Carl Levin

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I have a unanimous consent request, and I think I am following a pattern, at least I hope so. If not, I will withdraw. I ask unanimous consent that three amendments be called up and then be set aside so that they are in advance of cloture. I ask unanimous consent that amendment No. 3825 be called up and set aside. I also send to the desk a modified version of amendment No. 3809, which has been approved by the Democratic leader, which I understand the process is the modification and then that modified amendment will be set aside. Also, I ask unanimous consent that amendment No. 3810 be called up and set aside.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I thank the managers of the intelligence reform bill, S. 2845, for accepting an amendment offered by myself and Senator Coleman on the issue of terrorist financing. This amendment, amendment No. 3867, was developed in coordination with Senators Collins and Lieberman of the Governmental Affairs Committee and Senators Shelby and Sarbanes of the Banking Committee. I thank each of my colleagues for their guidance and assistance which has enabled us to fashion a good amendment with bipartisan support and offer it to the bill today. This amendment is the result of an extensive investigation by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, initiated at my request, into money laundering allegations involving Riggs Bank, a nationally chartered bank located right here in the Nation's Capital. Our investigation found a bank which routinely allowed highly questionable transactions with few questions asked. Some of these transactions involved millions of dollars in cash or suspicious wire transfers; others have raised serious concerns about possible terrorist financing. We live in a post-9/11 world. After the attack on America, we strengthened our antimoney laundering laws, in part, because Osama bin Laden boasted that his modern new recruits knew the ``cracks'' in ``Western financial systems'' like they knew the ``lines in their hands.'' That chilling statement helped fuel a new effort to strengthen our defenses against terrorists, corrupt dictators, and others who would use our financial systems against us. Part of that effort was Congress' enactment of the PATRIOT Act which, in title III, strengthened U.S. laws to stop money laundering, foreign corruption, and terrorist financing. Even before the PATRIOT Act, we had laws and regulations to stop money laundering. In fact, since 1987, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC, has required nationally chartered banks to establish anti-money laundering programs to ensure the banking system is not misused by criminals. The PATRIOT Act was intended to build on that existing foundation to further strengthen our defenses against money launderers. Our investigation found that Riggs Bank ignored its antimoney laundering obligations before the PATRIOT Act, and continued to ignore them afterward. We found that the bank didn't get serious in part because, in the past, when bank regulators pointed out problems with Riggs' antimoney laundering controls, if the bank promised to do better, the regulators let it go. The regulators tolerated the bank's weak antimoney laundering program, continued to accept excuses when deficiencies were not corrected, and continued to hold off on tough enforcement measures. We were particularly surprised to learn that the OCC examiner-in- charge who oversaw Riggs Bank for 4 years, from 1998 to 2002, appeared to function at times as more of an advocate for the bank than an arms- length regulator. The investigation found, for example, that in 2001, the examiner-in-charge advised more senior OCC personnel against taking a formal enforcement action against Riggs for its lax antimoney laundering program, because the bank had promised to do better. In 2002, after subordinate examiners had uncovered troubling transactions and bank accounts involving Augusto Pinochet, the former President of Chile, and actions by Riggs to hide those accounts from the OCC for 2 years, the examiner-in-charge ordered the examination materials not to be included in the OCC's electronic database, even though such materials are normally placed in that database. The examination materials were instead saved in paper form, making it much more difficult for subsequent examiners to learn about the Pinochet examination. About a month after giving this order, that same Examiner- in-Charge was offered a job at Riggs. He later retired from the OCC and 3 days after retiring, took a senior position with Riggs. These actions--advising against a formal enforcement action, suppressing the Pinochet examination materials, and accepting a job offer at the bank he regulated, among others--raise serious conflict of interest concerns. Federal bank examiners are our first line of defense against money laundering and terrorist financing at U.S. banks, and we can't allow their independence to be undermined by the lure of a job at the banks they oversee. The 9/11 Commission report notes the important role that stopping terrorist financing plays in our counterterrorism efforts. It explicitly recommends that U.S. antiterrorist financing programs remain ``front and center in U.S. counterterrorism efforts.'' Subcommittee hearings and a report released by my staff in July of this year support that recommendation and offer a detailed legislative record demonstrating the need for new measures to further strengthen federal oversight of the antimoney laundering programs at our financial institutions. The Levin-Coleman amendment would strengthen U.S. anti-terrorist financing efforts in two ways. First, it would require the President, through the Treasury Secretary, to take a hard look at the current state of U.S. efforts to combat terrorist financing and issue a report in 6 months with recommendations for reforms. One of the most important issues to be addressed is improving our process for setting priorities and coordinating U.S. agency efforts to detect, track, disrupt, and stop terrorist financing. It is far from clear today, when it comes to combating terrorist financing, what U.S. agency official, if any, has primary responsibility for developing priorities, assigning tasks to agencies, and monitoring the implementation of policy and operations. Secondly, the amendment would impose a 1-year cooling off period before a senior Federal examiner may take a job with a financial institution that he or she was responsible for overseeing. This cooling off period is similar to one already in place for Federal procurement officials under 41 U.S. 423(d). Members of Congress, Congressional staff, and many other Federal employees already operate under cooling off periods, which have been in place for years and have had a beneficial effect. Our amendment would apply a new cooling off period to senior federal bank examiners like the OCC examiner who oversaw Riggs. John D. Hawke, Jr., U.S. Comptroller of the Currency and head of the OCC, which served as the primary regulator of Riggs, has expressed strong support for legislation imposing a 1-year cooling off period for senior Federal examiners, stating in a memorandum to OCC staff that ``when an OCC examiner, with no break in continuity, takes employment with a bank he or she has been supervising, there are inevitably questions that will be asked and suspicions raised.'' He apparently wanted to impose a cooling off period on OCC examiners 4 years ago but was advised that he lacked the statutory authority to do so. The report released by my subcommittee staff in July also recommends enacting a 1- year cooling off period for bank examiners. Similar legislation, introduced in the House of Representatives by Rep. Luis Gutierrez, D- Ill., and Rep. Sue Kelly, R-NY, was recently approved by the House Financial Services Committee for inclusion in the House intelligence reform bill. The Levin-Coleman amendment would close the revolving door and eliminate potential and actual conflicts of interest for our federal examiners. It would also provide a fresh look at our country's antiterrorist financing efforts. I thank my colleagues on both sides of the aisle for supporting this amendment. A brief section-by-section explanation of the amendment follows. Subsection (a) directs the Treasury Department to prepare a report within 6 months evaluating the current state of U.S. efforts to curtail the international financing of terrorism. The report is required to address the effectiveness and efficiency of current Federal programs to detect, track, disrupt, and stop terrorist financing; the relationship between terrorist financing and money laundering; the nature, effectiveness and efficiency of current efforts to coordinate intelligence and agency operations related to terrorist financing, including identifying which agency official, if any, has primary responsibility to develop priorities, assign tasks to agencies and monitor the implementation of policy and operations related to terrorism; the effectiveness and efficiency of efforts to protect the critical infrastructure of the U.S. financial system; ways to improve the effectiveness of financial institutions; ways to improve multilateral and international governmental cooperation on terrorist financing; and recommendations for reforms. Subsection (b) imposes a 1-year cooling off period on senior examiners at the OCC, Federal Reserve Banks, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of Thrift Supervision, and National Credit Union Administration before a senior examiner can take a job at a financial institution that he or she oversaw. The subsection does so by establishing a new subsection (k) in the statutes applicable to these agencies. The new subsection (k) contains language that was drawn from two sets of postemployment provisions now in the federal code, the provisions in section 207 of title 18 applicable to a variety of senior federal employees and the provisions in section 423(d) of title 41 applicable to senior Federal procurement officials. For example, the new subsection (k) draws on the ``knowing'' standard used in the section 207 provisions, and the ``compensation'' language that appears in section 423(d). The new subsection (k) is intended to apply only to senior examiners who have a meaningful relationship with a financial institution, such as an examiner-in-charge or a senior examiner with dedicated responsibility to oversee a particular institution. It is not intended to apply to less senior examiners who may examine or inspect dozens of financial institutions in a single year without developing a sustained relationship with any one institution. It is also not intended to apply to persons holding supervisory positions that do not involve routine interactions with an institution for purposes of examining or inspecting the institution's books or operations. The provision may apply to more than one senior examiner at the same financial institution, and is not limited to examiners with an office at the site of the financial institution or to examiners who spend 100 percent of their time on a single institution. Each Federal banking agency is directed to issue rules, regulations, and guidance to delineate the personnel to which this postemployment restriction applies. Each agency head also has authority, on a case-by- case basis, to waive the postemployment restriction for a particular individual if the waiver would not hurt the integrity of the agency's supervisory program. It is intended that the agency head issue these waivers personally, without delegating the waiver authority to another official, to ensure careful usage. The new subsection (k) authorizes two types of penalties for senior examiners who violate the 1-year cooling off period. These two penalties are in addition to any other administrative, civil, or criminal remedy or penalty that may be available to the United States or any other person for the same conduct. The first penalty is an industry-wide employment ban which requires the relevant agency to remove the affected individual from the financial institution and prohibit them from employment at any insured financial institution for up to 5 years. The second penalty authorizes the agency to impose a civil monetary fine on the individual of up to $250,000. This fine would have to be imposed either in a Federal court proceeding or in an administrative proceeding that accords with the agency's administrative rules for imposing civil monetary penalties. The provision also authorizes the Attorney General to impose a civil monetary penalty if an agency does not, but prohibits both from doing so. The requirement for a 1-year cooling off period is intended to become effective one year after the date of the enactment of this act, whether or not any agency issues implementing regulations to carry out the act's requirements.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I support much of what is contained in amendment No. 3845, offered by Senator Byrd. However, I will vote against the amendment because it strikes from the underlying bill section 224(b)(3), a provision included in an amendment I offered during markup of the bill in the Government Affairs Committee. Section 224 requires that the NID, the Director of the NCTC, and the Director of any other intelligence center make intelligence information available upon the request of committees of Congress with jurisdiction over the subject matter to which the information relates, or upon the request of the chairman or ranking member of the House or Senate Intelligence Committees. Too much information and too many documents have been withheld from congressional committees by the CIA. If we are going to prevent a stronger national intelligence direction from becoming a stronger ``yes man'' and stronger political arm of a White House, there must be strong oversight from Congress. The intention of section 224(b)(3) is to limit the amount of intelligence information that the executive branch can legally withhold from the Congress. The requirement to provide information to Congress exists unless the President asserts a Constitutionally-based privilege. Senator Byrd and I both agree that the Congress should have broad access to intelligence information. I disagree, however, with that part of the Byrd amendment which strikes section 224(b)(3).

Mr. LEVIN. I very much thank my dear friend from West Virginia, and I thank the managers.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank my good friend from Connecticut. I thank him and Senator Collins, again, for their leadership on this very critically important bill, one that is surely needed, one that surely must be done right. I think we are all determined to do both--to get this bill passed, but to get it passed in a form which not just improves our intelligence capability but also addresses an issue which I have been very much concerned about, which is the shaping of intelligence, the exaggeration of intelligence, the distortion of intelligence to support particular policy purposes. Unhappily, this is not new. We saw the same problem in the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, with a distortion of the intelligence that was used in order to obtain passage of a resolution which would support the expansion of a war in Vietnam. We saw the same problem with the Iran-contra matter, where intelligence was distorted, shaped, and misused in order to support a particular policy position. We recently saw, before Iraq, that intelligence was shaped and exaggerated and distorted inside the intelligence community, in my judgment, after it was received by the policymakers. But even before they got it, it was shaped in a way that pointed, in every single instance where there is an error in omission, toward a more imminent threat, a stronger threat, which thereby supported the position of the policymakers. I believe in a stronger national intelligence director. We need a stronger national intelligence director, but we also want a director who is going to exercise that power in a way which will not produce intelligence aimed at supporting policy. We need intelligence which is aimed at providing facts--unvarnished, objective, independently arrived at. While supporting a more powerful director, I do not want to support a stronger ``yes'' man or simply to support a stronger political arm of the White House. Here, when I say that, I am referring to any administration, not just this administration. I don't want national intelligence directors to be shaping intelligence to support the policy of any administration. I want them to be providing information which is critically important to policymakers but information which must be right, must be accurate, must be objective, must be independently arrived at. That is what my goal has been. The Senator from Connecticut and the Senator from Maine, who are leading this effort, and the Governmental Affairs Committee have willingly added a number of provisions which have furthered that goal. There are a number of other provisions which I believe should be added here on the floor. I will be offering one today. I have not personally been able to talk to the Senator from Connecticut, but I understand that this first amendment of mine may have been cleared now. I want to describe it, in any event. I ask unanimous consent we set aside the pending amendment and that amendment No. 3808 be called up.

Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the 9/11 Commission, in addition to recommending a number of ways in which we could strengthen the national intelligence director and that office and produce more coordinated and helpful intelligence reports where we have all the information necessary to connect the dots and where agencies share information with each other, also reminded us on page 414 of their report that: In managing the whole community, the National Intelligence Director is still providing a service function. With the partial exception of his or her responsibilities for overseeing the NCTC [the National Counterterrorism Center] the National Intelligence Director should support the consumers of national intelligence--the president and policymaking advisers, such as secretaries of state, defense and homeland security, and the Attorney General. The consumers of intelligence are the ones who need to set forth and lay out their needs. What do they need by way of collection? What is it that they and their agencies--whether it is the State Department or Homeland Security Department or the Treasury Department or any other department--what kind of satellite capabilities do they need? Where do they need the electronics to be used? They need to tell that new national intelligence director and the NCTC what it is they need for their purposes. They are in the best position to know what are the requirements of their agency. When all these requirements and needs are put together, we are then in a situation where the needs and the requirements of the agencies will probably exceed the resources that we have available to meet those needs. At that point, you need somebody to arbitrate. You need somebody to decide: We have this many needs, but we have only this many resources. How do we allocate limited resources--or at least not unlimited resources--among a very finite package of needs which frequently will exceed the resources we have? Who is going to arbitrate that problem? If the State Department says we have to have satellite coverage here, and another department says, no, we have to have that coverage here, who is going to make that decision? The answer which this bill provides, and I think rightly so, is that the national intelligence director needs to make the decision as to what needs are going to be met if we can't meet all of them. But in terms of what those needs are, in terms of setting forth the requirements of the agency, that has to be something which the agency head sets up. There is no way that the NID can decide what the State Department needs and what the Defense Department needs and what the Treasury Department needs. Those agencies and others have to lay out what their requirements are, what their needs are. Where the NID comes in is deciding among those needs which ones have the top priority. That is why the language in the bill which says that the NID will establish the collection and analysis priorities and manage collection tasking is, in my judgment, correct. I want to make it clear that this amendment is truly intended to clarify what I believe is the intent of the sponsors of this bill. There are other amendments I will be offering which differ on the substance, where there is something I would do differently from the sponsors of the bill. But this amendment is intended to clarify what I believe not only is but should be and must be the intent of the sponsors of this legislation in two ways. First, as I have just described, and as the 9/11 Commission described, one of the purposes of the national intelligence director is to support the consumers of national intelligence. It is the consumers who must set forth and lay out their needs. When those needs exceed the resources or can't be met for whatever reason, you need an arbiter. That is where the NID should come in. Sorry, we can't meet that department's need; or, Sorry we can't meet the Treasury Department needs because this Homeland Security need has to take priority. You need someone who will make that decision and who can make it quickly. That, I believe, is the intent. No one is in a position to determine the needs of 15 intelligence agencies with intelligence operations except those agencies themselves. But when you aggregate those needs and they exceed the resources, at that point you have to have a national intelligence director who says, That has priority and we are tasking that particular satellite; we are tasking an agency that has satellite capability to accomplish that particular goal and meet that need rather than their other needs which cannot be met. That is one part of the amendment. The other clarification has to do with the analyses, the so-called competitive analyses, which are welcome. Everybody who testified in front of us--Secretary Powell, Secretary Ridge, the chairman of our committee and the ranking member said this at hearings--``We don't want group-think.'' We want independent analyses. We want analyses which are competitive. We want to encourage that. We don't want to discourage it. We want to make it clear in the bill that by giving power to the national intelligence director to direct that a competitive analysis be achieved, it is not exclusive. We are still urging all of the intelligence agencies on their own initiative to provide independently arrived at and competitive analysis. We want agencies to tell us those aluminum tubes have two purposes, not just one. We want agencies on their own initiative--not waiting for a direction by the NID but on their own initiative, should they determine that is what they wish to do--to tell us, No, those unmanned aerial vehicles do not have a purpose of delivering biological weapons; they are more suited for a legitimate purpose. We want agencies, in other words, to give us those competitive analyses which is what is the great antidote to group-think and which the chairman, the ranking member, and every single witness, I think, who came in front of us said should be encouraged. We have language in the bill now which gives the power to the NID to direct a competitive analysis, which is fine. He or she ought to have that power. We want to encourage independent or competitive analysis, and that means we don't want any agency to think they have to wait for a direction, but they on their own will be encouraged by the NID to engage in those kinds of independent analyses. I want to assure my dear friend from Connecticut, the ranking member, that this particular amendment does have that purpose. I believe it is a very commonsense amendment which is complimentary to everything that is in the bill. I will be offering amendments perhaps on Monday which I think are very modest amendments which do, though, make substantive changes to the bill. This would carry out what I hope the intention is of the sponsors of the bill and which has been stated by the sponsors of the bill to be something they deeply believe in. I yield the floor.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first let me thank my dear friend from Connecticut. I ask unanimous consent that Senator Inouye be added as a cosponsor to this amendment.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I don't know whether the Senator from Connecticut at this point wants to have a voice vote or wait for the Senator from Maine.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this fall marks a solemn 2nd anniversary of the sniper attacks which terrorized the Washington, DC area and the country for 3 weeks in 2002. In October of that year, John Allen Mohammad, who was sentenced to death, and John Lee Malvo who was sentenced to life imprisonment, indiscriminately shot 13 innocent people, killing ten. In a settlement that marked victory for the 2002 sniper shooting victims, Bushmaster Firearms, manufacturer of the XM-15 assault rifle used in the attacks, agreed to pay $550,000 in damages for negligence leading to criminal violence in connection with the shooting spree. According to reports, Bushmaster continued to sell firearms, including the XM-15 assault rifle used in the sniper shootings, to Bull's Eye Shooter Supply in Tacoma, WA, even after several ATF audits documented the dealer's inability to responsibly account for its inventory of weapons. Reports indicate that 238 guns had gone missing from Bull's Eye's inventory and over 50 had been traced to criminal acts since 1997. As part of the settlement with victims, Bull's Eye has agreed to pay $2 million for its negligence in failing to account for the assault rifle that ended up in the hands of the snipers. Earlier this year, I voted with 89 of my colleagues to defeat S. 1805, the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act. That bill would have weakened the legal rights of gun violence victims by terminating a wide range of pending and prospective civil cases against members of the gun industry. The victims of the sniper shootings would have lost their ability to sue Bushmaster Firearms and Bull's Eye Shooter Supply had S. 1805 become law. For the families and victims impacted by the 2002 sniper attacks, no amount of money will replace their loss and suffering. However, we should continue to pursue sensible gun safety legislation, including reinstating the expired assault weapons ban, to help prevent future gun crimes and improve the security of communities across our Nation.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am honored to recognize Dziennik Polski, or the Polish Daily News, one of Michigan's oldest and honored publications, on its 100th anniversary. The Polish Daily News can be proud of its dedication to generations of Polish Americans and its support of American traditions and ideals. The Polish Daily News has worked together with other organizations in the greater Detroit area to help build strong and effective communities, which has given rise to a diverse and vibrant socioeconomic region in southeast Michigan. Founded in 1904 by a small group of community members, the Polish Daily News was housed in a building on the south side of Canfield east of Riopelle. This was home to the paper until the 1960s when the offices and print production moved to a location on Van Dyke in Detroit. A third and fourth move relocated the newspaper to two addresses on Joseph Campau, with the last one in Hamtramck. As Detroit's primary Polish newspaper serving the new immigrants who began to settle in what was becoming the Nation's Motor City, the Polish Daily News played a vital role in building a strong Polonia that was committed to full participation in American life. The paper supported a cohesive community that encouraged its members to strive for accomplishments that reflected their shared values of a deep commitment to family, faith, hard work, as well as the American ideals of democracy and freedom. With a circulation of 30,000 during the 1940s and 1950s, the Polish Daily News kept its readership informed about the struggle for Poland's independence from Soviet oppression while advocating for a future democratic Poland and strong U.S.-Poland relations. Today as the Polish Weekly, the newspaper continues the heritage of promoting both a strong Polonia and citizen participation in the life of the United States. The Polish Daily News is celebrating its 100th anniversary of serving the Polish-American community of greater Detroit on Saturday, October 2, 2004. Families, friends, community leaders, and elected officials will gather at the American Polish Cultural Center in Troy to pay tribute to the important efforts of the Polish Daily News organization which has helped to promote community life and strengthen Polish-American pride throughout the 100 years of its existence. I know my Senate colleagues join me in also congratulating publisher Bruno Nowicki and the editors and staff, along with the community supporters and many friends of the Polish Daily News/Polish Weekly on this great milestone. I am proud to recognize their record of service to the Polish-American community and their respected standing among all the people of Michigan. A Hearty Sto Lat--Another 100 Years.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I take this opportunity to recognize Ambassador H.E. Bader Omar Al-Dafa, a distinguished career diplomat and the current Ambassador of Qatar to the United States. Ambassador Al- Dafa, who earned his bachelor's degree in political science from Western Michigan University in 1975, will receive the College of Arts and Sciences Alumni Achievement Award from Western Michigan University in a special ceremony on October 15, 2004. Ambassador Al-Dafa is admired in Michigan for his dedication to service and his work in promoting US-Arab relations. His efforts to foster better understanding among America, Qatar and the Arab world through support of important initiatives in the American Arab community are appreciated by many. His respect for diplomacy has been demonstrated throughout his exemplary career which spans more than 25 years. Upon graduation from Western Michigan University, Ambassador Al-Dafa began his career as a diplomatic attache at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Doha. While serving in his second assignment as First Secretary at the Embassy of the State of Qatar in Washington, DC, he earned a master's degree in international public policy from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in 1979. With his solid understanding of America and its people, Ambassador Al- Dafa has been energetic and consistent in his commitment to improving bilateral relations. Ambassador Al-Dafa has served in his post as Ambassador of Qatar to the United States since September 5, 2000. Prior to this assignment, he served as Non-Resident Ambassador to Mexico; Director of European and American Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Qatar; Ambassador to The Russian Federation; Non Resident Ambassador to Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia; Ambassador to France and Non Resident Ambassador to Greece; Non-Resident Ambassador to Switzerland; Ambassador to Egypt and Permanent Representative to the Arab League in Cairo, Egypt; and Ambassador to Spain. Through the Washington Embassy, Ambassador Al-Dafa has worked on a wide array of programs, including the establishment of branches of Virginia Commonwealth University, Texas A&M, and Weill Cornell Medical College in Education City in Doha. In addition to Arabic and English, he speaks Spanish and French fluently. Ambassador Al-Dafa is married to Awatef Mohamed Al-Dafa and has three children. I know my colleagues join me in congratulating Ambassador Al-Dafa on his success and achievements in international affairs and on this prestigious honor that will be conferred by Western Michigan University. I am pleased to offer my best wishes on his continued service and contribution to the close ties and good relations between the State of Qatar and the United States.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I oppose the Specter amendment and I will take a few minutes to explain my opposition. I think all of us are in favor of bold moves, of having a powerful new national intelligence director and having analysis that is independent and objective, much more so than has been the case in the last few decades and recently, to have that analysis done by a group which can bring together all of the information and come up with a coordinated position which is independent and objective, and the NCTC is able to do that. This amendment would place the National Security Agency and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the NSA and the NGA, and the National Reconnaissance Office, the NRO, under the direction, supervision, and control of the national intelligence director and would do the same for the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency regarding the national intelligence collection mission of the DIA. In doing so, this amendment would have the national intelligence director basically be substituted for the Secretary of Defense in the military chain of command. There are thousands of uniformed members of our military who are currently in those agencies. To break the chain of command and to say for the first time we are going to take thousands of uniformed personnel and put them under the supervision, direction, and control of a civilian agency head would create havoc inside of the military, would create a very unfortunate precedent, and would in the process be creating a new agency, a new agency that would require a supervisory staff similar to the supervisory staff that now exists in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the agencies which would be transferred. Those are the two major reasons I have problems. There is a third I want to talk about in a moment. But the two major reasons I have are that it would require the creation of a whole new supervisory bureaucracy for these agencies in the national intelligence director's office. You cannot supervise these agencies, from the national intelligence director's perspective, without having people to engage in that supervision the way the Office of the Secretary of Defense now supervises and overseas these agencies. So we would be creating a new bureaucracy. We should be breaking down walls between bureaucracies, not building up a new bureaucracy. When the 9/11 Commission reached its conclusion and when they testified in front of us, they told us they decided not to create a department. They thought that would be overcentralization. They were bold. I don't think anybody can successfully argue here that the 9/11 Commission was not bold. They were bold. They made some major shifts, in terms of budget execution authority and in terms of personnel authority. In shifting those authorities over the agencies which we are debating here to the NID, they made a major decision relative to power, relative to control. But they decided they would not go toward a more centralized new agency; that they would rather coordinate with the budgeting personnel power in a new powerful NID but not create a new bureaucracy in the process. There are many reasons why their decision--and I focus on the 9/11 Commission recommendation at our hearing--was a wise one. Their approach was not just bold in terms of recommending the transfer of budget and personnel authority, but it was wise in not creating a new bureaucracy in the process. The chain of command is such that we now do not put large numbers of our uniformed military people outside of the chain of command and under the command and control of civilian supervisors. We do not do that. There is a purpose for having a chain of command from your commander inside the military, which is clear, which you must abide by. That is what you sign up for when you join the military and that is what is so essential to military effectiveness, that the chain of command be solid and that it not be broken in the way this amendment would break a chain of command. These agencies we are talking about today are integral parts of the Defense Department. They are recognized for the support they provide to combat operations. Indeed, when the Congress adopted the Goldwater- Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986, we created the concept of ``command support agencies.'' Pursuant to that legislation, the DIA and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency have been designated by law as command support agencies. We hear that designation will continue. But it is pretty hard to square that with what this amendment proposes, which is that they would not be inside the military chain of command. They would still have the label but not the reality. They would be called combat support agencies, but they would not be in the chain of command of the Department of Defense. The combat support functions of the DIA and the NSA and the NGA have been recognized in law. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required by law to evaluate periodically, and not less often than every 2 years, the responsiveness and readiness of these agencies to support operating forces in the event of war or threats to national security. The pending amendment would preserve the form of the periodic review. That periodic review by the JCS Chairman of the combat support agencies of the intelligence community would be retained, but it would be a report which is in form only because it is the Secretary of Defense who is charged with being responsible for the combat capabilities of the Armed Forces. The NID, the national intelligence director, does not have the responsibility that the Secretary of Defense has for the combat capabilities of our Armed Forces. So to simply say, well, there will still be a periodic review by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of the combat support agencies of this community, but then to say that report goes to the NID, the national intelligence director, instead of going to the person who we make responsible for the combat abilities of the Armed Forces, is a hollow gesture. It says that one thing will continue to be true, we will still call them a combat support agency, but when it comes to the real world of where that review goes, it will go to the person, the national intelligence director, who is not the person responsible for the combat capabilities of the Armed Forces. So we have a break in the chain of command, which is unprecedented, which creates all kinds of problems inside the military in terms of military effectiveness, which weakens not only the power of the Secretary of Defense but which undermines his responsibility to make sure we have full combat capability inside of the Department of Defense. For these reasons, that we should not be creating a new bureaucracy, we should be breaking down walls of old bureaucracies; that this amendment would require new supervisory staff over these entities if they are going to be transferred to the national intelligence director in order to help him perform the supervision of these agencies, which is now performed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and because this would represent an unprecedented break in the chain of command that now exists, and which is so critical to our military effectiveness, I believe the 9/11 Commission reached the right balance. Their balance was one which was conscious and conscientious; it was bold but it was wise. I have one other thought which I want to share and then I will yield. These agencies now do analysis on their own. We got some very important analysis before the Iraq war, in fact, from the Defense Intelligence Agency, analysis which was different from the analysis produced by the Central Intelligence Agency. If we are serious about wanting alternative views relative to intelligence; if we are serious, as the 9/11 Commission urges us to be and as I hope we are, about ending the politicization and misuse of intelligence to support policy positions; if we are serious about promoting objectivity and independence of analysis, we would want these agencies not to be shifted because their analysis should not be under the control of the national intelligence director. Their analysis should be independent and objective. For these agencies to be shifted outside of where they now are, separate from the national intelligence director, and put underneath his umbrella, is going to make us weaker when it comes to the most critically important reform we should be producing, which is to have objective, independent analysis of intelligence which can be provided to the policymakers and not shaped to support policies of the policymakers. To remove these agencies that now are in a position to provide alternative analysis and to put them under the aegis of the national intelligence director will make that many fewer sources of independent, objective intelligence that will be available to our policymakers. That is a real loss. There are other provisions in this bill and other provisions I hope will be added during the amendment process to promote the objectivity and independence of intelligence analysis. We have had too much abuse in this area. We have had too much shaping and exaggeration, going back at least as far as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, when intelligence was misused, to the Iran-Contra years when intelligence was misused, shaped, and exaggerated in order to support particular policy positions, and the same thing happened before the Iraq war. We have to find ways to break down any kind of group- think, any kind of a monolithic approach to intelligence, and we have to make it more difficult for a national intelligence director to be doing the shaping, to be in total control of the analysis of intelligence. That is why having an NCTC office separate from NID is so important. Having an NCTC director who is subject to the confirmation of the Senate is so important. That is why some of the other provisions which we were able to add in committee to promote the independence and objectivity of the intelligence analysis are so important. We should not be reducing the numbers of sources of independent analysis of intelligence, as this amendment would do, by putting these agencies that now produce intelligence analysis under the aegis, supervision, and operational control of the national intelligence director. It is too much concentration of that critically important analysis power under one person. We should be wary of doing that. We should be moving in a very different direction. We should be finding ways to plot independence and objectivity of intelligence so we don't have a repeat of the fiasco we just saw where we had 500 pages, according to a bipartisan Intelligence Committee report, of instances where intelligence was shaped, stretched, and exaggerated, and they all moved in one direction. All those intelligence changes and all the shaping was moved in the direction of supporting a particular policy of the administration. That is a great danger. This amendment, because it concentrates or would concentrate agencies that are currently involved in intelligence analysis under the NID, increases the danger rather than reduces the danger of having intelligence which is shaped to support policy rather than provide support for objective information and objective estimates to the policymakers. I oppose this amendment. I hope it will be defeated. I yield the floor.

Mr. LEVIN. If the Senator will yield, I don't know any other way you can.

Mr. LEVIN. If the Senator will yield to respond, and I don't want to interrupt, but that is exactly what the words ``controlling operations'' mean. That is what the word ``operations'' means. I think the Senator from Ohio is correct in pressing for clear answers to the wording in the bill. There are plenty of places where I have some similar questions which I will be raising by amendment, but I don't think this is one of them. I don't think this is one of the places. Because I think the bill is clear here that when the NID issues collection tasking, that is exactly what the Senator from Ohio wants, is to issue collection tasking, I believe. But what I believe the Senator from Ohio does not want is to control the day-to-day operations as to how that task will be carried out. Yet that is what the Specter language results in. Rather than clarifying this issue as between the order or the task, and how you are going to carry it out, it blurs the issue. Because once the Senator from Ohio says it is not his understanding of the Specter language that the operations which will now be assigned to NID include the day-to-day operations, then where is that line drawn? If it is not the day-to-day operations, if you are truly shifting those agencies to the responsibility and control of the NID, of course he is responsible for the day-to-day operations. Where is the line, where is the operations point divided between the NID who controls operations under Specter and the operations not controlled by the NID, under your understanding?

Mr. LEVIN. I am happy to yield.

Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if the Senator from Ohio would address a question which his question raised in my mind, having spent a lot of time trying to figure out what the line is, in terms of supervision and control. Let me put the hypothetical this way. I would also appreciate the managers perhaps listening to it as well. We have a new national intelligence director. The first question the Senator from Ohio asked, the first that I heard, at least, was: Can that director direct, order--in the words of the chairman, ``task''-- the collection, let's say, of signals intelligence in Iraq instead of Afghanistan? Can he or she make that decision? We only have certain resources. We have to allocate them. Can that director, after consulting, presumably--because these are day-to-day consultations, as the Senator from Connecticut says; these go on every single day, these decisions on allocations and priorities. But hopefully, after going through that process, can that NID, that director, say: OK, folks, I have heard it; we have to make a decision. We are collecting signals in Iraq; we are not going to do it in Afghanistan. The chairman's answer was ``yes.'' It seems to me that ought to be very reassuring to folks. The next question is, should that director be responsible for deciding which airplane it is that is going to do the collection? My good friend from Ohio says no, I think, shaking his head no. But that is what is left to the day-to-day operations. That is why you need to leave that decision on which airplane is going to go over Iraq to the day-to-day operational decisions inside of that agency. You can't transfer all of those decisions to a NID. That is where I think the Senator from Ohio would draw the line, I hope. That is clearly where I draw the line.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friend from Ohio. In closing, I do have some questions about certain words in this particular paragraph which I will raise later on the floor, relative particularly to the establishment of requirements, because I think the consumer must establish the requirements and not the NID. I think there is also an issue about analysis, because I think we ought to be promoting greater numbers of analyses, and not getting into group- think. We should be promoting independent, objective analysis and I think this wording probably or unintentionally could concentrate or centralize that in a NID. I think that is an unintended result, but we can discuss that later. But on this one issue that is raised in this amendment, it seems to me this amendment goes exactly in the direction all of us want, which is we need somebody to make a tasking decision, to have that power, and to do it exactly as our friend from Ohio said. You can't at a critical moment have that confused or diffused or uncertain. If something has to be done quickly, someone has to make a decision, and the person who makes a decision in this bill is clearly the NID on the tasking of the intelligence. That is where the decision, it seems to me, has to reside. But again, I think the Specter amendment, because it goes into the operational side after the task is issued, goes too far, and rather than clarifying an issue will put the responsibility purportedly on somebody who can't handle that responsibility, who doesn't have the horses to handle that responsibility inside of his agency, unless you recreate the entire Department of Defense almost inside the NID in order to carry out those day-to-day operations to effectuate the task collection which properly belongs with the NID.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if the Senator from Virginia has the floor. Who has the floor?

Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent also that I be given 5 minutes in opposition to the Specter amendment tomorrow morning, and if I am not here because of the full committee meeting we have at Armed Services, that my statement be made part of the record at that time.

Mr. LEVIN. No, I am done.

Mr. LEVIN. On the first part of the inquiry, what is interesting to me, and ironic, is the Director of Central Intelligence has that same authority the chairman just read from page 12, line 20, that is provided to the NID, which is to develop and present to the President the annual budget for the national intelligence program. That is the same authority as exists in current law to the intelligence director. So there is no change in terms of presenting and developing the budget. Where the real changes take place are after the budget or after the appropriation is adopted, and then it depends--then the law will change who it is that executes that budget authority. That is where we get very complicated changes. I think the discussion and debate is very important, that we analyze which specific programs, projects, and activities, budget execution-- not presentation or preparation--but execution is transferred to the NID from where it currently is. That is where I think we all would benefit from a description of specific programs which are not transferred. There are some in the tactical area. But there are also some that are transferred--very few, perhaps 3 percent of the 80 percent of the budget that is transferred, in terms of budget execution to the NID--that in my judgment should not be transferred. A very tiny, few programs, including the intelligence--the J-2 programs that are out in the combatant commanders, including the communications infrastructure between the JCS and the combatant commanders. Those specific programs--and I know my good friend from Virginia knows these programs--those specific programs clearly belong in the Defense Department's budget execution, in my judgment. However, they are transferred. To try to answer the Senator's question, I think it would be very illuminating, in addition to what he has asked for, if we could take some examples, and there are very few, of some programs where budget execution is transferred to the NID that should not be. I emphasize again, so this is not mischaracterized, I am talking here about less than 3 percent of the 80 percent of the budget which is transferred.

Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent I be able to respond to the Senator from Virginia without his losing the right to the floor.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, as the assault weapons ban expired last Monday, one of our Nation's law enforcement officers was recovering in a Miami, FL hospital from two gunshot wounds inflicted by an AK-47 rifle. According to the Brady Campaign, all models of this make of assault rifle were prohibited at the time of the attack, but are now legal due to the expiration of the assault weapons ban on September 13. Last Monday, the Miami Herald reported that on September 12, 2004 Miami-Dade Police Officer Keenya Hubert was on a routine patrol when she heard gunshots fired in a nearby neighborhood. She spotted a suspicious vehicle leaving the area, called for backup, and pulled the vehicle over. Suddenly, the driver got out of his vehicle and fired nearly two-dozen bullets at Officer Hubert and her police car using an AK-47 assault rifle. One of those bullets struck Officer Hubert in the shoulder and another grazed her forehead. Later in the week a man was arrested in connection with this attack. Press reports indicate the man had been previously convicted of attacking two other police officers in 1997. Unfortunately, assault rifles like the one reportedly used in the attack on Officer Hubert's life as well as many other similar assault weapons are once again being legally produced and sold as a result of the expiration of the assault weapons ban. The ban also included firearms that can accept detachable magazines and have more than one of several specific military features, such as a folding/telescoping stock, protruding pistol grip, bayonet mount, threaded muzzle or flash suppressor, barrel shroud or grenade launcher. Common sense tells us that there is no reason for civilians to have easy access to guns with these features. In 1994, I voted for the assault weapons ban and in March of this year I joined a bipartisan majority of the Senate in voting to extend the ban for 10 years. Unfortunately, despite the overwhelming support of the law enforcement community, the ongoing threat of terrorism, and bipartisan support in the Senate, neither the President nor the Republican Congressional leadership acted to protect Americans from assault weapons like the one used in the attack on Officer Hubert. Last week, Sarah Brady, the wife of Jim Brady who was shot in John Hinckley's attempted assassination of President Reagan, issued an open letter to President Bush expressing disappointment in his decision to allow the assault weapons ban to expire. Mr. President, I hope that in the remaining days of the 108th Congress the Republican leadership and the President will reverse course and act to extend the assault weapons ban. I ask unanimous consent that Sarah Brady's letter to President Bush be printed in the Record.