Carl Levin

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Without losing his right to--

Mr. LEVIN. The time limit on the substitute amendment is also 120 minutes.

Mr. LEVIN. That is on the bill itself. And on the habeas amendment, that would be up to you and Senator Specter--right?--to control.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, last month, on August 10, President Bush announced a new U.S. initiative to combat corruption around the world. He named it a ``National Strategy to Internationalize Efforts Against Kleptocracy.'' In introducing this initiative, President Bush said: High-level corruption by senior government officials, or kleptocracy, is a grave and corrosive abuse of power and represents the most invidious type of public corruption. It threatens our national interest and violates our values. It impedes our efforts to promote freedom and democracy, end poverty, and combat international crime and terrorism. I couldn't agree more. But lately, some of the President's actions are at odds with his rhetoric. The first principle of the President's initiative against corruption is to deny entry into the United States to kleptocrats, meaning high-level officials engaged in or benefitting from corruption. Yet in recent months the administration has welcomed two of the world's most notorious kleptocrats: Teodoro Obiang, the President of Equatorial Guinea, and Nursultan Nazarbayev, the President of Kazakhstan. What do these two men have in common besides corrupt dictatorships? Oil. Both control their nations' vast oil resources. Both supply oil to the United States. By welcoming these corrupt dictators into the United States, in contradiction to the anticorruption principles articulated by the President in August, the administration announces to the world that we will compromise our principles for a price: oil. On April 12 of this year, at the State Department, Secretary Rice greeted the President of Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro Obiang, by saying: ``Thank you very much for your presence here. You are a good friend and we welcome you.'' In welcoming Mr. Obiang, she made no mention of the deeply troubling hallmarks of his regime, no mention of human rights abuses, no mention of election fraud; no mention of widespread and high-level corruption. Instead, a photograph of Secretary Rice shaking Mr. Obiang's hand and smiling broadly appeared in publications around the world. Mr. Obiang has undoubtedly used his visit, and that photograph, to legitimize his regime and demonstrate his favored status in the United States. Secretary Rice said that her objective as Secretary of State is to conduct ``transformational diplomacy'' which, in her words, requires us to ``work with our many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people--and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.'' Under Mr. Obiang, Equatorial Guinea is nothing near democratic, well-governed, or responsive to its citizens. Equatorial Guinea is the third largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa. It currently exports about 360,000 barrels per day, with much more under development. U.S. companies have invested over $10 billion to develop those oil resources. But the development of Equatorial Guinea's oil resources has not benefitted its deeply impoverished people. Though Equatorial Guinea's oil money makes it, on a per capita basis, one of the wealthiest nations in the world, the standard of living of its people is among the world's poorest. Equatorial Guinea ranks 121st on the United Nations Human Development Index. According to a 2002 State Department report, there is ``little evidence that the country's oil wealth is being devoted to the public good.'' Mr. Obiang is a principal cause of his people's misery. He took power by coup 30 years ago, his opponents have been jailed and tortured, and his most recent election was condemned by the State Department as ``marred by extensive fraud and intimidation.'' The 2005 State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices states, that in Equatorial Guinea, ``Official corruption in all branches of the government remained a significant problem.'' In its index of corruption, Transparency International ranks Equatorial Guinea 152 out of 159 nations. In other words, Equatorial Guinea is one of the most corrupt countries in the world today. I became familiar with the Obiang regime through my role as ranking minority member of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. On July 15, 2004, the subcommittee held a hearing entitled, ``Money Laundering and Foreign Corruption: Enforcement and Effectiveness of the Patriot Act.'' That hearing and an accompanying report detailed how President Obiang and his family had been personally profiting from U.S. oil companies operating in his country, established offshore shell corporations to open bank accounts at Riggs Bank here in Washington, and made large deposits, including cash deposits of as much as $3 million at a time, in transactions suggesting strongly that the funds were the proceeds of foreign corruption. In addition, over $35 million in oil proceeds were transferred to suspect offshore accounts. President Bush has stated that his intention is to ``defeat high- level public corruption in all its forms and to deny corrupt officials access to the international financial system as a means of defrauding their people and hiding their ill-gotten gains.'' And yet, after it was revealed that Mr. Obiang misused U.S. financial institutions to launder suspect funds, the State Department actually intervened on behalf of his regime in order to convince U.S. banks to open accounts for the Equatorial Guinean Government. That bears repeating: after it was shown how Mr. Obiang used Riggs Bank to deposit and transfer suspect funds, and after Riggs shut down the accounts used by him and his regime, the State Department approached reluctant U.S. banks and asked them to open accounts for the Obiang regime. So much for ``denying corrupt officials access to our financial system.'' There is more. A few months ago, in May, the administration announced a new program directing the Defense Department to help 20 specified countries build up their military forces. One was Equatorial Guinea. Despite a terrible human rights record, a reputation for corruption, and their own oil wealth, the administration proposed spending U.S. taxpayer dollars to build up the Obiang regime's military. Indeed, President Bush asked for a provision in the DOD authorization bill approving the funding. A number of us objected, and Equatorial Guinea was removed from the provision in the Senate bill. These and other actions taken by the administration to court Mr. Obiang are more than misguided. They supply ammunition to critics of America who claim we don't mean what we say and we don't live up to our principles, especially when oil is at stake. On the issue of foreign corruption, the President needs to play it straight. What will it be? Will we avert our eyes from Mr. Obiang's record of corruption and brutality so we can obtain Equatorial Guinea's oil? Or will we demand an end to his corrupt ways? The President's courting of Mr. Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan is also disturbing. Mr. Nazarbayev is an iron-fisted dictator who imprisons his opponents, bans opposition parties, and controls the press. The State Department's 2005 Kazakhstan Country Report on Human Rights Practices states that ``the government's human rights record remained poor,'' and ``corruption remained a serious problem.'' That is not all. Several years ago, our Justice Department filed a criminal indictment alleging that Mr. Nazarbayev accepted tens of millions of dollars in bribes from an American businessman. The U.S. attorney of the Southern District of New York is at this very moment preparing for trial in the case, U.S. v. Giffen. The indictment targets the American businessman, James Giffen, for paying $78 million in bribes to Mr. Nazarbayev and his cronies to gain access to an oil field in Kazakhstan. It does not charge Mr. Nazarbayev with a crime, despite alleging his acceptance of the bribes. It is a sad and sorry spectacle to observe that, despite this indictment, the administration is welcoming Mr. Nazarbayev to the White House this week. Talk about mixed messages. For paying the bribes, Mr. Giffen gets indicted for violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, mail and wire fraud, money laundering, and tax evasion; for accepting the bribes, Mr. Nazarbayev gets an invitation to the White House. The President has invited to the White House a man who our very own Department of Justice accuses of accepting a $78 million bribe. Why? What could be the reason, the justification, for this White House invitation? Could it be that Kazakhstan exports 1 million barrels of oil per day? The President has got to play it straight. The State Department says Mr. Nazarbayev is a dictator who imprisons opponents and disregards human rights. The Justice Department says he accepted $78 million in bribes from one U.S. businessman alone. The President says he is an honored guest. Which is it? Corrupt dictator or honored guest? Surely it can't be both. President Bush said that kleptocracy ``threatens our national interest and violates our values.'' He said high-level foreign corruption ``impedes our efforts to promote freedom and democracy, end poverty, and combat international crime and terrorism.'' He is right, which is exactly why his courtship of corrupt dictators like Mr. Obiang and Mr. Nazarbayev is so deeply regrettable. To compromise our battle against corruption to gain favor with oil-producing dictators is not only morally wrong, it hands a propaganda club to our critics, it sustains brutal and corrupt regimes, and it is ultimately destructive of our efforts, in the words of Secretary Rice, to ``build and sustain democratic, well-governed states.'

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Is the Hamdan language which has been filed in the amendment the same as the Hamdan language that was agreed upon by the three Republican Senators with the administration?

Mr. LEVIN. In your judgment there is no substantive change between that amendment and the language that was agreed upon?

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the majority leader.

Mr. LEVIN. Will the majority leader yield for a question?

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, Kenneth Wainstein is President Bush's nominee to be Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the Department of Justice. From July 2002 to March 2003, Mr. Wainstein was the general counsel at the FBI and from March 2003 until May 2004 Mr. Wainstein was the FBI Director's chief of staff. FBI documents, released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request, show that during Mr. Wainstein's tenure at the Bureau, FBI agents at Guantanamo sent e-mails to FBI headquarters objecting to DOD interrogation techniques being used on detainees there. FBI agents described DOD's methods as ``torture'' techniques and expressed alarm over military interrogation plans. Over the past several months I have posed a number of questions to Mr. Wainstein and Mr. Marion Bowman, who was his former deputy at the FBI General Counsel's office, regarding their knowledge of those concerns and their actions in response to hearing about them. I also requested from the Department of Justice a number of documents relevant to Mr. Wainstein's nomination. Mr. Wainstein's June 19, 2006, answers confirm that he was aware and ``there was wide awareness within the FBI--that FBI personnel stationed at Guantanamo disagreed with the aggressive techniques that were authorized to be used there. . . .'' His July 14, 2006, letter to me indicated that the FBI's Office of General Counsel conveyed those concerns to the Department of Defense's General Counsel and said that his office expected that DOD would address the FBI concerns. Mr. Wainstein also told me in his July 14 letter that he discussed detainee interrogations with FBI Director Mueller and that the Director ``maintained a bright line rule barring FBI personnel from involvement in interviews that employed techniques inconsistent with FBI guidelines.'' I will ask that copies of my letters to Mr. Wainstein and his replies to me be printed in the Record. In connection with Mr. Wainstein's nomination, I also posed a number of questions to Mr. Bowman, Mr. Wainstein's deputy in the FBI General Counsel's office. Over the August recess, I received a reply to my most recent letter to Mr. Bowman. I will ask that copies of my letters to Mr. Bowman and his responses to me be printed in the Record. Mr. Bowman's answers to my earlier questions and his more recent response shed additional light on the concerns about detainee treatment at Guantanamo. Mr. Bowman wrote on June 27, 2006, that after he heard from FBI personnel in Guantanamo in late 2002, he believes that he ``recommended--to Wainstein--that we notify DOD's general counsel that there were concerns about the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo.'' Mr Bowman also said in that reply that he learned of ``legal concerns among some DOD personnel about the DOD tactics.'' With regards to the directive issued by FBI Director Mueller that FBI personnel ``stand clear'' of any interrogations that used techniques other than those approved by the FBI, Mr. Bowman wrote me on August 7, 2006, that he does not recall when Director Mueller issued the policy. However, Mr. Bowman recalled a discussion that reflected the concerns that FBI leaders had about what they were hearing from Guantanamo. Mr. Bowman told me: As soon as I heard [about concerns about interrogation tactics] from BAU [the Behavioral Analysis Unit] [in late 2002] I talked with (now retired Executive Assistant Director Pat D'Amuro who immediately said we (the FBI) would not be a party to actions of any kind that were contrary to FBI policy and that individuals should distance themselves from any such actions. . . . He made it abundantly clear that FBI would adhere to its standards and, to the extent possible, would not put itself in a position that would create even the appearance that those standards had been compromised by physical association with activities inconsistent with the tenets of the Bureau. The responses of Mr. Wainstein and Mr. Bowman contrast with those of Alice Fisher, who the Senate confirmed earlier this week to be head of the Criminal Division at the Department of Justice. Throughout her nomination process, Ms. Fisher maintained that she heard nothing about FBI concerns regarding DOD interrogation techniques other than vague concerns about effectiveness. Mr. Wainstein has said that ``there was wide awareness within the FBI--that FBI personnel stationed at Guantanamo disagreed with the aggressive techniques that were authorized to be used there. . . .'' While Ms. Fisher was in the Criminal Division at DOJ and not the FBI, her claim of no awareness strikes me as somewhat incredible given the raging dispute going on between the FBI and DOD. As I urged in the debate on Ms. Fisher's confirmation, I felt it essential that documents which might shed light on whether she was aware of that dispute be made available to the Senate. In Mr. Wainstein's case, I have been able to question officials who worked with Mr. Wainstein. Mr. Bowman answered my letters. In the case of Ms. Fisher, the Justice Department continues to block people who worked for her, namely David Nahmias and Bruce Swartz, from answering my questions. I continue to be troubled by the Department of Justice's stonewalling of my requests for documents relevant to events at Guantanamo. The Department's stonewalling is simply the latest example of the Department's pattern of secrecy and obstruction. For years, this administration has run roughshod over a compliant Republican-controlled Congress. Congressional oversight is desperately lacking. The Department's continuing denial to the Senate access to information we need to carry out our responsibilities violates fundamental constitutional principles. Every Senator should stand up for the right of any individual Senator to review relevant documents. That said, Mr. Wainstein and his deputy Mr. Bowman have been forthcoming. They do not control the documents I seek. The Department of Justice does. Either or both of those men might be willing to provide them. Unfortunately, neither is in a position to do so. Mr. Wainstein has answered to the best of his ability and I will support his nomination. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letters to which I referred be printed in the Record.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, analyses of gun trace data has consistently found that a tiny percentage of our Nation's licensed gun dealers contribute to the vast majority of our Nation's crime guns. This finding was first revealed in a 1995 report produced for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives--ATF--by a team of researchers at Northeastern University. The report used trace data to identify patterns of firearm trafficking. It found that less than one percent of licensed gun dealers account for almost half of the traced crime guns. Later analyses confirmed these findings. A report published by Senator Schumer used 1998 trace data to identify 137 dealers nationwide that sold more than 50 guns traced to crime. The 13 worst dealers were the source of 13,000 guns used in crimes that year. In the ``Commerce in Firearms'' report released in February 2000, the ATF reported that only 1.2 percent of dealers, or about a thousand dealers, accounted for 57 percent of the crime guns that year. A smaller subset of only 330 dealers accounted for approximately 40 percent of the crime guns. Again, the trace data showed that a relatively small number of gun dealers were responsible for the diversion of a tremendous number of guns into the illegal market. The report also recognized that trace data should be used by manufacturers of firearms to ensure retail sellers act responsibly to prevent the diversion of guns into the illegal market. In 2004, the Americans for Gun Safety Foundation released a report based on trace data introduced into evidence in a lawsuit brought against the gun industry by the NAACP that named the gun dealers who sold the most guns traced to crime. Dealers that sold 200 or more crime guns from 1996 to 2000 were listed by name and location. The publication of the report not only allowed local communities to know where high trace gun dealers were operating, but also handed the gun industry a specific list of dealers who were contributing the most guns to the illegal market. In 2005 the ATF released a study that found that 97 rogue gun dealers had 11,840 guns ``disappear'' from their shops. These dealers accounted for 96 percent of the guns identified as missing from 3,083 Federal firearm licensees that the ATF inspected. Over the last few years, crime gun tracing has produced a great deal of valuable information on how the illegal gun market is supplied. A small number of rogue gun dealers are playing a tremendous role in aiding gun crimes by supplying thousands of guns to the criminal market. We must use this type of information to help point the way to policies that keep guns out of the hands of criminals.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if the Senator from Pennsylvania would agree that we can put in a quorum call and the time be deducted proportionally from all of the remaining speakers.

Mr. LEVIN. I reserve the remainder of my time, and I yield the floor.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I thank my good friend from Pennsylvania for his words. After I tried for about a year to get the Attorney General to make available an FBI agent so we could talk to him about a memo that he wrote naming Ms. Fisher, naming three other members of the Criminal Division that she was the Deputy Director of, as being very aware of the debate between the FBI and the Department of Defense over interrogation practices at Guantanamo, I was unsuccessful for about a year to simply get information. Stonewalling has occurred in this case. The delay that has occurred in this case is directly attributable to the refusal of the Department of Justice to provide information to this Senator. After that meeting--and I thank the good Senator from Pennsylvania for arranging it; it wouldn't have happened without him--after that meeting, something became clear which needed to be clarified. I sent a letter to the Department of Justice on that matter. It is a very important matter involving whether Mr. Nahmias, the counsel to the Criminal Division who was aware of the tactics which were being used at Guantanamo, was personally involved in knowing about this debate between the FBI--it did not like what it saw--which objected to the tactics being used and was very vehement about it and did not want his agents to participate in the interrogations and wrote e-mails to the Department of Justice saying: You cannot believe what is going on down here. There was this vehement dispute between FBI and the Department of Defense on interrogation tactics. This is the background for what is in the headlines today. At the discussion which occurred in my office, which Senator Specter accurately described, the FBI agent indicated that Ms. Fisher's connection related to one discussion he could remember about a specific event, not abusive interrogation techniques but, rather, about whether one of the detainees down there had been involved in September 11. That is what his recollection was. We accept that. We have no basis to not accept it. However, something came out at that July meeting which is critically important. He said he had regular discussions on this subject about the detainee treatment at Guantanamo with the counsel to the Criminal Division, David Nahmias, and another Deputy Director, Bruce Swartz. We simply wanted to find out from the two of them, particularly from Mr. Nahmias since he served in the same department of the Justice Department with Alice Fisher, and the Deputy Director of that department, whether he, David Nahmias, had shared the information that he got from the FBI that wrote the e-mail, with the Deputy Director of that department. For reasons that I cannot fathom, the Justice Department is still stonewalling answering questions which are directly related to the nomination. That question is, Did Mr. Nahmias and Mr. Swartz share with the Deputy Director of their own department, the Criminal Justice Department, what they had learned from this FBI agent about the raging dispute going on between the FBI and the Department of Defense over these tactics? We asked the Attorney General if we could talk with Mr. Nahmias. By the way, this is the fourth request I had made to meet with Mr. Nahmias. I started in May of 2005 because he was named, along with Ms. Fisher, and Mr. Swartz as having been present at meetings during which these tactics were discussed. So he was right in that e-mail. We asked four times to see Mr. Nahmias. We have been rejected every time. But now, in my office, we learned something else which is significant, which is relevant, which is going to go unanswered. It is going to go unanswered because the Department of Justice will not even answer the questions which I want them to put to Mr. Nahmias. What I finally have done out of exasperation was to write to the Attorney General saying: You obviously are not going to produce two relevant people so I can ask them very basic information--did they share the information they had about these abuses and these raging debates between FBI and DOD. You are not going to allow me to ask those two people whether they shared that with the Deputy Director of their department. You are simply not going to do it. Would you at least ask the two of them questions in writing about whether they shared that information with Ms. Fisher? The answer of the Department of Justice is silence--stone, cold, silence--to my request. That is where we are. I will be voting against this nomination because of the stonewalling by the Department of Justice of legitimate, reasonable requests for information which are still outstanding, relative to Nahmias and to Swartz. That is unacceptable. It puts us in a position of voting on nominees without relevant information which we should have. The delay--and I emphasize this--the delay in this matter is not mine. The delay is the refusal of the Department of Justice to provide information, to provide witnesses for a year and a half. Without the help of my good friend from Pennsylvania, Senator Specter, we never could have even received the information that we got from the FBI agent, and, as he knows, I am grateful to him for that. I can now only hope that he will join in asking the Department of Justice--it can come after this nominee's vote--I would hope he would consider joining the request of the Department of Justice that we have this information for the record as being relevant to the matters we are debating. I close by saying I believe it is unacceptable, it is wrong for the Department of Justice to deny the Senate relevant information. We are going to end up voting now on this nomination of Ms. Fisher without it. It should not be that way. I will express my opposition to the stonewalling tactics of the Department of Justice by voting no on this nomination, again, with my thanks to the chairman of the Judiciary Committee for the help that he did provide in this matter.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, why is the administration more interested in keeping information from the Senate relevant to the knowledge of senior Department of Justice Criminal Division officials, including Alice Fisher, of the administration's policies and practices on the interrogation of detainees? What is going to happen again is that the administration's obstructionism will result in the Senate acting without relevant information. I know there will be many who will say we have more than enough information, and for many in this body, they have every right to vote based on the information they have. But when any Member of this body seeks relevant information on a confirmation, every Member of this body ought to stand in unison behind that request. We are all either going to be or have been in the position of seeking relevant information to a confirmation. We have all been in this position, and many of us will be in this position again. This should be treated as an institutional matter. There is no reason these questions that have been addressed to Mr. Nahmias and Mr. Swartz should not be answered. I believe this body, as a body, should ask the Attorney General to have these questions answered. There is no reason any relevant information to a confirmation should be denied to a Senator, providing the information is relevant and germane, and clearly this is. Again, I want to emphasize, this is not a last-minute request. This is something which arose from a meeting that was held with the FBI agent in question back in July. But the request for these meetings with Messrs. Swartz and Nahmias were made as early as May of 2005. They have been asked for on four occasions since then. Do David Nahmias and Bruce Swartz recall the FBI agent sharing his concerns about aggressive DOD interrogation techniques? He does. Do they remember? Did those two senior officials share those FBI concerns about DOD techniques with Alice Fisher? If so, what was her response? These are directly relevant questions. The pattern of this administration is transparent. The administration stonewalls on providing requested information. It then accuses Senators of delay and demands that the Senate act to confirm their nominees without the information. The administration follows this pattern because it works, and it works because this institution allows it to work. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

Mr. LEVIN. They didn't consent, but they indicated to me there was no objection, to be technically correct.

Mr. LEVIN. I understand we have a thumbs up from the rear of the Chamber. I have no objection.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I listened to the Senator from Texas, but I do not want to debate the Wainstein nomination today because we have the Fisher nomination in front of us. I would just say one thing in response; that is, the delays in his confirmation vote are directly the result of the administration's obstruction of Senate requests for very relevant documents. Any delays can be placed right at the feet of the administration that has stonewalled requests for information. I hope the Senator from Texas and other Republicans would join in legitimate requests for relevant information. The documents that are being sought are directly related to Mr. Wainstein and his role in the FBI as General Counsel from mid-2002 to mid-2003 and when he was the Chief of Staff for the FBI Director from mid-2003 to 2004. So the delays here are directly attributable to the obstruction and the stonewalling of the administration in response to legitimate requests for documents. These impediments to votes can be easily removed by simply having the committee chairman join in the request for these documents, but that has not been forthcoming. Today the issue is Ms. Alice Fisher. It is another example where requests for documents and for information have been denied. These are legitimate requests which directly relate to Ms. Fisher and to whether she should be confirmed. I want to get into the history of this matter in some detail. I yield myself 45 minutes for that purpose.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, today the issue of detainee abuse at Guantanamo Bay is very much on our minds and in the headlines as we debate how we will treat detainees in the future. In this context, the nomination of Ms. Alice Fisher for the position of Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division at the Department of Justice is not just a routine appointment. Alice Fisher was the deputy at the Criminal Division while the abuse at Guantanamo was occurring and while concerns about interrogation tactics were being raised within the Criminal Division at that same time. We are being asked to confirm Ms. Fisher today with unanswered relevant questions about any knowledge she may have had or actions she might have taken relative to those interrogation tactics. I want to share with my colleagues longstanding unanswered questions regarding Ms. Fisher's nomination to this position. The constitutional duty of the Senate to provide its advice and consent to nominations is a solemn one. Instead of respecting this constitutional duty, the administration has consistently sought to thwart it by denying us relevant information. The administration has put up barrier after barrier, hurdle after hurdle to efforts to get legitimate information that bears on Ms. Fisher's fitness to serve in this important position. Why the administration has stonewalled for so long instead of answering questions and providing information can only be speculated by me. Is it because it is part of an effort to prevent information about interrogation tactics from being provided to Congress, or does it relate directly to Alice Fisher? I don't know the answer, but the fact of the stonewalling is undeniable. It is part of a pattern of secrecy that this administration has engaged in in so many areas and so many ways. The information I have sought relates to what Ms. Fisher knew about aggressive and abusive interrogation techniques in use at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, during the time that Ms. Fisher served as deputy head of the Criminal Division in the Justice Department from July 2001 to July 2003. From publicly released FBI documents, we have learned that FBI personnel raised serious concerns about these DOD interrogation tactics at weekly meetings between FBI and Department of Justice Criminal Division officials. I have sought to find out what Ms. Fisher knew about these FBI concerns over aggressive DOD methods; what, if anything, was reported to Ms. Fisher; and what steps, if any, she took in response. If Ms. Fisher knew of aggressive interrogation techniques at Guantanamo and did nothing about it, or she knew about them but has denied knowing, then I would be deeply troubled. The administration has repeatedly obstructed efforts to get this information, information which is, in my judgment, relevant to Ms. Fisher's suitability for the position to which she is nominated. The administration has literally and figuratively covered up the Guantanamo abuses. This refusal by the administration to provide relevant information is part of a larger pattern by the executive branch of denying the Senate the information needed to carry out confirmation and oversight responsibilities. Over and over again, the administration seems to use every means at its disposal to deny documents or information to the Senate, or to withhold key portions of documents, or to limit access to information. It threatens to erode the Senate's constitutional obligations and responsibilities and the constitutional balance between the executive and legislative branches of Government. Senate acquiescence in the administration's refusal to provide relevant information undermines the fundamental principle of Congress as a co-equal branch of Government. The story of the administration's concealing information about Guantanamo abuses began during a previous confirmation, that of Judge Michael Chertoff in early 2005 to head the Department of Homeland Security. Judge Chertoff had been the head of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, where Alice Fisher served as his deputy from July 2001 to July 2003. In preparing for the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee's hearing on Judge Chertoff's nomination, I became aware of a document bearing on what officials under Judge Chertoff's supervision knew, and therefore about what he might have known, about the mistreatment of detainees at Guantanamo. This document had been made public in response to a Freedom of Information Act, or FOIA, request. The document, dated May 10, 2004, consists of a series of e-mails by an FBI agent--unnamed--recounting the concerns that FBI Agents as law enforcement personnel down at Guantanamo, had during 2002 and 2003. He was recounting what the FBI Agents saw in those critical years when Ms. Fisher was the Deputy Director for the Criminal Division. It spoke about DOD interrogation techniques which ``differed drastically'' from methods employed by the FBI. It recounted ``heated'' conversations of FBI personnel with DOD officials. There were heated conversations between FBI personnel and DOD officials about aggressive interrogation techniques. This FBI agent said that the Department of Defense has their marching orders from the Secretary of Defense and that the two techniques again differed drastically. E-mails during those years recounting these heated conversations between the FBI which was objecting to the techniques being used at Guantanamo and DOD officials who were engaged in those techniques confirmed the serious FBI concern about what they saw at Guantanamo. FBI agents expressed alarm about the military's interrogation plans, saying in an e-mail dated December 9, 2002: ``You won't believe it.'' Also in that e-mail dated December 9, 2002, they included an outline of the coercive techniques in the military's interviewing toolkit. So you have the FBI on the one hand talking to their headquarters about coercive techniques being used against Guantanamo detainees, complaining about those details, and in one e-mail dated September 30, 2002, FBI agents were asked whether or not they could even work with the military interrogators. They were told that FBI agents had guidance to work with military interrogators ``as long as there was no `torture' involved.'' Think about it. We read the headlines in today's newspapers of the techniques being used by the Department of Defense, the CIA and the Department of Justice. These are the headlines that we see in today's papers. These are the events from which those headlines flow. These are e-mails back in 2002 and 2003 referring to coercive techniques that the FBI objected to, talking about heated conversations that the FBI was having with the Department of Defense over those techniques. That is what today's story flows from. Yet the FBI was finally told by their superiors that you can be present as long as no torture is involved. FBI agents complained of DOD techniques in a number of settings, including to the generals at Guantanamo, to the DOD General Counsel here in Washington, and in video teleconferences with the Pentagon. According to FBI emails, a senior member of the Department of Justice Criminal Division was present at Guantanamo at the time of a ``heated'' video teleconference during late 2002. FBI officials were so concerned that their agents at Guantanamo received guidance during this period from headquarters ``to step out of the picture'' and ``stand clear'' when these aggressive interrogation techniques are being used. That is how deep this went. This was all brought back to the Department of Justice when Alice Fisher was the deputy head of the Criminal Division. And if the Criminal Division people were deeply involved in these debates, was Ms. Fisher involved? What did she know about the aggressive tactics? What did she know about the objection of the FBI agent, which is part of the Department of Justice, to these techniques? That is what we have tried to find out over the last year and a half. The May 2004 FBI document I mentioned describes how senior FBI officials communicated regularly with their Justice Department counterparts in the Criminal Division during the period in question, the period when Ms. Fisher was Deputy Director of Department's Criminal Division. In these meetings, the FBI's deep concerns about techniques employed by DOD personnel were discussed. Efforts to learn more began during Judge Chertoff's confirmation as head of the Department of Homeland Security. He had been head of the Criminal Division during the time of these events, from April of 2002 through March of 2003 that Alice Fisher was his deputy. Let me read from the May 2004 document. This was the highly redacted version which was available at the time of the Senate's consideration of Judge Chertoff's nomination. The document reads in part as follows: In my weekly meetings with DOJ, we often discussed [redacted, blanked out] techniques and how they were not effective for producing intelligence that was reliable. Then there is a series of blotted-out names of several individuals with the abbreviation SES after the names indicating the individuals were members of the Senior Executive Service. The document states that the named individuals ``all from the Department of Justice Criminal Division'' attended meetings with the FBI. Again, Alice Fisher was the Deputy Director of the Department of Justice Criminal Division at the time. The document continues: We all agreed [blank, redacted, covered over] were going to be an issue in the military commission cases. I know [blank] brought this to the attention of [blank]. That was the document that we were given during the Chertoff nomination. Clearly, the redacted information--the deleted portions of this document--was relevant. It included the names of senior Criminal Division officials participating in those meetings with the FBI agents. The administration withheld this information during Judge Chertoff's confirmation hearing before the Homeland Security Committee of which I am a member. On February 2, 2005 during his confirmation hearing, I asked Judge Chertoff about this document. In that hearing, Judge Chertoff could not say which Criminal Division officials were named in the document or even whether the weekly meetings referred to in the document occurred on his watch as head of the Criminal Division. He could not recall any discussion about DOD's interrogation techniques at Guantanamo ``other than simply the question of whether interrogations or questioning down there was effective or not.'' Judge Chertoff further testified that he ``had no knowledge'' of the use of any interrogation techniques other than those that he described as ``plain vanilla.'' We learned a few months after Judge Chertoff's confirmation that the interrogation techniques the military was using at Guantanamo were anything but ``plain vanilla.'' The Defense Department investigation by Generals Schmidt and Furlow into the FBI allegations of detainee mistreatment at Guantanamo during the period of 2002 to 2003 found that interrogators at Guantanamo could subject detainees to numerous aggressive interrogation techniques. These included nudity, sleep deprivation, isolation, temperature extremes, both hot and cold, loud music and strobe lights and ``gender coercion;'' that is, inappropriate touching by female interrogators. The report found that the interrogation of one high-value detainee involved many of these techniques as well as forcing the detainee to wear a dog leash and perform dog tricks; also forcing him to wear women's underwear; strip searches; and 20-hour interrogations for 48 out of 54 days. Here is what one of the persons in the Army helping to keep these detainees in custody wrote about her experiences. She wrote: On a couple of occasions, I entered interview rooms to find a detainee chained hand and foot in a fetal position to the floor with no food or water, or care. Most times, they would urinate and defecate on themselves. They had been left there for 18 to 48 hours or more. On one occasion the air conditioning had been turned down so far the temperature was so cold in the room that the barefooted detainee was shaking with cold. When I asked the MPs on duty what was going on, I was told the interrogators the day prior had ordered this treatment and the detainee was not to be moved. The detainee was almost unconscious on the floor with a pile of hair next to him. He had apparently been literally pulling out his own hair throughout the night. ``Plain vanilla'' is all that Judge Chertoff heard about. But members of his Division heard about those techniques, and we didn't know that during the Chertoff nomination because the information was denied to us. Other FBI documents include a partially redacted letter dated July 14, 2004 from Thomas Harrington, Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division to Major General Donald Ryder, Commanding General of the Army's Criminal Investigation Command. Detailee highly aggressive, interrogation techniques at Guantanamo. The subject line in the letter is ``suspected mistreatment of detainees.'' The letter describes alleged incidences of abuse witnessed by FBI agents as early as the fall of 2002. These include allegations of a female interrogator squeezing a male detainee's genitals, bending back his thumbs; an interrogator reportedly wrapping a detainee's head in duct tape; the use of a dog to intimidate a detainee. The letter describes a detainee suffering from extreme mental trauma after being kept in isolation in a cell flooded with lights for 3 months. The letter indicates these incidents and other FBI concerns were discussed with two officials in the DOD General Counsel's office in mid-2002. There are two points to emphasize here. These events took place from 2002 to 2003 when Ms. Fisher was the Department's Director of the Criminal Division. These events were reported to top level people in the Criminal Division. The question is, What did she know about these events as Deputy Director of that Criminal Division? That is what we have tried to find out since her nomination. That is where we have been thwarted and frustrated and obstructed by the administration in getting information from them. These are not some unknown people making these complaints to the Department of Justice's Criminal Division. This is our own FBI people who are strongly objecting to these aggressive DOD interrogation techniques. They were writing in. They were sending e-mails back to their headquarters about the military's coercive interrogations. One e-mail said, ``You won't believe it''--the techniques used and what they were involved with. At the same time, FBI personnel had weekly meetings with senior Criminal division officials discussing the Department of Defense techniques. Again, Michael Chertoff was head of that division at the time Alice Fisher was his deputy. Other Department of Defense investigations into detainee abuse, in particular the report of Major General George Fay and the Schlesinger panel, concluded that it was some of these aggressive techniques in use at Guantanamo which migrated to Afghanistan and Iraq and were part and parcel of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere. If the techniques at Guantanamo that I have just described sound familiar, it is, because the pictures of those techniques used at Abu Ghraib became painfully familiar to us and to the world. That Judge Chertoff did not recall any discussions about DOD interrogation techniques other than perhaps whether they were effective, never heard of a discussion about abuses, aggressive techniques being used by the Department of Defense, Judge Chertoff did not recall any knowledge, did not have any knowledge about who in his division might have engaged in such discussions or when those discussions might have taken place, should not have been the end of the Senate inquiry into this matter. If the Senate had access to the names listed in the May 2004 FBI document at the time of Judge Chertoff's confirmation, we would have tried to refresh Judge Chertoff's recollection about the conversations referred to in these documents. The Senate clearly had a right to find out the names of these Department of Justice Criminal Division officials and ask them what they knew about these interrogations, what if anything they reported, what actions if any were taken. The Senate was frustrated and thwarted by an administration that wanted to cover up what was going on in the area of interrogation of detainees at Guantanamo. In February of 2005, Senator Lieberman and I wrote to FBI director Mueller requesting that he provide an unredacted version of the May 2004 document referring to the weekly FBI Criminal Division meetings or, if a copy was not provided, then provide a legal justification for denying us the unredacted document. In letter dated 3 days later, February 7, 2005, the Department of Justice--not the FBI but the Department of Justice--wrote to deny the request. The Justice Department claimed that an unredacted copy could not be provided because it contained ``information covered by the Privacy Act . . . as well as deliberative process material.'' A few days later, on February 10, Senator Lieberman and I wrote to the Attorney General requesting that he reconsider his decision not to provide an unredacted copy of the May 2004 FBI document. Despite repeated requests, the Justice Department refused to provide either an unredacted copy of the May 10, 2004 e-mail or information on the names of the FBI and the Department of Justice personnel redacted from the document prior to the Senate confirmation vote on February 15, 2005 of Judge Chertoff, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. The Justice Department's refusal to provide this information based on the Privacy Act was a misuse of that statute. The Privacy Act was designed primarily to prevent the U.S. Government from disclosing personal information about private individuals who have not consented to that disclosure. That act is not intended to authorize the Government to conceal from Congress the names of public officials engaged in Government conduct funded with taxpayers dollars. Invoking the Privacy Act to deny the Senate relevant information regarding a nomination before the Senate was an abusive and dangerous precedent, and we were determined not to let it stand. The excuses used to deny us an unredacted May 2004 document went beyond any assertion that a U.S. Senate has ever accepted from any administration as far as I can determine. There is no claim of executive privilege, and the document itself has no bearing on any advice given to the President. The particular FBI document that Senator Lieberman and I sought, and the other documents that I have referred to, dramatize the refusal of the administration to be straight with the American people and with the Congress relative to the detainee abuse issue. The thwarting of congressional oversight over this and so many other issues is deeply ingrained in this administration. The executive branch is determined to seize any crumb of justification to prevent Congress's access to executive branch documents needed to carry out our constitutional responsibilities of confirmation and oversight. We found out a month after the Senate confirmed Judge Chertoff to head the Department of Homeland Security the redacted portions of the May 2004 FBI e-mail were, indeed, very relevant to Judge Chertoff's nomination. On March 18, 2005, the Justice Department finally responded to our February 10, 2005 letter, a letter from Senator Lieberman and myself, asking the Department to reconsider its decision to withhold an unredacted copy of the May 2004 document. In its May 2005 response, the Justice Department stated it had reviewed the May 2004 FBI e-mail and provided a new version of the document, somewhat less redacted than previously. While significant information continued to be withheld, including the name of the FBI agent who authored the e-mail, the new version contained new information, including the names of the four Department of Justice Criminal Division officials who had regularly met with FBI personnel concerned about Department of Defense interrogation techniques. Specifically, the named Criminal Division officials who, according to this e-mail, were present at those meetings, discussing those interrogation techniques, were Alice Fisher, who served as Judge Chertoff's deputy, Dave Nahmias, then counsel to Judge Chertoff within the Criminal Division, and two other senior Criminal Division officials, Bruce Swartz and Laura Parsky. Also newly revealed was that one Criminal Division official, Bruce Swartz, had brought concerns about Department of Defense tactics to the attention of the Department of Defense Office of General Counsel. On May 2, 2005, I wrote to Attorney General Gonzales requesting the name of the author of that May 2004 e-mail. Who was the FBI agent who wrote that e-mail naming those persons? I also requested an opportunity to interview both the FBI and the Department of Justice personnel named in that document, including, specifically, senior Justice Department officials David Nahmias, Bruce Swartz, and Laura Parsky. I don't think there is any doubt that information would be relative to the nomination of Judge Chertoff. The administration essentially told us, however, to trust them, that the information and interviews we were seeking were not relevant to Judge Chertoff's nomination. Yes, it was. This saga, the pattern of withholding relevant information about Guantanamo abuses continued in relation to Alice Fisher's nomination in April 2005 to fill the position vacated by Judge Chertoff, the head of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. Remember, Ms. Fisher was specifically named by the FBI agent in the May 10, 2004 e-mail as having attended weekly FBI Department of Justice meetings where DOD interrogation techniques were discussed. The name of the agent, however, was still redacted. There was still, and is to this day, stonewalling and obstruction to legitimate requests of Senators who must vote under the Constitution on the confirmation of these appointees. I ask unanimous consent to have a chronology of my attempts to get information relative to the Alice Fisher nomination printed in the Record.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield back my time, also. I am willing to do that as Senator Specter has yielded his back. What time remains?

Mr. LEVIN. Let me summarize these efforts. Alice Fisher was first asked in written questions what she knew or heard about these FBI concerns. In her answers, Ms. Fisher stated that she recalled regular meetings between the FBI and Department of Justice Criminal Division officials but did not ``recall that interrogation techniques were discussed at these meetings.'' She stated, also, that she did recall ``general discussions'' with Judge Chertoff, who was heading the Criminal Division, about the ``effectiveness'' of DOD interrogation techniques and methods compared to the FBI's methods. On June 14, 2005, Senators Kennedy, Durbin, and I interviewed Ms. Fisher regarding her recollections of FBI concerns about Department of Defense interrogation techniques. At that meeting, she stood by her statement that she did not ``recall'' FBI officials expressing concerns about Department of Defense methods at Guantanamo other than general concerns about their effectiveness. To attempt to resolve the conflict in those statements, I wrote to Attorney General Gonzales in June of 2005 requesting a response to my request originally made on May 2, 2005 for the name of the FBI agent who authored the e-mail and for an opportunity to interview the Criminal Division officials named in that document, including David Nahmias, Bruce Swartz, and Laura Parsky. So May of 2005 is the first time I made the request for the name of the FBI agent who authored the e-mail and an opportunity to interview the named Criminal Division officials that were listed in that document--Nahmias, Swartz and Parsky. On July 26, 2005, the Justice Department wrote the Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter, responding to Senator Specter's request for information about the May 2004 e-mail. In that letter, the Department provided a summary of an interview it had conducted with the FBI agent who authored the e-mail regarding what he knew of conversations with Alice Fisher. In that letter, the Department said: [the FBI agent] did not have conversations with Ms. Fisher nor does he recall conversations in Ms. Fisher's presence about the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay. He did participate in conversations with Ms. Fisher and other department and FBI representatives about a specific detainee and that detainee's links to law enforcement efforts. These discussions focused on the information gathered regarding the information and individual and his associations, but not on his treatment or interrogation. The letter also stated that the unnamed FBI agent's conversation with Ms. Fisher: . . . focused on the particular detainee described above and predated the broader conversations [in the weekly meetings] about DOD techniques with other department representatives. And the letter concluded by expressing the hope that this would resolve any outstanding questions about Ms. Fisher's nomination. A few days later, the Attorney General wrote to the minority leader, Democratic Leader Harry Reid, stating that the Department had taken steps in response to the Senator's concerns ``sufficient for the Senate to make an informed decision'' on Alice Fisher's nomination. In essence, what the Justice Department was saying, they will do the interview; trust them. It is up to them to decide on the sufficiency of information for the purpose of Senate confirmation. The Department was unwilling to trust Senators with the name of the FBI agent who had written e-mails despite the fact that the Senate, on a regular basis, has access to sensitive documents and information which frequently contains the names of FBI agents. On this important issue of Senate advice and consent to a nomination, the Department was refusing to provide Senators with information relevant to our constitutional duty. I requested that the nomination of Ms. Fisher not be considered until I had the opportunity to get the relevant information I had been seeking. The administration continued to refuse to provide the information and instead made a recess appointment of Alice Fisher to head the Criminal Division in August of 2005, and she was renominated in September of 2005. In December of 2005, Attorney General Gonzales offered to make the FBI agent available to be interviewed by me if a Department of Justice official could be present. I declined an interview under these terms but told Attorney General Gonzales I could accept having someone from the Department of Justice Inspector General's office present. This led to more delay, more stonewalling by the Department of Justice until this past June. With the help of the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Senator Specter, and others, the Justice Department finally agreed to make the FBI agent who authors the e-mails available to be interviewed. On July 26 of this year, more than 1 year after my request for the FBI agent's name, Senator Specter and I, along with FBI General Counsel Caproni, met with the FBI agent--1 year, delayed by the administration, simply providing access to the FBI agent who wrote a critically important e-mail. There was reference made about the Senate obstructing the nomination. (Mr. CHAFEE assumed the Chair.)

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the obstruction here should be directly laid at the feet of the administration which, for 1 year, refused access to an FBI agent who wrote a critically important memo regarding detainee abuse at Guantanamo and whether Ms. Fisher had any knowledge of that and, if so, what she did relative to that knowledge. The FBI agent said in the interview that he recalled Ms. Fisher attended only one of the weekly meetings, which dealt primarily with the relationship between a particular high-value detainee and the 9/11 hijackers. He also stated that he had ``frequent conversations'' with David Nahmias, counsel to the Criminal Division's head, Mr. Chertoff. That is now the issue which comes before the Senate. Just a couple of months ago, it was finally provided to the Senate that an FBI agent says he had frequent conversations about the issue of interrogation techniques at Guantanamo with the counsel, the attorney to the head of the Criminal Division of which the current nominee was the deputy. This is the same David Nahmias named in that FBI agent's May 2004 e-mail regarding FBI concerns about aggressive DOD techniques. The FBI agent added that he specifically shared with Mr. Nahmias his view that interrogation methods used on one detainee were ``completely inappropriate.'' This is the same David Nahmias I have repeatedly sought to interview since May of 2005. Compare these statements of the FBI agent when interviewed in person to the assurances the Justice Department made in their July 2005 letter about the FBI agent's discussions with the Criminal Division officials, including Alice Fisher. The Justice Department wrote that the discussions at the meeting attended by Alice Fisher ``focused on the information gathered'' from one specific detainee ``but not on his treatment or interrogation. . . .'' The Justice Department never said that the FBI agent had ``frequent conversations'' about interrogation techniques being used at Guantanamo with David Nahmias, counsel to the head of the Criminal Division, or less frequent conversations with Bruce Swartz, also a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division. That wasn't disclosed--very critical information, which is the subject now of the debate. Why can we not get questions answered from David Nahmias, who we now believe, acting as counsel to Chertoff, head of the Criminal Division, of which Alice Fisher was the deputy-- why can we not get David Nahmias to answer questions as to whether he shared those deeply held concerns, which were shared with him by FBI agents at Guantanamo, with Alice Fisher, the deputy head of the Department? Following the interview, I also learned of a December 11, 2002, e- mail to Mr. Nahmias from the FBI agent I interviewed, asking for his comments on ``legal issues regarding Guantanamo Bay,'' which were apparently set out in an attachment to that e-mail. The FBI agent's statements to me in that December 11, 2002, e-mail reveal that FBI personnel raised concerns with senior Department of Justice Criminal Division officials, including David Nahmias and Bruce Swartz, that went beyond simply questions about the ``effectiveness'' of Department of Defense techniques, which was the only FBI concern that both Chertoff and Ms. Fisher could recall during their confirmation proceedings--the only concern they ever heard about the effectiveness of DOD techniques, despite a raging debate between the FBI and the Department of Defense about the aggressiveness of those techniques and whether those techniques were abusive and indeed illegal. To try to determine whether those FBI concerns were shared with Nahmias, counsel to the Criminal Division, and were shared with the deputy head of that Criminal Division, Ms. Fisher, I wrote to Attorney General Gonzales on August 1, 2006, to renew for the third time my request to interview these two senior Criminal Division officials, David Nahmias and Bruce Swartz. This is a highly relevant request. The FBI agent said he discussed the Department of Defense interrogation tactics during regular meetings with Mr. Nahmias and Mr. Swartz. Mr. Nahmias was counsel to Assistant Attorney General Chertoff, who was head of the Criminal Division. Alice Fisher and Bruce Swartz were both deputies in that division. Alice Fisher was in charge of overseeing terrorist suspect prosecutions. FBI objections to aggressive DOD interrogation tactics were a major issue, a raging issue, according to numerous e-mails sent back and forth from Guantanamo to Washington. This issue was so intense that FBI agents were wondering whether they could even be present during interrogation. They were so intense that FBI agents were writing back to headquarters saying: Can you believe what is going on down there? These differences between the FBI and the Department of Defense were so intense that there were regular discussions, meetings, debates, and heated conversation over the tactics being used by the DOD at Guantanamo that the FBI rejected, reacted to, and shared with their headquarters. All we needed to do--and we still need to ask--is ask, Did Mr. Nahmias and Mr. Swartz talk to the deputy head of the Criminal Division about those concerns? Did they talk to Alice Fisher about those concerns? Alice Fisher may not recall hearing about those concerns, about abusive and aggressive tactics, but they might recall talking to her about them. If the administration has its way, we will never know. We are never going to know whether David Nahmias and Bruce Swartz discussed with Alice Fisher what we now know they knew about in their capacities--one as counsel to the Criminal Division, of which she was the deputy, and the other as a deputy director of that division. In an August 30 response, the Justice Department ignored my request to interview Mr. Nahmias and Mr. Swartz, urging instead that the Senate proceed to a vote on Ms. Fisher's nomination. On September 12, a week ago, I wrote back, reiterating my request for an interview, offering in the alternative that Mr. Nahmias and Mr. Swartz respond to just a set of questions I had provided. The Justice Department has not responded to this letter. So the Justice Department stalled for 1 year in allowing me access to an FBI agent whose information is clearly relevant to this nomination; for 1 year, they stonewalled; for 1 year, they stood in the way of information coming to the U.S. Senate; for 1 year, they set up a roadblock to a Senator who is making a request that is clearly relevant to the fitness of a person to serve as head of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice of the United States. And then finally I am given access to that agent 1 year later. And when that agent discloses that he, in fact, shared concerns about aggressive interrogation techniques with two other individuals who were working at the Criminal Division with Ms. Fisher, and when I simply say I want to talk to those two people to see if they shared those concerns with Ms. Fisher because she denied ever hearing concerns about aggressive techniques, of course, I have been denied that. The stonewalling continues. Obstruction by the Department of Justice of access to information relevant to the nomination of Alice Fisher continues to this day. When I wrote the Attorney General on September 12 saying: OK, if we cannot meet with these two witnesses, at least would you ask them to answer questions as to whether they shared this information they had heard about these techniques being used at Guantanamo, there is no answer from the Department of Justice. They are silent. The current form of stonewalling and obstruction by the Department of Justice of information that is relevant to this nomination is silence. There is one other important background fact I wish to bring to the attention of the Senate. The Justice Department's inspector general has been investigating for over a year now the allegations by FBI personnel of having observed the mistreatment of detainees at Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and elsewhere. The inspector general of the Justice Department, Glenn Fine, has assured me that this review will look into ``the role of Alice Fisher, Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, and other Department officials regarding detainee interrogation techniques.'' We have been waiting for the IG's findings for many months. The Senate is about to vote on Ms. Fisher's nomination before the IG report comes out. The delay in voting on the confirmation of this nominee is directly attributable to the administration stonewalling on requests for relevant information from the Senate. Ms. Fisher is in place. She is in office. She is in an acting capacity. I have had a standing request to interview former Department of Justice Criminal Division officials, seeking relevant information, since May of 2005. This is not a last- minute request to talk to Messrs. Nahmias and Swartz. I have made four requests since May of 2005 to interview the two of them. What is new here is that now we know, in addition to them being named in the e-mail I referred to, now we know from an FBI agent, the unnamed author of that e-mail, that he shared with those two men at the Criminal Division--one being counsel and one being a deputy director-- that he shared with them the aggressive techniques, abusive techniques I have outlined, which were being utilized at Guantanamo. Why stonewall? Why not simply just ask Mr. Nahmias and Mr. Swartz the questions I have submitted to the Department of Justice? What is behind this? By the way, I ask unanimous consent that the questions I asked the Attorney General to submit to Mr. Nahmias and Mr. Swartz be printed in the Record at this time.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. To make sure that the Record is clear, there has never been and has not been any objection--I am sure the majority leader would concur--any objection from this side at any time to the Armed Services Committee meeting today.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this past Friday, the Senate Intelligence Committee released a report that, among other issues, looks at what we have learned after the attack on Iraq about the accuracy of prewar intelligence regarding links between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida. The report is a devastating indictment of the Bush-Cheney administration's unrelenting and misleading effort to convince the American people that Saddam Hussein was linked with al-Qaida, the perpetrators of the 9/11 attack. Before the war, President Bush said: ``[Y]ou can't distinguish between al-Qa'ida and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror,'' and: ``This is a man [Saddam] that we know has had connection with al- Qa'ida. This is a man who, in my judgment, would like to use al-Qa'ida as a forward army.'' But the report released by the Intelligence Committee on Friday tells a different story. The report quotes the CIA's June 2002 assessment that ``our assessment of al-Qa'ida's ties to Iraq rests on a body of fragmented, conflicting reporting from sources of varying reliability.'' That same CIA report said that ``the ties between Saddam and bin Ladin appear much like those between rival intelligence services.'' The Intelligence Committee's report quotes a January 2003 prewar CIA assessment that ``Saddam Husayn and Usama bin Ladin are far from being natural partners;'' that Saddam has ``viewed Islamic extremists operating inside Iraq as a threat;'' and that ``the relationship between Saddam and bin Ladin appears to more closely resemble that of two independent actors trying to exploit each other.'' Those accurate prewar assessments didn't stop the administration from making many false and misleading statements trying to link Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida before the war. What is doubly shocking is that the false statements continue to this day. Just last weekend, the Vice President said on ``Meet the Press'' that ``The evidence we also had at the time was that he [Saddam] had a relationship with al-Qaeda.'' And the Secretary of State told Fox News earlier this week that ``There were ties between Iraq and Al Qaida.'' Just read the Senate Intelligence Committee's bipartisan report. Those statements are simply not supported by the intelligence, prewar or postwar. Three weeks ago, the President said in a press conference that Saddam Hussein ``had relations with Zarqawi'' the recently killed terrorist. The Intelligence Committee's report demonstrates that statement to be flat out false. The committee report discloses, for the first time, the CIA's previously classified October 2005 assessment that Saddam's regime ``did not have a relationship, harbor, or turn a blind eye toward Zarqawi and his associates.'' But neither the CIA's assessment nor the committee's report has stopped the false statements. Just last Sunday, the Vice President said on ``Meet the Press'' that ``We know that Zarqawi . . . fled and went to Baghdad and set up operations in Baghdad in the spring of '02 and was there from then, basically, until basically the time we launched into Iraq.'' Just last weekend, the Secretary of State told CNN ``We know that Zarqawi ran a poisons network in Iraq. . . . So was Iraq involved with terror? Absolutely, Iraq was involved with terror.'' And just this week, Tony Snow, the White House spokesman said ``there was a relationship'' between Saddam and Zarqawi. Don't they read the CIA's assessments? If they do and disagree, they should say so. Again, the CIA's October 2005 assessment said, flat out, Saddam's regime ``did not have a relationship, harbor, or turn a blind eye toward Zarqawi and his associates.'' There are many more misleading statements. In the fall of 2001, the Czech intelligence service provided the CIA with reporting based on a single source who stated that the lead 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in April 2001. On December 9, 2001, Vice President Cheney was asked about the report on ``Meet the Press.'' The Vice President said, said that ``. . . it's been pretty well confirmed that the [9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta] did go to Prague and he did meet with a senior official of the Iraqi intelligence service in Czechoslovakia last April, several months before the attack.'' On March 24, 2002, the Vice President told ``Meet the Press'' that ``We discovered, and it's since been public, the allegation that one of the lead hijackers, Mohammed Atta, had, in fact, met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague . . .'' But the Intelligence Committee's report declassifies, for the first time, a July 2002, a Defense Intelligence Agency paper that said ``Muhammad Atta reportedly was identified by an asset (not an officer) of the Czech [ ] service only after Atta's picture was widely circulated in the media after the attacks, approximately five months after the alleged meeting occurred'' and that ``there is no photographic, immigration or other documentary evidence indicating Atta was in the Czech Republic during the time frame of the meeting.'' Two months later, in September 2002, CIA published it's assessment that ``evidence casts doubt'' on the possibility that the meeting had occurred and that ``The CIA and FBI have reviewed the reporting available so far and are unable to confirm that Atta met al-Ani in Prague.'' None of those assessments stopped the Vice President from continuing to suggest that the report of the meeting was evidence that Saddam's regime was linked to the 9/11 attackers. On September 8, 2002, in a ``Meet the Press'' interview the Vice President said that the CIA considered the report of the meeting ``credible,'' although, again, that same month the CIA said that there was evidence that ``cast doubt'' on it having occurred. In January 2003, still before the war, the CIA published an assessment stating that, ``A CIA and FBI review of intelligence and open-source reporting leads us to question the information provided by the Czech service source who claimed that Atta met al-Ani.'' The January 2003 paper stated that CIA was ``increasingly skeptical that Atta traveled to Prague in 2001 or met with IIS officer al-Ani'' and that ``the most reliable reporting to date casts doubt on this possibility.'' But the Vice President continued to be undeterred by the CIA's skepticism. In September of 2003, 8 months after the CIA said that the most reliable reporting cast doubt on the possibility of a meeting between Atta and the Iraqi intelligence officer, Vice President Cheney was still citing it as having possibly occurred. On January 19, 2004, a full year after the CIA expressed serious doubts about the meeting and the fact that not a shred of evidence had been found to support the claim of a meeting, the Vice President told the Rocky Mountain News that the Atta meeting was ``the one that possibly tied the two [Saddam and the 9-11 attackers] together to 9/ 11.'' Six months later, on June 17, 2004, the Vice President was asked whether Iraq was involved in 9/11. The Vice President said ``We don't know. . . . We had one report, this was the famous report on the Czech intelligence service, and we've never been able to confirm it or to knock it down. We just don't know.'' The Vice President may not have ``known'' but the intelligence community sure as heck didn't believe-- for a long time before the Vice President's statement--that the meeting took place. Now the Senate Intelligence Committee's report says that ``Postwar findings . . . confirm that no such meeting occurred.'' But just last Sunday, before a nationally televised audience, the Vice President was asked whether the meeting occurred. The Vice President replied ``We don't know.'' The Intelligence Community does know. The Senate Intelligence Committee knows. The bipartisan report we released last week says ``Postwar findings . . . confirm that no such meeting occurred.'' The intelligence assessments contained in the Intelligence Committee's unclassified report are an indictment of the administration's continuing misleading attempts to link Saddam Hussein to al-Qaida. Portions of the report which have been kept from public view provide some of the clearest evidence of this administration's false statements and distortions. Among what remains classified, and therefore covered up, includes deeply disturbing information. Much of the information redacted from pages 96, 97, and 98 of the public report does not jeopardize any intelligence sources or methods. The continued classification of that entire portion of the report reeks of a coverup by the administration. The Senate should not go along. The public is entitled to the full picture. Unless this report is further declassified, they won't.

Mr. LEVIN. It is my understanding that the following provisions in the bill, for example, would apply to all containers, whether they moved by truck or by ship: section 201, which would call on the DHS Secretary to establish a strategic plan to enhance the security of the international supply chain; section 211, which would codify the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Program; section 301, which would establish the Office of Cargo Security Policy; and section 303, which would increase research into ways to strengthen cargo security. Is it your understanding that these provisions would apply to containers traveling through both the seaports and land ports?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, will the majority leader yield?