Carl Levin

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, how much time remains?

Mr. LEVIN. I understand that unresolved amendment on our side may have just been resolved. That adds a note of optimism.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we support the amendment. Obviously, if there is a desire for a rollcall, that is their right. We will be recommending a ``yea'' vote.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, there is a little uncertainty as to the modifications.

Mr. LEVIN. Specifically, the changes contained in this bill will increase the efficiency of the Department of Defense's operations by allowing the Guard and Reserve to train and instruct other component members as an additional duty. It is desirable for Active Guard and Reserve, AGR, and technician members of the National Guard and Reserve to be able to train members of all components to the extent that these duties do not interfere with the performance of the member's primary duties. Currently, titles 10 and 32, United States Code, limit the efficiencies that can be realized by restricting the employment of AGRs and technicians to ``organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training'' the Reserve components. This bill will expand the role of AGRs and technicians so that they may instruct and train members of any other component, and also DOD civilian employees, DOD contractor personnel, and foreign military personnel. The changes included in this bill will also increase the Department's flexibility in using the Guard and Reserve to support certain operations or missions. It is the committee's belief that members of the Reserve and National Guard need increased flexibility to support certain operations or missions assigned in whole or in part to the Reserve, or undertaken by the National Guard at the request of the President or Secretary of Defense. This bill will facilitate the transformation of the National Guard and Reserve from a Cold War ``strategic reserve'' to a present day ``operational reserve.'' An ``operational reserve'' actively supports ongoing operational missions where appropriate, while also providing the additional reserve capacity needed to meet surge requirements or support wartime or contingency operations. These amendments would make some distinctions between the duties that may be performed, in addition to their primary duties, by Reserve AGRs and technicians and those that may be performed by Guard AGRs and technicians in title 32 status. Generally, full-time Reserve personnel would be permitted to support title 10 operational activities, while full-time Guard, including AGRs and technicians, would be permitted to perform operational activities if authorized by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. LEVIN. I share the Senator's concern and will work with her to address these important questions.

Mr. LEVIN. Have the yeas and nays been ordered?

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I will be very brief. I wanted to get back in time to hear Senator Byrd speak about Senator Warner. I knew that is what you were going to do, and I missed only the opening. I was back long enough to get the full flavor of what Senator Byrd was saying. The honor that he has just bestowed upon Senator Warner is genuinely deserved and genuinely delivered. It comes from perhaps not just a Senate man, but the Senate man to another Senate man. This institution we occupy for different lengths of time, but all relatively brief compared to its history, is really entrusted to all of us. I know of no two Senators sitting right across the aisle from each other in whom that trust is more genuinely felt and recognized and honored than Senator Byrd and Senator Warner. Just to be able to get back and listen to, Senator Byrd as he spoke about Senator Warner was a genuine treat for me. He captured the essence of Senator Warner. I tried to do it a few times in the last few weeks very briefly, always saying that when we bring back that conference report, which will be Senator Warner's last conference report as chairman, that I hope there will be many Members on the Senate floor who can try to do what you did so beautifully today, Senator Byrd, which is to capture the essence of the great Senator and to express the gratitude of each of us and everybody in this body, and I know the men and women in the Armed Forces--but truly broader than that, the men and women of the United States--for the service that Senator Warner is providing. So I thank Senator Byrd for taking the time to do what each one of us would want to do in our own ways, and that is just simply to acknowledge our love and our respect for a truly great man, a Senate man, from the Senate man, Senator Byrd.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. No objection.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask, how many minutes remain?

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Presiding Officer. Mr. President, I yield 4 minutes to the Senator from Rhode Island, my cosponsor, Mr. Reed.

Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if I may list the sequence on our side so it would be understood that after Senator Carper, we would expect Senator Lautenberg and then Senator Murray, Senator Obama, Senator Biden, and Senator Durbin.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield myself the remaining time.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield 10 minutes to Senator Salazar.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 1 additional minute to the Senator.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, for the information of Senators--if I could get Senator Warner's attention--the order on our side will be Senators Clinton, Feinstein, and Salazar.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Rockefeller be added as a cosponsor of our amendment.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, the current open-ended commitment of U.S. forces in Iraq is unsustainable and counterproductive, contributing as much to Iraqi instability as it does to Iraqi security. Our troops have performed magnificently in Iraq. We are all deeply grateful for their professionalism and their sacrifices. But, ultimately, as our military commanders have repeatedly said, stability in Iraq can only come through a political settlement by the Iraqis, and the best way to bring about that political settlement is to make it clear, in words not yet spoken by the administration, that our commitment is not open-ended, and that a phased redeployment of our forces from Iraq will begin by the end of this year. The administration's refrain that we are in Iraq as long as the Iraqis need us is creating a dependency of unlimited duration and gives the Iraqis the impression that their security is more in our hands than in theirs. The hallmarks of the administration's open-ended policy are the President's extraordinarily broad and vague description of our mission--nothing less than ``complete victory,'' as he put it, along with the President's explicit commitment to stay until the Iraqis can ``govern themselves, sustain themselves, and defend themselves.'' The President's statement that American force levels in Iraq ``will be decided by future Presidents'' reinforced that unlimited commitment, as did Secretary Rice's statement that we will stay in Iraq ``as long as we are needed.'' The President of Iraq, Mr. Talabani, reflected the Iraqi perception of the administration's policy when he said that U.S. forces are ``ready to stay as long as we ask them no matter what the period is.'' That is what the President of Iraq says he understands our policy to be, that U.S. forces are ``ready to stay as long as we,'' the Iraqis, ``ask them, no matter what the period is.'' We must change that Iraqi perception and the open-ended commitment which led to it, and that is what our amendment would do. Our amendment urges the President to begin the phased redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2006--to begin the phased redeployment of U.S. troops by the end of 2006. Our amendment also calls for a number of actions to help achieve the broad-based and sustainable political settlement so essential for defeating the insurgency and preventing all-out civil war. It calls for adoption by the Iraqis of a fair sharing of political power and economic resources among all the Iraqi groups so as to invest them in the formation of an Iraqi Nation. That can be done by amendment to the Iraq Constitution or by legislation or other means, but it needs to be done within the timeframe provided for in the Iraqi Constitution; namely, 4 months from the beginning of the functioning of their parliament. An international conference needs to be convened so as to more actively involve the international community and Iraq's neighbors in promoting a durable political settlement among Iraqis and by reducing regional interference in Iraq's internal affairs. It is also important to encourage more countries to contribute to Iraq's extensive needs and to ensure that pledged funds are forthcoming. Our amendment also points out that it is critically important for the Government of Iraq to promptly and decisively disarm the militias and remove those members of the Iraqi security forces whose loyalty to the Iraqi Government is in doubt. Now, what does our amendment urge the President to do relative to our troops in Iraq? First, after consultation with the Government of Iraq, begin a phased redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of this year. Second, submit to Congress a plan by the end of 2006 with estimated dates for the continued phased redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq, with the understanding that unexpected contingencies may arise. Third, expedite the transition of U.S. forces in Iraq to a limited presence and mission of training, providing logistical support, protecting U.S. infrastructure and personnel, and participating in targeted counterterrorism activities. Our amendment does not establish a fixed ending date for redeployment. It doesn't set out fixed milestones once the phased redeployment has begun. So while it does not establish a timetable, it does establish a fixed, but not precipitous, time for the beginning of a phased redeployment--by the end of this year. Beginning the phased redeployment of American troops in 2006 would send a very clear message to the Iraqis: We have been in Iraq over 3 years. We have lost 2,500 brave Americans and suffered more than seven times that number of casualties to make it possible for Iraq to become a free Nation. You, the Iraqis, must now decide whether you want a civil war or a nation. Madam President, sending that message to the Iraqis and ending the open-ended U.S. policy towards Iraq will prod the Iraqis to take the necessary steps to end the dominance of the militias; will reduce the Iraqi dependence on the U.S. security blanket which deters tough choices by the Iraqis; will change the perception that we are permanently occupying Iraq, a perception which plays into the hands of terrorists; will reduce the number of U.S. targets for terrorists and insurgents; and will reduce the strain on U.S. forces. Supporters of our amendment are just as determined to maximize prospects for success in Iraq as are the opponents of our amendment. We do not accuse opponents of our amendment of wanting failure or of advocating surrender to chaos and terror. We do believe that maintaining the status quo and the open-ended commitment, which is the hallmark of that status quo and that open-ended commitment, and adhering to a bumper sticker slogan of ``stay the course'' is a recipe for continuing instability and failure. Success isn't assured in any event, but letting the Iraqis know that we are not there for as long as they want us is key to avoiding a culture of dependency. The bottom line is that our open-ended policy and presence has become a deterrent to the very success that we want to bring about. Although the administration policy is aimed at providing security, it is a major contributor to instability. The Iraqi leaders themselves have set a 6-month goal for making major progress in assuming their security responsibility. Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki said on May 22 that his government could take over security for 16 of Iraq's 18 provinces by the end of this year. On June 11, the Iraqi National Security Adviser, Mr. Rubaie said: I believe by the end of this year the number of the multinational forces will be probably less than 100,000 in this country. That amounts to a reduction of at least 30,000 U.S. forces by the end of this year. Mr. Rubaie repeated that position in an op-ed in yesterday's Washington Post. He, again, is the National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister. Our amendment's call for the beginning of a phased redeployment by the end of this year fits the very goals Iraq's leaders have set for themselves. Listen to what Mr. Rubaie wrote about the many benefits of Iraq reducing the number of coalition forces. This is benefits to Iraq of our reducing the number of coalition forces in Iraq: It will remove psychological barriers and the reason that many Iraqis joined the so-called resistance in the first place. The removal of troops will also allow the Iraqi government to engage with some of our neighbors that have to date been at the very least sympathetic to the resistance because of what they call the coalition occupation. ``Moreover,'' Mr. Rubaie said: the removal of foreign troops will legitimize Iraq's government in the eyes of its people . . . the drawdown of foreign troops will strengthen our fledgling government to last the full four years it is supposed to. Mr. Rubaie's words are similar to those of General George Casey, the commander of the U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq, who told Congress last fall: Increased coalition presence feeds the notion of occupation, contributes to the dependency of Iraqi forces on the coalition, extends the time it will take Iraqi security forces to become self-reliant, and exposes more coalition forces to attack at a time when Iraqi security forces are increasingly available and capable. That is our commander talking about the disadvantages of having a large number of troops remain in Iraq. Regardless of one's views on whether it was wise to attack Iraq--and I for one thought it was unwise, and so voted--and regardless of one's views on whether the war has been well managed--and I have been critical of the administration's management--all of us want to maximize the chances for success in Iraq. To maximize the chances for success in Iraq, the Iraqis must take control of their country. Our approach, our amendment, maximizes the chance for success. Last year, by a bipartisan vote of 79 to 16, the Senate adopted an amendment stating that: [C]alendar year 2006 should be a period of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty. The Senate language remained in the bill and was signed into law. Our amendment implements that policy direction. The Iraqis are standing up. U.S. and coalition forces have trained and equipped more than 250,000 Iraq security forces. More than two-thirds of Iraq's Army combat battalions are either in the lead or operating independently, according to the administration's May 2006 report to Congress. It is now time for the United States to set a date for the beginning--the beginning of a standdown. Last fall, General Casey said that our presence in Iraq ``fuels the insurgency'' and that ``beginning to reduce our presence in Iraq'' as conditions warrant would result in ``taking away one of the elements that fuels the insurgency.'' That is our commander speaking. Conditions not only warrant the beginning of a reduction of our presence, conditions are such that only a phased, orderly redeployment beginning by the end of this year will maximize the chances of succeeding in Iraq. By making clear that a phased redeployment of our forces from Iraq needs to begin this year, we will send a clear message to the Iraqis that our presence is not an open-ended security blanket and that they need to assume responsibility for their own future. I yield the floor.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield for a unanimous consent request?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, may I have 10 seconds? I wish to add my thanks to the Senator from Nebraska for his very constructive, positive remarks.

Mr. LEVIN. That is correct.