressing me, she wrote: As you mentioned, I sent to you a letter in January in which I noted that Iraq's Political Committee on National Security agreed upon a set of benchmarks and an associated timeline, which were reaffirmed by the Iraqi Presidency Council in October 2006. She continued: We have confirmed with Iraqi President Talibani's Chief of Staff that the benchmarks were formally approved last fall by the Iraqi Political Committee on National Security. This committee includes the Presidency Council--the President and two Vice Presidents--as well as the leaders of all major political blocs in Iraq. The Iraqi Presidency Council then posted the benchmarks on its website for several months. I have already made this part of the Record. I ask unanimous consent that my letter to the Secretary, which precipitated this response on June 13 also be printed in the Record.

Mr. LEVIN. Success in Iraq--creating a stable, independent Iraq-- depends on Iraqi leaders finally seeing the end of the open-ended U.S. commitment. The Iraq Study Group correctly pointed out almost a year ago that ``An open-ended commitment of American forces would not provide the Iraqi government the incentive it needs to take the political actions that give Iraq the best chance of quelling sectarian violence.'' In the absence of such an incentive, the Iraqi Government might continue to delay taking those actions. The President's current strategy is nothing less than stagnant because it is open-ended. It lacks the key ingredient of an action- forcing mechanism aimed at getting the Iraqi leaders to resolve their political differences. What is that mechanism? What is the mechanism that will finally force the Iraqi leaders to get on with the job of negotiating their political differences? It is action on our part, not just rhetoric, that clearly demonstrates to the Iraqi Government that our open-ended commitment to the American troops in the middle of their civil war is over, and that while we will provide support to their army, we have decided, as did the British, to transfer principal responsibility for security to Iraqi forces. It is not good enough to do what the President did a few days ago and say we are going to take another look next March. That maintains the open-ended commitment. That does not have a timetable for the reduction of our troops to the levels which are necessary to carry on the missions which are identified. The Jones Commission reported that ``The Iraqi armed forces . . . are increasingly effective and are capable of assuming greater responsibility for the internal security of Iraq.'' The Commission went on to say that a number of Iraqi Army battalions that are capable of taking the lead are not in the lead. That was a fact acknowledged by General Petraeus in our hearings about a week ago. The Commission did one other thing: The Jones Commission also recommended--and these are the keywords--``the size of our national footprint in Iraq be reconsidered'' and that ``significant reductions . . . appear to be possible and prudent.'' Those are the words of General Jones and his Commission that significant reductions in our presence appear to be prudent. This is a group of retired generals and police officers. I asked General Petraeus about whether there are these units of the Iraqi Army that are capable of assuming greater responsibility, as General Jones's Commission said, but they have not done so. General Petraeus acknowledged that there were such Iraqi units. I asked him how many, and he said he would supply that number for the record. The Jones Commission emphasized that ``there is a fine line between assistance and dependence.'' When I was in Iraq last month, I asked a young American soldier who is on his third deployment to Iraq what his ideas were about transferring greater responsibility to the Iraqis. His answer was: The Iraqi soldiers will let U.S. soldiers do the job that they're supposed to be doing forever, and we need to let them do it on their own. I could not agree more. In addition to getting our troops out of the middle of their civil war, success also depends on a transition of missions. According to the Iraq Study Group: By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. That Commission proposed that a far smaller U.S. military presence would remain only for limited missions to include force protection, counterterrorism, and training the Iraqi security forces. I believe it is essential that transition to the limited missions be announced now as a way of ending this open-ended commitment which the Iraqi political leaders have taken to be such a security blanket and have taken them off the hook from doing something that only they can do--work out the political differences that divide them which, in the words of their own Prime Minister, the failure to do has resulted in the continuation of violence. Everybody seems to agree that there is no military solution, and yet when it comes to telling the Iraqi political leaders that the open- ended commitment is over, we are not only going to begin to reduce our troops, but we are going to transition their mission and complete that transition in a reasonable period of time, not precipitous but in a reasonable period of time, and our amendment provides 9 months after enactment of this law, it is the only way--the only way--that this open-ended commitment can finally be brought to an end. So we not only have to transition to the limited missions and announce it now, we have to adopt a timetable for the completion of that transition. Those are the key provisions of the amendment before us. It is the key to ending the open-endedness, and it is long overdue. Presenting Iraq's political leaders with a timetable to begin withdrawing our forces and transitioning those that remain from mainly combat to mainly support roles is the only hope that Iraqi leaders will realize their future is in their hands, not in the hands of our brave men and women who proudly wear the uniform of our country. Taking this step will also recognize another fact of life: that the stress on our forces--especially the wear and tear on the Army and Marines--must be reduced. We cannot continue to deploy our forces at the current level without seriously weakening our ability to respond to other challenges that might confront us. So how can Congress bring about a change of course in Iraq when President Bush delays and delays and delays making any change? A clear majority of the Senate indicated support for Levin-Reed last July when we voted 53 to 46 to cut off the filibuster of the Republican leadership against the Levin-Reed amendment. Madam President, 53 to 46 was the vote. The Levin-Reed amendment required the Secretary of Defense to begin a reduction in the number of U.S. forces in Iraq not later than 120 days after the date of enactment. It would have also required a transition to a limited presence only to carry out the missions of protecting U.S. and coalition personnel and infrastructure, training, equipping, and providing logistics support--and those are important words--to the Iraqi security forces and engaging in targeted counterterrorism operations against al-Qaida, al-Qaida affiliated groups, and other international terrorist organizations. The transition to the limited presence in mission would have had to have been completed by April 30, 2008. This reduction would have been implemented along with a comprehensive diplomatic, political, and economic strategy that includes sustained engagement with Iraq's neighbors and the international community. The continued inability of the Iraqi Government to make any progress toward a political settlement and the refusal of the Bush administration to change course reinforces the need for the Levin-Reed amendment. So that amendment is now before us. It is essentially the same as the amendment we voted on last July. The changes in the timetable are slight to accommodate the fact that we are voting at a later time, essentially. We would require the reduction to begin no later than 90 days after the date of enactment and to be completed within 9 months of the date of enactment in order to adjust the timetable to be both clear and to respond to the fact that we will be voting on this months later than the last vote in July. The challenge before us is to get to the 60 votes. Sixty votes is the goal that I guess almost all our Iraq legislation has to meet because of the filibuster that took place the last time we offered Levin-Reed and because the threat of that filibuster exists again. The reality is that we are going to continue to plug away to get to those 60 votes. We hope we can get them on this version of Levin-Reed. It is a version which finally, if we can get to the 60 votes and defeat this filibuster, will change course in Iraq. The majority of us in this Senate have voted to change course in Iraq, in effect, when there were 53 of us who voted to end the filibuster last July. The majority of the American people clearly want a change of course in Iraq. They do not want a precipitous withdrawal. They understand we are going to need some troops there for force protection and for training of the Iraqi Army and for providing logistics to the Iraqi Army and for some targeted counterterrorism efforts against al-Qaida, their affiliates, and other terrorist groups. The American people understand. They want something that is planned in terms of reduction of our forces, and they want a timetable. What they want more than anything else is to get the Iraqi leaders to end their dawdling so our troops can come home. Everybody wants a stable, independent Iraq. The course we are on now, the course of status quo, an open-ended course, the course of, ``well, we will figure out next July whether we want to go further, whether we want to go below the presurge level,'' that stagnant course is exactly the wrong signal to the Iraqi leaders. The course the President is on keeps that open-ended commitment of American forces. It does not do what we must do, and because the President will not do it, Congress must do it, which is to tell the Iraqis that the future of their country is in their hands and we will continue to be helpful. We have given them an opportunity they have not seized, and 4\1/2\ years later, almost 4,000 American troops have been killed, 7 times that many wounded, $600 billion now spent, $10 billion more every month. It has to come to an end. We want to bring it to a successful end. We cannot do it militarily. Every military leader says there is no military solution. There is only a political solution, and only the Iraqi political leaders can achieve it. That is what this amendment will help to bring about, that final statement to the Iraqi leaders: We cannot save you from yourselves. I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Whitehouse.) The clerk will call the roll.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I discussed this with the Senator from Arizona. I ask unanimous consent that after the current lineup of speakers, Senator Brown be recognized for up to 10 minutes, Senator Stabenow be recognized for up to 10 minutes, and then, as the Senator from Arizona mentioned, we will try to see if in the next few minutes we are able to come up with an agreement to schedule a vote--probably, I guess, around 5 o'clock, for the convenience of Senators.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we hope to be able in the next few moments, perhaps after Senator Martinez has gone, to enter into a unanimous consent agreement which would hopefully schedule votes on both the Webb amendment and on the McCain amendment. We expect those votes would begin at approximately 5:15. We do not have a unanimous consent locked in yet, but we do expect, perhaps after Senator Martinez has completed, to be able to offer a unanimous consent agreement.

Mr. LEVIN. That is the expectation. So two votes and 10 minutes interviewing between the two, and then move on to other amendments.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the time between now and 5:20 p.m. be for debate with respect to the Webb amendment 2909, with the time divided as follows: Senator Durbin be recognized for 5 minutes; at 5:05, the majority leader be recognized for 10 minutes; and at 5:15, for 5 minutes, which would be immediately prior to the vote, it be equally divided and controlled between Senators McCain and Webb or their designees; and that at 5:20, without intervening action or debate, the Senate proceed to vote on the amendment; further, that upon disposition of the Webb amendment, there be 10 minutes of debate with respect to the McCain-Graham amendment No. 2918, with the time equally divided and controlled between Senators McCain and Webb; that upon the use or yielding back of time, the Senate proceed to vote on the amendment; that no amendment be in order to either amendment in this agreement; that each amendment must achieve 60 votes to be agreed to, and if neither vote achieves 60 votes, it be withdrawn; that if either amendment receives 60 votes, then it be agreed to and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table.

Mr. LEVIN. So Senator Carper would be after Senator Durbin for 5 minutes, and everything else will be delayed for 5 minutes.

Mr. LEVIN. I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, the Senator from Texas, I understand, is now ready to offer an amendment. We have been alternating. My understanding is he will lay down his amendment tonight, then he will speak on his amendment for some period of time, and then we will pick that up tomorrow morning. There may very well be a side-by-side amendment relative to the Cornyn amendment. We do not know, though, until we see that amendment. Then I would ask unanimous consent that--I do not have my ranking member here, however, so I am going to withhold the unanimous consent request. It is my intent to ask unanimous consent that after Senator Cornyn lays down his amendment and speaks on it, that we then move into morning business. That is my intent as soon as--all right, it turns out that has been cleared on that side. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that after Senator Cornyn is recognized, lays down his amendment, speaks to it, we then go into morning business, with Senators permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes each.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, could the request be restated? I apologize.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, reserving the right to object--and I will not object--I understand Senator Leahy has now authorized me to withdraw his amendment which is pending, so it will avoid, perhaps, that pendency requirement for future amendments. So I withdraw now the Leahy amendment.

Mr. LEVIN. I do not object.