Carl Levin

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that John Jennings, Dana Krupa, and Pam Nicholson, legislative fellows in Senator Bingaman's office, be granted floor privileges during the pendency of S. 2549.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, one of the reasons I left the floor with great joy during the day was to greet the arrival of my granddaughter, Bess Rachel--who was delivered today. Bess is named after my mother. I am sure she will forgive me for doing this because she is too young to know the difference. Her mother, my daughter Kate, and my son-in-law Howard Markel, may be looking at us now. If they are, I hope they will forgive me, too. I am just a proud grandpa, with grandma Barbara there at the hospital in New York. That is why I disappeared for a few minutes. As always, Harry Reid does yeoman work on this floor for all of us on this side of the aisle, obviously, but really for every Member of the Senate. I thank him for filling in. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. No objection.

Mr. LEVIN. Am I correct, as the manager of the bill he would have that opportunity in any event? If he sought recognition, he would be first to be recognized after the leadership; is that correct?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, what is being temporarily laid aside if there is not a pending amendment?

Mr. LEVIN. Do I understand there is a pending Warner amendment which is being temporarily laid aside for this?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I object.

Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, once again, it is necessary for Senator McCain and I and a number of colleagues he has specified to make an effort to authorize an additional two rounds of base closings. On this issue, the Congress simply can run but it cannot hide. Every time we speak about the need for additional resources, be it for health care in the military for retirees or active duty people, whether it is for modern equipment, whether it is for a reasonable, decent cost-of-living allowance or a pay increase for our active duty people, whatever it is we talk about as being needed in our military, it seems to me to be a little bit hollow if we are not willing to make the savings that clearly are essential and can be made and are requested by our uniform military to help pay for those additional expenditures. We can run but we simply cannot hide from our responsibilities in this area. The amendment would implement the recommendation of the Quadrennial Defense Review. We have heard a lot about Quadrennial Defense Review today and how important it is that review take place, and it is important. The recommendation of the Quadrennial Defense Review was that we have additional rounds of base closings. The National Defense Panel recommended additional rounds of base closings. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended additional rounds of base closings. The Secretary of Defense has made the same recommendation. The way to respond to the need for resources for our military is to eliminate the expenditures which are not essential. This amendment would authorize two base-closure rounds: one in 2003 and one in 2005. The first round would take place well into the next administration. The second round would take place in the administration after that. The amendment Senator McCain and I and others are offering would follow the base-closure process that was used previously in 1991, 1993, and 1995, with three main exceptions: First, because 2005--which is the second round under this amendment--will be the first year of a new administration, the schedule in 2005, which again would be the second round, would start and end about 2 months behind the schedule that would be used in 2003. The 2003 schedule would basically mirror the 1995 schedule, except that it would start and end about 2 weeks later than in 1995. We include a 2-month slip in the timetable of the whole process in 2005 to allow a new administration time to decide whether they want to have a base-closure process and to make its appointments to the commission. As our friend from Arizona pointed out, this process we would authorize is simply that--we authorize the process. The President would decide whether or not to trigger the process by the appointments of the members of the base-closing commission and then would have a fail-safe mechanism to reject the recommendations of the commission. The second exception to the general rules that were followed in the last rounds' process is this amendment also includes the language to address the problem of privatization in place for future BRAC rounds. It would allow the Secretary of Defense to privatize in place the workload of a closing military installation only when it is specifically recommended by the Base Closure Commission. That would address the issue which has been raised about the previous round when some thought that round was politicized when there was privatization in place, which was allowed. This cures that problem by saying no privatization in place unless the Base Closure Commission itself specifically recommends that course of action. The third main difference between this and the previous rounds is that this amendment specifies we look at the costs and savings not just of the one agency but total costs and savings to the Federal Government. That is important so that we do not simply save money in one Federal Government pocket but cost money in another Federal Government pocket; that we look at the costs and the savings to the entire Government from a proposed closing when these recommendations are made and not just to the Department of Defense. In 1997, the Congress mandated there be a report on base closures. Secretary Cohen, in compliance with that, issued a report in April of 1998. That report, which we insisted on, contains a convincing analysis of 1,800 pages of detailed backup material. It is responsive to those who said last year that we needed a thorough analysis before we could reach a decision on the need for more base closures. What that report reaffirms is that the Department of Defense simply has more bases than it needs. Since 1989, we have reduced the total active duty military end strength by one-third, but even after four base-closure rounds, DOD's base structure in the United States has been reduced by only 21 percent. We have a disconnect. We have too much structure. There are too many bases and facilities which are operating which we can no longer afford to operate and which must be consolidated. Each of us in States that have faced those closures understand the short-term pain involved. We have lost all of our Strategic Air Command bases in Michigan. We understand what is needed in the aftermath to cushion the impact of those so-called realignments, which were closures, of our three SAC bases, but we succeeded. We are on our way back in all three areas. The Department of Defense is telling us they have 23-percent excess capacity in current base structure. It seems to me we cannot hold our heads up and talk about the need of additional resources for the Department of Defense if we are not willing to close or at least put a process in motion which would fairly recommend the closure of some of this 23-percent excess capacity which the Department of Defense analysis says we have. Mr. President, in relation to the excess capacity we have in our defense structure, the Department of Defense analysis concludes that we have 23 percent excess capacity in its current base structure. Just a few examples now of that excess capacity which I think are indefensible, again, particularly for those who are urging additional resources in the defense budget. How do we justify the Army having reduced classroom training personnel by 43 percent while classroom space is only reduced by 7 percent? What we are doing by not allowing additional rounds of BRAC is telling the Army: You have to maintain all that classroom space even though you have no personnel to run it. So the classroom training personnel is reduced 43 percent; classroom space is only 7 percent reduced. The Navy will have 33 percent more hangars for aircraft than it requires. We are telling the Navy--unless we allow these additional rounds of BRAC--you have to maintain those extra hangars even though you do not have the aircraft or the need for it. The Air Force has reduced the number of fighters and other aircraft by 53 percent since 1989, while the base structure for those aircraft is 35 percent smaller. So they have to keep 18 percent more base structure than they need because we have been unable to show the political will to allow the military to do what they are pleading with us to allow them to do. The chiefs come over here, the Secretary of Defense comes over here, year after year, and they say: We need additional rounds of base closures. So far, for the last few years at least, since the last round, we have been unwilling to show that political will to make those savings possible. The report of Secretary Cohen has demonstrated some significant savings. People say: What about the savings? Can you really demonstrate savings? First of all, it seems to me, there is a commonsense demonstration that if you have four stores and you are making a profit in three, you are going to close one of those stores. So many of us always tell the Defense Department they ought to emulate the private sector more, to act a little bit more as a business, be a little bit more businesslike, to show some savings in order to make it possible for us to fund some other things needed in the defense budget. The Department of Defense estimates--these are not ours, these are the Department of Defense estimates--that BRAC, so far, has saved us $14.5 billion net. After 2001, when all of the four BRAC actions must be completed, what we call steady state savings, the savings will be $5.7 billion per year. Those are not our estimates; those are the Department of Defense estimates: $5.7 billion every year saved, starting after 2001, as a result of the four rounds we have had so far. The CBO and the GAO reviewed the Department of Defense report. So our Budget Office and our General Accounting Office reviewed that report, and they agreed that base closure saves substantial amounts of money. Based on the savings from the first four BRAC rounds, every year that we delay another base closure round, we deny the Defense Department, the taxpayers, and our Nation's defense about $1.5 billion in annual savings we can never recoup. Again, I know base closings can be painful. I know that probably as well as anybody because all three SAC bases, as I said, in my home State have been closed, and we are still working hard to overcome the economic blow to those communities. But we are working successfully. There is no question that the BRAC process is the fairest, most open, most objective way to close bases. Without it, we are not going to close bases. That is what history has shown. Furthermore, in last year's bill we took steps to make the conveyance of BRAC property even easier for local communities. We have taken care of the objectionable part which surfaced last time when there was privatization in place which many thought had not been provided for by the Base Closure Commission but which the administration nonetheless allowed. We have cured that in this bill by saying the next Base Closure Commission must specifically authorize privatization in place for a closed facility or else it cannot occur. Our forces need quality training. They need precision weapons. They do not need extra military bases. We just simply have higher priorities for our defense dollars than funding bases we no longer need. As the Senator from Arizona said, we have paid a lot of attention, and should pay a lot of attention, to the chiefs' unfunded requirement lists. We should give, and do give, great weight to them. The Senator from Arizona listed the shortfalls the chiefs listed, totaling approximately $20 billion. There are a number of ways to fund those unfunded requirements. One is to use some of the surplus we have worked so hard to achieve by just simply adding to the budget for the Defense Department, to the so- called top line. But we are not limited to that approach, and it is a difficult approach. Whether or not we pay down the national debt, whether or not we protect Medicare, whether or not we have a tax cut, or whether or not we spend some of that on education, there are very important competing interests for the surplus. We don't have to simply say: We will use the surplus and add money to the defense budget. We can find savings and reapply those savings to higher priorities. That is what past BRAC rounds are already doing for us, and that is what the BRAC rounds in this amendment will do for us in the future, if we are willing to do what the Secretary is asking us to do, not for himself but for his successors and, more importantly, for the men and women who will be serving under his successors. Secretary Cohen said recently that his biggest disappointment as Secretary has been that the Department of Defense still has too much overhead and he has not been able to persuade his former colleagues, meaning us, to do what needs to be done to have more base closures. We all know Secretary Cohen. He was a colleague of most of us. I think every one of us trusted his judgment. We all know that BRAC affected him and his State when he served in this body, so this is not a request Secretary Cohen makes lightly. He knows what he is talking about and what he is asking of us. We can't have it both ways. We can't say we want additional billions for health care, which we said today with the Warner amendment. We can't say we want additional billions for disability compensation, which was provided for in Senator Reid's amendment. We can't talk about an additional pay raise for the military and all the other things we rightfully talk about and are concerned about and at the same time we maintain in place unneeded bases and structure. It is inconsistent. We can't have it both ways. It is an issue of political will and overcoming back-home concerns, understandable concerns but nonetheless overcoming those concerns to meet our long-term security needs. Are we willing to do the necessary thing, the right thing to avoid the wasteful spending which is inherent when we maintain base structure we don't need, when we have reduced the size of our force by a third but our base structure by only 20 percent, and when we have classrooms and hangars that are no longer needed, a hundred other things that are no longer needed, because we don't have the political will to put in place an outside base-closing commission whose recommendations can be totally rejected if they are unfair by either the President or by us? That is a reasonable amount of political will for which to ask in order to achieve the billions of dollars of savings that will be achieved by additional rounds of base closings. I yield the floor and thank the Chair.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arizona yield me 10 minutes?

Mr. LEVIN. I yield 6 minutes to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. LEVIN. How much time do the proponents have?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am authorized to yield the Senator from Rhode Island whatever time he may need.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time which is utilized by the Senator from Oklahoma come from the side of the opponents of this amendment.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. LEVIN. Any time remaining?

Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent the portion of the 1997 QDR saying that the 1994 posture review still applied and was adequate be printed in the Record.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank my good friend.

Mr. LEVIN. On the point of the President signing five bills, when the President signs bills--these bills are 600 pages long--he makes it very clear he doesn't agree with every single provision in every bill he signs. As a matter of fact, if that were the test, I am sure we could get a statement right now from the President indicating his opposition to this provision. I would think the Senator from Virginia would still not drop this provision, even though the President of the United States would indicate opposition to it. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, speaking for the administration, I am sure, in 1995, said: Our analysis shows that, even under the worst conditions, the START II force levels provide enough survivable forces and survivable, sustained command and control to accomplish our targeting objectives. That is the Joint Chiefs speaking for the administration in 1995. The current law will not allow this administration to go down to the levels which General Shalikashvili and the current Joint Chiefs say are adequate. It is wasteful as well as attempting to hobble the President. But if the test is whether the President supports the language or not, I am sure we can get a quick letter from the President indicating his opposition to the Senator's amendment. I wonder whether the Senator would drop his amendment if the President indicated opposition in a letter?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, if I may have 1 additional minute, I will then yield the floor.

Mr. LEVIN. The Senator from Virginia and I properly tipped our hats to Bob Dole last night.

Mr. LEVIN. Every one of those were cosponsors, each one with extraordinary stories to tell. I was just delighted to be a small part of that, even though I am not a vet, just in some way to speak for the nonvets in this body about the contributions which have been made by those who served us.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I join my good friend from Virginia in commenting on that action last night, how appropriate it is for the heroes and heroines who served us so well in World War II, both in war and on the home front. As my dear friend from Virginia mentioned last night, there were an awful lot of heroes and heroines--obviously, veterans first and foremost, but a lot of folks here at home. And this memorial is to them. We have now nine World War II veterans remaining, I believe, in the Senate; is that correct?