Carl Levin

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am disappointed in the conference outcome on the emergency supplemental appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan Security and Reconstruction. I had hoped that the conferees would have followed the Senate's decision to provide one-half of the funding for Iraqi reconstruction as a loan, which could become a grant only if 90 percent of Iraq's bilateral debt was forgiven. A loan would have given the Iraqis a stake in the reconstruction of their own country, which is important, I believe, for them and for us. Beyond that issue, I am also disappointed at the administration's response thus far to a proposal most recently made by the October presiding officer of the Iraqi Governing Council, Iyad Alawi, in an opinion piece in the New York Times on Sunday, October 19. I wrote to Secretary Rumsfeld on October 22 to bring Mr. Alawi's proposal that Iraqi Army units be recalled at the mid-officer level and below to his attention and to ask that he consider it. I ask unanimous consent that my letter to Secretary Rumsfeld be printed in the Record at the end of my remarks.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask that I be recognized to speak for up to 10 minutes with the time coming from the time previously allotted to Senator Kennedy.

Mr. LEVIN. Last week I discussed the proposal with Ambassador Bremer, and I urged him to raise this issue with the entire Iraqi Governing Council. Last Friday, I discussed the issue further on the Senate floor. The conference report before us contains $3.2 billion for Iraqi security and law enforcement, and an additional $1.3 billion for justice, public safety infrastructure, and civil society. Included in those amounts is funding for the Iraqi police, border patrol, facilities protection services, the Iraqi civil defense corps, and the New Iraqi Army. While I strongly support that funding, I again call upon Secretary Rumsfeld and Ambassador Bremer to consider reassembling the units--and I emphasize units--of the Iraqi Army, and I call upon them further to ask the Governing Council in Iraq, which we established, for their advice and recommendations on the wisdom of reassembling units of the Iraqi Army. The security situation is too serious for us to stand on ceremony. The decision of May 15 to disband the Iraqi Army may turn out to be a major mistake. The decision made on May 15 was against the advice of a study conducted under the aegis of the Department of State. It resulted in a significant Iraqi security force being tossed to the wind. The major reason given by the Department of Defense for not reconstituting the Iraqi Army is that the army melted away when we attacked. But that happened because most of its members did not want to lay down their lives for Saddam Hussein. In fact, it was because Saddam Hussein knew the Iraqi Army might not fight for him that he created his special security forces. The fact that the Iraqi Army would not fight for Saddam is one of the reasons we should consider reconstituting it. It is surely not a reason for not doing so. Let me be clear, it is the units of the Iraqi Army about which I am talking. The administration's response to this proposal--that they are already signing up members of the Iraqi Army--is disingenuous. While they are using individual members for various security functions, the New Iraqi Army they are creating from scratch currently has fewer than 1,000 members. We cannot afford to transfer security functions to Iraqis at that slow a pace. Americans are the target of more and more deadly attacks. The quicker we get the Iraqi Army back in place, the more security we are likely to have and the better off Iraq will be. Nobody suggests that the Baathist army officers be reinstated. The proposal is that mid-level officers and below be called back and that they be vetted to rid their number of those who committed crimes under the old regime. When I personally urged Ambassador Bremer last week to consider doing so, I further asked him to commit to taking up this issue with the Iraqi Governing Council. His reply was ambiguous, and that will not do in this extremely dangerous situation. Ambassador Bremer is running Iraq at this time, to the extent that anyone is, but that doesn't give him a monopoly on wisdom. We are not smarter than everybody else in the world, particularly about other countries and their traditions and cultures. We should consult with the Iraqis who are presently carrying out governing functions. In issuing Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 6 last July 13, Ambassador Bremer specifically committed to ``consult and coordinate on all matters involving the temporary governance of Iraq'' with the Iraqi Governing Council. He should do so urgently, and he should do so visibly if we truly believe Iraq can become a democratic state. The judgment of the Governing Council on this issue may not be unanimous, but it is relevant. There is another reason to consider shifting course. Today, the Iraqi Army is being paid a lot of money to do nothing--$25 million a month. We know who the officers and the noncommissioned officers are and where they live. Many of them are probably frustrated and angry because they believed they were serving their country by refusing to fight for Saddam. The stubborn refusal to reconsider decisions will not do in the dangerous security situation we face in Iraq. Stubbornly staying the course we set when we disbanded the Iraqi Army, instead of considering changing course to improve the security situation, cannot be tolerated. We do not need confessions of error. What we do need is a willingness to try some new approaches. At the top of the list should be to reconsider the May 15 decision to disband the Iraqi Army and, as part of that process, to involve the Iraqi Governing Council in reconsidering that decision. Exhibit 1 Dear Mr. Secretary: Attached is a copy of an OP-ED piece from the Sunday, October 19, 2003 edition of the New York Times written by Iyad Alawi, the president of the Iraqi Governing Council for the month of October. This highly-significant article calls for the call up of the Iraqi Army at least up to the mid-officer level, with appropriate vetting by the Coalition and the Iraqi Interior Ministry, as a way of more quickly relieving the burden on American troops and replacing them with Iraqi soldiers who have credibility and legitmacy with the Iraqi people. Since it appears that, despite the adoption of a new UN resolution on Iraq, there are unlikely to be large numbers of additional foreign troops made available for duty with the Coalition, Mr. Alawi's proposal strikes me as worthy of serious consideration. I would welcome an opportunity to discuss this matter with you personally and, in any event, would solicit your views on this matter. Sincerely, Carl Levin, Ranking Member. Enclosure.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I will vote for the Interior appropriations conference report because it contains valuable funding for Michigan's parks, trails, museums, and forests. However, I have reservations about several aspects of this legislation. I am disappointed that the conference report does not include the language I offered with Senator Collins, unanimously adopted by the Senate, which would have directed the Department of Energy to develop procedures to ensure the Strategic Petroleum Reserve is filled in a manner that minimizes the cost to the taxpayer and maximizes the overall supply of oil in the United States. The amendment expressed the sense of the Senate that the Department of Energy's current procedures for filling the SPR are too costly for the taxpayers and have not improved our overall energy security. Since early 2002, DOE has been acquiring oil for the SPR without regard to the price of oil. Prior to that time, DOE sought to acquire more oil when the price of oil was low, and less oil when the price of oil was high. In early 2002, however, DOE abandoned this cost-based approach and instead adopted the current cost-blind approach. Because over this period the price of oil has been very high--often over $30 per barrel--and the oil markets have been tight, this cost-blind approach has increased the costs of the program to the taxpayer and put further pressure on tight oil markets, thereby helping boost oil and gasoline prices to American consumers and businesses. The DOE's cost-blind approach has proven to be very expensive without much benefit to energy security. DOE's staff estimates that in just 2 years, 2000 and 2001, the policy now abandoned by DOE saved the taxpayer approximately $175 million, and that a continuation of this policy could have saved the taxpayer additional hundreds of millions of dollars through 2005. Economists estimate that the DOE's current policy has increased the cost of crude oil by up to $1.75 per barrel of oil, and 5 to 7 cents per gallon of gasoline at the pump. DOE's own figures also show that under the new policy overall energy security--as determined by the total amount of oil in both governmental and private storage--has barely increased. I am very concerned that without the direction provided in the Senate's version of this bill, the American consumers, businesses, and the taxpayers will continue to pay dearly for the Department of Energy's cost-blind approach to acquiring oil for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, with only minimal, if any, benefit to our energy security. The Department of Energy does not need new authority, however, to adopt sound business practices. DOE already has sufficient legislative authority to improve the cost-effectiveness of the SPR program. The Department of Energy should try to better spend the taxpayers' dollars and improve our overall energy security. I urge the Department to follow the direction unanimously adopted by the Senate and improve its procedures for filling the SPR. In addition, I am also concerned about a provision in the bill which limits the Department of the Interior's ability to perform its legal and statutory responsibilities with respect to the 1994 American Indian Trust Management Reform Act. For several years, Native Americans have come to expect that the Federal Government and, specifically, the Department of the Interior would rightfully manage and account for the Native-American trust fund. Unfortunately, because the U.S. Government has not adequately fulfilled its obligations, Native Americans have had to use the judicial system to have their rights enforced. A rider on this Interior Department conference report, which was not included in the either the House or Senate bill, was added in conference which abrogates the rights of 500,000 Native Americans. The provision, which legislates on an appropriations bill, sends the wrong message to Native Americans that their judicial gains can be changed by an act of Congress, drafted in a backroom and added by a conference committee when neither House had approved the language. A full and appropriate accounting of the Native-American trust fund is necessary to make sure that the tribes are treated fairly. To overturn court decisions through undebated legislation is not good practice, especially when the judicial proceedings are ongoing. The trust fund contains approximately $176 billion while an appropriate accounting of the fund would cost an estimated $9 to $12 billion. There are also antienvironmental provisions in this bill that I do not support. Language in the conference report will roll back the moratorium on offshore drilling in Bristol Bay, reduce judicial review on Tongass timber sales, and waive National Environmental Policy Act, NEPA, review for expiring grazing permits. Further, the conference report also drastically reduces funding for the Land and Water Conservation Fund, LWCF. Lower funding of the LWCF may result in the inability to purchase and protect land needed for habitat around the Great Lakes. It also could result in land being developed which will result in more pollution flowing into the tributaries and the Great Lakes.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, yesterday the Cannon House Office Building was temporarily evacuated when a staff member apparently carried a toy plastic gun past a Capitol Police security check point. This incident reminds us of how important it is that we maintain adequate security in our public buildings. Even though I raised this issue last week, I want to take this opportunity to highlight the importance of the Terrorist Firearms Detection Act, a bill introduced last week by Senator Kennedy. Originally passed in 1988, and sometimes called the ``plastic gun'' law, this Federal law makes it illegal for any person to manufacture, import, ship, deliver, possess, transfer or receive any firearm that is not detectable by walk-through metal detectors or the type of x-ray machines commonly used at airports. Since September 11, 2001, Congress has worked hard to improve the security of our borders, airports, Government buildings, and communities. In just over a month, on December 10, the plastic gun law is set to expire. The Terrorist Firearms Detection Act would permanently reauthorize this law. I support this bill because plastic guns, whose production has been endorsed by the National Rifle Association, should only be used by our military and intelligence agencies. This legislation has the support of major gun safety organizations, including the Brady Campaign to Prevent Violence United with the Million Mom March, Americans for Gun Safety, and the Violence Policy Center. The Department of Justice, while failing to endorse Senator Kennedy's permanent ban, has indicated its support for extending the current ban. I urge my colleagues in Congress to act quickly to pass the Terrorist Firearms Detection Act, so that hopefully President Bush can sign it into law.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, last week a memorandum on the war on terrorism from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to his top subordinates was leaked to the press. In that memo, Secretary Rumsfeld asked a number of questions, including the following: Is our current situation such that ``the harder we work, the behinder we get?'' Then he asked: ``What else should we be considering?'' Well, I am dismayed that Secretary Rumsfeld says publicly something so differently than what he has said privately. I am glad he is looking for new direction since our post-Saddam policy is not working well, given the sustained and increasing attacks on our forces. Secretary Rumsfeld asked--again--``What else should we be considering?'' Well, the President of the Iraqi Governing Council has made a specific recommendation for us to consider: that the regular Iraqi Army units be called up to assist our troops in providing security for the reconstruction of their country. Surely it is worthy of our consideration, when Iyad Alawi, this month's serving President of the Iraqi Governing Council--the 25-member body selected by the United States to represent the Iraqi people--is making a suggestion to change course. He wrote an important opinion piece entitled ``America Must Let Iraq Rebuild Itself,'' which was published by the New York Times on October 19. The main premise of the article is that ``ultimately, only Iraqis themselves can restore security, rebuild national institutions, enact a constitution and elect a democratic government.'' I believe all of us would agree with that premise. For Mr. Alawi, the vital step is to ``call up the Iraqi Army and the national police force [for] at least up to the mid-officer level'' to deal with the insecurity and chaos in the country. Mr. Alawi believes the Iraqi officer corps will have to be vetted to remove those who have committed crimes under the old regime. He points out that most of the Iraqi Army's soldiers are ``Iraqi patriots who chose not fight for Saddam Hussein'' and ``would probably return to their units and contribute to their country's future.'' He argues that it would be ``much easier and quicker to retrain and reequip them within their existing organizational structure than to start from scratch.'' Mr. Alawi argues that these steps would not only relieve the burden on American troops but also would gain substantial good will among Iraqis. Tom Friedman, writing in the New York Times, on October 23, is of a similar mind. He urges the administration to declare the following: ``We thank all the nations who offered troops, but we think the Iraqi people can and must secure their own country. So we're inviting all former Iraqi Army soldiers (not Republican Guards) to report back to duty. For every two Iraqi battalions that return to duty (they can weed out their own bad apples), we will withdraw an American one. So Iraqis can liberate themselves. Our motto is Iraq for the Iraqis.'' That is from Tom Friedman, who has been a very strong supporter of the administration's military actions in Iraq and the decision to attack Iraq. The administration and the Coalition Provisional Authority have taken a different tack in reorganizing Iraqi security, particularly with regard to the Iraqi Army. They are essentially starting from scratch to build a completely new Army of 40,000 people who are being trained and equipped as a motorized infantry. The goal is to form nine brigades by the end of 2004, but thus far only one battalion of 750 soldiers has been trained and equipped. Additionally, the Coalition Provisional Authority is creating an Iraqi border patrol force, only 5,000 to date, with the need to expand to more than 20,000 sometime in the future. A 20,000-person Facilities Protection Service is intended to take over security at fixed site locations from coalition forces, and an Iraqi civil defense corps of 6,600, expanding to more than 15,000 in 2004, is being integrated into coalition military units to provide local intelligence and help with security patrolling. While I have some questions regarding the need for four distinct security forces, including a new Iraqi Army, in addition to a new national police force, I am open to arguments that this approach to building a new army may be desirable in the long run. A better educated, trained, equipped, and motivated army, whose members are more representative of the diverse Iraqi population, and which was created expressly to serve the people of the new Iraqi state, may be more ideal. However, in the short term, I believe Mr. Alawi's recommendation to reconstitute units of the old regular army is surely worthy of consideration. No one, including Mr. Alawi, argues for a continued role for those portions of the old army that were part of the repressive security apparatus of the Saddam regime--units such as the Special Security Guards, the Special Republican Guards, and the Fedayeen Saddam. In fact, those units were created by Saddam because he did not trust his regular army. In that portion of the State Department-sponsored ``The Future of Iraq Project,'' dealing with Iraqi Armed Forces, the Working Group that wrote this part of the report, discussed this issue. They noted the following: ``Saddam Hussein realized, with his sense of security, that he will not be able to earn the loyalty and trust of the army with its varied character in spite of many attempts to purify or clean the army from the disloyal elements--as he called them--in order for the army to become an army of ideology to protect the party and the revolution and defend the nation's values.'' They added that ``Thus the army remained a source of worry, suspicion and threat to Saddam; in spite of the fact that the army got into its many wars because Saddam desired it. There are some who think that the army was pushed into these wars to keep it continuously busy confronting outside aggressions.'' Finally and in view of these findings, the Woking Group concluded that ``In any event we think it necessary to keep the basic structure of the army, which can be easily rehabilitated. . . .'' That regular army, below the midofficer level, after vetting, could serve a useful role by putting trained Iraqi forces into the field to more quickly enhance overall security. The regular Iraqi Army was a sizable force of approximately 80,000 officers, 130,000 noncommissioned officers, and 400,000 conscript soldiers.'' We probably made a mistake in formally disbanding the Iraqi army in May. I wonder if Ambassador Bremer doesn't tacitly believe the same, given the quick decision that was made by him shortly thereafter by agreeing to pay monthly allowances to officers and noncommissioned officers after the unrest that was unleashed by that decision. Beginning in July, monthly payments were made according to a rank- based scale, ranging from $50 for a noncommissioned officer to $150 for a general, somewhat below the base pay for the various ranks. Additionally, a one-time $40 stipend was paid to former conscripts. Since July, the Coalition Provisional Authority has paid from Iraqi funds approximately $78 million to about 260,000 individuals and just over $15 million to approximately 375,000 conscripts. The estimated cost for the stipend during the next year will be $190 million, if payments continue throughout the year. In other words, we know where the men and women--mainly men--in the Iraqi regular army are located. They came for those payments, and we know how to locate them, should we make a decision to reconstitute units of that Iraqi army. That money was well spent. There is ample evidence from other conflicts that unemployed former soldiers can be a destabilizing and a disruptive influence, as some believe is currently the case in Iraq today. In view of the $156 billion that is likely to be appropriated for U.S. military forces in Iraqi reconstruction in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, paying those sums to members of the old regular Iraqi army would be a modest expenditure. But would it not make more sense to pay those sums to soldiers who are actually doing something? Would it not make sense to quickly reconstitute recently disbanded Iraqi regular army units to take on security tasks that are within their capabilities? Would it not be possible that recently disbanded Iraqi army units would be able to more quickly assume duties for which the border patrol, the facilities protection service, and the civil defense corps are intended, including patrolling Iraqi streets with our own soldiers? Would this not more quickly give Iraqis the responsibility for and a stake in securing their own country? And, more importantly, wouldn't it be better for all concerned if primarily Iraqi soldiers and not Americans were acting to restore security in Iraq and dealing with those who would seek to disrupt it? The Governing Council President thinks so. I ask unanimous consent that an article written by the current President of the Iraqi Governing Council, Iyad Alawi, entitled ``America Must Let Iraq Rebuild Itself,'' which appeared in the New York Times on October 19, be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mr. LEVIN. I asked Ambassador Bremer when we met with him: At a minimum, would he not raise this issue with the Governing Council to see whether or not the views of the President of the Governing Council, that the Iraqi army regular units should be reconstituted, represent the views of the Governing Council itself. We surely should listen to those views. These are the folks we put in office there as representing the Iraqi people. At a minimum, I urged Ambassador Bremer to find out formally from that Governing Council whether or not the President's views, as represented by this article in the New York Times--that the regular units of the army, properly vetted to make sure we don't hire old members of the Saddam leadership--should be reconstituted to help us maintain order and security in Iraq. I believe Ambassador Bremer will in fact make that request of the Governing Council--not the request to reconstitute the army, because I don't think Ambassador Bremer is there yet, but the request of the Governing Council to see if they agree that it would be wise for those units below the mid-level officer level to be reconstituted, properly vetted, to help us on the streets of Baghdad and in the areas which are very dangerous, and to take some of the pressure off our troops to make us less of a target and to have Iraqis gradually but more quickly take over their own security so that we are not a lightning rod for the folks who are trying to destroy us. I look forward to the response of the Governing Council of Iraq to Ambassador Bremer's request. We know that as a new Iraqi army is formed, some of the existing units will be retrained and equipped to expand that army. But it is critically important that we have this question put before that Governing Council. The creation of a new Iraqi army is going very slowly. We are at less than a thousand. We must move more quickly. The question is, since most of the members who we are hiring for that new army are members of the old army in any event, would it not be much quicker to reconstitute the units of that old army--again, below the mid-officer level, so we don't have the Saddam regime involved--would it not be much quicker to follow the suggestion of the President of the Governing Council, reconstitute the units and move on from there? The Secretary of Defense asked, in his leaked memorandum, if what the U.S. is doing is enough and what else should be considered. I am glad he asked those questions. As I said before, I am sorry he has not said publicly what he said privately in terms of his doubts and concerns. But having said that, I am glad he is raising questions. I am glad he is asking questions about whether we should change course in some way. I have written to the Secretary of Defense to solicit his views on Mr. Alawi's proposal. Again, I hope Ambassador Bremer does consult with the Iraqi Governing Council, seek their recommendations on this issue, and not only solicit their recommendations but seriously consider ways to formulate an integrated and comprehensive plan to move more quickly to involve Iraqis in their own security and in their overall governance. Exhibit 1 [From the New York Times, Oct. 19, 2003] America Must Let Iraq Rebuild Itself (By Iyad Alawi) Baghdad, Iraq.--No Iraqi will ever forget the momentous April day when a crowd of hundreds of cheering Baghdadis, helped by an American armored vehicle, pull the huge statue of Saddam Hussein to the ground. With this act, we tore down three decades of tyranny and repression and began building in its place a foundation for freedom, democracy and a better future for our children. To see that this goal is achieved, the Bush administration has challenged me and my colleagues on the Iraqi Governing Council to draft a permanent constitution within six months and to move as quickly as possible to hold internationally monitored, free elections. We gladly accept that challenge, and welcome the vital assistance of the United Nations, through the Security Council resolution passed on Thursday, to see through to completion the enormous task ahead. But we also realize that there are obstacles on Iraq's march toward democracy. In the months since Iraq was liberated, jubilation has given way to insecurity and chaos. When my fellow Iraqis finally go to the polls to elect their government, they must have confidence that state institutions are not only legitimate and independent, but robust enough to guarantee safety and civil rights. That is why the coalition and the council must take several immediate steps to establish these necessary conditions for the constitutional process to succeed. First, it is vital to call up the Iraqi Army and the national police force, at least up to mid-officer level. The coalition's early decision to abolish the army and police was well intended, but it unfortunately resulted in a security vacuum that let criminals, die-hards of the former regime and international terrorist flourish. And the coalition's plan to build a 20,000-member lightly armed force mostly responsible for security and border control could make poor use of a valuable resource: the 300,000 Iraqi soldiers who simply went home with their weapons in the face of the American-led invasion. Most of these soldiers are Iraqi patriots who chose not to fight for Saddam Hussein. Americans should not confuse the Iraqi Army with the hated Republican Guard, which Saddam Husseim created precisely because he distrusted the legitimate military. In one simple process, the coalition authority can support the governing council to call the army back to its barracks for retraining and, ultimately, for redeployment. Most soldiers and their officers will proudly return to their units and contribute to their country's future. The coalition and the Iraqi Interior Ministry can vet officers to remove those who committed crimes under the old regime, and then rapidly redeploy the most capable units to work with, and progressively relieve, American troops of security duties. Iraqi Army units have an established chain of command and esprit de corps. Not only can they be recalled to barracks immediately, but it would be much easier and quicker to retrain and re-equip them within their existing organizational structure than to start from scratch. By supporting the recall of army units, the United States would not only speed the process of relieving the burden on its troops, it would also gain substantial good will in Iraq. In contrast, any American-led military presence, even if complemented by the United Nations, will never have the credibility and legitimacy that the Iraqi Army has among the people. In addition, the Iraqi national police must also be recalled. Most Iraqi policemen--as opposed to Saddam Hussein's feared intelligence and security organs--are dedicated to law and order. The United States does not have the time or money to create a police force from the ground up, nor is it necessary, because we have a large, organized force that is ready and willing to serve. Many other Iraqi governing institutions should also be reactivated by the governing council, with the support of the coalition authority. Special priority must be given to the Ministries of Interior, Justice, Finance, Oil and Education. The Iraqi bureaucracy must also be called back to work, although of course after screening to disqualify serious offenders of the former regime. Together, the council and the coalition leaders can modernize the state apparatus, phase out obsolete policies and practices, and encourage a new mindset of transparency and efficiency. Finally, as security improves, Iraqi institutions are re- established and the constitutional drafting process is completed, the United States should support international recognition of Iraqi sovereignty. Then a recognized interim government could quickly present a popular referendum, under United Nations monitoring, on the new national constitution. It would be a grave mistake for the United States to hold out sovereignty and international recognition as the reward for passage of a constitution. Rather, making Iraqis once again a part of the international system is the prerequisite of successful reconstruction and a durable democratic system. Iraqis are grateful for the tremendous efforts and sacrifices the United States is making on our belief. Yet, ultimately, only Iraqis themselves can restore security, rebuild national institutions. enact a constitution and elect a democratic government. America must not rebuff Iraqis who are eager to have a stake in this intimate national process. Like any free people, we want to ensure that we are in control of our own destiny.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I cannot support the Climate Stewardship Act of 2003 since its effect, if enacted, will be the loss of more manufacturing jobs to countries which have few, if any, environmental standards. That won't help the environment, and it will hurt our economy. Climate change is not something we can tackle by shifting industries and their emissions to other countries, or by shifting manufacturing jobs to China or other countries which have no limits on emissions of greenhouse gases. The bill before us reflects a unilateral approach to a problem which can only be solved globally. Let me give one example of how this bill would promote job loss in the U.S. with no benefit to the global environment. In the past decade, a large number of companies have moved their manufacturing plants overseas. Take, for example, a U.S. manufacturing company that had seven plants in the U.S. in the 1990s. Today it has only five left, because two moved to countries with cheaper labor. Assume that those five remaining domestic plants each emit 20,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide for a total of 100,000 metric tons. Under this legislation, reasonable estimates are that the company's cap could be placed at around 90,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide credits. The company, already under heavy competition because of cheap labor costs overseas, faces a choice: pay to reduce emissions at its five plants by 10 percent, or move another one of its plants overseas, say to China. If the company moves one of its five plants abroad, it has 10,000 credits remaining to play with which it can use to actually increase emissions at its four remaining plants, or it can sell them. So this bill adds to existing incentives, such as lower labor costs and no safety standards, to move manufacturing plants overseas, and the result is that we lose jobs and the environment gains nothing. In other words, when this bill's mandates are imposed on sectors of the economy that can pick up and move overseas, it adds another incentive to do just that. The United States must take a leadership role in addressing climate change, but that leadership must move us in the right direction. It is not sound leadership to give additional incentives to U.S. businesses to move their facilities, and the jobs that go with them, to other countries that don't have the costly environmental standards which this bill would impose on U.S. businesses. It is not sound leadership to simply shift industrial emissions from American soil to countries which have no emissions standards. And it is certainly not sound leadership to act unilaterally in a way that puts U.S. manufacturers at a competitive disadvantage when there is no built-in incentive for other countries to follow. In fact, the opposite is true: the unilateral approach in this bill provides an economic incentive for countries who are picking up our manufacturing jobs not to follow our lead. Effective and sound leadership would be to tell competing countries that we are going to adopt high environmental standards if they will join us, or, in the alternative, leadership is getting countries to agree (1) to the adoption of tough environmental standards, and (2) to refuse to purchase products from countries which won't adopt those environmental standards. Sound leadership, in other words, is working to create an international agreement where all countries take steps to reduce global warming, so that there is no incentive to move jobs and emissions from a country with high environmental standards to one with low environmental standards. Climate change cannot be addressed unilaterally. It must be addressed multilaterally. It doesn't help the global environment to push down greenhouse gas emissions in one country only to have them pop up in others. We need a Kyoto-type treaty which binds all countries. Otherwise, there is a perverse incentive to move more and more jobs to countries with lower environmental standards. That does nothing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and does damage to U.S. jobs. To achieve a global agreement will require our putting maximum pressure on all countries to join it, so that the emissions of greenhouse gases can be reduced, not just shifted. Shifting manufacturing jobs and the production of greenhouses gases from here to other countries is not a solution to climate change. It would just be another economic blow to America at a time when our economy is already losing jobs at an historic and alarming rate. We have already lost enough American jobs to countries with cheap labor, no safety standards and no environmental standards. To add more incentives for companies to move overseas to countries with no limits on greenhouse gas emissions, as this bill would promote, is not sound policy. Global climate change is just that: global and it needs to be dealt with globally, not unilaterally.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I express my support for the Terrorist Firearms Detection Act, a bill introduced earlier this week by Senator Kennedy. Originally passed in 1988, and sometimes called the ``plastic gun'' law, this Federal law makes it illegal for any person to manufacture, import, ship, deliver, possess, transfer or receive any firearm that is not detectable by walk-through metal detectors or the type of x-ray machines commonly used at airports. Since September 11, 2001, the Congress has worked hard to improve the security of our borders, airports, government buildings, and communities. However, in just over 2 months, on December 10, this essential common sense gun safety legislation is set to expire. The Terrorist Firearms Detection Act would permanently reauthorize the plastic gun law. Plastic guns, whose production has been endorsed by the National Rifle Association, should only be used by our military and intelligence agencies and must never find their way back into our communities. This legislation has the support of every major gun safety organization in the country, including the Brady Campaign to Prevent Violence United with the Million Mom March, Americans for Gun Safety, and the Violence Policy Center. The overwhelming majority of my colleagues would agree that plastic guns pose a clear and present danger to our nation's aviation security, as well as governmental targets across the country. In fact, Pete Shields, the former president of Handgun Control, the predecessor organization to the Brady Campaign to Prevent Violence, said it well in testimony before the House Judiciary Committee in 1988. Weapons which evade security devices put us all at risk. Every airport, every courthouse, every public building which relies on screening devices for security will no longer be safe. At a time when our Nation is committing vast resources and energies to stopping terrorism and protecting our citizens abroad, we should not even consider making it easier for terrorists to operate in our own country. I urge my colleagues in the Congress to act quickly to enact this legislation, and I also hope that President Bush will soon sign this important gun safety legislation into law.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first, I thank the chairman of the Armed Services Committee for his extraordinary effort in putting together a proposal which I am pleased to support. For the reasons he gave, it is a much more honest approach to the acquisition of these tankers. There is no use pretending this is a lease when, in fact, it is intended to be a sale. It has been the intent of the Air Force they purchase it. It has been wrapped in the clothing of a lease but, in fact, the clear intention here and the only commonsense outcome is that it be a purchase, not a lease, because under the lease agreement, 80 percent of the cost of these planes would be laid out by the Air Force while only 20 percent of their useful life would have been actually used by the time the lease was over. It is obvious the intention and the commonsense approach was this is intended to be a purchase and it ought to be called what it is. The proposal I am pleased to join in sponsoring is much more honest in terms of the intention. It also complies much more closely to what the normal budgeting procedures are around here. We do not want this to be a precedent for leasing. That distorts the entire budget process because it looks like it is free, in essence, for a couple years. These are not free. There is a huge cost. If we can reduce the real cost, as this proposal does, by acknowledging that it is really a purchase, by authorizing a multiyear acquisition, which is what we do after the leasing of the first 20, it seems to me we will save taxpayer dollars, we will commit to actually acquiring these tankers, but we will force the Air Force to be straightforward in the use of this country's resources. They are not going to be able to have something which looks free for a couple years because there is a small lease payment and then have this huge obligation in the outyears. At the same time presumably they will want to buy more and more tankers. We address the long-term need to acquire tankers. We do it in a more straightforward way. We save money for the taxpayers. I commend the two Senators from Washington, Senators Murray and Cantwell, for being so persistent in moving this program forward. This outcome would not have happened without them. I also acknowledge Senator McCain's role. He has insisted from the beginning this be reviewed in an honest way by the General Accounting Office, by the Congressional Budget Office, and by the Armed Services Committee. It has been his insistence we deal with this honestly. That has led to this proposal. I have not had a chance to speak with Senator McCain personally or directly so I don't know what his reaction is. I hope it meets his expectations and his needs. I do acknowledge the fact that Senator McCain is always playing it straight, looks at things straight, and wants an honest addressing of an issue. That is what we are now doing. To the two Senators from Washington and the Senator from Arizona, I express my thanks, and particularly the chairman of the committee, who put together a proposal which I am pleased to join. The members of the committee have spent considerable effort in reviewing the basic Air Force proposal to sign a long-term lease for 100 KC-767 tanker aircraft. Based on my review of the issues surrounding this proposal, I support Senator Warner's intention to offer the proposal he outlined in the conference on the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004. Let me also recognize the strong and positive role that the two Senators from Washington, Senator Patty Murray and Senator Maria Cantwell, have played in moving the leasing program forward. I know personally that they have spent many hours understanding the current Air Force tanker situation, and in working with other members of the Senate in moving this program forward. The proposal to go forward with a lease of 20 aircraft now and providing, up-front, multiyear procurement authority for the Air Force to buy the remaining 80 tankers should help address several concerns. First, it will help address our long-term need to replace the Air Force's existing fleet of tanker aircraft. We have spent many hours trying to understand the severity of the corrosion problem within the KC-135 tanker fleet. While the Air Force has not made a convincing case that there is an imminent risk to the fleet, the Air Force does have a long-term requirement for tankers that will ultimately require the fielding of replacement aircraft. For this reason, I believe that it is prudent to move forward now with an orderly replacement program. Second, our approach would give the Air Force multiyear contracting authority now. This will reduce the acquisition cost for aircraft, significantly reducing the price to be paid by the taxpayers. I believe that providing such multiyear contracting authority is a responsible step to take in the case of a program like this, which involves very little new development and very little program risk. Third, the proposal that Senator Warner and I are putting forward would address very real concerns with the lease proposal presented by the Air Force. I believe that what the Congressional Budget Office said is correct: this is not a real lease, but a purchase. The Air Force, not Boeing, will control the special purpose entity that borrows funds for this program. There is no doubt in anyone's mind that the Air Force intends to buy these aircraft at the end of the lease. We simply cannot afford to pay 90 percent of the value of the aircraft for less than 20 percent of the useful life. Finally, our proposal would take a far more responsible approach to federal budget issues than the proposal put forward by the Air Force. The Air Force proposal would have pushed the cost of the tanker aircraft off until the next decade, creating a huge funding program for the next generation of Air Force leaders. Our approach would move the costs forward, requiring the Department of Defense to provide almost $5 billion more in current Future Years Defense Program. The Air Force case that it is urgent to replace these tanker aircraft will be a lot more convincing, if the Department of Defense is willing to put money up for the problem earlier, rather than taking a free ride on the back of future taxpayers and defense needs. I hope that we will get agreement from the House conferees on the defense authorization on including this provision in the final authorization act. I believe that it will help address a significant problem identified by the Air Force, while acting more responsibly in preventing postponing too much funding to later years. I thank Chairman Warner for his leadership on this issue.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, today I am introducing with the cosponsorship of Senator McCain and Senator Baucus the Auditor Independence and Tax Shelters Act, a bill designed to strengthen auditor independence by prohibiting audit companies from selling tax shelter services to the publicly traded companies they audit and to the officers and directors of those companies. Last year, Senators McCain, Baucus and I each participated in investigations conducted by our respective Committees, the Committees on Commerce, Finance, and Governmental Affairs, into corporate misconduct by Enron and other major U.S. companies, including participation in misleading accounting and tax practices. These investigations led each of us to focus on the role of accounting firms in, not only going along with publicly traded companies' using abusive tax shelters, but also selling them the very tax shelters they used to overstate their earnings on their financial statements. In fact, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, on which I am the Ranking Minority Member, has spent the last year investigating the roles played by accounting firms and other professional organizations such as banks, investment advisors and law firms, in developing, marketing and implementing abusive tax shelters. The Finance Committee held a hearing today on this same topic. Tax shelters have become a huge business in this country. An 1998 article in Forbes magazine--five years ago--described how tax shelter use was growing even then: Pay attention. These letters are prime evidence of a thriving industry that has received scant public notice: the hustling of corporate tax shelters. These shelters are being peddled, sometimes in cold-call pitches, to thousands of companies. Will the shelters hold up in court? Maybe yes, maybe no, but many schemes capitalize on the fact that neither the tax code nor the IRS can keep up with the exotica of modern corporate finance. Hesitant at first to participate, respectable accounting firms, law offices and public corporations have lately succumbed to competitive pressures and joined the loophole frenzy. A March 2003 article in BusinessWeek magazine states that U.S. corporations are some of the biggest players in the tax shelter game: The federal tax rate for corporations is 35%, but few pay that much. . . . Many have achieved the Holy Grail of corporate finance: steadily growing profits coupled with a dramatically shrinking tax burden. . . . [I]n the late 1990s, the hunt for tax breaks became a much bigger business. . . . Tax avoidance became a competitive sport, with even blue-chip companies aggressively benchmarking their effective tax rates against those of rivals. According to a recent Harvard University study, U.S. companies avoided paying tax on nearly $300 billion in income in 1998. Recently, the New York Times reported that a consultant's report prepared for the IRS but not released to the public until now will show that ``corporate tax cheating in 2000 cost the government $14 billion to $18 billion'' in revenues during that one year alone. Accounting firms are in the thick of the tax shelter activity, earning tens of millions of dollars in fees. According to Bowman's Accounting Report, the Big Four accounting firms, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, and Ernst & Young, brought in $5.6 billion of U.S. tax practice revenues in 2001, more than twice the tax-related revenues these companies posted in 1995. While some of these fees are the result of tax return preparation work, our Subcommittee investigation indicates that significant fees were generated by tax shelter services provided to wealthy individuals and corporations. Increased tax shelter activity has not only led to substantial U.S. tax revenue loss, it has complicated U.S. tax enforcement efforts and undermined taxpayer confidence in the federal tax compliance system, leading the IRS to designate abusive tax shelters as an enforcement priority. The IRS has accordingly begun a major effort to combat this form of tax avoidance. In 2002, for example, the IRS issued about 200 summonses seeking tax shelter related information from 30 accounting firms and other tax shelter promoters, and filed suit against two major accounting firms, KPMG and BDO Seidman, and two major law firms, Jenkens & Gilchrist and Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, to obtain information about their tax shelter activities. In addition, the Securities Exchange Commission and the new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board have expressed serious concerns about accounting firms that audit publicly traded companies while wearing two hats: those of the tax shelter promoter and those of the auditor auditing the same tax shelters it has promoted. That issue is the focus of our legislation. Auditors of publicly traded companies are supposed to be independent watchdogs charged with determining whether a company's financial statements are accurate and fairly report the company's finances. But multiple accounting scandals involving billions of dollars at companies like Enron, Tyco, Healthsouth, Aldelphia, and MCI-WorldCom have rocked investor confidence in auditors and severely damaged the reputation of the U.S. accounting profession. These accounting scandals showed again and again that our laws and financial systems were insufficient to ensure that U.S. auditors were doing their jobs. In response, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. A primary purpose of that law was to strengthen auditor independence and restore investor confidence in U.S. financial statements. Among other measures, it established the new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to strengthen auditing standards, investigate and discipline auditor wrongdoing, and oversee auditing practices to ensure adequate financial statement reviews. While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a landmark piece of legislation--replacing decades of self-policing in the accounting industry with independent oversight--a number of reform issues remain unresolved. One key, longstanding issue that continues to compromise auditor independence is the role played by accounting firms in developing and selling tax shelters to public companies they audit. As part of their review of public company financial statements, auditors are supposed to review the company's tax practices to ensure that the company is not understating its tax liability and overstating its earnings. But in some cases, the same accounting firm is also pitching tax shelters to that client, many of which rely on aggressive and novel interpretations of tax law. If a company buys one of these tax shelters from its accounting firm, the unacceptable result is that the accounting firm can then turn around and audit the company's financial statements and, in effect, audit its own work, a situation that strikes at the heart of auditor independence. In some cases, the accounting firm may have even negotiated ``success fees'' which are contingent upon a tax shelter's success in reducing a client's tax burden. In such cases, accounting firms will audit tax transactions in which they have a direct financial interest, creating a conflict of interest between the firm's income and auditing responsibilities, and making it highly unlikely that questions will be raised about a tax shelter that the firm itself sold to its client. Similar conflicts may arise when accounting firms offer tax shelter services to the officers and directors of the companies they audit. One case extensively discussed in the media involves a major accounting firm which not only audited Sprint Corporation, a publicly traded company, but also sold tax shelters to the Sprint CEO and other Sprint executives. These tax shelters supposedly eliminated taxes owed on millions of dollars in personal compensation from stock options given by Sprint to its executives. When the value of the stock options later fell, the accounting firm apparently analyzed strategies that could have lowered the individuals' taxes but increased the company's taxes, pitting the individual against the company, with the same accountant on both sides of the equation. Sprint eventually fired several of the executives and recently announced it was also changing auditors. In addition, Sprint has instituted a new policy barring its auditor from providing any financial services to its executives. Investors, our markets, and the American public deserve better. The legislation we are introducing today would end these auditor conflicts by prohibiting auditors from providing tax shelter services to both the publicly traded companies they audit and to those companies' officers and directors. In addition, the bill would codify four common-sense principles of auditor independence that would assist public companies in analyzing what services may compromise auditor independence. Our bill would build upon the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which took the first step last year to address the conflict of interest problems that arise when accounting firms provide tax services to the companies they audit. Seeking to limit a wide range of possible conflicts of interest, the Act broadly prohibited auditors from providing any tax service to an audit client without first obtaining the approval of the audit committee of the company's board of directors. The SEC took the next step when it proposed regulations to implement the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The SEC issued a draft proposal that essentially would have prohibited auditors from selling any tax shelters to their audit clients. The draft SEC proposal also contained the four principles that would have helped company audit committees evaluate whether other tax services proffered by auditors would impair auditor independence. Unfortunately, under heavy lobbying pressure from accounting firms in the tax shelter business, the SEC dropped both of these important provisions from the final regulation. So we need to legislate. Our bill would, first, prohibit accounting firms that audit publicly held companies in the United States from providing tax shelter services either to the companies they audit or to the companies' officers and directors. The bill defines tax shelter services by referring to existing law, using language in an existing definition of tax shelters in section 6111(d) of the tax code. The bill would prohibit auditors from providing to their audit clients those services related to designing, promoting or executing tax transactions which have tax avoidance or evasion as a significant purpose and which generate fees for the auditing firm exceeding $100,000. It is intended that questions about whether particular tax-related services fall within this definition would be resolved by corporate audit committees when asked by their accounting firm to approve the company's paying for the particular services. The audit committee could consult with the IRS, SEC, or other experts in reaching its decision. If an audit committee were to approve tax shelter services that should have been barred, the bill does not provide new penalties or enforcement authority, but makes use of the existing oversight authority of the SEC and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to enforce compliance with federal law. That means, for example, if an audit committee were to allow its auditor to provide prohibited tax shelter services, the SEC or Public Company Accounting Oversight Board could use their existing oversight authority to require the company to ``cease and desist'' paying for the services or to prohibit the accounting firm from providing the services. If appropriate, the SEC could also order the public company, the accounting firm, or both, to pay a monetary penalty for violating the tax shelter services prohibition. The legislation would further reduce potential conflicts by codifying four principles of auditor independence that public company audit committees would be required to apply when determining what non-audit services an auditor can provide. These principles have been repeatedly cited in SEC efforts to strengthen auditor independence and were also cited during debate on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. They provide that auditor independence is compromised when auditors: 1. audit their own work; 2. perform management functions for their clients; 3. act as advocates on behalf of their clients; or 4. act as promoters of their clients' stock or other financial interests. To better ensure auditor independence, our bill would require audit committees to apply these four principles when considering what services, not otherwise prohibited, an auditor may provide to their company. If an audit committee were to find that the proposed auditor service would reasonably result in a violation of one of the above principles, the audit committee would have to disallow the proffered service. Experts in the financial and accounting industries agree that auditors should not be permitted to provide tax shelter services to their audit clients. In January of this year, The Conference Board's blue-ribbon Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise, co- chaired by John Snow before he became Secretary of the Treasury, concluded the following: [P]ublic accounting firms should limit their services to their clients to performing audits and to providing closely related services that do not put the auditor in an advocacy position, such as novel and debatable tax strategies and products that involve income tax shelters and extensive off- shore partnerships or affiliates. . . . The Commission believes that any work performed by the company's outside auditors [should] be closely related to the audit. Auditors' development and recommendations of new tax strategies for their clients is not closely related to the audit, and, in our opinion, removes focus from their audit work and poses a potential conflict of interest. Furthermore, the development and recommendations of these strategies have often been accompanied by ``success fees.'' In turn these strategies, if implemented, were often then subject to an audit by the firm. This practice, in our opinion, is highly undesirable. The firm's need for impartiality in conduct of the audit is in direct conflict with the financial incentives to provide tax strategies which themselves must be audited. William McDonough, Chairman of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, has indicated that the Board is also considering whether to ban auditors from providing tax shelter services to their audit clients and will be closely monitoring how accounting firms audit a company's tax liabilities and any company use of tax shelters. In testimony before the Finance Committee earlier today, Mr. McDonough stated: While the SEC made clear that it did not consider conventional tax compliance and planning to be a threat to auditor independence, it distinguished such traditional services from the marketing of novel, tax-driven, financial products, which the SEC noted raise some serious issues. . . . [T]he AICPA has also suggested that ``advice on tax strategies having no business purpose other than tax avoidance is an appropriate dividing line for activities that should be prohibited to auditing firms registered under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.'' Thus, there appears to be consensus that auditors ought not to be selling abusive tax shelters to audit clients. In an unrelated Wall Street Journal interview, Mr. McDonough was described as saying that ``[w]hat he finds problematic is `very creative tax work' . . . . `There is no way you can do that and claim to be independent,' he said.'' The Sarbanes-Oxley Task Force formed by the American Bar Association's Section of Taxation, has also expressed support for barring auditors from providing tax shelter services to their audit clients. In a comment letter supporting the proposed ban in the SEC regulations on auditor independence, the Task Force wrote: We believe that tax shelter products raise particular auditor independence concerns. Companies purchasing tax shelter products are exposed to a variety of risks over and above the calculation of tax liability. An accounting firm that markets a tax shelter product to a registrant should be prohibited from conducting the audit of the registrant because it cannot be expected to fairly evaluate the risks inherent in the tax shelter product. Our legislation has been endorsed by a number of public interest groups working to strengthen auditor integrity, renew investor and consumer confidence in the financial statements of U.S. publicly traded companies, and curb abusive tax shelters. The Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, Consumer Action, U.S. Public Interest Research Group, and Common Cause have stated in a letter of endorsement: ``Passage of this bill is one of the most important steps Congress could take to ensure that last year's corporate reform efforts have their intended effect of restoring real independence to the 'independent' audit and, with it, a reasonable level of reliability to public companies' financial disclosures.'' Our bill's reforms are straightforward. Auditors should not audit their own work, including evaluating a tax shelter that the auditor itself sold to its audit client. Auditors should not sell personal tax shelters to the officers and directors of its audit clients, due to the conflicts of interest that can arise. Publicly traded companies ought to have explicit guidance to help them avoid auditor conflicts of interest, and the best guidance we can give them is the four auditor independence principles that have long guided SEC and Congressional action in this area. Together, a ban on auditors providing tax shelter services to their audit clients and a codification of the four auditor independence principles to guide public companies away from auditor conflicts of interest could go a long way to restoring the confidence of investors in the U.S. auditing profession, financial reporting system, and capital markets. I urge my colleagues to support this common-sense and much-needed legislation. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, there are very many things in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan Security and Reconstruction bill with which I strongly disagree. For example, I object to the virtually unfettered ability of administration officials to move dollars from one classification of Iraqi relief and reconstruction to other classifications. And I object to Ambassador Bremer's unilateral approach to spend U.S. taxpayer's money on such things as zip codes for Iraq, expensive business school scholarships, and a honey pot for high-priced U.S. consultants. Nevertheless, I will vote in favor of this bill. I do so in order to provide $67 billion to support the American troops who are in harm's way in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere. And I do so because the Senate wisely decided last night to provide one-half of the funding for Iraqi reconstruction as a loan, which could become a grant only if 90 percent of Iraq's bilateral debt was forgiven. I have long maintained that Iraqis must have a stake in the reconstruction of their own country and Iraqis must have a say in decisions that affect their future. The Bayh, et al., amendment gives them the investment in their own future that is so important to them and to us.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, last week the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence United, with the Million Mom March, released a report entitled ``Disarming Domestic Violence Abusers.'' This report provides a guide for closing loopholes in State gun laws that allow domestic violence abusers to purchase or possess firearms and offers Congress some insight into how to help our States effectively enforce gun safety laws. Under current Federal law, domestic violence abusers subject to restraining orders or convicted of domestic violence are prohibited from owning guns. Despite the law, some domestic violence offenders continue to gain access to firearms. The Brady report proposes a number of ways to keep guns out of the hands of domestic violence offenders. Among the suggestions are ensuring that restraining orders clearly state that the possession of a firearm is prohibited and that restraining orders be entered into state and national databases used to conduct background checks on gun sales. Further, the report recommends that law enforcement remove firearms from the scene of domestic violence incidents. Finally, stopping domestic abusers from buying additional guns requires background checks on the sale of all firearm transfers, including those that take place at gun shows. The deadly combination of domestic violence and guns put many women and families at great risk. While Federal laws provide a general framework to prevent abusers from purchasing or possessing firearms, the Federal laws will not be effective in protecting women from armed abusers until every State enacts complementary laws. I urge my colleagues to read the Brady Campaign's report and to support Federal efforts that assist States with enforcing our Nation's gun safety laws.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, my own preference would have been, instead of a direct loan from us, that there be a loan from a third party, guaranteed by us. That is my preference because that would have taken away any possibility of misconstruing what we are doing, any propaganda value that might be gained by anybody else by saying somehow or other the United States is going to be a creditor, therefore, we have designs on Iraq. That could have been avoided if there were a third party making the loan, with our guarantee. If this amendment were not adopted--and I hope it will be--I would offer such a loan guarantee amendment as a preferable way to go. But this amendment is preferable to the grant approach of the administration. I yield the floor.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I first thank the Senators who have been so deeply engaged in coming up with a bipartisan amendment. It is critically important there be a bipartisan amendment relative to issues of war, peace, reconstruction, and the aftermath of war. I congratulate them on it. I support this amendment. The administration has requested approximately $20 billion for the reconstruction of Iraq and the entire sum is intended to be a grant. We are told that Saddam Hussein's debts are so great that we cannot contemplate the new Iraq taking out a loan against their huge resource, the second largest oil reserves in the world, perhaps $1 trillion or more, so that they can become involved in their own reconstruction. Only a grant, we are told, will do, even though this is a country with a tremendous resource. We are told they cannot contribute to their own reconstruction financially. It was just last March Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz said that ``we are dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon.'' And it can. It surely can help finance its own reconstruction and would be far better off if it did help to finance its own reconstruction. If the Iraqis possessed billions of dollars in gold bullion, I cannot imagine anyone talking about granting them $20 billion. They have $1 trillion in liquid goal. Yet the suggestion for us to propose to Iraq that they can stand on their own feet, that they can contribute to their own reconstruction by a tiny fraction of that asset being used, somehow or other that does not mean we are leading--I reject that. We have led with our lives, almost 350 American lives. Every one of those lives shows resolve. Every one of the 1,700 Americans who have been injured show resolve. And we are going to continue to show resolve with our lives on the line. To suggest that Iraq, with an asset of $1 trillion, somehow or other should not be part of its own reconstruction financially is portrayed here as a lack of leadership. To me, it is a central element of wisdom and recognizing that Iraq has a right to be treated as a country that has great resources, great capabilities and we need to treat them as a partner. What is missing from the Bremer plan is a sense of ownership by Iraq of its own reconstruction. The money involved in the plan is U.S. money being appropriated to a U.S. administrator, who is going to spend the money pretty much as he sees fit. That is not the best way to succeed in Iraq. The best way is Iraq having the will to succeed. There has been a suggestion that somehow or other we do not have the resolve if we become partners with Iraq. It is quite the opposite. Iraq must have the will to succeed and contribute to its own reconstruction with a tiny fraction of its own resources as a reflection of that will to succeed. If Iraqi money were involved, I don't think this plan would have proposed new ZIP Codes for Iraq; sending Iraqi students, at huge expense, to business schools; some kind of a big honeypot for U.S. consultants. Is that how the Iraqis would be spending their money? I doubt it. When we talked to the Iraqis who came here, we asked them if they had a role in this plan? We were told, no; this was our plan. This has got to be their plan for their own reconstruction. They have to own it. It is their country. We can help them. We can be a partner, and God knows we have been. All the blood that we have shed for their liberation has surely made us a partner. Nobody is going to be able to misconstrue this as our aiming at their oil resource. No one can misconstrue a grant of $10 billion, and a following loan of another $10 billion if others will contribute, as somehow or other targeting their resources. Nobody is going to buy it. There may be an effort made to misconstrue it, but nobody is going to buy that. We shed too much blood. We have spent too much money in Iraq for this to be misconstrued this way. One other thing: Our simply giving them billions without their participating, and then our deciding how to spend it, is going to keep America as the target of terrorists, not just because of the military power that we deploy so visibly, but because of the reconstruction projects that we choose so unilaterally. If an electric power plant is built with our money--it's a visible U.S. target for terrorists. If its built with Iraqi money--it's less of a lightening rod. The distinction is important in another way. Iraqis will have more incentives to protect and to fight what their money builds. For those reasons alone, the future of Iraq will be more assured if Iraqis have the financial stake to succeed. This has to be a partnership. We must join with Iraq in the reconstruction. We should not dominate. We should not control. We should not determine. Their resources should be spent on their own reconstruction, with them, surely in part, choosing their priorities as to what is important for them. That is what we should all want for Iraq. And our simply saying, here is $20 billion, these are the ways we will spend the $20 billion--is not the way to help Iraq get back on its feet. It is the way to signal to the world that we control, we dominate, and that is the worst message that we can send to the world. Mr. President, do I have time remaining?

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I commend the services of Dennis Hertel, who is retiring after 6 years as a director of the Northeast-Midwest Institute. Dennis has ably served as chairman of the Institute's policy committee. Dennis, as all my colleagues know, also is a former Congressman from Michigan. He served with distinction on both the Armed Services and Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committees. I serve as a cochair of the Northeast-Midwest Senate Coalition's Great Lakes Task Force. For many years, the bipartisan Coalition and the Institute have provided valuable services to the State of Michigan and the entire Northeast-Midwest region. Dennis Hertel has been particularly effective in ensuring that the Institute's work is relevant to policymakers. He also has been a valued champion of protecting and restoring the Great Lakes. I am pleased to commend his leadership at the Northeast-Midwest Institute.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I bring the National Instant Criminal Background Check Improvement Act, formerly called the Our Lady of Peace Act, to the attention of my colleagues. On March 12, 2002, a priest and a parishioner were killed at the Our Lady of Peace Church in Lynbrook, NY, by a man who was able to obtain a gun despite the fact that he had a prior disqualifying mental health commitment and a restraining order that should have prevented him from purchasing a gun. The man who committed this double murder passed a Brady background check because the NICS database did not have the necessary information to determine that he was ineligible to purchase a firearm. The NICS Improvement Act would provide funding to fix the hole in the current NICS background check system caused by the failure of many states to computerize and update their criminal history records. While the Brady check system currently provides fast responses to firearms dealers for over 90 percent of gun purchasers within a few minutes, responses are occasionally delayed because information concerning state and local convictions is not up-to-date or available. This can result in delays for some who lawfully seek to purchase a gun and the failure to block gun sales to some unlawful purchasers. To fix this problem States need adequate funding to input and update criminal history data. This bill would provide $1 billion to help States do just that. This is not a small problem. According to Americans for Gun Safety, 25 States have automated less than 60 percent of their criminal conviction records. Twenty States do not automate domestic violence or temporary restraining order records. This shortcoming in our public safety system, according to AGS statistics, has allowed over 10,000 prohibited buyers to obtain a gun because the background check could not be completed within the three business days as required by the law. The NICS Improvement Act has been sponsored by Senators on both sides of the aisle, and I urge my colleagues to support it.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I voted for the McConnell amendment, as modified, because I believe that it is appropriate to recognize and commend the men and women of our Armed Forces for their bravery, professionalism and dedication during the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq; to honor the sacrifice of those who died or were wounded and to convey our deepest sympathy and condolences to their families and friends; and to support the efforts of communities across the Nation who are honoring our troops. Although I voted for the amendment, I want to make clear that I have some reservations about some parts of it. For example, I do not believe that the planning for the post-Saddam portion of the military campaign in Iraq was done well. Additionally, I want to note my concern that there may be unacceptable profiteering by some contractors in the post- Saddam period in Iraq.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I have cosponsored the Schumer sense-of- the-Congress amendment which is before the Senate. The amendment calls upon the Attorney General to appoint an independent special counsel to investigate allegations that a high ranking official or officials within the Bush administration purposely disclosed to the media the identity of a CIA agent involved in clandestine operations. If these allegations are true, they are extremely serious. In fact, the individual or individuals who provided this information to the media may well have committed a felony under federal law. Such a disclosure could endanger the CIA operative involved, former Ambassador Joseph Wilson's wife, and makes it impossible for her to continue to function as a clandestine CIA operative. This act could also endanger a number of individuals, assets, contacts and even mere acquaintances of the CIA operative. And, this act may send a cold shiver down the spine of every CIA employee and asset now operating under cover anywhere in the world. If the administration itself will not safeguard their identities, how can they feel secure? These are men and women playing absolutely critical roles in the defense of our national security. The role in our security of such individuals gathering intelligence around the world has been all the more clear since September 11, 2001. Mr. President, this amendment seeks to send a clear message that we believe that the American people deserve a credible and independent investigation not influenced by or even weakened by the perception of influence which results from an appointee of the President investigating high level administration officials. An appointment of a special counsel of unquestioned integrity and credibility is the only way to assure that independence. I hope the majority will permit a vote on this sense-of-the-Congress amendment today and that the Senate will adopt this amendment.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the Small Business Administration 50th Anniversary Reauthorization Act of 2003 reflects a bipartisan effort that passed the Senate Small Business and Entrepreneurship Committee unanimously. This bill reauthorizes many Small Business Administration, SBA, programs for 3 years as well as authorizes a number of pilot programs. The reauthorization bill is a great improvement over the President's proposal which would have frozen SBA programs at fiscal year 2003 funding levels for 6 years. By reauthorizing the SBA over a shorter 3- year period, as Congress has done traditionally, our bill allows Congress to exercise closer oversight than would have been the case under a 6-year bill. Our bill is responsive to our Nation's small businesses and entrepreneurs, many of whom have no alternative credit source and allowing the SBA to make more loans to small entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs provide the job creation and business expansion that can result from the small business loans. I am pleased the Senate SBA reauthorization bill contains an amendment I authored to establish the Small Business Intermediary Lending Pilot Program to address the needs of expanding small business. The pilot lending program is aimed at businesses that need loans that are larger than those available under the SBA microloan program but a variety of reasons--including lack of sufficient or conventional collateral--are unable to secure the credit they need at the terms they need through conventional lenders, even with the assistance of the 7(a) program. The pilot lending program is designed to work through local non- profit lending intermediaries. This proposal authorizes the SBA to make 1 percent, 20-year loans on a competitive basis to up to 20 non-profit lending intermediaries around the country. These loans would be used to capitalize a revolving loan fund through which the intermediary would make loans of between $35,000 and $200,000 to small businesses. Unlike the SBA microloan program there would be no technical assistance grant provided to the intermediary. All administrative costs or technical support provided to business borrowers would be covered by the interest rate spread between the lending intermediary's 1 percent loan from the SBA and the loans made to the business borrowers. While the SBA is committed to ensuring that 7(a) lenders make smaller loans, this pilot is designed to reach a sector of small businesses that 7(a) lenders cannot and will not reach due to the perceived higher risk of these businesses. Many of our States, including Michigan, Maine and Idaho, are fortunate to have a health network of community based, non-profit intermediary lenders that are experienced and successful in meeting the needs of these businesses. This pilot program will give them additional tools to help them create badly needed jobs among small businesses. Finally, I am pleased that the reauthorization bill contains the bill providing disaster relief for small businesses damaged by drought. This includes a provision I authored which would make eligible small businesses hurt by low water levels on the Great Lakes. I am also glad to see it includes the childcare lending pilot program to allow affordable and low interest SBA 504 loans for non-profit child care center. It is my hope that this program will spur the establishment and expansion of child care providers.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am concerned that the 5-month highway bill extension being considered by the Senate today does not address the inequity faced by the donor States for so many years. The donor State inequity issue is the historic problem of about 20 States, including Michigan, Ohio and Oklahoma, known as ``donor'' States, who have sent more gas tax dollars year after year to the Highway Trust Fund in Washington than were returned in transportation infrastructure spending. The remaining 30 States, known as ``donee'' States, have received more transportation funding than they paid into the Highway Trust Fund. For a long time there has been no legitimacy to retaining such antiquated and unfair formulas that require taxpayers in 20 of our States to subsidize highway projects in 30 other States. We should not consider a highway bill without addressing this important issue. It is a high priority to see that this historic inequity be corrected. At stake are tens of millions of dollars a year in additional funding to pay for badly needed transportation improvements in Michigan and the jobs that go with it. My colleague from Ohio and I have authored legislation that would bring donor States to a 95 percent rate of return on their contributions to the Highway Trust Fund. This would be up from the current minimum rate of return of 90.5 percent under the current TEA-21 bill. I am reluctant to see even a short term extension of the highway bill go through without increasing the minimum rate of return for donor States to address the inequity. I would at the very least like to get a commitment from the chairman that achieving donor State equity in a 6-year reauthorization bill in his intention and an urgent priority. I know he is as determined as we are to achieve equity for donor States.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am reluctant to enact a short-term extension of the highway funding bill without improving equity for donor States. At issue is the historic mistreatment of about 20 States, including Michigan, known as ``donor'' States, who, year after year, have sent more gas tax dollars to the Highway Trust Fund in Washington than were returned in transportation infrastructure spending. The remaining 30 States, known as ``donee'' States, have received more transportation funding than they paid into the Highway Trust Fund. This came about in 1956 when Senators from a number of small and large States banded together to develop a formula to distribute Federal highway dollars that advantaged their States at the expense of the remaining States. They formed a coalition of about 30 States that would benefit from the formula and, once that formula was in place, have tenaciously defended it. At the beginning there was some legitimacy to the large low- population predominately Western States getting more funds than they contributed to the system in order to build a national interstate highway system. Some arguments remain for providing additional funds to those States to maintain the national system and our bill will do that. However, there is no justification for any State getting more than its fair share. Each time the highway bill is reauthorized the donor States that have traditionally subsidized other States' road and bridge projects have fought to correct this inequity in highway funding. It has been a long struggle to change these outdated formulas. Through these battles, some progress has been made, but we still have a long way to go to achieve fairness for Michigan and other States on the return on our Highway Trust Fund contributions. At stake are tens of millions of dollars a year in additional funding to pay for badly needed transportation improvements in our States and the jobs that go with it. Unfortunately, this short-term extension bill does not make any improvements on the rate of return for donor States, even on the new funds that are included in this bill that are above last year's funding levels. My colleagues have argued that this short-term bill is a straight ``clean'' extension of Federal highway and transit programs. They have argued that we cannot accommodate any policy changes in an extension bill such as improving the rate of return for donor States. But this bill does include one policy change. It includes an increase in funding over last year. In fairness to donor States and to bring us closer to narrowing the funding gap between donor and donee States, the additional money contained in this bill should have been distributed to donor States at a higher rate. Unfortunately, this bill does not do this. It contains more money than last year yet fails to address the longstanding inequity. Every time we extend these programs without addressing equity, donor States lose out on getting back their fair share of gas tax dollars currently being spent in other States. There is no logical reason for some States to continue to send that money to other States to subsidize their road and bridge projects and to perpetuate this imbalance is simply unfair. I plan to enter into a colloquy with the chairman of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee to obtain a commitment to achieve a 95 percent rate of return for a donor State's share of its contributions to the Highway Trust Fund in the long-term transportation reauthorization bill, up from 90.5 percent under the current bill. This is an issue of simple fairness and we should not be satisfied until we achieve it.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, on September 18, 2003, the Bureau of Justice Statistics released its annual report on the National Instant Criminal Background Check System, also known as NICS. According to its report, approximately 136,000, or 1.7 percent, of the 7.8 million of the gun checks performed by the NICS system resulted in a denial. Since its inception, the NICS database has prevented approximately 976,000 individuals from illegally acquiring a firearm. The report went on to note that 66 percent of the rejections were due to a felony record or outstanding warrant, and about 14 percent were rejected for a domestic violence misdemeanor conviction or restraining order. Earlier this year, the Americans for Gun Safety Foundation released a report entitled, ``The Enforcement Gap: Federal Gun Laws Ignored.'' The report analyzed the Justice Department's record enforcing and prosecuting gun laws. The report examined prosecution data acquired under the Freedom of Information Act from the Justice Department for fiscal years 2000 through 2002. The AGS study reveals a significant gap between the number of Federal gun crimes committed and the number of Federal prosecutions initiated. The report found that 20 of the 22 major Federal gun laws are rarely prosecuted. The two statutes consistently enforced are laws against the use of a firearm in the commission of a Federal crime and a felon in possession of a firearm. The 20 laws that address other illegal firearm activity, including gun trafficking, firearm theft, lying on a criminal background check form, removing firearm serial numbers, and selling guns to minors are rarely enforced according to the AGS study. The statistics in the AGS report are startling. According to AGS, in the fiscal year ending September 30, 2002, U.S. Attorneys filed only 578 cases against individuals who lied on the criminal background check form to purchase a firearm despite the fact that over 100,000 people were denied purchases for that reason. President Bush and Attorney General Ashcroft pledged to vigorously enforce the gun laws on the books, but the AGS report seems to indicate that the Bush administration has failed to live up to the promise. I believe vigorous law enforcement is a critical step toward reducing gun violence. I urge the Justice Department to step up its efforts to prosecute not only people who commit gun crimes, but those who illegally seek to buy a gun.