Carl Levin

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, could we add that the next Democratic speaker will be Senator Feinstein?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, on the question of the 60 votes, there is a procedural roadblock which is being placed here. It is not the first time in history, of course, but a decision has to be made here whether the verdict of the American people last November that there be a change in policy is going to be thwarted by that procedural roadblock, and the Republican leader has apparently decided it will be. In terms of precedent, last year on the Defense authorization bill, there were at least two votes on Iraq, both majority votes. That is the precedent. Last year, there was a Levin-Reed amendment that received 39 votes and a Kerry amendment, both on Iraq on the Defense authorization bill, the most recent experience. This issue is so vital. It is so much in the minds of the American people that we should not throw up procedural roadblocks to allowing the Senate to vote. That is why we have asked that we be allowed to vote up or down on this amendment, and that apparently has now been objected to.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I have a unanimous consent request. I need Senator McCain to listen. Apparently, the time the Senator from Arizona took on his reservation came out of our time, and I am wondering if he would give us a minute.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, tomorrow's vote in the Senate is not a vote on the Levin-Reed amendment. It is a vote on whether the Senate will allow us to vote on the Levin-Reed amendment. It is a vote on whether the Senate will break a filibuster so that the Senate can express its will, which I think is totally clear and reflects the will of the American people as expressed last November. A change in course in Iraq is critical for our national security. If you think the present course is working, if you think we are making progress, as the President has said month after month, year after year, then presumably you are going to vote against the Levin-Reed amendment--if we can ever get to a vote on the Levin-Reed amendment. But if you believe that changing course is the only hope of success in Iraq, that forcing the political leaders of Iraq to accept responsibility for their nation and to work out the political settlements that could prevent this violence from continuing and lead to the ultimate success in Iraq, and if we can get to the Levin-Reed amendment and break the filibuster, then you will be voting yes. Madam President, it has been more than 4 years since the United States invaded Iraq. Despite a military victory that toppled Saddam Hussein and routed his army, Iraq soon became victim to a Sunni insurgency, to Shiite militias bent on revenge, and became victim to an incursion of al-Qaida terrorists whose actions were aimed and are aimed at promoting an Iraqi civil war. As the situation on the ground has shifted, so has President Bush's rationale for our involvement. He took us into Iraq to get rid of Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction. When no weapons of mass destruction were found, the President said we needed to create a democracy in Iraq. Now the President says we must stay on to fight al- Qaida. The President had a pre-surge strategy, a surge strategy, and now he has offered a post-surge strategy. What has remained constant in all of these strategies is one thing: They all have an open-ended commitment of U.S. forces in the middle of Iraq's civil war. That open-ended commitment of a Muslim country by the West has played right into the hands of al-Qaida. Indeed, the intelligence community is recently reported to have concluded that the years of our occupation of Iraq have seen a surge of al-Qaida in Iraq. It has come at a staggering cost--the loss of more than 3,600 of America's best and bravest, seven times that many wounded, and a price of $10 billion each month. In spite of the heroic efforts of the U.S. service men and women, chaos and destruction have deepened in Iraq. Yet, month after month, year after year, the President has touted progress in Iraq and called for patience. It has been a litany of delusion. Just listen to President Bush's repeated claims of progress. In October of 2003, President Bush said: We are making progress about improving the lives of the people there in Iraq. On September 25, 2004, the President said: We're making steady progress in implementing our five-step plan toward the goal we all want: completing the mission so that Iraq is stable and self-governing, and American troops can come home. . . . On April 28, 2005, the President said: I believe we're really making progress in Iraq. . . . On October 28, 2005, the President said: Iraq has made incredible political progress. . . . On November 14, 2005, the President said: Iraqis are making inspiring progress toward building a democracy. On May 25, 2006, the President said: We are making progress on all fronts. On March 19, 2007, the President said: There has been good progress. The exaggeration and the hype continues to this day. On June 28, a few weeks ago, the White House press release stated: The Iraqi security forces are growing in number, becoming more capable, and coming closer to the day when they can assume responsibility for defending their own country. But in the benchmark assessment report released last week we read: There has been a slight reduction in units assessed as capable of independent operations since January 2007. That is referring to Iraqi units. Even that turned out to be an exaggeration. Just 2 days later, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, told the press that the number of Iraqi Army brigades that were capable of independent operations had fallen from 10 to 6--quite a difference from a ``slight reduction.'' Madam President, one merely has to take note of recent incidents in Iraq as reported in our newspapers to know that things are not going well in Iraq and that the administration's assessments of progress have been consistently overblown through the years and continue to be overblown. Consider the headline in USA Today on July 12: ``Iraqi police assist gunmen.'' The story described our Army investigation into a January attack in Karbala that killed five U.S. soldiers. Our investigation concluded that the Iraqi police who were supposed to be partners with American troops colluded with insurgents. Then there was this story in the New York Times on July 14: ``U.S. Troops Battle Iraqi Police in East Baghdad.'' Those are the police who are supposed to be on our side trying to quell the violence in Baghdad, not attacking American troops. On the all-important area of political benchmarks, consider this headline from the Financial Times of June 18: ``U.S. Military Frustrated at Lack of Iraqi Reconciliation.'' The story reports that General Petraeus said there has not been any ``real substantial achievements in terms of political reform in progress.'' Reuters reported on June 18 that Iraq was ranked the second most unstable country in the world behind Sudan in the 2007 Failed States Index, produced by Foreign Policy magazine. Failed state? Obviously, we don't want Iraq to be left as a failed state. It is failing. It is on a failing course. If we don't change that course, it is going to continue to descend into that failed status. The administration's recent self-assessment of benchmarks that there is progress on 8 of the 18 benchmarks would have us believe that the cup in Iraq is half full rather than being half empty. Eight of eighteen--that sounds pretty good, like progress. But as a matter of fact, Iraq is a cup with a hole in its bottom. We keep pouring in our men and women and resources, and there is a hole in the bottom of that cup through which they go. It is that Iraqi hole that Secretary Gates addressed on June 14 in Baghdad when he said the message he was delivering to the Iraqi people was that ``our troops are buying them time to pursue reconciliation and that, frankly, we are disappointed in the progress thus far.'' Secretary Gates was accurate in saying that ``our troops are buying [the Iraqis] time to pursue reconciliation.'' But what he left unsaid is that our troops and our Nation have paid, and continue to pay, far too high a price to give the Iraqis that opportunity, and the time is long past due for the Iraqi political leaders to accept responsibility for their own future. Secretary Gates' statement that we are ``disappointed in the progress'' was surely an immense understatement. The American people are downright incensed at the failure of the Iraqi leaders. Everybody agrees there is no military solution in Iraq and that the only way to end the violence is for the Iraqi political leaders to settle their differences. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki acknowledged that last November when he said--and these words should be seared, I believe, into the consciousness of each of us as we vote, if we are ever allowed to vote on the Levin-Reed amendment. Here is what he said: The crisis is political, and the ones who can stop the cycle of . . . bloodletting of innocents are the [Iraqi] politicians. Our service men and women are dying and being wounded while Iraqi leaders dawdle. The Iraqis themselves made commitments to share resources and power, amend their constitution, hold provincial elections, and take over responsibility for their own security in many more places than they have. They made the commitments last year in writing, but they have not kept them. Secretary of State Rice recently confirmed in a letter to me that Iraqi leaders themselves, including their Presidency Council, had approved those benchmarks and the associated timeline. Secretary Rice wrote me: We have confirmed with Iraqi President Talabani's chief of staff that the benchmarks were formally approved last fall by the Iraqi political committee on national security. This committee includes the presidency council, the President, and the two vice presidents, as well as the leaders of all the major political blocs in Iraq. Well, the Iraqi leaders' record on meeting the political timelines, which they approved themselves with a timeline, is abysmal. For example, they said they would approve provincial elections and set a date for those elections by October of 2006. That has not been accomplished. They didn't do what they promised they would do. The Iraqi political leaders said they would approve the hydrocarbon law by October 2006. That was not done. That has not been accomplished. They didn't do what they said they would do. The Iraqi leaders said they would approve a debaathification law by November 2006. They didn't do what they promised to do. The Iraqi political leaders said the Constitutional Review Committee would complete its work by January 2007 and hold a constitutional amendment referendum by March of this year. They did not do what they promised they would do. This is not us imposing our benchmarks on them, this is the Iraqi political leaders who adopted their benchmarks, and have not met them. I ask unanimous consent that my letter to Secretary Rice and her response be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, while our troops have done everything, and more, of what has been asked of them, while they have risked their all and given their all, the Iraqi political leaders remain frozen by their own history, unwilling to take the political risks that only they can take. If there is any hope of forcing the Iraqi political leaders to take responsibility for their own country and to keep the commitments they made to meet the political benchmarks that they set and to make the compromises that only they can make, it is to have a timetable to begin reducing American forces and to redeploy those forces to a more limited support mission instead of being everybody's target in the middle of a civil war. We need to send a clear message to the Iraqi leaders that we will not be in Iraq indefinitely, that we will not be their security blanket forever. That is what the Levin-Reed amendment would do if we are allowed to vote on it. Our amendment would require the President to begin reducing the number of American troops in Iraq within 4 months of enactment. It would require transitioning the mission of our remaining military forces to force protection, training of Iraqi security forces, and targeted counterterrorism missions. Our amendment would require that the transition to those limited missions be completed by April 30 of next year. Finally, and importantly, it would call for a comprehensive diplomatic, political, and economic strategy, including sustained engagement with Iraq's neighbors and seeking an appointment of an international mediator under the auspices of the U.N. Security Council in order to try to bring stability to Iraq. Some have criticized our amendment because it contains a timeline for the completion of the transition to new missions. We received similar criticism in the past about the timeline for the commencement of the transition. Timelines need to be established as the only way to force a change of course in Iraq and to force the Iraqis to accept responsibility for their own future. It is human nature to put off difficult decisions. Passage of our amendment would serve as a forcing mechanism and serve to stimulate action by the Iraqi Government to reach a political settlement. Delaying action until the receipt of the administration's plan in September would only delay the time when Congress applies the needed pressure. There is no indication that Iraqi political leaders will compromise without our pressure. Indeed, there is every indication they will not. As Secretary Gates stated in April: Debate in Congress . . . has been helpful in demonstrating to the Iraqis that American patience is limited . . . The debate itself and . . . the strong feelings expressed in the Congress about the timetable probably has had a positive effect in terms of communicating to the Iraqis that this is not an open-ended commitment. There is no indication the administration is willing to change course. For years, they have deluded themselves and the Nation with claims of progress while Iraqis descended into sectarian violence and chaos. On July 4, President Bush repeated his call for patience which he has made so many times over the years. After more than 4 years, over 3,600 U.S. deaths, seven times that many wounded, and expenditures of $10 billion a month that we are borrowing from the future to finance this war in Iraq, the President's pleas for patience not only have a hollow ring, it is exactly the wrong message to the Iraqi leaders. Our message should be we are out of patience, and the refusal of the Iraqi leaders to work out their political differences is something which is no longer acceptable. Congress attempted to respond to last November's election with a vote that we made on April 26. We adopted a bill that did provide a timetable to begin the reduction of U.S. forces in Iraq, the beginning of a phased troop reduction, redeployment in no more than 120 days, and a transition to a more limited mission focusing on counterterrorism, force protection, and training and logistical support for the Iraqi Army. President Bush vetoed our bill shortly thereafter. Senator McConnell made a statement which was, I believe, very direct and very accurate, when he assessed not too long ago that ``the handwriting is on the wall that we are going in a different direction in the fall.'' That Presidential veto does not wash away the handwriting on the wall. It only makes the handwriting clearer and firmer that there is going to be a change of direction in Iraq. So the question is: Why wait? Why not decide on a change of course now to save months of lost and wounded lives and huge additional expenditure of funds? The clearer the handwriting on the wall is to the Iraqi political leaders and the quicker they read it and accept it, the greater the prospect for political settlement. The clearer the handwriting on the wall is that the open-ended commitment of President Bush is over, not just rhetorically but in reality, the greater chance that an even wider civil war can be avoided. There are some who acknowledge that a change of course is needed in Iraq, including U.S. troop reductions but who then say not now. But surely time is not working for us in Iraq. The sooner we shift strategy to force Iraqis to take responsibility, the better. If we wish to improve the chance of a positive report on political progress in September, we need to put great pressure on Iraqi political leaders in July. We cannot and must not continue to have the lives of American servicemembers held hostage to Iraqi political intrigue and intransigence. If we can get to the Levin-Reed amendment, if we can overcome the filibuster, and if we can adopt the Levin-Reed amendment which provides for the beginning of the reduction of our forces in Iraq in 120 days and transitioning to more limited missions, no more than 120 days after enactment, if we can adopt an amendment which says we will complete that transition by April 30, 2008, if we can adopt our amendment which provides for the appointment of an international mediator under U.N. auspices, we believe we will have passed the best chance of success in Iraq, and we will have adopted the only course of action which has a chance of pressuring the Iraqi leaders to do what only they can do. The clock is ticking. We are losing more American lives and more American resources every day we delay. The time has come to set deadlines, to reduce our forces in Iraq, to transition to the new limited missions, and to embark on a comprehensive, diplomatic, political, and economic strategy to bring stability to Iraq. I yield the floor. Exhibit 1 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC, May 9, 2007. Hon. Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, Washington, DC. Dear Madam Secretary: I am writing in connection with your letter of January 20, 2007 in which you advised me regarding a set of benchmarks that the Government of Iraq has set for itself. You wrote that ``Iraq's Policy Committee on National Security agreed upon a set of political, security, and economic benchmarks and an associated timeline in September 2006. These were reaffirmed by the Presidency Council on October 16, 2006, and referenced by the Iraq Study Group; the relevant document (enclosed) was posted at that time on the President of Iraq's website.'' Yesterday, I met with Mowaffak al-Rubaie, Prime Minister Maliki's national security adviser. During the course of our meeting, Dr. Rubaie stated that the Presidency Council never reaffirmed the benchmarks. He was adamant on this point even after I showed him the statement in your letter. This is an important point as the Presidency Council, whose three members, President Jalal Talabani (Kurd), Deputy President `Adil `Abd al-Mahdi (Shia Muslim) and Deputy President Tariq al-Hashimi (Sunni Muslim), are elected by the Council of Representatives and represent the three major ethnic groups of the country. Earlier today, State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack stated ``These are the benchmarks that they've laid out for themselves. We didn't come up with them. They came up with them. And they need to be seen in the eyes of the Iraqi people as delivering for the Iraqi people.'' It seems to me that it would make a difference if the benchmarks and associated timeline were only approved by an advisory group as compared to the Presidency Council. Accordingly, please confirm that the benchmarks and associated timeline, which you attached to your January 30, 2007 letter, were reaffirmed by the Presidency Council after being agreed upon by the Policy Committee on National Security, as stated in your letter. Thank you for your assistance. Sincerely, Carl Levin, Chairman.

Mr. LEVIN. We know what we hope will happen, and there are some things we can predict that will happen. What do we know? We know that Iraq is in chaos. We know that the Iraqi President, or Prime Minister more accurately, has said the only way to end the bloodletting of innocents in Iraq is if the Iraqi leaders reach a political settlement. We know that. We know there is no military solution in Iraq. We know there is only a political solution and that the violence cannot end unless Iraqi leaders reach a political settlement. I think those are consensus points. Those are things we know. We know how many of our troops have been killed and how many are killed every month and how many are wounded and come home. We know those things. Then the question is: Since there is no military solution, there is only a political solution--that is the only hope of succeeding in Iraq--how do you promote a political settlement in Iraq? Is the current course we are on succeeding or do we need to change the course? We all have the same goal. We all want to maximize the chances of success in Iraq. If you believe we are succeeding in Iraq now, then you vote to stay the course. If you believe after all these years and all these deaths and all these wounded and all these expenditures, now over $10 billion a month, that we need to change course because we are not succeeding in Iraq, you have to ask yourself: How do we change course? How do we change what is going on in Iraq? So those are the things that we, each of us, I think in our own conscience, are trying to figure what is the best way to maximize the chances of success in Iraq. I believe the only hope in getting the Iraqi leaders to reach the political settlement, which everybody agrees is the only hope, is to force them to accept responsibility for their own nation, to work out the political differences on revenue-sharing, on elections, on debaathification amendments, and on constitutional changes. They have been dithering for years. They made a promise to their people, to the American people, and to the world last year. It is on their Web site, 16 of their benchmarks--not ours, their benchmarks. They have not carried out the commitments they have made. There was a timetable attached to those benchmarks. I put that timetable in the Record. It was part of a letter that Secretary Rice sent to me. So we have a situation--

Mr. LEVIN. They are different.

Mr. LEVIN. Some are the same, some are different, but they are political benchmarks which the Iraqi leaders said they would meet. They made those benchmarks. We didn't impose them, those are their benchmarks. The letter from Secretary Rice makes it explicit that the Presidency Council, which represents all the factions in Iraq, formally adopted those benchmarks. They were supposed to have been adopted in October, November, December, January, and in February. They have not been met. How are we going to get them to meet them, to keep an open-ended commitment, which is what the President wants us to do. Another delay and then patience. The President asks us to be patient? We should be downright impatient with the Iraqi leaders. The message to the Iraqi leaders shouldn't be, for heaven sakes, after all these casualties, that we are going to be patient with them when it is in their hands as to whether this civil strife is going to end.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I think that is precisely what has been typed up, and that is our intent, that those last four 10-minute slots be allocated in the way the Senator from Arizona has proposed.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, has that previous unanimous consent request been adopted?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I understand now the Senator from Florida is seeking recognition; is that correct?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on this side, following the Senator from Florida, Senator Bingaman be recognized.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following Senator Bingaman, Senator Lautenberg be recognized on this side--just on this side.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I thank Senator Bingaman for that. I was not aware of that. Let me revise the unanimous consent request. Before I do so, in light of what Senator McCain has said, let me inquire of the Democrats--I say to Senator Lautenberg, if you could stay here for 1 minute. I am wondering if the Senator from Florida could give us an idea of the amount of time he needs.

Mr. LEVIN. Should we say up to 10 minutes each?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, let me now revise the unanimous consent request in this way: that Senator Nelson be recognized for up to 10 minutes, that Senator Lautenberg be recognized for up to 15 minutes, that Senator Bingaman be recognized for up to 10 minutes on this side, with alternating to the other side. I say to the Senator I think that would leave 35 minutes to be allocated on your side.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from New York.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Washington.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Veterans' Affair be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, July 17, to conduct a vote on the nomination of Charles L. Hopkins to be an Assistant Secretary of Veterans Affairs (Operations, Preparedness, Security and Law Enforcement). The Committee will meet in the Reception Room, off the Senate Floor immediately after the first roll call vote of the Senate on Tuesday, July 17.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Veterans' Affairs be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, July 17, 2007, to conduct a hearing on VA and DOD Education Issues. The hearing will begin at 2:30 p.m.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs' Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services and International Security be authorized to meet on Tuesday, July 17, 2007, at 2:30 p.m. in order to conduct a hearing entitled Preparations for 2010: Is the Census Bureau Ready for the Job Ahead?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions' Subcommittee on Retirement and Aging be authorized to hold a hearing on the Federal response to the Alzheimer's epidemic during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, July 17, 2007, at 2:30 p.m. in room 628 of the Senate Dirksen office building.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. If the Senator would yield further, last week, we did accomplish a major achievement in terms of the wounded warrior legislation, which is now on this bill, and I believe, on Friday, there were speakers on the Iraq issue, on Levin-Reed and other amendments, and there were yesterday as well. So the debate on the Iraq amendments has taken place, and it is now going to continue today and into the night. Hopefully, we can get to a vote on Levin-Reed and not be thwarted by this 60-vote procedural roadblock. Again, I want to say something that has been the case before. We had a number of votes on Iraq in the last authorization bill, and those were 50-vote votes. There was not a threat of a filibuster that deprived the Senate of voting on those amendments in the last authorization bill. For instance, there was a Levin-Reed amendment in the last authorization bill which I believe received 39 or 40 votes. There was also a Kerry amendment on Iraq which was voted up or down without that procedural roadblock. I would hope that on this bill, given the absolute importance of this issue and the expression of opinion of the American people last November about this issue, that we would be allowed to vote up or down and to remove that 60-vote filibuster threat, the roadblock that has now been put in the way, and will determine tomorrow whether cloture will be invoked and that roadblock can be removed. But the Senator is correct, there is ample opportunity for people to come down today to continue the debate on the Iraq amendment should they choose.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friend for his willingness to always sit down and try to work things out. The roadblock here to our proceeding will be either kept in place or removed tomorrow with the vote on whether to allow Levin-Reed to come to a vote. The Senator is right that there have been times when people have filibustered matters. There have been times when they have decided not to. On the Iraq issue, on the last authorization bill, there were votes up or down without a 60-vote procedural roadblock being put in place to the then Levin-Reed and Kerry amendments. So that is the precedent we established last year that I would hope the Republican leader would allow to be followed, because--one other comment--I can't think of a more appropriate place to be debating Iraq policy, frankly, than on an authorization bill. Whether I am right or wrong, that is what happened last year. I hope it will again be followed this year. I thank my good friend. My remarks will be coming this afternoon. Senator Kennedy will be following the Senator from Arizona.