Carl Levin

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for an additional question?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator will yield for a question without losing his right to the floor.

Mr. LEVIN. Without losing your right to the floor. I wonder if your staff could put that other chart on with the judges because I just want to expand on one or two points. Some of the judges which the good Senator from Nevada pointed out were judges where cloture votes were required by the opponents of the judges; is that not correct, during the Clinton years, and it was required there be 60 votes in order to get those cloture motions adopted?

Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for a question without losing your right to the floor.

Mr. LEVIN. The Senator from Nevada, probably more than anybody, has made it possible for this Senate to run as smoothly as it does, even though there are huge numbers of bumps in the road. There would be 100 times as many bumps in the road but for the willingness of the Senator from Nevada to work with Members on both sides of the aisle to get legislation passed. He is constantly here in the well of the Senate asking people if they could cut the time down on their amendments, could they drop amendments, could they work cooperatively with somebody to work jointly on a bill. It is a constant effort to keep the wheels greased so we can accomplish as much as we do. I ask the Senator from Nevada this question: As somebody who is known to every Member of this Senate as someone who makes it possible for us to get a whole lot of things done, which we could not get done but for that effort, is part of the cooperation which makes it possible for us to act cooperatively, to act with a sense of comity, which we do most of the time, is it not true that part of that is that there be a willingness to share scheduling information with the minority so the minority can schedule airplanes, come back when there are going to be votes, and that that is an essential part of a spirit of cooperation which is so essential to be President of the Senate, and whether that is something which the Senator is referring to when he talks about an unwillingness to give information about whether there would be votes and on what subjects today and tomorrow?

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, 2 weeks ago, the majority leader indicated that before this session of Congress comes to an end, the Senate may consider the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, a bill the New York Times has said ``would give gun manufacturers and dealers a courthouse shield that tobacco and asbestos companies never had in being forced to come to terms with some of the damage their products inflict.'' While it now appears unlikely that the bill will be considered in the Senate this year, I would nevertheless like to express my concerns about it. The bill would rewrite well-accepted principles of liability law, providing the gun industry legal protections enjoyed by no other industry. Some claim that this bill would prevent frivolous lawsuits and protect firearm manufacturers, dealers, and distributors from being held responsible for the actions of criminals. While most gun dealers and manufacturers may conduct their business responsibly, this bill would shield negligent and reckless gun dealers and manufacturers from legitimate civil lawsuits. In fact, according to the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence and the Violence Policy Center, many meritorious cases could be dismissed under the bill. And according to a letter from University of Michigan Law Professor Sherman Clark, the case filed by the Washington, D.C. area sniper victims is among those that would not survive if the legislation were enacted. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of Professor Clark's letter be printed in the Record.

Mr. LEVIN. The two alleged snipers were both legally prohibited from buying guns, but through the apparent negligence of a gun dealer, they were able to obtain the military-style Bushmaster assault rifle. Reportedly, the gun dealer operated in such a grossly negligent manner that 238 guns inexplicably disappeared from its store. Among the missing guns were the alleged snipers' Bushmaster rifle. Several of the snipers' victims have filed a lawsuit against the dealer and others. Their case might not survive if this bill became law. This bill would set a dangerous precedent by giving a single industry broad immunity from civil liability and depriving many victims with legitimate cases of their day in court. If it is enacted, other industries will almost certainly line up for similar protections. Every single gun safety organization has expressed its opposition to this bill. This is special interest legislation. It should not be adopted.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I wish to ask my colleagues from Utah and Wisconsin if they are aware of the great need to control erosion and sediment in the Great Lakes region.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am pleased that S. 1427 acknowledges the problem posed by the emerald ash borer. To date, tens of thousands of Ash trees in my home State of Michigan have died due ``to infestations of the emerald ash borer,'' and I am glad that this bill provides $1 million for efforts to remove Ash trees that have been claimed by this invasive species. I appreciate the efforts made by the Agricultural Appropriations Subcommittee to acknowledge and address the devastation caused by the emerald ash borer in Michigan, Ohio and Ontario, Canada, and which is threatening to spread. The provision of funds contained in this legislation will assist local communities in removing trees that have been killed by this invasive species. It is also my understanding that USDA's Animal Plant Health Inspection Service--APHIS--provided $14.8 million in fiscal year 2003 funds to assist with efforts to contain and eradicate the emerald ash borer. Michigan's Governor, Jennifer Granholm, has requested that USDA provide $33 million in fiscal year 2004 funds for further efforts to combat this pest. These funds are vitally needed; however, efforts to combat the emerald ash borer should not be dependent upon the provision of emergency funds each new fiscal year. USDA must develop a multi-year plan for eradicating the ash borer.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I join the Senator from Michigan in asking the distinguished ranking member to give this important project consideration in conference. Phytophthora root rot is a fungus that is destroying crops and once the soil is infested, it must be taken out of production for 10 years. Currently, methyl bromide, which has been used by fresh market growers to control the disease, is scheduled to be phased out in 2005. New research is needed to develop tools that can effectively contain and eradicate this devastating disease.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the distinguished ranking member of the subcommittee.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the distinguished ranking member of the subcommittee.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I join the junior Senator from Michigan in her concern for this potentially devastating problem. The Canadian yard waste, which includes tree branches and trimmings, poses a serious threat of spreading the Asian long-horned beetle to Michigan. According to the USDA, these beetles lay their eggs in grooves that they chew into the tree's branches and trunk. The beetle requires 1 to 2 years to completely develop from an egg to an adult and feeds on the host tree during that time. Branches and tree scraps brought into Michigan as yard waste could contain beetle eggs and larvae that are embedded in the bark. The Asian long-horned beetle is extremely destructive to hardwood trees, particularly maple, poplar and willow trees. Michigan's tree population has already been severely damaged by the spread of the emerald ash borer beetle, which has killed over 6 million trees in Southeast Michigan and caused over $162 million in damage. The USDA must act immediately to prevent another devastating infestation, the Asian long-horned beetle, from spreading into Michigan.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I did not hear the beginning of that statement, but we are awaiting the document so we can read it. We would be happy to give an answer as promptly as we can, after the document is completed, but I understand there is some unfinished business and uncertainty that needs to be looked at.

Mr. LEVIN. I think we all hope it gets finished, but it is not finished yet.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator withhold for a unanimous consent request?

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, while that is being considered, I ask unanimous consent that a statement of the American Public Gas Association, supporting the amendment; a statement of Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, supporting the amendment; a statement of the North American Securities Administrators Association, supporting the amendment; a statement from the Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, U.S. Public Interest Research Group, and Public Citizen, supporting the amendment; and a statement from the Derivatives Study Center be printed in the Record.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first let me thank Senator Feinstein for her leadership on this issue and for her typical courtesy in interrupting her statement so I may give mine at this time. It is most appreciated. More important, I thank her for her leadership and Senator Lugar's leadership in bringing this amendment to the floor. Recent highly negative events in our energy markets show that there is an urgent need to prevent price manipulation in those markets, improve the transparency of energy markets, and to strengthen the ability of State and Federal agencies to enforce the rules governing the operation of those markets. Widespread price manipulation and falsification of price information in the electricity and natural gas markets in the last few years have inflicted billions of dollars in extra costs on energy consumers and businesses and have been a severe blow to our economy. The corruption and manipulation of these markets by Enron and other companies fueled the collapse of some energy markets in the United States, the bankruptcy of some energy companies, and a huge decline in investment and trading in the energy markets. The bipartisan amendment of Senators Feinstein, Lugar, myself, and others would close these ``Enron loopholes.'' Enron used these loopholes, and other companies joined with them, to manipulate energy markets at the public's expense. Our amendment would strengthen prohibitions on fraud and manipulation and give both the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, FERC, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC, the necessary tools to monitor the energy markets, to prevent manipulation, and ensure that prices are fairly and competitively arrived at. This legislation is needed because companies such as Enron are now permitted to trade large amounts of energy in virtually unregulated markets, making those unregulated markets and the resulting price of the energy we use vulnerable to fraud and manipulation. FERC's recent report on manipulation in the western energy market provides some stunning examples of how the energy markets can be manipulated. FERC found that Enron, through an unregulated electronics trading center called EnronOnline, ``manipulated the price of physical gas upward and downward,'' earning huge amounts of illegal profits. FERC determined that Enron often ``invited counterparties to wash trades, and these trades created a false sense of liquidity, which can distort prices. Enron also manipulated prices on the EOL by having affiliates on both sides of certain wash-like trades. This created artificial price volatility and raised prices.'' The report by FERC concluded that ``large-volume, rapid-fire trading by [Enron] . . . substantially increased natural gas prices in California.'' FERC found ``significant market manipulation'' in the ``inextricably linked'' natural gas and electricity markets, and that ``dysfunctions in each fed off one another'' during the energy crisis in California. According to FERC: Spot gas prices rose to extraordinary levels, facilitating the unprecedented price increase in the electricity market. Dysfunctions in the natural gas market appeared to stem, at least in part, from efforts to manipulate price indices compiled by trade publications. Reporting of false data and wash trading are examples of efforts to manipulate published price indices. Finally, the report found: The widespread false reporting led staff to conclude that reported prices did not reliably reflect market activity. I would like to give one specific example on how one day, January 31, 2002, Enron used an unregulated, nontransparent Internet trading system to manipulate the natural gas market in California. In August of 2002, the FERC staff issued an investigatory report finding that out of a total of 227 trades on that day, January 31, 2002, 174, or more than two-thirds of the trades on that day, involved Enron and a single unnamed party. Most of these trades took place during the last hour of trading with two parties buying huge amounts of natural gas from each other in numerous transactions. FERC determined that the trades took place at ``higher prices,'' in their words, than other trades that day, and resulted in a steep price increase over the last hour of trading. FERC described this trading activity as ``difficult to rationalize as a normal or standard business practice'' and noted: [O]nly Enron and possibly the counter party could have known that so much of the trading was going on between themselves, because parties looking at EOL's screens could only see the bid and ask prices; they could not know who the counter party was on any particular trade. The FERC report indicated that EnronOnline's prices were routinely used to prepare published reports on natural gas prices, which meant that the Enron price data was not just affecting Enron trades but also causing higher natural gas prices industry-wide. The report concluded that Enron had ``significant ability and incentive to manipulate the price data published by the reporting firms.'' This spring, FERC issued a number of recommendations to fix the problems in the energy markets. FERC recommended new policies and procedures for the oversight of commodity trades and prices and a system of market surveillance to detect and prevent manipulation. In March of this year, following a year-long investigation, I released a Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations staff report into the operation of crude oil markets. The report describes the regulated and unregulated markets for buying and selling crude oil and explains how crude oil prices are set and how they affect the price of critical oil commodities, such as gasoline, home heating fuel, jet fuel, and diesel fuel. The report describes the vulnerability of unregulated commodity markets to price manipulation and the need for and beneficial effects of U.S. commodity regulation. The report also explains how the over- the-counter markets are virtually unregulated and, therefore, vulnerable to manipulation. The report recommends that traders in over-the-counter markets be required to ``provide the CFTC with routine information on large positions in crude oil and energy contracts and derivatives, as well as other information that would aid the CFTC in detecting, preventing, and halting commodity market manipulation.'' So we have two reports reaching the same conclusions about the need for more market transparency and strengthened oversight to detect and prevent fraud and manipulation in energy markets. How did we get to this position where companies, such as Enron, are permitted to manipulate prices in our energy markets? The answer lies in how the energy markets and the Federal regulations have evolved over the last 20 years. Billions of dollars' worth of contracts for the future delivery of energy are now traded every day. These contracts are called energy derivatives because they derive their price from the price of the energy commodity in the contract. There are two basic types of energy derivatives. Energy derivatives that are traded on futures exchanges are called futures contracts. The trading of futures contracts on futures exchanges is regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission under the Commodity Exchange Act. The other type of energy derivatives, which are not traded on futures exchanges, are called over-the-counter energy derivatives. These derivatives may be traded by fax, by phone, in face-to-face meetings, or over the Internet. The trading of these derivatives is virtually unregulated. Both the futures markets and the over-the-counter markets perform identical economic functions. Both markets enable traders to buy and sell commodities at fixed prices, disseminate information about commodity prices, and provide a way for buyers and sellers to hedge against changes in the price of these commodities. Commodity traders routinely use both the futures markets and the over-the-counter markets for price discovery and hedging. Today, the types of contracts traded in the futures markets and the over-the-counter markets are virtually identical. As an indication of how indistinguishable these contracts really are, the NYMEX even calls some of the contracts that it offers on its over-the-counter electronic market ``futures contracts.'' This is an example of what is shown on the NYMEX boards. This is the way the NYMEX advertises: Light Louisiana sweet crude oil futures-- futures. Futures are supposed to be bought and sold on futures markets, not over-the-counter markets, but this is an over-the-counter sale and offer. This is a picture the New York Mercantile projects over the Internet for the purchase and sale of over-the-counter contracts. Notice it says: Trading venue is over the counter, and yet it calls that over- the-counter offer ``futures.'' If they were really futures, they would be regulated as futures contracts are by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. But these are over-the-counter sales. These are unregulated, and yet they are characterized as futures. The language used here is interchangeable. The economic function is interchangeable. The only difference--and it is a critical difference--is that futures contracts are regulated by the Commission and over-the-counter contracts are not. And they should be. They perform the same economic function. The language used is exactly the same and yet there is one group of contracts unregulated. The other group of contracts is regulated. It is the unregulated contracts which got us into so much trouble, the lack of transparency which got us into so much trouble. Let me give another example. The largest over-the-counter electronic trading facility is the Intercon- tinentalExchange, known as ICE, in Atlanta. It trades contracts that it calls futures, and yet these are not futures; these are over-the- counter transactions, described by the ICE as futures. It says you can trade futures from your desktop. Yet these are over-the-counter transactions. Here is what they say on their Web site: IntercontinentalExchange brings parallel trading in IPE Brent crude of futures to the ICE platform. Electronic futures trading sessions operate in parallel with the regular open-outcry session on the IPE floor in London. Now, that open-outcry session, as they phrase it, is the futures trading session that occurs at the exchanges. So they are treating them the same. They are saying, one can trade in futures electronically. The language now has become the same, the economic function is the same, but there is one key difference, and it is a deadly difference in terms of consumers and in terms of manipulation of prices. That difference is that futures contracts are in fact regulated and must be disclosed and are in fact transparent, whereas the over-the-counter trades are not. They are now dealt with interchangeably by the largest exchange, the largest over-the-counter electronic trading facility in the country, the IntercontinentalExchange in Atlanta. Only real futures markets are regulated to prevent price manipulation. That is a fact. The over-the-counter market is not. That is what has got us in the hole we are in. That is what permitted Enron to dig us deeper into the hole we are in and to cause the loss of huge amounts of money to our consumers and to many customers. No disclosure, take care of these trades over the market. If the market were a regulated market, such as the futures market is, it would have been regulated. It could have been transparent. We would not have seen the Enron disaster and the manipulation that we saw in Enron and by other companies. The Commodity Exchange Act regulates the futures exchanges so that they cannot be artificially manipulated. This regulation and transparency has bolstered the confidence of traders in the integrity of these markets and it has helped to propel our country into the leading marketplace for many commodities. For example, the New York Mercantile Exchange, NYMEX, is the world's leading exchange for futures contracts, for energy products such as natural gas, crude oil, gasoline, and home heating oil. The CEA makes it a felony to manipulate the price of any commodity, and it contains a number of provisions to enable the futures exchanges and the CFTC to detect and prevent price manipulation. The CEA requires the regulated futures exchanges to ensure that trading is orderly and to detect and prevent price manipulation. The CEA directs the CFTC to oversee the operations of the futures exchanges and to itself perform market oversight and ensure that trading is orderly. According to a former CFTC Chairman: The job of preventing price distortion is performed today by regulatory and self-regulatory rules operating before the fact and by threats of private lawsuits and disciplinary proceedings after the fact. Both elements are essential. According to the CFTC: The heart of the commission's direct market surveillance is a large-trader reporting system, under which [the futures exchanges and brokers] electronically file daily reports with the commission. These reports contain the futures and option positions of traders that hold positions above specific reporting levels set by the CFTC regulations. There are no protections against manipulation in the over-the-counter markets. Unlike the futures markets, the over-the-counter markets are not required to monitor trading to detect and deter fraud and price manipulation. Information that is routinely reported to the futures exchanges and the CFTC is not available to the over-the-counter exchanges or to the CFTC. Traders do not have to report large trades. There are no position limits or daily price limits. The over-the- counter markets lack all of the critical features of an effective program to detect and prevent price manipulation. Over-the-counter energy derivatives are unregulated because of a provision that was added to a conference report at the last minute in an amendment to the Commodity Exchange Act in an omnibus appropriations bill at the end of the Congress in the year 2000. The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 was intended to clarify the regulation of financial instruments. Most of the provisions in the CFMA were based upon the recommendations contained in the Report of the President's Working Group on Financial Markets, Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets and the Commodity Exchange Act, which was jointly issued in November 1999 by the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve, the SEC, and the CFTC. The working group recommended that financial derivatives be excluded from regulation under the CEA but that derivatives involving nonfinancial commodities with a limited supply, such as energy commodities, not be excluded. The working group stated: Due to the characteristics of markets for nonfinancial commodities with finite supplies, however, the working group is unanimously recommending that the exclusion not be extended to agreements involving such commodities. A unanimous recommendation of the working group and the House and Senate bills leading up to that conference in fact did not extend the exclusion to commodities transactions. Yet the exemption in the current law for trades in over-the-counter energy derivatives, the Enron exemption, somehow or another got inserted in that law at the eleventh hour during a House-Senate conference. This exemption was never considered by any committee. It was never discussed at any hearing. It was never commented on by interested parties. It was simply inserted in the conference report at the last minute. It is one of the reasons for the Enron mess that we have had to clean up after. This amendment would correct that situation. It is essential we have this kind of transparency regulation in the commodities markets. I hope this amendment, which is a bipartisan amendment, will be adopted by this body and close the Enron loophole which was created in the dark of night, without any debate in this body, without any knowledge of this body, in a bill which this body had passed without such an exemption, in a bill which the House had passed without such an exemption, and yet the exemption showed up nonetheless in a conference report and helped to create the Enron disaster and mess which we have been trying to clean up ever since. Exempting energy commodity trades from the CEA did not make sense when it happened in 2000. It would be irresponsible to continue it now, especially after we have seen how it facilitated the market fraud and manipulation by Enron and others. The amendment before us would return the commodities law to the way it was for decades prior to the passage of the Enron exemption. It would ensure that fraud and price manipulation would be a felony, and it would remove ``the Enron exemption'' as a shield against regulation and prosecution. It would authorize the CFTC to establish recordkeeping requirements to enforce the anti-fraud and anti-manipulation prohibitions in the CEA. This amendment also contains important provisions to improve FERC's ability to ensure the transparency and integrity of wholesale energy prices. It would direct FERC to establish an electronic price reporting system, strengthen the penalties for violations of the Federal Power Act and the Natural Gas Act, prohibit wash trading and other collusive and manipulative practices in wholesale energy markets, and clarify FERC's authority to fashion appropriate remedies in cases of wholesale price manipulation. There is a great deal of support for this legislation. Governor Jennifer Granholm, of my home State of Michigan, writes that, in the aftermath of the massive electricity blackouts that struck Michigan and large areas of the midwest and northwest this past summer, ``all necessary steps should be taken to bolster business and consumer confidence in the Nation's energy markets and promote additional investment in reliable energy delivery at a fair price.'' Governor Granholm says our language ``would improve energy price transparency in wholesale electricity markets, greatly increase criminal and civil penalties for trading violations, prohibit market manipulation and fraud in all energy market sectors, and strengthen day-to-day energy market oversight, including over-the-counter market transactions that significantly affect energy prices.'' The American Public Gas Association supports the amendment because ``it will improve market transparency and provide the essential regulatory oversight to detect and prevent manipulation and improve the efficiency of energy markets.'' Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, from the State of New York, urges swift adoption of the amendment, writing that ``the amendment closes loopholes used to manipulate energy markets, improves the ability to detect fraud and other manipulation, and deters manipulation by establishing substantive penalties.'' The North American Securities Administrators Association, the association representing the securities administrators of the 50 States, supports this amendment because it ``would provide more transparency to the wholesale electricity markets, supply the CFTC with the authority to detect fraud and manipulation, and help to deter wrongdoing by significantly increasing the penalties for violations of the Federal Power Act.'' Consumers Union, the Consumer Federation of America, Public Citizen, and the U.S. Public Interest Research Group support this amendment. They state it ``would go a long way towards addressing the serious problems plaguing the Nation's energy markets.'' The Derivatives Study Center comments that ``this important legislation will assure that [energy commodities] will be covered by Federal prohibitions or fraud and manipulation. . . . It will subject [energy] derivatives to some of the same regulations that apply to securities, banking, exchange-traded futures and options and other sectors of U.S. financial markets.'' The National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates writes that this legislation ``will help fix broken energy markets and given regulators the tools needed to protect consumers from market manipulators.'' One hundred and fifty years of history of our commodity markets demonstrates that market integrity and investor confidence will not magically spring up in markets that have been tainted by manipulation. That same history shows that fair and efficient markets do not emerge by themselves. Rather, regulation and oversight are necessary to ensure that markets are fair and efficient. Without fair and efficient, and that means transparent, energy markets consumers will pay higher prices for energy products, capital will be misallocated, and out national economy and energy security will be harmed. This history also shows that a legal prohibition against commodity market manipulation, without more, does not deter or prevent manipulation. Continuous market disclosure and oversight are essential to halt manipulation before economic damage is inflicted upon the market and the public. This is why a major portion of the CFTC's budget and resources is devoted to oversight of the futures markets. Although some enforcement actions have been brought following the manipulation of the western markets, these enforcement actions will do little to make whole the consumers and businesses that suffered billions of dollars in losses from those misdeeds. It would be far better to ensure that such abuses do not occur in the first place, rather than rely on the hope that a few of the manipulators are caught after the fact. We cannot afford to have more Enrons, more manipulations, more frauds, and more flight of capital in the energy sector. It is imperative that we restore the integrity and credibility of our energy markets. Our bipartisan amendment will help create fair and transparent energy markets that investors can trust. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from California for her tenacity on this and so many other issues. But in this matter she and her State have suffered firsthand probably more than any other State as a result of this Enron loophole which she is so heroically and determinedly trying to close this afternoon.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, early this morning there was a discussion on the floor of a staff memo from some Intelligence Committee staffers which had not either been authorized or indeed shared by members of the Intelligence Committee. But it was characterized--and I think mischaracterized, quite clearly--as a Democratic plan relative to the review of the intelligence that was created and used prior to the Iraqi war. The only thing that Democratic members of the Intelligence Committee have pressed is for a full investigation, a full inquiry into not just the creation of the intelligence but the use of that intelligence. Without looking at the use of intelligence that was created by the intelligence community, there would only be half a picture painted. Hopefully, that half of a picture will be fully explored on a bipartisan basis. I think the first half of the picture, indeed, is being fully explored on a bipartisan basis. That is the part of the picture that looks at the intelligence community's production of intelligence and as to whether or not that intelligence community in some way either shaped or exaggerated that intelligence for whatever purpose. It has also been now added that if any of the administration put pressure on the intelligence community that would also be included in the review. But what is left out is the critical half of the picture which the American public hears, which is the use of the intelligence given to the policymakers by those policymakers. Now, the word ``use'' of intelligence, that word ``use'' actually appears in the resolution creating the Intelligence Committee and identifying the oversight role of the Intelligence Committee. So the word ``use'' is actually embedded in the very document creating the Intelligence Committee that sets forth what its role will be and what its oversight responsibilities are. Yet so far the majority of the Intelligence Committee has said: We will not look at the use of the intelligence which was given to the policymakers. Now, that is a huge gap. That means we will be walking up to the water's edge and stopping there. That means instead of letting the chips fall where they may, the chips will only be allowed to fall on the intelligence community's side of the fence. They will not be allowed to fall on the policymakers' role and responsibility. We were told by the policymakers, prior to the war, that--this is Secretary Rumsfeld-- We know where the weapons of mass destruction are. We were told, before the war, by the Vice President: Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. We were told, before the war, by the President, himself, that: Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised. So the heart of the problem that we have at the Intelligence Committee is whether or not we are going to stop at that water's edge or look at the use of the intelligence, whether a critique will be made of the intelligence community's shaping or exaggeration, to the extent that existed, or whether or not the same searchlight will be placed upon the policymakers as to whether they exaggerated or shaped or misstated what was given to them by the intelligence community. The Department of State had a Web site. On December 19 of last year, that Web site said: Why is the Iraqi regime hiding their uranium procurement? This is months after the CIA apparently told the State Department that there was no such effort on the part of Iraq to obtain uranium, or at least that they had not reached that conclusion. Yet in December-- and by the way, much later--the State Department's Web site still is representing to the public that the Iraqi regime is hiding uranium procurement. Why should we not look into that Web site? How does that Web site get created, despite what we now believe was the intelligence community's conclusion or lack of conclusion relative to uranium acquisition?

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask that the Chair inform me when 5 minutes have been utilized so I can share the remainder of our time with the Senator from New Jersey. I think the Senator from Indiana may be on his way over as well.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that morning business be extended for 20 minutes, equally divided between this side and the Republican side.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. LEVIN. I do withhold.